IR 05000267/1988011

Insp Rept 50-267/88-11 on 880425-29.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Program,Including Training,Emergency Facilities,Equipment,Instrumentation & Supplies

ML20155B010
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Saint Vrain
Issue date:	05/25/1988
From:	Fisher W, Hackney C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155A976	List: IR 05000267/1988011 ML20155A972 ML20155B004
References
50-267-88-11, NUDOCS 8806130054
Download: ML20155B010 (6)

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APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/88-11 Operating Licer ' *: DPR-34 Docket: 50-267 Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo)

2420 W. 26th Avenue, Suite 15c -

Denver, Colorado 80211 Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station (FSV)

Inspection At: FSV, Platteville, CO 80651 Inspection Conducted: April 25-29, 1988 Inspector: /t f/Jf/Fif C. A. Hackney, Emergency Preparedness Datd /

Specialist Accompanying Personnel: D. Schultz, Comex Corporation Approved: , , m 2;- dr /GP W. L. Fisher, Chief, Nuclear Materials and Dat#

Emergency Preparedness Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted April 25-29, 1988 (Report 50-267/88-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the emergency respon3e program, including training (knowledge and performance of duties), emergency facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplie ,Resul ts: Within the areas inspected, two violations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000267 O DCD

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DETAILS Persons Contacted PSCo R. Williams Jr., Vice-President, Nuclear Operations >

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• C. Fuller, Manager, Nuclear Production

• F. Novachek, Technical Administrative Services Manager

• P. Tomlinson, Manager, . Quality Assurance

• F. Borst, Nuclear Training Manager

• Denniston, Shift Supervisor

• T. Schleiger, Health Physics Supervisor

• D. Weber, Staff Assistant to Station Manager W. Ashmore, Senior Reactor Operator Training Instructor T. Dice, Shift Supervisor R. Kevin, Shift Supervisor G. Moore, Shift Supervisor R. Shafer Jr. , Shift Supervisor S. Shafer, Shift Supervisor J. Weller, Shift Supervisor G. Moore, Shift Supervisor J. Maynard, Senior Reactor Operator S. Koleski, Senior Reactor Operator M. Frazier, Senior Reactor Operator >

T. Hackett, Senior Reactor Operator P. Morgan, Reactor Operator M. Kasten, Reactor Operator C. Evans, % =ctor Operator B. VandenLogaard, Reactor Operator D. Johnson, Reactor Operator T. Virgil, Reactor Operator D. Dacatoire, Reactor Operator D. Trumblee, Reactor Operator E. Hansen, Reactor Operator NRC

• P. Michaud, Resident Inspector

• Denotes attendance at the exit intervie . Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (02.02)

The NRC inspector reviewed key facilities and equipment to determine whether the facilities were maintained and whether any facility changes had been incorporated into the Emergency Plan and Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP). Additionally, facility, equipment, and supply changes were reviewed for adverse effect on the emergency preparedness program, i

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Emergency ~ facilities, equipment, instrumentation, and supplies were e-reviewed to determine the state of readiness and accessibilit Selected communication and emergency vehicle equipment was tested for operabilit !

All selected equipment functioned as required. All documents in the emergency response facilities appeared to have bean maintained and updated according to procedur No violations or deviations were identified in this program are . Training (02.04)

The NRC inspector reviewed the documents listed below and interviewed licensee representatives to determine whether emergency response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could perform their assigned functions in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q), which requires _that a licensee shall maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1). Each of the five teams -

interviewed was given an emergency scenario that simulated plant and/or radiological conditions of significance to warrant declaring one of the emergency classe Interviews were conducted with five emergency response team Four teams consisted of four persons; one team consisted of two persons. A total of 18 emergency response personnel were interviewe *

Documents Reviewed:

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FSV Project Personnel Training and Qualification Programs  ;

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Training Procedure - Radiological Emergency Plan ,

Response to Emergencies (PT 004.03)

RERP Overview (PT 007.02) *

RERP, Control Room RERP, Technical Support Center RERP Communications - Administrative (PT 026.00)

Selected emergency response personnel training records Emergency Procedure - B-1 Emergency Procedure - E .

Standard Operating Procedure - 12-01 Abnormal Operating Procedure - 12-05 Emergency Procedure - Class Health Physics Procedure - 56

- The NRC inspectors determined that a formal emergency training program had been established. Training records for selected emergency response team

members were reviewed to determine whether personnel had received required l training. All selected personnel had received training in the time specified by the license During the inspection on April 25-29, 1988, a regional inspector and an  :

HRC contractor designed a plant-specific walk-through to test the ability  ;

of control room senior operators to detect and classify accident '

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conditions, to notify'offsite authorities, and to formulate protective

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action recommendation The inspectors preceded each walk-through with a-series of questions to test the licensee's understanding of basic emergency response concept The main objective of these walk-throughs, which listed approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, was to verify that operating shift

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personnel were capable of adequately implementing their emergency pla . The walk-throughs were performed in the Technical Support Center, with all reference material normally available to the crews in the control roo The same accident scenario was used for each team to obtain standa.dized results. The inspectors invited members of the plant staff to attend and observe the walk-through The following findings resulted from the interviews and walk-throughs:

, . One of five teams elected to insert reserve shutdown reactivity locally in response to a scram without shutdown due to rods stuck in  ;

the out position (140 inches). As a consequence, the reactor continued to operate at power without primary or secondary flow for

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approximately 22 minutes before shutdown could be initiate . In spite of High Activity Alarms, one shift supervisor declared that the plant was "not releasing yet," because Reactor Building Area Radiation Monitors were normal except in areas of ventilation exhaust piping. Recognition of the condition was delayed approximately 8 minutes until the inspector prompted the shift supervisor into

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correct evaluation of the proble ;

. All teams failed to exhibit command and control of resources and activities. Shift supervisors became engrossed in detailed in plant manipulatirsns, performing notifications, and completion of mundane

, administrative detail. As a consequence, important issues such as classification and evaluation of important plant parameters were not

addressed or handled in a timely manne . Four of five teams failed to classify properly the Emergency Action Level (EAL) initiating condition of "loss of normal ability to place '

the reactor in a subcritical condition by scram of the control rods."

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(Table 4, EAL 9, RERP-CR)

. One of the five teams failed to classify as a general emergency a

stack effluent release rate resulting in greater than 1 R/hr at the

Exclusion Area Boundary.

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. Two of five teams improperly interpreted main stack effluent *

radiation monitor readings of counts per minute (cpm) as a release

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rate, and improperly evaluated the EALs associated with the monitor reading . None of the five teams demonstrated an understanding of process ,

radiation monitor readings in counts per minute (cpm), instrument ( sensitivity in microcuries per cc per cpm, and the mathematical

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manipulation required to obtain release concentration and release rate. The EAL tables do not alert the user to the fact that

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instrument readings must be converted to use the listed EAL.

l . Three of five shi<ft supervisors entered wind directions improperly on L notification messages.

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. - Two of five persons assigned to perform dose calculations on the data , logger' reversed (upon entry) instrument readings and instrument

sensitivities. One. operator failed to recognize the error and, when i prompted about tne error by the inspector, was unable.to recover the l dose calculation. Neither the operator nor the shift supervisor recognized the large inconsistency between stack release activity and the computed dose rate. One operator did not enter observed stack flow rat . The data logger coniputer is not user friendly. For example, to enter delta T (stability), the operator must enter a plus or minus sign with the value. No other positive values require a plus sig '

. Data logger operators did not understand the 2-hour default value for release tim .

. One shift-supervisor ordered a reactor coolant sample without warning the technician of expected very high radioa-tivit . One shift. supervisor had difficulty in relating. dose rates, as measured in the environs, to classification. Until prompted by the inspector, the shift supervisor was unsure of his authority to make classifications on such reading . Emergency procedure (s) continuity, at least for the case of scram without shutdown, is inadequate. If the rods are stuck out on a scram signal, it is not possible for the operator to track procedural steps through to taking the action of inserting reserve shutdown activit . EAls and classification tables are included in at least three different sets of procedures:

• RERP-CR, Control Room Procedure

• Emergency Procedure - Class, Emergency Procedure Classificatic

• Each individual Emergency Procedure As a consequence, the operators are faced with sorting through the various locations to make classifications, and the emergency I

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operating procedures are unnecessarily cluttered with information  ;

that is of little use and, in some cases, is incorrec This is an apparent violation of NRC regulatory requirements 10 CFR

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50.54(q) and 50.47(b). (267/8811-01)

One violation and no deviations were identified in this program are . Notifications (Offsite)

The NRC inspector discussed with licensee representatives and reviewed documentation of licensee events'following the reactor manual scram and ,

radiological release on April 4, 1988. The inspector reviewed licensee notification forms that included RERP-CR, Attachment B, Issue 11, page 15 of 22, entitled "Emergency Event Notification Form - Sheet 1."

The inspector determined from interviews of licensee personnel that the l reactor manual scram occurred at 2:21 p.m. and that the radiological monitor RT 7324-1 indicated upscale at 2:15 p.m. The emergency event notification form, dated April 4, 1988, indicated that an unusual event i (Notification of Unusual Event) was declared at 5:10 p.m. Weld County was  !

notified at 5:25 p.m. and the state answering service was notified at 5:35 p.m. The notification form indicates that the state was notified at 5:45 p.m.; however, review of the state's answering service records indicated that the answering service was notified at 5:35 p.m. The state representative who was notified at-5:40 p.m. verified the call by calling the control room at 5:45 p.m. The state was, therefore, notified at 5:35 p.m., 25 minutes following the declaration of the Notification of Unusual Event, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix E IV D.3, which requires the state to be notified within 15 minutes following the declaration of an emergenc This is an apparent violation of NRC requirements (267/8811-02).

One violation and no deviations were identified in this program are . Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with the NRC resident inspector and licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on April 29. 1988, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report. The licensee had provided backshift training for control room personnel in the ,

areas of emergency classification and notification, and dose assessmen .i Additional training was to be provided during the weekend and following week until all the remaining control room personnel had received additional training in these area . -.