ML20151W514

Summary of Operating Reactors Events Meeting 88-016 on 880419 in Rockville,Md.List of Attendees & Viewgraphs Encl

ML20151W514
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Calvert Cliffs, South Texas, Fort Calhoun, 05000000
Issue date:	04/21/1988
From:	Lanning W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
OREM-88-016, OREM-88-16, NUDOCS 8805030415
Download: ML20151W514 (16)

Text

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APR 81200 MEMORANDilM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING April 19, 1988 - MEETING 88-16 On April 19, 1988 an Operating Reactors Events meeting (88-16) was held to brief senior managers from NRR, RES, AE0D and Regional Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on April 12, 1988. The list of attendees is included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a report-to.date of long-term followup assignments and a sunnary of reactor scrams. Four significant events were identified for input to NRC's performance indicator program. No events were suggested for long-term followup.

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Ps Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

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s MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events A c essment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

THE OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS MEETING April 19, 1988 - MEETING 88-16 On April 19, 1988 an Operating Reactors Events meting (88-16) was held to l brief senior managers from NRR, RES, AE0D and Regionel Offices on events which occurred since our last meeting on April 12, 1988. The list of attendees is 1 included as Enclosure 1.

The events discussed and the significant elements of these events are presented in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 presents a report-to-date of long-term followup i

assignments and a sunnary of reactor scrams. Four significant events were identified for input to NRC's performance indicator program. No events were suggested for long-term followup.

Wayne Lanning, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l

Enclosures:

As stated l

cc w/Enclo.:

l See Next Page 1

e .

cc:

T. Hurley J. Sniezek F. Miraglia J. Forsyth, INP0 -

E. Jordan J. Calvo E. Beckjord H. Harper W. Russell, RI -

D. Jaffee B. Davis, RIII J. Stolz J. Nelson Grace, RII R. Ferguson R. D. Martin, RIY S. McNeil J. B. Martin, RV R. Capra W. Kane, RI A. Bournia L. Reyes, RII P. Kadambi E. Greenman, RIII J. Callan, RIV D. Kirsch, RV S. Varga D. Crutchfield B. Boger G. Lainas ,

G. Holahan L. Shao J. Parttow B. Grimes F. Congel E. Weiss S. Black T. Martin -

J. Stone R. Hernan -

H. Bailey J. Guttmann A. Thadani S. Rubin l

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ENCLOSURE l LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING RFACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING (88-15)

April 12, 1988 NAME ORGANIZATION NAME ORGANIZATION W. Lanning NRR/DOEA M. L. Rearden NRR/DOEA D. Crutchfield NRR/DRSP V. Benaroya AE0D/DSP L. Rubenstein NRR/DRSP R. Lobel NRR/DOEA

, J. Guttmann SECY J. Scarborough OCM/KR R. Woodruff NRR/DOEA T. Elsasser OCM/KC B. Boger NRR/ADRI C. Miller CCM/FB R. Scholl NRR/DOEA P. Baranowsky NRR/DOEA A. Vietti-Cook OSP/CP B. Tricarico SECY S. McNeil NRR/PDI-I C. E. Rossi NRR/DOEA D. B. Matthews NRR/ADR II R. Parkhill NRR/RSIB T. O. Martin OEDO B. Grimes NRR/DRIS i

i l

f ENCLOSURE 2 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 88-16 LOCATION: 12-B-11 WHITE FLINT TUESDAY, APRIL 19, 1988, 11:00 A.M.

THIS INFORMATION MAY ALSO BE OBTAINED BY DIALING EXTENSION 21449, MILLSTONE 2 BORIC ACID LEAK MILLSTONE 3 OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS I

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 & 2 POTENTIAL FAILURES OF AIR REGULATORS FORT CALHOUN 1 SAFETY-RELATED CHECK VALVES IN INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM SOUTH TEXAS 1 LEAKS IN ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM l

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MILLSTONE 2 BORIC ACID LEAK APRIL 9, 1988 PROBLEM BORIC ACID CRYSTALS (SNOW) WERE FOUND ON AND IN COMPONENTS ABOVE THE REACTOR VESSEL AND IN THE CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRCULATION COOLERS, CAUSE THE SOURCE HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED, SIGNIFICANCE POTENTIAL INTERACTION OF SECONDARY, CONTAINMENT COOLING, AND CEDM COOLING SYSTEMS, DISCUSSION o EARLIER THIS YEAR AT 100% POWER, THE UNIDENTIFIED LEAK RATE WAS 0,14 GPM, l 0 STATUS ON 03/10: LEAKAGE HAD INCREASED TO 0,48 GPM, THE LICENSEE STARTED ADDING BORIC ACID TO THE STEAM GENERATORS, AND A BLOWDOWN VALVE WAS LEAKING, l 0 ON 04/09, THE REACTOR WAS SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF A DROPPED R0D AND l BECAUSE LEAKAGE HAD' INCREASED TO 0,8 GPM, o SNOW WAS FOUND IN THE CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS AND CEDM COOLERS AND ON THE CEDMS AND THE SHROUD, i o CLOGGING OF THE CEDM COOLERS CAUSED FAN CURRENTS TO DECREASE SIGNIFICANTLY, o SNOW WAS NOT RADI0 ACTIVE.

I o LEAKING PRIMARY VALVES AND THE BLOWDOWN VALVE WERE REPAIRED, o TV CAMERAS WERE INSTALLED ON THE REFUELING BRIDGE AND IN BOTH PRIMARY COOLING COOP AREAS, l 0 THE UNIT IS AT 100% P'" ER, o ADDITIONAL DEPOSITIW 0F SNOW MIGHT BE VISIBLE ON CLOSED CIRCUIT TV AND MIGHT BE INDICATED BY LOW COOLER FAN CURRENTS AND DROPPED l

RODS.

l FOLLOWUP I THE REGION AND EAB ARE CONTINUING TO FOLLOW THE EVENT, CONTACT: R. WOODRUFF

REFERENCES:

50,72 # 11981, DR 04/12/88, DR 04/14/88

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MILLSTONE 3 I OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS APRIL 13 TO APRIL 18, 1988 PROBLEM MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT FAILURES, SIGNIFICANCE POSSIBLY RELATED TO MAINTENANCE PROGRAM, DISCUSSION o APRIL 13, 1988 - TWO 0F 6 CIRCULATING PUMPS TRIPPED CAUSING TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP ON LOW CONDENSER VACUUM, CLOGGED TRAVELING SCREEN WITH BOTH SCREEN WASH PUMPS OUT OF SERVICE, o APRIL 14, 1988 - REACTOR VESSEL INNER VESSEL HEAD SEAL ' AILED (ABOUT 4 GPM),

- UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED, LEAK-OFF LINE ISOLATED STOPPING THE LEAK,

- INNER VESSEL SEAL FAILED DURING PREVIOUS CYCLE, SEAL REPLACED, o PORV BLOCK. VALVE STEM LEAK 0F 6 GPM,

- CONTAINMENT DRAlfl TRANSFER TANK (CDTT) REACHED 100 PSIG, CDTT DESIGN AND RELIEF SETPOINT 75 PSIG, LICENSEE EVALUATING,

- ISOLATION VALVE TO CDTT CLOSED TO STOP LEAX, o april 15, 1988 - UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE 1,15 GPM WHICH IS AB0VE T.S.

- DECLARED ANOTHER UNUSUAL EVENT,

- VALVE BODY TO BONNET LEAKS

1. CHARGING LINE STOP VALVE,

2. CHARGING LINE CHECK VALVE,

3. LOOP 1 HOT LEG ISOLATION,

- LICENSEE COMMITTED TO FIX LEAKS BEFORE STARTUP, FOLLOWUP o REGION I TO REVIEW LICENSEE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD LEAKAGE SAFETY EVALUATION, o REGION I CURRENTLY BELIEVES LICENSEE ACTING RESPONSIBLY, REGION I CONTINUING TO EVALUATE, CONTACT: W. JENSEN

REFERENCES:

50,72s # 12007, 12018, 12055; PN0-1-88-41

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 & 2 POTENTIAL FAILURES OF AIR REGULATORS APRIL 14, 1988 PROBLEM

'0VERPRESSURIZATION FAILURE OF INSTRUMENT AIR REGULATORS ALLOW THE SAFETY-RELATED AIR-0PERATED VALVES TO CHANGE STATE (NOT FAIL SAFE),

CAUSE MISA.PPLIED SOLEN 0ID VALVES, SIGNIFICANCE TWENTY AIR OPERATED VALVES FOR VARIOUS SAFETY SYSTEMS COULD IMPROPERLY CHANGE STATE, BOTH UNITS ARE AFFECTED, POTENTIALLY GENERIC, DISCUSSION o ON APRIL 14, 1988 CALVERT CLIFFS IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL FAILURES OF PRESSURE REGULATOR IN INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM THAT COULD CAUSE FAILURE OF SAFETY-RELATED VALVES IN THE FOLLOWING SAFETY SYSTEMS, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SAFETY INJECTION FILL AND VENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN ISOLATION o AIR SYSTEM REGULATORS LOCATED IN A HARSH POST-ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT CAN FAIL IN A WAY THAT APPLIES HIGH PRESSURE TO THE SYSTEM, o THESE ARE MECHANICAL COMPONENTS NOT CJVERED BY 10 CFR 50,49, l 0 SOME SOLEN 0ID OPERATED PILOT VALVES DOWNSTREAM 0F A FAILED REGULATOR ARE NOT RATED FOR THE SYSTEM PRESSURE THAT WOULD OCCUR, o AIR WOULD BE REAPPLIED TO THE SAFETY SYSTEM'S VALVES CHANGING THEM FROM THEIR POST-ACCIDENT ALIGNMENT, o A SIMILAR SITUATION EXISTS AT KEWAUNEE WITH AN INFORMATION NOTICE IN PREPARATION, FOLLOWUP l 0 LICENSEE WILL REPLACE AFFECTED SOLEN 0ID OPERATED VALVES WITil UNITS I

RATED FOR HIGHER OPERATING PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL.

o THIS EVENT WILL BE ADDED TO THE KEWAUNEE INFORMATION NOTICE, 1

l CONTACT: R. KARSCH I

REFERENCE:

50,72 # 12013, MORNING REPORT 04/14/88 l

FORT CALHOUN 1 SAFETY-EELATED CHECK VALVES F_ ALLURES IN INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM april 15, 1988 PROBLEM FOUR CHECK VALVES IN THE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM HAD EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE WHICH COULD AFFECT HOW FAST THE AIR ACCUMllLATORS BLOWDOWN, THIS COULD IMPACT THE AIR BUBBLER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION USED BY THE REFUELING WATER ACTUATION SYSTEM (RAS). THIS AFFECTS ALL SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS, CAUSE POSSIBLE DESIGN INADEQUACY AND MECHANICAL FAILURE OF THE FOUR CHECK VALVES IN THE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM c

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE FAILURE OF THE CHECK VALVES COULD IMPACT LENGTH OF OPERATION OF THE LEVEL SENSORS ON THE RWST (OR SIRWT). THIS MAY CAUSE A PREMATURE SWITCHING TO THE CONTAINMENT SUMP, WHICH MAY BE DRY OR INSUFFICIENT NPSH, DISCUSSION o THE SS0MI TEAM IDENTIFIED POSSIBLE DESIGN AND FUNCTIONALITY TESTING DEFICIENCIES IN MARCH 1985 ON ALL S.R. ACCUMULATORS AND CHECK VALVES, i o CHECK VALVE FUNCTIONAL TESTING WAri NOT BEING PERFORMED, i o THE DESIGN OF THE INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM APPEARS TO BE TYPICAL, l 0 LICENSEE HAS REPLACED THE FOUR CHECK VALVES AND SATISFACTORILY -

PERFORMED OPERABILITY TESTS.

FOLLOWUP o REGION IS CONTINUING TO FOLLOW LICENSEE ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH INSTRUMENT AIR PROBLEMS, o NRR HAS RECOMMENDED THAT OPERABILITY TESTING OF THESE VALVES BE INCLUDED IN THE LICENSEE'S ISI PROGRAM, CONTACT: J. THOMPSON

REFERENCE:

50,72 # 12026

SOUTH TEXAS UNIT 1 -

LEAKS IN ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM APRIL 1, 1988 PROBLEM PIN HOLE SIZE LEAKS IN SOCKET JOINTS IN ESSENTIAL COOLING WATER SYSTEM (ECWS).

CAUSE "DEALUMINIZATION" 0F' CAST ALUMINUM-BRONZE FITTINGS AND VALVES, CAUSE UNKNOWN.

SIGNIFICANCE SYSTEM PROVIDES COOLING TO SAFETY-SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER, LOCA, SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE.

DISCUSSION o APRIL 1, 1988 SHIFT SUPERVISOR IDENTIFIED EVIDENCE OF LEAKAGE ON VALVES IN ECWS (TABLESP0ON EVERY 3 DAYS),

o VALVES LOCATED ADJACENT TO ESSENTIAL CHILLER IN THE MECHANICAL ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING, o APPROXIMATELY 50 VALVES AND 20 FITTINGS HAVE EVIDENCE OF "WEEPING",

o APRIL 14, 1988 TWO 1" VALVES AND 1 ELB0W WERE REMOVED TO ASCERIAIN CORROSION MECHANISM, ONE VALVE AND THE ELB0W HAD VISIBLE LEAKS, o SYSTEM PROVIDES ESSENTIAL COOLING T0:

COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGERS ESSENTIAL CHILLER CONDENSERS STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR INTERCOOLER ECW PUMP SEAL COOLERS o THREE 50% CAPACITY TRAINS, o ONE TRAIN SUFFICIENT TO OBTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS, o FOR DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT TWO TRAINS ARE REQUIRED, o LEAKS ONLY IN CAST COMPONENTS, NOT IN PIPING WHICH IS WROUGHT.

o N0 SLIME OR MICR0 BIOLOGICALLY INDUCED CORROSION (filC) OBSERVED, FOLLOWUP o LICENSEE HAS INITIATED THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS, CONTACT: R. LOBEL

REFERENCE:

MORNING REPORT 04/14/88

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1. ADDITIONAL SAMPLES WILL BE TAKEN.

2. NON-DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION METHODS WILL BE EVALUATED FOR ASSESSING EXTENT OF CORROSION,

3. DEPTH OF CORROSION WILL BE DETERMIt3D USING METHOD IDENTIFIED AS BEST IN 2,

4. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA WILL BE DEVELOPED BASED ON STRESS AND THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WILL BE EVALUATED, 5, A MONITORING PROGRAM WILL BE DEVELOPED FOR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY.

6. COMPONENTS WILL BE REPLACED AS NECESSARY, o MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH HAS THE LEAD FOR REVIEW 0F LICENSEE'S ACTIONS AND NECESSARY ACTIONS TO DETERMINE GENERIC APPLICABILITY, e

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SOUTH TEXAS UNIT 1 Cross Section of Fitting liith Leak location Identified

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PERFORMANCE 13]CATORSSIGNIFICANTEVENTS PL T NAME EVENT EVENT DESCRIPTION OTR $16N!FICANCE DATE CALVERT CLIFFS 142 04/14/88 AIR SYSTEM RESULATORS COULD Fall OVERPRESSURl!!N6 1 POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL CE6RADAT10N

$0LEN0!D OPERATED P! LOT VALVES WHICH CAUSES VARIOUS OF SAFETY-RELATED EGUIPMENT SAFETY-RELATED AIR OPERATED VALVES TO NOT FAIL SAF2.

FORTCALHOUN 04/13/98 FAILURE OF AIR SUPPLY COULD LEAD TO FAILURE OF LEVEL 1 POTENTIAL F09 OR ACTUAL DEGRADAi!0N INSTRUMENTAi!ON FOR SIRWT WHICH COLtD CAUSE TRANSFER OF CF SAFETY-RELATED EQU1FMENT SUCTICN OF $1 FUMPS TO DRY SUMP.

MILLSTCNE 3 04/13/68 TURBINE TRIP /RIACTCR TRIP AND SUBSEQUENCE REACTOR SYSTEM i F0TENTIAL FCR OR ACTUAL tE6RADAfl0N LEAKS. OF SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT SOUTH TEIAS 1 04/01/88 CORROS!ON CN SMALL BORE P! PIN 6 0F ESSENilAL COOLIN6 WATER 1 POTENTIAL FOR OR ACTUAL DE6RADATION SYSTEM PRODUCED LEAKS. OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT t

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KACTOR SCRAM SUtmARY EEKENDING04/10/88

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA .

DATE SITE UNIT PONER SIGNAL CAUSE COMPL1- YTD YTD YTl CAi!ONS ABOYE BELON TOT (5 151 151 -

04/12/88 KEVAUNEE- 1 25 A PERSONNEL NO 2 0 2 04/13/88 MILLSTONE 3 100 A E7JIPRENT NC 2 0 2 04/16/88 MCS'JIPI i 100 R EGulPMENT NO 3 0 3 04/17/88 HATCH 2 79 A UNKNONW NO 2 1 3 04/17/98 CALLANAY, 1 10 A EQUIPMENT NO 2 1 3 e

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ACTES

1. PLANT SPECIFIC DATA BASEC ON INITIAL REVIEW 0F S0.72 REPORTS ,

FOR THE WEEK OF INTEREST. PERIOD IS MIDNIGHT SUNDAY THROUGH MIDNIGHT: SUNDAY SCRAMS ARE DEFINED AS REACTOR PROTECTIVE ACTUATIONS WHICH RESULT IN ROD MOTION, AND EXCLUDE PLANNED TESTS OR SCRAMS AS PART OF PLANNED SHUTDOWN IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PLANT PROCEDURE. THERE ARE 109 REACTORS HOLDING AN OPERATING LICENSE.

2. COMPLICATIONS: RECOVERY COMPLICATED BY EQUIPMENT FAILURES OR PERSONNEL ERRORS UhRELATED TO CAUSE OF SCRAM.

3. PERSONNEL RELATED PROBLEMS INCLUDE HUMAN ERROR, PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES, AND MANUAL STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL PROBLEHS.

4. "0THER" INCLUDES AUTOMATIC SCRAMS ATTRIBUTED TO ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSES (LIGHTNING), SYSTEM DESIGN, OR UNKNOWN CAUSE.

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