ML20128G562

Seismic Evaluation Rept for Resolution of USI A-46

ML20128G562
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	09/30/1996
From:	BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20128G462	List: ML20128G455 ML20128G536 ML20128G562 ML20128G587
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR NUDOCS 9610090066
Download: ML20128G562 (171)

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! Seismic Evaluation Report for the Resolution of USl A-46 3

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9610090066 960930 PDR ADOCK 05000293 P PDR I

! Boston Edison Company l Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 4

4 i Seismic Evaluation Report f

for the Resolution of USI A-46 l

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4 September 1996 Revision 0

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k PNPS A-46 Final Report 4 September,1996 Revision 0 Table of Contents 1 Section Page i 1. Introduction and Seismic Verification Methodology 1-1 1.1 Introduction 1-1 l 1.2 Seismic Verification Methodology 1-1 l

1.3 Report Organization 1-2 l

2. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Safe Shutdown Path 2-1 j 3. Pilgrim Station in-Structure Spectra for Seismic Screening 3-1 i

l 3.1 Pilgrim Station Site 3-1

3.2 Description of Pilgrim Design Response Spectra 3-1

. 3.3 Characterization of the Pilgrim Design Spectra for Seismic Screening 3-1 l 4. Results of Screening - Equipment Classes 0 Through 20 4-1 4.1 Seismic Evaluation Guidelines 4-2 4.1.1 Seismic Capacity Vs. Demand 4-2 4.1.2 Caveat Compliance 4-3  !

4.1.3 Anchorage Adequacy 4-3 l 4.1.4 Seismic Interaction Checks 4-5 l 4.2 Outlier Resolution 45 l 4.3 Seismic Capability Engineers and Peer Reviewer 4-6

4.4 Other Types of Seismic Evaluations and Interfaces 4-6 i 4.5 Documentation -

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5. GlP Deviations and Commentary on Meeting The Intent of Caveats 5-1 1

i l 6. Results of the Tanks and Heat Exchanger Review 6-1 4

7. Results of the Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Review 7-1 4

8. Description of Outliers 8-1 4

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PNPS A-46 Final Rrport September,1996 Revision 0

, 8.1 General Interaction issues 8-1 8.2 Equipment, Tank, Heat Excharger, Cable Tray and Conduit Otitliers: 8-2

9. Resolution of Outilers 9-1 9.1 Outlier Resolution 9-1 i 9.2 Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Systems Outlier Resolution 9-9 j 9.3 Alternate Reactor Building in-Structure Spectra for Outlier Resolution 9-10

10. References 10-1

11. Appendix A: Seismic Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) 11-1 1

12. Appendix B: SSEL Cabinets and Panels Housing Essential Relays 12-1 i

13. Appendix C: Walkdown Personnel Resumes 13-1 1

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14. Appendix D: Screening Verification Data Sheets (SVDS) 14-1

) 15. Appendix E: Peer Review Assessment 15-1 15.1 Description of Peer Review 15.2 Results of Peer Review 15.3 Resolution of Peer Review Findings Requiring Follow-up Action 15.4 Peer Review Letter

16. Appendix F: Results of Cable Tray and Conduit Review 16-1

17. Appendix G: Soil Structure Interaction Spectra 17-1 il

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PMPs A-46 Fird Reprt september,1996 Revision 0

. List of Acronyms CEA Concrete Expansion Anchor

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EQE EQE Engineering GERS Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra j GIP Generic Implementation Proce.iure for the Seismic Verification of i GL Generic Letter ,

1 GRS Ground Response Spectrum 1 IRS In-structure Response Spectra ,

1 PNPS Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station I l LAR Limited Analytical Review 1 MCC Motor Control Center I

- OSVS Outlier Seismic Verification Sheet l l PASS Plant Area Summary Sheet -

PSD Power Spectral Density

S&A Stevenson & Associates

SCE Seismic Capability Engineer

SEWS Screening Evaluation Work Sheet l SQUG Seismic Qualification Utility Croup j SRT Seismic Review Team

SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake

SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List 4

. SSER Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report l SVDS Screening Verification Data Sheet

USl Unresolved Safety issue

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission j BECo Boston Edison Company i ZPA Zero Period Acceleration i

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PNPs A-46 Final Report srptImber,1996 Revision 0

1. Introduction and Seismic Verification Methodology 1.1 Introduction This report provides the final documentation of the seismic adequacy evaluations performed at Boston Edison Company's (BECo's) Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS), for the resolution of Unresolved Safety issue (USI) A-46, " Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants " . USl A-46 was issued by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in Decemb r 1980 to address the' concem with the sdsmic adequacy of mechanical and electrical equipment in older nuclear power plants. This report describes the methodology used and the results of the seismic reviews of active mechanical and electrical equipment, selected tanks and heat exchangers, and cable and conduit raceways.

1.2 Seismic Verification Methodology Utilities affected by USI A-46 formed the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) in 1982 to develop a consistent industry approach for resolving USl A-46. SQUG utilities, including BECo, with the technical assistance of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),

conducted research and studies regarding this issue in order to formulate a thorough and reasoned program to resolve the identified concem. In February 1987, the NRC issued Generic Letter 87-02, " Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety issue USl A-46 ", (Reference 1]

requesting affected licensees to commit to a detailed approach for resolution.

Subsequently, further research conducted by SQUG (and its contractors) and reviewed by the NRC staff resulted in a detailed procedure developed by SQUG called the " Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment "

[ Reference 2]. Specifically, the NRC staff reviewed Revision 2 of the GIP and accepted (with provisos) the approach in Supplement No.1 to Generic Letter (GL) 87-02 that Transmits Supplemental Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER #2) on SQUG Generic implementation Procedure, Revision 2 as Corrected on February 14,1992 (GIP-2) (Referem 3]. This GlP version and the clarifications, guidance, and additional requirements provida - ry the NRC in SSER #2 are the basis for the seismic evaluation of mechanical and electn. equipment at Pilgrim Station for resolution of USI A-46. The GIP Revision 2, referred to 4. GlP-2 by the NRC, is referred to as the GIP in this report.

The GIP approach relies on developing a safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL) which identifies equipment needed to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions as defined by a nuclear power plant's Technical Specifications. This equipment is then reviewed in accordance with the GIP methodology. By means of plant walkdowns to specifically observe and evaluate each equipment item on the SSEL, an assessment can be made concerning its seismic adequacy.

By evaluating seismic demand criteria, selected caveats to ensure similarity to the GIP equipment classes, anchorage capacity, and seismic interaction potential, the trained walkdown engineer can be satisfied that the equipment will not become inoperable due to the plant's design basis seismic event. The basis for this approach is rooted in detailed observations of representative, if not identical, equipment in commercial and industrial facilities that have experienced earthquakes of greater magnitude in Califomia and in other seismically active regions around the world. Each equipment assessment is documented on a Screening 1

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l PNPs A-46 Final R2 port september, WA Revision O Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS). Any deficiencies are documented on an Outlier Seismic l Verification Sheet (s) (OSVS). l 1.3 Report Organization Section 2 of this report refers the reader to the " Safe Shutdown Equipment List Report " which discusses the development of the safe shutdown path and the resulting Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) for Pilgrim Station. The " Safe Shutdown Equipment List Report "

contains the Seismic Review SSEL whose scope is mirrored in the Screening Verification Data Sheets, (SVDS), in Appendix D. The seismic design basis of Pilgrim Station in-structure seismic spectra and the assessment of it by the NRC are discussed in Section 3. The Pilgrim Station equipment walkdown and results are provioed in Section 4. These assessments are summarized in the SVDS in Appendix D. Section 5 provides a detailed listing of exceptions to the rules taken for any equipment item assessment. Section 6 discusses the results of the Tanks & Heat Exchangers assessment. Cable Tray & Conduit Raceway assessments are provided in Section 7. Section 8 provides a listing of outliers and identifies the reasons for which they are outliers. Section 9 provides potential methods for resolution of all remaining outliers.

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l PNPS A-46 Fird RGport September,1996 Revision 0

2. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Safe Shutdown Path For a description of the safe shutdown paths selected to accomplish the safe shutdown function requirements of the GlP, refer to the " Safe Shutdown Equipment List Report ", Reference 14, i

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3. Pilgrim Station in-Structure Spectra for Seismic Screening 3.1 Pilgrim Station Site 1 Pilgrim Station is located on the shore of Cape Cod Bay, near Rocky Point, Plymouth, Massachusetts, USGS Coordinates N41-56-30 and W70-35-00. Ground grade at the site is Elevation 23 feet, and the depth to bedrock is approximately 80 to 100 feet. Overburden materials consist of dense to very dense sandy and gravely glacial drift, which has been over I ridden and compacted by one or more episodes of continental glaciation. Building structures 1 are embedded at various depths ranging from approximately 4 feet to 50 feet below ground grade, and are surrounded by compacted backfill.

3.2 Description of Pilgrim Design Response Spectra The peak ground acceleration design basis for Pilgrim Station structures, systems and l components is a 0.08g Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE), and 0.15g Safe Shutdown I Earthquake (SSE). The ground response spectra type corresponds to the so-called Housner  !

shape and is shown in the UFSAR Figures 2.5-5 and 2.5-6 [ Reference 10]. For purposes of I dynamic analysis, Bechtel Corporation used a Taft time history, scaled to 0.08g and 0.15g for  !

the OBE and SSE respectively, to generate floor response spectra. Buildings were analyzed  !

using lumped mass " stick " models, with soil springs to account for foundation interaction with )

the soil. Bechtel prepared horizontal floor response spectra in 1969 for the Reactor, Turbine  ;

and Radwaste Buildings as part of the original plant design. Building model development was i two dimensional. Vertical response within buildings was assumed to be rigid, and represented I by a value equal te two-thirds of the horizontal ground response. Cygna Energy Services used l similar techniques in 1981 to prepare floor response spectra for the Emergency Diesel l Geneiator Building and the Intake Structure, in conjunction with work related to NRC I&E  ;

Bulletin No. 80-11. Design response spectra for the Reactor Building, Turbine Building, j Radwaste Building, Emergency Diesel Generator Building and Intake Structure, are contained )

in BECo Specification C-114, entitled " Seismic Response Spectra"[ Reference 11).  ;

1 3.3 Characterization of the Pilgrim Design Spectra for Seismic Screening in accordancc with NRC Supplement No.1 to GL 87-02, detailed information conceming procedures and criteria used to generate the Pilgrim design response spectra, and the Specification C-114 data, was furnished for staff review in BECo's 120 day response l document [ Reference 6]. The Safety Evaluation for this 120 day response [ Reference 4]

concluded, among other things, these design spectra were adequate and acceptable, but ,

should be treated as " median centered " because of the lack of consideration of three statistically independent earthquake components, lack of variation of foundation medium properties, and the rigid vertical response assumption. Based on study analyses of Pilgrim's deeply embedded structures performed for BECo by EQE Engineering, additional information

[ Reference 8], was submitted to NRC staff requesting a re-evaluation of this conclusion for the Reactor, Turbine and Radwaste Buildings. The study data furnished consisted of new Reactor Building response spectra developed using a 0.15g SSE with a R.G.1.60 ground response spectral shape with a control point in the free field at ground grade, a three dimensional finite 3-1

1 PNPs A-46 Final Report ]

september,1996 Revtson 0 element model of the Reactor Building, soil structure interaction analysis, in accordance with the intent of the applicable guidance contained in NRC Standard Review Plan NUREG 0800

[ Reference 9) Sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.2. Selected portions of the Reactor Building soil structure interaction (SSI) spectra developed as part of Reference 8 are included as Appendix G of this report. By comparison, the new spectra demonstrate the conservatism contained in the original Pilgrim design spectra. NRC concurred and modified their position to permit the design spectra for the Reactor, Turbine and Radwaste Buildings to be treated as " conservative design "

spectra where they envelop the new spectra, i.e. above 4 Hz. Thus, the Pilgrim design response spectra contained in Specification C-114 was used for seismic demand screening purposes and treated as required by the GIP based on the characterization assigned by NRC review documented in their June 17,1994 letter: Reevaluation of the Approach for Developing Floor Response Spectra for the Resolution of USl A-46 [ Reference 5), is given in Table 3-1 below.

l Table 3-1 1 Characterization of BECo Specification C-114 Floor Spectra Based on NRC Staff Review l

1 Location Characterization of Spec. C-114 Floor Spectra Reactor Building Conservative Design for items having funderner,tal frequency > 4 Hz, otherwise treat as Median Centered Turbine Building Conservative Design for items having fundamental Nequency > 4 Hz, otherwise treat as Median Centered Radwaste Building Conservative Design for items having fundamental frequency > 4 Hz, otherwise treat as Median Centered  ;

Emergency Diesel Median Centered ,

Generator Building i Intake Structure Median Centered l

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4. Results of Screening Verification and Walkdown - Equipment i i

Classes 0 Through 20 l i The purpose of this section is to describe the Screening Verification and Walkdown performed ,

to verify the seismic adequacy of active mechanical and electrical equipment identified in the l Pilgrim Station Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) Report [ Reference 14]. The guidelines  !

. contained in this section were used to screen the equipment for seismic adequacy. If the equipment did not pass this screen, it was declared an outlier (see Section .8). Outlier Resolution, described in Section 9, is proposed to be accomplished by various means which may include:

1) more refined or sophisticated methods for verifying seismic adequacy,

2) equipment / anchorage modification,

3) review and refinement of the SSEL logic to eliminate the need for the item. l The SSEL contains a total of 1008 items. Of this total,22 items are inherently rugged or are part of the NSSS and do not require further evaluation per the GlP. An additional 294 items are covered by the host SEWS per the Rule of the Box and another 47 items are Tanks and Heat Exchangers. The remaining 645 components have individual Screening Evaluation Work Sheets, and appear on the SVDS in Appendix A. Table 4-1 presents a summary of the screening verification results by equipment class. This table also includes the results for Tanks and Heat Exchangers (otherwise identified as Class 21) for completeness. For additional information on Tanks and Heat Exchangers see Section 6.

Table 4-1 Screening Verification Results by Equipment Class Class Equipment Name Total SEWS Acceptable Outliers 0 Unclassified 10 0 10 1 Motor Control Centers 10 4 6 2 Low Voltage Switchgear 5 3 2 3 Medium Voltage Switchgear 2 1 1 4 Transformers 9 9 0 5 Horizontal Pumps 19 16 3 6 Vertical Pumps 12 7 5 7 Fluid-Operated Valves 84 82 2 8 Motor and Solenoid-Operated Valves 124 99 25 9 Fans 7 5 2 10 Air Handlers 64 20 44 11 Chillers 2 2 0 12 Air Compressors 2 1 1 13 Motor-Generators 0 0 0 14 Distribution Panels 21 20 1 15 Baueries on Racks 14 14 0 16 Battery Chargers and Inverters 3 3 0 17 Engine-Generators 2 2 0 18 Instruments on Racks 104 80 24 19 Temperature Sensors 60 50 10 20 1 & C Panels and Cabinets 91 68 23 21 Tanks and Heat Exchangers 47 33 14 TOTALS 692 519 173 4-1

PNPs A-46 Final Rrport srptImber,1996 Revision 0 4.1 Seismic Evaluation Guidelines The procedure for performing the Screening Verification and Walkdown is based on the following four seismic screening guidelines, as defined in the GIP:

Seismic Capacity Compared to Seismic Demand - The seismic capacity of the equipment, based on earthquake experience data, generic seismic testing data, or equipment-specific seismic qualification data, should be greater than the seismic demand imposed >

on the equipment by the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).

Caveats - In order to use the seismic capacity defined by the earthquake experience Bounding Spectrum or the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS), the equipment should be similar to the equipment in the earthquake experience equipment class or the generic seismic testing equipment class and also meet the intent of the specific caveats for that class of equipment. If equipment-specific seismic qualification data is used, then any specific restrictions or caveats for that qualification data apply instead.

Anchoraae - The equipment anchorage capacity, installation, and stiffness should be adequate to withstand the seismic demand from the SSE at the equipment location.

Seismic Interaction - The effect of possible seismic spatial interactions with nearby equipment, systems, and structures should nc,t cause the equipment to fail to perform its intended safe shutdown function.

The evaluation of equipment against each of these four screening guidelines at Pilgrim Station is based upon walkdown observations, calculations, and other supporting data.

4.1.1 Seismic Capacity Vs. Demand Screening Pilgrim Station determined the seismic capacity of safe shutdown equipment using:

. Earthquake experience data with capacity defined by the Bounding Spectrum, or Reference Spectrum depending on the demand spectrum used, e Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra, or

. Equipment-specific seismic qualification data.

The seismic demand for screening an item of equipment is chosen based on the equipment elevation relative to the ground grade, and its fundamental frequency. The ground spectrum was compared to the bounding spectrum for equipment within 40' of grade with an estimated fundamental frequency greater than 8 Hz. Alternatively, the IRS were compared to 1.5 times the Bounding Spectrum (i.e., reference spectrum). The GERS were used infrequently in the l capacity vs. demand comparisons. Finally, newer, upgraded equipment that had been i seismically qualified in accordance with the IEEE 344 Standard,1975 Edition or Icter, was I accepted based on this testing documentation and anchorage inspection and design calculations supplemented by a seismic interaction review by the Seismic Review Team (SRT).

For purposes of determining the 40 ' Above Grade elevation, effective grade for the site and/or each building must be determined. " Effective grade " at a nuclear plant is defined as the average elevation of the ground surrounding the building along its perimeter. Pilgrim Station  ;

effective grade is Elevation 23' (above mean sea level). I l

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PNPs A-46 Final RIport sipttmber,1996 Revision 0 4.1.2 Caveat Compilance l

The second screening guideline which must be satisfied to verify the seismic adequacy of an item of mechanical or electrical equipment is to confirm that the equipment meets the intent of the specific caveats for the equipment class. This review is necessary when the Bounding Spectrum or the GERS is used to represent the seismic capacity of an item of equipment. If equipment-specific seismic qualification data is used instead, then only the specific restrictions i applicable to that equipment-specific qualification data need be applied.

Another aspect of verifying the seismic adequacy of equipment included within the scope of this procedure is explained by the " rule of the box " For major items included in equipment class, all of the individual components mounted on or in this item are considered to be part of that equipment and do not have to be evaluated separately. However, the walkdown engineers did look for suspicious details or uncommon situations which could make individual l components vulnerable. l

" Caveats " are defined as the set of inclusion and exclusion rules which represent specific characteristics and features particularly important for seismic adequacy of a particular class of equipment. Appendix B of the GlP contains a summary of the caveats for the earthquake experience equipment class and for the generic seismic testing equipment class.

Engineering judgment is used to determine whether the specific seismic concern addressed by the caveat is met. Each item of equipment was evaluated to determine whether it meets the specific wording of the applicable caveats and/or their " intent " However, if an item of equipment meets the " intent " of the caveats, but not the specific wording, that item is considered to have met the caveat. These cases are reported in Section 5 of this report.

4.1.3 Anchorage Adequacy The screening approach for verifying the seismic adequacy of equipment anchorage is based upon a combination of inspections, analyses, and engineering judgment. Inspections consist of measurements and visual evaluations of the equipment and its anchorage, supplemented by use of plant documente'!on and drawings. Analyses compare the anchorage capacity to the seismic loading (demand) imposed upon the anchorage. These analyses were done using the guidelines in Section 4 and Appendix C of the GIP. Enaineerina iudament is also an important element in the evaluation of equipment anchorage. As a general rule, all significantly sized equipment was rigorously analyzed to determine anchor bolt forces. Small equipment, weighing usually 50 pounds or less, was accepted based on judgement if a comparison of estimated anchor bolt forces and the size and strength of the as-found anchorages indicated that sufficient anchorage strength existed.

The four main steps used to evaluate seismic adequacy of equipment anchorages at Pilgrim Station followed the guidance of the GIP and are shown below:

. Anchorage Installation inspection

• Anchorage Capacity Determination

. Seismic Demand Determination

. Comparison of Capacity to Demand 4-3

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l PNPs A-46 Final Riport septembar,1996 Revision 0 l The first main step in evaluating the seismic adequacy of anchorages is to check the anchorage installation and its connection to the base of the equipment. This inspection consists of visual checks and measurements along with a review of plant documentation and 1 drawings where necessary, and an anchor bolt tightness and embedment check for i anchorages utilizing concrete expansion anchors.  !

All accessible anchorages were visually inspected. A check of the following equipment anchorage attributes was made:

1. Equipment Characteristics

2. Type of Anchorage

3. Size and Location of Anchorage

4. Installation Adequacy S. Embedment Length

6. Gap at Threaded Anchors

7. Spacing Between Anchorages

8. Edge Distance

9. Concrete Strength and Condition

10. Concrete Crack Locations and Sizes

11. Essential Relays in Cabinets

12. Equipment Base Stiffness / Prying Action

13. Equipment Base Strength / Structural Load Path

14. Embedment Steel and Pads 1

The predominant expansion anchor type at Pilgrim Station as part of the original construction and through approximately 1982 is the Phillips Redhead shell anchor. Wej-it wedge anchors  !

have also been identified to a more limited extent [ Reference 16]. During the period when j modifications were being made for I&E Bulletins Nos. 79-02,79-14 and 80-11, Boston Edison I adopted the Hilti Kwik Bolt and Sleeve Anchor as its standard expansion anchors for reinforced concrete and masonry respectively. During this period the Parabolt wedge anchor j was also specified for selected applications.

For the installation adequacy review of all accessible expansion anchors, a tightness check or a tug test was performed to detect gross installation defects (such as oversized concrete holes, total lack of preload, loose nuts, damaged subsurface concrete, and missing plug for shell types) which would leave the anchor loose in the hole. The tightness check for expansion anchors was accomplished either by the use of a calibrated torque wrench or by applying a torque to the anchor by hand to confirm the anchor was " wrench tight ". If the anchor bolt or nut rotates less than about % turn, then the anchor is considered tight. A tightness check or tug test was performed on all accessible expansion anchors for equipment. The tug test simply involves pulling on the device (say, a wall-mounted transmitter) with a force exerted by the SCE to confirm that the anchorage is tight and free from gross installation defects. In a limited number of instances the installation adequacy review identified outlier bolts. These bolts were repaired or discounted during the capacity / demand review. In addition, a random embedment spot check on selected shell anchors was performed to ensure that the shell and equipment base were not in contact so as to invalidate the results of the tightness check.

The second main step in evaluating the seismic adequacy of anchorages is to determine the allowable capacity of anchors used to secure an item of equipment. The allowable capacity is obtained by multiplying the nominal allowable capacities by the applicable capacity reduction factors using formulas presented in Chapter 4 of the GlP. The nominal capacities and reduction factors are obtained from Appendix C of the GlP based on the results of the 4-4

PNPs A-46 Fml RIport september,1996 Remon 0 anchorage installation inspection checks. The nominal allowable capacities incorporate a design safety factor of 3 between the ultimate and allowable (working) capacities.

Pullout and shear capacities for anchors are based on having adequate stiffness in the base of the equipment and on not applying significant prying action to the anchor. If Check 12, Base Stiffness and Prying Action, from Part 11, Chapter 4 of the GIP shows that stiffness is not adequate or that significant prying action is applied to the anchors, then the Seismic Capability Engineers lowered the allowable capacity loads accordingly.

The third step in evaluating the anchorages is to determine the seismic demand imposed on the equipment. The demand load is established based on the type of demand spectrum used.

If IRS are used, additional factors of conservatism may be applied to establish the demand load. This is necessary since the IRS are characterized as either " conservative design or median centered" depending on equipment frequency and the building in which the equipment is located. The details of spectra characterization for seismic screening purposes may be found in Section 3.3. The demand load is the product of the appropriate spectral acceleration value times the weight of the equipment item. Table C.1-1 of the GIP is used, in general, to establish the fundamental frequency and equipment damping for the given classes of equipment. If the item is deemed rigid, the zero period acceleration (ZPA) is used. If the item is deemed flexible, the peak of the response spectrum may be used for initial screening. If the fundamental frequency is estimated or calculated, then the largest spectral acceleration in the range from that estimated frequency to the ZPA is used.

The fourth and final step to complete the anchorage adequacy evaluation compares the seismic demand to the anchorage capacity. If the demand is less than the capacity, the anchorage is acceptable; otherwise, the equipment item is declared an outlier.

4.1.4 Selsmic Interaction Checks The fourth and final screening guideline used to verify the seismic adequacy of an item of mechanical or electrical equipment was to confirm no adverse seismic spatial interactions with nearby equipment, systems, and structures which could cause the equipment to fail to perform its intended safe shutdown function. The interactions of concern are (1) proximity effects, (2) structural failure and falling, and (3) flexibility of attached lines and cables. Guidelines for judging interaction effects when verifying the seismic adequacy of equipment are presented in Appendix D of the GIP.

During the plant walkdowns at Pilgrim Station, the SRTs identified a number of localized interaction concems which were classified as outliers. These outliers and potential methods for resolution are discussed in detail in Sections 8 and 9.

Overhead piping systems and ductwork were observed in plant areas containing USI A-46 equipment during the walkdowns. As a result, the SRTs identified four ductwork vulnerabilities and noted the systems were otherwise well supported. Refer to Outliers O11,023,053 and 059 for additionalinformation.

4.2 OutlierResolution An outlier is defined as an item of equipment which does not meet the screening guidelines previously noted. An outlier may be shown to be adequate for seismic loading by performing 4-5

PNPs A-46 FanalReport september,1996 Revision 0 additional evaluations. These additional evaluations and altemate methods will be documented.

4.3 Seismic Capability Engineers and Peer Reviewer The station walkdowns were conducted during a combination of on-line and outage plant conditions during the 1992 to 1996 time frame. The Seismic Capability Engineers for the Pilgrim Station walkdown were Messrs. W. Djordjevic, J. O'Sullivan and T. Tracy of Stevenson and Associates (S&A); and Messrs. W.R. Kline, J.G. Dyckman, J.A. Kalb, S.C. Chugh and C.T.

Pitts of Boston Edison Company. All have been SQUG trained and certified. Their resumes are provided in Appendix C.

An independent evaluation and peer review of the walkdown process was performed by Dr.

John Stevenson of S&A during August 1994. As required by the GIP, the review included an assessment of the walkdown and analyses by audit and sampling to identify any errors. Dr.

Stevenson conducted a one day walkdown to ascertain completeness and correctness of the USl A-46 walkdown. His review included comparing completed SEWS with equipment previously inspected by the SRTs. Dr. Stevenson also reviewed the documentation packages the SRTs used to determine equipment design details that could not be readily determined by walkdown. Dr. Stevenson concluded that the walkdowns were being conducted competently and the findings made were appropriate. Appendix E provides documentation of Dr.

Stevenson's peer review and BECo's resolution of peer review comments requiring action.

4.4 Other Types of Seismic Evaluations andInterfaces in addition to the seismic evaluations covered in this section for active mechanical and electrical equipment, seismic evaluations for two other types of equipment are covered in other sections as follows: I

. Section 6 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers Review

. Section 7 - Cable and Conduit Raceways Review A separate Relay Evaluation Report has been prepared to document the results of the relay functionality review required in Section 6 of the GIP. A list of SSEL cabinets and panels containing essential relays is given in Appendix B.

While these other seismic evaluations can generally be performed independently from those for active mechanical and electrical equipment, there are a few areas where an interface with the Relay Functionality Review is appropriate:

. Any cabinets containing essential relays, as determined by the relay review, are evaluated for seismic adequacy using the guidelines contained in this section.

. A capacity reduction factor is applied to expansion anchor bolts which secure cabinets containing essential relays. The capacity reduction factor is discussed in Section 4.4 and Appendix C of the GlP.

. Seismic interaction, including bumping which does not cause damage, is not allowed on cabinets containing essential relays. This limitation is discussed in Section 4.5 of the GIP.

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. In-cabinet amplification factors for cabinets containing essential relays have been estimated, using the guidelines in Section 6 of the GlP, by the Seismic Capability i Engineers for use in the Relay Functionality Review.

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4.5 Documentation Pilgrim Station summarized the results of the equipment Screening Verification and Walkdown in the Screening Verification Data Sheets (SVDS) contained in Appendix D. Complete review information for each piece of equipment may be found in the Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) which are rnaintained in the project file. The project file also contains the l SEWS for Class 21 equipment, Heat Exchangers and Tanks, and Plant Area Summary l Sheets (PASS) for the Cable Tray & Conduit Raceway Reviews.

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5. GIP Deviations and Commentary on Meeting The Intent of Caveats No programmatic or significant deviations from the GIP were taken while performing the walkdowns and seismic adequacy evaluations at Pilgrim Station for resolution of USI A-46.

Interpretations were made with respect to the wording of the GIP caveats versus the caveat's

intent. This section lists the bases for SRT conclusions that the intent of an affected caveat i has been met. All other equipment not listed in this table met the caveat rules as stated in the 4 GlP or was declared to be an outlier.

Table 5-1 Commentary Regarding GIP Equipment Meeting the Intent of the Caveats ID Class Caveat Comments l B10,B14,B15, 1 Bounding Spectrum - 1 These MCC's are 15' deep and do not have

B17,B18,B20 structural top bracing. Inclusion in the experience database requires bracing for MCC's narrower than 18*. These MCC's were seismically tested to criteria which predates IEEE 344-75. The seismic test has been reviewed and found to be as severe as an IEEE344-75 test thus meeting

, the intent of this caveat.

P205,X203 5 Bounding Spectrum - 2 The pump (P205) and turbine (X203) are on 4 different skids supported on a common concrete pedestal. Therefore, there is no potential for differential movement between pump and driver, so the intent of this caveat is met.

AO1301-12, 7 Bounding Spectrum - 7 The yoke and valve body are both supported, but A01301-34 not independently, meeting the intent of the

] caveat.

4 PSV4020 7 Bounding Spectrum - 4 The pipe diameter for all of these valves is %*

PSV4563A which is less than the minimum 1* diameter PSV45638 required by the caveat. All of these valves are PSV4563C lightweight, and the SRT judged them seismically

! PSV4565A acceptable on the pipe diameter. The PSV series PSV45658 valves weigh less than 10 lb., and the RV series PSV4582A weigh 2.5 lb.

PSV4582B j PSV4582C PSV4582D RV9085A

, RV90858 RV9085C RV9085D RV9085E RV9085F j RV9085G RV9085H 5-1

.- _ _ _- . - _ - . ~ - - .- -- .. . - .-

PNPS A-46 Final Rrport September,1996 Revision 0 MO1001-36A 8 Bounding Spectrum - 5 These motor operated valves exceed the weight MO1001-368 limits of Figure B.8-1. The valve weight and M01201-5 operator cantilever length meet the intent of the MO1301-49 caveat using the methodology of GIP Rev 2A which allows the operator weight or length to exceed the Figure B.8-1 by up to 30% provided that the product of the weight times the length i

does not exceed the limits of Figure B.8-1.

M O3800 8 Bounding Spectrum - 3 These motor operated valves have cast iron valve MO3801 a +ua*or support brackets. A stress analysis of

- M O3805 tbc yokes determined that the stresses all fall 1

M O3806 be; . N 20% of the minimum ultimate strength M O3808 whict ds the intent of the caveat.

M O3813 MO4083

. M O4084 VAC205A-1 10 Bounding Spectrum - 5 VAC205A-1 and VAC205D-1 are installed in line.

Vibration isolators that are under the supports, VAC205D-1 are unhoused and unconfined. The duct is so well supported that the SRT judged that the fan will not displace. Therefore, the isolator springs are judged to meet the intent of the caveat.

D16,D17 14 Bounding Spectrum - 1 D16 and D17 contain relays, but all of the relays have been evaluated as non-essential. D16 and i D17 there' ore meet the intent of the caveat.

M O202-5A 8 Bounding Spectrum - 5 The operator weight, the offset and the pipe diameter exceed the limits of Table B8.1. The MO202-5B intent of the caveat is met based on vendor ,

qualification which demonstrates the structural l 4 Integrity of the valve and its parts for the seismic i plus rated load condition. I MO2301-4 8 Bounding Spectrum - 5 This motor operated valve exceeds the weight limits of Figure B.81. The intent of the caveat is

. met based on vendor qualification which demonstrates the structuralintegrity of the valve and its parts for the seismic plus rated load condition.

l l

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I PHPs A-46 Final Rrport l 1 september,1996  ;

Revision 0 f

6. Results of the Tanks and Heat Exchanger Review The screening evaluations described in this section for verifying the seismic adequacy of Class 21 tanks and heat exchangers include those generic features which experience has shown can be vulnerable to seismic loading. The evaluations include the following features: 1 l

i' . Check that the shell of large, flat-bottom, vertical tanks will not buckle. Loading on these types of tanks include the effects of hydrodynamic loading and tank wall flexibility.

. Check that the component anchor bolts and their embedments have adequate strength

against breakage and pullout.

l . Check that the anchorage connection between the anchor bolts and the component l shell (e.g., saddles, legs, chairs, etc.) have adequate strength.

! . Check that the attached piping has adequate flexibility to accommodate the motion of i large, flat-bottom, vertical tanks.

l

, The Seismic Capability Engineers reviewed each component to verify it met the intent of 2

Section 7 of the GIP. The review consisted of a walkdown and an initial evaluation using the

! step-by-step screening guidelines. The objective of the walkdown was to confirm as-found conditions to be used during the step-by-step screening, to identify for evaluation any 4

potentially unacceptable spatial interactions or degraded conditions, to inspect anchorage i connections and anchor bolt installations, and to determine the need to consider the effect of l piping nozzle reactions on load path stresses. Review results are documented in the SEWS for each component.

The types of loading and analysis methods described in Section 7 of the GIP for tanks and 1 heat exchangers were developed specifically for: (1) large, flat-bottom, cylindrical, vertical, j storage tanks; and (2) horizontal cylindrical tanks and heat exchangers with support saddles

made of plates. Class 21 items outside the bounds of the parameters and assumptions in GIP Table 7-1 (vertical tanks) or Table 7-f, (horizontal tanks and heat exchangers) for applicability of the step-by-step screening, were 'eviewed by component-specific evaluations. Such items

, were not immediately classified as outliers if they were smaller in size than the generic parameters (See Table 6-1, items 1,17,18,20,21,22 and 23). In general, component-specific evaluations were performed using an approach similar to the one contained in EPRI NP-5228-SL, Rev.1, Vol. 4, entitled " Guidelines for Tanks and Heat Exchangers " [ Reference 19), as  ;

applicable. Review results are documented in the component SEWS, and any supporting calculations are referenced in the SEWS Comments section.

l The results of the tank and heat exchanger evaluations are summarized in Table 6-1. When i outlier conditions were identified during the course of the initial evaluation, component-specific evaluations were performed to address them. All outlier conditions were resolved by these evaluations. Components were formally designated to be outliers, or to have outlier conditions, j under the following circumstances:

. The item did not satisfy the parameters and assumptions for applicability of the step-by-step screening and it is larger than the minimum size parameters, or,

. The step-by-step screening evaluation was applicable and the initial results did not satisfy

] the guideline requirements.

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i PNPS A-46 Final R1 port September,1996 Rewsion 0 1

Table 6-1 Tanit & Heat Exchanger Evaluation Results No. ID Description Type l Screening Result and Resolution 1 CONPOT HPCI Exhaust 0.83'R vertical Acceptable - Component-specific evaluation Drain Line Pot tank with legs (GIP Table 7-1 not applicable) 2 305-125 RPS N2/ Water small Acceptable - Rule-of-the-box with HCUs Accumulator accumulator 3 305-128 RPS Scram Wtr small Acceptable - Rule-of-the-box with HCUs Accumulator ac'cumulator 4 E122A&B TBCCW Heat 3'D horizontal Outlier - Anchorage capacity < demand.

Exchangers heat exchangers Resolved by component-specific evaluation 5 E204 RCIC Turbine very small unit Acceptable - Rule-of-the-box with X202 Lube Oil Cooler 6 E205 HPCI Turbine very small unit Acceptable - Rule-of-the-box with X203 Lube Oil Coo!er 7 E206A&B Fuel Pool Cooling 1.06'D horizontal Outlier - Anchorage capacity < demand.

Heat Exchangers heat exchangers Resolved by component-specific evaluation 8 E207A&B RHR Heat 1.86'R vertical Outlier - GIP Tables 7-1 & 7-6 not applicable.

Exchangers heat exchangers Resolved by component-specific evaluation 9 E209A&B RBCCW Heat 4.25'D horizontal Outiler - As-built baseplate anomalies &

Exchangers heat exchangers anchorage capacity < demand Resolved by component-specific evaluation &

design change modification (FRN 95-01-60) 10 E211A&B RBCCW Recire. 1.67'D horizontal Acceptable - Meets GIP 7.4.2 MG Set Oil Cooler heat exchangers 11 E212A&B CRD Pump Oil very small unit Acceptable - Rule-of-the-box with P209 Coolers 12 E213A&B RBCCW Recire. internal to Recire Acceptable - Rule-of-the-box with Recir. Pump Pmp Seal Wtr Ctr Pump (NSSS component) 13 E214A&B RBCCW Recire, internal to Recire Acceptable - Rule-of-the-box with Recire.

Pmp Lube Oil Clr Pump Pump (NSSS component) 14 E216A&B RWCU Heat 1.06'D horizontal Outlier - GIP Tables 7-6 not applicable.

Exchangers heat exchangers Resolved by component-specific evaluation 15 T124A&B DG Day Tanks 4'D horizontal Acceptable - Meets GIP 7,4.2 tank 16 T126A&B DG Main Storage 10.5'D horizontal Outlier - GlP Table 7-6 not applicable Tanks buried tank Resolved - Component-specific evaluation 17 T146A,B,C&D DG Air Start 1.5'R vert tank Acceptable - Component-specific evaluation Receiver Tanks on support stand (P" Table 7-1 not applicable) 18 T150A,B,C&D DG Turbo Air 1.5'R vert tank Acceptable - Component-specific evaluation Receiver Tanks on support stand (GIP Table 7-1 not applicable) 19 T151A&B DG Turbo Air 4'D horizontal Outlier - GIP Table 7-6 not applicable.

Receiver Tanks tank Resolved by component-specific evaluation.

20 T201A&B RBCCW Surge 2'R vertical tank Acceptable - Component-specific evaluation Tank (GIP Table 7-1 not applicable) 21 T220 A,B,C&D Steamline Isol Viv 0.58'R vert tank Acceptable - Component-specific evaluation Air Accumulator on support stand (GlP Table 7-1 not applicable) 22 T220 E,F,G&H Steamline Isol Viv 0.58'R vert tank Acceptable - Component-specific evaluation Air Accumulator on support stand (GIP Table 7-1 not applicable) 23 T221A,B.C&D ADS Nitrogen 0.58'R vert tank Acceptable - Component-specific evaluation Accumulator on support stand (GIP Table 7-1 not applicable) 6-2 i l

PNPS A-46 FiruJ Rrport September,1996 Revision 0

7. Results of the Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Review The results of the Cable Tray and Conduit Review may be found in a stand alone report which is included as Appendix F of this report.

I I

i 7-1

PNPs A-46 Final Rtport srptImber,1996 Revision 0

8. Description of Outliers This section discusses the outliers identified during the USl A-46 walkdowns conducted at Pilgrim Station. The outliers are a result of equipment reviews, tanks & heat exchanger reviews and cable tray and conduit raceway reviews. Relay outliers are discussed in the Relay Evaluation Report for Resolution of USI A-46 [ Reference 15). Section 9 provides a discussion of the disposition or corrective action, as appropriate, for each remaining outlier discussed below and also for the single remaining conduit and cable tray outlier.

An outlier is an item of equipment which does not comply with all of the screening guidelines provided in the GIP. The GIP guidelines are intended to be used as a generic basis for a preliminary screening evaluation of the seismic adequacy of equipment. If an item of equipment fails to pass these generic screens, it may still be shown to be adequate by additional evaluations. Most outlier conditions are minor items which were not considered to be nonconforming or degraded and did not present a concern for equipment operability.

Supporting comments regarding STR judgments, safety implications and operability concems are contained in the outlier summaries that follow.

As part of the SEWS review process, Boston Edison used pertinent design basis information along with engineering judgment to determine if any outlier condition could be considered nonconforming or degraded, or otherwise warranting further review to confirm equipment operability. In a few instances, outlier conditions were identified that were nonconforming or degraded, and a corrective action process document known as a Problem Report was initiated to cause the appropriate steps to be taken to conform to regulatory requirements. Outliers O23, 056 and 058 are examples of this ' situation. Sometimes during the screening evaluation, nonconforming or degraded conditions were not found, however the SRT never-the-less judged it to. be prudent to perform further reviews to establish whether an outlier condition could be an operability concem. The extent of these reviews varied depending on the specific outlier condition. In the ca'se of some of the heat exchangers, formal calculations were prepared to confirm conformance to design basis requirements. Outliers 054 through 057 are examples, and these efforts resulted in outlier resolution.

8.1 GeneralInteractionIssues Three instances of potential seismic interaction issues that are not specifically addressed by the GlP were observed in the plant by the Peer Reviewer. These issues involve design details that have a potential to affect USI A-46 equipment. These. general interaction issues and the action required to verify that they are not a concern for USI A-46 equipment are discussed below.

G1. Finding (s): In a few instances, chains that appeared to be smaller than the generally used chain size were observed supporting overhead lights. The peer review recommended that this concem be evaluated and that any light support chains of less than sufficient capacity be replaced. ,

Status: Open. To be addressed during the outlier resolution phase, l l

l 8-1  !

_ _ _ -. _ . _ _ _ ~ _ - _ _ ~_____m_.__ ~_-__.,__-m____ ..__ - .

l I

PNPS A-46 FinalReport l September,1996 l Reviseon 0 1

)

G2. Finding (s): In the Reactor Building, a gas bottle was observed to be secured with a single horizontal chain. The peer review recommended that as a minimum a horizontal chain at two locations or a bottom restraint shoe combined with a single chain at partial height are required to secure compressed gas bottles for seismic loading '

conditions. l Status: Open. To be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

G3. Finding (s): In a few instances, fire extinguishers were observed to have supporting brackets with restraining tabs which might not prevent the fire extinguisher from slipping off the bracket during an earthquake,

. being damaged and becoming a missile which could potentially damage plant equipment.

Status: Open. To be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

8.2 Equipment, Tank, Heat Exchanger, Cable Tray and Conduit Outilers:

1 A total of 183 outliers were identified during the seismic verification walkdowns and analytical l reviews. This total includes 182 pieces of mechanical and electrical equipment including the tanks and heat exchangers. In addition, the single conduit and cable tray outlier is also included in this section. 29 of the 183 outliers were added to the SSEL after the last plant outage and are located in areas that are not accessible during power operation. These 29 outliers do not have known deficiencies but have been classified as outliers pending  :

successful completion of a walkdown during the next plant outage.  ;

l l

The 182 component outliers plus the single conduit and cable tray outlier are combined into 67 groups of similar outlier type. They are discussed below.

01. Equipment ID: T214A & T214B Outlier Finding (s): RBCCW shielded sample chambers T214A & T214B are Class 0 items. As a result, their capacity cannot be established by the GlP. In addition they are anchored by friction clips which are not a recognized form of anchorage according to the GIP.

Safety implications: No. The existing anchorage is substantial.

Capacity will be established by additional evaluation and is expected to be adequate.

Outlier Status: Open O2 Equipment ID: PSD-68 and PSD1301-9, Outlier Finding (s): PSD-68, the HPCI Turbine Exhaust Rupture Disk and PSD1301-9, the RCIC Exhaust Line Rupture Disk are Class 0 items.

As a result, their capacity cannot be established by the GIP.

Outlier Status: Resolved. The rupture disks are in-line devices in a seismically supported piping system. They are bolted between flanges 8-2

b PNPs A-46 Final Roport september,1996 Revision 0 and, thus, are not subjected to extemal mechanical load. The rupture disks are seismically adequate based on SRT review and judgment.

4 03 Equipment ID: ST1301-2, ST1301-3, ST2301-5 & ST2301-6 Outlier Finding (s): RCIC steam traps ST1301-2 & ST1301-3 and i HPCI steam traps ST2301-5 & ST2301-6 are Class 0 items. As a result their capacity cannot be established by the GlP.

j Outlier Status: Resolved. The steam traps are in-line devices in a seismically supported piping system. They are rugged valve like steel castings. The steam traps are seismically adequate based on SRT review and judgment.

04 Equipment ID: HCU-EAST and HCU-WEST Outlier Finding (s): These components are the control rod drive hydraulic control units located on the east and west sides of the Reactor Building. They are Class 0 items. As a result their capacity cannot be established by the GlP and they are outliers. Their anchorage type is also a GIP outlier.

Outlier Status: Resolved. The HCUs and their anchorage have been verified by altemate methods as discussed in Section 9.3.

05 Equipment ID: MCC B10 Outlier Finding (s): Demand per Conservative IRS exceeds seismic capacity.

Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation is expected to demonstrate that capacity exceeds demand.

Outlier Status: Open 06 Equipment ID: MCC's B17, B20, D7 and D10 Outlier Finding (s): MCC's have spatial interactions with the MCC enclosures.

Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not result in damage to the MCC's. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 07 Equipment ID: MCC D8 Outlier Finding (s): MCC D8 has 2 loose cabinet to base channel bolts at the front of the 2"d to 3 sections. These loose bolts are a relay and load path concem. The MCC is an outlier for this reason.

Outlier Status: Resolved. Bolts tightened per MR19301573 on 7/19/93.

08 Equipment ID: Switchgear B1 Outlier Finding (s): 480V Switchgear 81 does not have front anchorage.

Uplift is not a concem but distortion may degrade switchgear capacity.

B1 also has a spatialinteraction with a cable tray.

6-3

I PNPs A-46 Final Report september.1996 i Revision 0 l Safety implications: No. The switchgear anchorage is adequate for uplift and shear. The spatial interaction will not result in damage to the switchgear. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 09 Equipment ID: Switchgear B3 Outlier Finding (s): 480V Switchgear B3 will not be denergized until Refueling Outage 11 in April 1997 and as a result was not accessible due to electrical safety concerns. Anchor bolt tightness could not be performed. Internal inspection including anchor bolt checks must be done. The switchgear is an outlier for these reasons.

Safety implications: No.

Outlier Status: Open O10 Equipment ID: Switchgear A6 Outlier Finding (s): 4160V Switchgear A6 has three spatial interactions with cable tray and conduit.

Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not result in  !

damage to the switchgear. The interaction will be addressed during the i outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open  ;

l 011 Equipment ID: Pumps P202A, P2029 & P202C Outlier Finding (s): RBCCW Pumps P202A, P2028 & P202C have a potential interaction hazard with a ventilation duct located above which has an unusual support system.

Safety implications: No. Further evaluation of the duct supports is expected to demonstrate that they are acceptable.

Outlier Status: Open '

012 Equipment ID: Pumps P208A, P2088, P208C, P208D & P208E Outlier Finding (s): Demand per Conservative IRS exceeds Capacity.

The pumps also do not satisfy the column length caveats.

Safety implications: No. Vendor qualification analysis is on file for the pumps. The outlier is a GlP screening issue and is expected to be l resolved by review of the vendor analysis.

Outlier Status: Open O13 Equipment ID: CV302-22B & CV302-24B Outlier Finding (s): Control valves CV302-228 & CV302-248 have an interaction concem with an overhead light on open S-Hook which could fall and impact an air supply line to the valve.

Outlier Status: Resolved. S-hook fixed per MR19600726 On 3/37/96.

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PNPs A-46 Final R port september,1996 Revision 0

014 Equipment ID: MO1400-24A & MO1400-24B I

Outlier Finding (s): Motor operated valves do not meet the GIP j screening criteria.

i Safety implications: No. Vendor qualification analysis is on file for the i valves. The outlier is a GlP screening issua and is expected to be i resolved by review of the vendor analysis.

l Outlier Status: Open 015 Equipment ID: M01400-25A & M01400-258 l Outlier Finding (s): Motor operated valves do not meet the GIP l screening criteria.

l Safety implications: No. Vendor qualification analysis is on file for the

valves. The outlier is a GlP screening issue and is expected to be

! resolved by review of the vendor analysis.

3 Outlier Status: Open 1

016 Equipment ID: M01400-48 Outlier Finding (s): Motor operated valve M01400-4B has a potential interaction involving the handwheel and motor casing and an adjacent platform.

Safety implications: No. MOV operability is not affected by the potential interference however preferred practice is to provide adequate clearance.

Outlier Status: Open 017 Equipment ID: VEX 104A-BDD & VEX 104B-BDD Outlier Finding (s): Ventilation backdraft dampers VEX 104A-BDD &

VEX 1048-BDD are degraded and broken.

Operability Concern: The operability impact on intake Structure ventilation could not be determined at the time of initial walkdown and screening. Problem Report PR93.9245 was written to address the potential operability impact on safety related ventilation. It was subsequently determined that there was no operability issue.

Outiler Status: Resolved. A design change made by Field Revision Notice (FRN) 96-01-18 was issued to remove these back draft dampers from the ventilation system. As a result they have been deleted from the SSEL and are no longer classified as A46 equipment.

018 Equipment ID: VSF-103A & VSF-1038 Outlier Finding (s): CRHEAFS supply fans VSF-103A & VSF-103B drive motor and fan are not mounted on a common base and are supported by rubber vibration isolators.

Safety implications: No. The fan and motor are of small size and weight and the supports are substantial.

Outiler Status: Open 8-5

PNPs A-46 Final Rcport september,1996 Revision 0 O19 Equipment ID: AOX1, AOX3, AOX4, AOX6, VSF103A-BDD and VSF1038-BDD Outlier Finding (s): Demand per Conservative IRS exceeds Capacity for CRHEAFS dampers AOX1, AOX3, AOX4, AOX6, VSF103A-BDD and i VSF1038-BDD. '

Safety implications: No. Further evaluation is expected to demonstrate that capacity exceeds demand.

Outlier Status: Open O20 Equipment ID: VAC-201 A, VAC-2018, VAC-202A, VAC-2028, VAC-203A, VAC-203B, VAC-204A, VAC-204B, VAC-204C, VAC-204D, VAC207A, VAC2078, VAC207C & VAC207D and drywell equipment area coolers VAC205B-1, VAC205B-2, VAC205C-1 & VAC205C-1 Outlier Finding (s): Equipment area coolers and drywell equipment area coolers are supported by vibration isolators. The capacity of the base mounting on these components is not documented in existing records.

Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation of the base design details on these components is expected to demonstrate that ,

capacity exceeds demand.  !

Outlier Status: Open 021 Equipment ID: VAC204A-BDD & VAC2048-BDD

~

Outlier Finding (s): Equipment area cooler back draft dampers VAC204A-BDD & VAC2048-BDD are supported on structural steel in an unconventional manner. They could be postulated to slide.

Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation of the support details is expected to demonstrate that capacity exceeds demand.

Outlier Status: Open i O22 Equipment ID: VCRF-101A & VCRF-1018 Outlier Finding (s): Demand per Conservative IRS exceeds Capacity for CRHEAFS Filter Heaters VCRF-101A & VCRF-101B.

Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation is expected to demonstrate that capacity exceeds demand.

Outlier Status: Open 023 Equipment ID: VD206A, VD206B, VD206C & VD206D Outlier Finding (s): The ductwork plenums connected to the duct supporting dampers VD206A, VD206B, VD206C & VD206D have potential seismic interactions with a pressurized water filled %" dia. wet pilot line for the Pilotex spray nozzles which are part of the fire protection system for the Diesel Generators. A broken wet pilot line rnay be a spray hazard which could affect the diesel generators. Limited degradation of the plenum wall base anchorage in one instance and two instances of degraded plenum hangers were also observed.

Operability Concern: Yes. The SRT considered the spray hazard to be a potential operability concem for the diesel generators and initiated Problem Report PR95.9494 to address the concem. It was determined 8-6

s .

PNPs A-46 Final Rtport september.1996 Revision 0 that the piping would maintain its integrity and as a result, operability of the diesel generators is not a concem. The results of this review are documented in PR95.9494.02. The limited degradation of the plenum wall base anchcrage and two instances of degraded plenum hangers were not considered to have safety implications based on the walkdown observations of the plenum configuration and anchorage. See Section 9 for additionalinformation.

Outlier Status: Open 024 Equipment ID: K103A Outlier Finding (s): Diesel Generator A Air Start Compressor K103A has a potential interaction hazard with an open S-hook on a overhead florescent light fixture.

Outlier Status: Resolved. Open S-hook closed per MR19600726 on 3/27/96.

025 Equipment ID: D36 Outlier Finding (s): Panel D36 is an outlier because it is mounted to a l block wall. The GIP only covers anchors installed in structural concrete. I Outlier Status: Resolved. Panel anchorage was determined to be adequate by the SRT.

026 Equipment ID: C2205A & C22058 Outlier Finding (s): Reactor Protection (RPS) and NSSS Instrument '

Racks C2205A & C2205B have potentialinteraction hazards involving . 1

1) an overhead light with an open G hook, l

2) a nearby scaffold and

3) an equipment cage that requires additional bracing.  !

Safety implications: No In the judgment of the SRT, RPS Racks C2205A & C2205B would not be damaged or degraded by the potential seismic interaction. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: As indicated below. See Section 9 for details.

1) close open light S-hook, Resolved by MR19600726 on 3/27/96

2) remove nearby scaffold, Open

3) add additional bracing to equipment cage, Open O27 Equipment ID: C2206A & C2206B Outlier Finding (s): Reactor Protection and NSSS Instrument Racks C2206A & C2206B have a potential interaction hazard involving an overhead light with an open S-hook.

Outlier Status: Resolved. Open S-hook closed per MR19600726 on 3/27/96.

O28 Equipment ID: C2250A & C22508 Outlier Finding (s): HPCI instrument Rack C2250A & C22508 have a potential interaction hazard involving a nearby cart on wheels that may impact the rack.

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PNPs A-46 Fird Report september,1996 Revision 0

Safety implications

No. The HPCI Instrument Rack C2250A &

C2250B would not be damaged or degraded by the potential l seismic interaction. The interaction will be addressed during the l outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open O29 Equipment ID: C2251 A & C22518 1 Outlier Finding (s): Jet Pump instrument Racks C2251 A & C2251B have j potential interaction hazards involving an overhead light with an open S-

hook.

Outlier Status: Resolved. Open S-hook closed per MR19600726 on 3/27/96.

3 030 Equipment ID: C2252A & C22528 Outlier Finding (s): Jet Pump instrument Racks C2252Ai & C2252B have a potential spatial interaction hazard between C2252A and .

j adjacent rack C2204. There is no gap and the racks are not bolted l

together.

Safety implications

No. The spatial interaction will not damage the racks. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

j Outlier Status: Open j 0 31 Equipment ID: C83 j Outlier Finding (s): Rack C83 contains SSEL switches LS3502B and

LS3507B which are mercury switches. These switches are considered

' chatter prone per the GIP.

Outlier Status: Resolved. Switches LS35038 and LS3508B are classified as ' Seismic Review Only' per the SSEL because the pressure I boundary should remain intact for proper functioning of level instruments j that share the same instrument line. Chatter due to these switches is acceptable. Their use is therefore of no consequence.

. 0 32 Equipment ID: FSE-101 & FSE-102 1

Outlier Finding (s): Demand per Conservative IRS exceeds Capacity for

! these small and rugged CRHEAFS flow switches.

4 Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation is expected to demonstrate that capacity exceeds demand.

i Outlier Status: Open O33 Equipment ID: LS2351 A Outlier Finding (s): Level switch LS2351 A has a potential interaction hazard with adjacent instrument 9-LS-5066.

i Safety implications: No. The level switch wili not be damaged by the potential interaction. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier i

resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open i

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PNPs A-46 Final Rrport september,1996 Revision 0 j 034 Equipment ID: RHS-1 A & RHS-1B

Outlier Finding (s): Demand per Conservative IRS exceeds Capacity for these small and rugged CRHEAFS switches.

Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation is expected to demonstrate that capacity exceeds demand.

Outlier Status

Open

O35 Equipment ID

TS1 A, TS18, TS2A, TS2B, TS3A, TS3B, TS4A & TS4B

Outlier Finding (s): Demand per Conservative IRS exceeds Capacity for 4 these small and rugged CRHEAFS switches.

Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation is expected to

demonstrate that capacity exceeds demand. )

l Outlier Status: Open O36 Equipment ID: TSD45 & TSD46 )

j Outlier Finding (s): Equipment area cooler controls TSD45 & TSD46 are '

located below unsecured grating which is an interaction hazard for the i controls.  !

l Safety implications: No. Grating details will be revised. See Section 9 l for details.

Outlier Status

Open

\

l O37 Equipment ID: C103A, C103B & C103C i

Outlier Finding (s): Diesel Generator A Control Panels C103A, C1038 &

l C103C have a spatialinteraction with a conduit exiting the cabinet roof that is in contact with a wall bracket. There is also a rod hung 1" fire pipe j

that can swing into the conduit. Diesel Generator A Control Panels l C103A, C103B & C103C are rugged and would not be damaged or e

degraded by the potential interaction hazard.

l Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not damage the l

! panels. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution )

I phase. j Outlier Status: Open s O38 Equipment ID: C110 Outlier Finding (s): Diesel Generator A Pump Control Panel C110 is an I outlier because it is anchored to a block wall. The wall is safety-related however the GIP does not cover anchors installed in block walls.

Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation is expected to demonstrate that the anchorage is adequate.

Or% Migtus: Open O39 Equipment ID: C2228-A1, C2228-A2, C2229-B1, C2229-B2 Outlier Finding (s): RPS Analog Trip Cabinets C2228-A1, C2228-A2, C2229-B1, C2229-82 have spatialinteractions with the conduit entry box on the cabinet roofs because it is fastened to exterior framing and not to the cabinets and could impact the cabinets.

. 8-9

PNPs A-46 Final Report september,1996 Revision 0 Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not damage the cabinets. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 040 Equipment ID: C2233B Outlier Finding (s): Analog Trip System Cabinet C22338 has a potential spatial interaction with an overhead light that might swing and hit the cabinet. This a relay concem.

Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not damage the cabinet. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 041 Equipment ID: C2261 Outlier Finding (s): RHR A Loop instrument Rack C2261 contains a computer device identified as a Kaye Instruments " Solid State Scanner".

This item is well mounted; however, seismic capacity is unknown. The cabinet anchorage is adequate frorn a strength standpoint but the cabinet has a 3/8" gap along the east edge which exceeds the GlP allowed %" gap under cabinets.

Safety implications: No. The equipment anchorage is substantial and additional evaluation is expected to demonstrate that the capacity exceeds the demand.

Outlier Status: Open i 042 Equipment ID: C64 Outlier Finding (s): SSW HVAC Control Panel C64 is an outlier for the following reasons:

1) A pressure regulating valve in the pneumatic copper piping running to 4

the panelis not properly secured to the wall.

2) Adjacent 2" PVC piping is unsecured (missing U-bolt). It could thus impact into the wall and crack, spraying fluid on panel.

Outlier Status: Resolved,

1) WRT22245 written to refasten valve to the wall. Work complete.

2) Missing U-bolt replaced under MR19402687. Work complete.

043 Equipment ID: C903 Outlier Finding (s): Control Panel C903 is an outlier because of anchor bolt conditions. The outlying anchor conditions are; two anchors vith greater than %" gap, two anchors are bottomed out and not fully engaged and seven anchors with slotted holes. The anchorage evaluation neglected the outlier bolts and was successful from a strength standpoint.

8-10

PNPs A-46 FinalRoport september,1996 Revupon 0 Safety implications: No. The anchorage is adequate. The outlying anchor bolt conditions will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 044 Equipment ID: C904 Outlior Finding (s): Control Panel C904 is an outlier because of anchor bolt conditions. The outlying anchor conditions are; seven anchors with greater than %" gap, and two anchors are bottomed out and not fully engaged. The anchorage evaluation neglected the outlier bolts and was successful from a strength standpoint.

Safety implications: No. The anchorage is adequate. The outlying anchor bolt conditions will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 045 Equipment ID: C905 Outlier Finding (s): Control Panet C905 is an outlier because of anchor bolt conditions. The outlying anchor conditions are; four anchors with greater than %" gap, two anchors with slotted holes. The anchorage evaluation neglected the outlier bolts and was successful from a strength standpoint.

Safety implications: No. The anchorage is adequate. The outlying anchor bolt conditions will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 046 Equipment ID: C927 Outlier Finding (s): Control Panel C927 is an outlier because of anchor bolt conditions. The outlying anchor conditions are; two anchors are bottomed out and not fully engaged and seven anchors have slotted holes. The anchorage evaluation neglected the outlier bolts and was successful from a strength standpoint, but the anchors not fully engaged are a relay concern. C927 also has rule of the box items PSX5 and PSYS mounted on slide out drawers that are missing retaining screws.

Safety !mplications: No. The anchorage is adequate. The outlying anchor bolt conditions will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status:

1) Outlier anchor conditions - Open

2) Replace retaining screws for PSX5 and PSYS - Resolved per WRT 020395, work complete.

047 Equipment ID: Control Room Ceiling Outlier Finding (s): The Control Room Ceiling and overhead lights present a potential interaction hazard for the control room. The control 8-11

PNPs A-46 Final Riport September,1996 Revision 0 room ceiling and overhead was inspected from the floor and also from above by removing selected ceiling tiles and using a ladder to allow the SRT to view the area above the panels and ceiling. Inspection results were favorable and only a limited number of locations were observed to have anomalies consisting of open S-hooks, missing light cover screws l or unattached ceiling tie wires.

Outlier Status: Resolved. The anomalies observed in the control room ceiling have been repaired per MR19600726 on 3/27/96.

048 Equipment ID: C1, C2, C8, C10, C910, C921 and C928 Outlier Finding (s): A number of anchor bolt anomalies and installation I problems were observed during the inspections in control panels C1, C2, C8, C10, C910, C921 and C928. These anomalies did not preclude a successful anchorage evaluation in any instance because the capacity of outlier bolts was discounted in the evaluations. They are summarized below:

l

1) C1 - One anchor witn an approximately 1/8" gap.

2) C2 - One anchor w;th an approximately 1/8' gap. l

3) C8 - One anchor bolt is on a high stack of shims. '

4) C10 - One ancher bolt is on a high stack of shims.

5) C910 - One anchor bolt is not fully engaged.

6) C921 - One anchor bolt is not fully engaged.

7) C928 - Ten anchors have slotted holes.

Safety implications: No. The anchorage is adequate. The outlying anchor bolt conditions will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status:

1) through 6), Open

7) Resolved, Shear capacity of anchors is discounted in the anchorage evaluation.

i 049 Equipment ID: C930 and C932 Outlier Finding (s): RCIC Relay Vertical Board C930 and Channel A Vertical Board C932 are bolted together; however, adjacent vertical ,

board C938 is not bolted to the line-up. This is an interaction hazard. i Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not damage the cabinets. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 0 50 Equipment ID: D32 Outlier Finding (s): Panel D32 is an outlier because it is mounted to a safety related block wall. The GIP does not cover anchors installed in block walls.

Outlier Status: Resolved, The panel anchorage installation is adequate based on SRT inspection and evaluation.

8-12

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PNPS A-46 Final Rtport ,

Sept:mber,1996 l Revision 0 0 51 Equipment ID: D33 l Outlier Finding (s): Panel D33 has an interaction hazard involving a 6.5" fire pipe which is in contact with an attached conduit. Panel D33 would not be damaged or degraded by the interaction hazard.

Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not damage the 1 cabinets. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open l

)

0 52 Equipment ID: N/A-45-1 l Outlier Finding (s): N/A-45-1 is the RPIS Translation Electronics. l This item is located in Panel C927 and consists of printed circuit cards {

mounted in a hinged rack. This is an outlier because the seismic capacity of the card mounts or card rack is not established.

I Safety implications: No. Additional evaluation is expected to demonstrate that the capacity exceeds the demand.

Outlier Status: Open j 053 Equipment ID: Y12 Outlier Finding (s): Panel Y12 has a potentialinteraction hazard with an overhead duct that might swing and bump an attached conduit.

Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not damage the panel. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 0 54 Equipment ID: E122A, E122B, E206A & E206B Outlier Finding (s): TBCCW Heat Exchangers E122A & E122B and Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers E206A & E206B have anchorage capacity which was less than demand when evaluated by Section 7 of the GIP. l Outlier Status: Resolved by a component specific evaluation. l 055 Equipment ID: E207A & E2078 Outlier Finding (s): GIP Section 7 is not applicable to RHR Heat Exchangers E207A & E207B because of their vertical orientation.

Outlier Status: Resolved by a component specific evaluation.

0 56 Equipment ID: E209A & E209B Outlier Finding (s): RBCCW Heat Exchangers E209A & E2098 -

Anchorage capacity was less than demand when evaluated by Section 7  ;

of the GlP and base plate anomalies were observed. Problem Report PR95.9027 documents nonconforming baseplate anchor bolt conditions.

Outiler Status: Resolved by a component specific evaluation and a modification.

i 8-13

PMPs A 46 Frd RGport september,1996 Revision 0 0 57 Equipment ID: E216A & 216B, T126A & T126B and T151 A & T1518 Outlier Finding (s): GlP Table 7-6 is not applicable to RWCU Heat Exchanger E216A & E2168, DG Main Storage Tanks T126A & T126B and DG Turbo Air Receiver Tanks T151A & T1518.

Outlier Status: Resolved by a component specific evaluation.

058 Equipment ID: C2230 Outlier Finding (s): Instrument Rack C2230 had one concrete anchor which failed the tightness check.

Outlier Status: Resolved. The anchor was repaired under MR 19300887 on 8/24/93.

059 Equipment ID: J600, J602, JG03, J604, J605 & J606.

Outiler Finding (s): J600, J602, J605 and J606 - The subject junction boxes house essential relays. The duct the junction boxes are attached to is well supported from an overall standpoint however the local portion of the duct at the junction box attachment is flexible light gage sheet metal and has a low estimated frequency.

Outlier Finding (s): J603 & J604 - These junction boxes are located adjacent to each other and are supported by a horizontal run of duct.

The duct is well supported from an overall strength standpoint however the supports are flexible and as a result have a low estimated frequency.

The following outlying conditions exist: 1) Demand per Conservative ,

IRS exceeds Capacity, 2) demonstrate that the duct structure is adequate to support the essential relays,3) the duct has a potential interaction with adjacent cable tray support frames and 4) two unattached strap hangers were observed on the duct.

Safety implications: No. The current support conditions will not result in damage to the junction boxes. Additional evaluation is expected to demonstrate that the capacity exceeds the demand and that the duct support structure is adequate. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 060 Equipment ID: MO202-5A & MO202-5B Outlier Finding (s): Flex from the motor operator passes through the grating at Elev. 23' in the drywell. There is a potential rubbing interaction between the flex and the grating.

Safety implications: No. Potentialinteraction between the valve parts and the grating is not a concem based on the existing clearance and the massive size and strength of the valve assembly and will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open i

061 Equipment ID: Cable Tray and Conduit Outlier Outlier Finding (s): A interaction hazard consisting of a small unanchored hot water tank located on a platform above safety related l

8-14

l PNPs A.46 Final Rrport september,1996 Revision 0 conduit was identified in the Machine Shop area of the Radwaste Building at elevation 23.0'.

Safety implications: No. Damage to the conduit is highly unlikely. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 062 Equipment ID: C108 Outlier Finding (s): 1) Panel C108 has an interaction concern with an overhead light on an open S-Hook which could fall and impact the cabinet. 2) Several Unistrut nuts do not have the grooves lined up with the strut edge.

Outlier Status: Resolv% TN panelis rugged and would not be damaged by the light (mture if S hit the panel. In addition, the capacity of the panel mounting boltr p innalled is more than adequate to support the light cabinet.

063 Equipment ID: MO3808 Outlier Finding (s): MO3808 has a potential interaction hazard involving the sluice gate power operator which is stored in the vicinity. The power operator could fall and impact the motor operator.

Outlier Status: Resolved. Subsequent inspection confirms that the power operator is properly restrained and is, therefore, not an interaction hazard.

064 Equipment ID: C61 Outlier Finding (s): 1) Panel base detail has thin materi'<l (10 ga.) with an eccentric load path and 2) the anchorage type is not covered by the GIP.

Safety implications: No. Panel C61 contains controls for drywell cooling area coolers which are non-safety and as a result the outlier findings do not effect safety-related components.

Outlier Status: Open 065 Equipment ID: C208 Outlier Finding (s): Panel C208 houses essential relays. It is free from direct impact hazards but is connected to the top of MCC B17 by conduit that runs between C208 and MCC B17. C208 is also mounted to the environmental enclosure which surrounds MCC B17. MCC B17 is classified as an outlier because it can impact the environmental enclosure around it, which is a spatial interaction. C208 is classified as an outlier because it is potentially subject to the spatialinteraction between MCC B17 and its environmental enclosure.

Safety implications: No. The spatial interaction will not damage the panel. The interaction will be addressed during the outlier resolution phase.

Outlier Status: Open 8-15

.- -. . .. - . . _ . _ _ - .. . . - . . . . = _ - - . . . . . ~ . - . . . - . . ..

PNPS A-46 Final R1 port september,1996 Revision 0 l 066 Equipment ID: MO4038A thru F, MO4039A thru F, MO4040A, B and MO4041 A, B Outlier Finding (s): These valves are located in the drywell and are I inaccessible during plant operation. The valves are classified as outliers l pending successful completion of walkdown screening and evaluation.

Safety implications: No.

Outlier Status: Open l 067 Equipment ID: VAC205B1-BDD, VAC205B2-BDD, VAC205C1-BDD, l VAC205C2-BDD, VAC205E1-BDD, VAC205E2-BDD, VAC205F1-BDD, VAC205F2-BDD, VAC206A1-BDD, VAC206A2-BDD, VAC206B1-BDD and VAC206B2-BDD

! Outlier Finding (s): These backdraft dampers are located in the drywell i and are inaccessible during plant operation. The backdraft dampers are l classified as outliers pending successful completion of walkdown screening and evaluation.

Safety implications: No.

Outlier Status: Open i

l l

l l

l l

)

l 3

8-16 l l

l l _ .i

1 PNPS A-46 Final Report Septernber,1996 Revision 0

9. Resolution of Outliers 9.1 Outlier Resolution All of the open outliers.'for Equipment Classes 1 throught 21, discussed in Section 8 are shown in Table 9-1 and 9-2. The resolution block provides a summary of the outlier finding that is recorded on the OSVS form along with the completed, in-progress or proposed resolutions. The single remaining Cable Tray & Conduit Raceway outlier is summarized in Section 9.2 and also included in Table 9.2 as outlier 061.

TABLE 9.1 OPEN GENERAL INTERACTION ISSUES l

l ID EQUIPMENT ISSUE FINDING RESOLUTION OPTION G1 Lights over SSEL in a few instances, smaller than Verify adequacy of light equipment. normal size chains were supporting chains in the process observed supporting overhead buildings. Replace any chains lights. that are not adequate.

G2 High pressure gas in one instance, a gas bottle was Survey gas bottles in the bottle. secured with a horizontal chain process buildings to assure that at a single location. restraints are adequate for seismic loads. Revise PNPS Procedure 1.4.36 to require two restraints in lieu of the currently specified single restraint. Modify any restraints that are not adequate.

G3 Fire extinguishers Supporting knobs were observed Survey supports to assure that to be less than %* high in some extinguisher can't fall off and be instances. subject to damage. Replace any supports that are not adequate. l l

l l

9-1

.- , , _ . . . . ~ . - - _.-. -- . ...-- - .-.

4 i PNPS A-46 Final Report j September,1996

• Revision 0 TABLE 9.2 l A46 OPEN EQUIPMENT OUTLIERS ID EQUIPMENT OUTLIER FINDING RESOLUTION OPTION O1 RBCCW shielded RBCCW shielded sample Confirm adequacy of equipment sample chambers chambers T214A & T214B are capacity and anchorage. i T214A & T214B Class 0 items. As a result their capacity cannot be established by the GIP. In addrtion, they are anchored by friction clips, which are not a recognized form of anchorage according to the GlP.

05 MCC B10 Demand per Conservative IRS Verify adequacy of equipment exceeds seismic capacity. capacity.

O6 MCC's B17, B20, D7 MCC's have spatial interactions Resolve spatialinteractions based

& D10 with MCC enclosures. on evaluation or modification.

08 480V Switchgear 81 480V Switchgear B1 does not Confirm anchorage adequacy and have front anchorage. Uplift is resolve the spatial interaction based not a concern but distortion may on additional evaluation or degrade switchgear capacity. B1 modification.

also has a spatialinteraction with a cable tray.

09 480V Switchgear B3 480V Switchgear B3 will not be Perform internal inspection including deenergized until Refueling anchor bolt check. Complete Outage 11 in April 1997 and as a screening and document results in a result was not accessible due to SEWS revision.

electrical safety concerns. Anchor bolt tightness cannot be perforr,1ed Internalinspection including anchor bolt checks must be done. The switchgear is an outlier for these reasons.

O10 4160V Switchgear A6 4160V Switchgear A6 has three Resolve spatialinteractions based spatialinteractions with cable on evaluation or modification.

tray and conduit. ,

1 011 RBCCW Pumps RBCCW Pumps P202A, B & C Resolve potentialinteraction based P202A, '202B & have a potential interaction on evaluation of duct supports.

P202C hazard with a ventilation duct located above which has an unusual support system.

012 SSW Pumps Demand per Conservative IRS Demonstrate that actual capacity P208A P2088, exceeds Capacity. The pumps exceeds demand based on review of P208C, P208D & also do not satisfy the column existing vendor component P208E length caveats. qualification.

9-2

PNPS A-46 Final Repri Septernber,1996 Revision 0 014 Motor operated valves Motor operated valves do not Demonstrate that actual capacity MO1400-24A & meet the GIP screening enteria. exceeds demand based on review of MO1400-24B valve analysis on file or by alternate methods.

015 Motor operated valves Motor operated valves do not Demonstrate that actual capacity M01400-25A & meet the GlP operator weight exceeds demand based on review of MO1400-25B limits or pass a 3g load valve analysis on file or by alternate evaluation. methods.

016 Motor operated valve Motor operated valve MO1400- Determine that actual valve MO1400-4B 48 has a potentialinteraction movements are less than the involving the handwheel and clearance or modify platform.

motor casing and an adjacent platform.

018 CRHEAFS supply CRHEAFS supply fans VSF-103A Demonstrate that capacity of fans VSF103A & & VSF-1038 motor and fan are vibration isolators exceeds demand VSF1038 not mot nted on a common base by addrtional evaluation or modify to  ;

and are supported by rubber provide adequate capacity. Address i vibration isolators with unknown the fact that drive motor and fan are  !

capacity. not on a common base. j l

019 CRHEAFS dampers Demand per Conservative IRS Demonstrate that actual capacity AOX1, AOX3, AOX4, exceeds capacity. exceeds demand based on i AOX6 and CRHEAFS additional evaluation.

backdraft dampers  ;

VSF103A-BDD and  !

VSF1038-BDD j O20 Equipment area Equipment area coolers are Demonstrate that capacity of coolers: supported on rubber vibration vibration isolators exceeds demand  ;

VAC201 A,VAC201B, isolators of unknown capacity. by additional evaluation or VAC202A,VAC202B, modification.

VAC203A,VAC203B, VAC204A, VAC204B, VAC204C, VAC204D, .

VAC207A, VAC-2078, VAC207C,VAC2070, and drywell equipment area coolers:

VAC205B-1, VAC2058-2, VAC205C-1, &

VAC205C-2 021 Equipment area Equipment area cooler backdraft Demonstrate that anchorage is cooler backdraft dampers VAC204A-BDD & adequate or modify.

dampers VAC204A- VAC2048-BDD are supported on BDD & VAC2048- structural steel in an BDD unconventional manner. They could be postulated to slide. The seismic review team recommended further evaluation to resolve the outlier.

9-3

PNPS A-46 Final R1 port September,1996 Revision 0  ;

O22 CRHEAFS Filter Demand per Conservative IRS Demonstrate that capacity exceeds Heaters VCRF-101A exceeds capacity. demand by additional evaluation.

& VCRF-101B O23 The ductwork The ductwork plenums connected Evaluate the potential spray hazard plenums connected to to the duct supporting VD206A, to the diesel generators. This duct supporting VD206B, VD206C & VD206D evaluation will be conducted under j VD206A, VD206B, have potential seismic Problem Report Pr195.9494. Fix VD206C & VD206D interactions with a pressurized degraded plenum wall base water filled 1/2" dia. wet pilot line anchorage and degraded plenum for the Pilotex spray nozzles hangers.

which are part of the fire protection system for the Diesel DG A Duct Base -WRT35485 was Generators. A broken wet pilot written to initiate repairs.

line may be a spray hazard which could affect the diesel DG A Rod Hanger-WRT35486 was j generators. Limited degradation written to initiate repairs.

of the plenum wall base anchorage in one instance and DG B Rod Hanger - WRT35486 was 1 two instances of degraded written to initiate repairs. I plenum hangers were also observed.

026 RPS and NSSS Racks have a potential Relocate scaffold member . Will be Instrument Rack interaction hazard involving a resolved by FRN 96-01-13. This C2205A & C2205B nearby scaffold and a fence that FRN has been issued for is not properly braced. construction. l l

Brace fence. Will be resolved by FRN 96-01-45. This FRN has been issued for construction.

O28 HPCI Instrument Racks have a potential Secure cart. Will be resolved by FRN Racks C2250A & interaction hazard involving a 96-01-45. This FRN has been issued C22508 nearby cart on wheels that may for construction. ,

impact the rack. '

030 Jet Pump Instrument Jet Pump Instrument Racks Resolve spatial interactions based Rack C2252A & C2252A & C2252B have a on evaluation or modification.

C2252B spatial interaction hazard between C2252A and adjacent rack C2204. There is no gap and the racks are not bolted together.

O32 CRHEAFS Flow Demand per Conservative IRS Demonstrate that actual capacity Switches FSE-101 & exceeds capacity. exceeds demand by additional FSE-102 evaluation.

O33 Level Switch LS2351A Level switch has a potential Resolve spatialinteractions based spatial interaction with adjacent on evaluation or modification.

instrument 9-LS-5066.

034 CRHEAFS humidity Demand per Conservative IRS Demonstrate that actual capacity switches RHS-1 A & exceeds capacity. exceeds demand by addrtional RHS-1B evaluation.

9-4

_ _ _ _ _ _ . - . - . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . ._ __ . .___.. _ . -_._m m. . ._ .

PNPS A-46 Final Rtport Septernber,1996 l Revision 0 l 0 35 CRHEAFS Demand per Conservative IRS Demonstrate that actual capacity 4

temperature switches exceeds capacity. exceeds demand by additional j TS1A,TS1B,TS2A, evaluation.

TS2B, TS3A, TS3B, TS4A & TS4B

0 36 TSD45 & TSD46 Equipment area cooler controls Will be resolved by FRN 95-01-66 j TSD45 & TSD46 are located which revises the grating details.

below unsecured grating which is This FRN has been issued for 4

an interaction hazard for the construction.

1 controls.

037 Diesel Generator A Diesel Generator A Control Resolve spatial interactions based j Control Panels Panels C103A, C103B & C103C on evaluation or modification.

1 C103A, C103B & have spatialinteractions with a l C103C conduit exiting the cabinet roof i that is in contact with a wall

! bracket. There also is a rod hung 1' fire pipe that can swing into the conduit.

j 038 Panel C110 C110 is an outlier because it is Verify and document anchorage i mounted to a block wall. The qualification blockwall is safety-related however the GIP does not cover anchors installed in block walls.

i I

O39 RPS Analog Trip There is a spatialinteraction with Resolve spatial interaction based on l Cabinets C2228-A1, the conduit entry box on the evaluation or modification.

4 C2228-A2, C2229-81 cabinet roofs because it is j & C2229-B2 fastened to exterior framing and not the cabinets and could impact the cabinets.

040 Analog Trip System Cabinet has a potential Resolve spatial interaction based on

Cabinet C22338 interaction with an overhead light evaluation or modification.  ;

, which could swing and hit the cabinet.

i 041 RHR A Loop RHR A Loop Instrument Rack Verify the computer device seismic Instrument Rack C2261 contains a computer capacity considering the gap at the C2261 device identified as a Kaye base.

Instruments " Solid State Scanner". This item is well mounted; however, seismic 1

capacity is unknown. The cabinet anchorage is adequate from a strength standpoint, but the cabinet has a 3/8' gap along the east edge which exceeds the GIP allowed %' gap in cabinets.

i, a

i 4

G 9-5 1

d

. PNPS A-46 Final Report SeptImber,1996 Revision 0 4

) 043 Main Control Panel Control Panel C903 is an outlier Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor 1 4

C903 because of anchor bolt conditions. 1 condrtions. The outlying anchor l

. conditions are; two anchors with

greater than %* gap, two anchors

are bottomed out and not fully engaged and seven anchors with slotted holes. The anchorage evaluation neglected the outlier '

i

! bolts and was successful from a

strength standpoint.

j 044 Main Control Panel Control Panel C904 is an outlier Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor C904 because of anchor bolt conditions.

condrtions. The outlying anchor conditions are; seven anchors with greater than %* gap, and two anchors are bottomed out and ,

not fully engaged. Anchors with greater than %* gap are a relay concern. The anchorage evaluation neglected the outlier bolts and was successful from a strength standpoint.

045 Main Control Panel Control Panel C905 is an outlier Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor C905 because of anchor bolt conditions.

conditions. The outlying anchor conditions are; four anchors with greater than %* gap, two anchors with slotted holes. Anchors with greater than %* gap are a relay concern. The anchorage evaluation neglected the outlier bolts and was successful from a strength standpoint.

046 Main Control Panel The C927 anchorage strength Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor C927 evaluation is acceptable. Outlying conditions.

anchors were observed but were not included in the strength evaluation .The outlying anchor conditions are; two anchors not fully engaged and seven anchors with slotted holes.

9-6

- _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . _ - - . . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . - . . . .

I j 1

PNPS A-46 Fird Report Stptember,1996 Revision 0 t

l 048 Panel C1 - Anchor The anchorage strength is Resolve / evaluate outlying ancht I i anomalies acceptable. An outlying anchor condition.

! was observed but was not included in the strength i evaluation ,The outlying anchor I j condition is one anchor with an I i approximately 1/8' gap.

l Panel C2 - Anchor The anchorage strength is Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor ,

anomalies acceptable. An outlying anchor condition. l 4

was observed but was not

included in the strength

! evaluation. The outlying anchor -1 condition is one anchor with an i j approximately 1/8" gap.

i

, Panel C8- Anchor The anchorage strength is Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor j anomalies acceptable. An outfying anchor condition.

was observed but was not 1 included in the strength j evaluation. The outlying anchor condition is one anchor on a high

. stack of shims.

i .

Panel C10 - Anchor Panel is not in the A46 scope but Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor anomalies an outlying anchor was observed. condition.

The outlying anchor condit:0n is one anchor on a high stack of shims.

Panel C910- Anchor The anchorage strength is Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor anomalies acceptable. An outlying anchor condition, was observed but was not included in the strength evaluation The outlying anchor condition is one anchor which was not fully engaged.

Panel C921 - Anchor The anchorage strength is Resolve / evaluate outlying anchor anomalies acceptable. An outlying anchor condition.

was observed but was not included in the strength evaluation. The outlying anchor condition is one anchor which  ;

was not fully engaged.

049 Vertical Board C930 There is a spatialinteraction Resolve spatial interactions based  !

and C932 hazard between C930 and C932 on evaluation or modification.

which are bolted together and adjacent vertical board C938 is not bolted to the line-up. There is no gap.

0 51 PanelD33 033 has a spatialinteraction Resolve spatial interactions based hazard involving a 6.5* fire pipe on evaluation or modification.

which is hard against an attached conduit. This is a relay concern.

9-7

. - - _ _ _- - _ - = -

PNPS A-46 Final Report Septernber,1973 ,

Revision 0 l

052 N/A-45-1 (RPIS This item is located in C927 and Determine seismic capacity of card Translational consists of printed circuit cards mounts and card rack and establish Electronics) mounted in a hinged rack. This that capacity exceeds demand. i an outlier because the seismic l capacity of the card mounts and l card rack is not known.

053 PanelY12 Panel has a potential spatial Resolve spatial interactions based interaction with an overhead duct on evaluation or modification.

that might swing and hit an attached conduit.

0 59 J600,J602,J603, J600, J602, J605 and J606 - The J600, J602, J605 and J606 - Fudher J604, J605 & J606 subject junction boxes house evaluation is required to essential relays. The duct the demonstrate that the duct structure junction boxes are attached to is is adequate to support the essential well supported from an overall relays.

standpoint however the local portion of the duct at the junction box attachment is flexible light gage sheet metal and has a low estimated frequency.

J603 & J604 - These junction boxes are located adjacent t J603 & J604 - 1) Verify that actual each other and supported by a capacity exceeds demand based on l horizontal run of duct. The duct additional evaluation.

has flexible supports and as a result a low estimated frequency.

The following outlying conditions Verih ht h M she is adequate to support the essential exist: 1) Demand per Mays-Conservative IRS exceeds capacity.

3) resolve the potential spatial interaction.

2) The duct has a low estimated frequency . Structural adequacy to support relays should be 4) Fix two strap hangers. WRT demonstrated 035491 written to initiate repair.

3) The duct has a potential interaction with adjacent cable tray support frames.

4) Two unattached strap hangers were observed on the duct.

060 MO202-5A & MO202- Flex from motor operator passes Resolve the potential rubbing SB through an opening in the grating interaction by locally modifying the at Elev. 23' in the drywell. There grating opening.

is a potential rubbing interaction between the flex and the grating.

9-8

._ m . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .__ . _ . _ __ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . _

PNPs A-46 Final Riport septrmber,1996 Revision 0 061 Cable Tray and A interaction hazard consisting of Resolve interaction hazard based on Conduit Outlier an unanchored hot water tank evaluation or modification.

located on a platform above safety related cenduit was identified in the Machine Shop area of the Radwaste Building at elevation 23.0'.

i 064 C61 1) Panel base detail has thin Demonstrate adequacy of panel material (10 ga.) with an details and anchorage based on eccentric load path, and evaluation or modification.

2) the anchorage type is not covered by the GIP.

065 C208 C208 is classified as an outlier Resolve spatialinteractions based because it is potentially subject to on evaluation or modification.

vibration resulting from the spatial interaction between MCC B17 and its environmental enclosure.

066 MO4038A thru F, These valves are located in the Perform inspection including anchor MO4039A thru F, drywell and are inaccessible anchorage check. Complete MO4040A, B and during plant operation. The screening and document results in a MO4041 A, B valves are classified as outliers SEWS revision. ,

pending successful completion of l walkdown screening and j evaluation. 1 067 VAC205B1-BDD, These backdraft dampers are Perform inspection including anchor I VAC205B2-BDD, located in the drywell and are anchorage check. Complete VAC205C1-BDD, inaccessible during plant screening and document results in a VAC205C2-BDD, operation. The backdraft SEWS revision.

VAC20SE1-BDD, dampers are classified as outliers VAC205E2-BDD, pending successful completion of VAC205F1-BDD, walkdown screening and VAC205F2-BDD, evaluation.  !

VAC206A1-BDD, VAC206A2-BDD, VAC20681-BDD&

VAC206B1-BDD 9.2 Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Systems Outlier Resolution The Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Review, included as Appendix F, identified eight (8) of the twenty-five (25) LARs as outliers. LAR #s 3,11,12,13,14,15,21 and 22 are analytical out!iers and were resolved during the analysis phase. An additional falling hazard outlier consisting of a srnall unanchored hot water tank located on a platform above sorne wall mounted safety related conduit was identified in the Machine Shop area of the Radwaste Building at elevation 23.0'. This outlier is the only cable tray and conduit outlier awaiting resolution. It is identified as outlier 061 and included in Table 9.2 above.

9-9

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. ._ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ ___ . . . _ _ _ . _ . . . .__._ _ . . _ -_ m . _ . _ . . .

I PNPs A-46 FinalRtport september.1996 Revision O 9.3 Alternate Reactor Building In-Structure Spectra for Outfier Resolution Section 3.0 discusses the in-structure spectra contained in BECo Specification C-114, entitled

" Seismic Response Spectra ". These licensing basis design response spectra are approved by the staff for resolution of USl A-46, and have been used for the seismic screening evaluation results contained in this report. Boston Edison proposes as an additional option the use of alternative Reactor Building in-structure response spectra contained in Appendix G [ Reference 17]. These spectra were previously considered by the NRC staff as the basis to justify treating portions the Specification C-114 spectra as Conservative Design. Based on a recent request, the previously submitted supporting documentation for the spectra is currently undergoing staff review. These alternative Reactor Building spectra use time history inputs based on a R.G.

1.60 ground response spectral shape, with a control point in the free field at ground grade, anchored at Pilgrim's 0.15g Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) Response is calculated using a

! new, state-of-the-art, three dimensional finite element building model, soil-structure interaction analyses, and in accordance with the intent of the guidance contained in NRC Standard Review Plan NUREG 0800 Section 3.7.1 and 3.7.2. Although not required for the completion of outlier resolution, we would propose the use of the alternate Reactor Building in-structure response spectra upon NRC approval.

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PNPs A-46 Final R1 port septiminf.1996 Revision 0

10. References

1) Generic Letter 87-02," Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety issue (USI) A-46

• USNRC, Washington, D.C., February 19,1987.

2) " Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment ", Revision 2, Corrected,2/14/92, Seismic Qualification Utility Group.

3) " Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 (SSER #2) on GIP-2 " USNRC, Washington, D.C., May 22,1992.

4) " Safety Evaluation of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Response to Generic Letter 87-02 ", Supplement 1, USNRC, Washington, D.C., November 18,1992.

5) " Reevaluation of the Approach for Developing Floor Response Spectra for the Resolution of USl A-46 (Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1) " USNRC, Washington, D.C., June 17,1994.

6) " Response to Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 87-02 on SQUG Resolution of USI A-46 " Letter No. BECo 92-109, R.A. Anderson (BECo) to USNRC, September 21, 1992.

7) Not Used

8) " Additional Response to Genenc Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 " Letter No. BECo 94-016, E.T. Boulette (BECo) to USNRC, February 9,1994.

9) " Standard Review Plan "- NUREG 0800, USNRC, Washington, D.C.  !

10) BECo, " Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station "

11) " Seismic Response Spectra " BECo Specification No. C-114-ER-0, Revision EO, March 3,1989.

12) EPRI Report NP-5228-SL, " Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment Anchorage (Revision 1). " Volume 1, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, prepared by URS/ John A. Blume & Associates Engineers, June,1991.

13) Not Used l

14) Boston Edison Company, " Safe Shutdown Equipment List Report for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station", Revision 0, September 1996.

15) BECo Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, " Relay Evaluation Report for Resolution of USI A-46 ", Revision 0, September 1996.

16) BECo Nuclear Engineering Civil / Structural Department Memo 96-82 (NESD 96-82), "

" Types of Concrete Anchors in Use at Pilgrim Station ", dated May 1,1996.

17) " Request for Approval of Alternate Reactor Building Response Spectra " Letter No.

BECo 94-036, E.T. Boulette(BECo) to USNRC, April 1,1994.

18) " Peer Review of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Resolution of USl A-46 " Letter No.91C2672A, LTR8.22, John D. Stevenson (Stevenson and Associates) to Mr.

Charles Pitts ( BECo), February 19,1996.

19) EPRI Report NP-5228-SL, " Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment Anchorage (Revision 1). " Volume 4, " Guidelines on Tanks and Heat Exchangers",

Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, prepared by URS/ John A. Blume &

Associates, Engineers, June,1991.

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PNPS A-46 Final Report s*ptember,1996 Revision 0

11. Appendix A: Seismic Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)

This report is based on the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List. The Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List is included in Reference 14.

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1 PNPS A-46 Final Riport l September,1996 1 Revision 0

12. Appendix B: SSEL Panels and Cabinets Housing Essential Relays Table 12.1 SSEL Panels and Cabinets Housing Essential Relays ID DESCRIPTION AS 4KV Emergency Bus A6* 4KV Emergency Bus AA504 4KV Undervoltage Relay Cabinet AA604 4KV Undervoltage Relay Cabinet B1

• 480V Emergency Bus Load Center B10 Swing MCC B14 MCC B15 MCC B17

• MCC B18 MCC (with Enc'osure)

B20* MCC (with Enclosure)

B2 480V Emergency Bus Load Center B3 480V Emergency Bus Load Center B4 480V Emergency Bus Load Center 86 480V Emergency Swing Bus LC C1 Feedwater& Cond Bench Board C101 DG A Generator Control C102 DG B Generator Control C103B

• DG A Engine Control Panel C103C

• DG A Engine Gage Panel C1048 DG B Engine Control Panel C104C DG B Engine Gage Panel C208* Drywell Cooling Fan Train A Relay Rack C209 Drywell Cooling Fan Train B Relay Rack l C2201 Core Spray A Instrument Rack C2228-A1* Analog Trip Cabinet A1 C2228-A2* Analog Trip Cabinet A2 C2229-81* Analog Trip Cabinet 81 C2229-82* Analog Trip Cabinet B1 C2233A Analog Tnp System C2233B

• Analog Trip System C2250A

• HPCI instrument Rack C22508

• HPCI instrument Rack C2257A HPCI instrument Rack i C2257B RCIC Instrument Rack l

C2258 RCIC Instrument Rack C2260 Core Spray B instrument Rack C5 Protective Relaying C6 Load Shedding Panel C89 Diesel A Vent Control Panel C90 Diesel B Vent Control Panel C903

• Rx & Cont Cooling Bench Board C904

• Rx Wtr Cinup Recire Bench Board C905

• Rx Control Bench Board 12-1

_ -.. . - . . . _ - . - ~ . .- .

.- ~_... .. . -... - . ,.-. _ . . .

PNPS A-46 Final Rrport j September,1996 Revision 0 l l

Cw .5 Channel A Prim isol & Rx Prot 1 C917 Channel B Prim Isol & Rx Prot )

C928 Rod Manual Control Panel l C930

• RCIC Relay Vertical Board ,

j C932

• Channel A Vertical Board  !

C933 Channel B Vertical Board

, C939 HPCI Relay Vertical Board l

C941 Prim Cont isol Relay Cab Pnbd I 1 C942 Prim Cont isol Relay Cab Outbd l

D32 D16 Contri Logic Y10 Switching

. D33* D17 Contri Logic Y10 Switching j D7* 125VDC MOV MCC D8 125VDC MOV MCC D9 250'; '9 MCC r

J315 Junction Box housing Essential Relays TS1360-15A & 's S1360-17A J317 Junction Box housing Essential Relay TS1360-17B J599 Junction Box housing Essential Relays TS1360-14C & TS1360-16C i JG00

• Junction Box housing Essential Relays TS1360-15C & TS1360-17C J601 Junction Box housing Essential Relay TS1360-16D J602

• Junction Box housing Essential Relay TS1360- )

17D J603

• Junction Box housing Essential Relays TS2370C

& TS2372C J604

• Junction Box housing Essential Relays TS2370D l

& TS2372D I J605

• Junction Box housing Essential Relays TS2371C l

& TS2373C ,

J606

• Junction Box housing Essential Relays TS2371D l

& TS2373D X107A DG A Engine & Generator X1078 DG B Engine & Generator Y10 125VDC Control Power Trans Y11 Auto Transfer Switch for Y1 Y12* Auto Transfer Switch for Y2 Notes:

1. The

• symbol denotes the associated piece of equipment has an outlier condition which involves a spacial interaction, a gap at an anchor or other cond;tions which require resolution in equipment supporting essential relays.

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PNPS A-46 Final Report September,1996 Revision 0

13. Appendix C: Walkdown Personnel Resumes l

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l WALTER DJORDJEVIC EDUCATION:

B.S. - Civil Engineering, University of Wisconsin at Madison,1974 M.S. - Structural Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1976 REGISTRATION:

State of California, State of Wisconsin, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of Michigan PROFESSIONAL HISTORY:

Stevenson & Associates, Inc., President 1953 - present; Vice President and General Manager of the Boston area office, 1983-1995 URS/ John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers, Boston, Massachusetts, General Manager, 1980 -1983; San Francisco, California, Superviscy Engineer, 1979 -1980 Impell Corporation, San Francisco, California, Senior Engineer, 1976 -1979 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston, Massachusetts, Engineer, 1974 -1976 .

l PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Mr. Djordjevic founded the Stevenson & Associates Boston area office in 1983 and serves as President and General Manager. He has performed over a thousand hours of onsite seismic walkdowns for using the EPRI - SQUG methodology for resolution of the USI A-46 and seismic IPEEE issues. He is one of the most experienced seismic walkdown, screening and verification engineers having personally participated in seismic walkdowns at 26 U.S. nuclear units. I In 1994 he performed seismic walkdowns and analysis of the Tooele Chemical Demilitarization Facility in support of a seismic quantitative risk assessment. Prior to the formulation of the current seismic screening criteria, Mr. Djordjevic performed seismic analyses at the eight SEP nuclear plants, and prototype seismic screening walkdowns on the Hanford Purex facility, and the Savannah River L and P ,

reactors.  !

l i

Under contract to the SQUG, Mr. Djordjevic authored sections of the Generic Implementation Procedure, now in broad use for seismic walkdown screening methodologies. Together with other S&A engineers, Mr. Djordjevic developed GENRS, a of the software product sponsored by the SQUG which establishes in-cabinet amplification factors for GIP relay evaluations.

Mr. Djordjevic is exped in the area of seismic fragility analysis and dynamic qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment. He has padicipated in and managed over twenty major projects involving the evaluation and qualification of vibration sensitive equipment and seismic hardening of equipment.

As demonstrated by his committee work and publications, Mr. Djordjevic has participated in and contributed steadily to the development of equipment qualification and vibration hardening methodology.

1 PROFESSIONAL GROUPS:

Member, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Nuclear Power Engineering Committee Working Group SC 2.5 (IEEE-344)

Chairman, American Society of Civil Engineers Nuclear Structures and Materials Committee, Working Group for the Analysis and Design of Electrical Cable Support Systems Member, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation, Application, and Components ,

Committee on Valves, Working Group SC-5 l l

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THOMAS J. TRACY EDUCATION:

B.S. - Civil Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute'- 1972 M.S. - Structural Engineering, Northeastern University - 1976 MBA - Worcester Polytechnic Institute - (1996)

REGISTRATION:

Commonwealth of Massachusetts PROFESSIONAL HISTORY:

Stevenson & Associates, Inc., Woburn Massachusetts, Vice President,1989 - present Boston Edison Company, Braintree Massachusetts, Civil / Structural Division Manager, 1982 -1989 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston Massachusetts, Marketing Engineer 1980 - 1982, Structural Engineer 1979 - 1980, Engineer 1972 -1979 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Mr. Tracy has twenty four years experience, primarily in the Civil and Structural Engineering of large  !

nuclear power generation facilities. His experience covers: 1) direct performance of Civil Engineering; )

2) supervision of a utility Civil Engineering Division; and, 3) financial, legal, insurance, and marketing activities for a large full service Architect Engineering firm. As a Vice President for Stevenson &

Associates he is responsible for marketing and project management. He served as project manager on the IPEEE/A-46 projects for the Boston Edison Co., the Omaha Public Power District, and the New York Power Authority. He also served as the S&A project manager for the seismic probabilistic safety assessment of the four Chemical Demilitarization Facilities for the U.S. Army. He holds SQUG certification as a seismic walkdown engineer, and completed the EPRI IPEEE add on certification training.

1 As the Nuclear Engineering Civil / Structural Division Manager for an operating utility, he exercised l responsibilities for both technical and administrative management. During this time, he was responsible for capital projects totaling over 540 million, and an annual operating budget of $1 million.

His responsibilities as a Division Manager included review and approval of all design changes, and i development, review, revision and implementation of engineering department procedures. j Mr. Tracy conceived of and implemented the first Standing Design Change package for Boston Edison.  ;

The Standing Design Change represents a concept whereby individual design modifications that satisfy strict technical scope and administrative limitations may be released in a streamlined fashion. He also implemented a design speufication development program that produced over two dozen general use specifications for ongoing operations, maintenance and modification support.

As a Division Manager, he assumed Department level management assignments including overall budget management of a $9 million operating budget, and approval authority over all Nuclear Engineering Department purchase orders totaling $10 million annually.

He spent 15 months on a four unit nuclear power construction site as the resident Structural Engineer with responsibility for evaluation and authorization of all field change requests. During this period he developed and implemented a design control process for field pipe supports and electrical hangers, i supervising the activities of twelve designers. l He spent three years on a developmental project to assemble prevailing design concepts for nuclear plants into an optimum composite concept called the Reference Plant. This activity involved developing interdisciplinary design control processes as well as actual design configuration.

INTERESTS:

Mr. Tracy served on the Town school board continuously from 1980 through 1992, serving four years as Chairman and as six years as Vice Chairman. He also chaired the Uxbridge School Building Committee responsible for a $9 million renovation to three school facilities that was successfully completed within the original budget.

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JOHN J. O'SULLIVAN EDUCATION:

MS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,1988 BSE - Princeton University,1983 PROFESSIONAL HISTORY:

Stevenson & Associates, Woburn, MA, Group Manager,1996 - present; Senior Engineer,1988 -

1995 Drsper Laboratories, Camb idge, MA, Draper Fellow, 1986-1988 RCA Astro-Electronics, Hightstown, NJ, Design Engineer, 1983 -1986 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

l Mr. O'Sullivan is currently a Group Manager at S&A. His background includes design, analysis and testing of civil and mechanical structures, development of analytical software packages, and project j engineering of comprehensive structural evaluation programs in recent years, he has been extensively '

involved in seismic evaluation of civil structures and mechanical equipment for the nuclear power industry.

He has completed training as a Seismic Qualification Engineer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's USl A-46 program for the seismic verification of electrical and mechanical equipment at operating nuclear power facilities. He served as the Project Engineer for the Monticello A-46 project, performing screening walkdowns and analyses, preparing the final report, and performing outlier resolution. He has also conducted A-46 walkdowns at Pilgrim and has performed walkdowns and  ;

analysis for the NRC's Individual Plant Examination for External Events program at Millstone Point (Units 1 and 2) and Connecticut Yankee.

Mr. O'Sullivan is an accompl;shed structural analyst. He has been responsible for the generation of in-structure response spectra used in A-46 and IPEEE evaluations, and has performed numerous fragility evaluations on civil structures and equipment. Mr. O'Sullivan contributed to the development of EPRl/SQUG Generic implementation Procedure for resolution of USI A-46. He is a co-author of EPRI Report NP-7146 related to seismic response of electrical cabinets and principal investigator for the recent EPRl/SQUG effort to expand the scope of the methods presented in NP-7146. He also performed much of the in-situ testing that forms the basis for those efforts Mr. O'Sullivan also has extensive knowledge on the seismic fragility of vertical storage tanks.

Mr. O'Sullivan has extensive computer and software development skills and has created a number of commercial, PC based, engineering software packages. Applications include analysis of equipment base anchorage by using linear programming theory (program ANCHOR), a Windows-based program for the analysis of motor operated valves (MOVALVE), and a Windows-based program for seismic response of buildings and equipment (EDASPw).

Mr. O'Sullivan is also actively involved in prediction, measurement and control of vibration in microelectronics facilities. For clients such as IBM, DEC, and Motorola, he has conducted site surveys, performed vibration testing and consulted on facility structural design.

While at RCA Astro-Electronics and Draper Laboratories, Mr. O'Sullivan was involved in the design and analysis of spacecraft structures. His experience includes structural design of Space Shuttle payloads, analysis of Space Station design concepts, and performance analysis of space-based structures under active control.

KEY PUBLICATIONS:

" Guidelines for Development of in-Cabinet Seismic Demand for Devices Mounted in Electrical Cabinets," with Walter Djordjevic, EPRI NP-7146-SL R1, June 1995.

" Vibration Monitoring in Microelectronics Facilities," SPIE Symposium on Optical Science and Engineering, Vol.1619, November,1991.

" Guidelines for Development of In-Cabinet Amplified Response Spectra for Electrical Bench-boards and Panels," with Walter Djordjevic, EPRI NP-7146-SCCML, December,1990.

RESUME Name: William R. Kline Position: Group Manager Group: Nuclear Engineering Services EDUCATlON M.B.A., Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA M.S., Civil Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA B.S., Civil Engineering, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION Registered Professional Engineer PE-030579-E - Pennsylvania SPECIALTIES / EXPERTISE SQUG Certification: SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course.

Seismic IPE Add-On Training Course EXPERIENCE PROFILE Total Years Engineering Experience: 18 Employer Position Function BECo Group Manager Nuclear Engineering Services Group:

Manager responsible for Mechanical, Civil / Structural, Electrical, Inst umentation & Control, Systems

& Safety Analysis, and Materials Engineering support management.

Dept. Manager Production Engineering Department Manager responsible for engineering support of BECo fossil generating stations.

Division Manager Civil / Structural Engineering and staff management.

! Senior Engineer Civil / Structural Design Engineering assignments.

PA Pwr. & Light Project Engineer Civil / Structural Design Engineering assignments.

Dated 7/5/96

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RESUME )

t Name: John G. Dyckman Position: Principal Engineer Department: Civil / Structural / Mechanical Group: Nuclear Engineering EDUCATION i

M.S., Civil Engimering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA B.S., Civil Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION l Registered Professional Engineer #27157 - Massachusetts

]'

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS American Society Of Civil Engineers, Member SPECIALTIES / EXPERTISE SQUG Certification: SQUG Waikdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course EXPERIENCE PROFILE Total Years Engineering Experience: 30 Employer Position Function BECo Principal Engineer Civil / Structural engineering and staff assignments Cygna Engineering Manager Engineering consulting i

Stone & l Webster Sr. Structural Engineer Power plant engineering and design l

Dated 5/28/96

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l RESUME  !

Name: Subhash C. Chugh Position: Senior Engineer Department: Mechanical / Civil / Structural EDUCATION i l

MBA, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL j BS, Civil Engineering, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India j SPECIALTIES / EXPERTISE Structural Engineering Project Management Field Construction Management SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Certification Relay Seismic Qualification EXPERIENCE PROFILE Total Engineering Experience 26 Years Nuclear Industry Experience 20 Years FossilIndustry Experience 1 Year Petroleum / Refining Industry Experit ice 3 Years Commercial EnglArchitectural Industry Experience 2 Years Dated 8/13/96

_ _ _ _ . . . - _ . . _ _ _ - _ . _ . . . _ . ~ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . . _ . . _ _

RESUME i Name: Jeffrey A. Kalb l

Position: Senior Engineer Department: Civil / Structural / Mechanical Group: Nuclear Engineering '

EDUCATION i

B.S., Civil Engineering, University of Rhode Island l SPECIALTIES / EXPERTISE ,

SQUG Certification: SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course EXPERIENCE PROFILE Total Years Engineering Experience: 23  ;

Emplover Position Function BECo Senior Engineer Civil / Structural engineering and staff assignments Impell Supervisor Engineering consulting I Cygna Supervisor Engineering consulting Stone &

Webster Structural Engineer Power plant engineering and design Dated 5/29/96 i

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RESUME Name: Charles T. Pitts Position: Senior Engineer Department: Civil / Structural / Mechanical Group: Nuclear Engineering EDUCATION M.S., Civil Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA B.S., Civil Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION Registered Professional Engineer #28351 - Massachusetts PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS American Society Of Civil Engineers, Member SPECIALTIES / EXPERTISE Structural Engineering Safety System Modifications Field Engineering and Design SQUG - Generic Implementation Plan (GIP) Evaluations and Reviews EXPERIENCE PROFILE Total Years Engineering Experience: 25 ,

Years Nuclear Experience: 20 Construction / Site Experience: 15 Dated 5/17/96

)

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PNPS A-46 Final Report September,1996 Revison 0

14. Appendix D: Screening Verification Data Sheets (SVDS) l l

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Page#1 05/20/96 3.47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS)

Bldg. FiEL Rm of Rw/Cl Base Et c407 Cap. Dernd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Ecur Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Dese OK7 OK7 Spec. Spec Demd? OK? OK7 Cl No RB 23.00 72 HCU 23.00 N/A DOC RRS NC Yes No Ye*

0 HCU-EAST 1 03 / RPS CRD HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT No RB 23.00 73 HCU 23 00 N/A DOC RRS No - Yes No Yes O HCU-WEST 1 031 RPS CRD HYDRAULIC CONTROL UNIT 10 00 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV1401-288 1 14 / Core Spray B Discharge Relef RB RW 37.00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes ",es 15 147R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lighting Unit RW 37.00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 148R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lghting Unit RW 37.00 CR 37 00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 149R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lghting Und RV" 37.00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 150R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lghting Und RW 37.00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 151R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lghting Und RW 37.00 CR 37.00 NIA GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 158R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lighting Und RW 37.00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRG Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 160R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lighting Unit RW 37.00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 161R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lghting Und RW 37 00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 162R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lghting Und RW 37.00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 163R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lghting und RW 37.00 CR 37.00 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 164R 0 46 / Emergency AC Lghting Unit Certification: Certificaton:

All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef correct and conclusion (whether venfed te be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capabihty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operatens Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty c:a required, there should be atleast two on the SRT rnatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should be lic nsed rof sional engineer.)

l JG D'/CKMAN l 2 M  % l 5/lb[K Date l Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgnature l

Date l

Pnnt or Type Name S@@tu l W DJORDJEVIC l l l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Signatdre Datd Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i I I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnaturs Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date

- m -.-_ _ - _ . . .. . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ , ,

SCREENING VENN.ATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#2 05/20/96 3 47 PM Eq. ID Rev Syt dq. Desc Bldg. FI Ei. Rm w NCI Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip Eq.

Spec. Spec Demd? OK? OK? OK7 OK?

Cl No RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 N/A DOC RRS No Yes Yes Yes No O PSD-68 0 23 / HPCI TURP dXH RUPTURE DISC 13 / RCIC Exhtust Line Rupture Disc RB -17.50 SW CD -17.50 N/A DOC RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 0 PSD1301-9 0 13 / RCIC Er.aust Line Steam Trap RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 N/A DOC RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 0 ST1301-2 0 13 I RCIC EEhaust Line Steam Trap RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 N/A DOC RRS No Yes Yes Yes No O ST1301-3 0 RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 N/A DOC RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 0 ST2301-5 0 23 / HPCI T JRB EXH DRAIN TO TORUS Yes Yes Yes No 0 ST2301-6 0 23 / HPCi fDRB EXH DRAIN TO TORUS RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 N/A DOC RRS No RB 51.00 RWCU PMP 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P204A 0 30 / RBCLW RWCU PMP COOLING SYSTEh/

RB 51.00 RWCU PMP 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P204B 0 30 / RBCCW RWCU PMP COOLING SYSTFWI RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 X203 1 23 / > PCI Turbme 54 ' riesctor Sample Line isolation RB 51.00 RWCU 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO220-45 0  ;

N / Tip Purge Supply Relief Valve RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV6031 0 12 / RWCU Suction Line isolation RB 51.00 RWCU HT 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1201-5 0 0 12 / RWCU Retum Line tsolaton RB 51.00 RWCU HT 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes f 8 MO1201-80 I 14 / Core Spray A injecten Vane RB 51 ud RWCU HT 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No N/A Yes No E M01400-V O 5.0 3605 0 29 / SSW LP B TBCCW HX OUTLET AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8

• MO3806 0 29 / SSW LP B RBCCW HX OUTLET AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8

8 MO3808 0 29 / SSW LOOP A HEADER ISOL INTK 25.50 A COMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 M O3813 0 29 / SSW LOOP B HEADER ISOL INTK 25 50 BCOMP 38.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N!A Yes Yes 8 MO4065 0 30 / RBCCW FUEL POOL RB 74 00 FP HT EX 74 25 N/A GERS RRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO4083 0 30 / RBCCW HX E2098 BYPASS AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes t 8 MO4084 0 30 t RBCCW HX E209A BYPASS AXBAY 3 00 ACOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes l 8 SV220-45 0 54 / Rx Sampie Line Control Sol RB 51 00 RWCU 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV4569A 0 61/ Turbo Air inlet Valve DG A 23 00 OG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV45698 0 611 Turbo Air Inlet Valve DG B 23 00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV4570A 0 61/ Turbo Air inlet Vane DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV45708 0 61/ Turbo Air inlet Valve DG B 23 00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Certification: Certificaten.

All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operatens j our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and bel.ef, cor ect and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismica!!y adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of an Seismic Capabikty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operatens Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.) I l CT PITTS l I l 84 l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i l W DJORDJEVIC l l Nl l l l Pnnt or Type Name SujrfedrP 'Dat6 Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l 1 1 I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature i Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date fl f

b

_ . . . - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ --_.r- __ e = w. 9=a.-+M e r-r .y - 9--- -

SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page03 05/20/96 3 47 PM Sys/Eq Desc Bldg. F1 El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equto Eq Eq.10 Rev Spec. Spec Demd7 OK? OK1 OK? OK7 Cl No 241 DG X107A Ratator inlet Damper DG A 23 00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 10 VD206A 0 24 / DG X107A Radator inlet Damper DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 10 VD206B 0 24 I DG X1078 Radotor inlet Damper DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 10 VD206C 0 24 / DG X1078 Radiator inet Damper DG B 23 00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 10 VD2060 0 DG A 23 00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VD207A 0 24 i DG Space A Air Inlet Damper DG B 23 00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VD2078 0 24 / DG Space B Air inlet Damper RS -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 11 E201 1 13 / RCIC Bar CondenserNacuum Tank 61/ DG A Air Start Compressor DG A 23 00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 12 K103A 0 46 / Emergency AC Lighting Panet RW 23 00 STAIRWH 37 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 16L 0 RW 23 00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

@ M L 0 46 / Emerg DC Lghting Dest Panet 46 / Panel 25L DC Contacter RW 23 00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes fr C 0 0 45 / Rectre instrument Rack RB 2.90 CRD OD 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2207A 0 45 / Recirc Instrument Rack RB 2.90 CRD OD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C22078 PS37 0 03 / Contro;Vaive Fast Close Relay TB 51.00 TB DECK 51 00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 18 PS38 0 03 / ControiVaive Fast Close Relay TB 51.00 TB DECK 51.00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS3828A 0 29 i SSW LP A PUMP CNTRL & ALARM INTK 25 50 ACOMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS38288 0 29 / SSW LP A PUMP CNTRL & ALARM INTK 25 50 A COMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS3829A 0 29 / SSW LP B PUMP CNTRL & ALARM INTK 25.50 BCOMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS3829B 0 29 i SSW LP B PUMP CNTRL & ALARM INTK 25.50 BCOMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS39 0 03 / ControiValve Fast Close Relay TB 51.00 TB DECK 51 00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS40 0 03 / Contro! Valve Fast Close Relay TB 51.00 TB DECK 51 00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT3828 0 29 / SSW LP A PUMP DISCH. INTK 25 50 ACOMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT3829 0 29 I SSW LP B PUMP DISCH. INTK 25 50 BCOMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 RHS-1A 0 24 / CRHEAF TRA:N A HUMIDITY SW RW 76.00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 18 RHS-1B 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAlN B HUMIDITY SW RW 76.00 #2FRM 81 00 N/A ABS RRS No fes Yes Yes No 20 C1 0 45 / Feedwater & Cond Bench Board RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C108 0 45 / PANEL C108 RW 51.00 #2FRM 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C109 0 45 / PANEL C109 RW 51.00 #2FRM 51 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certification: if D RETCD Feom 5 :S E L cert *caten:

All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belef, correct and accurate. "All informa; ion' includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our know' edge and belef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All eignatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entres and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS Pnnt or Type Name l (

Signature l S!Z2 9h l Dat Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgnature l

Date l

l W DJORDJEVIC l f[ l bl l l l Pnat or Type Name Sqnatulis / Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l I I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

03/20/96 3.47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PyeC4 Eq Eq ID Rev Sys'EQ Desc Bldg Fi El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El <40'? Cap Demd Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Eqmp Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 20 C111 0 45 / DG B Pump Control Panel DG B 23 00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C174 1 45 / PASS isolation Viv Control RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C175 1 45 / PASS isolation Viv Control RW 37.00 CR 37 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C2 0 45 / Tu-dine Bench Board RW 37.00 CR 37 00 Yes BS GR9 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C2204 0 45 / Accumu!ator Monitor Panel RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C2222 0 45 / Accumulator Monitor Panet RB 23 00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C3 0 45 / Auxiliary Pov-f Bench Board RW 37 00 CR 37 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C4 0 45 / INST PANEL C4 RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2C C5 0 45 / Protective Relaying RW 37 00 CR 37 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C6 0 45 / Load Shedding Panet RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C7 0 45 / Ctmt iso! & Ventilation VB RW 37.00 CR 37 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C8 0 45 / Auxihary Power Panel RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C89 0 45 / Desel A Vent Control Panel DG A 23 00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C90 0 45 i Desel B Vent Control Panel DG B 23 00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C402 0 45 / CONTROL RM PANEL RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C903 0 45 / Rx & Cont Cooiing Bench Board RW 37.00 CR 37 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes No Yes No 20 C904 0 45 / Rx Wtr Cleanup Recirc Bencn Bd RW 37.00 CR 37 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes No Yes No 20 C905 0 45 / Rx Control Bench Board RW 37 00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes No Yes No 20 C910 0 45 / CONTROL .lM PANEL RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C915 0 45 / Channel /. Pnm isoi & Rx Prot RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C917 0 45 / Channel B Pnm isol & Rx Prot RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C918 0 45 / FW & RECtRC VERT BRD RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C919 0 45 / Process Instrumentation VB RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes_

20 C921 0 45 / Nuclear Stm Temp Recorder VB RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C927 0 45 / RPIS Control Rod Position Cab RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes No Yes No 20 C928 0 45 / Rod Manual Control Panel RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C932 0 45 / Channel A Vertical board RW 23 00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes No Yes Yes No 20 C933 0 45 / Channel B Vertical Board RW 23 00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certification: Certrfication:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provxfed to the Seisme Capabety Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and behef. correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment Contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, cor ect and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic CapabWty Ergineers on the Seismic Revew Team (SRT) Approved. (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required, there should be atieast two on th" SRT. All signatones should agree with a:I the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS Pnnt or Type Name l Of [ P Sqnature l $ 2[#)@ l Date Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgnature l

Date l

l W DJORDJEVIC l [l/ l If l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnkh ' Dste Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date I I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnatur6 Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

, ~ - - . - . . . . .. ... - .. - . .. . ~ . . . . .~ . . _ . . . .

05/20/96 3.47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page05 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. Ft EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40~t Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 20 C939 0 45 t HPCI RELAY VERTICAL BOARD RW 23.00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C941 0 45 i Pnm Cont Isot Relay Cab inbd RW 23.00 CSR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C942 0 45 t Pnm Cont isol Relay Cab Outbd RW 23.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 N/A-45-1 0 45 / RPIS TRANSt.ATION ELECTRONICS RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No Yes Yes No i

I i

l i

i Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations [

our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and r conclusion (whether verified to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

l Approved: (Signatures of a!! Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS l

[

Sgnat l6 96 l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC l ~

l'6!Id!fb l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgv(ht re ' Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date i l i I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnatum Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l

SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page # 6 05/20/96 3.47 PM Eq Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. F1 El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40*? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equo Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 Cl No AXBAY 23 00 All Locat: 23 00 Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk No Yes No 0 T214A 0 30 / RBCCW SHIELDED SAMPLE CHAMBER AXBAY 23 00 All Locati 23 00 Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk No Yes No O T2148 0 30 / RBCCW SHIELDED SAMPLE CHAMBER 461 Swing MCC RW 23.00 CSrl 37.00 N/A ABS CRS No Yes Yes Yes No 1 B10 0 AXBAY 3 00 COMP A 3 00 NfA ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 815 0 46 / MCC RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 1 B17 0 46 / MCC (with Enclosure)

RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 1 B20 0 46 / MCC (w:th Enclosure) 46 / MCC,250VDC Power Bus TB 23 00 BSWGR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 1 D10 0 0 46 /125VDC MCC MOV Dtst. RB 23 00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 1 D7 1 D8 1 46 /125VDC MCC RB 23.00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No ,

1 D9 0 46 / 250VDC MCC RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 46 / 480V Emergency Bus TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Ye No Yes No No 2 B1 1

83 0 4G / 480V Emergency Bus TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes No Yes No 2

2 B4 0 46 / 480V Emergency Bus TB 23.00 BSWGR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 B6 1 46 I 480V Emergency Swing Bus RW 23 00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 A5 0 46 / 4KV Emergency Bus TB 37.00 ASWGR 37 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 A6 0 46 / 4KV Emergency Bus TB 23.00 BSWGR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 4 X18 0 46 i Stndby Tmsfrmer instr & Vital RW 23.00 CSR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 PSV1001-22A 0 10 / RHR A Loop Discharge Relef RB -17 50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV1001-228 0 10 / RHR B Loop Discharge Relef RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4334 0 09 / Nitrogen Header Relef Valve DG A 23 00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO4085B 0 30 / RBCCW LOOP A NE LOAD AXBAY 3.00 A COMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 10 VD208A 0 24 I DG A Space Sec Air init Damper DG A 23 00 DG A 34 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VD208B 0 24 / DG B Space Sec Air init Damper DG B 23.00 DG A 34.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VSF103A- 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A FAN BCKDRFT DMP RW 75 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No BDD 10 VSF1038- 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN B FAN BCKDRFT DMP RW 71.00 #2FRM 01.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No BDD 14 D16 0 46 /125VDC Control Bus A TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.0u , N/A GERS CRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in tim SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved; (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved;(One sgnature of Systems or Operat'ons Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.) ,

entnes and conclusions. One signatory shout be a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS lP' d C l~ l6 2!O)6 l l l l Pnnt or Type Name S nature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l JOHN OSULLIVAN l [ Z/ (pl l l l e Pnnt or Type Name y Sgnature # Dalb Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date  ;

I I I I I l 1 Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

05/20/96 3 47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page 87 Eq. Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Biog. Fi Et Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40 7 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equeo Ci No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK? OK7 OK7 14 017 0 46 /125VDC Control Bus B TB 23.00 BSWGR 23.00 N/A GERS CRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes M D29 0 46 / Current Limiter Fault Protect TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 D30 0 46 / Current Limiter Fault Protect TB 23 00 BSWGR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 D31 0 46 / Current Limiter Fault Protect TB 23.00 BSWGR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 D36 0 46 /125VDC Destnbutton Pane! A TB 37.00 A SWGR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 14 D4 0 46 /125VDC Distnbution Panel A TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 DS 0 46 /125VDC Distnbution Panet B TB 23 00 BSWGR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 D6 0 46 /125VDC DistnbAon Panes C RW 23.00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 Y1 0 46 /120V AC Instrument Bus RW 23 00 MG SET 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 Y2 0 46 / Vstal Sernces Power Supply RW 23.00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C129A 0 45 / Containmnt Press Sw instr Rack RB 74.00 EAST 74 25 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C1298 0 45 / Containmnt Press Sw instr Rack RB 74 00 EAST 74 25 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2201 0 45 / Core Spray instr Rack A RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2205A 0 45 / Reactor Prot & NSS Instr Rack RB 51.00 EAST 51.00 N!A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 18 C22058 0 45 / Reactor Prot & NSS Instr Rack RB 51.00 EAST 51.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No ,

18 C2206A 0 45 / Reactor Prot & NSS instr Rack RB 51.00 VEST 51.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 18 C22068 0 45 / Reactor Prot & NSS Instr Rack RB 51.00 WEST 51.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 18 C2250A 0 45 / HPCI INSTRUMENT RACK RB -17.50 RB SMP -17.50 Yes BS GR$ Yes Yes Yes No No 18 C2250B 0 45 / HPCI INSTRUMENT RACK RB -17.50 RB SMP -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 18 C2251A 1 45 / Jet Purrp instrument Rack RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 18 C2251B 1 45 / Jet Pump instrument Rack A RB 23 00 EAST 23 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes No No 18 C2259 0 45 / RHR A loop Instrument Rack RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 DPT1001- 0 10 / Torus Water Level Transmitter RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 604A 18 DPT1001- 0 10 / Torus Water Level Transmitter RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6048 18 FSE-101 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A FLOW SWITCH RW 73.50 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 18 FSE-102 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN B FLOW SWITCH RW 73.50 #2FRM 81 00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No Ccrtification: Certification:

All the Information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabmty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

ontnes and conclusions. One signatory shou be a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS l l 22 fa l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l JOHN OSULLIVAN 'f Q 4 - w 15/ziW.I I I l Pnnt or Type Name g Sgnature / Dat6 Pnnt or Type Name S gnature Date i I I I i l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

03/20/96 3 47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PqeCD Eq. Eq.ID Rev Sys/Eg Desc Bldg. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Eque CI No Soec. Spec Dema? OK7 OK? OK? OK?

18 FT6240 0 29 / SSW FLOW-RBCCW LP A AXBAY 3 00 ACOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS2351A 0 23 A HPCI TORUS LVL TO VLV CONTROL RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 18 LS2351B O 23 / HPCl TORUS LVL TO VLV CONROTL RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT504A 0 45 / RPS-First Stage Turb. Press. TB 51.00 TB DECK 51 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT5048 0 45 / RPS-First Stage Turb. Press. TB 51.00 TB DECK 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT504C 0 45 / RPS-First Stage Turtt Press. TB 51.00 TB DECK 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT504D 0 45 / RPS-First Stage Turb Press. TB 51.00 TB DECK 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1B X206A 0 10 / Condensing Pot Torus Level RB -17 50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 X2068 0 10 / Condensing Pot Torus Level RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 19 TE5021-01 A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-02A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-03A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-04A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-05A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N 'A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-06A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 T E5021-07A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-08A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17 SC Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-09A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-10A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-11 A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-12A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5021-13A 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-018 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-028 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Elernent RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-03B O 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-048 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-058 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS C-RS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-06B 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes C;,rtification: Certification:

/J1 the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regantng systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether verified to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

/pproved; (Signatures of all Seismic Capabil:ty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entnes and conclusions. One signatory should a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS Pnnt or Type Name l b Signature l 22 Dat hl l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l JOHN OSULLIVAN l 22 N l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature / Dhte Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date i 1 l l I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Ptge#9 05/20/96 3.47 PM Sys/Eq. Desc Btdg. F1 El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base Ei. <40"? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Eq. Eq. ID Rev Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK? OK7 CI No 10 / Torus Water Temp Elemer1 RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-07B 0 10 t Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022488 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-09B 0 10 / Torus water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-108 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-118 0 10 / Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N!A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-128 0 10 I Torus Water Temp Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE5022-138 0 0 46 I4KV Undervoltage Relay Cab TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 AA504 20 AA604 0 46 / 4KV Undervoltage Relay Cab TB 23.00 BSWGR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C101 0 45 I DG A Generator Control DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes C102 0 45 t DG B Generator Control DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 20 C103A 0 45 / DG A Auxthanes Control DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C103B 0 45 / DG A Engine Control Panet DG A 23 00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C103C 1 45 / DG A Engine Gage Panet DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C104A 0 45 / DG B Auxilianes Control DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C1048 0 45 / DG B Engine Control Panel DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C104C 1 45 / DG B Engine Gage Panel DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C110 0 45 / DG A Pump Control Panet DG A 23 00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 20 C160 0 45 / DG A ASP DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C2229-81 0 45 / RPS Anatog Tnp Cabinet RW 23.00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C2229-82 1 45 / RPS Analog Tnp Cabinet RW 23.00 CSR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C2233A 0 45 / Analog Tnp System RW 23 00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C2233B 0 45 i Analog Tnp System RW 23 00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C2261 0 45 / CRD instrument Cabinet RB 23.00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 20 D32 0 461 D16 Contri Logc Y10 Switching TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 20 D33 0 46 I D17 Contrl Logic Y10 Switching TB 23.00 BSWGR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 Y10 0 46 / Auto Transfer Switch RW 23.00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 Y11 0 46 / Auto Transfer Switch RW 23.00 MG SET 23 00 Yes l BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certification: Cert fication:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seism c Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, corred and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved; (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS l- M V. (~ l8{22!@6 l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l JOHN OSULLIVAN I I 5!E1bL i I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgn.ture / Dafb Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date i I l I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageC10 05/20/96 3 47 PM Eq Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interad Eque C1 No Spec. Spec Demd? OK? OK? OK? OK?

Y12 0 46 / Auto Transfer Switch for Y2 RW 23 00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 Certification: Certificateon:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engtneers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information* includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Tearn (SRT) Approved: (One sgnature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Setsme Capability are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entnes and conclusions. One signatory should a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS l .

[ 22 hl l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l JOHN OSULLIVAN A4)h-- l 6 Zl 9(o l l l l Pnnt or Type Name g Sgnature / Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i l i i l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name S qnature Date

05/20/96 3 47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page 011 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI Et. Rm or Rw/Ci Base El. <407 Cup Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Intemet Equip

'No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 Cl 1 B14 0 46 / MCC AXBAY 3 00 COMPB 3 00 N'A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 B18 1 46 / MCC (with Enctosure) RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P202A 0 30 / RBCCW PUMP A LOOP A AXBAY 3 00 ACOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 5 P2028 0 30 / RBCCW PUMP B LOOP A AXBAY 3 00 B COMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 5 P202C 0 30 / RBCCW PUMP C LOOP A AXBAY 3 00 ACOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 5 P202D 0 30 / RBCCW PUMP D LOOP B AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P202E O 30 / RBCCW PUMP E LOOP B AXBAY 3.00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P202F 0 30 / RBCCW PUMP F LOOP B AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 7 VRV261-96A 0 54 / RV203-3A Torus Disch Vac Ret RB 23 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 VRV261-968 0 54 / RV203-3B Torus D'sch Vac Ret RB 23 00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 VRV261-96C 0 54 / RV203-3C Torus Desch Vac Ret RB 23 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1301-16 0 13 / RCIC Stream Line isolaten Viv RB 41.00 DW 51 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO3800 0 29 / SSW LP A RBCCW HX OUTLET AXBAY 3 00 ACOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO3801 0 29 / SSW LP A TBCCW HX OUTLET AXBAY 3 00 A COMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV220-44 0 54 / Rx Sample Line Controt Sol RB 74 00 DW 74 25 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 14 Y3 0 46 / Safeguard Control Power RW 23 00 MG SET 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 v4 0 46 / Safeguard Control Power RW 23 00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2230 0 45 / EAST SDIV INSTRUMENT RACK RB 23.00 EAST 23.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2231 0 45 / WEST SDIV INSTRUMENT RACK RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 19 TE9019 0 09 / Drywell Temperature Element RB 38 00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE9044 0 09 / Drywell Temperature Element RB 38 00 DW 51 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 20 C61A 0 45 / EAC Safeguards Area Vent Cntri RB 23 00 E WALL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C618 0 45 / EAC Safeguards Area Vent Cntri RB 23 00 E WALL 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C84 0 45 / DG Storage Tank tvt instr Rack DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS i Yes Yes Yes Yes' Yes Ccrtificatron: Certrficaten:

All the informatiun contained on this Screening Venficaton Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The informaten provded to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowWge and behef. correct and accurate. "All inforraation" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capabihty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One sgnature of Systems or Operatens Engineer is required if the Setsmic Capability are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary )

entnes and conclusions. One sgnatory should be a licensed professonal engineer.)

l CT PITTS l l @ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgna* e Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l WR KLINE l 7 hl l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page 012 05/20/96 3:47 PM Bdg. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Ar.cncs interact Eque Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 Cl No TB 23.00 BSWGR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 B2 1 46 I 480V Emergency Bus Certification: Certification: ,

All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "Au information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether verified to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seism'c Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One sgnature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Sersme Capabtidy tre required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with aR the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory shou a licensed professi al engineer.)

l CT PITTS l Y I'b l l l l Pnnt or Type Name S' nat

• Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l TJ TRACY [M , l M"h l Da16 Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgnature l

Date l

Pnnt or Type Name S l I I i I i i Pnnt or Type Name nature U Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

l i

05/20/96 3 47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page # 13 EQ Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. F1 El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equto Cl No Spec Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 4 X20 0 46 / Transformer to C511 RW 23.00 MG SET 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes j 4 X21 0 46 / 4KV/480V Transformer TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes j 4 X22 0 46 / 4KV/480V Transformer TB 23 00 BSWGR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes '

5 P206 1 13 / RCIC PUMP RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 8 MO1001-288 0 10 / RHR B Loop LPCI infecten RB 23.00 BVLV 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-29B 0 10 / RHR B Loop LPCI Injection RB 23 00 B VLV 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-43B O 10 / RHR Pump B SDC Interte RB -6.00 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 10 / RHR Pump P203B Suction RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes GRS Yes N/A  !

8 M01001-78 0 BS Yes Yes Yes 8 MO1001-7C 0 10 / RHR Pump P203C Suction RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes a MO1001-7D 0 10 / RHR Pump P203D Suction RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 M O202-5A 0 10 / Reorculation Pump A Discharge isolaton RB 13.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A No No Valve i 8 M O202-5B 0 10 / Reorculation Pump B Discharge isolation RB 13.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A No No Va!ve 8 MO2301-4 0 23 / HPCI STEAM SUPPLY RB 40.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO2301-5 0 23 / HPCI STEAM SUPPLY RB 23 00 BVLV 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 9 VEX 104A 1 24 / SSW Exhaust Fan INTK 25 60 A PUMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 VEX 1048 1 24 / SSW Exhaust Fan INTK 25 60 BPUMP 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 VSF-103A 0 24 / CRHEAF TRA!N A SUPPLY FAN RW 73 50 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Unk Unk Yes No 9 VSF-1038 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN B SUPPLY FAN RW 73 50 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Unk Unk Yes No 10 AOX1 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN B INTK DAMPER RW 71.00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes NJ 10 AOX3 0 24 / CRHEAF NORML TRAIN 8 INTK DMPR RW 75 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 10 AOX4 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A INTK DAMPER RW 78 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 10 AOX6 0 24 / CRHEAF NORML TRAIN A INTK DMPR RW 75.00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 10 VAC206A-1 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 13.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC206A-2 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 1300 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VCRF-1018 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN 8 FILTER HEATR RW 78.00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No 14 C511 0 46 / RPS Power Distnbution Panet RW 23 00 MG SET 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  !

Cert:fication: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The informaton provided to the Seismic Capabahty Engineers regarding systems and operatens .

our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment cc'itained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef. correct and I conclusion (whether venfed to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Revew Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required rf the Seismic Capabihty gr3 required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Eng,neers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a hcensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS l /, l h)(p l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnapure Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l JA KALB Pnnt or Type Name l

V '

=

/ Signature l bl Date Pnnt or Type Name l

Signature l l Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date L__ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _

. m 05/20/96 4.19 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#14 Eq. Eq.10 Rev Sys/Eq Desc Badg. F1 EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip '

Cl No Spec- Spec Demd? OK? OK? OK? OK?

14 D37 0 46 /125VDC Distnbution Panet B TB 23 00 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 Y31 _ 46 / H2/02 Power Panet RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 Y41 0 46 / H2/02 Power Panet RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 Y6 0 46 / Power to MCC Fan Control RB 23.00 MCC B17 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 Y7 0 46 / Power to MCC Fan Control RB 23 00 MCC B18 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 14 Y8 0 46 / Power to MCC Fan Control RB 23.00 MCCB20 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2252A 0 45 / Jet Pump instrument Rack A RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes No Yes Yes No 18 C2252B 0 45 / Jet Pump instrument Rack B RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes No Yes Yes No 18 C22578 1 45 / RCIC instrument Rack RB -17.50 SW OD 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2260 0 45 / Core Spray instr Rack B RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2262 0 45 / RHR B Loop Instrument Rack RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 FE1360-3 0 13 / RCIC Pump Flow Element RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 FE6240 0 29 / SSW Loop A Flow Element AXBAY 3.00 A COMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 FE6241 0 29 / SSW Loop B Flow Element AXBAY 3.00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 J315 0 46 / J-Box for TS1360-15A and 17A RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 J317 0 46 / J-Box for TS1360-17B RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Ye* Yes Yes Yes 18 J599 0 46 / J-Box for TS1360-14C and 16C RB 23 00 TIP RM 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 J600 0 46 / J-Box for TS1360-15C and 17C RB 23 00 TIP PM 23.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No 18 J601 0 46 / J-Box for TS1360-16D RB 23.00 TIP RM 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 J602 0 46 / J-Box for TS1360-17D RB 23.00 TIP RM 23 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No 18 J603 0 46 / J-Box for TS2370C and TS2372C RB 23.00 NORTH 51.00 N/A ABS RRS No No Yes No No 18 J604 0 46 / J-Box for TS23700 and TS2372D RB 23.00 NORTH 51.00 N/A ABS RRS No No Yes No No 18 J605 0 46 / J-Box for TS2371C and TS2373C RB 23 00 TIP RM 23.00 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No 18 J606 0 46 / J-Box for TS2371D and TS2373D RB 23.00 TIP RM 23 00 N/A ABS RRS Yes No Yes Yes No 18 PS1360-21 A 0 13 / Pump Suction Pressure RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT1001-69A 0 45 / Suppr Pool Bottom Press Trans RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT1001-698 0 45 / Suppt Pool Bottom Press Trans RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C150 0 45 / SSW/RBCCW ALT SHUTDOWN PANEL AXBAY 3.00 B COMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seisrc Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capabihty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabikty are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS l Y l 2 (e l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnatu Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l JA KALB l f c l l l l l Pnnt or Type Name f Date i# g $1@n'ature Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i l i I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

05/20/964:19 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION CATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#15 Eq Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bidg. Fi EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base Et. <40*? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interad Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 20 C151 0 45 i SSW/RBCCW ALT SHUTDOWN PANEL AXBAY 3 00 ACOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C154 0 45 / RCIC ALT SHUTDOWN PANEL RB 23 00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C156 0 45 / ADS ALT SHUTDOWN PANEL RB 23 00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C157 0 45 / ADS ALT SHUTDOWN PANEL RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C159 0 45 / RCIC Remote Shutdown Panel RB 23.00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C161 0 45 / DG B ASP DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes I

20 C170 1 45 i Post Accident Monitonng Panel RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C171 1 45 / Post Accident Monitonng Panel RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C2228-A1 1 45 i RPS Anakxj Tnp Cabinet RW 23 CO CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C2228-A2 2 45 / RPS Analog Tnp Cabinet RW 23 00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 20 C930 0 45 / RCIC Relay Vertical Board RW 23.00 CSR 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes No Yes Yes No 20 EPA 1-6 0 46 / RPS Elec Protection Assembly RW 23.00 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes j i

L

(

Certification: Certification:  !

+

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Sersmic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operatens our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether verified to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of a!! Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.) , i entries and conclusions. One signatory should a licensed professional engineer.)

l CT PITTS l l 9h l l l l I Pnnt or Type Name Signatur Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l JA KALB l c l 9h l l l l Pnnt or Type Name f /I / Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i I I I l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date [

f i

i

i i

05/20/96 3 47 FM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#16 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Biog. F1 EL Rm or Rw/C1 Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equo Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK? OK? OK? OK?

4 X55 0 46 / Transformer to Y3/Y31 RW 23.00 MG SET 23.00 N!A DOC- RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 X56 0 46 / Transformer to Y4/Y41 RW 23.00 CSR 23.00 N'A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P209A 0 30 / RBCCW CRD PMP THRUST BRNG CLR RB -17.50 CRDOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P2098 0 30 / RBCCW CRD PMP THRUST BRNG CLR RB -17.50 CRD OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ,

7 PSV2301-23 0 23 / HPCI TURB SUCT PRESS RELIEF RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-28A 0 10 / RHR A Loop LPCI Injection RB 23.00 A VLV 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N!A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-29A 0 to / RHR A Loop LPCI Inject on RB 23.00 A VLV 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-43A 0 10 / RHR Pump A SDC intertie RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N!A Yes Yes

- 8 MO1001-47 0 10 / RHR Shutdown Coohng Suction RB 23.00 A VLV 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-50 0 10 / RHR Shutdown Coohng isol RB 52 00 DW 51 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-7A 0 10 / RHR Pump P203A Suction RB -17.50 SE OD J17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes

/ 18 PS4008 0 30 / RBCCW LOOP B PMP CNTRL & ALARM AXBAY 3.00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS4058 0 30 / RBCCW LOOP A PMP CNTRL & ALARM AXBAY 3 00 A COMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 1340-4 1 13 / Pwr Supply for Press. Inst /THIS SEWS RW 37.00 CR 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes REPRESENTS ALL CR ROOM RULE-OF-THE BOX COMPONENTS t

Certification: Certtfication: <

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seisr1c Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether verified to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capabihty En ineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved. (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seisuc CapabAty are required; there should be atleast two on the '. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entnes and conclusions. One signatory shou bfa licensed refessional engineer.)

l JG DYCKMAN l_V A l 7,b (. l l l l  ;

Pnnt or Type Name fSignature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Datu l CT PITTS l -

V. l f:p l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

! l I I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

W20/96 3 47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageO17 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bidg. Fi EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base Et (407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Eque Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK? OK7 CK?

4 X74 0 46 / Transformer to Y6 RB 23.00 MCC B17 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 X75 0 46 / Transformer to Y7 RB 23.00 MCC B18 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 X76 0 46 / Transformer to Y8 RB 23.00 MCC B10 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C153 0 45 / RHR ALT SHUTDOWN PANEL RB 23.00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C155 0 45 / HPCI ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL RB 23.00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C158 0 45 / HPCI ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PANEL RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C163 0 45 / RHR B Loop Alt Shutdown Panet RB 23 00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operatior 3 our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef. correct and conclusion (whether venfe' d to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved. (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Sersmic Capabihty cre required; there shou ld be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed *essional engineer.)

l WR KLINE Pnnt or Type Name v 1,' [da Sqnature lb UDate hl l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l JA KALB l l b l l l l Pnnt or Type Name f fi f Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date I l  ! I i l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

03/20/96 347 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#18 Eq Eq.10 Rev Sys!Eq. Desc Bidg. FiEL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 5 P141A 0 61/ DG A Fuel Od Transfer Pump DGA 23 00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P141B 0 61/ DG B Fuel Od Transfer Pump DG B 23 00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P205 0 23 / HPCI PUMP RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P220 0 23 / HPCI GL SEAL COND PUMP RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P222 0 13 / RCIC Vacuum Pump RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P223 0 23 / HPCI GL SEAL CONDENSER BLOWER RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Y ss Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 P229 0 23 / HPCI AUX OIL PUMP RB -17.50 HPCt -17.50 Yes BS GRS ' es Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 P203A 0 10 / RHR Pump A RB -17.50 SE OD -17f0 Yes BS GRS "/es Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 P2038 0 10 / RHR Pump B RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 P203C 0 10 / RHR Pump C RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 P2030 0 10 / RHR Pump D RB -17.50 NW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 P215A 0 14 / Core Spray Pump A RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 P2158 0 14 / Core Spray Pump B RB -17.50 NW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6 P221 0 13 / RCIC Vacuum Tank Cond. Pump RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ,

7 AO1301-12 0 13 / RCIC Vacuum Tank Cond. Disch RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 A O1301-34 0 13 / RCIC Steam kne Drain isol RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO203-1A 0 01/ Steamhne A isolatron Vatve RB 23.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO203-1B 0 01/ Steamhne B isolaten Vatve RB 23 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO203-1C 0 01/ Steamhne C isolaton Valve RB 23.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO203-1D 0 01/ Steamhne D isolat on Valve RB 23 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes l 7 AO203-2A 0 01/ Steamhne A isolaton Valve RB 23 00 STM TNL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO203-2B 0 01/ Steamhne B Isolation Valve RB 23.00 STM TNL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO203-2C 0 01/ Steamhne C tsotation Valve RB 23 00 STM TNL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO203-2D 0 01/ Steamhne D isolaton Valve RB 23 00 STM TNL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO220-44 0 54 / Reactor Sample Line isolation RB 74 00 DW 74 25 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO2301-29 0 23 / HPCI STEAM SUPPLY DRAIN ISOL RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO4521 0 61/ DG A Fuel Pump Descharge Valve DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 AO4522 0 61/ DG B Fuel Pump Discharge Valve DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Certificaton: Certification: j All the informaton contained on this Screening Venficaten Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operatens our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. *AR information" includes each entry and of the equrpment contained in the SVDS is. to the best of our knowledge and behef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capabihty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One sgnature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. AII signatones shouki agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should a licensed pr s nalengineer.)

l WR KLINE Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgn ture

_ l 27 N l

' Ddte

! l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC l bf)[

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l 6!M!f$ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnatur6 Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature{ Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

05/20/96 3_47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page019 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip C1 No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 7 CV2301-32 0 23 / HPCI TURB DRAIN POT ISOL VLV RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N 'A Yes Yes 7 CV302-21A 0 03 / RPS EAST SD'V VENT ISOL RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 CV302-21B 0 03 / RPS WEST SDIV VENT ISOL RB 23 00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 CV302-22A 0 03 / RPS EAST SDIV DRAIN ISOL RB 23 00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 CV302-228 0 03 / RPS WEST SDIV DRAIN ISOL RB 23 00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N 'A No No 7 CV302-23A 0 03 / RPS EAST SDIV VENT ISOL RB 23.00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 CV302-230 0 03 / RPS WEST SDIV VENT ISOL RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes MA Yes Yes 7 CV302-24A 0 03 / RPS EAST SDIV DRAIN ISOL RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 CV302-240 0 03 / RPS WEST SDIV DRAIN ISOL RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A No No 7 HO1301-159 0 13 / RCIC Goveming Valve RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PCV1301-43 0 13 / RCIC Lube Oil Cooling RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PCV2301-46 0 23 / HPCI Lube Oil Cooler RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV1301-31 0 13 / RCIC Suction hne Rehef RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV1301-42 0 13 / RCIC L.O. & Condenser Coohng RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV1301-70 0 13 / RCIC Vacuum Tank Relief RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV1401-28A 0 14 / Core Spray A Discharge Relef RB -10.00 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV2301-53 0 23 / HPCI PtJMP RELIEF VALVE RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4020 0 30 / RBCCW E207A RELIEF RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4031 0 30 / RBCCW E207A RELIEF RB -17 50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4032 0 30 / RBCCW E207B REttEF RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4036 0 30 / RBCCW E2078 RELIEF RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4563A 0 61 i Relef Valve - Turbo Air Tank DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4563B 0 61/ Relef Valve - Turbo Air Tank DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4563C 0 61/ Relef Valve - Turbo Air Tank DG A 23 00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GtlS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4563D 0 61/ Rehef Valve - Turbo Air Tank DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4565A 0 61/ Relef Valve - Turbo Air Tank DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4565B 0 61/ Refef Valve - Turbo Air Tank DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4582A 0 61/ T146A Pressure Rehef Valve DG A 23 00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Certification: Certfication:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the t.est of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operatens our knowledge and behef, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of 611 Seismic Capabihty Engineers on the Setsmic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones shouH agree wrth all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.)

l WR KLINE l

& l 7 l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sg6ature De Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC Pnnt or Type Name

] h SigrMtdr4 l bl l l l

' Dale Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l I I I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

05/20/96 3:47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page #20 .

l Eq Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eg Dese Biog. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40*? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Stec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 7 PSV45828 0 611 T1468 Pressure Relef Valve DG B 23 00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N 'A Yes Yes 7 PSV4582C 0 611 T146C Pressure Resef Valve DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV4582D 0 61/ T146D Pressure Relef Valve DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV5010 0 09 / Nitrogen Header Rehef Valve DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV5034A 0 09 i Nitrogen Header Relef Va!ve RB 23 00 N WALL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes  ;

7 PSV8004 0 10 / RHR Pump P203C Suction Relef RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 PSV8005 0 10 / RHR Pump P203A Sucten Reief RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes  :

Yes 7 PSV8006 0 10 / RHR Pump P203B Suction Rehef RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ,

7 PSV8007 0 101 RHR Pump P203D Suction Rehef RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes  !

7 RV203-3A 0 54 I ADS MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVE RB 45 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A , Yes Yes 7 RV203-3B 0 541 ADS MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVE RB 45.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 HV203-3C 0 541 ADS MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVE RB 45 00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV203-3D 0 54 / ADS MA!N STEAM RELIEF VALVE RB 45.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV203-4A 0 541 ADS MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE RB 45 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV203-48 0 54 / ADS MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE RB 45 00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV9085A 0 01/ Stmhne A Accum T220A Relef RB 23 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV90858 0 01 I Stmune B Accum T220B Rehef RB 23 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV9085C 0 01/ Stmhne C Accum T220C Rehef RB 23.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV90850 0 01 i Stmhne D Accum T220D Rehef RB 23.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV9085E O 01/ Stmhne A Accum T220E Relef RB 23 00 STM TNL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV9085F 0 011 Stmhne B Accum T220F Relef RB 23 00 STM TNL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV9085G 0 01/ Stmhne C Accum T220G Relef RB 23.00 STM TNL 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 RV9085H 0 011 Stmhne D Accum T220H Rehef RB 23.00 STM 1NL 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 VRV261-97A 0 54 i RV203-3A Torus Disch Vac Rel RB 30 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 VRV261-978 0 54 / RV203-3B Torus Disch Vac Ret RB 30 00 DW 23 DO Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 VRV261-97C 0 54 / RV203-3C Torus Disch Vac Ret RB 30 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 VRV261-970 0 54 / RV203-3D Torus Disch Vac Rel RB 30.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 VRV261-98A 0 54 / RV203-3A Torus Disch Vac Ret RB 30.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provded to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belef, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved; (Signatures of a!! Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One sgnature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Sersmic Capabihty are required; there should be atlesst two on the SRT. Alt signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed profe al engineer.)

l WR KLINE l-27 l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sign ur Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC Pnnt or Type Name l

S gn"a re l h/N/N Date l l l l ,

Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date 1 I I I I I l 1 Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt ce Type Name Sqnature Date b

03/20/96 3:47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#21 .

i Eq Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Dese Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'7 Cap. Demd Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK? OK7 OK7 OK?

Cl 7 VRV261-98B 0 54 / RV203-3B Torus Disch Vac Ret RB 30.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes t 7 VRV261-98C 0 54 / RV203-3C Torus Disch Vac Rel RB 30.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 7 VRV261-98D 0 54 / RV203-3D Torus Drsch Vac Rel RB 30.00 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N'A Yes Yes r 7 VRV9067 0 13 / RCIC Exhaust Line Vac Rehef RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes MA Yes Yes 8 CV9068A 0 23 / HPCI TORUS DRAIN POT VALVE RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 CV9068B 0 23 / HPCI TORUS DRAIN POT VALVE RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-16A 0 1(i / RHR A Loop Ht Exch Bypass RB -3.00 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-16B 0 10 / RHR B Loop Ht Exchange Bypass RB -3.00 NW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-18A 0 10 / RHR A Loop Minimum flow RB -7.00 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ]

8 MO1001-18B 0 10 / RHR B Loop Minimum Fkyn RB -7.00 NWOD 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-34A 0 10 / RHR Loop A Torus Retum RB 9.00 SE OD 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-34B 0 10 / RHR Loop B Torus Retum RB 9 00 NWOD 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 M01001-36A 0 10 / RHR Loop A Torus Retum RB -1.00 SE OD 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1001-36B 0 10 / RHR Loop B Torus Retum RB 9.00 NW OD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1201-2 0 12 / RWCU Sucten Line isolaten RB 45 00 DW 51 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 M01301-17 0 13 / RCIC Stes,n Line isolation Viv RB 23.00 TIP RM 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1301-22 0 13 / RCIC Suction from CST AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1301-25 0 13 / RCIC Suction from Torus RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1301-26 0 13 / RCIC Sucten from Torus RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1301-49 0 13 / RCIC Discharge isol. Valve RB 23.00 TIP RM 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1301-60 0 13 / RCIC Min Flow Bypass RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1301-61 0 13 / RCIC Steam Supply Viv RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1301-62 0 13 / RCIC L.O. & Condenser Coohng RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1400-24A 0 14 / Core Spray A injecten Valve RB 51.00 RWCU HT 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No N/A Yes No 8 MO1400-24B 0 14 / Core Spray B Injection Valve RB 51.00 WEST 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No N/A Yes No 8 M01400-25B 0 14 / Core Spray B Injection Valve RB 51.00 WEST 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No N/A Yes No 8 MO1400-3A 0 14 / Core Spray A Supp Pool Sucten RB -17.50 SE OD . -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 M01400-38 0 14 / Core Spray B Supp Pool Suction RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Certshcation: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operatons our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature (

• Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should a licensed p ional engineer.)

l WR KLINE l 4 8[ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Signature D' ate Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC Pnnt or Type Name l []

Signature' l

Date I l Pnnt or Type Name l

Sqnature l

Date l

i I I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name S qnature ' Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

f SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) PageC22 05/20!96 3 47 PM Sys/Eq. Desc BK$g. FI El Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Eq. Eq.ID Rev Spec. Spec Demd7 OK? OK7 OK? OK7 Cl No RB 0.00 SE OD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO1400-4A O 14 / Core Spray A Test Line Isol RB 0 00 NWOD 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A No No 8 M01400-4B 0 14 / Core Spray B Test Line isol RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO2301-10 0 23 / HPCI RCIC TEST LINE/ CST RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO2301-14 0 23 / HPCI RHR TEST LINE/ MIN AXBAY 3.00 B COMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N 'A Yes Yes 8 MO2301-15 0 23 / HPCI RCIC/HPCI DISC TEST RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO2301-3 0 23 / HPCI STEAM SUPPLY 23 / HPCI SUPP POOL SUCTION RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 M O2301-35 0 0 23 / HPCI SUPP POOL SUCTION RB -17.50 HPCI -17 50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO2301-36 MO2301-6 0 23 / HPCI CST SUCTION AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8

8 MO2301-8 0 23 / HPCI TURB INJ VALVE RB 23.00 TIP 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO4009A 0 30 / RBCCW LOOP B NE LOAD AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO40098 0 30 / RBCCW LOOP B NE LOAD AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO4010A 0 30 / RBCCW Inlet to E2098 RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO40108 0 30 / RBCCW inlet to E2098 RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO4060A 0 30 / RBCCW Inlet to E209A RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO4060B 0 30 / RBCCW Iniet to E209A RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MO4085A 0 30 / RBCCW LOOP A NE LOAD AXBAY 3 00 A COMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MOBB8183A 0 24 / MCCHVAC INLET MOV MCC B17 RB 23 00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MOBB81838 0 24 / MCCHVAC OUTLET MOV MCC B17 RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MOBB8184A 0 24 / MCCHVAC INLET MOV MCC B18 RB 23 00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yts~. Yes 8 MOBB81848 0 24 / MCCHVAC OUTLET MOV MCC B18 RB 23.00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 6 MOBB8185A 0 24 / MCCHVAC INLET MOV MCC B20 RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 MOBB8185B 0 24 / MCCHVAC OUTLET MOV MCC B20 RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 'SV1301-12 0 13 / RCIC Vac Tank Cond. Pump Disch RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV1301-34 0 13 / S'm line drain entri solenoid RB -17.50 SWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV2301-29 0 23 / HPCI STM SUPPLY DRN SOL VLV RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV302-20A 0 03 / RPS CV302-21A & 24A CNTRL RB 23 00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV302-208 0 03 / RPS CV302-21 A & 24A CNTRL RB 23 00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabdtty are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

Entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed p ional engineer.)

l WR KLINE l d [ . l l l l Pnnt or Type Name v Sgnaturf Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgnatur'e l

Date hl l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date 1 I I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

m., __ - _ _._ .. _ _ __. - _ _.=_ _ _ _- - .___.____.mm _ . _

i 05/20/96 3.47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page # 23 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bidg. Fi El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK? OK7 OK7 i 8 SV302-20C 0 03 / RPS CV302-22A & 23A CNTRL RB 2^.; 00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV302-200 0 03 / RPS CV302-22A & 23A CNTRL RB 23.00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes i 8 SV302-21A 0 03 / RPS CV302-21B & 24B CNTRL RB 23.00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV302-218 0 03 / RPS CV302-21B & 248 CNTRL RB 23 00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV302-21C 0 03 / RPS CV302-22B & 238 CNTRL RB 23.00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes .

8 SV302-210 0 03 / RPS CV302-228 & 23B CNTRL RB 23.00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS .Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV4521 0 61/ Solenod for A04521 DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 1 8 SV4522 0 61/ Solenoid for A04522 DG B 23.00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes

• 8 SV4586A 0 61/ DG A Air Start Solenoid DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV4586B 0 61/ DG A Air Start Solenoid DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV4587A 0 61/ DG A Air Start Solenod DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV45878 0 61/ DG A Air Start Solenod DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes  ;

8 SV4588A 0 61/ DG B Air Start Solenod DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SV45888 0 61/ DG B Air Start Solenoid DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes  ;

8 SV4589A 0 61/ DG B Air Start Solenod DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes O SV45896 0 61/ DG B Air Start Solenod DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes  ;

l O SVL22 0 24 / DG HVAC AVU31 & AVU33 Control DG A 23.00 DG A 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SVL23 0 24 / DG HVAC AVU32 & AVU34 Control DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 9 VSF-209 0 24 / MCCHVAC B17 FAN RB 23.00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 VSF-210 0 24 / MCCHVAC B18 FAN RB 23.00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 9 VSF-211 0 24 / MCCHVAC B20 FAN RB 23.00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC-201A 0 24 / EAC HPCI RM COOLING RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No Yes Yes No 10 VAC-2018 0 24 / EAC HPCI RM COOLING RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No Yes Yes No 10 VAC-202A 0 24 / EAC RCIC RM COOLING RB 2.80 SWOD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No j 10 VAC-2028 0 24 / EAC RCIC RM COOLING RB 2.80 SW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No l 10 VAC-204A 0 24 / EAC RHR LOOP A AREA COOL RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC-2048 0 24 / EAC RHR LOOP A AREA COOL RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No l 10 VAC-204C 0 24 / EAC RHR LOOP B AREA COOL RB -17.50 NWQD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No I i

Certification: Certification:

AH the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabdity Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "AH information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismicaHy adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operatioris Engineer is requireu if the Seismic Capability i tre required, there should be atleast two on the SRT, AH signatones should agree with au the Engineers deem it necessary.)  :

sntnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed p sional engineer.)  !

l WR KLINE l 7 l l l l  !

Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC l  ! l 4 l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Signatute Date' Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date 1 I I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature' Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date I

i

- ~ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ._ , _ _ ,,

I SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page#24 05/20/96 3:47 PM Sys/Eq. Desc Bidg. Fi EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip  ;

Eq. Eq. ID Rev Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 ,

Cl No RB -17.50 NWQD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No ,

10 VAC-204D 0 24 / EAC RHR LOOP B ARIA COOL RB 2.80 SWQD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC202A- 0 24 / EAC Backdraft Damper i BOD RB 2.80 SWOD 2?rm Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC202B- 0 24 / EAC Backdraft Damper BDD RB 2.75 CRD MEZZ 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No  ;

10 VAC203A 0 30 t RBCCW CRD EAC RB 2.75 CRD MEZZ 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC2038 0 30 i RBCCW CRD EAC 24 / EAC Backdraft Damper RB -17.5'; SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC204A- 0 BDD 24 I EAC Backdraft Damper RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC2048- 0 '

BDD '

24 / EAC Backdraft Damper RB -17.50 NWQD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC204C- 0 BDD 24 i EAG Backdraft Damper RB -17.50 NWQD -17.50 Yes OS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC204D- 0 BDD RB 45.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC205A-1 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 23 00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC205A-2 0 30 / RBCCW ORYWELL EAC RB 41.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC2058-1 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 41.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC205R ' O 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 23.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC20%.;-1 0 30 t RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 23.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC205C-2 0 30 t RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 41.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC20$D-1 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 41.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC2050-2 0 VAC205E-1 0 30 t RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 15.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC205E-2 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 15.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Ye', Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 t' VAC205F-1 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 15 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC205F-2 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 15.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes ies Yes Yes 10 VAC2068-1 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 13.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 VAC2068-2 0 30 / RBCCW DRYWELL EAC RB 13 00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Ccrtrhcation: Certification:

A.I the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations ot.r knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and  ;

cor clusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate. .

Approved. (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability i

are required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

Entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed pro 'o I engineer.)

l WR KLINE l

Sqnafu i l 27 h l

' Gate Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgnature l

Date l

Pnnt or Type Name l W DJORDJEVIC l Sqna%ur l hl IDath ' Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgnature l

Date l

Pnnt or Type Name l I I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnatqre Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date t

05/20/96 3.47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page025 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40"? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equtp Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK? OK7 OK? OK7 10 VAC207A 0 30 / RBCCW RECIRC MG SET EAC RB 51.00 MG SET 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC207B 0 30 / RBCCW REClRC MG SET EAC RB 51.00 MG SET 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC207C 0 30 / RBCCW RECIRC MG SET EAC RB 51.00 MG SET 51.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No No Yes No 10 VAC207D 0 30 / RBCCW REClRC MG SET EAC RB 51.00 MG SET 51.00 Yes BS .GRS Yes No No Yes No 11 E202 0 23 / HPCI GLAND SEAL CONDENSER RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 12 K1038 0 61/ DG B Air Start Compressor DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 17 X107A 0 61/ DG A Eng:ne & Generator DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 17 X1078 0 61/ DG B Engine & Generator DG B 23 00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2256A 0 45 / RPS-MSL Hi Flow RB 2.90 SWOD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C22568 0 45 / RPS-MSL Hi Flow RB 2.90 SW OD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2257A 0 45 / HPCI INSTRUMENT RACK RB -17.50 NWQD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C2258 0 45 / RCIC instrument Rack RB 2.90 SW OD 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 C83 0 45 i Condensate Transfer instr Rack AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes No Yes Yes No 18 FE1048A 0 10 / RHR Loop A Flow Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 FE10488 0 10 / RHR Loop B Flow Element RB -17.50 TORUS -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 FE1463A 0 14 / CS A Discharge Flow Element RB -5.00 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 FE14638 0 14 / CS B Discharge Flow Element RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 FT6241 0 29 / SSW FLOW-RBCCW LP B AXBAY 3.00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LE302-82C 0 03 / RPS EAST SDIV LVL TO LS302-82C RB 23.00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 16 LE302-820 0 03 / RPS EAST SDIV LVL TO LS302-82D RB 23 00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 LE302-83A 0 03 / RPS WEST SDIV LVL TO LS302-83A RB 23.00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LE302-838 0 03 / RPS WEST SDIV LVL TO LS302-838 RB 23.00 WEST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes to LIC3508 0 26 / CST Lvt indicating Contretier AXBAY 3.00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS2369 0 23 / HPCI EXH DRN POT LVL ALRM & CN RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS4531A 0 61/ DG A Fuel Pump stop/ start Sw DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS45318 0 61/ DG A Fuel Pump stop/ start Sw DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS4532A 0 61/ DG A Day Tank Level Alarm DG A 23 00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS45328 0 61/ DG A Day Tank Level Alarm DG A 23.00 DG A 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Cortification- Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and beliel, correct and accurate. "A!! information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate cr not), accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of att Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved:(One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability a.re required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

ontnes and conclusions. One signatory should a licensed pro ional engineer.)

l WR KLINE v

l / d 77 & l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnatu Date Pnnt or Type Name S qnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC Pnnt or Type Name l

Sign'at6M l

Gate '

hl Pnnt or Type Name l l l Sgnature Date l  ! I I I I- I Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date i

Ii

05/20/96 3.47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page # 26 Eq Eq ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. Fi El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor Interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK? OK7 18 LS4533A 0 611 DG B Fuel Pump stop/ start Sw DG B 23.00 DG G 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS4533B 0 61/ DG B Fuel Pump stop/ start Sw DG B 23 00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS4534A 0 61/ DG B Day Tank Level Altrm DG B 23.00 DG B 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS4534B 0 61 I DG B Day Tank Level Alarm DG B 23 00 DG B 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 LS9068 0 23 I HPCI TORUS DRPOT LVL VLV CNTRL RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS2390A 0 26 / Low CST Level HPC1 Transfer AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PS23908 0 26 I Low CST Level HPCI Transfer AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes 7es Yes Yes Yes 18 PT1001-600A 0 451 Drvwell Pressure Transmitter RB 74.00 EAST 74.25 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT1001-6008 0 45 / Drywell Pressure Transmrtter RB 74.00 EAST 74.25 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 PT1001-601 A 0 45 / Drywell Pressure Transmitter RB 74.00 EAST 74 25 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT1001-6018 0 45 / Drywell Pressure Transmitter RB 74.00 EAST 74.25 N/A ABS RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT1360-19 0 13 / RCIC Pump Suction Pressure RB -17.50 SW OD -17.50 Y.es BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT261-30A 0 45 I RPS-MSL Low Press. TB 23.00 COND PMP 23.00 Yes BS GRS ies Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT261-30B 0 4% / RPS-MSL Low Press TB 23 00 CONDPMP 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 PT261-30C 0 45, RPS-MSL Low Press. TB 23 00 COND PMP 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT261-30D 0 45 / RPS-MSL Low Press. T3 23.00 COND PMP 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 PT4008 0 30 t RBCCW LOOP B HDR PR IND AX tsAY 3.00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GP.S Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 18 PT4058 0 30 I RBCCW LOOP A HDR PR IND AXBAY 3.00 A COMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 19 TE1046A 0 10 / RHR A Loop Ht Exch inlet Temp R8 -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE1046B 0 10 t RHR B Loop Ht Exch inlet Temp RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE1047A 0 10 / RHR A Loop Ht Exch Outlet Temp RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE1047B 0 10 / RHR B Loop Ht Exch Outlet Temp RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yea BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE3835 0 30 t RBCCW LOOP B TEMP CL AXBAY 3.00 BCOMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE3836 0 30 t RBCCW LOOP A TEMP CL AXBAY 3.00 ACOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE3840 0 29 / SSW LP A RBCCW HX OUTLET TEMP AXBAY 3.00 ACOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE3841 0 29 / SSW LP B RBCCW HX OUTLET TEMP AXBAY 3 00 BCOMP 3 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE3890 0 29 i SSW LP A RBCCW HX INLET TEMP AXBAY 3.00 A COMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TE3891 0 29 / SSW LP B RBCCW HX INLET TEMP AXBAY 3 00 8 COMP 3.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of . The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in th JVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capabihty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty tre required, there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

cntries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professjonal engineer.)

l WR KLINE v

l l 17 @(> l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sign ur '

Dhte Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l W DJORDJEVIC ] '

l )( (, l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sigh ture Datd Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date 1 I I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sighature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date

03/20/96 3,47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page027 Eq Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. Fi EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 CK7 19 TS1A 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A TEMP SW RW 76.00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes N/A Yes No 19 TS1B 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN B TEMP SW RW 76 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes N/A Yes No 19 TS2A O 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A TEMP SW RW 76 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes N/A Yes No 19 TS2B 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN B TEMP SW RW 76 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes N/A Yes No 19 TS3A 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A TEMP SW RW 76 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes N/A Yes No "IF TS3B 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN B TEMP SW RW 76.00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes N/A Yes No 19 TS4A 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A TEMP SW RW 76 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes N/A Yes No 19 TS4B 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN B TEMP SW RW 76 00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes N/A Yes No 19 TS8155A 0 24 / MCCHVAC TEMP SW MCC B17 RB 23.00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TS8155C 0 24 / MCCHVAC TEMP SW MCC B17 ALARM RB 23.00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TS8156A O 24 / MCCHVAC TEMP SW MCC B18 RB 23.00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TS8156C 0 24 / MCCHVAC TEMP SW MCC B18 ALARM RB 23.00 WEST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TS8157A 0 24 / MCCHVAC TEMP SW MCC B20 RB 23 00 EAST 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TS8157C 0 24 / MCCMVAC TEMP SW MCC B20 ALARM RB 23 00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TSD41 0 24 / EAC VAC202A Fan Control RB 2.80 SW OD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TSD42 0 24 / EAC VAC2028 Fan Control RB 2.80 SWOD 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TSD43 0 24 / EAC VAC201 A Fan Control RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TSD44 0 24 / EAC VAC201B Fan Control RB -17.50 HPCI -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TSD45 0 24 / EAC VAC204A Fan Control RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A No No 19 TSD46 0 24 / EAC VAC204B Fan Control RB -17.50 SE OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A No No 19 TSD47 0 24 / EAC VAC204C Fan Control RB -17.50 NWOD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 19 TSD48 0 24 / EAC VAC204D Fan Control RB -17.50 NW OD -17.50 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 20 C11 0 45 / TRANSMITTER POWER PANEL RW 23 00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C152 0 45 / RHR ALT SHOTDOWN PANEL' RB '23.00 EAST 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C248 0 45 / MCC B17 Fan Controt Panet RB 23.00 MCC B17 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C249 0 45 / MCC B18 Fan Control Panel RB 23 00 MCC B18 23.00 Yes BL GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C250 0 45 / MCC B20 Fan Control Panet RB 23 00 MCC B20 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C64 0 45 / SSW HVAC Control Panel INTK 25 60 STAIRWL 38 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No Ccrtification: Certification:

All the % formation contained on this Screening Venficat!on Data Sheet (SVDS) is to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and behef, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry ind of the equipment contained in De SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Sqnatures of all Seismic Capabikty Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Oper6ons Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabikty gra required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatones should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entnes and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed pr 'o alengineer.)

l WR KLINE l l

2 7 [ [f l l l l Pnnt or Type Name S; n'tu D6te Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC l l [4 l l l l Pnnt or Type Name 'S ture Date' Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l I l l I i l Pnnt or Type Name S4 nature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date

[

t i

05/20/96 3.47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page028 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Eque Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK? OK7 OK? OK?

20 LIS302-82A 0 03 / RPS EAST SDIV LEVEL ATS TRIP RW 23.00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 LIS302-828 0 03 / RPS EAST SDIV LEVEL ATS TRIP RW 23.00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 LIS302-83C 0 03 / RPS WEST SDIV LEVEL ATS TRIP RW 23.00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 LIS302-830 0 03 / RPS WEST SDIV LEVEL ATS TRIP RW 23.00 CSR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes r

i Certification: Certification:  ;

All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided

• J Me Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations o w knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contair.ed in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and  !

ct vJusion (whethe+ venfied to be seismicaPy adequate or not). accurate.

l Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability tre required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

cntries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed pro n iengineer.)

l WR KLINE Pnnt or Type Name l

Sgndtu W ZI[(v l Date l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC Pnnt or Type Name l b ((" " '

l M Date/

[, l Pnnt or Type Name l

Signature l l Date E "f I I / I I I I l Pnnt or Type i4* .3 Signatp Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date

05/20/96 3:47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page # 29 Eq. Eq.80 Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. Fi El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <407 Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 g 6 P208A 0 29 / SSW PUMP A INTK 25.50 ACOMP 21.50 N/A ABS RRS No No Yes Yes No 6

^

P2088 0 29 / SSW PUMP B INTK 25.50 ACOMP 21.50 N/A ABS RRS No No Yes Yes No 6 P208C 0 29 / SSW PUMP C INTK 25.50 C COMP 21.50 N/A ABS RRS No No Yes Yes No 6 P208D 0 29 / SSW PUMP D INTK 25.50 BCOMP 21 50 N/A ABS RRS No No Yes Yes No 6 P208E O 29 / SSW PUMP E INTK 25.50 BCOMP 21.50 N/A ABS RRS No No Yes Yes No Cortification: Certrfication:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "AX information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belef, correct and conclusion (whether verifed to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of au Seismic Capability Engineers on Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability tre required; there should be atleast two on th S T All a s ould agree with au the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entnes and conclusions. One signatory should 5 sion l JG DYCKMAN l. ,

A engineer.)

l5 3 tc/2I / I Pnnt or Type Name

~

I l gna ' Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l JA KALB l l [ l l l l Pnnt or Type Name V i Tegnature' Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date i I I I I I l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

I i

(

05/20/96 3:47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (IVDS) PageO 30 Eq. Eq.ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40'? Cap. Demd. Cap

• Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK7 OK7 8 SVL-15 0 24 I CRHEAF TRAIN B DAMPER CONTROL RW 64.00 #2FRM 66.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 8 SVL-t, 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A DAMPER CONTROL RW 64.00 #2FRM 81.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 10 VCRF-101 A 0 24 / CRHEAF TRAIN A FILTER HEATR RW 78.00 #2FRM 81.00 N/A ABS RRS No Yes Yes Yes No l

20 C179 0 45 / Torus Wtr Temp Sgnal Proc Cab RW 37.00 SAS 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C180 0 45 / Torus Wtr Temp Sgnal Proc Cab RW 37.00 SAS 37.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes i

Certdication: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Venfication Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The information provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "A!! information" includes each entry and of the equipment cuntained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether venfied to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty cre required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. A!! signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a li sed profes ' n engineer.)

l JA KALB l , e l [h l l l l Pnnt or Type Name / # gnatu Da e Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date l W DJORDJEVIC l l f(l l l l Pnnt or Type Name SkJft 'Dath Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date i I l l l l l Pnnt or Type Name SgnatGre Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date

_ ._ _ _- m_ . . .- ~ ._ _ . . _ _ ___ m . . ._ . _ _ _ _ . - . m._ _ _ _ _ _ _. - _ _ _

05/20/96 3:47 PM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page # 31 Eq. Eq.ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40*? Cap. Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK? OK7 OK? OK?

15 D1 0 46 /125VDC Control Battery Rack A TB 37.00 A BTTRY 37.00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 rn 0 461125VDC Control Battery Rack 8 TB 23.00 BBTTRY 23.00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 15 D3 0 46 (250VDC Power Battery Rack TB 23.00 B BTTRY 23.00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 16 D11 0 46 / Normal 125VDC Changer for D1 TB 37.00 ASWGR 37.00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 16 D12 0 46 / Normal 125VDC Changer for D2 TB 23.00 BSWGR 23.00 N/A DOC RRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 16 D13 0 [46 / Normal 250VDC Changer for D3 TB 23 00 BSWGR 23.00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screen:ng Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of The irdormation provided to the Seismic Capabihty Engineers regarding systems and operations our knowledge and belief, corred and accurate. "All information" includes each entry and of the equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and conclusion (whether verified to be seismically adequate or not). accurate.

Approved: (Signatures of all Seismic Capability Engineers on the Seismic Review Team (SRT) Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability tre required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. All signatories should agree with all the Engineers deem it necessary.)

entries and conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed professional engineer.) ,

l CT PITTS l [ l 22f 6l l l l Pnnt or Type Name j Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date I SC CHUGH Pnnt or Type Name

]

Sqnatuk s' N8WM Date l l l l Pnnt or Type Name Sqnature Date l l

l l I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date I

_ _ ~ .

06/12/96 0928 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page # 18 Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI El. Rm or Rw/Cl Base El. <40"? Cap _ Demd. Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd7 OK7 OK7 OK OK7 10 C208 0 45 / Orywell Coohng Fan Tram A Relay Rack RB 23 00 MCC B17 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes No No 18 C209 0 45 / Drywell Coohng Fan Train B Relay Rack RB 23 00 MCC B18 23 00 Yes BS GRS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 20 C61 0 45 / React Bido H&V Control Panet RB 23.00 E WALL 23.00 N/A ABS CRS No Unx No Yes No 8 MO4038A 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control Viv RB 45.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO40388 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control V!v RB 41.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No G MO4038C 0 30 833CCW Drywell EAC Cor trol Vtv RB 23 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO4038D 0 30 / RBCCW Drywell EAC Control Viv RB 41.00 DW 51 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No i 8 WJ4038E O 30 / RBCCW Drywell EAC Control V!v RB 15.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO4038F 0 30 / RBCCW Drywell EAC Control V!v RB 15 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No G MO4039A 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control Viv RB 23 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO40398 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control Viv RB 41.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO4039C 0 30 / RBCCW Drywell EAC Control Viv RB 23.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO40390 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control Viv RB 41 00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No j 8 MO4039E O 30 / RBCCW Drywet EAC Control Vtv RB 15 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO4039F 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control Vtv RB 15.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO4040A 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control V!v RB 13.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO40408 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control Viv RB 13.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO4041 A 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Control Viv RB 13 00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 8 MO4041B 0 30 / RBCCW Drywell EAC Control Viv RB 13.00 DW 23 00 Yes BS GRS No Unk N/A Unk No 10 VAC205B1- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywell EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 41.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BOD SO VAC20582- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywell EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 41.00 DW 51.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD 10 VAC205C1- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 23.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD to VAC205C2- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 23.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No .

BDD 10 VAC205E1- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 15.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD Certification: Certification:

Au the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of our The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations of the dnowiedge and benef, correct and accurate *AR information" includes each entry and conclusion equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate.

(whether veiified to be seismicaHy adequate or not).

Approved: (Signatures of aR Seismic Capability Engineers on Seismic Review Team (SRT) are Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capabihty required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AH signat a ld agree with all the entries and Engineers deem It necessary.)

conclusions. One signatory should be a licensed .

.)

l JG DYCKMAN Pnnt or Type Name l . l 8 hl l l l i

' ' 'S{ nave Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l CT PITTS Print or Type Name

]

[Signature/

~

l de l l l l Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date

! I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date Print or Type Name Signature Date

08/12/96 09:28 AM SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SHEET (SVDS) Page # 2 /k-Eq. Eq. ID Rev Sys/Eq. Desc Bldg. FI EL Rm or Rw/Cl Base EL <40~1 Cap. Demd Cap > Caveats Anchor interact Equip Cl No Spec. Spec Demd? OK7 OK7 OK OK7 10 VAC205E2- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdtft Dmp RB 15.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD 10 VAC205F1- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 15.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD 10 VAC205F2- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 15.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD SO VAC206A1- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 13.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD 10 VAC206A2- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 13.00 DW 23 C0 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD 10 VAC206B1- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 13.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GitS No Unk Unk Unk No BDD 10 VAC20682- 0 30 / RBCCW Drywen EAC Bkdrft Dmp RB 13.00 DW 23.00 Yes BS GRS No Unk Unk Unk Na BDD Certification: Certification:

All the information contained on this Screening Verification Data Sheet (SVDS) is, to the best of our The information provided to the Seismic Capability Engineers regarding systems and operations of the knowledge and belief, correct and accurate. "Au informabon" includes each entry and conclusion equipment contained in the SVDS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate.

(whether verified to be seismicaHy adequate or not).

Approved: (Signatures of au Seismic Capability Engineers Seismic Review Team (SRT) are Approved: (One signature of Systems or Operations Engineer is required if the Seismic Capability required; there should be atleast two on the SRT. AH sig ' should agree with all the entries and Engineers deem It necessary.)

conclusions. One signatory should be a ~ fes ' 01 i .)

l JG DYCKMAN l_ _ l l Is l l l l Pnnt or Type Name " 3ign$ture ' Date Pnnt or Type Name Signature Date l CT PITTS Pnnt or Type Name l [ l A /2 96,l l _

l l Signature ' Date ' Pnnt or Type Name Signatur e Date i I I I I I I Pnnt or Type Name Sgnature Date Print or Type Name Signature Date

PNPS A-46 Finsi Rtport September,1996 Revision 0

15. Appendix E: Peer Review Assessment 15.1 Description of Peer Review A peer review of the resolution of USI-A46 at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in accordance with the Generic Implementation Procedure was conducted by Dr. John D. Stevenson of Stevenson and Associates to the requirements of GIP Part 1, Section 2.2.7 on August 17* and 18*,

1994. The review provided an assessment of GIP walkdowns by a review of a sample of completed Seismic Evaluation ~ Work Sheets (SEWS) and the associated Outlier Seismic Verification Sheets (OSVS). Following the review of the SEWS and OSVS forms, an in-plant walk by of the reviewed components was conducted to determine if the SEWS captured the "

as is " condition of the components in the plant as they relate to the seismic verification of these components.

15.2 Results of Peer Review A total of 17 component SEWS were reviewed which included 6 OSVS. The components reviewed along with the outcome of the review are summarized below. For additional information refer to the peer review letter [ Reference 18] included as subsection 15.4 of this report.

Table 15-1 Peer Review Results ITEM # COMPONENT ID & NAME REVIEW RESULTS & ACTION ITEMS 1 C2251 A, Jet Pump Instrument Rack Justify basis for 3/T gap acceptance 2 C22518, Jet Pump instrument Rack Agree with SEWS 3 C150, SSW / RBCCW Alternate Agree with SEWS Shutdown Panel 4 X22, 4KV/480V Transformer Agree with SEWS 5 C174, PASS Isolation Valve Control Validete deflection calculation. Consider anchor Panel tension 6 AA504, 4KV Undervoltage Relay Agree with SEWS Cabinet 7 C175, PASS isolation Valve Control i Oee with SEWS Panel 8 P206, RCIC Pump Agree with SEWS 9 VAC203A, RBCCW CRD EAC Shock isolator question.

10 X107B, Diesel Generator B Agree with SEWS 11 VAC203B, RBCCW CRD EAC Shock isolator question.

12 MO2301-6, HPCI CST Suction Valve Agree with SEWS 13 P202A, RBCCW Pump Editorial comment 14 AO1301-12, RCIC Vacuum Tk Cond Agree with SEWS Discharge Valve 15 B17 480V MCC OSVS for component missing 16 125 volt Station Battery Agree with SEWS 17 Low Voltage Switchgear 86 Agree with SEWS 15-1

- . . . - - - - . -~ . - . - - - _ - - . - . ~ - - . . . - - - _ - - - - - ~ . . ._- -.. . -.

4

' PNPS A-46 Final Riport S7pttmber,1996 i

Revision 0 )

i 15.3 Resolution of Peer Review Findings Requiring Follow-up Action l

1 The peer review generated comments which require resolution on a total of 6 component SEWS. In addition,2 localized observed items and 3 generic items were identified during the l field walk-by as requiring resolution. The items along with their resolution are summarized in Table 15-2 which follows.

e 1

l 4

1 j

b i

1 4

f 15-2

~ - _ _ _ ,. . - - ~ . - . - - . -_.~---. - - -_.--...-..--.-..- - - - - - . - - . . . .

4 1

PNPS A-46 First Rtport

}

. SeptImber.1996 j Revision 0 1

! Table 15-2 l Resolution of Peer Review Findings j

l l

l j ITEM # COMPONENT ID & NAME REVIEW RESULTS & RESOLUTION ,

1 C2251A, Jet Pump instrument Justify basis for 3/8* gap acceptance. i 1 Rack Resolved - Seismic interaction issue resolved in C2251 A , Rev.1.

{i 5 C174, PASS isolation Valve Validate deflection calculation. Consider anchor i Control Panel tension. 1 i Resolved . .e,r.somic interaction issue resolved in '

l 174, Rev.1.

9 VAC203A, RBCCW CRD EAC Shock isolator question.

Closed - This item will be resolved as part of Outlier O22.

I 11 VAC203B, RBCCW CRD EAC Shock isolator question.

Closed -This item will be resolved as part of Outlier '

O 22.

l

13 P202A, RBCCW Pump Editorial comment.

i Closed. This is a comment and no action is j required.

i 15 B17 480V MCC OSVS for component missing.

I Closed. OSVS has been generated and added to

! Rev 0 of the SEWS.

f *As D1, D2 and D3,125 volt and 250 Station battery racks had gaps between the batteries l observed" volt Station Batteries and the side bars. They should be closed by adjustment l Condition 1 or by shimming. Resolved - Station Batteries D1, D2

! and D3 have been replaced for other reasons. The d

replacements consists of new cells and racks which

! meet design basis seismic requirements, ie.

l lEEE344-75. The new batteries were inspected and j found to be free of the gaps observed in the old j racks.

g *As Emergency Diesel Generator B A small trolley hoist is located above Diesel Generator i observed

• B. The hoist operating chain hangs down and could be j Condition 2 dragged over the diesel in a seismic event causing j damage. The chain should be stowed so it cannot drag

along the diesel or the trolley should be positively l restrained. Resolved - FRN 96-01-45 has been issued j to install two chain loopo that the hoist chain can i be secured to.

I j General Lights over SSEL equipment in a few instances very light chains were observed

lssue1 supporting lights. Closed - This item will be tracked l' and resolved as GeneralInteraction issue G1.

I General High pressure gas bottle A gas bottle was observed to be secured by a horizontal

} lssue 2 chain at a single location. Close d - This item will be tracked and resolved as General Interaction issue G2.

$ General Fire extinguishers Supporting knobs were observed to be less than %*

issue 3 high in some instances. Closed - This item will be j tracked and resolved as General Interaction issue G3. .

}

i 4

1 a

15-3

PNPS A-46 Final RIport S1pternt>;f,1996 Revision 0 15.4 Peer Review Letter i

1 l

l 15-4

STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES S& a structural-mechanical consulting engineering firm 9217 Midwest Avenue . Cleseland, Ohio 44125 (216) 587-3805 Teles: 5106015834 . Fax: (216) 587-2205 91C2672A LTR8.22 February 19,1996

Mr. Charles Pitts Boston Edison Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

! 600 Rockyhill Road Plymouth, MA 02360-5599

Dear Mr. Pitts:

This letter is meant to document my independent peer review audit of the resolution of USI A46 on the Pilgrim NPP in accordance with the requirements of the Generic Implementation Procedure, GIP Section 2.2.7. This review was conducted Wednesday 17 and Thursday 18 August 1994. In this teview I am providing an assessment of an USI-A46 GIP walkdown by a review of a sample of the completed Seismic Evaluation Work Sheets, SEWS, and associated Outlier Seismic Verification Sheets, OSVS. Following a myiew of the comp!:ted SEWS and OSVS forms a walkby in the plant of the components reviewed was conducted to determine if the SEWS captured the "as is" condition of the components in the plant as they relate to the scismic verification of these components.

A total 17 component SEWS were reviewed which included 6 OSVS. The conclusion reached on the individual SEWS and OSVS reviewed are as follows:

1) Item C2251 Instrument Rack - Class 18 a) What is the basis for 3/8" gap O.K.? Otherwise agree with SEWS.

2) Item C2251B Instrument Rack - Clus 18 Agree with SEWS.

3) Item C150 Shutdown Panel - Class 20 Agree with SEWS.

4) Item X22 Transformer - Class 4 Agree with SEWS.

Mr. Charles Pitts Page 2 February 19,1996

5) Item C174 I&C Panels and Cabinet - Class 20 a) Inertia deflections only valid if no tension in anchorage. Deflection calculations give results which are not rational when considering anchorage flexibility. Otherwise agree with SEWS.

6) Item AA504 I&C Panel and Cabinets - Class 20 Agree with SEWS.

7) Item C175 I&C Panel and Cabinets - Class 5 Agree with SEWS.

8) Item P 206 Horizontal Pump - Class 5 Agree with SEWS.

9) Item VAC 203A Air Handler - Class 10 (a) Shock isolators are only a problem if they permit unrestrained lateral displacement. Is this the case in this instance? Otherwise agree with SEWS.

10) Item DG B Emergency Diesel- Class 17 Agree with SEWS.

I1) Item VAC 203B Air Handlers - Class 10 See Item 9(a). Otherwise agree with SEWS.

12) Item MO 2301-6 Motor Op Valve - Class 8 Agree with SEWS.

13) Item P202A Pump A Loop A - Class 5 a) If attached piping is well supported why do you need a comment? -

CAV4

14) Item A01301-12 Fluid Op Valve - Class 7 Agree with SEWS.

Mr. Charles Pitts Page 3 February 19,1996 i

l

15) Item B17 MCC - Class 17 l

(a) Why no OSVS for this component given on interaction concern? l l

16) Item D 1 Battery Rack A - Class 15 Agree with SEWS.

17) Item B6 Low Voltage Switchgear - Class 2 i Agree with SEWS. I In addition to the SEWS review OSVS were reviewed for the following items 1),2),7),9),11) and 13) and I agree with OSVS findings. It was also noted that for item 15) apparently an unresolved interaction concern was listed but without an accompanying OSVS.

On Thursday 18 August 1994,I walked through the plant to review the content of the SEWS against the "as observed" condition of the component. The only conditions observed not otherwise considered by the SEWS are as follows:

4 a) Item 16) battery racks had gaps between the batteries and the side bars which in a few instanced were up to about a 3/8" gap. In my opinion that gap should be classed by either adjusting the side bars or placing a shin panel between the side bar and the battery.

b) On the diesel generation item 10 it was noted that a small trolley section of a hoist was located over one end of the D.G. with a chain hanging down. In my

, opinion the chain should be secured so if the trolley slides along the beam on which it is mounted the chain would not be dragged over the diesel potentially failing tubing in its path. Alternatively, the trolley should be positively restrained.

There were some additional generic issues noted during the walkby as follows:

a) There are some very light chains support lights which in my opinion should be vertically load tested to 3 x deadweight to demonstrate there scismic adequacy.

b) Pressurized gas bottles were secured irt some cases by a single horizontal chain.

In my opinion a double chain or a lateral restraint shoe on the bottom of the bottle-should be added to assure lateral restraint adequacy.

c) Fire extinguisher should be checked to assure the knob supporting the extinguisher should be at least 1/2" high.

I Mr. Charles Pitts Page 4 February 19,1996 l In conclusion I believe USI-A46 walkdown and seismic adequacy judgment and analysis are being done in a thorough and competent manner in accordance with the requirements of GIP.

Sincerely, I b. C John D. Stevenson President JDS:ss cc: Tom Tracy l

4 s

PNPS A-46 Finil R1 port ST!Armber,1996 l Revision 0

' 16. Appendix F: Results of Cable Tray and Conduit Review I

J 4

4 16-1

~!

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1 i

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1 Boston Edison Company

< 1 1

USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report July 29,1994 for I

! Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station J

! S&A Project 93C2787 l

l l

l 4

i ,

1 Pilgrim USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report Table of Contents Page

1. Introduction and Purpose.... . . . . . . . . . . . .........................................1 7 2. Scope of Electrical Raceways Assessed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........1 4

2.1 General Areas Covered........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............1 2.2 General Description of Pilgrim Raceways.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2

.3 2.3 Specific Raceway Systems Evaluated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Previous Seismic Racemy Evaluation Procedure and Results...... .. . . . . . . . . . . ... 4

4. Current Raceway Evaluation and Result.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............6

- 4.1 GIP Inclusion Rules Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6 4.2 GIP Other Seismic Performance Concerns. .. . . . . . . . . . . . .........7 4.3 Bolt Tightness Testing For Expansion Anchors.. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4 Limited Analytical Review (LAR) Results.... .. .. . . ... . . ....................8 4.4.1 Summary of Results.. ... ...... .. .. . . . . . . ............................9

. 4.4.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Support Evaluation..... ....... 12 4.4.3 Method of Solution..... .. . . ... ... ... ..... .. . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 18 4.4.4 Input Data and Assumptions.. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 19 4.4.5 Allowable Stress and Load Criteria. ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 19 4.4.6 Lateral Load Check Calculations.. ... ... . .... .. . .. . ................20

. 5. Conclusions........... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

6. References.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........22 Appendices: Appendix A: " Cable and Conduit Raceway Review PASS Forms' Appendix B: " Outlier Seismic Verification Sheets" Appendix C: " Resumes of Seismic Capability Engineers' List of Tables: Table 4.4.1.1 " Critical Interaction Values' Table 4.4.1.2 " Analytical Review Tracking Summary' USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994

- _. - --_ _ . . = - - . _ - . - _ . _ - . - - - _ . . . - . - . . ._,

4 i

There were only a few inaccessible rooms that were not visited by the walkdown team. l 4

Those rooms were of small size (such as tank rooms) and extremely high radiation zones where the raceways were not expected to be different than the raceways that were observed outside of these rooms. Furthermore, for those inaccessible rooms, drawings l were reviewed to confirm that additional raceways did not originate in the rooms and that I the raceways that entered and exited the rooms did not significantly change their

. configuration such as number of tiers, or conduits, or their fill ratios.

All areas that were walked down were evaluated against the inclusions Rules,and the l caveats (also known as "Other Seismic Concerns" and " Seismic Interaction"). Section 4

, discusses the evaluation criteria at greater length.

The surveys are documented on Plant Area Summary Sheets (PASS).

Table A.1 in Appendix A provides an index of the areas reviewed and for which PASS 4

forms were completed. Appendix A also contains copies of all of the PASS forms listed in Table A.1.

2.2 General Description of Pilgrim Raceways

! Pilgrim's raceway systems are primarily light steel strut frame construction with some (very few) trapeze rod hanger construction. The strut hangers vary from the very simple single

cantilever strut supporting one or a few conduits to multi-tier, three-dimensional strut frames supporting cable trays and conduits.

The trays varied in size from 6" width to 36" width, primarily of 12" to 24" ladder and trough type construction. Conduits vary in size from 1/2" to 4" nominal diameter and are of rigid steel material (standard schedule pipe). Trays were often sprayed with fire retardant, covered or constructed with fire board barriers between tray tiers.

I The trays and conduits were secured to hangers using standard tray clamps (clips) and pipe i

clamps. Missing or damaged hardware was not identified in the scope of the walkdown. ,

The hangers are generally constructed of double channel members interconnected with 4-bolt gusseted ninety degree fittings. The hangers are anchored to overhead channels which are connected to concrete slabs by expansion anchors, or clamped and/or welded to structural steel. Anchorage designs such as welding fittings directly to steel and clamping to structural steel using clamps are quite common throughout the plant. The use of beam i clamps for the rod hanger systems are also found, but to a much lesser extent.

Lateral (transverse) bracing is used in various systems. Also, strut members longitudinally connecting raceway hangers provide ductile longitudinal frame action which increases longitudinal seismic capability.

USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 2

'j

._. .- - - - . . - = - -- .- - - ..- - _ _ - - . _ . - ._

i.

i 1

A considerable percentage of the raceway systems are rigidly mounted on walls using strut frames, brackets or single strut members mounted directly on the wall. This is the predominant mode of raceway support inside the drywell.

4 Photographs of the various types of Pilgrim raceways may be found in the PASS forms in Appendix A.

2.3 Specific Raceway Systems Evaluated l

The goal of the evaluation process is to determine overall plant raceway systems acceptability based on a detailed examination of a focused review scope. The GIP [6.1) evaluation procedure requires that each plant evaluates 10 - 20 raceway supports selected

{ for Limited Analytical Reviews (LAR) to envelop the most heavily loaded of the major

different support configurations in use at that plant. Following GIP, all of the raceway

systems and their supports were first checked against the inclusion Rules and Caveats.

l Then the Seismic Review team (SRT) selected representative, worst-case (bounding) samples of the raceway supports on which LAR was performed. This process allows for j the establishment of the adequacy of the plant's raceway systems. The actual supports i used for LAR were selected following GlP recommendations and at the discretion of the SRT relying on experience and technical judgment.

A limited number of large junction boxes were observed. The conduit / tray feeding into the j junction boxes are well supported in all instances. In addition, the junction boxes are also well supported. No unusual conditions were observed.

Raceways spanning seismically separate buildings were also observed. The raceway trays i

, and supports, including cable and conduit, possess adequate flexibility to absorb relative

movement between the buildings. It is also noted that relative seismic movement between seismically separate buildings at Pilgrim Station are low.

! in all,25 raceway systems (supports) were chosen for LAR. It shall be noted that 18 of them were previously (in 1982) selected by Bechtel Corporation for rigorous analysis [6.4].

Eight (8) out of the 25 supports chosen for LAR did not meet the LAR requirements -

. specifically the requirement that anchorage capacity be sufficient to meet the vertical dead load capacity (1.0 x DL) and vertical capacity checks (3.0 x DL) and were, therefore, I considered as outliers. However, they were ultimately found to be just " Analytical i Outliers" as they passed lateral load evaluations and did not require any hardware l 4

modification. Following the GlP recommendations for outliers these supports were further evaluated using more detailed analytical models to demonstrate that they were as rugged i as required [6.3]. The completed Outlier Seismic Verification Sheets (OSVS) for the 8 i analytical outliers are contained in Appendix B.

) As a result all 25 supports chosen for LAR were shown to meet acceptance criteria with no hardware modifications required.

Drawings or sketches of the LAR supports may be found in the respective PASS Forms.

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USI A 46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 3

3. Previous Seismic Raceway Evaluation Procedure & Results Boston Edison Company (BECo) conducted rigorous evaluations of the Pilgnm Station electrical raceway systems in 1982 through its contractor, Bechtel Corporation. The purpose in evaluating electrical raceway systems at that time was a desire to apply any lessons learned based on an extensive raceway testing program undertaken by Bechtel Corporation in the late 1970s. BECo decided to evaluate their raceways and incorporate any design modifications that might be forthcoming and of a generic nature [6.4].

In a fashion quite similar to the GlP procedural evaluations, the basis for evaluation was the selection of 20 representative worst case examples of the Pilgrim raceway construction. In this sense it was identicalin approach to the GIP evaluation procedure. Where it differed, however, is that the evaluations were conducted rigorously as opposed to the more simplified checks required by the GlP procedure. Each raceway was sketched (as-built condition) in great detail. Rigorous frequency and stress analyses were conducted with the aid of computer models. Test data specifically germane to Pilgrim's raceway hardware details were applied , as apprcpriate. Detailed longitudinal analyses were also conducted for each system analyzed. By then and present day standards, the analytical approaches and criteria would meet new plant analysis and design procedures.

Ref. 6.4 contains the Pilgrim Station Raceway Evaluation Criteria developed for the assessment.

Hangers were evaluated for the following load conditions:

(1) Dead Load (DL) + Live Load (LL) < f (working stress allowable),

(2) DL + LL + Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) < f, (3) DL + LL + Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) < 1.5 x f s; fy All concrete expansion anchors are evaluated against manufacturer's recommended working loads - generally a factor of safety of 4 or 5 (dependent on manufacturer) against ultimate failure loads. See Tables 1 through 3 in Appendix 1 of Ref. 6.4 for anchorage allowables used. For all analyses, the stresses were combined absolutely for vertical load and one horizontal component of the earthquake. The hangers were evaluated in the transverse and longitudinal directions in every case.

Each hanger system was evaluated for natural frequency including the flexibility of the raceway components (trays and conduits). The frequency was varied plus or minus 20%

for the purpose of selecting spectral acceleration. Spectral accelerations are based on the floor response spectra for the floor from which the hanger is supported.

USI A 46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 4

l Five levels of analysis were defined ranging from the most conservative attempt (Level 1) to the most detailed (Level 5). The five levels of analysis are discussed, following:

Level 1. This initiallevel of analysis is the most conservative of the five levels. All trays are considered fully loaded based on 50#/ft weight for a 24" wide tray. The OBE damping is set to 2% and the SSE damping to 5%.

Level 2. This analysis level is similar to level 1 except that actual tray weights are used and 7% damping is assumed for the SSE analysis. The OBE analysis case is eliminated.

Level 3. This level involves comparing the hanger to the lower bound test table response spectra used during the Bechtel/ANCO test program [6.5]. This clearly requires reasonable similarity to tested configurations and was not used in the evaluation of the 20 Pilgrim supports.

Level 4. This level of analysis utilizes inelastic analysis techniques commonly referred to as " energy balance". The criteria was based on a maximum ductility ratio of 4 on displacement and a minimum cyclic demand of 60 full cycles. The technique is described in detailin Appendix C [6.4]. Level 4 evaluations were not used for any of the 20 Pilgrim supports.

Level 5. Level 5 analysis involves modeling the entire raceway system, essentially from anchor to anchor of the system. Detailed computer models were developed using finite element techniques. Eigenvalue extraction analyses were performed and response spectrum stress analyses were conducted. Stresses and loads in every raceway element were checked. Both transverse and longitudinal analyses were y conducted.

This evaluation resulted in no major hardware modifications or seismic upgrades.

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USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 5

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4. Current Raceway Seismic Evaluations and Results The following three sections discuss the results of the raceway seismic evaluations for the

} Pilgrim station.

4.1 GlP Inclusion Rules Results As previously stated, the vast majority of raceway systems in the power block buildings were included in the walkdown. Where it is clear that not every hanger fitting or every square foot of supporting concrete can be inspected, it is still important to note that a very thorough review of most raceways was accomplished.

Without exception, no anomalies in design or construction were found. Allinspected raceways meet the requirements of Section 8.2.2 of the GIP [6.1) as follows:

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• Cable tray spans did not exceed the 10' limit between adjacent supports and the 5' limit for centilevers;

• Conduit spans were within the limits required by Rule 2 of Section 8.2.2 [6.1);

• On all cantilever bracket supported systems cable trays and conduit were found secured to their supports so no tray or conduit sliding can occur;

• Channel nuts used with light metal framing systems were nuts with teeth (ridges) stamped into the nuts ( Fig.8-1, Ref. 6.1);

• No " rigid boot" type connection or similar (Fig.8-2, Ref. 6.1) was observed during the walkdown inspection;

• None of the beam clamps inspected had friction resistance in the direction of Gravity;

• Cast-iron anchor embedment rule implementation was resolved as follows. To check  ;

for cast iron anchorage embedments in a walkdown is not clearly feasible; however, BECo undertook an exhaustive effort to identify and document its concrete anchorages for the IE 79-02 Bulletin Issue in 1981 and reported the results in Summary Report, Generic Response to USNRC I&E Bulletin Number 79-02 Baseplate / Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts [6.6). The report shows the use of various commonly used and vell documented ductile steel anchor types, but no usage of cast iron embedm, its was found. Therefore, this issue has no impact on Pilgrim Station.

Masonry block walls were found throughout the station and in the vicinity of electrical raceways. Moreover, some raceway systems were transversely and longitudinally braced to block walls. Since block walls are ubiquitous at Pilgrim, it was necessary to verify that all block walls near safety-related equipment, including electrical raceways, had been reviewed in a systematic fashion for seismic integrity. BECo undertook a program of detailed review of masonry block walls in response to IE Bulletin 8011 [6.7) in which all masonry walls (nearly 400 in total) were reviewed and dispositioned. The inclusion of Class 1E electrical raceways with other safety related systems and components, and satisfactory response to NRC Bulletins [6.6, 6.7] satisfies this GIP requirement.

Pilgrim Station meets the inclusion Rules in their entirety.

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USl A 46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994

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4.2 GlP Other Seismic Performance Concerns & Seismic Interaction Review in addition to the inclusion Rules the SRT inspected the raceway systems Lr the caveats known as "Other Seismic Performance Concerns" and " Seismic Interaction Review". The l I

assessment results are as follows:

Other Seismic Performance Concerns

• All raceway anchorages were reviewed for adequacy in accordance with Section 8.2.3 [6.1]. No concerns were found;

• No concerns were found regarding visible cracks, significantly spalled concrete, serious honeycombs or other gross defects in the concrete to which the raceway supports are attached:

• No significant corrosion of cable trays, conduit supports or anchorage was noted by the SRT:

• No noticeable sag of any conduit or cable tray as defined in Concern 4 of Section 8.2.3 [6.1] was observed;

• No broken or missing cable tray and conduit components were found by the SRT;

• All cables inspected were restrained so they will be kept in the tray during an earthquake. No concern of that type was observed by the SRT:

• Plastic ties were pull tested where found and no brittle ties of plastic materials were found by the SRT;

• The SRT evaluated the raceways for stiff /short supports and found no instances of this design flaw. Pilgrim's hangers are of uniform height in long flexible runs of cable trays or conduit.

No findings were noted with respect to "Other Seismic Performance Concerns".

Seismic Interaction

• The raceway systems were reviewed for seismic proximity interaction in accordance with Section D.2. [6.11. No concerns were found by the SRT;

• The raceway systems were reviewed for falling hazards in accordance with Section D.3 [6.11. One concern was noted, an unanchored hot water tank located on a platform above a safety-related wall mounted conduit located in the machine shop in the Radwaste Building. This concern has been documented on an OSVS which is included in Appendix B;

• Conduit and cables were reviewed for sufficient flexibility to accomodate differential displacement between safe shutdown equipment and adjacent equipment and structure. No concerns were found by the SRT;

• No isolated Outliers (other findings) were found by the SRT.

One finding was noted during the performance of the Seismic Interaction Review. The finding is noted above under the " falling hazards" category and documented on an OSVS which is included in Appendix B.

7 USl A-46 Electricsl Raceway Report, July 29,1994

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4.J Bolt Tightness Testing For Expansion Anchors

! Floor mounted supports with expansion anchors were observed in the following locations:

i e Cable Spreading Room Radwaste Building Elevation 23' l . Fan Room #6 Reactor Building Elevation 91' I e Feed Pump Area Turbine Building Elevation 51' j The expansion anchors for these floor mounted supports were tightness checked and found to meet GIP tightness guidelines of Appendix C [6.1).

/ 4.4 Limited Analytical Review (LAR) Results i This Limited Analytical Review (LAR), performed within the scope of Unresolved Safety Issue

(USI) A-46, evaluates the structuralintegrity of cable tray and conduit supports which have been i chosen as representative, worst case examples of the raceway support configurations within i the Pilgrim Plant. Twenty-five bounding examples of electrical raceway supports have been chosen from the plant raceway support systems for evaluation by the Seismic Review Team. )

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The hangers (members, connections and fittings) were first evaluated for static, dead load l stresses. They were then evaluated for lateral load ductility to ensure no brittle failure loads. l l

Finally, the vertical capacity was checked by comparing support anchorage capacity to 3 times j the support deadweight.' If any of these evaluations are failed, the support is declared an Outlier

and additional evaluations of lateral load capacity are performed as shown in Section 4.4.2.

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USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 8 2

4 4.4.1 Summary of Results Criticalinteraction values and related comments for each of the raceway support evaluations in this LAR are summarized in Table 4.4.1.1 below. Refer to [6.3) for details of each of the

evaluations.

Table 4.4.1.1 Critical Interaction Values LAR No.** Interaction Value l

, DL Members DL Fittings / Vertical Capacity Maximum j Connections Anchorage

• 001 1.00 0.41 0.49 (DL Capacity) 1.00 002 0.26 Low 0.33 (DL Capacity) 0.33 I 003 Resolved, refer to OSVS, Appendix B 004 0.34 Low 0.56 0.56 005 0.81 0.20 0.61 0.81 006 0.86 Low 0.91 0.91 007 0.88 Low 1.00 1.00 008 0.24 Low 0.44 0.44 l 009 0.40 0.65 0.95 0.95 j l l Outlier (Continued on next page) l j

USl A 46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 9

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Table 4.4.1.1 (Continued) l CriticalInteraction Values l

LAR No." Interaction Value Members Fittings / Vertical Capacity Maximum

~

Connections Anchorage

• I 010 1.00 1.00 0.50 (DL Capacity) 1.00 l

011 Resolved, refer to OSVS, Appendix B 012 Resolved, refer to OSVS, Appendix B 013 Resolved, refer to OSVS, Appendix B 014 Resolved, refer to OSVS, Appendix B 016 Resolved, refer to OSVS, Appendix B I 016 0.P5 0.23 0.69 0.95  :

017 0.89 Low 0.50 0.89 I 018 Low Low 0.60 0.60 019 0.19 Low 0.99 0.99 02D Low 0.33 Low 0.33 j 021 Resolved, refer to OSVS, Appendix B 022 Resolved, refer to OSVS, Appendix B 023 0.55 Low 0.41 0.55 024 1.00 Low 0.80 1.00 025 Low Low Low Low l l Outlier

• ) Support connection to building structure. LAR 001,002 and 010 are wall mounted-therefore, vertical capacity check not required.

") All LARs referenced in this table are from [6.3]. For analytical review tracking summary see Table 4.4.1.2.

USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 10

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l Table 4.4.1.2 j l

Analytical Review Tracking Summary i

Bldg /Elev Plant Selection Final Initials /

Location Number Resolution Date RB EL 51' General LAR 1 OK .yp f hl 3.n .9 y TB EL 51' Feed Pump Area LAR 2 OK fff . R- P TB EL 1' South Corridor LAR 3 Analytical Outlier / Resolved 'fg/ . G TB EL 23' Condenser Bay LAR 4 OK ffg . G l TB EL 37' Battery Room A LAR6 OK fX/ - g TB EL 37' Upper Swgr Rm LAR 6 OK fgj - p.

TB EL 37' Upper Swgr Rm LAR 7 OK l721. A f RW EL 23' MG Set Room LAR 8 OK ~5f] . n .

RW EL 23' MG Set Room LAR 9 OK fgf . e RW EL 23' Cable Sprdg Rm LAR 10 OK 4/ . t/it RW EL 23' Cable Sprdg Rm LAR 11 AnalyticalOutlier/ Resolved 17/ . 6t RW EL 23' RW & TB Corridor LAR 12 Analytical Outlier / Resolved pfd . yt j RW EL 23' RW & TB Corridor LAR 13 Analytical Outlier / Resolved ft)f . A RB EL 23' General Area LAR 14 Analytical Outlier / Resolved ~pg/ . t/;L RAB EL 23' Ground Level LAR 15 Analytical Outlier / Resolved ft/ - tjt '

i RB EL 23' General Area LAR 16 OK fg/ . (f6 l RB EL 23' General Area LAR 17 OK g/ - t/A RB EL 23' General Area LAR 18 OK fff t/t.

RB EL 23' General Area LAR 19 OK , & . tq-RB EL 23' General Area LAR 20 OK fff . 4 RB EL 23' General Area LAR 21 Analytical Outlier / Resolved ;9) - t&

RB EL 23' General Area LAR 22 Analytical Outlier /Recolved fB . t/t RAB EL 23' Ground Level LAR 23 OK ppj . @-

RAB EL 3' AuxBay SSW Comp LAR 24 OK p/ - trb RB EL 23' General Area LAR 25 OK f / - (ft- 3.d.gg i

l USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 11

4.4.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Support Evaluations Logic diagrams indicating the evaluation path taken to demonstrate the acceptance of each of the raceway supports are shown below. Note that the particular evaluation path taken for the support in question is defined in heavy outline. The steps (8.3.1, 8.3.2, etc.) are Section numbers from [6.1].

LAR Nos. 004,005,006,008,009,017,018,019,023,025 START 8.3.1 Yes* Does the Support Have No Vertical Dead Load Capacity )

With Eccentricitiesg 1.0 x DL ?

Yes se 8.3.2 Does the Support Have s Vertical Capacity ( 3.0 x DL ? 1 l

Yes

% /

8.3.3 No l 8.3.4 Does the Support Have Ductile )i Does the Support Have No ) l Response to Lateral Loading ? l Adequata Lateral Load Strength?

, l Yes Yes , ,

u )

8.3.5 8.3.5 Yes ,

4 Is the Support a Fixed - End 2 Does the Fixed - End Rod Hanger No > I Rod Hanger ? Pass Fatique Evaluation ?

Yes No  ;

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OUTLIER PASS S[ ANALYTICAL REVIEW GO TO SECTION 8.4

• ) Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall USI A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 12

l l 4.4.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Support Evaluations (Cont.)

e LAR Nos. 010,016,024 Note: Evaluation path is defined in heavy outline.

i i START

% r 8.3.1 Yes* Does the Support Have No l Vertical Dead Load Capacity ) l With Eccentricities j 1.0 x DL ? l Yes I

%r 8.3.2 Does the Support Have I s Vertical Capacity > 3.0 x DL ?

Yes

%/

8.3.3 No 8.3.4 N

Does the Support Have Ductile d Does the Support Have >

Response to Lateral Loading ? Adequate Lateral Load Strength ?

j l Yes

' Yes s,

, I l  %

8.3.5 Yes I r

8.3.5 l No s is the Support a Fixed - End

<, Does the Fixed - End Rod Hanger /

i Rod Hanger ? l Pass Fatique Evaluation ? i Yes No ,

PASS

.[; OUTLIER )

, ANALYTICAL REVIEW (GO TO SECTION N 8.4

% /

• ) Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall 13 USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994

4.4.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Support Evaluations (Cont)

LAR No. 007 Note: Evaluation path is defined in heavy outline.

START se 8.3.1 Yes* Does the Support Have No Vertical Dead Load Capacity )

With Eccentricitiesg 1.0 x DL ?

Yes se 8.3.2 Does the Support Have N ,

' I Vertical Capacity ( 3.0 x DL ?

Yes j se -

8.3.3 No 8.3.4 I Does the Support Have Ductile ) Does the Sup-

• kve .,4 Response to Lateral Loading ? Adequate Lateral t trength Yes i r o 8.3.5 y 8.3.5 is the Support a Fixed End d,, Does the Fixed - End Rod Hanger No >

Rod Hanger ? Pass Fatique Evaluation ?

No , Yes s

' PASS OUTLIER

\' ANALYTICAL REVIEW /

8.4 /

• ) Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 14

l 4.4.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Supports (Cont.)

LAR Nos. 001,002,020 Note: Evaluation path is defined in heavy outline.

START ,

1 l

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8.3.1 Yes* Does the Support Have No s Verth al Dead Load Capacity '

With Eccentricitjes g 1.8 x DL ?

i Yes

,2, 8.32 l Does the Support Have  %

Vertcal Capacity

>_ 3 0 x DL ?

i Yes

• I 833 No 834 No s Does the Support Have Ductile / Does the Support Have < l Response to Lateral Loading ? Adequate Lateral Load Strength ?

., !Yes Yes -

,, j 835 y 835 lNo is the Support a Fixed . End ) Does the Fixed End Rod Hanger )

Rod Hanger ? Pass Fatklue raluation ?

I t Yes No (

s ,

S' OUTLIER pg33 ANALYTICAL REVIEW N /

• ) Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall 15 USl A 46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994

_ _ _ _ _ .~ _ _ _ _ . _ . ._. . . .._.

4.4.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Support Evaluations (Cont.)

N LAR Nos. 011,021 l

, Note: 1) Evaluation path is defined in heavy outline.

l 2) See Appendix B for OSVS's for LAR Nos.

011 and 021.

START l  %/

l 8.3.1 Yes' Does the Support Have No g Vertical Dead Load Capacity e ,

With Eccentricities y 1.0 x DL ?

,Yes j v 8.3.2 No Does the Support Have '

Vertical Capacity 3 0 x DL 7 Yes v

8.3.3 8.3.4 No s

! Does the Support Have D Jctile i ) Does the Support Have ,

Response to Lateral Loading ? Adequate Lateral Load Strength 7 l

Yes Yes (

835 y,, 835 lNo, is the Support a Fixed - End ) Does the Fixed End Rod Hanger  !

I Rod Hanger ? Pass Fatique Evaluation ?

Yes No (

v OUTLIER PASS Y ANALYTICAL REVIEW

, 8.4 K. ./

l

• ) Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall l

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USl A 46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 16

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1 i 4.4.2 Logic Diagrams for Cable Tray and Conduit Support Evaluations (Cont.) )

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LAR Nos. 003,012,013,014,015,022 )

Note: 1) Evaluation path is defined in heavy outline.

2) See Appendix B for OSVS's for LAR Nos.

003, 012, 013, 014, 015 and O22.

START

%/

8.3.1 Yes* Does the Support Have No y Vertical Dead Load Capacity e With Eccentricities g 1.0xDL?

Yes

%/

8.3.2 Does the Support Have A Vertical Capacity >_ 3.0 x DL ?

IYes si-8 3.3 8.3.4 No Does the Support Have Ductile )l Does the Support Have e Response to Lateral Loading ? Adequate Latera! Load Strength 7 I, lYes Yes $

\/

8 3.5 y, 8.3.5 is the Support a Fixed End ,

) Does the Fixed - End Rod Hanger No )

Rod Hanger 7 i Pass Fatique Evaluation ?

Yes No '/

OUTLIER PASS

.\. GO TO SECTION

< ANALYTICAL REVIEW s.4

/

• ) Directly mounted or rigidly cantilevered from structural wall USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 17

4.4.3 Method of Solution l

Hand calculations employing the methodology outlined in Section 8 of [6.1) are used to conduct the evaluation of the raceway support configurations chosen for the LAR [6.3).

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There are three basic analytical checks consistent with the LAR evaluation procedure as follows:

Check 1: Dead Load Check 2: Ductility Review Check 3: Vertical Capacity (3 x Dead Load)

These analytical checks are discussed below:

Check 1: Dead Load All support members, connections and anchorages are to be checked for adequate design  ;

margin with respect to normal, working stress allowable loads. This will be the only check required for conduits and cable trays mounted directly to walls or rigidly cantilevered from walls.

Clip angle bending stresses are considered only for floor supported (at base) designs.

Check 2: Ductility Review Suspended supports will be reviewed for ductility. Supports suspended from above may be characterized as ductile if connection and member yielding can be accomplished without degradation of primary vertical support connections and anchorage. (See Section 8 of Ref. 6.1 for a more detailed discussion of ductility.)

Check 3: Vertical Capacity This check concentrates on the support anchorage - specifically, the fittings, overhead members and expansion anchor and/or welding anchorages. It has been estabthed that high vertical capacity (three times dead load) is a design attribute for good seismic performance. High vertical c,apacity provides significant margin for horizontal earthquake loading.

The vertical capacity check is applicable to raceway supports suspended from above and deemed ductile (Check #2). The check is limited to the primary framing connections at the anchorage (including overhead members but excluding building structural steel) and the anchorage capacities. Bending stresses in clips are once again excluded. Allowable stresses l shall be in accordance with Part 2 of the AISC Steel Construction Manual [3). Expansion anchor allowables shall not be less than ultimate strength pullout and shear allowable loads divided by 3.0 following the guidelines of the GlP seismic anchorage guidelines in Appendix C [6.1).

18 USI A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994

l If the hangers meet the Checks 1-3, the analytical review is complete. Failing to meet the Checks results in the hanger being declared an outlier. Failing to meet Checks 2 or 3 for suspended supports generally requires a lateral load or limit state evaluation.

l 4.4.4 Input Data and Assumptions The input data used in the performance of the LAR of the cable tray and conduit support systems within the Pilgrim Plant are as defined below:

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. Plant Area Summary Sheets (PASS forms, see Appendix A to this Report) l

. Plant Design Calculations I

. Plant Seismic Response Spectra [6.11)

. GIP Bounding Spectrum - Fig. 4-2 [6.1). l l

Specific input data used in the evaluation of raceway supports are defined within their individual i evaluations (Section 4.3.6) and referenced to Section 6.0 of this Report. Assumptions made in the process of performing the individual evaluations are also defined in Section 4.4.6.

4.4.5 Allowable Stress and Load Criteria l The following is a compilation of allowable stress and load criteria used throughout the raceway support evaluations. These criteria are referenced to Section 6.0 of[6.3).

Allowable Stress .

A-36 Structural Steel [6.8): F=

y 36,000 psi j Fu = 58,000 psi Unistrut Channels [6.9]: Fa,b = 25,000 psi E60XX Filler Metal, Table 4.1.1, [6.10): Fu = 62,000 psi E70XX Filler Metal, Table 4.1.1, [6.10): Fu = 72,000 psi

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o USl A 46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 19

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4.4.6 Lateral Load Check Calculations The following provides a reference for the lateral load accelerations employed in the performance of the Lateral Load Check evaluations.

Transverse Load Condition (s) Employed in Lateral Load Checks Section 8.3.4 [6.1] describes three different transverse load conditions that must be considered ,

when conducting a Lateral Load Check on a raceway support. Those conditions are repeated l below for reference convenience.

. " Dead load plus a 2.0G horizontal acceleration in the transverse direction. The horizontal acceleration may be scaled down linearly by the minimura ratio of the design basis earthquake ground motion spectral acceleration for the plant site divided by the corresponding spectral acceleration of the Bounding Spectrum given in Figure 4-2." j

. " Dead load plus a transverse acceleration of 2.5 times the Zero Period Acceleration (ZPA) of the floor response spectrum for the anchor point in the plant where the raceway I

system is attached." l l

. "For elevations lower than about 40 feet above grade, dead load plus a transverse l acceleration of 2.5 times the floor ZPA where the floor ZPA is equal to the free-field ZPA times 1.5 (to account for building amplification), times 1.25 (to adjust for median-centered response)". ,

l The scale factor determined for this loading condition is 0.45; however, it did not govern as discussed below.

The following describes the transverse loading condition chosen for raceway support Lateral Load Checks in the Auxiliary, Radwaste, and Reactor Buildings. Raceway supports chosen for evaluation and located elsewhere in the plant did not require Lateral Load Checks.

Auxiliary, Radwaste and Reactor Building Transverse Loading Acceleration All raceway suppods in these buildings, that require a Lateral Load Check, are located at elevations below 40 feet above grade. Supports requiring a Lateral Load Check use a transverse acceleration based on the third transverse loading condition, above, =

2.5x0.15Gx1.5x1.25 = Ol0G.

Finally, all outlier supports requiring a lateral load (or limit state evaluation) passed that evaluation without the need for fudher analysis or design modification. See Analytical Review  ;

Tracking Summary, Table 4.4.1.2.  :

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l USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 20 j

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5.0 Conclusions As a result of SRT walkdowns ( April- July 1993 ) all raceway support systems located in all power block buildings and on all elevations of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station were thoroughly inspected and evaluated following the GIP Inclusion Rules, Other Seismic Performance Concems and Seismic Interaction requirements. The SRT included W. Djordjevic

(Stevenson & Associates), and C.T.Pitts and V. Zukauskas (BECo).

All electrical raceway systems inspected by the SRT, with the exception of the Machineshop area in the Radwaste Building, Elevation 23", were in full conformance with the above mentioned GlP requirements (see PASS forms in Appendix A to this Report). The concern in i

the Machineshop relates to an unanchored tank that may or may not pose a seismic ,

interaction hazard to safety related cables in that area. It is concluded that the Pilgrim Station l j raceways, with the exception of the Machineshop area, meet the " Inclusion Rules", "Other '

4 Seismic Performance Concems" and " Seismic Interaction" caveats in their entirety.

li Based upon SRT expertise and previous ( 1989,1982 ) walkdown inspections performed by S&A and Bechtel,25 worst case samples were chosen as representative for Limited Analytical Review (6.3]. Out of these twenty-five samples,17 passed the LAR requirements and 8 did i

not satisfy the vertical capacity LAR Guidelines and were identified as outliers. They were j further evaluated by GIP accepted methods including lateralload analyses and found to be i Analytical Outliers only, not requiring any hardware modification. OSVS's are contained in 3

Appendix B.

l Based on the walkdown reviews and results of the evaluations, Stevenson & Associates concludes that the electrical raceway systems at the Pilgrim Nuclear Pcwer Station will 4

maintain structuralintegrity with respect to the design earthquake loads. An OSVS has been j written to document and track the seismic interaction concem identified in the Machineshop j area.

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USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 2I

6.0 References 6.1 " Generic implementation Plan Procedure (GIP), for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment", Revision 2, Corrected,2/14/92, Seismic Qualification Utility Group.

6.2 USNRC Generic Letter 87-02 that transmits Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No.

2 (SSER No. 2) on SQUG GlP, Revision 2, as corrected on February 14,1992; Washington DC, May 22,1992, USNRC.  ;

C.3 " Cable Tray and Conduit Supports Limited Analytical Review", Job. No. 93C2787, PNPS USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Project, BECo Calc. No. C15.0.3216, Rev.O,Jan.

11,1994, Stevenson & Associates 6.4 " Evaluation Report of Cable Tray and Conduit Support Systems for Unit No.1, Pilgrim Station No. 600, Boston Edison Company." Vols.1-8. Job. No.10394-088, Revision 0, April 26,1982, Bechtel Power Corporation 6.5 " Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Seismic Test Program." 1053-21.1-4. Vols.1 & 2.

Prepared by ANCO Engineers, Inc. for and in collaboration with Bechtel Power Corporation, December 15,1978.

6.6 Utility /TES Owners Group. " Summary Report, Generic Response to USNRC I&E Bulletin Number 79-02 Baseplate / Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts",

Report No.3501-2. Teledyne Engineering Services. August,1979.

6.7 USNRC. Report No. 50-293/86-31. Docket No. 50-293. Resolution of Masonry Wall Design (IE Bulletin 80-11).

6.8 ASTM Specifications A-36/A 36M, " Standard Specification for Structural Steel" Annual Book of Standards, American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA. '

6.9 " General Engineering Catalog", No.10, Unistrut Building Syctems, GTE Products Corp.,

1983.

- 6.10 " Structural Welding Code - Steel", ANSI /AWS D1.1-88, American Welding Society.

6.11 Pilgrim Unit 1 Seismic Response Spectra Specification No. C-114-ER-O-EO, Rev.0. ,

6.12 " Cable Tray and Conduit System Seismic Evaluation Guidelines", EPRI NP-7151-D,

~

1991.

l 22 USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994

,I

^

Appendix A Cable and Conduit Review Forms Table A.1 - Listing of PASS Form Areas by ID Name PASS Form 10 Name Raceway Description Bldg Elev TipRmCT Cable tray and Conduit Raceway RB 23.00 StmTunCT Raceways in Steam Tunnels RB 23.00 DWCT Raceways in Drywell- All Elev RB 23.00 CDBAYCT Condenser Bay Cable Trays-El 6 TB 6.00 RCICOUADCT RCIC Ouad Area Raceways All El RB 3.00 TORUSRMCT Torus Compartment RB -17.00 RWCURMCT Reactor Water Cleanup Room RB 0.00 REFEULCT Refeuling Floor RB 117.00 s CONDBAY2ND Condenser Bay- El. 23' TB 23.00 TRUCKLOCKCT Truck Lock - Turbine Building TB 23.00 UPBATTRMCT Upper Battery Room Cable Trays TB 37.00 UPSWGRCT Upper Switchgear Room Cable Trays TB 37.00 LOWSWGRCT Lower Switchgear Room - El. 23 TB 23.00 MGSETCTCON MG Set Room RW 23 00 CABSPRCT Raceways in Cable Spreading Ro RW 23.00 1 SOUTHCORRDR Turbine Building - South Corri RW -1.00 RWTBCORR RW/TB Building - Comdor RW 23.00 ARHROUAD Reactor Building - A RHR Ouad RB 23.00 BRHROUAD Reactor Building B RHR Ouad RB 23.00 CRDOUAD-17 Reactor Bldg - CRD Quad. RB 17.50 CRDOUAD-2.75 Rx Bldg - CRD Quad, El 2' 9" RB -2.75 ARHRVALVE Rx Building - A RHR Valve Rm & RB 23.00 BRHRVALVE Rx Building B RHR Valve Rm RB 23.00 RBTRKLOCK Rx Building Truck Lock RB 23.00 RB51 GENERAL Rx Building - El 51 Gen Area RB 51.00 RB51CUBKTANK Rx Bldg El 51 CU Bkwsh Tank RB 51.00 RB511&CLAB Rx Building - El 51 I&C Pr Lab RB $1.00 RB51CAVENCL Rx Building - El 51 Cavs End RB 51.00 RB51RCMGSET Rx Bdg- El 51 Recirc MG Set Rm RB $1.00 RB74 GENERAL Rx Building - El 74 Gen Area RB 74.00 RB74 FAN 3RM Rx Building - El 74 Fan Rm 3 RB 74.00

' RB74 FAN 4RM Rx Building El 74 Fan Rm 4 RB 74.00 RB74 FAN 5RM Rx Building - El 74 Fan Rm 5 RB 74.00 Rx Building - El 74 Pump Area RB 74.00

RB74PUMPAREA RB74HXAREA Rx Building El 74 HX Area RB 74.00

- RB74FIUPOWD Rx Bldg - El 74 Filter /Powdex RB 74.00 RB74HOLDPUMP Rv Oldg El74 Hold Pump Area RB 74.00 1" RB91 GENERAL Rx Building - El 91 Genri Area RB 91.00 RB91FANRM6 Rx Building - El 91 Fan Rm 6 RB 91.00

) Rx Building El 91 Catwalk RB 91.00 RB91 CATWALK RB91 SLICK Rx Building - El 91 SLIC Area RB 91.00 AUXBAYHPCI Aux Bay - HPCI Compartment AB -17.50 AUXBAYHEATIN Aux Bay - Heating Pump Area AB 3.00 AUXBAYREGEN Aux Bay - Condemin Regen Area AB 3.00 AUXtsAYASSW Aux Bay - A SSW Compartment AB 3 00

~

AUXBAYBSSW Aux Bay - B SSW Compartment AB 3.00 AUXBAYGROUND Aux Bay - Ground Level AB 23.00 HOTMACHSHOP Hot Machine Shop RW 23.00 MACHINESHOP Machine Shop RW 23.00 USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 sa

I Table A.1 (Cont.)

Listing of PASS Form Areas by ID Name PASS Form ID Name .

Raceway Descript&on Sidg Ele f t FANRM2 Rad Waste - Fan Room 2 RW 23.00 VALVEGALLERY Turb Bg Valve Gallery TB 3.50 CONDPUMPAREA Turb Bg - Condensate Pump Area TB 6.00 MECHVACPUMP Tb Bg Mech Vacuum Pump Area TB 6.00 LUBEOILAREA Turb Bg Lube Oil Area TB 0.00 RECOMBINERRM Turb Bg Recombiner Rooms A&B TB 37.00 TURBINEHALL Turb Bg - Turbine Hall TB 51.00 FEEDPUMPAREA Turb Bg Feed Pump Area TB 51.00 LOWFAN& GEN 51 Turb Bg - Fan Rm 1/Genral Area TB 51.00 UPFAN& GEN 51 Turb Bg - Upper Fan Rm 1 TB 51.00 RADGEN 13 Rad Wst-General Area 13' RW -13.00 RADGEN-1 Rad Wst General Area 1' RW -1.00 RADTANKRM Rad Wst - Tank Rooms RW 1.00 REDLINE Rad Wst Redline & Change Rm RW 23.00 RDWSTTRUCKLK Rad Wst - Truck Lock RW 23.00 RB23 GENERAL Reactor Bldg - General 23' RB 23.00 ABCUPUMPRM Rctor Bldg A&B CU Pump Rooms RB 51.00 ADIESELRM DG BLDG - A Diesel Room DG 23.00 AIRRECVDG DG BLDG - Air Reev Area DG 23.00 BDIESELRM DG BLDG - B Desel Room DG 23.00 CHEMLAB Rad Wst - Chem Lab RW 37.00 COMPRSSRM Turb Bldg - Compressor Room TB -1.00 CONDEMIN Turb Bldg - Condemin Tank Area TB 3.50 CONTROOM Rad Wst - Control Room & SAS RW 37.00 CONTROOMANNX Rad Wst - Control Rm Annex RW 37.00 LOWBATTRMCT Lower Battery Room Cable Trays TB 23.00

- MICRWAVE Rad Wst Microwave Eq. Rm RW 37.00 MONTRTANK Turb Bldg - Monitor Tank Room TB -1.00

• PASSMEZZ Rad Wst Pass Mezzanine RW 37.00 TREATTANKRM Turb Bldg - Treated Tank Room TB -1.00

-- INTKCT Intake Structure INTK 21.50 s

T l

3. l

?

i

• USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994 w

i 1

', Appendix B Outiler Selsmic Verification Sheets (OSVS)

PASS Form Area ID Outlier Issue Definition 4 s

, AUXBAYGROUND Limited Analytical Review (No. 015) i

! CABSPRCT Limited Analytical Review (No. 011)

RWTBCORR Limited Analytical Review (Nos. 012,013)

! Limited Analytical Review (No. 003)

SOUTHCORR RS23 GENERAL Limited Analytical Review (Nos. 014,021,022)

MACHINESHOP Other (Falling Hazard)

I J

1

~

i_

4 4

s 1

a..

1 1

A-3 USI A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994

l Bosten Edisen Comptny - Pilgrim Nucirer Pcwsr Station GIP Rev 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Shett 1 of 1 ID : AUXBAYGROUND (Rev. 0) l Class  : 22. Cable Tray and Conduit Raceways l Description : Aux Bay - Ground Level j Building : AB l Floor El. : 23.00 l Room, Row / Col:

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - C$Je and Conduit Raceways

a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

, inclusion Rules Other Seismic Performance Concerns i

Limited Analytical Review X '

Other

b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

The support, LAR 015, did not pass the vertical capacity check.

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ootional)

a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.

The support was qualified by a successful lateral load check.

l l

b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).

I l

1

4. CERTIFICATION:

The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified

- for seismic adequacy:

Approved by: Date:

v -

22 [ 7%

g V-A .

a.

I l

1

Beaten Ediscn CompIny - Pilgrim Nucl:rr Pcwsr Station GIP Rcv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 1 ID : CABSPRCT (Rev. 0) l Class : 22. Cable Tray and Conduit Raceways Description : Raceways in Cable Spreading Ro Building : RW l Floor El. : 23.00 l Room, Row / Col: CSR

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Cable and Conduit Ra_gggjtyn

a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

inclusion Rules Other Seismic Performance Concerns Limited Analytical Review X Other

b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

The support, LAR 011, did not pass the dead load check.

l l

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ootionali l

a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.

1 The support was qualified by a successful redundancy and consequence evaluation.

b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of

~

fundamental frequency).

4 a

4. CERTIFICATION:

7 The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of I

[  !

the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:

Approved by: Date: l 7

M) 1/u/n \

m L

C< a/ohc ,

L.4 ce

Beaton Edison Comp ny - Pilgrim Nucisar PowIr Staticn GIP Rev 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Shset 1 of 1 ID : RWTBCORR (Rev. 0) l Class : 22. Cable Tray and Conduit Raceways Description : RWfrB Building - Corridor Building : RW l Floor El. : 23.00 l Room, Row / Col:

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Cable and Conduit Raceways

a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidennes could not be satisfied.)

inclusion Rules Other Seismic Performance Concerns Limited AnalyticalReview X Other

b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

Both LAR 012 and LAR 013 did not pass the vertical capacity check.

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ooll2nal)

a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.

Both supports were qualified by a successful lateral load check. -

b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e g., estimate of fundamental frequency).

4. CERTIFICATION:

7 The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of i

the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified r- for seismic adequacy:

Approved by: Date:

1 -

a/. S,in e="""'"~

f Y 0' d l30) $

t 1 .

m

Bc:: ton Ediscn Ccmptny - Pilgrim Nuclzar Pow:r St?.tisn GIP Rsv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Sheet 1 of 1 ID : SOUTHCORRDR (Rev.1) l Class : 22. Cable Tray and Conduit Raceways Description : Turbine Building - South Corri Building : RW l Floor El. : -1.00 l Room, Row / Col: CSR

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Cable and Conduit Raceways

a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

inclusion Rules Other Seismic Performance Concerns Limited Analytical Review X Other

b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

l The support, LAR 003, did not pass the vertical capacity check. l

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Optional)

a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.

l The support was qualified by determining a higher capacity by clastic analysis. l

,- b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of

~ fundamental frequency).

- I l

+ 3. COMMENTS

~

7

1. 4. CERTIFICATION:

T The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified

[

for seismic adequacy:

Approved by: Date:

. El 1f 7

3/2tl@[

rL we e

M

Bost:n Edimen Comprny - Pilgrim Nuciscr Pawsr Station GIP Rev 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) She t 1 of 1 ID : RB23 GENERAL (Rev. 0) l Class : 22. Cable Tray and Conduit Raceways Descnption : Reactor Bldg - General 23' Building : RB l Floor El. : 23.00 l Room, Row / Col:

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Cable and Conduit Raceways

a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

inclusion Rules Other Seismic Performance Concerns Limited Analytical Review X l Other

b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

1. Support LAR 014 did not pass the vertical capacity check. < j

2. Support LAR 021 did not pass the dead load check. - l

3. Support LAR 022 did not pass the dead load check. < l l

l

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ootional)

a. Defined proposed method (s) fo'r resolving outlier.

1. Support LAR 014 was qualified by a successful lateral load check. < l

- 2. Support LAR 021 was qualified by a successful redundancy and consequence check. <

3. Support LAR 022 was qualified by a successful limit state evaluation./

b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).

)

I b

r

4. CERTIFICATION:

c The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:

i Date:

Approved by:

" 'W L s i r

f jt7 40/6

.O he

Boston Edison Ccmprny - Pilgrim Nuclasr Powsr Striion GIP Rev 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS) Shset 1 of 1 ID : MACHINESHOP (Rev. 0) l Class : 22. Cable Tray and Conduit Raceways Drscription : Machine Shop Building : RW l Floor El. : 23.00 l Room, Row / Col:

2 l L_ OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Cable and Conduit Raceways I

i a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

j inclusion Rules Other Seismic Performance Concerns Limited Analytical Review i

Other X I

b. Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

) An unanchored hot water tank is located on a platform above safety-related, wall-mounted conduit. (

I i 1

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Ootional)

I

a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier. i

\

i. j b.

2

b. Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of j fundamental frequency).

4 e

i I

T

~

4. CERTIFICATION:

C

! i,. The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of i the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy;

{ Date:

i' Approved by:

Y fh

! ^

3//3 95-he J "9 M

Appendix C Resumes of Seismic Capability Engineers Walkdown Team Qualifications and Resumes

- The walkdown(s) was conducted by Mr. W. Djordjevic of Stevenson & Associates and Messrs.

C. Pitts and V. Zukauskas of Boston Edison Company. All of the engineers meet the experience requirements of the GIP [7] as described for Seismic Capability Member Engineers.

Mr. Djordjevic is a registered Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a registered Civil / Seismic Engineer in the State of California. Regarding experience specific to electrical raceway design, Mr. Djordjevic served as Principal-in-Charge for the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Raceway Program conducted for the SEP plants from 1980 to 1983.

During this effort, over 200 raceway seismic shake table tests were conducted for rod and strut hung raceway systems as well as over 100 cyclic fatigue tests of raceway components. In addition, Mr. Djordjevic has seismically evaluated and designed raceway systems for the Grand Gulf, DC Cook, Millstone and Connecticut Yankee nuclear power stations in his career.

Mr. Pitts is a registered Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Mr.

- Pitts has extensive experience in the seismic analysis and design of structures, equipment and components.

- Mr. Zukauskas is a registered Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Mr Zukauskas has extensive experience in the seismic analysis and design of structures, equipment and components.

b.

T L

w s

l USl A-46 Electrical Raceway Report, July 29,1994

WALTER DJORDJEVIC i

EDUCATION:

I  ;

i B.S. - Civil Engineering, University of Wisconsin at Madison,1974 .

M.S. - Structural Engineering, Massachusetts institute of Technology,1976

REGISTRATION:

State of Califomia, State of Wisconsin, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of Michigan i PROFESSIONAL HISTORY:

i

Stevenson & Associates,Inc.,Vice President and General Manager of the Boston area office.

1983- present URS/ John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers, Boston, Massachusetts, General Manager,1980-1983; San Francisco, Califomia, Supervisory Engineer,1979 - 1980 ImpellCorporation, San Francisco, Califomia, Senior Engineer,1976-1979 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston, Massachusetts, Engineer,1974 - 1976

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

,

l l

Mr. Djordjevic founded the Stevenson & Associates Boston area office in 1983 and serves as Vice President and General Manager. He is currently preforming numerous seismicwalkdowns for resolution of the USl A-46 and seismic lPEEE issues, and serving as the Project Manager for the Kewaunee, Point i Beach and Palisades projects, alljoint A-46 and Seismic PRA projects.

Mr. Djordjevie ls expert in the area of seismic fraglity analysis and dynamic qualification of electrical and i mechanical equipment. He has participated in and managed over twenty major projects involving the

,~ evaluation and qualification of vibration sensitive equipment and seismic hardening of equipment. As

. demonstrated by his committee work and publications, Mr. Djordjevic has participated in and contributed steadily to the development of equipment qualification and vibration hardening methodology.

?

E Mr. Djordjevic's previous walkdown experience included a!! of the SEP plants (8 plants), Nine Mile - Unit 1, D.C. Cook - Units 1 & 2, the Hanford Reservation Purex facility and the Savannah River Plant T Reservation L-Reactor. He has personally participated in seismic walkdowns at 26 U.S. nuclear units.

L Representative projects include overseeing the SEP shake-table testing of electrical raceways, in-situ 7 testing of control panels and instrumentation racks at various nuclear facilities, equipment anchorage i walkdowns and evaluations at various nuclear facilities, principal author of the CERTIVALVE software package to evaluate nuclear service valves, and contributing authorin the development of the ANCHOR and EDASP software packages commercially distributed by Stevenson & Associates.

SA-

Mr. Djordjevic has been involved extensively in the reassessment of safety-related equipment for commercial nuclear facilities and govemment U.S. Department of Energy facilities, for which he I maintains an active Q-clearance status. He has served on advisory groups and review teams touring I

older existing nuclear facilities to assess safety and has performed earthquake reconnaissance at such installations following seismic events. I PROFESSIONAL GROUPS

Member, Institute of Electncal and Electronics Engineers, Nuclear Power Engineering Committee Working Group SC 2.5 (IEEE-344)

Chairman, American Society of Civil Engineers Nuclear Structures and Materials Committee, Working Group for the Analysis and Design of Electrical Cable Support Systems l Member, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation, Application, and Components Commit-tee on Valves, Working Group SC-5 l

1 i

l l

-+

IP' e

e 9'

4 i

L.

L

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9.

WD pg 2 M

RESUME Name: Charles T. Pitts Position: Senior Engineer Department: Civil / Structural / Mechanical Group: Nuclear Engineering EDUCATION M.S., Civil Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA B.S., Civil Engineering, Northeastern University, Boston, MA PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION Registered Professional Engineer #28351 - Massachusetts PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS American Society Of Civil Engineers, Member SPECIALTIES / EXPERTISE Structural Engineering Safety System Modifications Field Engineering and Design SQUG - Generic implementation Plan (GlP) Evaluations and Reviews EXPERIENCE PROFILE Total Years Engineering Experience: 25 ,

Years Nuclear Experience: 20 Construction / Site Experience: 15

l RESUME Name: Viktor J. Zukauskas Position: Principal Structural Engineer l

l Division: Civil / Structural Section: Design Department: Nuclear Engineering Education MBA Suffolk University 1982 l MSCE Northeastem University 1978 i BSCE Northeastern University 1972 l .

ProfessionalReeistration Registered Profession Engineer #29658 Massachusetts l

Licensed Construction Supervisor #000399 Massachusetts Professional Membershios/ Societies American Institute of Steel Construction, Member

/ :nerican Concrete Institute. Member americal Society of Civil Engineers, Member Seecialtir;/Exceitise Structural Engineering Project Management Engineering Management

.i Exnerience ProRie Total Years Engineering Experience: 22

, Years with Boston Edison: 15 Years Nuclear Experience: 18 Construction / Site Experience: 5 i

Dalgt 05/23/94 O

G .

. . . - . . . . . - _ . - . - . . - _ - - . - - . - . . - . . - - - . - . - - - . ~ . - - .

l l

l PNPs A-46 Firwi Report septzmber,1996 Revision 0

17. Appendix G: Soll-Structure Interaction Spectra The enclosed are selected in-structure response spectra plots for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) case extracted from Attachment item #7 to Reference 17. These l plots show the alternate Reactor Building spectra dis ussed in Section 9.3. Plots are furnished for north-south, east-west and vertical response at 2%,3%,4%,5% and 7%

l damping for Elevations (-) 17.5 feet,23.0 feet,51.0 feet,74.25 feet,91.25 feet,117.0 l feet,145.0 feet and 164.5 feet.

l l

l i

h l

l 17-1 l

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X 10 , ---

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'10 2 0.0------ 0 10 1

'Id I 10 .

i Frequency (Hz) 1 Notes:

Legend: '

Acceleratiss in g's 2% Damped Spectrum 31 Damped Spectrum _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1 SSE Levt' = 0.159 Five Locations Enveloped l 4% Damped Spectrum _________

5% Damped Spectrum . ..

71 Damped Spectrum __ _ _ _

E BECO: Pil, grim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building Basemat, El.-17.5', Translation in the NS Direction l

_ _ _ _ _ . _ - - _ _ _ _.-__- - --- -_- _ _ _ _ --_-- _ __ _ - - __ _ - _ - _ - _ - ____-- --____ =_ __-___ ___ _ - _ ____--__________--_-_-_ _ -_

--..m__..,.=_... _ . _ . . _ _ , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , ,

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0. :h (n ,

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p _-

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0.0 2 0 10 1 '10

,16 1 10 Frequency (Hz)

Notes:

Legend:

Accelerations in g's 2% Damped Spectrum 1 SSE Level - 0.15g 3% Damped Spectrum _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ '

Five Locations Enveloped 4% Damped Spectrum _________

5% Dainped Spectrum . ..

7% 9amped Spectrum __ _ _ _

t BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building Basemht, El.-17.S', Translation in the EW Direction  !

.-...__.I

t

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X Id G 1.2 E

z

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pg rs __s ,

5 0.8 --

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S l'!ll '-1 (. h

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$ 0.6 - - - - - - - -- -- -- -----

$o l ,,

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/J, t O.2 ['..nTC -- - - - - -

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u

(- . s v $ l j # ~

0.0 I 2 0 10 '10 .

.I 10 Frequency (Hz)

Notes:

Le Jend:  ;

Accelerations in g's 21 Damped Spectrum 3% Damped Spectrum _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1 SSE Level = 0.10g ,

4% Damped Spectrum _________

Five Locations Enveloped St Damped Spectrum . .. ,

7% Damped Spectrum __ _ _.

c h

t BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building Basemht, El.-17.S', Translation in the-Vert. Direction '

[

_-_ - _ - - . _ _ _ - _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - -- - --------------2

Eig^ Ez 6 '" n%xb* > >';* ,o ow " do .

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_ p c o e

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BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building, El.' 23.0', Translation in the Vertical Direction  ;

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Five Locations Enveloped 5% Damped Spectrum . .. ,

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BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Ree' tor Building, El. 51.0', Translation in the NS Direction t

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BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building,'El. 51.0', Translation in the EW Direction

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BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building, El.'51.0', Translation in the Vertical Direction

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7% Damped Spectrum __ _ _ _

BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building, fl. 74.25', Translation in the NS Direction .

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BECO: Pil Reactor Building, grim El. Reactor Building, RGin1.60 74.25', Translation theSSE EW Direction .

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f k BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60'SSE Reactor Building, El. '74.25', Translation in the Vertical Direction

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BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE [

Reactor Building, Bl. 91.25', Translation in the EW Direction .

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7% Damped Spectrum ,_ _ _ _ 1 l

l BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building, El. 91.25', Translation in the Vertical Direction  !

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BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE l Reactor Building, El. 117.0', Translation in the EW Direction i i

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Legend: Notes:

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Five Locations Enveloped -

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7% Damped Spectrum __ ___

BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building, El. 117.0', Translation in the Vertical Direction

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i BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE ,

Reactor Building, El. 145.0', Translation in the Vertical Direction j i

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7% Damped Spectrum __ _ _ _

BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE Reactor Building, El. 164.5', Translation in the NS Direction

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v> t c  !

z 2 . *,

i l

f l 2.0 - - - --

E i C' g 8

o l

~A I r

=0 a,o ka hj ' *\ s

~

o i

, / -_g 3 1.5 . _ _ _ __

-i _.___ - - -.

^ _If- t .\

u ._,,tf ,i 1 ,

l o ) 3

. , .' l ,t/ . ".. i

, y 'l i , Q M 1.0 -- -- - - - --

>% o s , u i

/I.

tf i

~'l y

0.5 -- -.- -- - --- S b I

,- 9/P F.: d-:'/

v: :Q -

z l M i a 4:;E?te -

s 9

7 - i 1 0 1 *2

. 15 10 10 10 i

Frequency (Hz) '

Legend: Notes:

, 2% Damped Spectrum Accelerations in g's  ;

3% Damped Spectrum _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ 1 SSE Level = 0.15g i 4% Damped Spectrum __________ Five Locations Enveloped  :

S% Damped Spectrum- . ..

f

'l% Damped Spectrum __ _ _ _  ;

l' r

BECO: Pil

• Reactor Building, grim El. Reactor 164.5', Translation Building, RGin1.60 theSSE EW Direction j i

i x 10 0 5 E ,

e .

E l z >

1.2 -- - - - - - -- - r= ~ -- - - - - - - -

t 1 -:

l

1. o. -

.\

(_

k , O d

-II - - -- - - -

e i

c / g -

O hI \ \ ' M i

^r '

E l Ti o.8 ,

. \~c c \

N', ", _Il *

-, I, '

4

/-T Qy m "-

'i j t

's \ \

21 0.6 - - - - - --- - - - - - -

'r j g, d- , /- -t -

nh .

llr' *b k U y\

s r, j ,,j

- - - m j S.A i

'h, ,, -h

$fk 4k '

8 o.2 - -- -- -- -- -

g-W V M

, e

i!

o.o - - - - - - - - - - -

1 0 1 2  ;

15 10 10 10 r

. i Frequency (Ilz) l I

Legend: Notes: f E ~ Damped Spectrum Accelerations in g's 3I Damped Spectrum _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ 1 SSE Level = 0.109 4% Damped Spectrum _________ Five Locations Enveloped l S% Damped Spectrum . ..

'1% Damped Spectrum __ _ _ _

BECO: Pilgrim Reactor Building, RG 1.60 SSE lleactor Building, El. 164.5', Translation in the Vertical Direction n