ML20235R436
| ML20235R436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1988 |
| From: | Antonopoulos P, Fairbank R, Hanley D, Swanson R BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235R314 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-88-519 NUDOCS 8903030303 | |
| Download: ML20235R436 (98) | |
Text
g-m ifl i
ihY
- 47 l't.g t-
.]
BOSTON EDISON COMPANY
.1 i/
e.
1-4 INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ADE00ACY OF POWER
- ASCENSION PROGRAM TESTING JUNE 1988' NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 8903030303 895223
~
a.:-
PDR FDIA k1 CARREYBB-519 PDR eg.g LL
- .,=LL_--_
i, ;;. -
INDEPENDENT' REVIEW OF THE ADEQUACY OF POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM TESTING.
Prepared by:
/4/
A_ Im
- 6. W. Hanley~
Reviewed by:
8Vf 7/7[8[
R. V. Fairbank
- = frb 7A/rp P. T. Antonopoulos '
/
Approved by:
Ry'd k fgk+vsog 7/1/rf R. N. Swanson F
~
b
'd-m N &
e
- r y
4 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE Executive Summary..................................................
i I
Introduction..............................................
1 II Approach..........................................................
1 III Initial Review and Findings................................
3 IV Follow-on Hork....................................................
7 V
Recommendations for Test Sco Conclusions................pe Changes............................
11 VI 11 VII References........................................................
14 TABLE NO.
TABLES 1
Summary of Recommended Test Scope Changes..........................
iii 2
Summary of Resul t s of the Detail ed Test Revi ews....................
12 FIGURE NO.
FIGURES 1
Program Evaluation Process.........................................
2 ATTACHMENT NO.
ATTACHMENTS A
Memo from R. N. Swanson to R. Anderson - Power Ascension Program Start-up Test Review Continuing Effort. HEDBB-245, 5/4/88..........................................
B PNPS FSAR Table 14.4-1 List of Transient Events....................
C Transient Response Matrix..............................
O Lists 1 through 6.......................................,.
E PNPS RF0 #7 Power Ascension Program Start-up Tests.................
F, Sample Completeness Questionnaire..................................
G RF0 #7 PDC / Issues Matr1x...........................................
H RF0 #7 Changes (e.g. Major Maintenance) Matrix.....................
I Documentation of Plant Response as Designed to Dynamic Transients..
3 Pre RF0 #7 PDC Matrix................................
K NE0HI 383, Rev 0....................................
L Test Scope Change Documentation....................................
___.m-____
4
(
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The Nuclear Engineering Department organized and conducted a multidisciplined and multi-departmental review to ensure that testing performed at PNPS is sufficient to provide confidence that the dynamic response of the plant to transient events has not been significantly affected by modifications and major maintenance activities. The power ascension program start-up test plan was reviewed to ensure that it, in conjunction with postwork and surveillance testing, includes:
Specific tests for plant design changes (PDCs) and major maintenance work completed during the refueling outage.
Specific tests for system and component evaluations considering:
- recent anomalous events for which we have yet to establish the root cause and implement corrective actions.
(e.g. spurious Group 1 & 6 isolations)
- recent industry operating experience and lessons learned (e.g.
Rosemount transmitter model 1153 " ringing" and NUREG 1275) 1 The review program was developed in two phases. The initial phase involved a four day multidisciplined " design-review-board-like" review using a structured evaluation process:
Operating Transients were selected from Plant and Industry Analysis / Experience The Expected Plant Responses to these Transients were defined by Analysis and Operating Experience The Potential Impact of RF0 #7 changes was examined through an Integrated Approach The Dynamic Test Program Scope was evaluated on Transient Related Changes and on a System Basis The initial four day review concluded that additional transient tests were not required for the Power Ascension Program but that further review of the adequacy of supporting tests (e.g. post-work, surveillance) for critical changes was needed.
The follow-on work involved detailed reviews using a comprehensive assessment methodology (NEDWI 383) of 46 critical items identified by the initial four day review. The result of these detailed reviews were recommendations to change the test scope of twelve critical items as shown on Table 1.
None of the scope change recommendations involve additional dynamic transient testing. Other work performed during the follow-on phase included documenting event dates for successful plant dynamic responses to loss of off-site power (8/28/79) and HS1V closure (8/13/82) events; and documenting the completeness of the initial four day review process.
The 16 year operation of PNPS has shown, more convincingly than limited start-up testing, that the basic system design responds as required transient conditions. Any deficiencies which have occurred have been corrected. The 5000 man hour review has concluded that recent modifications and maintenance have been or will be adequately tested to ensure transient response remains unimpaired. Therefore, additional transient tests are not required.
l
n.
Transient. tests represent potential risks to plant safety by challenging plant safety systems while providing no significant benefit. In addition, transient tests represent a significant economic' risk because there is a potential for damage to plant systems and components, especially Balance of Plant'and Non-Safety Related equipment.
~
11
,_'__._-.-_A,_
e;
- 1. INTRODUCTION The Nuclear Engineering' Department organized and conducted a multidisciplined
.and multi-departmental review to ensure that testing performed at PNPS is sufficient to provide confidence that the dynamic response of the plant to transient events has not been significantly affected by modifications and major maintenance activities. The power ascension program start-up test plan was reviewed to ensure.that it, in conjunction with post work and surveillance testing, includes:
Specific tests for plant design changes (PDC's) and major maintenance.
-work completed during the refueling outage..
Specific tests for system and component evaluations considering:
- recent anomalous events for which we have yet to establish the root cause and implement corrective actions.
(e.g. spurious Group 1.& 6 isolations)
- recent industry operating experience and lessons learned e.g.
Rosemount transmitter model 1153 " ringing" and NUREG'1275)
The review program was developed in two phases. The initial' phase involved a four day multidisciplined " design-review-board-like" review which confirmed
.the adequacy of the power ascension program start-up dynamic test plan. This review also noted that the thoroughness of post-work. testing was extremely
.)(.
important to a number of critical design changes and major maintenance items and cognizant NED engineers had not, in general, reviewed these tests.
Accordingly, a series of follow-on reviews were conducted of the post work and other tests associated with the critical items identified as a result of the initial review. Additional tasks performed by the follow-on work involved the consideration of the need to perform system level tests, and the documentation of the initial review process and findings.
The balance of this report documents the review process and findings of both the initial and follow-on work, including 1the recommendations for test scope changes and the conclusion that no additional dynamic transient tests are
-recommended.
II. APPROACH NED Project managers developed a structured process (see figure 1) for the initial " design-review-board-like review and assembled a multidisciplined review team of managers and cognizant engineers from each of the eight NED divisions as well as key individuals from the technical, modifications management, operations, and maintenance sections of the Nuclear Operations Department.
Based on the magnitude of the follow-on work resulting from the initial series of reviews, NED assigned a dedicated Project Engineer to scope out, implement and manage the project (see attachment A).
The follow-on work consisted of the. completion of 19 separate tasks, including the detailed review of post work and other testing associated with 46 critical items. i
SNO ISU L
S CN fC(
I O
a E
S TA J'
S L
U L
F E
A O
C VE N
O O
R W
P D
T E
R S
T A
S L
E U
T T GS T
S N NE E
E AS C
l TM l
E AE 9
T HN D
.S O CO E 7E U
VES
- E R P P
T J
a P
P W
G R CT 1
A k
NS G
R U AE O C E OE a
I F A X
F S O N L
E T
SL T U R S T
S A P ATR VR H L
1 U CN E
E V
LAO R
C D
T MS E
AP RU T
S VM F
E O O S e
G E
F WT EI I
F SU N
O L
E N
D sS A
IT CA t
T G
E iN I
T A
WI 1
F t P PI A N tO a
R r
S UE I
U PD E FS D
L DX E M
E R E
AV y
E M
M I
S A
RUT G/S L SE r
R I
T 1
DTT S P
ENN R
G I
AE R E F
T O
I VI 4
A P L
R T E S S A1 NLN F H M
I RE EEA P
REC GPN DRR C
P E I
1 T
r I
I XE L
h
4
.The management of this project _ included daily and weekly reports to NED managers on the status of-each task and critical item against its committed completion date (see Reference 13).
III. THE INITIAL REVIEN AND FINDINGS The initial four day review used a structured process portrayed by Figure 1.
i Operating. transients which would envelope plant dynamic response were selected for review based on plant design (FSAR Chapter 14), plant specific operating experience and initial plant (Pilgrim specific and Near Term Operating License) start-up transient tests. The effort involved a transient by transient review to ascertain the completeness of the start-up test plan and to recommend changes, if required. As'shown in Figure 1, for each transient and potential start-up test, plant design changes,. major maintenance work, unresolved items, and potential problems were considered (especially their synergistic effects) to predict where system and/or component behavior during the plant transient
. might be different than it had been and therefore where dynamic testing might be warranted. Equipment malfunctions and failures were postulated when appropriate. The review was intentionally pessimistic to look for potential problems. The objective of the review was to predict dynamic behavior changes and potential equipment malfunctions and failures which might occur as a result of plant design change (s), major maintenance work, unresolved problem (s), or potential problem (s).
The potential behavior changes of most interest to es during the review were:
o plant response during transients where key plant parameters (e.g. reactor pressure) could be affected; especially if analysis predicted values could be exceeded or LCO limits might be approached
- unwanted outcomes which might occur during the transient (e.g. scram or failure to scram, containment isolation or failure to isolate, etc.)
which might result in an unanalyzed event.
The next step would have been to recommend changes to the startup test plan to:
a) add test (s) to ensure potential change (s) to the plant dynamic response would be acceptable. This proved to be unnecessary.
b) instrument the plant to enable the cause of a potential unwanted outcome to be identified if it did occur during restart. Additional use of EPIC /GETARS monitoring is being considered.
III.A. OPERATING TRANSIENTS Operating transients were selected for review considering plant specific and industry analysis and operating experience.
A list of transients to be considered in the review was constructed to envelope the expected design' response of the plant. The transients were selected primarily from the FSAR to include each type of disturbance to normal operation, i.e., decrease in core coolant temperature, increase in reactor pressure, decrease in reactor coolant system flow rate, and power distribution anomalies and increase in reactor coolant inventory. _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _. - _ _
o Table 14.4-1 (Attachment B) of PNPS Chapter 14 was used as the basis for the list of transients. This list was reviewed against PNPS initial startup tests (Ref. 1), a typical NTOL startup program (Ref. 2 and Ref. 3) and PNPS operating experience to ensure that the list contained transients of particular relevance to PNPS. As a result -loss of offsite power was added to the list. Transients which were tested during either PNPS startup tests or typical NTOL plants were noted for future reference.
The list of transients selected for review thus became that shown on Attachment (C).
III.B. EXPECTED PLANT TRANSIENTS RESPONSE For each of the transients selected for review, the expected plant response was defined considering analysis and operating experier.ce. Using the Reference (14) material, which included transient descriptions and plant parameter time histories gathered from past analyses (e.g. FSAR, Pilgrim Transient Analysis Report, NEDC-10839), we predicted the behavior of key parameters and defined expected plant system responses such as SCRAMS, Isolations, Actuations, and Initiations.
The specific system responses which were selected for review were as follows:
- SCRAM e Primary Containment Isolation (PCIS) (Group 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7)
- Secondary Containment Isolation (SCI) and Stand-by Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Start
- Alternate Rod Insertion / Recirculation Pump Trip (ARI/RPT)
- Core Spray (CS) pump start
- Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump start
- Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Initiation
- High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system start
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system start
- HPCI Trip
- RCIC Trip l
- CS/LPCI valve opening
- LPCI Break Detection (Loop 3 election)
- Start-up Transformer Loss of or Degraded Voltage Trip
-4 l
. _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _
- Recirculation Pump Trip
- Recirculation Pump Runback e Relief Valve (SRV) Opening a Turbine Bypass Valves Open e Feedwater Pump Trip For each of the above actions the devices that cause the action were identified (i.e. for a Group I containment isolation.the mode switch, reactor water level
.Lo-Lo, main steam line radiatien high, main steam line flow high, main steam line tunnel high temperature, main steam line pressure low, or reactor water.
level high) such that on review of a specific transient the potential effect of the design changes and problems could be assessed as to whether the action would occur, or not occur, as expected. For each transient, the action was categorized as to whether it was Expected (E) to occur or Unexpected (U)..The most critical actions that must occur with certainty were designated essential expected (EE) or. unexpected unwanted (UU). (It was realized that since the transient information was based on. licensing grade analyses and are therefore very conservative, some " expected" responses might not occur in actual cases if the set points values were not attained).
III.C. STARTUP TEST TRANSIENTS The initial PNPS Start-up Test Results (reference 1) and Shoreham's (Near Term Operating Licensee) Start-up Test Plan (reference 2 & 3) were used to review candidate transient tests. The original Pilgrim startup tests were found to be essentially the same as the NTOL tests except the NTOL tests include an inadvertent start of HPCI pump test. The plant's performance during initial PNPS startup testing was reviewed and used to assess the impact of plant design changes and problems.
In addition, the last time the plant was subjected to and successfully responded to each of the transients was researched and documented (Attachment I).
III.D. PLANT DESIGN CHANGES & PROBLEMS While the review concentrated on the design changes (Plant Design Changes Commercial Quality Items dedications, and substitution / equivalency evaluations) made during this refueling outage (References 15, 16, & 17 respectively) plant design changes made over the years (Reference 4) were also considered and included in the review as appropriate. In addition to PDC's, major maintenance activities (Reference 18) were included in the review.
Potential problems which might manifest themselves during startup and operation were listed based on plant specific experience and industry operating experience. Plant specific experience considered in the review (Reference 19) consisted primarily of plant problems for which root cause investigations or corrective action effectiveness verifications is ongoing. Industry operating experience considered in the review (Reference 5) consisted of lessons learned by other plants in their initial start-up (new plants) or startup following long outages. ;
j III.E. THE REVIEW The review consisted of a four day multidisciplined review of the entire package of information in a design review board like forum.
The reviewers included primary and alternate design review board members, the design review board chairman (Analysis Section Hanager) and alternate (NED Deputy Manager),
as well as representatives from Nuclear Operations, technical, operations, systems, and radiological engineering divisions.
The review proceeded using a transient response matrix (Attachment C) whereby for each transient the description of the transient and expected plant response was discussed.
Each action (e.g. Scram) was categorized as to whether it was expected (E), essential and expected (EE), unexpected (U), or unexpected and unwanted (UU). Next, the list of plant design changes, engineering equivalency / substitutions, commercial quality item dedications, major maintenance work, resolved problems (Reference 20), unresolved problems, and potential problems (Reference 21) was reviewed and any item which could cause the plant response (key parameter or action) to be affected was noted in the transient / action block applicable.
For example, for an inadvertent MSIV closure a scram, which is essential and expected, could be prevented by a failure caused by PDC 84-11A.
during RF0 #6.
PDC 84-11A modified the MSIV limit switches In some cases, a PDC could affect the action for all transients.
Accordingly a separate list of changes which could affect that action was developed and was used to assess each transient.
are included as Attachment D.
These were designated as List 1, 2, 3, etc. and The possible effects of modifications, problems, etc. on transient response were discussed in detail the with particular emphasis on failure modes, synergistic effects (a fluids system change which may affect an instrument, e.g. pressure spike etc.), response times sensitivities etc. The changes were evaluated to ascertain the potential impact the change could have on:
the initiating device the expected action 1
transient initiation key parameter response Finally, changes which, if implemented incorrectly, had the potential to cause transients were identified to explore the need for extra precautions or tests.
The fact that certain systems and equipment had been subjected to long lay-up without operation was assessed.
III.F. TEST PROGRAM EVALUATION The next step wa's t'o assess the adequacy of the test program to ensure that potential problems will be uncovered during testing. The types of tests that were considered were post-work tests (PDC and maintenance), routine surveillance tests (e.g. Diesel start, SGTS start, logic system functional tests, HPCI and RCIC tests), and the dynamic tests already planned in the power 1 l
t i
ascension program. The test coverage was reviewed on a transient by transient, response by response basis considering whether or not it would provide assurance that the potential problem could be uncovered before full power i
operation.
c During the course of this review a system-basis evaluation of the dynamic test program scope was also performed. Using a system vs. modification matrix the i
major test categories, post-work tests, surveillance tests, and start-up dynamic tests were reviewed to assess whether the system level testing is sufficient.
III.G. INITIAL RESULTS In all cases it was concluded that the strength of the design change and modification management processes would preclude problems from manifesting I
themselves during restart or operation. It was also noted that the J
thoroughness of post-work testing was extremely important to a number of critical design changes and major maintenance items and cognizant NED engineers had not, in general, reviewed these tests. Accordingly, the post-work tests associated with these critical items were identified for follow-on work.
The systems level review resulted in the potential need to perform system level tests. Specific system level tests requiring further review by NED were:
- Logic System Function Tests (those not planned already to be done again l
before restart)
- Reactor Nater Level
- Back-up Nitrogen (after restart when purging and venting the drywell)
- Integrated Tests i
No instrument changes or additions or additional startup test were considered necessary because of system lay-up, or the interaction of changes / modifications.
For the plant modifications & major maintenance which have been performed, post work, survelliance and system testing should be adequate to insure that any problems which would affect the plant response to transients would have been found & corrected prior to restart. This conclusion assumed that the non-transient tests have been properly designed and implemented. To increase confidence in this assumption, additional reviews of testing for selected changes and major maintenance work items was considered necessary. In addition a number of Unresolved Problems required continued investigation.
These unresolved problems are listed in Reference (19). The initial review did I
conclude that the power ascension program startup tests (Attachment E) include l
the key tests necessary for restart and thus reinforce the effort that went i
into its initial development.
IV. FOLLOH ON WORK The four day initial review confirmed the adequacy of the start up test plan and identified the need for some further work to provide additional assurance i
L*,
II of the adequacy of the test program. The follow-on work consisted of separate tasks under three major work categories (Sections IV. A, B, and C describe these major work categories).
IV.A. VERIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION OF THE INITIAL INPUTS TO THE POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM TEST REVIEH 1.
Vertftcation of the completeness of the changes and problems considered in.the initial review is provided by two separate documents. The first is a questionnaire that was developed to erisure that the initial test review captured all major PDC, unresolved problems, major maintenance activities and industry emerging problems. The questionnaire (Attachment F) was issued to and completed by key members of the review team (References 6 through 9). No new unresolved issues were identified by the questionnaires.
The second document is a PDC / issues completeness matrix (Attachment G &
H) which'11sts the RF0 #7 PDCs implemented, and major maintenance work performed and provides an assessment of their impact on plant dynamic responses to transients. This matrix was reviewed and completed by the three NED design division managers and did not identify any additional critical PDCs that would require detailed test reviews.
2.
Verification of the completeness of the operating transients considered is provided by Section III of this report.
3.
Documentation of the post-work testing and surveillance testing considered as part of the initial four day review is provided by the PDC / Issues matrix (Attachments G & H).
Guidance on the identification of surveillance testing that would capture the failure modes postulated during the initial test review are provided by Reference 10. This document lists surveillance procedures, the failure modes they would capture, the frequency they are performed, and the safety related components and systems they are performed on.
4.
Documentation of the initial four day test review process is provided by Section III of this report.
5.
Verification of the dates of the last successful plant dynamic responses transients is provided by Attachment I.
This review of the PNPS Transient Response History uncovered no unusual plant responses to the operating transients events identified. A special detailed investigation of PNPS responses to the Loss of Offsite Power (8/28/79) and MS1V closure (8/13/82) events noted no unusual trends. A complete package of all review documentation is provided by Reference 11.
l 6.
Because the loss of off-site power and MSIV closure transients are of most interest, systems required to function in response to the loss of off-site power and MSIV closure transients were identified and the associated PDCs implemented since the event dates were documented on l
Attachment J.
These PDCs were then assessed for potential impact on plant tr.ansient response. The attachment provides the assessment of the potential impact of these changes on the ability of the plant to still respond as designed to these transients. No pre RF0 #7 changes were identified for'which subsequent operating history did not confirm that the change did not introduce unwanted changes to plant dynamic response behavior. Detailed reviews of other pre-RF0 #7 changes were i
4 e
not considered because such a review would involve an inordinate amount of manhoers with negligible benefit. Considering the plant's transient response history, it is unlikely that any problems attributable to these earlier changes would manifest-themselves for the first time during this power ascension.
IV.B. DETAILED TEST REVIENS OF CRITICAL ITEMS The initial four day test review noted that the thoroughness of post-work testing was extremely important to a number of critical issues. Critical issues were defined as meeting one or more of the following criteria:
t o Complex Change (many opportunities for errors) e History of Problems at PNPS e History of Problems in Industry e New Dynamic Failure Modes Introduced Forty-six of the over 250 items considered by the initial four day review satisfied this criteria (see documentation in Attachments G & H). They are:
EQCi PDC 83 EPIC PDC 84 ATS PDC 85 RHL/ATS Rack PDC 85 MSL Rad Monitor PDC 86 ADS Logic PDC 86 SGTS PDC 86 MSIV PDC 86 Feedwater Check Valve PDC 85 HPC1 Vacuum Breaker PDC 86-102 -Feedwater Pump PDC B7 Recire Pump Motor Breaker PDC 87 Turbine Scram Bypass l
PDC 86 D/G Room Damper Temp Switch PDC 87 Micro Versa Trips PDC 86 RHR Leakage Start-Uo Tests RHL MS1V HPC1 Cold Start RCIC Cold Start Mode Switch RHR Leakage Start-up Test Systems Tests Logic System functional Tests Integrated Testing Back-up Nitrogen Reactor Water Level
-g-I
t Maior Maintenance Items PDC 84-11A/86-28 & Maintenance of MSIVs HFA Relays E-203 Electrical Panet Hork-MOV Work (HPC1/RCIC - IE 85-03'-Hovats Testing)
Turbine Overhaul EO ATS/RPS Fuses Fire Protection CR 120A Relays (PDC 87 DC)
RHR Minimum Flow Bypass (and PDC 86-95)
RHR Minimum Flow Bypass (PDC 86-33)
Unresolved Problems Spurious Group 6 Rosemount Transmitters DC Voltage Cross Talk D/G Cooling SDV Vent Valve Instrument Snubbers Division II ATHS Fenwal Temp Switch (LER88-010-00)
RHR Check Valve Leakage NEDHI 383, Rev. O, Attachment (K) was developed to provide NED engineers with instructions to review the adequacy of the testing performed / planned to verify that the 46 critical items have not introduced unacceptable changes to plant dynamic response to transients. The NEDHI Review methodology addresses:
1.
Potential Impact to Systems / Response due to change
- a. Cause Failure Mode e
Malfunctions e
Synergistic Effects e
- b. Effect Initiating Device Parameters e
Transient Initiation e
Expected Plant Response e
2.
Design and Acceptance Criteria Review 3.
Testing Adequacy to Detect Potential Impacts e Post Work Tests e Surveillance Tests Start-Up Tests 4.
Lay-Up. Effects 5.
Environmental and Operating Conditions 6.
Potential Installation Errors t
L s
L i
x l ;The outcome of the detailed reviews' w'ould be'etther:
- : Confirmation that the post work testing was adequate, or,
~
e-Recommendations to add tests (s) to ensure potential change (s) to.
-the plant' reference response would be acceptable and/or.
_ Recommendations to instrument the plant to enable the cause of a
. potential unwanted outcome to be identified if it did occur
~
1 during start-up.
'V.
RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TEST. SCOPE CHANCES-The results of the detailed test reviews 'of the 46 critical items are summarized in Table (2). Test scope changes have been made on twelve of the critical:
14 items.TA summary. of the test. scope changes in provided by Table (1), and the test documentation _.is provided in Attachment-(L).
While.no changes to the scope of tests are indicated for the balance of the critical items, the:following recommendation is made with respect to PDC 86-36 (Removal of Temp Control from the D/G Room): - Procedure 2.2.108 should be updated.to reflect the removal of the reference to the " temperature controller".
In addition, the surveillance check of ZS's.should be updated to include testing of the dampers and verification of their-.'open-closed" positions during diesel:
. operation and shut down.
The detailed test. reviews are documented by References (12). Documentation includes completed, independently reviewed and approved NEDHI 383 worksheets for.
each critical: item and where applicable the necessary test scope change documentation'(e.g. PCAQ, Scope Change).
Several=of the. unresolved problems continue to.be investigated and there is the potential:that' additional testing and/or monitoring instrumentation may be requirtd as part of the resolution of these issues. The unresolved problem that are.still being investigated are:
RHR Check Valve Leakage DC Voltage Cross Talk VI. CONCLUSIONS The results of the initial test review work led to the tentative conclusion that the strength of the design change and modification management processes would preclude problems from manifesting themselves during restart or operation. A series of follow-on detailed reviews of testing of 46 critical items has confirmed the initial conclusion that the Power Ascension Program Testing is adequate.
The changes being recommended to the test scopes of twelve of the 46 critical items reviews will provide additional assurance that the plant is ready for operation. None of the test scope changes being recommended involves transient tests; and based on the results of this 5000 man hour review effect, no additional transient tests are recommended.
The 16 year operation of PNPS has shown, more convincingly than limited startup testing, that the basic system design responds as required to transient conditions. Any deficiencies which have occurred have been corrected. This review has concluded that recent modification and maintenance have been or will be adequately tested to ensure transient response remain unimpaired. Therefore, additional transient tests are not required.
e TABLE 2 SUmiARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DETAILED _ TEST REVIEWS l.
l NEW I
TEST PACKAGE PRESENTOR REO'D PDCs PDC 83 51 EPIC Cygna No PDC 84 70 ATS Crona Yes PDC 85-07 RWUATS Rat:k Cygna No PDC 85 01 MSL Rad Monner Cygna Yes
< PDC 86 73 ADS Logic Cygna Yes PDC 86 70 SGTS R Williams Yes PDC 86 28 - MSiv G Milens Yes PDC 86-46 Feed
- ster Check Valve P. Cataretta No PDC 85 59 HPCI Vacuum Breaker P. Catarella No PDC 86102f Feedwater Pump Cygna Yes PDC 87 30 Rectre Pump Moior Breaker Cygna No PDC 87 48 Turbine Scram Bypass Cycna No PDC 86 36 D/G Room Damper Tomo Swnch Cyana No PDC 8715 Mero Versa Tnps J. Pawlak No PDC 86 30 RHR Laakaos D. Heard No MAJOR M AINTENANCE ITEMS PDC 8411N86 28 & Maintenance of MSIVs G. Milens Yes HFA Re ays R. Atkins Yes E 203 Electreat Panel Work B. McLaughlin No MOV Work (HPCt9CIC IE 85-03 MOVATS Testir D Heard No Turbine Overhauf D. Heard No EO J Pawlak No ATS/RPS Fuses
Cygna No CR 120A Relays (PDC 87-80 AC)
Cygna No RHR Minimum Flow Bypass (and PDC 66 95)
L Chan No RHR Mrnimum Flow Bypass (PDC 86 33)
Cyana No START UP TESTS RWL D. Richards Yes MSIV G Milens No HPCI Cold Start Cyona No RCIC Cold Start Cygna No Mode Switch Cygna No RHR Leaksee Startup Test D. Heard No SYSTEMS TESTS Logic System Functional Tests J. Vail No Integrated Testino J. Vail No Back-up Nttrogen J Gerety Yes Reactor Water Levet see startup tests UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS B.DiCroce No Spunous Group 6 C
D. Richats Yes Rosemount Transmitters R. Kirven No DC Votage CrDss Talk R Keven D/G Cootino I
D Heard No SDV Vent Veno i
R.Byme Yes Instrument Snubbers R Williams Yes Drvision 11 ATWS X
Cygna No Fenwal Temp Swnch (LER 88 010 00) _
RHR Cne:x Valae
- Root Cause Anatysis Ongoing _ - _ _ _ _ -.
~ _ _
+-
i, 1,
. Transient tests represent potential rists to plant saf'ety by challenging plant safety systems while providing no significant benefit.
In addition, transient tests represent alsignificant economic risk because there is a potential for damage to plant systems and components, especially Balance of Plant and Non-Safety Related equipment.
l I
l l J I J
REFERENCES (1)- Startup Test Results, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit I, NEDO 20252, 74NED3,. Class I dated February 1974, General Electric Co., H.S. Smith (2) General Electric Company, Shoreham Startup Test Specification 22A5727 (3) General Electric Company, Shoreham Startup Test Transient Test-Specification 386HA923 Revision 0, January 30, 1978 (4) PDC System Tracking, Status as of March 25, 1988 (S) NUREG 1275 (6) Completed Questionnaire from FSLHC (7) Completed Questionnaire from Power Systems (8) Completed Questionnaire from ILC (9) Completed Questionnaire from NOD (10) Draf t PNPS Data Base, Component Success Data Summary Sheets, PLG, Oct.1987 (11) Backup Documentation Selected PNPS Transient Response History (12) Documentation Package for the Test Reviews of the 46 Critical Items (13) Test Review Project Plan of the Day (14) Analysis of Abnormal Operational Transients (15) List of RF0 #PDCs by DDC date (as of 3/11/88)
(16) Commercial Quality Item Engineering Evaluation Log (17) Engineering Equivalency Evaluation Log (18) Refueling Outage #7 Hajor Maintenance Activities (19) List of " Unresolved Problems" Identified as Part of Test Review (20) List of " Resolved Problems" Identified as Part of Test Review (21) List of "New Potential Problems" Identified as Part of ~ett Review (22) List of Continuing Unresolved Problems Identified as Part of Test Review for which Instrumentation or Testing may be Recommended.
ATTACHMENT A OFFICE HEMDRANDUM Boston Edison Company 4 V7.2Id To: R.Andersen/A.V.Morisi From: R. N. Swans ; 44'S Record Type A4.06 Date: May 4, 1988 Dept. Doc. NED B B clYS' Non-Safety Related
\\
Subject:
POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM STARTUP TEST REVIEW CONTINUING EFFORT
References:
- 1) Power Ascension Program Startup Test Review Initial Report, NED 88-(DRAFT) 4/15/88 2)
Power Ascension Program Startup Test Review Project Plan
- 3) Questionnaire - Identification of all Changes and Problems
Enclosures:
A)
Power Ascension Program Startup Test Review Table of Tasks, Resources and Dates B) Power Ascension Program Startup Test Review Lead and Support Resources C) Work Instruction - Verification of PDC and major Maintenance Item Test Adequacy Distribution:
J. Alexander J. A. Seery J. E. Howard K. Nicholas R. Sherry P. T. Antonopoulos R. V. Fairbank D. W. Hanley DISCUSSION The four day multi-disciplined " design-review-board-like" review (Reference 1) confirmed the adequacy of the startup test plan and identified,the need for some further work.
The purpose of this memo is to describe the tasks involved in the ongoing reviews and invr.stigations and to request your assistance in this effort.
The goal of this continuing work is to provide additional assurance of the adequacy of the power ascension program start-up dynamic test plan.
The continuing work is composed of three Major Activities and a number of support tasks as follows:
ACTIVITY I:
VERIFY THE INITIAL INPUTS TO THE POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM STARTUP TrsT RrviEW A. Verify completeness of changes and problems considered
- 1. Major Maintenance Work
- 2. Unresolved Problems
- 3. Industry Emerging Problems 4.
Relevant PDCs 1
q-ATTACHMENT A OTTICE MEMORANDUM Boston Edison Company B. Verify completeness of transients considered C. Verify: adequacy of post-work testing and surveillance
'\\
testing D.
Document the test review process used E. Verify the dates of the last successful plant dynamic responses to transients ACTIVITY II: PEPTORM FURTMFR PJVIEWS AND TNVECTICATION9 A.
Identify changes since last successful responses to transients B. Reevaluate need for additional. reviews to verify completeness of changes and problems C
Review the need to perform system level tests
- 1. LSFT
- 2. RWCU
.3. Backup Nitrogen 4.
Integrated Electrical Tests D.
Investigate and recommend solutions to unresolved problems ACTIVITY III: RECOMND ADDITIONAL TEST. INSTRfM NT AND SCOPE CHANGES A. Develop test, instrument, and scope changes for
. unresolved problem recommendations B.
Recommend (Final) Systems Test C. Recommend additional tests and instrumentations based on PDC, Major Maintenance and Surveillance test adequacy reviews D. Prepare final report on all recommendations'
. Reference (2) and Encicsure (A) provide a description of the tasks, milestones and schedule for the completion of this work.
Enclosure B identifies the lead and support resources for each task.
The Questionnaire developed to assist in the completeness checks of industry emerging problems and " unresolved problems" is provided by Reference 3.
Enclosure C contains the work instructions to assist in the review of PDC, Major Maintenance and Surveillance test adequacy.
Your support is requested in two ways.
First, you are requested to make personnel assignments to fulfill the lead and support resource l
requirements identi,fied in Enclosures A and B pertaining to your area of
)
cognizances.
l-l 2
f.
i ATTACHMENT A
'OTT2CE MEMORANDUM-Boston. Edison Company I
Second, you are. requested to have your' people provide assistance to lead and support personnel who may require documentation to revi-w (e. g.,
, test procedures and reports, scram histories).
This work is being coordinated by D. Hanley and please contact him if you have questions and comments.
References (1), (2), and (3)
(X 8714, 'X 6 926).
are available from.D. Hanley coNetusiON The initial review indicated that transient tests are not recommended.
.The results of.the ongoing work discussed in this memo will provide additional assurance of the adequacy of the Power Ascension Program Startup dynamic test' plan and, therefore, confirm that transient tests are not recommended.
3
' ATTACHMENT A t
POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM STARTUP TEST REVIEW TASKS RESOURCES AND DATES l
ESTIMATED RESOURCE ACTION DURATION LLEEt1 STARI EEStf Document DRB #1 Test Review Process 12 Days Note 10 5/9 5/25 Prepare Test Review Work instruction '
2 Days D. Hanley 5/5
~ 5/7 Collect Test Documentation; 4 Days Note 1, S/7 5/11-Review Tests 9 Days Note 1 5/12 5/25 l
Review Transient History 2 Days
= Note 9 5/10 5/12 Collect & Analyze Transient Documentation 7 Days Note 9 5/12 5/20 Identify Additional Changes (since last transient) 7 Days Note 2 5/12 5/20 Completeness Checks (PDCs) 3 Days Note 2 5/9 5/12 Completeness Checks (Industry &
9 Days Note 3 5/10 5/20 Unresolved Problems)
Completene:s Checks (Major Maintenance) 10 Days MNB/RES 5/9 5/20 investigate System Tests (Prelim. Recomm.)
10 Days Note 4 5/9 5/20 DRB #2 1 Day Note 5 5/20 5/20-Final System Test Recommendation 2 Days Note 4 5/20 5/24 Resolve Problems:
Spurious Group 6 N/A JBM/DH X
5/21
- Spurious Group 1 N/A TB/FM COMPLETE
- Rosemount Transmitters N/A DPR X
5/21
- RHR Check Valve Leakage N/A WSC.
X 5/21
- D/C Voltage Cross Talk N/A RLK X
5/21 D/G Cooling N/A WJR X
5/21
- SDV Vent Valve N/A WSC X
5/21
- Instrument Snubbers N/A DPR X
5/21 Develop Prelim. Test Recommendations 3 Days Note 6 5/22 5/25 (Problem Solutions)
Develop Prelim. Test Recommendations 2 Days Note 1 5/23 5/25 (Test Reviews)
DRB #3 1 Day Note 5 5/27 5/27 identify & Document Survel!!ance Tests 3 Days Note 7 5/9 5/12 Review Survelltance Tests 9 Days Note 8 5/12 5/25 FinalTest Re: commendations 1 Days Note & Note 1 5/31 5/31 Prepare Final Report 9 Days D. Hanley 5/31 6/10 DRB #4 1 Day Note 5 6/10 6/10 Encisoure A Page 1 of 1
m --
. y.m )
POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM STA TUP T REVIEW L EAD AND SUPPORT RESOURCES NOTE 1 RESOURCE PDC 83 51 EPIC T. L Clark PDC 84 70 ATS.............
D. Richard PDC 85 07 RWL/ATWS Rack.......
D. Richard PDC 85-01 MSL Rad Monitor.......
J. Turner PDC 86 73 ADS Logic..........
L. Namer PDC 86 53 Back up Nitrogen.......
G. Choquette/W. Riggs PDC 86 70 SGTS............
Rick Williams PDC 86 28 MSIV G. Mileris PDC 86 46 Feedwater Check Valve....
P. Cafarella PDC 85 59 HPCI Vacuum Breaker P. Cafarella/W. Riggs PDC 86102 Feedwater Pump.......
N. Eisenmann PDC 87-30 '
Recire. Pump Motor Breaker..
J. Neville PDC 87 48 Turbine Scram Bypass N. Eisenmann PDC 86-36 D/G Room Damper Temp. Switch L. Namer PDC 87-15 Micro Versa Trips.......
E. Janus PDC 8411 A/86 28 & Maintenance of MSIVs
+
G. Mileris -
HFA Relays
+
R. V. Atkins E 203 Electrical Panel Work...........
B. McLaughlin MOV Work...................
P. Cafarella/W. Riggs Turbine Overhaul..................
P. Cafarella
- MR 86 45-96 Mode Switch
+
B. Rancourt EQ L. Perfetti ATS/RPS Fuses E. Janus Appendix R R. Kirven CR 120A Relays R. Byrne Fenwal Temperature Switches............
B. Rancourt RHR Minimum Flow Bypass (and PDC 86 95)
L. Chan/D. Heard i
s START.UP TESTS
- r. - a R
s _WLj.......................
Don Richard MSIV........................
G. Mileris/S. Roberts s
RHR Leakage.....................
Paul Cafarella HPCI Cold Start W. Babcock RCIC Cold Start W. Babcock Mode, Switch W. Babcock
\\
Enclosure B Page 1 of 4
l' l<
,p.
L 3 ATTACHMENT A-NOTE 2 RESOURCE L
Civil / Structural.....................
. (Later)
Mechanical (Later)
Electrical (Later)
' Control Syste ms....................
'(Later)
S&SA....................
(Later)
Relia bility.......................
(Later)
Nuclear Analysis....................
(Later)
Lice nsing.......................
(Later)
Systems'
. (Later)
NOTE 3 Systems W. Clancy Tech nical.......................
J. Seery Relia bility.......................
Don Hanley.
Power Systems J. Pawlak Control Systems....................
D. Richard Fluid Syste ms.....................
P. Cafarella/FS&MC S&SA.........................
Lice n si n g.......................
Operations P. Mastrangelo NOTE 4 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS Tech nical.......................
Kent Nicholas Systems Bob Oneil/ Lee Kitchen S&SA.........................
Jim Vail (lead)
Control Syste ms....................
R. Byrne Power Systems J. Pawlak
. Maintenance Jean La Fond REACTOR WATER LEVEL TEST
.Co nt rol Sy st e m s....................
Don Richard (lead)
Technical Nuclear Analysis....................
~
Fluid Sy st e m s.....................
G. Mileris S&SA.........................
Enclosure B Page 2 of 4
i _....
ATTACHMENT A NOTE 4 '(CONTINUED)
RESOURCE-INTEGRATED ELECTRICAL
' Te c h nic al.......................
K. Nicholas /D; Harris Power Syste ms..................
Control Systems..................
. R. Byrne Fluid Systems.............
S&SA.................
P. Cafarella (lead)
Maintenance Operations.......................
J. Alexander BACK.UP NITROGEN Fluid Systems....................
G. Choquette Control Syste ms.....
N. Eisenmann Operations S&SA.........................
P. Mastrangelo J. Gerety (Lead)
NOTE 5 DRB 2,3,4 '
P.T. Antonopoulos DRB 2,3,4 S. Dasgupta DRB4 H.V. Chelm DRB 2,3,4 D. Richard DRB 2,3,4 D. Hanley DRB 2 R. Byrne DRB 2,3,4 W. Riggs DRB 2 T. Clark DRB 2,3,4 G. Mileris DRB 2,3,4 R. Fairbank DRB 2,3,' 4 P. Ca!arella DRB 2,3,4 D. Whitney Optional R. Kirven DRB 2,3,4 K. Nicholas DRB 2,3,4 J. Pawick..
DRB 2,3,4 P. Mastrangelo DRB 2 B. McLaughlin DRB 2,3,4 L. Kitchen DRB 2 J. Coughlin DRB 2,3 J. Davis /M. Akhtar Optional V.Zukauskas Optional J. Alexander DRB'2, 3, 4 J. Gosnell DRB 2,3 R. Sherry /P. Moraites Optional J. Rogers DRB 2,3,4 D. Gerlits DRB3 J. Vail DRB 2,3 J. Gerety DRB 2,3 S. Brennion Optional P. Karatzas NOTE 6 Spurious Group 6 Brian McLaughlin (Bill DiCroce)
Rosemount Transmitters Don Richard RHR Check Valve Leakage...............
Paul Cafarella DC Voltage Cross Table Talk Ron Kirven D/G C ooli ng......................
Bill Riggs SDV Ve nt Valve...................
P. Cafarella/J. Calfa lost,rument Snubbers..................
R. Byrne Enclosure B Page 3 of 4 I
ii (
,p.
t
.. f. n
- 1.. i 4..;;;
ATTACHMENT A.
c,-
NOTE 7' RESOURCE
- Kent NicholasE
' Paul _ Mastrangelo Dave Gerlits
' Lee Kitchen.
- -Don Richard -
John Pawlak.
' Don Hanley -
Petros Antonopoulos.
Bob Fairbank Paul Cafarella George Mileris
. Jim Gosnell.
NOTE 8.
o (Later)
.i 1l NOTE 9 1
Don Hanley '(Isad)
Jim Gosne!!-
Kent Nicholas.
. Paul Mastrangelo.
l-Dave Gerlits Bonnie Gordon NOTE 10 Jim Gosnell (lead) l Don Hanley I
Bob Fairbank Petros Antonopoulos Kent Nicholas Lee Kitchen Don Richard George Mileris.
Paul Cafare!!a John Pawlak
, Vern Oheim Enclosure B Page 4 of 4 i
I 1
E-t e
1
e ATTACHMENT B PhPS-FSAR
~~
O Table 14.4 1 LIST OF TRANSIENT EVENTS Decrease in Core Coolant Temperature 1.
Loss of Feedwater Heating 2.
Inadvertent Start of HPCI Pump 3.
Feedwater Controller Failure, Maximum Demand 4.- Pressure Regulator Failure - Maximum Output 5.
Inadvertent Opening of Safety or Relief Valve 6.
RHR Shutdown Cooling Malfunction - Decreasing Temperature Increase in Reactor Pressure 1.
Pressure Regulator Failure - Zero Output 2.
Generator Load. Rejection with Bypass 3.
Generator Load Rejection without Bypass O
4.
Turbine Trip with Bypass 5.
Turbine Trip without Bypass 6.
Ir. advertent MSIV Closure 7.
Loss of. Condenser Vacuum 8.
Loss of Auxiliary Power Transformer 9.
Loss 6f All Feedwater Flow Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate i
1.
Trip of One Recirculation Pump Motor i
2.
Trip of Two Recirculation Pump Motors 3.
Recirculation Flow Control Fallure - Decreasing Flow
~
?
r g
s I
1 of 2 Revision 6 - July 1986
3 ATTACHMENT B PNPS-FSAR
~
Table 14.4-1 (Cont)-
^^-
Reactivity and. Power Distribution Anornelles 1.
Rod Withdrawal Error - Refueling l
2.
Rod Withdrawal Error - Startup l
4 3.
Rod Withdrawal Error - At Power 4.
Abnormal Startup of Idle Recirculation Loop 5.
Rectreulation Control Failure
' Increasing Flow Increase in Reactor Coolant Inventory 1.
Inadvertent Start of HPCI Pump (See Decrease in Core Coolant Temperature Events) n.
/~.
b-l l
E I.
v i
l 2 of 2 Revision 6 - July 1986
llqllN I; i ;
l
- g i
Hi l
i !! $l i ij i 8
E I(
l!!!
Il l llfi' 4
j ini
{} k I
{
Pk
!I i[I I!
l I I Isli a
l! lIl!!!!3'!I
!!' I' I
_ i i,, li!"l,',i k..
i.
ip n!
i j j,' jj,!!'.i,, i i
i I/
i i lj!
I!!illi!
Ij!-
li!-
ji j!i
- !i iiij;
. g, i;ijj ag lliillll1ll:
fj
[
i i
i i;jii g;
p.
ijn ijjj l
- j p.
llljjjgii l.
- )
ll!l!u ii'i
.iiiiii!
i ji;jiiiii.ii jj g.
i iiiri!;!iiii
- ,i n.i nii li i
s gju i;ii, ji
.M.!;i,!!i.l
,;!jri;j;j;;!jju;i p:i.t,i.t,!!vj!!.!n.i y
i
!..!,.. i;!ij!iin ll i t
q "ll!!!!'i!!
ll Ik
rm.
4_;l;;.:kN'?N..
'i
'.e ;
i u3 Attachment ( D)
'Pg 1 of 7-
+:
Liit Des c riotiori
- 1.'
Scram - Re' lated Changes 2
.PCIS Related Changes-3 Changes which could cause HSIV Closure 4
-PCIS S
SCI & SGTS Start 6
D'r el - Generator - Related Changes I
_,______a____-_-__u-------
d jf
-Attachment ( D)
Pg. 2 of 7 List #1 i
Scram-Related Chances Reference Description PDC B6-21 LPRM Replacements PDC 86-23A LPRM Cable CQI #228 Fast Acting Fuses (IRM)
PDC B7-21 Fast Acting Fuses (IRM)
PDC 85-73 Pressure Switch Mod to DPIS 261-2A-5 L
PDC 85-01 Main Steam Line Rad Monitor PDC 86-28 MSIV Pilot Poppet PDC 84-70 Analog Trip System (including Rosemount transmitter ringing and instrument. snubbers)
PDC B7-48
. Turbine Trip Scram Bypass Setpoint PDC 85-07 Reactor Water Level
-(.
(including Rosemount transmitter ringing and instrument' snubbers)
HR 86-45-96 (Equivalency #4)'
Mode Switch Replacement PDC 87-27 HFA Relays PDC 83-51 EPIC M'R 1 EQ (Splices & Terminal Blocks etc.)
HR ?
Turbine Overhaul I
I PDC 86-53 Back-up Nitrogen CQI #274-Fuses IRM/SRM Buss AGC CQI #313 Fuses FNM Bussman RPS/ATS i
CQI 231 & CQI 203 LPRM Connettors PDC 85-07 (Major fRN)
ATHS Rack Mod PDC B4-79 Control Rod Blades MR Scram Discharge Volume
" Resolved Problem" 112 Valve Stem Disc Cracking
" Resolved Problem" HCU Bolts / Nuts / Fasteners I-
a.--
f' il f r.
We, 1.
Attachment ( D )
Pg. 3 of 7 1
List #1 Scram-Related Chances Reference -
Description I'
' Resolved Problems
-Air Solenoids.
Resolved' Problems
-Insert & Hithdraw Line Support
. Resolved Problems' CRD Insert & Withdraw Line Haterhammer Unresolved Problems Scram Discharge Volume Vent Valve.
Resolved Problems Hydraulic Coupling SDV Header-l
4 Attachment (p )
Pg, 4 of 7 List #2 PCIS - Related Chances Reference Description
" Resolved Problem" HOV IEB85-03 Work PDC 84-70 Analog Trip System (including Rosemount transmitter ringing.
and instrument snubbers)
PDC 85-01 Main Steam Line Radiation PDC 86-28 MSIV Pilot Poppet Modification PDC 83-51 EPIC PDC /MR E-203 Project Electrical Panel Work PDC 87-27 HFA Relays Replace HGA Relays HR ?
HFA Relay Issues PDC 85-07 Reactor Water Level i
(-
(including Rosemount transmitter ringing and instrument snubbers)
" Resolved Problems" Breakers
" Potential Problem" Fenwal Temperature Switch MR,?
EQ (Splices and Terminal Blocks PDC 85-07 (Major FRN)
ATHS Rack Mods HR ?
Appendix R Modifications
" Unresolved Problem" Division 2 Alternate Rod Insertion
" Unresolved Problem" Spurious Group 1 Isolation
" Unresolved Problem" Spurious Group 6 Isolation Equivalency #4 Mode Switch PDC Valve Betterment
~ '
" Potential Problem" CR 120A Relays PDC 86-53 Back-up Nitrogen PDC 85-59 HPCI Vacuum Breaker
i Attachment. (D )
i Pg. 5 of 7 List #3 Changes Hhich Could Cause HSIV Closure Reference Description
" Unresolved Problem" Spurious Group 1 Isolation
" Unresolved Problem" Spurious Division 2 Alternate Rod
- Insertion PDC 85-01 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor PDC 84-70 Analog Trip System
.(including Rosemount transmitter ringing and instrument snubbers)
Equivalency #4' Hode Switch
.l PDC 85-53 Back-up Nitrogen MR HFA Relays PDC 87-27 HFA Relays Replace HGA Relays
- Potential Problem" C
CR120A Relays PDC 85-07 (Hajor FRN)
ATHS Rack Modifications PDC 85-07 Reactor Water Level (including Rosemount transmitter ringing and instrument snubbers)
PDC 83-51A EPIC PDC /HR E203 Project Electrical Panel Work i
Equivalency & CQI HSIV
r*-
4 qu c
,1 4
Attachrent ( D)-
Pg. 6 of 7 List #4 P_C15
' Reference i
Description PDC 83-51
-EPIC Potential Problem CR 120A Relays PDC 84-70 Analog Trip System (including Rosemount transmitter.
ringing and-instrument snubbers)
PDC 85 Reactor Water' Level (including Rosemount transmitter ringing and instrument snubbers)
List #5 SCI & SGTS Start l(,
Reference Description PDC 84-70 Analog Trip System (including Rosemount transmitter ringing and instrument snubbers)
PDC 85-07 Reactor Water Level (including Rosemount transmitter ringing and instrument snubbers)
Potential Problem CR 120A Relays 4
O i
jnn, co
,.i
)
Attachment (D )
fPg. 7_of 7 List #6 liesel Generator - Related Chances Reference Description PDC 86-36 Temperature Controis For Dampers Potential Problem" SEP Diesel Generator Test PDC 87-26 Starting Air Line PDC 87-28 D/G Radiation Panels PDC 87-55 Radiator Cooling Fan PDC 85-30.
Annunciator Jacket Water Pressure PDC 85-47 Diesel Generator Differential Relays PDC 86-56B SEP Diesel Generator-PDC 87-27 HFA Relays Potential Problem" Breakers PDC 84-70 Analog Trip System Resolved Problem" E-203 Project Electrical Panel Work Potential Problem" Appendix R PDC 83-51A EPIC Resolved Problem" Diesel Generator Cooling Potential Problem" Long Lay-up i
i 1
9
--____._.___-______m_m__.
n.
e cu, a.-
Attatt. ment =( E)
,r N
PNPS Rr0 #7 Power Ascension Procram Start-un Tests
!=
MSIV Open w/4P RHR Low Pressure Intersystem Leakage Mode Switch Test (GETARS)
Remote Shutdown Test Reactor Water Level
.t e
f B
e F.
r t
e
\\
e l
l r7 4
I*
i i
l
_______z__
-_--_-_-_-_---_z_____
l I
l
. ATTACHttE!iT T QUESTIONNAIRE i
TH!S IS TO REOUEST YOUR INPUT TO ASSURE THAT THE RECENT POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM START UP TEST REVIEW IDENTIFIED & CAPTURED ALL PILGRIM UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS, INDUSTRY EMERGING PROBLEMS, AND MMOR MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.
BACKGROUND
~
A review of the power ascension program start up test plan has been performed by a multi-departmental task force to ensure that it includes:
Specific tests for plant design changes (PDC's) and major maintenance work completed during the refueling outage.
Specific tests for system and component evaluations considering:
recent anomolous events for which we have yet to establish the root cause and implement corrective actions. (e.g. spurious Group 18 6 isolations) recent industry operating experience and lessons teamed. (e.g. Rosemount transmitter model 1153 ' ringing
- and NUREG 1275)
The four day multidisciplined " design review board like' review confirmed the adequacy of the start-up test plan and identified the need for some further reviews. In particular, work l
continues on the investigation of a number of " Unresolved Problems * (problems for which no' definite root cause has been identified, or for which corrective / preventive actions have not been implemented). Consideration of these " Unresolved Problems
- is an essential part of the ongoing work to predict where system anWor component behavior during the plant transient will be di!erent than it had been (due to the synergistic effects of unresolved problems and design changes and n;ajor maintenance work) and, therefore, where dynamic testing might be warranted.
OEUECTIVE-Given the significance of the potentialimpact of
- unresolved problems
- on system and/or component behavior during plant transients, it is imperative that g
- unresolved problems
- at Pilgrim be identified, in addition, g emerging problems from the industry that could manifest at Pilgrim and affect system and/or component behavior during plant transients must be identified. Finally, g major maintenance activities also must be identified for similar reasons.
The purpose of this Questionnaire is to assist the reviewer in his/her completeness review of Pilgrim
- unresolved problems", industry emerging problems, and major maintenance activities. The issues captured by the use of this questionnaire will be considered for review by a specially convened DRB meeting (DRB#2) scheduled for May 6,1988.
l
+.
i 1
4 ATTACHMENT F INSTRUCTIONS:
l l
A Sources of Information 1.
Industry Emeroine Prob! ems. These problems are often captured by Pilgrim's Operating Experience Review Program (OERP). NOP 8401 provides a list of the 4
sources that document industry problems. However, some emerging problems may not
~
have made it to one of these documents and an a!!stnate source of such information may be from direct contacts with knowledgeable industry representatives. The following industry emerging problems have been identified:
j Rosemount 1153 transmitter sensitivity and ringing issues
]
NUREG 1275 issues (see attached matrix) 2.
Pilorim Unresolved Problems. These problems are most often captured on F&MRs, LERs, and PCAQs: though it is possible that such issues may be captured only on MRs.
The following unresolved problems have been identified:
SDV vent valve l
Spurious Gp.1 containment isolation Div. 2 afternate rod insertion I
Spurious Gp. 6 containment isolation Full Scram during surveillance (LER 88 002)
RHR minimum flow-check valve leakage l
Instrument snubbers D/G cooling,
D/C voltage cross talk l
3.
Maior Maintenance Activities - The following refueling Outage #7 Major Maintenance Activities have been identified:
HFA relay replacements
.' Turbine-generator overhaul Electrical panel (E203) work Motor operator valve work (lEB 85 03)
MR 86 45 96 mode switch Equipment qualification work Appendix R work ATS/RPS fuses l
CR 120A relays Fenwat temperature switches MStV work RHR wo'rk I
r' L
' ~'
7 ATTACliMENT F
, r..,
OUESTIONS
RESPONSE
.1.
_Please review the attached
- Responses to
. NUREG 1275 Improvement Lessons"
. Matrix.
- a. " Are there any new issues that should be '
added to the matrix?
b.' Should any of the ongoing & proposed -
' actions for the identified issues be c
changed?
l' 2.
Are there any incidents or events you are aware of for which no definite root cause has been established or for which you believe
' the established root cause is incomplete or incorrect?
3 '. Are there any problems for which the corrective action planned' implemented does not address the root cause and will be ineffective in preventing the recurrence of the problem?
4.
Are you aware of any OER material you believe has not been adequately reviewed for, impact on Pilgrim and should be captured for review by the task force?
5.
Have you reviewed any industry problem documents (not included in your review of
- OER material) that you believe ought to be captured and reviewed by the task force?
6.
Please indicate the results of discussions with industry contacts concerning any emerging problems with the potential to q
manifest at Pilgrim and adversely impact its performance.
I SECTION MANAGER SGMTURE DATE 1
. guy, yP
~
~
R I
ATTACHMENT F QUESTIONS
RESPONSE
7.
Are there issues (not already identified) for which one or more of the following may apply?
State-of the art, one of a kind, or-first of a kind technology involved?
,. ' Ambitious design requirements imposed? (i.e. design requirements specified close to design limits, design -
requirements imposed that exceed the standards of performance generally accepted by the industry)
Vendor support has been inadequate?
. Actuation logic is non coincident?
Potential for electronic noise to be
. Induced during Maintenance / Ops.?
. Potential for radiation pickup from unintended sources?
Egylpment history (Internal or Industry) of sensitivity, response time, or anomalous behavior problems?
Instrument setpoints established conservatively?
8.
Please review the list of ' Refueling Outage
- 7 Major Maintenance Activities" and identify any other work that should be considered under this category.
9.
Please identify any other major Maintenance Activities (prior to RFO #7) that you believe could potentially impact system or component behavior during a plant transient.
SECTION hWMGER SGMTURE DATE
i i
.c h, 2 yy il l,
Il ei II Watli n
e e
=
> 1 3
=
.h 0
L-li c
y 11 s
o-sf g
r-t
=-
s' l l
! h
!I,I e
i i
o J
~
g d
l
}
fi I
4 L
3 y'
4l 1
+
.m Is jf.
bj u
,a e
fa 4
. h., h I
h.
p,'
P d
J J J J.
J 4.J 11 n!
a 3 - -
tir j
g
-i
.g
~
=
8 3: t si l'
l=. i I h ff}!I!jp!il'p;,
!,W i
!J t t U
1 s:
d J
s i j
l t< Q r J 'pI, d![d{
fIlll!iNiIlIlE I ! fif pi
- 1)i f
d !llI!!! %ri 'i O
LU j
t lllf Il3 lli
, f !,
,l
- f
[h,1 l f! ssl B=kwaml,h, i
g f
m s s s s s s wi s v, wa s ss i m
N___-__________-____-______-__________________-__-__--_________________--_-________-____-________-____
____j
m s,+,
-.g
. p
l o
it ),
i il!
3Il f!
- lf ill n
f i
i e
=
\\l
- t N
I
- il 7
i E
ee E
U g
EA-g a
a E
I ad i
it a
k it L
I ji
(?
2 I
ii e
s t
t hI d
)
ti ii;.
H i.,
! h'!!!!,!!!!
h! I
! !f
!If h ! ! !
j l'
- }
1r i.. 1 I
j!
lI I
! !!!$!!5!!!!$!t ftYiYiY,Y??,YM!Y,Yi Y? M Y??,Y M Y???, Y?!i Y$i i Yi i
4
L
.3
- +.
j. g.:
f t
s o
5 n.
i ri i
[g
.I El I1 h,1 3p 1
l
[
i-
[
es si e
g.
N
. )
a.
. g 4
h.
e 3 n
. a g
y y y
.=
I i i
t t
i l
l lJ Y
J d jil.
.I q
i t-i lii i !!
l!!!!!.!! i b!ili l! !!
I T,
E!f, 1
in 'fs'
' Jy 1
- t I
t i
,L A
N,4i[1Pi!,lE,ikf, 9-;-
J
$g!!!}jlpf~.jj [.M Lv,g
.!gj 1
ih ji:fl viili[i J
{p!I!!!d!I
. i, g
fi N I u;I!>izlabili!Il J
nul n1 n witobaJn 1J AVAWJ AW;,L AWAhWidAl l JJ#iJAW/ JA
??????6'?????n ', '?????????n '?A
$ 4'?'??5 *!A5 '?A 'i ',
- u__
1 z.
(l.4 s
i'i E
if If in l.1 li n1 li c
, [ ::
a
=
=
0 m.
hi t
I y
li e
e e
e f
B 3 j j
[2 1
r,,
o u
l" Eg.!
- i !
u i
t i
i I:
t l
Ii.
I ijj
!(1 t
w iry i;
J l i,.
s EE E
.I
.LJ.I ijd.I i
j, 3
,r.
j I
b o
i i
)J
!!!}Ifj!io;!m!!l!!bf u$j'If'o t l e
Ih!
li !
hW n.answw?????????Y!jYnY???5 Y?????i Y6* *:*****'
savassassa aa nman ftY?,YiY?n Y 1
1 l
j t---_____________________
___________________.-_________-.-------_j
l 1
f i
, i, q,5 ii.
D\\
f
)
3 l
6:
I I
ti
.Il W$
Ir :
J NI
- )
L-t II 4
_r l~
.1 e
is j
I 2
6*
g b
g
[
W l
i lP r
Ee h5 1
i a
-i
[
'I E
i s
((i-i
!ii l
'jy h'
W {;f W
gfVi
!.f E.
. ff!
t ID1 i
[1,,/l lil[v!$j,h1, inn k:ly!
i; 1Jmr ab i
3.i.fl.:l'9 81E. ;
r l
Y Tj
_!' }s:!M, fil
.. s I__
I$NnwriYF6W!!Ff rWhd0Wil
'Ih Y.'i S
1 t
1 lL _ _ --. _ __
ATTACHMENT G NOTE 1:
~
Does change have' the potential to alter, unacceptably, system and/or component behavior. during plant transient?
NOTE 2:
Reason: Impact (yes) or No impact (no) on:
A.
Initiating. devices B.
Expected plant response (e.g. scram or failure.to. scram.
containment. isolation or failure. to isolate, etc.)~
C. -Transient' initiation (e.g. Inadvertent MSIV closure, etc.)
D.
Key Parameter Response (e.g. reactor pressure, etc.)
' NOTE 3:
Indicate the specific tests that have _ been verified (by the augmented DRB Review) to capture dynamic behavior changes (e.g.. DG start up test for DG Modifications).
NOTE 4:
Detailed Test Reviews to verify that post-work testing (and/or surveillance /startup) would capture dynamic behavior changes is required for those changes identified as critical and for which the DRB Review did not verify that testing captured changes.
L l
1
9 l.
s r!
y1 11p
.a lil
!!I ij
- =g =n= m,,nn =,ui,==4=g===
'ti 1-Lli m
1 d!
O I*T y
i.
h Jgj 8
=5
.ii mn 6 hsn L.i
<=
s:s IJ t
1
. j!
E p
i 4
i sa
, 2.,
p 6
hv d
115
- .y*
i.
i, s juhl
- ..s
.t4m s,. d J illl! h il]!h lis!!!!!! h i !
- .s
~,
is
- .b. Ada @.A.. 6.U.
,g y
.i.
I L
1
!!!b:Etb.[-l:
L(!
f Yd.I}!!!!!!N!I!ih,jlf11djj
'l
!jflloIdN}![}
(
I 1
o h
p ililiIf!!Is j
!. Y
..U.U.U.1 11!)11%
lii!!
L! llIl ll!llillL fili
w.
n.-'
ATTACHt7.NT I-DOCUMENTATION CT PLANT RESPONSES TO' TRANSIENTS
.IASh For each operating transient (PNPS FSAR Chapter 15 plus Loop)-
establish the.last event for which the plant responded as designed.
APPROACH:
The Plant Performance History was reviewed for evidence of-successful.' responses to the referenced transients using two major data - sources:
UNIRAM.' Data' Base of PNPS performance from 1973 through i
1983 (compiled by ARINC' Engineers working for BECo and.
l
.PNPS Data Base from 1982 through 1987 (compiled by a
, team of PLG and BECo Engineers using one.or more of the following~ documents'for each data base entry: 1) W.E. Logs,
- 2) LERs, 3) F&MRs, 4) MRs, 5) NRC Monthly Reports,.
- 8) PNPS Exposure Data).
The following last event dates were identified:
OPERATING TRANSIENT LATEST EVENT DATE Inadvertent Start of HPCI Pump (INC hventory)
None Feedwater Controller Failure (Max. Demand)
None Pressure Regulator. Failure.(Max. Output)..
10/7/87 Inadvertent Opening of Safety or Relief Valves 10/7/87:
Loss of Fw Hig.
None Generator' Load Reject With Bypass 9/1/85 Generator Load Reject Without Bypass....
None Turbine Trip With Bypass
. 4/4/85 Turbine Trip Without Bypass................ None Loss of Condenser Vacuum..
None MSIV Closure 8/13/82 Loss of All Feedwater Flow None Loss of One Feedwater Flow.
10/79 l
Trip of One Recirc M/G Set Drive Motor
. 2/7/85
- Trip.of Two Recire -H/G Set Drive Motor
. 2/7/85
. Recirc Flow Control Failure - Decr. Flow.
None Rod Withdrawal Error Refuel /Startup/At Power.
None Abnormal Startup of Idle Recire Loop None Recire Control Failure - Incr. Flow None Loss of Offsite Power
. 8/28/79
i.
' ATTACHMENT I Next, for the operating transient events identified, a second more thorough review of the available documentation (at least three or more of the following for each event: Scram Reports, LERs, F&MRs, MRs,.W.E. Logs, PNPS Monthly Performance Reports) was performed to determine if any unusual responses to the transients were noted.
Finally, because of the concern for the frequency of Loops at PNPS and because inadvertent MSIV closures were involved in the events that led to the current PNPS shutdown in April 1986, a special detailed investigation was conducted of PNPS response to these two transients. The methodology used in this detailed investigation is described in Enclosure (A).
RESULTS A thorough review of the published documentation (LERs, Scram Reports, etc.)
uncovered no unusual plant responses to the operating transients events identified. The special detailed investigation of PNPS response to the Loop and MSIV closure events noted no unusual trends. The detailed investigation process and results are discussed in enclosure (B)'for the MSIV event and Enclosure (C) for the Loop Event. A complete package of all review documentation is on file in NED and available from D. Hanley (x-8926).
4
_______________________________._.___.______-__._._______m.__.___
o ATTACEMEhT. I ENCI.OSURE A ANALYSIS OF TRANSIENT RESPONSE BASIC METHODOLOGY The purpose of this repon is to document that the plant responded as designed to both the loss of offsite power transient occurring on August 28,1979, and the inadvenent MSIV closure y
event of August 13,1982.
The methodology used, to document a successful response to each transient involves three steps. First, the acceptance enteria for plant response were established. Second, pertinent plam documentation that described the event and recorded the plant response to it were collected.end reucaed. Hird, the documentation is reviewed to determine if the acceptance criteria for each event were satisfied, and that no unusual trends were observed.
Sten One! Establish Accentance Criteria ne process of establishing the acceptance criteria for each transient involves two stages.
The first stage involves establishing acceptance criteria for key process parameters. De parameters available for a post monem review of the transients ofinterest are only those process parameters which are normally recorded in the control room. It was felt that applying the same criteria used at present by NTOL plants was inappropriate, since these stanup test programs are performed with extensive and sensitive transient instmmentation installed, far beyond what was present during the actual transients. A reasonable set of process variable acceptance criteria was determined by examining the original startup test program for Pilgrim Station, and applying the acceptance criteria from the original stanup test. These stanup test acceptance critena more nearly fit the archival evidence available.
The second stage involved establishing expected system response. During the first multi-discipline design review board session, the FSAR response curves and description for this transient were reviewed, and a matrix of the system responses to the transient was developed.
~ Ris matrix was developed to provide a basis for expected system response, against which the archival records for the transients in question could be compared. "Dus is used to identify the system actuations which were expected to occur during these transients.
Sten Two Collect and Analyze Plant DocWWEDD his step in the methodology involves gathering all available plant documentation that described the event and recorded the plant response to it. His included (where available) the Scram Repon, LER, F&MR, Watch Engineer's Log, Monthly Summary Repon, Recorder Traces, and Control Room Alarm Typer's Sequence of Event leg for the event in question.
Once the available information was assembled,it was analyzed to determine if both levels of acceptance criteria were satisfied. The process variables (when available) were compared to the acceptance criteria stated in the stanup test repon. Also, the response of plant systems (based on whatever data was available) was compared to the matrix of expected responses, j
Sten nree: Results The final step in the methodology was to document that the Acceptance Criteria were
~
satisfied for this event and that no unusual trends were observed. If this can be done, based on the analysis of available data outlined in Step Two, then it can be determined that the plant responded as designed to the transient in question.
i 1
l
l:
['
1,'
f, 1
ATTACHMENT I ENCLOSURE A l
Enclosed are the event specific analyses and results for both the loss of offsite power transient occurring on August 28,1979, and the inadvertent MSIV closure event of August 13, 1982.
e
1'
- +:
ATTACHMi.NT I ENCLOSURE B-ANALYSIS OF TRANSIENT RESPONSE INADVERTENT MSIV CLOSURE
~
AUGUST 13,1982
. - An analysis. of the Inadvertent MSIV Closure event of August 13,
.1982 was performed.
The.MSIVs closed on the' inadvertent high steam line flow signal. This signal was caused by a contractor bumping the instrument rack with staging material (ref: thel scram report).
The l.
" success" criteria for the event are as follows 1..
STARTUP TEST SUCCESS CRITERIA: The startup test criteria for this transient was a peak pressure 60 psig below Safety Valve setpoints, as described in the startup test repo-t.-
.No indication of Safety Valve opening. The' pressure trace 'for PR
~
640 27 showed a peak pressure of approximately 1070 psig (very rough approximation from the ' evidence available), well below the SV setpoints.
In addition,"No major variation from expected setpoints" was noted in the LER.
2.
. EXPECTED EVENT MATRIX: The Control Room Alarm Typer's Sequence of Event log and alarm typer output were compared against the
" Expected / Unexpected" matrix.
. SCRAM:The plant: scrammed on MSIV closure.
.PCIS: The MSIVs closed on the inadvertent high steam line flow signal.
. SCI AND SGTS START: Low water level occurred. There is no indication of Secondary Containment Isolation or Standby Gas Treatment System initiation on event log, but there is no indication on any reports
' that it failed to initiate.
.RECIRC:Recire System Low Flow alarm received on the alarm typer
.SRVs opened manually for pressure control (ref: the August scram report).
3.
The scram report was reviewed for any unusual events / conditions.
.No unusual transients noted on the scram report.
4.
Recorder traces for level, FW flow, steam flow, and power were qualitatively compared to 'he predicted trend from the startup test report.
.No unusual trends were noted from review of recorder charts.
i
i ATTACliMEt;T I EFCLOSURE C ANALYSIS OF TRANSIENT RESPONSE LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT AUGUST 28,1979 An analysis of the Loss of Offsite Power event of August 28,1979 was performed.
This loss of offsite power was caused by lightning striking the switchyard, causing all four Air Circuit Breakers to open(ref:
the scram report). The " success" criteria for the event are as follows.
1.
STARTUP TEST SUCCESS CRITERIA: The startup test criteria for this transient was a peak pressure 60 psig below Safety Valve setpoints, as described in the. startup test report.
No indication of Safety Valve opening. No record of peak pressure available.
The hard copy record from the wide Tange pressure recorder is not kept for more than 6 years.
2.
EXPECTED EVENT MATRIX: The Control Room Alarm Typer's Sequence of Event log and alarm typer output were compared against the
" Expected / Unexpected" matrix.
. SCRAM:The plant scrammed on control valve fast closure.
.PCIS:The MSIVs closed, as noted on the scram report. The RPS MG sets lost power, and eventually tripped, generating all RPS signals, as well as PCIS isolation signals.
. SCI AND SGTS START: Low water level occurred. There is no indication of Secondary Containment Isolation or Standby Gas Treatment System initiation on event log, but there is no indication on any reports that it failed to initiate.
. DEGRADED VOLTAGE: not installed at this date.
. DIESEL GENERATORS: Diesel Generators started, as noted in the Licensee Event Report (LER)
.RECIRC:Recire System Low Flow alarm received on the alarm typer, due to trip of Recire pumps on loss of power
.SRVs OPEN: The sequence of events log shows two SRVs with high tail pipe temperatures whether automatically or manually is unknown.
However, operating procedures direct the manual opening of the SRVs during vessel isolation for pressure control.
. TURBINE BYPASS VALVES: opening not captured in the alarm typer.
However, the pressure trace appears to be consistent with control valve fast closure.
- FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP:Feedwater pumps trip, and flow is lost, due to loss of power. The automatic pump trip was not installed at this date.
1 ATTACHilENT I i
ENCLOSURE C
)
3.
The scram report ' was ' reviewed for any. unusual events / conditions.
.Nothing unusual noted on the scram report.
1 4
Recorder traces for level, FW flow, steam flow, and power were
- qualitatively compared to the predicted trend from the startup test. report.
.No unusual trends were noted from review' of recorder charts.
O r*
n o'Il irI" s;
,I 1
i.!
J y
. l,,
1 lj a'i s
Ii t_
I 2
i:
h$
3!
E E
E E
_.h, l
- Ti 2l3 i
$- _!,i I
g e
i k
E U
k 5
E3 I.
s e
V s.
5 i.
E!
! l E
"Ij a
I r
=
i
- li
~
nj
=
!l" 5
s k
!!S I
b !!
g Z
er I
U
$a ki
{
-igjg j
j, -= === ===
=
1 a
v'u 1
- 3 P!hhn&Ilh!HNfdiiliNidiLillill!$li!hi
{
?f
- Gi fffffffff$m.mpo^va v?uawa nl n-l H?l?ffffffNiffl H tn fff e w a powaw
O' ir oI I
- t g
se E!
p
!_I uI!
j!
2,1 li a
I; i
r Il L.
- 1s
]g?
g l!
23 2
I t 'l}e r,
"o f -li
.Lj 8a s
H p;!
9 D !
?
t in EE i
t ljia ga a
a a r a z l'?
! i !!!ip l
h
.H41 l'...
- r
- FFFFF i
1 O
ATTACHMD'T K NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT NUMBER: 383 REV.O WORK INSTRUCTION EFFECTIVE DATE: MAY 23,1988 TITLE: VERlFICATION OF TEST ADEOUACY SUPERSEDES NUMBER:
I DATE:
PREPARED BY: h#v VbM%d.a SUBJECT TO 10CFR50.59 YES REQUIREMENTS to x
REVIEWED BY:
ll li /*L
[r APPROVED BY: VL'RML+ V ll{
ccurenTs SECTION g
1.0 EMCKGROOO 2
2.0 PURPOSE 2
3.0 APPLICABILITY 2
4.0 REFERENCES
2 5.0 DEFINITIONS 3
6.0 RESPONSIBILITY!ES 3
7.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3
8.0 DOCUMENTATICtJ 5
d ATTACHMENT K NEDWI 383 REV 0
1.0 BACKGROUND
A review of the RFO #7 power ascension program start up test p!an has been i
performed by a multi departmental task force to ensure that it includes:
Specific tests for plant design changes (PDC's) commercial quality item (COI) dedications, engineering equivalencies / substitutions and major maintenance work completed during the refueling outage.
Specific tests for system and component evaluations considering:
recent anomalous events for which we have yet to establish the root cause and implement corrective actions. (e.g. spurious Group 1 & 6 isolations) recent industry operating experience and lessons learned. (e.g. Rosemount '
transmitter model 1153 ' ringing
- and NUREG 1275)
The four day multi disciplined
- design review board like' review confirmed the adequacy of the start up test plan and identified the desirability to examine certain items in greater 3
detall. Specifically, it was concluded that the thoroughness of post work work testing was-extremely important to a number of critical design changes and major maintenance items.
Accordingly, these instructions have been prepared to assist NED in its review of post-work and other testing.
2,0 PURPOSE 1
The purpose of this NEDWI is to provide NED engineers with instructions to review the adequacy of the testing performed to verify that plant design changes, major maintenance work, unresolved problems, and potential problems will not introduce unacceptable changes to plant dynamic responses to trantients. The test reviews shall include, where applicable, the following:
Tests performed by Equipment / Component manufacturers.
Tests performed by BECo at Receipt inspection.
Surveillance tests.
Pre operational and post work tests.
Restart & Power Ascension Program tests.
3.0 APPLICABILITY This NEDWI applies to selected PDCs, COls, engineering equivalencies, RFO #7 major maintenance work, unresolved problems and potential problems.
4.0 REFERENCES
i' 4.1 Current process for *1 identification, Prioritizing Planning and Scheduling of
)
Maintne.nace Requests", Doc No. OMG 88 112, 1/1/88.
i 4.2 NOD Procedure No. 3.M.130, Post Work Testing Guidance, Rev. 0,-10/15/87-4.3 NOD 83A6, Modifications Management,4/21/88.
2 l
ATTACHMENT K e.
4.4 NOP 83E1, Control of Modifications to Pilgrim Station, 12/30'67.
4.5 INPO GPTS 415. Technical Reviews of Design Changes,'3/86.'
4.6 NED Procedure 3.02, Preparation Review, Verification, Approval and Revision of.
Design Documents for Plant Design Changes, Rev. 22, 1/30/88.
5.0 DEFINITIONS 5.1 Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA) A systematic approach for identifying the modes of failure and for evaluating their consequences.
6.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 6.1 COGNIZANT ENGINEER (CE) Responsible for the review of test adequacy per this NEDWI (see Table 1 and 2) and the preliminary recommendations, if warranted, for additional testing or instrumentation (to identify the causes of unwanted outcomes if they occur).
6.2 DRB - Responsible for:
The review of the preliminary recommendations for additional testing or-Instrumentation.
The final recommendations for additional testing or instrumentation to the NEM.-
Review of the final report documenting these reviews.
6.3 NEM Responsible for the final approval of additional testing or instrumentation and the final report.
7.0 INSTRUCTIONS 7.1 The general strength of the change and modification management processes ensures that design changes meet their objective and do not introduce unacceptable changes to plant dynamic responses to transients. However, the thoroughness of post work testing is extremely important to a number of critical design changes and major maintenance items. Therefore, these instructions will concentrate on the review of the adequacy of the testing performed or planned to be performed for the plant design changes, major maintenance work, unresolved problems and potential problems.
7.2 REVIEWPROCESS The review process to be followed for each item is shown on Figure 1 and consists l
of two Tnajor parts:
7.2.1 Part 1 involves a description of the key attributes that make up the current
=
test plan (e.g. functional performance requirements, environrnental specifications, interfacing system functioning, test requirements and acceptance criteria. and the test procedures and test rest,lts).
l.
.t I i# 3 H
~
ATTACHMENT K NEDWl 383. REV. 0 7.2.2 Part 2 assesses the adequacy of this test plan to ensure that the design -
change' major maintenance items does not introduce unacceptable changes to L
plant dynamic responses to transients.-
7.2.3-The possible outcomes of this two part review are:
7.2.3.1. Verification that the test plan is adequate.
' 7.2.3.2 Recommendations to modify the functional requirements and conditions, and/or test requirements and acceptance criterla; g
anfor test procedures.
7.2.3.3 Recommendations to add pre op and'or startup tests.
7.2.3.4 Recommendations to add instrumentation.
I 7.2.4 Preliminary recommendations to make changes to the test plan would be reviewed at a specially convened DRB meeting.
i
7.3 DESCRIPTION
OF THE CURREhfT TEST PLAN i
7.3.1 Use Table 1 to describe the key attributes of the current test plan.
7.3.2 Inputs for 1,11, and 11 are obtained from the PDC package (see Reference 4.6) or Maintenance Request Package (see Reference 4.1). ~ For unresolved problems or potential problems, these sections must be generated by the owner of the problem.-
7.3.3 Inputs for lA,llA, and tilA are also obtained from the PDC package or Maintenance Request Package. For unresolved problems or potential problems, these sections must be developed by the owner of the problem.
7.3.4 Inputs for IB, llB, and lilB are obtained from the test procedures and results of the tests,if they have been performed. The Planning and Outage i
Department is responsible to prepare the pre. operational tests and perform the pre operation acceptance testing (see References 4.3,4.4).
Include any tests performed by the manufacturer and at BECo receipt inspection.
7.3.5 Once completed, Table 1 will provide a description of the test plan which will be reviewed for its adequacy to ensure that the item has not introduced unacceptable changes to plant dynamic responses to transients.
7.4 ADEO@CY OFTHE CURRENTTEST PLAN 7.4.1 Use Table 2 to perform the verification analysis.
7.4.2 A ' Failure and Malfunction
- type analysis (FMEA) is performed to establish the expected ways the component / system can fail and the impact of these failures. The key question is what tests have been or will be performed to
' assure these failure modes are not present. If a failure mode is not adequately addressed by the test plan, recommend changes to the test plan to capture the failure mode (e.g. additional tests, modifications to the functional requirements, test requirements, test procedures, and additional instrumentation).
4
I
~i-
' ATTACHMENT'K NEDWI 383 REV. 0
- 7. 4.3 Establish the expected errors which could be made during installation or-I
. functional problems which could be caused by a long layup and verify that the test plan is adequate to ensure these errors and problems,if existing, will be found, if the test plan is not adequate, recommend changes.
7.4.4 Establish the range of operational environmental conditions (e.g. temp, vibrations, voltage fluctuations) and verify that the test plan accounts for.
these conditions. If the test plan is not adequate, recommend changes, q
7.4.5 Perform a final re assessment of the adequacy of the test plan described on '
-]
Table 1 by completing all of the "D" questions on Table 2. Completion.of these questions willidentify any additional needs to change the test plan.
l
- 7.4,6 A complete Table 1 and Table 2 provides the documentation of the review of the adequacy of the test plan for each item considered. Remmmendations to l
change the test plan should be clearly stated on a separate sheet of paper and attached to Table 1 and 2.
8.'h DOCUMENTATION Documentation of the completed test review shall consist of the test review cover sheet
.l (see p.10) and Tables 1 and 2, filled out per this NEDW1.. Additional sheets shall be attached as required for any recommendations, or to supplement the tables. The completed package shall be signed by the preparer and reviewer. The approver shall be :
the Division Manager of the cognizant discipline. His approval shall indicate that the test review was performed and reviewed by qualified personnel, and he concurs with the recommendations (or absence thereof).
~
. 1
+
ATTACliMENT K c,.
NEDWI 363-REV. O j
I l.l l
i
.I.
g
. I;I;.
~
e i '
l
- i.jfil l
li l
l-t l
l-l
.i;I l!!
l e
l s) l i
g 1
h 4
g
. ti,!
ll l
1; r
di i
r t
- .i.!
I l
l l
l g
l E
l!.i.
l l
r,. t. a
[
'!!;lll.
'ig!s.I;;:;;! ;j,!,I "!
gi.
- l l
e; s,
g!!"
l l' l
l l
it ll s.nii ll 3!!I!
l I
f
i
+-
l i
i tlI,jI
- ee l[
l l
ll
-I 1
g l
w!!!!im!!!!!i n,,I!
9 l;a
!!i.!!
-+
l
~
.i e
y i
i l i
! ;+
ll i,
6.....................................,
b***.........'...........
l -
-__-__-____-_-_a n-__-----_-__._-_.-a_
,1!ll H Q3@H x p
>t<*
O ytg " wm" 1
11 sn r
r to e
d e 4d) 4.de)t r
r u
e u e
md)
G e
. at N
r at I
L. f L. d s
bt s
s
. ue ue e
C r
uT r
nT ant A
pa pa v et F
eMn eMn etaao c n T
tb e
R b
e bt i
c s fut E
Mt Mtc R
n ec e
e(
d
(
e R
I u. w w.p iwe ap N
Ms r t t s r r r
D o e n o e n oe n
mi mI ndMi N
n t
n t
t A
aep eep e n(im p
T. T.
ar i
eu E
b a e er c
b am b g
. e NM etse etse ein
. R E
vnR v nR v n I E aeI aeI a
h h e sI SR h
m R.
m R.
d s R.
y N A a
t e
t t
a A
r t a
ant r t t
R S hi s hi s h uns t u e t
u e t f ae N
sqT sqT sr T. O lpT t e t e t
e sr p s r p s pgp LI AIT et sO et sO e onO t
t t
TD ee o ee o epc o r i N N h
r h
r h
ar t
t eP eP t
ef P EO sr -
t t
r 1
i u P.
tor -
e ut -
r e
M C u P.
tasn P.
E N s
s nt L
E nt es es icni t B OH eh s d
twt e
e A R oT noie IT
.oT
- t L
T VE B.
L t
I t N RU B
E. S I
BE LAN NE ets R s OT c n le am A
n e b s r e IT m
ac le et CH a
s N T tpe p p t
e bd y US c iu cl tan er es u ts p
FT c
q c a egn S
a e at ci la n
YE r
n c np d
d e a
ET nla iog n m.
&t n KD a n a
ci N
so s
snc E
t i
t ua A
ntc n
tnf H
en e
er e f
r TA mu m.e met I
f ER e
e epn T
i e oi r e i r h EE uh r
r iuht q ew upt RI q
q t
i CR e e e e e
r SC u
r r
r r
u u s.
r t
EE s s t s t
e n s
s s b e n D C e n t
e t
e e
t MN et EA h a et et e T T t h h a h
a-.
P y
y t.
t ht wt h
EE fiaet.
t t
t I
m Py cr m f'c iae icr em ia e
d r
CC e e ee eet NC pe e pe e pi ae r r r r t
r r t AA Sca Sca Scsa
/
N S ET W
A A
TN P
I N
I I E I
AM ME s
R n
RI OU vr io vedd JO
.d n
AE
. n MR o u o
/
c c
hl ET et a GS h iwt s
t n
NE n
tay A T e
CH ts io t
m h r HE ta spoen t
ne c
M.
N m
f mroi T
s rv E GD e
ic epn T
r e
sne t
I I N iu p
SA yo&
E q
s s
s DS e
e la n n a t
t cl s
g' N
R) y H O la a t
d en n
a u n i'c ma e
lpf ito CI AT nid a
ih m
gsc t
I ov p
T C ED o
a s n
un RN itcr Cte eyty o
M m f,u st it y
i f
np a ni r
OO viin c v
n mR oit or n
eet s v
mt ut t
a r
FC Fs e
n wpc is p u e
tnsie yi ts s a nt c y
i y n e:
ylo ee ee c v
e R s K-.
SFRRSSA k
a/a 1.
t t
r is &
is is ol t
t nt T
L (s
. 234567. 8. 90.
L
- 1. 234. 5678. 90 L na
- 1. 234. 567. 89 0 1
l R
1 1
1 A
P R
t I
IaI t
l1 ll, lI ji l'
1i y44>ox2t'szl W y tEH ucw
%D.
3 n
~
G L
- N YD TNA LP O
T SEGN A
HC ELBA T
2 P
?
E d
E C e
. L d
B C e
A A e
T N n
U s
t E
se C
U lta D
n O
o R
it i
T d
N d
I a
T e
O A
r N
?
S t
E n
O es D
e r
M
?
p e
t E
r T
u o
I' B
n e
e E
f r
C e
a N
h s
t A
e r
N o
d f
o ET e
m
?
i M
a la e
f s
r A
n ia l
lu y
M e
b R
a p
f v
m e
O r
?
o e
m es U
c r
o lu o
h n
M t
c ia
?
e t
E n
n f
r e
f o
g u
G g
o
?
i is s
t N
n s
c e
s w
id e
o e
d a
A a
e r
H h
d c
o t
C h
n m
d e
d e
t N
o i
d i
m n
G.
h e
d a
s s
IS r
e e
n d
r r
u e
o S
u h
lu
?
d T
f E
r r
DN ig t
ia o
d lc u
e e
e p
f E
n c
f e
t EI so u
e la e
i b
c n
e S
H ic d
h s
N t
s t
e o
T re r
I a
d a
il e
r l
A Ish p
M:
TR nt e
in e
s rw A T f
t E H Ao h
b T
TO sn ig s
e b
n o
o
. I t
e i
e r
n T
c o m
d lu r
s N
s i
IE feit e
ia A
v e
OS r
m e
a o
b s
f f
o f
f Ep d
f r
TS
's p
e e
e e
v ACN dh in h
t t
FS en e
ld la h
n a
nc a
t IO Aa h
t u
d re h
FP e
s M
s c
t lu h
s u
s e
t o
o o
i t
EE d a m
n e
c p
w VR oc e
t t
Mw a
a h
w a
a t
t e o h
h t
o h
h H
W W
H W
W s
r I
u 2
lia T
F1.
2 3
4.
5 6.
7.
RAP A.
- I iIl
ATTACHMEFT K
.NEDWI 363J'REV. 0
}
t 4
]
l a{
i i
I ll
=j 1 g
i i
- flg i
Lj 1
jl 1
1 l
5 1 lf
$j
}I
'[
I i
i 1
j j],
i
,i 4
i 12 1;
!l 1
li p
{n}1 }
1 i
11
,i ii}i
}
I fl 11 i,
j p
t!cl j j
le 8
l 8
il h
i it js y4a i
i 1
e E llt
,lp dp! :1 l 1
i l
i:
I i
i 1
l g
i i
3 i
1 p
al gi i
4
.1 mi aa o
4 s
e e
o a
_____._____________________m---
i 8-1 ATTACHMENT K NEDWl 383 REV.0 1
TEST REVIEW COVER SHEET'
Subject:
PDC or Major Maintenance Item Recommendations for Additional Testing?
Yes No Prepared:
Reviewed:
Approved:
Division Manager Date Sh.1 of 10-
P(.) I t;, ti i i A L w n u s i e.e e o m w i 6 e i i 6-iw w,a.
e k.U.$CMAACU hh.
h{gy
,,?g
- k. V ACL t$1 9nov 5.S*. 8 C AN" E Ri aivi DEVIATION ACTUA' VsascE;it;; '
gs..:..,g,cr....,,,..
EY tssulNG DEST)
O BECAM RELATED
- *2 5; 73 YES ONO E fr VE 5 YES / NO.O IF YES 0 DEFICIEN0Y W CMROLLEO D00 5,-
'"yg 5 gg s ; c c e y 1 0 0 0*J
,,,t.,,,g o r,g e t a INITIATE v; AR, PARTI >
0 DEFICIENOY N SAFETY EVA;uATos
,tAs;E FOA s 73 AEDEW E5e La*E DATE(
)
0 FAILURE To lMPLEMENT REOJmE
.,7 r,...;,i AT E LY G gg JAENTS OF THE SAFETY Eveauco,
=; A; TC. v.*
- 0a E N 3:
- CA 5-72 RE s ii **
NOTiriED F OTHER MF70'* b<ktew F
- y;C=-esO.; vA**-ESS:AE "EW DATEl
)
0 NOT BECAMRELATED 0 FIRE PROTECTION
~, rig.'. 5: 72 !y;.a c;; At/, vE $ : p54 je;.[~n n:
a M *!-
AA g, f J
ADPARENT CAUSE o HOUSEKEEPING 1
yr d
/
/
/
(CAUSE CODES ON O SECURITY l
- v. J = g sf=t-. -r,r: f.c
~ c0s-
- !e r
- v. a ':- r.y B10k Of PO AO.
j l
ter!- g; DD*,Ni',"5 7jo g 7,,, jy g i e s :% :is:5 =~. '..i' iS5::'.3 DE CT i TP g) l}y t3 YMC l'/ r-O/" 7'C'T r f*'t-fbC PC-7O $ 0 0-T.$
/"1 0 b //=r C,+ 77o H.3,
pp y y 7,y4:
fo,c W
$ 6 7 7 0' ~ r o f i'.5 et3e c,n/ ec w sw 6c
.1. co o ce=/ r wr M'~
Dn7M '"D 'e nm> 7 ro c n es s.w& sm arme e.
ritis x.emi. c ~*s sec.r Tn~k c>. - vi ru O rz 4A - L2..
Dez An.u. is up ro nmuss eccx a in a
TO A63utt T d'C W $ PCC. c on s,,1 guc e-.r y sne.g r$} %" D r $ C M/M WC Y 0E'YW603 ' 7"'*f d~
me usce r. e me r~o e ~ ~ s rna,ers.,e a n um r~ wr~+~ ~ wo.v.
$/0 Y&
7 y*M f
/W &ilus*1tWY
$ t*"?/0/WT" sbf '9 $ 8 CT W C PH A/$.4"O $"P=C (" Y W f W ?"
p *..::,."ifsW7 cce
.. aavEo sr.
1 p 2 'M 6 10 99 MW l,%(n v
U y,=grs c.s: s r:A:,.ces i
l l
I
.v',! 1 i*L=:i'~.iA**.:N l'/2.!'.'is7; A%; g:rg;i.'! g. A!3 O%s 3,g OgcT,)
.===:.::..
- r
, = 3,, = :,. : = 1.
i l
J
POTENTIAL CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY f.\\f. NoKIST pp:y *d f der *:r'
- r.
4,,.c
- = 4
,r 9..gg
.,.-se 5,3sJ C As;E RE. eE.'
DEVIATC*i ACTUda.8 SUSSE:TEO:
s m 25 YES C se.,
(BY ISSUING DEPT) 0 BECAM RELATED 1: 72 50 73 YES DNO 2
,,,yg 3 p. 3,g g. r on.
YES 0. NO e ir YES e DEFICIEN0Y N CONTROLLED DO:
r VE S SEND tv,Y TC 00*/
vA, st e at v.g w tN111 ATE M:AR, PARTI) e DEFICIEN0Y N SAFETY EVA uco '
D.lANOE FOE 50 ?) AEVIEW gs, gjg et E g4 DATEt
)
e F A! LURE To lMM.EMENT REO.!::E.
A*.O ft/.*E D. AT E L Y G YE MENT $ OF THE SAFETY EvA.uco '
- A0 TO WM C* EN32 F CA S0 72 RE vie W NOTIFIED A
0 WER it ' 0 cms $$ O.** wt'tw E N3: REVIEW PAT [ t
)
e MT BE%'A REuTED v,A cmis3; M vIv. 5: 72 E!*LATAS.E vt5 : NOI D FIRE PROTECTION it vi 5 h 4: N 0* i' a ' *d " * '
t B*~E' i
APPARENT CAUSE o H3USEGEPING r
mec-Issu cos A: ED (CAUSE ODDES Cr4
.f.
O SECUR TY
- c t o. t 7,t s-Ds? t v 4 :- E,3:.
.m,: mvis 5 7,, z.,y OIvic os315:4 : Os (E v 155.liss OE-7 ) 50
$$ "! AD$ Lef;n. Mc//exi'+
effe'r' s4'stte' V f
{~ s) a r4ys J.ch p ea,dre/,,uor/o eds >.
2 rkt e 'rku,4 of the RNR *end' t
(**e /)< i L yer. 7tr rohys oro f*/fM'## O "#*'#'A #'
~72-N2 a sa' r3.t*13 of ed e b cme ol 1'/ t tet'aff bat nol detts ltdel b '
.le,..,a..:y rarorw ec
~1"f 8 7 /4f y
a I...e: By Del R
A87R'4D a...ea;.../p..... c..,<
c/u/n 46 Br.
-fp Det/v/n
.. Aus e sv5.,0 =,v.ces s c... o,.. <.e.i., _ o s -,,,,,.,,,, n,<s S't 0
'Te. g or
- j t'<. e o o4.t de d'd' Wje..o f'o * / /t f oi vw 2.ctco=u:.4.: osiv=.svis t: As: tert:wt rBv Re5 mse.z Dr=:.
4'L
('l w : u:4.: u..t.::e.
ci 4==a:4: e-tei
~
.s....
POTENTIAL CONDITIO *
- nur.FISE TO QUALITY f.\\/ b c d ' 6 PCADs DA*E R vsg
.kf f a>Ad "L u _'
_- - _f s #
FAOV 6/pa/fy Ji 35
- I..aavcrers se E<'??.NSpre i siGs si; As;E Ai,ni A DtviAToy ACTUAL p Susp[c1ggg p
(B) ISSUING DEPTl e BECAM RELATED 1072'50 73 YE$ C"INO CS,,gET ps, yg $ g A34 yg3 gr;,,e 5 rom.
YES o. NO. 3 IF YES
- YES SEND Co*Y To COM 0 DEFlCIEN0Y N CO6TROU.ED DOC va hEDAEVEW INtTiATE MOARpARTI) e DEFICIENCY N SAFETY EVALUATos pslANCE FOR 50 73 REVIEW Esa D AT E DATEt
)
0 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT REos;RE.
AND ftMAEDIATELY GIVE p:AQ TO WATCH ENSA FOR 50 72 RE VIEW MENTS OF THE SAFETY EVA;UATos NOTIFIED
- NO CADES 0.7 WATCw ENSC REVIEW 0 OTHER DAT E t
)
e NOT BECAM RELATED wATCM EN3R RE v.Ew $0 72 RIPDRTAB.E YE5 0.Noe o FIRE PROTECTON W YES. NRO NDT#i'n
- Twr, 3 es.g, 3
APPARENT CAUSE C HOUSEKEEPING WATCH EN3R cosiA:TED (CAUSE CODES CW i.
O SECURITY erne:N e TT.ES ON' e v.'*
-!ssa BAO<OrPOADi r s m oo t A*.*
F N>ct w at No iva s 4. 5 2.
ATS TTA4bf(ITTER,, T$t$$Uftt "TT$ Ten 46 DI viAiiON DE 50R,87CN (B Y ISS.llN3 DE PT.)
(t)PPetsssftt. Ttsmo(, oc susia.s3*et4T Ltuts ro PTIDol-89A.C ( PT StM,.Tetst Liuts.
watet mooiP tEO %gi oug PARTI AWY PALMuSE ' RESTED, Sgt ATTAcuth PN,Y. 2. Fei-S ptc.i p-t c. D ETAT u.
(eg) $4tr$5,omi Tr.sTid( e5 44STR.UMEATL 4,.60tb Tw A'T HA0 tus,TnoMEuT,a:,,RtMwto wa S
eau a-ea.us,e, m u.,nol~sAu-su,,, w.
,m vams.a,.u m
u n to 44 "TTth 51.
Psic o t-13 % 4 #
912s.3-$3A,b
- 6161 *$5A,% C,D
'..'ARIDBv.
DATE A#P DvED BY.
e baJT. [EEQAQ O!/[
l' [I APP ARE N" C A;.'$E($) FoR DE V.AilDN li)FAiLeRet "Tb +40TE,46T 0061 A c e AuGE. IW subT#ueta/T5 BJT. A ckAdot au LocAT lou ot.
Twe. gutTrtgM K nJT wmc64 MooiFt ED Tviet FITTe4 % Aug CouNccT,out.
(t) yAunt to eTE"itsTsub or sustav64swT Lidt5 waw.u hAD t$sSiEJ6arats asunto was Mce,s.t.b.
j uv :.cz CoaRt:T;vi A: es iva.Euss ED AND EFFECTIVE (By RIS*DNSS.I DEPT.)
i
'8
- 2:Aat: A.::;eie.;: e.
O'*E A*:R VI: e
- C'~l i
l
mb E c R AC K, CIE9B RACK Cl29B BEroRE ATS CHANGE ATTER ATS CHAuGE
/
T
'e*91 B IM f
I
^h l
l FORMER LOCATLou ou PS1001 *)0 A TH15 AAEA MODtFIED r
.f BY ATS CMAwC.E NU R 04 E NT TO ----* P3 PT (7f,
[k 90 y.
s
..J
-M x
xe '
Xc LIMIT oF c'
- T P 8 (. - 57.
1 THE PRESSURE TEST NEEDS T0 BE EYTEMDED To VALVE"C". THE T0EMG AFTERJ val.VE W WAS MODIFIED ( AS NOTEb AboVE.) WHICH WILL RERulfLE_ERE55URE TESTING. THE SAME SITUATION EXIST FoA PT512B ON 7Ht. SAKE PACK.
RACK Cl?.9A HA5 7HE SAME PROBLIM FCA INSTRUMENTS P.T SilAt PTlobi-99C.
POTEtJTIAL COtJDITIOtJ ADVERSE TO QUALITY PO AO e 4@
CE Rw; 3
A.V M CSRIS I 8EDV NO 8.I 88
- d 0/88
.M 2
..r..,..ct:-:seea<'<c.*."?'**'
5 0** '; ^0 E EE ' 'i i'.
deviation ACTUAL o SuscE;iE[g
-~
YE S O. NO f IF YES c DEF10lENOY N CCPTROLLED DO:
.: v~s,S $I'.O CCDY TO CO'A
- e. A. Ag D RI v.t.v INiT ATE M" AR,PART4 o DEFICIEN0Y N SAFETY EVALUATo-ppAN;E Fon 5 73 REVIEW gso t,A*E DATE(
)
0 FAILURE TOIMPLEMENT REogmt.
A.,; itr.at 3:ATELv G:.'E MENTS CF SAW EvecuAi e:A0 To WATCw EN5m FOR 5 72 AE
- iW NOTiriED f OTHER N *
- 4 Asam/.o-er
,;; C:0te o WA*:- ENS: SE VIEW DALE i
)
e NDT BECAM RELAT'c.D r, A*C-E NGs Al E A 6* 7; R L;A*.E,gg5:
0 ir vE S NR~ N0i' ',
A, PAR!,3 gAJ3E 0
SE PP 10AUSE CDDES CW O SECURITY
,"I v.**Cm E NGE CD'.UAO~I, agse. e 7,rs
.s e e s, - E,,: _-
gg,.<0rp Ao ArtIcTE: Doc.t'/IN 5 ((g/-/fO YiMccs015:A*70s(5'155.NLD18~4 ft vtCH9 Cf W$l={/O 4 kt.
/Y bl.f 4lA C.ek t/mfy fZc o'!Wey of Aie /oul.r&A&;y ff/ relay,7 & /c c.weJa per dn~p rdA%; < Gir,5 Juh&c/
fvfitc.
SET prr M
'M V -
A. gts cAs5:5.,ca: toc es r//I.A i:,:. !:*i!A C.iv:.! vin 1: ANO E"i O~'VI (*' RI5*DNS B.! DEST I
'i.
?.i
- v c : t. : =.. t <: i.
- n o==: 5: e-
- t
O REVIEW Or HrA RELAY TESTING PL@0SI To review the adequacy of the functional testing which was performed on the HTA relays which were replaced during RF0 #7 and determine if any further testing is required or recommended.
COCLUSIONS Except for TP87-170, the approach used to functionally test the HFA relays which were replaced during RF0 #7 adequately tested the relays and no further testing is recommended or required. TP 87-170 " Diesel Generator Load Shedding HFA Relay Contact and Coil Verification" as written does not verify that the HFA load shedding relay contacts are wired correctly. Therefore unless proof can be found to show that the test was not performed "as written" we recommend the test be revised and repeated.
BACKGRottND General Electric Co. type HFA auxiliary relays were replaced during RF0 #7 for various reasons. Prior to removal of an individual relay to be replaced, it was required that the contact configuration be verified and that the wires lifted be identified. When the replacement relay was installed (after being subjected to G.E. SIL*44 calibration guidelines) the as found and as left conditions were compared and functional testing was then performed. The functional testing (concern of this review) was performed either by selected existing station procedures or special temporary procedures. See memo (attached) from W. H. Deacon to M. M. Akhtar dated October 7, 1987 which summarizes the approach / methodology, the temporary procedures and the existing procedures which were used to functionally test the HFA relays.
REVIEW I
The Power Systems Group (Mr. R. V. Atkins) has reviewed the approach which was I
applied when functionally testing the HFA relays using the temporary procedures. These TP's were developed to test by system and to test the individual relays within the system. Ex: Temporary procedure 87-171 was written for the HFA relays associated with 4Ky logic and the relays were individually tested. Most of the temporary procedures were reviewed but only one or two relays in each procedure was reviewed to ensure the methodology / approach was adequate and no further testing required. All TP's reviewed were found acceptable except for TP87-170 " Diesel Generator Load Shedding HFA Relay Contact and Coll Verification". The procedure "as written" does not verify the wiring of the load shedding HFA relays are correct. TP 87-170 intends for continuity checks to be made from terminal points on test switch, to verify that contact wiring is correct. However the classic mistake is made in that it is the contact terminal points to be verified which are identified and not the test switch terminal points which they are wired to.
This is a case of the individual being to close to the jnb.
The1PB7-170 discrepancy (commonthroughouttheprocedure)wasdiscussedwith Mr. H. H Deacon and it was agreed the procedure "as written" is incierrect.
However it is suspected that individuals when performing the test w;7pid have recognized the discrepancy and performed the test as intended and n6t as written. If proof does exist that the test was performed as intended and not l
i
~
REVIEW OF HrA RELAY TESTING (Cont'd) as written it may not be necessary to repeat TP87-170. The existing station procedures which were used to functionally test some ret?r s were selected because they were developed during original plant start-up. These procedures 1
I functionally test ECCS logic, are performed on a routine schedule and is why they were selected to test the relays in ECCS logic which were replaced.
l Therefore only two of these procedures were reviewed and again it was the approach / methodology of the procedure which was reviewed to see that it functionally tested the relay / contacts.
j NOTE:
It was the procedures which were reviewed not the signed off results. It is expected because of plant conditions at the time the tests were or are to be performed exceptions /SRO changes were/maybe necessary.
SUMMARY
- The testing which was used to functionally test those HFA relays which were replaced during RF0 #7 adequately tested the relays and no further testing is required except for TP B7-170. The Power Systems Group considers the above to be a sufficient review of HFA relay testing.
9 h$
B i
t WORK /lOENTIFIC ATION' SUPPORT / PLANNING / CONTROL SHE ET dil gb ggg f g y j
, y cow.o s.t io s casio non A Ali dol%l
/ 2 t g g s
l i
c o..oan =,
ovagn'Q pin, g w
=_
5.,
i S
e t qr
, e y cass oi s c a+ '.oa l } l o,sc.
..o. o,. 08..
...o
., w..
yl p_ ls l, N in t
a c = o tau =o l Els i lK t
D IC ' 1 C
's***
i woe.ca sse*.
esose< esass sus s a.c a < e.
l C *w=*ao as"*
D ca' D we D ****oaat6 O ateut6 ostace R es' D access D *La=1 coao'ticas y g sestin ovince O se6it ici sa: D sestas s e Eovissab h d O eowie atoweten _*.i D eista.Sutas.:
. O esa poca e M Mfi$
U U" hdW D orasa D caeacni caevoa g seccia6
- o. c.na toel EvA cats h 7A l')Cb costamaa tocation woes omosa no accovat no aufmoa:tation assaG=yt h{
P Q $3s$
d o. i.o..c..,eOYO
"*" *Do=-
~ "*'
'o
- 4g s
,S geset we fr*/akas s'O svm was Ooooe D oa s emo assec=
oittact mesarso ca6e fica s*Ic steica h ig t l l
l l l l l l l l l lus*act eatf lglgl l l l ltust lgh l n,* a i
,a....
.a,.
... ov,s,. s
.. J ag.
,q
.a. o.sc..
o.a,,
... os,s.,
l os oc..
,.a...
.a o,a,,o. w.....,,
cW11*4 wt 6 *G Mot wona st aw.t tw1(PeoC 8 Toots (NTatI sta0*G shsV6stiose satif 6eteG
"'a'v'iar o** O
'o'u
'o'a6 mao =,so soo me 6 oc a,.o.,
PaoCf ovats owG mos f
hearma 4, d r,tm.br k,7 M 919 CRA' T I5T TTL * **TI 5 TOTALBUDGETS s*f e.a6 mstavetions a cowstn's l (gg.;o og 4,. r,cc cm ggg( u gop 4 39.,y s
ios.
.casic. sono.i es== =s - e we se caov 6 acie co= tao 6 - aviac, to a c
.amentare.
e E x hi bi t OM-1-1 (Front).
Work Identification / Support / Planning /
Control Sheet, Front OM-1-20 t
C-i i
.r:
r I
E.
I$
h I
j l' -l l % 4 ['
l' E
l N
i g
l[l1 lbd i
=
i E
1:l 2
i i
i c.
N I-og f
t tE E
5 c.
i v.s ea eL Cc g,
-e O g
I wm c
D I
g u.
.-< u l
b h C
'b ee W
D I
i
- o b
es t
.nf M
,h L C i
U<
CO M-av W
M l
E
(
l I.
f 3 U
i F at, i !
2
,4 N
g lf l
I C
c:
i i
i D
l i i t1 i
i i i l 1 i i!
i i
l i
i o
i
, i i i
!.i i i
.e t.(
I ! i i i i!
t
.c
!i'i 3,
i c3
[ !' l f i., 3 f i
- ': i *k,5.h Pi i s l ' - ( o n,5 o
i
.c I
if" 4
aa g.
I SCcPt caA>Cg potx CSCDPED32A5f.
CSCDPEDECLEA5t E1157D8C 1A51 f _
n sTtx 1.D.
c4 CD +:s or7 re g1 Alm Cuss Dt.5C11PT10H k.t. 30 y y yy gggggggg or tau v_....,
,.m.-
.. _ <.m s. m e,. c w. n._
- c. _. _.
t t.. e r ' i ne P,- ; n d r a.. % e N W,,j e
. s _ r _- - _
s'.,.
- n e -Y e-w.'T' s %. & O W 4 a t'trA W s We ~~C-~ p C yJ_ W _~ ~ - L * * *" s VrM w
'\\Y w ee e
eh, Yh Oerk t L,.,.,e,V
-s eto.
%w k s'c.
?
(S% 1 tss e A - -a r}
& *T-P D= 2'Pm e.v Ar m/m,,, 4 af,m/g g1
+ce
~
con A m CT :P = in1.az m o anixm = nuxmf C DEFICTION C TEQ SPSC T101AT300t SODCET IET 'L D nn D car Fac m m.
aus i D x2ss e ra n D ras.s = man Jeoo o m an O mn D==8m D:
scarn a it sui a ns.
b r.w L u @ m c acncrf ctAss _
es.Ic 2Ast mat en __.
u g
zu oum # _
acc7A con anz.A q
cara::= rta um iD =D aufn2At amn
- D =D m, ua o roe-2 D =D
=== unn m s
- D in mx 2 D :D
=> unn m o 3D D""'
C.
me =T unn m' 5D D
313013124'D TO IN D GAFT
~
Do=ca===n ****
D *= =
-d,.,w _,f S w -
k.
dV 2$f JNW A' M
.so -
OL141MTD1/LA7p c.L./C.E. /LATI.
f DLPARTMENT MCE/DATE h (100W) RICT!TD/LATs AS$1CRED 002 inacT l
g (Mt 124DHDCAT10pt:
MICLKat DC1ctu:
START FDIER WIV SCED01.E:
START Q
\\
AP?uTAL TC SCIIW t AC IMPtDCDr; d
t ETl Jilt 1 VICE Dl 5:pD.- ftrry 6
cc Origir.a t o r W.F. Bwelaat Operations V.P. Engtuering (Wlity Statioe Manager Task hits f.ah a b i t 0+ 2-1 (F r cm t ). scope D.ar.ge Fe m 07-2-23 l
1
d
-)'
e e
e 1
~
] 1 g d il e t-
~
l 1 s -
W i
i gl j
l at.
y 8
O
- v.. -
1 e
o n3
{
8 0
i D
s g
I I..
I O
- g s
I a
G
....o
~
e O
9
--...w.
SCCYE GUJs:t Pong
@ $CDPE DCHA$E C&CDPEDtalAst 311571Joc 1ASK f n ero. i.e.
a m.rr n re ouR m cuss Dt.5C11FTloN
's.t..E.
FuMT IACAT10N OF TASK t).., <ni s r. t%. m T2 4on ctw c.L re h ent % _ e m,
A t.
6. e P..J.. V,. w. L 1. r
- si.2A d be e c-A,,e t :, A
.. ;, a e t-
_ L
...., w c 4-- a -. t%, dc_ter N -TSer,mk t L.c 2
y.=
.J CApst AFFECT IF 307 IMP 1bitNTED 83fEMATE TO DEP12MDff O DEFICTION D,s a stic viet4 Tram noncrf miT t D nn D car acTon me-mu g Q K!sim 7ASE D ruas. sir:TT mazA.n 4.2.. o voT co:T i Oem D==m2 oc
- =z==
'z sui la ns.
3 r,a ~ m ra m erf cus eue na swA. em,
g eu com #
accts con nu coNTruca:1 MAN ExtrT 1 D sD stTn1A!. avnunts yQ sy m ure nxr 5D sO
- D uim nee 3 D arm rax 5 O :D son uim co
- O s O "" '
(..
=> =T ui m amen v D = D suoact n eo to neta =7 Ocam BJu moest Frucertz sncms r t' c _
O==
. <... >.~.! O. - G. e v.. d. Y (IA/P9_Je W %Ar I
calc 1xATot/DATL f7 C J./C.E./DATI.
TeuARTMDr1 n;t/ Daft h
(toog) EF.011TD/DATE AS$!CED OME
.c,
I " " " " " "
MICLMAL SCEDCut START FIIIER
=EW $3 Dcu:
START FHQER Ui AFF10TR To seu Ac Exr1Jxtr7 I
M C'tTIVE TItr FM 57 DINT h
'e et: Originator V.F. Buelaar Operations V.P. engineering'& Wlity Station Manager Task Files E.shibit O&2-1 (Frcmt). Scope Change Form DM-2-13
s SCcrt OLunct ronx
$11511J8C 1A51 I gsecPgpcs.tASE CScorgDtm2 Alt mm a sn -
ocu.m ewt q
n, m....... u s.l..W.
FL&lff lacATIDW ptsc11rTIDW OF TASK MLStat. 'T ESTLuG c' I64hT*J M t *JT Li+JCS mi 6 4 Ab i'4m. M e m _
a TE M wtQ 4 L emJts, C AM CO.
~
u nist bt 6 e eJ Psicot-83B t t t PS 2( 'b - 55 Ath ot %'b - $ $ A A iC 4 0 m icT se ser i m m am m incur
,ano,,
l can na stic v1=x=
s==
un.
.i O usrze=
imu li O nn D co 'Ac= sac.
/ 4-w o m con
'g D x!sso un D rus. smn sma scur a r a
= =su.
O mn D
- nom oc
}e
=x eien #
mets an au anca mas eaxc um me.n i
TD s2 awfucact rw aln 3D :D mmun muusu mo ire nxr T D :D
== usm ue's 5 D sfm rax T D *O
=> una ases 5 D sE '" '
en =T uim ana'
,a D
(.'-
suons ues = imman Dam Erzetrts T4e reeu E su mon ynenem l
QOTEEE lJr7lw A G
-h. c h 4 v 9 f*1 2 & ao/a
" tLPARTMDr7 sct/ pat c.L./C.R./ late -
[mictufot/ LATE al W D sME
} (goog) stetivn/DATs arAct O
g WIE RECDMDEDATW8 F2158 mictut 93D0u:
START M
sIW ScEpcus START ArtsDTAL To DOEpcLE AC DU'WMDfT kna'TIVE TICI FtISIDM / DOOM V.P. b gi m risgg M 181 g
v.t. Duclear Operati m CC: Origittator Tant Files Station Manager GeoPe m ange Fors Eahibit W 2-1 (Front).
.,4 SecPE CEAN E F01M g scort L AIAst C scope DEG2ASE EKISTINC 1An I nrrtx 1.D.
Comcaowort in QUALITY c1A55 pt.SC11F710N N.R..WD.
F1 ANT _lecAn M _
DT TASK N/rM7" Pe*t/Vl*/Wrf of TPS 7~/70 MM Lev /Jes a ro FAnots kenr M VdericM100 etc, pas w pr w s,gg u
WA rt? h/ countr~ no e1"E. er nicn 17 9 7"/70 /r Mutzw ir n,-sa - m m w w e.
xca smim CADSE AFFECT IF 30T EMPLDIDffED SSTIMATE TO IMPLEMDff O usrmia O na sr= vrouTx=
sacr 2 mTt O nn D Co. +AeTom =C.
s mas i D D nn D ms. smn nuan m con H
nuz2 O nromtoc e=rms
~ sa is us.
j wme seen cus:
eue un mit.=T y
rh 71?o unsanm o sectI
.an nu i ochttnp:TrLANnist YO auntuL ATAILARLE
- O BE me co vixr vD is m usin awe 50 sm v4 nu 2DsE anasinawn
- E D nu '
an =T usta * * *
- B D
(.:.
nuoner ua o to uru==
Dcun 6 D ECEI FE130EEEL srECIn&
MWF Dmm f
h YwEL U?o/W WkT i
g/ calc 1xAtot/nATE C.L. /c. t. / ban '.
F9&ARTMDri ER/DATE l
(goog) RIstvp/DATs As510rD OME
= =.
.Mr im>#zmn.:
g M !c1 MAL 3CE CCLtt START FIE15R WIW S=IM'LE:
STAn
- i AFF1DTAL To garwJ &c IMrt1MDrT F
4, g
EIITTIVE TICE Ml57DD'7 /DCC" L-cc: Originator V.F. Baclaar @ erations V.P. $ngineering & Mity Station Manager Task Filas Exhibit 0* 2-1 (Pront), scope Change Fo n h 2-13
SccPE M Anct PotM Q SccPE D 32ASE CSCOPEDtm2Ast E118T UC 1AIK f
,,,m i...
coman T.
ouAun cus:
stR11FT1oM W.R..WD.
F1Alff teCATION _
OF TAst prom er'Teunes** v n xr d.it e w, s t s e 9
- Mt'-emu t.co at w,,,,
, n cas.. ie.ca w.e4 a t vens t t u ve 6
- c wwt *i. i u.3* d vs v Wott -ro s Ta n t u p. wg b.a rus sa t wa7 * *t St99L Si*>46 4 'dtmM8d5 A ssoci Atts wiiu 90c 85 07 AM Fett es w.,,... c, m e s....,. g.
c:
MKT ar = immano anzun nim m
D -Tm D m c >1mim
-T T ',
l D nn D co== *=-
mas O mssD ust O ms. - man
= con H
E m rx D amme oc sC m a se a ims.
11 poss,m =
noa:T aus macunamem u
g w.-.., s..w. n.
m ez en m o acto en au emswix:T nu ain iO sD
=== mnma
- O nG monwo nxr iD :D
=D min un's 50 nm mx
- D D
=>usta un's 3 D sta 8" '
~
=> m min un's :E D
r.:.
masons uq's to_EMrlaxm Cauf
@ p socEt Psamoerts. EP K m T4c..mo4 COTEIR ilgK cMr M " Cl>4/pg SYALL'Mr r calcinATOL/DATE C.L./C.E./DATE.
ErgTMDry ag2/ Daft
' A881ED ONE l
(gook) SI GITD /DATs IW ACT:
I l
l E!CinAL 3C1DC11:
MART FII!EE FBqE WIW SmDCU:.
START Fr P
AFFSDVAL TO SMEAE AND EMPLINDrf EIIn'!Ivt VICE FM 5IDIy*/DCOM E'
%p v r. Butlaar Operations V.P. Engineering 6 Quality cc: Originator Stetton Manager Task Filta Eshibit Ost-2-1 (Front). Scope Change FomOM-2-13 i
Scott taAnct rotx Q SCOPE DK12Ast C&CDFEDEC12Ast E11FT1J8C 1AEK f __
sirrtx 1.e.
cocontrr te t.12G 59A8B quA1. TTY class stM21rT10w m.t..Wo.
rLArt tecAnos _
0F TAlt "rt sT ro N tru r-/ Tw ai t usT t Juter ve n.t.its w a-rt/L trvtt d eviem -
le st t twdot od "I t iura uTE D, "rt sT rbt P4 *E t, Lt vut t t uo. c ATie d, coM MR t. Ltv a r, i w,iw e 3-.se es s t t u s 5 9 a t s 'ww isoicA tic.> ew L c 263-too^ 4 Ltto s cos --
ratssuvivet.r w,teio c a c e.t c 9 e c vot t rta o ct t i t,. re ss scesau x.w 6 wavu t s: E m..v..a ~a vts r u
.re.c d e c o t v 9a ss v atet, cic 5..o e q ave.c. rog,yg e u,st p re.
v e n n e o r " < s o s Lt m ' e tatiod w=icw was m t Aei x waves. trn e iu rwe veut c CApst AFTECT 1F W T iMPIDCENTED ESTDi&TE TO DIP 1JMDrr C IRIFICf10W D ria spec vietAfra sanc 7 mat.i.
$ D nn D car== sec.
mas g'
O x2sso risz D tm smn mAu vor cDn y
a eran D urorar see ec m a E a,,3.
h to Atm*T C BUDCET CIA 15 -
M.1C TAEK TOTAL CDET g
mri e
==t a m,_
4een CDWTTycD:'T F1AR n!sT T C 5C ELTERIAL ATAILAIL.E YQ 3C
=oawn roe 2D O
==usmtwo D sm mx v D :D meD usta two D mm 8" '
(.;
me =T mm aws is D
u m ia a w n to iMrtb e=T D3m O a =ca rma=st acIn*
- m-J' D arm
?!.-
fl WWu A h -? M b4in Wm %Ar
[0EICIAATDL/ LATE C.L./C.E./h&TE.
f 3 DART 7ENT IE2/DATE DIQQK) 113TTED/D&TE AS$1MED me Ac,t s..
o g
me taca*Dcana:
la.!C1XA1. SCIZDULE:
START FINIR WIW $3EDCL2:
START Q
,l
.I
& AFFSMAL TO DCIIDC" E AND IMPLEMDrT f
[
t-EIILTTIVI TICI F115IDIF'hM Vr 8
cc OT181M tor W.F. twelsar Operettoes V.F. 2ngineertag & T ailty f
Statioe Nuger Task Pitta a
Eshibit Ort-2-1 (Front). Scope Change Form CM-2-13
i
..a SCOPE CEARCE Fos.x
@ SCDPE WCE.IAIE C SCDf t DECREAst EKitTINC 1ASK f _
tvBTEM 1.9.
E=&w w i D QUA1.fTT CLASE Q
ptA411FT10W k.R..W.
1Parr.gacarggg -
er tAst r u ov e ri e n 7'l57' sg.nc sa m,_,p g,.yg c w s e s y e e us sy
>>c e s
,.s"3
~
g
,, r..
l CADst AFTECT U BUT IMF12MENTED 38TIMATE TO IsrLam yr i
D = =5ct =
0 rs= ase v===
= cer
=Tt j
Q ft37
@ CAP. fACTUE M C.
_ BS 4/
gg3
]
@ MIssa TA8K O rias sArztf nAzAnn
< <4, eco,,,,,,,
?
D prun D spesnar me sexamu sua In nas.
i
)
sancer mass Expce aus tAst serat, ens?
s
- T, corrIncaner rtAs nist iE aO mrsu4L avazzanut v@ sD lI
= nw
==e v D sE
= nem men ia eri uA mx 2 D
- B som ass m e w s vB su "'
== = 4 := aws vE su
- =x : iw = orsas=T OC=Arr
.; o:;.4/ '
B D nods Psassumen EPacmt -
optmres h) o
.-@.'C.?
Dor===
- bk hW
- ND W
$Y$h A.
l l
x RICinAfoa/ bate G.Ed/C.R./bA.L.
3E74323I2 SER/h&1T}
T
'E
' ' ##%'I"
' '$'hf ',
? $ '.h ggesc,g
~ ' ' >
-. 'ty yyt.y f_
y,
..%...i p;l: T."..
5.b.
- v. '. f ',' h.
.k
.:w :..tf.1
?
s.-
.s
.,..;.. *., k....
4.
., W..-
i 3
< )'
.S y g
og narrneematta:
,' 9t -
, L, i 3
.f..4.4..
3,,
R IC1XAL SCIEm u :
START FII15
?.
ERW 9CEDtut g! ART Fugs
.h g
t e-Id E arynovaz. To acsom. amp Isrumeurf
~ ~;
t-EIICWTVI Vitr FLt5IDtr*/Doby y'
j act Origtaator V.P. Duc taa r Ope ra t tens V.P. b aineerias 6 Gual**y.. i.
I
.L Stattee Menarer Task tilas gahibit On-2-1 (freet). Scope p ge Pers CM-2-13 5.
T Y
- -~
1
. gu e No rxe c t s' Sver r i, fun c riw s.
7l,,.7 6d7 I N $at h5K _
Y !*n43-(o s";f If 8FC_
- (wwerg Y*
Io00 3000 h.)Ri-ft. LEA < /?A E 7
ft.fr Ago c CDwtC
/6 h o' nao
.c 02C M %^t.
os I
U:
"Trs7 /%cCouel zen y,
>& n. ye ao.
Pa w t.w,eae i
k f %e
- lk...-
g.
9
.yg g y
es<s s)<,
e P
f...b^'AL M b4'fA EY
.$t o O 1.E09._
?.
I 3tno
'asse f
^
. 'l 5t4(to2) 6 yo fe.g).
f.yg,og,gg).
[
i
/sY Jpto
/e,f 6 e c
$ b 9%Al=Md 4 M
E of(AA'7$
'Y'. @A(Kbto) Al YNE T
s
- F 4
p ti lab (,4 lAth$
7'O N4hA M/dC.*{d(._.$.Q4R. AAYS t
-re s r
~
- +6r L
t I
- 5M SE (.
i.,* 6:4 2
=
- .?.b.
I
,q P
+
3
. _ rp ke A t<.
RlQArR
@t h'IC D$
ff/{fatw EA &
=fiq t '4R
.a
% sus.l*7/eA Z *
}.
. $~,
bR YL at i L l'N(GW "?/ C /YlAO V n..+
z.
2 ofLt.A7et 3 A7E twA/L hs L E fsA R yy.s l
l
p.-
t l.
E 0* YT-M/%f 4 _
bsK 6E C, of Onwe e r
+st
_s.c l
iroo soo
)Stft 11f/ tab / x A
2.o
~k
[We C C4L*4'l wAl*7fiA' Ae7 I
<s YM
/E00
/lo
. ORC AWAJAL of M
- f.
- M wsLb ~7c s *f NoCWL Ff...
v:.
W.
Ih
'PP' W !
- - - - ~
Pa srt~
Fwtwr"A t-smir
.../.asO_ ___L
}
seso
- Tis ~f of ~7WL BAC/uA YO
-0 1
N/*f4CEd YNL lh CAE
~ ~ ~ -
ls*
1 fo77ttJ
.,.. l. t.. ? a.- c.9:;..
Q.
s(k'?.*A{*'.<( f k,'.,
/ {p
.,,..,..i ' f fgj(sA'n YALvl
' l L1
.,a,.. ',,g-.
j
- P
{
Lixee
' '. '. 9t d,$
I' i ' y.;i,,@pf.
g
. ' ' ' %L,,-: <
i
.. t
, r.
zY
' '0.jl;, W
- s. ~F l
Aotyet bm
'ltoo t/ G Sto (tet)'
s
~
' "*,i G Q 11 (te t)
- 3 18*
,y,
.jgQ
'a t. y,L n*2
,, _,+
.S g
1 i
1
'E 1
~f"A s t N/h4 J
-b6ST pg SCG C.~ m tm.
i irb
., l9Y 2*
Cob
/SCO
,q p t a p / x b 7;
,.yg g, y>g L ta A't*f M
)%r Z y..
i...
/'
no
' ' * *.: ' ;i
~ l:.
2C A ets. vs c-oF
.. _._ l Y.'
~7a1 /AtCUJWL w
'tvis m 6
g,.
j-g.
~
YAL VE UN tv/)
/6 t'oO- - -
y;, c, F.;
.L r.-
gp e
I-
. <l>
. [
I 0
-. -lS?
}g
. g%
j'gge7/rNAc
.YE'J 'l t
.,.a eiroe ea wieve
\\. ; F,'
..: :., ' l
~ '~'~~~~~~'
L
,.y.,.
s,.
A ) '{
., g.Y,
)
s
....A-i g
4 Zob
- 2 600.*;
p
/6so y ;. -
Ay g y'g g.
A *TA
_ g, (.
s s e r a tT ' :/' :f. 33 Sb h.
l.
t
'"1 W 4 At. u z )...._ _ _ __
i i
y f9o
<..- n. y<,.t+;
p L-e
~,u'*-
l
(,;.,2g i.g,...
- ' ~
?.f
. I c
.nd
. : ;*a..
g3-
~.
j tg c.
4
.,)
i
=
as
.'? \\
h A
.. b se u u n,e w rn M.o
/sw e encar '
(tiuness Aerm )
g.
Tac f,t t c wa c nua 7 Al o%uolo fit E f 37(t'cA vt t
P mwJ-
_.. _t:.
ca.t 7 1A s t_
2
.E2900
,f.
i80 A.
A o nwis itA ?'uf 4toute E MCw71
.s I
YPD r.
40 s.
7YPuvG D.
Sult7t/d7 r,
w I
c BO IdoD C. /N'f Cf 4* C /# C
.g I4-b
. i.oi '7# O'7A El f.
\\
'ff3 % N G E Tth l s';
t'c o
- 9 51, (see
?
S c ho.%)._
4' !'O S S, J S G : -
r-J I
4 ca w < ras' isem'_..sr...due w s.c t Oxcr?
- .'-(.#
f u
' dS.k.i
{
- ..y
. c..s:-
s
' '
- V,:
. *b PVWthd J
-- C*ST "fb TA L.5-
.Mt l
f b
86Y
... 0,73 &
7 l
.t
..e
.F.
.M-
'l-Ug
..sk?
i I-
-.94
.. s.,
..,, }f
.*4 W 4
'W6 E-_-___________._
SCOPE C1AMCE POLM
@ SCOPE DC1ZASE CSCOPEDLC21Ast E115TINC TAR f n m i.e. m s. 4 c - Tv//:;/ft/
omm cuss e
i
~
DESC11FT10M M. R..W.
.FIANT LOCAT10et
_OF TA5K n C)
Off res Ma r t
- ff W2 d e W
'f'?. M3 d ff h/3 pp, gy,
[v
- r *' es t s ' e l
- 2_f ? 2 ' $ I3 CAD $E AFFICT IF WT EMP12MZKTD ESTEMATI TO IMPLacyr C DEFICTION C TIG SPEC T10LAT1001 SUDctT MAT'1, h
C TEST O car.'AcTomsu.
incas j
@XISIDTAn O 7:15. SAF TT mirun
/s,oo
,or co,T 3
O erun D im mu De earw12 a
D wxn cuss cuc un Tom em ma aan o uen an au g
CDNTI11:IN:1 FLAR E11ST TC 3@
MATELIAL AYartAntr 1@ 5D T C Wh' RED A3518T REQ'D Y@ BM non RIQ'D
' 107 1 o ag => uim no'n i O s E "* '
rax
(.:,
non et unm ano's
@' :D usona na'n To xxrizxmf Ocun
~
@ D accu enenerrt srsc m a # f C - 6 4.
D o75=
Ll2 Tite &DEPARTMENT O...n'rn i-2s n. A ' 2 6-otic 1MATot/ LATE C.L./C.E./ LATE.
Alli stD OME (300K) RECI!TD/DATE i,Aef, i
?
N g CNE RECDHDCATICm:
et!C1XAL SCIDULE:
START FII!sa MEW S3DULE:
START 1
h.
AFFtDTAL 70 SCIZWLE AND IWLIMINT EIICl*I1VI VICE FM 5 f DD T M T t-cc: Originator W.F. socisar Operations V.F. Engineerbs 6 QwlltY 5tation Manager Ta alt Files gzhibit Det-2-1 (Front). Scope Change ForuOM-2-13
(
,,$'5?@7k & 'f. Q,9z y Q $ g f $ h & f ' f fj {
- 9s;:.....;4 m gg 3?l.32gg.gLi g y* g.,) g yg _
u.-*
l.... s...
-. u ~a
..w. w.
. s..,..
.a
- n..m~ a
..sy',.,i g ',zp. : e ;... ' * *'.
~.
.,,,...,f***,*.-a
~
.s
.. r..-.
e..h/ ~ a svis4l 7/'A h ll n
y w./w e# 14,4aa.7A /.~..) r* & &A
. J y ' a e., ov Y % fr.s* lt Twf ArsM
+,7.,e -rc -.: u a,...... w'/~
Ar a
11.K2GA fr. fr.W 7 wlse".* Yo rst s W' T2='*r2.
mek.4/<y.o6d/odo le sue // s Wt
~1Xe y
.Z6 oe.a or. 44 reArt tr. rte?,tr seio 1
e / ff*!!/8 4
e e e
9 6
4 1.
+, -..
f==
l k.k.
O r
'PlaceKeylock-Svitch2E-516A(AutoInhibitBlordown
.3.
~
'T Inhibit Train A) in the }NHIEIT p0sition at Panel C903.
'/
Signature Date
/
Verified By -
Date a.
Verify the following:
(1) Alarm
- Auto Blowdown Timers Initiated".
A1(4-1) is Cleared at Panel C903.
(2) Auto Blowdown Inhibit Train A White indicating light 2E-DS10A tur s ON at Panel C903..
(3) Alarm " ABS In ' Inhibit'". A3(6 )
is ON at Panel C903.
4.
Depress and hold Initiation Signal mer Reset A Reset pushbutton switch 2E-52A at nel C903.
I Signature Date a.
Verify the following:
(1) Alarm " ABS Hi RHl. Press Bypass Timer Initiated".
(7-3) is Cleared at Fanel C903 (2)' There i an open circuit between termin s M1 and T1 of relay 2E-K22A at P el C932.
i Pre are to check elapsed time for timer o ratio
$nferk A Ntrt.
y 5.
' lease the Reserpushbutiva n'iG h->zA at Panel C903 and
.3 tart timing device.
U f
Signature Date N
2 n4:
i TPS7-146-9 Rev. 5 4
l e
. <p
.g.
a.
Verify alarm
- ABS Hi DRWL Press Bypass Timer Initiated" A3(7-3) is ON at Panel C903.
I Signature Date b.
Verify the elapsed time for TDPU-2E-K20A to time in is 11 2 0.5 minutes,.by verifying that contact T4-H4 relay 2E-K20A in Panel C932 closes. (If-required, just relay TDPU 2E-K20A time delay in Panel C932 and re eat step 4 thru 5 as required to obtain proper setti
.)
"',.. s *1.. -
r Signature Date c.
2md 8 As-e. '
6.7nfteH-e in 7m ery jew 6n~PiniTTfTITe~ tile n terminals GG-51 and GG-66.
/
Signature Date
/
Vertfled by Date
'a.
' Verify alarm " Auto Blowdo RHR/CS Pump Running Interlock". A1(6 ) is ON at Panel C903.
I Signature Date IQ1l Prepare to eck elapsed time for timer operation.
7.
At Panel 03, place the Auto /Open switch for the following valves i the " Auto" position:
1) 203-3A, switch (2E-51A) in Auto.
l
/
i g
Signature Date 3
2)
SV203-3B, switch (2E-518) in Auto.
C
/
Signature Date r?
o 2/
.9' I
iPS7-1:S-10 Re.. 4 l
l
l
'.O' 1
,1/f.*
Y mefc/ oY po#Y 432 $e
- ll rely Weeet l
Con lACb /4A-K$A br m,.e
/ a d reby eJ.
an - s.J/.
.o,.& i,y 1?a./ //c
,,,,t n 1
-4 e
<w.A.a
<.-s.<.~,._,/e 4 G/
., j..,., c....,, u.
pr4 0 ~ al.de al
- / vn de/ wee, cehy ca,, fact '
s 4,- /3 o -. / < e to y coil iss-r?34 ios.xs2 Je,n.~ / is. J?e../ -Me
,,,e n., 4 ma a -Ne 4,4-/ d i.,/.% <ea.eL..c.c..
i.e c.c i.,..a r eoa...a i
r.1. <-. <
w,.
f,uJ B C.
Reco/ -fle cA~,2u wad un jud
,,,rk tled o.m.../ es 7s& 72-me. ad 73-m3
're /~y coil of-K20K M,{
-Me < era..a 4, c 4,d/- u. /y
.f
.~./'%o9
..aa..,
-4, e
<. g,.. <... r
~
g d.
pn..e Me
. L-sr w.
r,-.s., e
/2g--
i 4
E
---,,-,,,-__g n
-,,w-.
,,-,,_e--,_--_-,,e--.,w_,-_-
pj [
l l
y p N
M N
.M 1
l lI I
1 i 1 i
5 l !
i i
i i
l' I 9 aj i
n1 ij..s j
1' l{t 3
!i! }f[!g!
Ilp
.L !
3 I!ig}[,l It}
l l.li is
.e e
. ! ctjd ltl a g g I {f i e If,1j! E.] ils l} l} sl; !!t i ll lj t i i!,!,f. 1,1., ,i ie 1 1 i ., 3 1 j__ I f tf Rkk j jd !" si !Ie 'f }
- fI.
h 8 n !i ili } ; j-g# A]Il y1 l 1 Is ra dh NI sl, a! .1 si ggi 3~ 3 i; a} ~ s g i l si ll l 1 i i l i i f i i i U l. }. } ) I l } l }i } } o; ri ar i s i i nlg g a ji n l l ir ie a r
- e i
is as es i! s x, s& i_____.___1___.________._.._____.______
j) i .- r. 1 ..,di,*]i. .j 7g \\ f- - ll l-lll'!ll!,!ln ~ b Ip. INili.!Pil'll'Illi s!i.;,i in. lini!!!!!niil'1illi!!!! illii!!ii'lil. y ,li j;. i ; 1 pp ii i q llll l*ll l = = l = l =- = = = p3:lll;l,;; g j i q !!i!!ii!l!illl j;llll, n;!jij v n;ijjgl j; j i llji. j; j . ill, l 11lil l l ,!!i llil!i n ll;ji I ll;;i 3;. .g !isi11 ill .iji ill m i I., 5l 1 1,. l8
- l8 i
l.n l 9 g 3 I i i i n.: .i .i,,,.i .il .I Illitti f litilillilIll,l- :i iiv 1j, ll
- I
-I l lI C' i i, : - 1 .i. pgg i. I' i i I. i I I f.' l ! B dj l 1 l 5] ' )$))A b), li R3r i l,/.., i Ei ji $a 1 'pi l jt j k. p i n ifj si sn. i l! $"07,
- II ET J!
n.w, e lik n = e
9-gjgg.gj2 gg j = 2 = = y. llllll$fEli. = =- = = gg:; 5 j 00 T !lE! W! lI.r I. s Eg 2 2 2 = = = = 3 3 2-2 = E. si;g;l,g l s,:; o s .g 4 S!;ifl-l 3 t g.g. f EE* s 2 a 3 .s s s s 3 m a ji 2 2-3 3 2 = 2 = = = = = j[l l 2 = = = = = 2 2 = l!!jIlll.llll a x = 3 = = = = = = = rt I. icE$ *s ' 3 s s s s (f I I-3 s a. s 2 e s g!ljg 2 2 2 3 = 2 2 2 el Ij! e!E 3 3 = = 2
- i "f:
![ -a .a &a is SI 358 363 I!3 2 11 Egl f*I .f a.I .s .s .s u E e!! E I II .I! lgi E E
- ?g. I g8II Ig W go
-gu 3 gj ,52j i i i j j na = = = = ~ ~ 8 !s a as '6i I.s!!5!s*.- e!!' e8 '8 Ifffffl fil e e g
- b h3 R.
A 8 ab iiii!!!!!ll,ll9j Qjji!g( eji eli ll jj =gl ):ill f
- 1 I
1 5 l e e ss! i I s i it t r i i p p! 3 ! :s I 6 i s g gl g .i l ! I i l! l !. EI Is 5 8 W.ej p I r, 11 i i l. i 1 r e I 1 H a i i se
- Ign, i
r h l i
- hr s
s r s 8 ek!, 1 - im! ! 58 d i d 5, h.. I-M$' ;! IEi I I E es e m e t v. J 4 6___ _-___m_
a ~$~ u,
- j'- C f'.
' t.4%., p. i g 4 il , t p. m r s I {l:r N lE!ElI:c:kr.: : a !El saast e:e: s = a t::
- stem E=s t s
j*eeses=gitat:: lgl83gn aangri,en n son ung on;n 3 g gr*rn! Ijj
- st:
35 1. van ng lI-gll,j. 8 g* = i r n y n l [3l[ g g ig-s ll!!iifltl s. = = = l!! jjjihit s i 3 l !l$! k k r re E l r = = = nij!;l s ll j 11lj,!lll ,g gj j c g!j; j I!lj; i = iiii!!!ilill i s e 3 'I ,l,g!;r! i .'4 _ - - -}}