ML20065L596
| ML20065L596 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 11/30/1990 |
| From: | BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20065L594 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9012070226 | |
| Download: ML20065L596 (188) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . November 1990 l t Detailed Control Room Design Review l Final Summary Report l l l i-I- t Pilgrim Station BOSTON r= m BEDISON P PDC 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION BAE ListofFigures.......................................................iv ListofTables.........................................................v List of Exhibits ......................................................vi Preface ..............................................................v11 - SECTION I. INTRODUCTION A. Purpose ......................................................I-1 B. Background'..................................................I-1 DCRDR Evaluation Criteria ...................................I-2 o '. C. D. Ac ti vi ti e s Si nc e Apri l 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-3 E. Ac ti vi ti es i n Prog res s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-5 F. R e ma i n i n g H o r k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I - 6 SECTION II. 1989-90 CONTROL ROOH SURVEYS AND SYSTEM FUNCTION TASK ANALYSIS A. I n t rod u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 -1 B. Data Collection Methods .....................................I1-1 C .' R e s u l t s -- N ew H ED s ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I- 13 SECTION III. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS t A. I n t rod u c t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 11 - 1
- B. C a t e g o ry A H E D s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1 1 - 1 Category 1 -- Annunciator-Related HED
- ..................III-7 E C.
Category 2 -- Control Panel Enhancement HEDs.................III-il D. E. Category 3 -- Habitability-Related HEDs .....................III-20
'F. Category 4 -- HEDs Rel ated to Hardware Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III-22 G. Category 5 -- HEDs Related to Equipment Location . . . . . . . . . . . .III H. Category 6 -- Potentially Resolved HEDs .....................III-26
- 1. Category 7 -- Non-Engineered HEDs ...........................I11-27 J. Category 8 -- HEDS Related to Plant Computer (" EPIC") . . . . . . .III-33 l
SECTION IV. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE A. Introduction ................................................IV-1 B. Category 1 -- Annunciator ...................................IV-1 C. Category 2 -- Enhancements ..................................IV-1 D. Category 3 -- Habitability ..................................IV-4 ...........IV-4 E.- Categories 4 and 5 -- Equipment Type and Location F.- Category ~6 -- Potentially Resolved ..........................IV-4 G. Category 7 -- Non-Engineered Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IV-4 H. Category 8 -- HEDs Related to Plant Computer (EPIC) . . . . . . . . .IV-5 l ii
I TABLE OF CONT (Nil (Cont.) l SECTION V. RESPONSE TO 1989 NRC COMMENTS l A . I n t rod u c t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V-1 B. Response to Inspection Report ...............................V-1 C. Response to 1989 Technical Evaluation Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V-S SECTION VI. PROJECT ORGANIZATIOM AND QUALIFICATIONS A. Pilgrim Station Organize cion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VI-1 B. Project Structure ..... .....................................VI-1 C. Key Individuals ....... .....................................VI-6 APPENDICES A. References ..................................................A-1
- 8. Human Engineering Discrepancies .............................B-1 C. Resumes of Key Personnel ....................................C D. Preliminary Schedule for Additional Scope of Panel Improvements (LTP 328).................................D-1 l
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y' s II-1: Layout of. Pilgrim Station Control Room .........................II i
. IV-l ' Summary Schedule --' Pilgrim Station Control Room Design Review .IV-2 ,
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- , 'VI-2 Boston Edison' Nuclear Engineering Organization ..................VI-3 ;
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LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO. EA_G[ I-l Compliance with DCRDR Evaluation Cri teria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I-4 11-1 New HE0s Identified in 1989-90 CRDR Effort .. [ M' k ........II II-2 H EDs by Sa f e ty Ca t egory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-16 11-3 Category A HEDs by Phase and Implementation Category .........II-17 11-4 Initial Screening Results ....................................II-18 11-5 Ca t egory De fi ni t i on s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-19 II-6 Results of Quantitative Impact Evaluations (Updated) .........II-22 111-1 Generalized Implementation Status, by Category .............. 111-2 III-2 Category A (Safety-Sigin ficant) HEDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III-3 III-3 Category 1--Annunciator-Related HEDs ........................ 11I-8 III-4 Category 6 HEDs Not Yet Closed-Out .......................... 111-28 III Category 6 HEDs That Are Closed-0ut...........................III :VI-l Technical Disciplines Assigned, by Task ......................VI VI 2' Personnel Assigned to DCRDR or l Providing Hajor Support ......'................................VI-8 l l V
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i i l 5 PREFACE l Boston Edison submitted the Executive Summary Report of the Pilgrim Station j Detailed Control Room Design Review Project (DCRDR) to NRC in September 1984, , to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. { In' response, the NRC issued a Safety Evaluation in May 1985, in which the NRC I requested that Boston Edison submit a supplementary summary report, with l j
,- ' additional information, J
The Supplementary Summary Report was submitted in May 1989..providing some of o
'the additional.information requested in the NRC's Safety Evaluation. A I revised Program Plan was submitted in July _1989. 'o This report is the Final Summary Report. IYs submitta1' satisfies a commitment ;
made in the Supplementary Summary Report and completes the reporting '
'- requirements of NUREG-0737 for the Pilgrim Station Detailed Control Room-Design Review. It includes the identification of corrective actions and the !
schedules for: implementation. i t-i I' L {. s r i f A,5 g '.
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2 I t vii
SECTION I INTRODUCTION A. PURPoit The purpose of this Final Summary Report is to complete the description of the Detailed Control Room Design Review ({RDR) for Pilgrim Station. In I two previous reports (References 1 and 2) Boston Edison described the DCRDRprojecttodate,tabulatedtheidentifiedHumanEngineering Discrepancies (HEDs) and described the corrective actions for a portion of the HEDs. This report provides information on the remainder of the Pilgrim Station DCRDR, and is meant to complete the DCRDR reporting requirements of NUREG-0737. In summary, this report will:
- Describe the status of DCRDR at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, by providing an update to information provided earlier in Reference 2.
- Describe additional control room survey, inventory, and task analysis
' work done in 1989-90, and tabulate the HEDs identified by that effort.
- Identify corrective actions for both:
- The "new" HEDs identified by the 1989-90 DCRDR efforts.
- HEDs identified earlier (References 1 and 2) for which corrective actions were not identified in Reference 2.
- Provide status and schedules for the identified corrective petions.
- Identify HEDs for which corrective actions are completed (with an emphasis on those completed since early 1989).
- Identify the safety-significant HEDs for which no corrective action is planned, and the basis for not correcting them.
- Respond to the comments in the NRC's inspection report of mid-1989 (Reference 3) and in the NRCs review (Reference 10) of the Program Plan and Supplementary Summary Report (References 2 and 6).
B. BACKGROUND Boston Edison originally prepared and submitted a Program Plan and a Summary Report (References 4 and 1) in 1984. The Program Plan described the project crganization and methodology for performing a human factors review of the Pilgrim Station Control Room in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1. The Summary Report described the i. L work completed, listed the HEDs identified during the review, and outlined a series of corrective actions. 1 References are listed in Appendix A. 1-1 l i
The NRC conducted a pre-implementation audit of tha DCRDR program during the week of November 26-30, 1984, and issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in May 1985 (Reference 5). The SER identified a number of deficiencies in the DCRDR program and concluded that the corrective The NRC actions were not described in sufficient detail in Reference 1. required that a supplemental report be prepared and submitted to resolve their concerns. In April 1986, we committed to prepare and subdt a Supplementary Summary Report. That report (Reference 2) was submitted in May 1989. The Supplementary Summary Report summarized the key activities on the Pilgrim DCRDR project since 1984; described physical improvements th t enhance the operators' ability to prevent and mitigate accidents; described additional corrective actions that were planned; and identified the remaining engineering tasks needed to allow selection of corrective actions for the remaining HEDs. The .lupplementary Summary Report also committed to:
- Prepare and submit a revised Program Plan, which was completed in July 1989 (Reference 6).
- Update the DCRDR to include:
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- Update of the control room inventory.
- Performance of a partial control room survey, incl., ding a survey of all plant equipment installed in the control room since the original (1984) DCRDR survey. ,
- Perform a new System Function and Task Analysis, including verification-and validatien activities, encompassing the current set of Emergency Operations Procedures (EOPs).
- Submit a Final Summary Report conforming to NUREG-0737 requirements ,
by November 30, 1990. The report is to include the scope and schedule for the remaining corrective actions for Pilgrim's HEDs. In March 1989, NRC conducted an in-process review of the Boston Edison l- DCRDR project. This report addresses NRC's comments provided during that review (see Reference 3). I C. DCRDR EVALUATION CRITERIA BECo recognizes and is responsive to each of the nine NUREG-0737 criteria by which the NRC evaluates DCRDR Final Summary Reports. Table I-1 identifies each of these evaluation criteria and the specific section(s) l l of this report or the Program Plan (Reference 6) that describes compliance I with each criterion for the BECo DCRDR. Note that this report will describe any instances in which the DCRDR data collection and analysis activities were substantially different from the planned activities as described in the Program Plan (Reference 6). Otherwise, the Program Plan can be assumed to provide a description of the DCRDR processes. I-2
D. ACTIVITIES SINCE APRIL 1989 l This sub-section describes the principal activities of the Pilgrim DCROR project since our submittal in April 1989 of the Supplementary Summary Report (Reference 2). For the purpose of this discussion and for other discussion throughout I this report, it is convenient to separate the r,rojects into several major l elements. These elements coinci e with items identified in the Pilgrim I Station Long Term Program (LTP); the LTP numbers are in parentheses.
- 1. Performance of additional data collection. analysis. identificatian l of HEDs. and selection of corrective actions (LTP #299) l As committed to NRC in Reference (2), Boston Edison planned and conducted an effort to update the Pilgrim DCRDR. General Physics was the contractor selected to conduct the additional data collection and human factors review. The update effort included the following elements:
- a. Update of the control room inventorv -- The inventory of control room instruments and controli; was revised to include hardware changes since 1984, and to include additional panels added to the scope of the DCRDR in 1989.
- b. Additional control room surveys -- Human factors surveys were performed to complete several NUREG-0700 requirements not previously done (including noise and HVAC), and to include panels added to the DCRDR scope since the 1984 survey,
- c. Review of Oct,ratina Exoerience as documented in PNPS Licensee Event ReDorts (LERs) -- LERs from the last five years were examined to identify potential human factors problems that have origins in the control room,
- d. Task analv.111 -- A complete new System Function and Task Analysis (SFTA) was conducted, using the latest Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). A Verification of Task Performance Capabilities and Validation of Control Room Functions was also conducted,
- e. Identification ed screenina of additional HEDs -- The collected data resulted in the identification of additional Human Engineering Observation (HEOs). The Boston Edison Design Review Team (DRT) was convened, and reviewed the HEOs. llEOs were categorized as to importance and corrective action types.
1-3
TABLE I-1 COMPLIANCE HITH DCRDR EVALUATION CRITERIA Criteria Referentg2 ,,_
- 1. Establishment of a qualified Section VI and multioisciplinary review team. Program Plan
- 2. Function and task analyses Section !! and to identify control room Program Plan operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency operations.
- 3. Comparison of display and control Section !! and requirements with a control room Program Plan inventory.
- 4. Control room survey to. identify Section !! and deviations from accepted human Program Plan factors criteria.
- 5. Assessment of HEDs to determine Section !! and which HEDs are significant and Program Plan should be corrected.
- 6. Selection of design improvements. Sections III and V and Program Plan I
- 7. Verification that selected design Program Plan improvements will provide necessary correction.
- 8. Verification that improvements will Program Plan not introduce new HEOs.
- 9. Coordination of control room Program Plan improvements with changes from and Section V other programs such as SPOS, operator training, Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and upgraded E0Ps.
2 Section numbers refer to this report; Program Plan refers to revised Program Plan (Reference 6).
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- f. Selection of Correction Actions -- As detailed in Section !!! of l this report, corrective actions have been identified and i scheduled for the HEDs to be corrected. Safety-significant l
items not to be corrected are identified in Section 111.
- 2. Continue Installation of Enhancements (LTP #300)
SECo has continued the design and installation of control panel enhancements, including: labels, mimics, and demarcations; rewiring of switches and replacement of switch escutcheons; removal of abandoned equipment; and other minor items. In general, progress has been slower than scheduled. (Revised schedules are in Section IV.) He also submitted to the NRC a detailed report on the labels, mimics, and demarcation effort, Reference 7.
- 3. Comolete Annunciator Contectual Desian Study (LTP #327)
Boston Edison planned a conceptual design study to select the course of action to correct HEDs on the alarm annunciator system, selected a . contractor (NUS Corp.), and conducted the study. The study has been completed and the planned corrective action is discussed in Section III.C.
- 4. Desian of Lichtina Imorovements (LTP #375)
As previously committed, Boston Edison engaged a contractor (Stone & Webster), who prepared a detailed design for lighting improvements. The design is complete and material procurement is underway. Each of these activities is described further in Section !! (the data collection effort) and Section III (corrective actions) of this report. ' Section IV provides schedules for the corrective actions. E. ACTIVITIES IN PROGRESS At the present time, activities in progress include the following. Each ' of these items is discussed in greater detail in Section II (Corrective Actions).
- 1. Panel Enhancements -- Design and implementation is continuing on the panel enhancements program referred to earlier (and described in detail in Section III and in References 2 and 7). Labels, mimics, and demarcations are installed first in the simulator for review, then in the plant control room. The bulk of this installation work I' can be done while the plant is operating. Design work is continuing on the remaining panels to be enhanced. Installation of these enhancements will continue through 1991 and after, until completed.-
Design work is also underway for a number of other panel enhancements l planned for installation in Refueling Outage #8 (Rf0 8) in 1991,. L including:
- Repainting and refurbishment of all panels.
- Removal of additional equipment previously abandoned in place.
- Rewiring and replacement of selected switches.
- Replacement of switch escutcheons.
- Other minor hardware replacements and rearrangements.
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- 2. Desian of Additional Control Panel Imorovements -- Additional control panel improvements (including those involving significant panel cutting, hardware replacement, or rearrangement) are being defined and scheduled in this report. As this report is being written, scoping and planning are underway and some detailed design is underway.
- 3. Annunciator 1morovements Desian -- A contyptual design has been selected (see Section III). As this report is being written, the effort to develop a detailed design of the improvements is being scoped, estimated, and planned. Detailed lesign is expected to begin in early 1991.
- 4. Verification -- As corrective actions are completed, BECo performs a field review of the completed work to verify that the original HED was corrected and that no new HED is created. This verification process is a requirement of BEco procedures and will continue throughout the implementation of the project.
i
- 5. Desian Manual -- As design proceeds on corrective actions, standards !
are being developed for such control room features as switches. > labels, meter scales, mimics, demarcation, and others. These ! standards are to be published as a Design Manual for guidance to future modifications in the control room. Manual preparation is underway, with publication of the initial scope expected in late 1990 or early 1991. F. REMAINING HORK " What remains is to design and implement the corrective actions that have been selected but have not yet been completed. Section III describes the corrective actions, and Section IV discusses the schedule for the work. In addition, two other tasks remain:
- 1. Completion of the Design Manual. As work proceeds, the manual is i expected to require modifications (both expansion and revisions to reflect experience).
I
- 2. Verification that completed corrective actions resolve the original human factors concerns, and do not create new concerns. This process will continue throughout the implementation period.
This Final Summary Report completes DECO's DCRDR reporting requirements as provided in NUREG-0737 and we do not plan to submit additional reports. ! Implementationschedulesaresubjecttoconfirmationandrefinement through the Long Term Program process. 1-6
i SECTION II 1989-90 CONTROL ROOM SURVEYS AND SYSTEM FUNCTION T ASK ANALYSIS A. INTRODUCTION
- 1. Backarou04 In 1989-90, Boston Edison completed a comprehensive update of the Pilgrim DCRDR. The updating effort conformed with the most recent revision of the Pilgrim Program Plan (Reference 6).
- The first task in the update effort was to develop a specification for a human factors consultant. The specification (Reference 8) was based closely upon the relevant sections of the Program Plan.
Next, General Physics Corp. (GP) was selected to perform the data collection and analysis effort. General Physics also was designated as the lead human factors consultant for the Pilgrim DCRDR project, to assist in other human factors tasks. Refer to Section VI for discussions on the project organization.
- 2. Stone of 1989-90 Effort General Physics beaan their data collection in October 1989. The scope of their wot on this project can be summarized as follows.
- Update the inventory of control panel instrumentation, controls, and other equipment, to reflect changes in equipment since the inventory was prepared in 1984, and to expand the scope to several additional panels. (See Figure 11-1.)
- Perform a human factors survey for the added panels, revised hardware, and certain equipment (e.g., SPDS) not previously surveyed.
- Perform a review of operating experience as documented in Licensee Event Reports.
- Perform an entirely new System Function and Task Analysis, including verification and validation.
Each of these elements is described in detail in reports provided by the contractor and summarized in the section that follows. B. DATA COLLECTION METHODS
- 1. .Uedated Control Room Inventory The control room inventory is a comprehensive computerized listing of the instrumentation, controls, and other equipment contained in the control room. This list was used in subsequent tasks of the DCRDR to determine the adequacy of control room components for supporting operator information and control requirements identified during the task analysis. It is also available to engineering for reference purposes and for use in design of futuie control room modifications.
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- 1. CROR PROJECT SCOPE SHOWN BY 2.* DENOTES PANO.S ADDED BY 1989-90 DTORT.
3.50ME DETAILS OMITTED FOR CLARITY. FIGURE II-1. LAYOUT OF PILGRIM STATION CONTROL ROOH 11-2
The control room inventory will be kept up to date to reflect component changes made in the control room during and after the DCROR. Project personnel conducted a systematic inspertion and review of , the control room and relevant control room documentation (e.g., instrument lists) to update the existing control room inventory. Emphasis was on two scope elements: hardware changes since 1984 when the inventory was compiled, and the additional panels incorporated in the DCRDR scepe in 1989. The inventory records contain the following information for each L component:
- Instrument number / designation number
- Component nomenclature or description
- System number
- Manufacturer
- Component characteristics (e.g., scale ranges)
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Panel number
- Identification of Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumentation
- Annunciator identification (where applicable)
- Comments j The product of the control room inventory is a comprehensive record _
of the instrumentation, controls, and other equipment contained-in the control room. The control room inventory was used in the verification of availability and suitability of the existing control room instrumentation. Exhibit II-l is a sample page from _ the completed inventory.
- 2. Control Room S Eyty _
A systematic human factors survey of control room design features - was started in 1984. The portions of the survey that were completed in 1984 were updated in 1989/90 to include the control room components added to the revised inventory. Both the 1984 and = 1989/90 surveys were performed using checklists provided in _ NUREG-0700, Section 6. _ Besides surveys of hardware changes on the previously-surveyed = panels, the survey also included: =
- The additional panels added to the DCRDR scope in 1989 (see Figure II-1).
- Survey of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) per relevant items in NUREG-0700 Section 6.7 (which had not been available for survey in 1964).
- Survey of the control room HVAC performance, per NURLG-0700.
Section 6.1.5.1 and 6.1.5.2.
- Survey of control room noise levels, per NUREG-0700, Section 6.1.5.5 -
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I, !,= !e !, !, E, !, !, E, O n E n D .l'- g g v v J # 9 A U U V h5 I i i i i i i i i ! EXHIBIT 11-1. SAMPLE INVENTORY PAGE 11-4
e Panel layout survey and control / display integration survey per NUREG-0700, Sections 6.8 and 6.9. Human Engineering Observations (HEOs) resulting from these surveys are discussed in later sections of this report. In the future, we will perform a survey update for each control panel as we complete installation of control panel improvements. As part of the verification step after modifications are installed, the completed panel will be reviewed against NUREG-0700 criteria and checklists will be prepared. (See Section III for description of the enhancements program.) Three panels have received a post-enhancements survey (as of October 1, 1990).
- 3. Ooeratina Eroerience Review A partial Operating Experience Review (OER) was conducted, to determine if there were documented problems in control room '
operation that could indicate human factors concerns. The review l consisted of a review of the last five years of Licensee Event Reports (LERs). Items potentially related to control room human engineering problems were documented as HEOs. Note that the Program Plan had indicated that the OER would also include interviews with control room operating personnel. Because of resource constraints, that portion of the OER was not performed, NRC (NRR) concurred with this change in scope (Reference 10).
- 4. System Function and Task Analysis a) Backaround -- When the Boston Edison Detailed Control Room L Design Review began in early 1984, the symptom-based Emergency i i Operating Procedures (EOPs) had been drafted but not issued.
- Also, two additional E0Ps based on the Rev 4 BWR Owner's Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) had not been drafted. He committed to the NRC to perform System function .
and Task Analysis (SFTA) on the two additional E0Ps when they were issued (see Reference 1). The initial set of E0Ps was based upon revision 2 of the EPGs. In 1988-1989, the entire set of Pilgrim E0Ps was rewritten and reissued, including the two E0Ps not included in the 1984 SFTA. The E0Ps were upgraded to revision 4 of the EPGs, which are substantially different from the revision 2 guidelines. The changes in the E0Ps were extensive. Boston Edison deciJed to perform a new SFTA on the entire set of EOPs. The purpose of the SFTA was to determine tne action and information requirements and performance criteria for tte tasks that operators are required to accomplish under emergency conditions as defined by the PNPS E0Ps and their associated satellite procedures. (Analysis of operatcr tasks I l associated with normal, abnormal, and alarm procedures was excluded from this analysis, except where they led the L II-5
l operator into emergency procedures). These requirements and the performance criteria servcd as the benchmarks for l examination of the adequacy of control room equipment and , instrumentation during the verification and validation ] activities. b) SFTA Methodoloav Overview -- The SFTA methods and procedurcs established an objective, top-down approach to accomplish the following objectives:
- 1) Identification of the PNPS plant-specific systems used for response to emergency conditions,
- 11) Detailed development of operator information and control requirements from the function descriptions and emergency tasks.
Throughout the SFTA process, the emphasis was on identifying and analyzing opera'.or action and information requirements for those tasks performitd under emergency conditions. The identification of event sequences and operator functions, the performance of function analysis, operator task identification, and task analysis utilized expertise in systems engineering and analysis, human factors analysis, and plant operations. The process was conducted independent of instrumentation and controls utilized in the control room. Human factors experts from General Physics Corp, conducted all phases of the SFTA; with participation by BECo operating and engineering personnel where required. c) Identification of the PNPS Plant-Soetific Systems and Subsystems -- The identification of PNPS systems and subsystems required for response to emergencies has essentially been performed as part of the Procedure Generation Package for the PNPS Plant-Specific E0Ps. The PNPS E0Ps are based upon the Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BHROG) Eme*ger.cy Procedure Guidelines (EPGs), which were developed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, item I.C.1. Revision 4 of the EPGs have been submitted to and approved by the NRC. These generic EPGs have
. been made plant-specific by the preparation of the PNPS Plant-Specific Technical Guidelines (PSTGs) and appendices of 4 the E0Ps. These PSTGs served as the technical foundation for the development of the PNPS E0Ps. The development of the PSTGs included the substitution of plant-specific values for setpoints..' design limits, etc., in the generic guidelines.
The calculation of plant-specific limit curves and values was performed using the appropriate calculational methodology provided by Appendix C of the EPGs. Where the EPGs specify the systems to be used, the appropriate or equivalent PNPS systems were incorporated. l l II-6 l
I l d) Identification of the coerattna ey.g,tts to be analvred and l their translation into funct' omal recuirements -- BECo used 1 the PSTG as the function and system tia>it for conducting the SFTA. The E0P Procedure Generation Package, particularly the PSTGs and E0Ps, define the PNPS systems and system functions. The allocation of functions to associated plant systems, and needed operator and plant equipment actions are all demonstrated in the structure of the E0Ps. Since the SFTA requires that all of the emergency actions performed by control room operators be analyzed, the E0Ps were selected and used in determining the operators' informational and control needs during the SFTA process. Satellite procedures were also analyzed to the extent that they govern actions to be taken as , directed by the EOPs, e) Detahled develooment of ooerator information and control reaut rements from the function descriotions -- The initial step in the detailed development was to separate the functional requirements from the PSTGs, E0Ps, and satellite i procedures into specific tasks. This included all entry conditions, procedure steps, cautions and notes. All task identification information, including a description of the task itself, was recorded on the first page of a two page Task Analysis Horksheet (TAH). Then, the analysts determined the behavioral elements necessary to accomplish each task. This information was complied on " Element Tables" (also included on page 1 of the TAH). The element tables summarize the basis for the step, and data beneficial for determining the action and information requirements for each task, Included in these element tables are:
- Task initiation information requirements ,
- Task feedback information requirements
- Task decision requirements
- Task knowledge requirements
- Task action requirements
- Consequences of task error / omission Exhibit II-2 is an example of a Page 1 TAH that has " task '
identifier" information and " behavioral elements". The next step in the SFTA process was to generate a list of action and information requirements for each task specified above. Confirmatory or alternate indications and controls
+ hat might be needed to confirm the performance of operator ik steps were also annotated on the data sheet.
.The tasks and behavioral element data on page I were analyzed by a team composed of a human factors engineer, a BECo subject matter expert (licensed senior reactor operator) and a subject 11-7 l
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63AM DT & SL51A.T MtiveCimED. ABC1TV TO YLRFT A 3GAnd N/A N/A Nrff tN CDMTR(1, ANYT1hE DL'ENO $$4 l(/A LLtlW50 Ltd tt1 RAN!kOPL LA1TD VALYL 3 letk32b4L itW 43. lar'4Jp41 8 50004 FIAPDtb4ANQ QF IMk3DAs ANDHisdJhAlbli4T L193 Bf 00135.DT0 ALll'31THIT ALI Lin)D OPLM PtK)210 PLAlff $!ARTVP EXHIBIT II-2. EXAMPLE OF PAGE 1 0F TASK ANALYSIS WORKSHEET II-8 1
matter expert from General Physics (BWR certified) to identify the instrumentation and control requirements for each step. This table-top analysis was done independent of the control room. During this analysis the human factors engineer and the subject matter experts identified, within each procedure (sequence of tasks) and for each E0P step, the required instrumentation component and/or parameter, as well as the > relevant characteristics of the information needed. Informational characteristics for the instrumentation include parameters monitored, dynamic range, setpoints, precision (accuracy) at which the reading must be made (reflected in required scale increments), units, and the need for trending and alarming. Control characteristics include ttt type (discrete or continuous). If the type of control needed is discrete, then the control characteristics such as detent versus spring-loaded, momentary contact positioning, and position (open-closed, stop-start, on, of f, auto) are specified, as well as feedback information associated with control. This data was recorded in the initial columns of page 2 of the TAH (see Exhibit II-3). The procedure record number was also included for cross-reference to page 1. This information was tabulated and entered into a comprehensive database. This database, along with the control room inventory database, was used as input into the verification of task performance capabilities. This verification assessed the availability and suitability of instruments and equipment used by control room operators. In addition, the results of the SFTA was used to assist in selecting event sequences for analysis during the validation of control room functions.
- 5. famoarison of Disolav and Control Reauirements to Control Room Inventory The next phase utilized the products of the previous phases, namely the updated control room inventory and the database of operator information and control requirements. The comparison of requirements to actual control room features involves two steps, referred to as verification and validation.
- a. Verification of Task Performance -- The objective of this activity was to ensure the availability and suitability of required control room instrumentation and controls. As recommended by NUREG-0700, this activity was conducted in two parts: verification of availability, and verification of suitability. After completion of both the verification and validation activities, the problems identified were documented as Human Engineering Observations (HE0s).
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!!-10
i) Verification of Availability -- The verification of availability was done by camparing the operator ; information and control r<equirements identified during i the task analysis with tre control room inventory. The action and information requirements identified were analyzed to determine the essential characteristics of control room instrumentation and controls that are needed by the operators for acceptable task performance. This , comparison was performed on a component level, in order to verify the presence or absence of the required instruments and controls for each task analyzed during the SFTA. Foranyactionorinformationrequjrement where an appropriate instrument, control, or other device could not be found in the inventory, an HE0 was generated,
- 11) Verification of Suitability -- Verification of suitability involves the examination of the human j engineering characteristics of instrumentation and controls identified during the verification for -
availability. For this process, selected guidelines from NUREG-0700 and the criteria derived from the task analysis were used. Such aspects of component design as the adequacy of the display range, usability of displayed values, adequacy of the display range, usability of displayed values, adequacy of control type, adequacy and completeness of component labels, component location, and other characteristics which are unique to specific task sequences were considered. Any deviations from the established criteria were documented as HEOs. -
- b. Validation of Control Room Functions -- The objective of this activity was to determine if the functions allocated to the control room operating crew during emergencies can be accomplished effectively within the structure of the E0Ps and their satellites, and the present design of the control room.
Emphasis was placed on determining the adequacy of the control room design for supporting operator task sequences. In addition, the location of the required information and control characteristics was considered, with particular attention paid to the unique characteristics of specific accident sequences.
- E0P validation sequences were used, to ensure that all of
, e emergency tasks required by the E0Ps were examined, to ,
cover all of the systems in the E0Ps, and all the controls and ' displays used in the E0Ps. L The validation was conducted by observing operators walking through the E0P validation sequences on the PNPS plant-specific simulator. Two GP human factors engineers and a GP operations expert (BWR SRO certified) made up the observation team. The participants in the validation were briefed concerning the objectives of the validation process, 11-11 l
as well as initial plant conditions for the scenario being ; used. l The control room operators were observed as they performed each sequence. As they performed the sequence, the operators were prompted to describe their actions, and to be aware of I and comment on the following: , i the cues by which they initiate a task a) b) the sources and adequacy of information (instruments, l procedures, personal knowledge, etc.) ' c) the application of information, including any mental l conversions required, or uncertainties in the information i provided , d) controls selected and expected system response I e) methods for verifying system response and selection of 1 alternative actions if response is not obtained I f) indications that the sequence is proceeding as expected g) indications that the sequence is complete h) other comments as appropriate The observers recorded all relevant operator comments, as well as any observations that relate to the performance of the E0Ps or satellite procedures. They also recorded:
- 1) any difficulties the operators had in responding to the scenario .
- 2) the impact on' operator performance of any previously identified HEOs or HEDs
- 3) any additional discrepancies identified during this task '
Each scenario was videotaped for later review (as necessary) during the human factors evaluation of the validation activity. The operating crew was also interviewed and deiirlefed as a group to verify observations noted and to discuss the adequacy of the control room instrumentation and controls for managing the event. Comments on how the SPDS , could be used in supplementing other control room equipment L was also requested from the participating Shift Technical ' Advisor (STA). The results of the validation observations were analyzed to
-identify any problems with the control room layout, l obstructions to line of sight or operator movement, location i i
of instrumentation and controls, operator nrkload, or other human engineering concerns. These results helped assess the impact of previously identified HEOs and HEDs en actual operator performance. HEOs identified during the validation i process were recorded and assessed in the same manner as the l other HEOs. l 11-12
I C. RESULTS - NEH.E Q1
- 1. EQi I
As a result of the 1989-90 CRDR update effort described above, General Physics identified 226 new Human Engineering Observations . (HEOs). Table II-l shows the number of HEOs identified during each phase of ) the 1989-90 update effort. It should be noted that the NUREG-0700 survey was limited to the panels added to the DCRDR scope in 1989 (see Figure !!-1) plus ' panel devices known to have been replaced since the original survey in 1984. General Physics produced HE0 reports for each major data collection task (verification, validation, etc.). These reports are available in BECo files. All new HEOs were compiled and entered into an HE0 computer database for ease of tracking and sorting.
- 2. Initial Streenina Results -- New HEDs following the completion of the data collection effort, the DCRDR Design Review Team was convened and the screening process was conducted. The initial screening process reviews each HE0 and:
- Classifies the HE0 according to safety significance (categories A through D). Category A-C HEOs are considered ,
HEDs. Category D HEOs are not considered HEDs and were set i aside until they were considered for cumulative and interactive effects, discussed below.
- Places the accepted HEDs in implementation catego les (1 .
through 8).
- Identifies a recommended implementation priority. <
- Adds comments, notes, questions, or suggested co'rective actions as appropriate in each instance. ,
TheDesignReviewTeamalsodecidedwhichHEDswouldbesubjected to the detailed screening process. l The Design Review Team (DRT) included the following personnel: e one or more engineers (including the Principal Investigator) from the Eoston Edison Control Systems Division
!!-13 l.
1
T. TABLE 11-1. NEW HEOs IDENTIFIED IN 1989-90 CRDR EFFORT Quantity g Identified IlL011 22 1-22 SPDS Review 7 51-57 Historical Documentation Review 65 101-165 Verification 48 201-248 [ Validation. NUREG-0700 Survey of 84 301-384 Additional Panels 2 400,401 Design Review Team Heetings TOTAL 228
- Note: Two HEOs from Validation (#230 and #244) relate to SPDS issues.
K h _ 11-14
n e one or more engineers from the Boston Edison Systems and Safety Analysis Division
- an experienced nuclear plant operator from P11 grin. Station e one or more human factors experts from General Physics Corp.
Additional BECo engineering personnel participated in the discussions, as required for particular HEDs. The DRT screened the HEOs identified by General Physics and listed in Table 11-1 plus: l
- 51 HEOs previously identified by BECo but not previously screened, most of which were tabulated in Appendix B of Reference 2. These include 5 HEOs from the lighting survey.
l
- 2 HEOs resulting from the HVAC survey. l
- Several additional HEOs identified by either BEco or GP during the review team meetings or during related work. ,
As part of the DCRDR assessment process, individual HEOs were reconsidered due to cumulative or interactive effects of multiple HEOs (Reference #6). That is, the PNPS HEOs which were classified as non-significant (Category D) when evaluated by themselves were reconsidered as they might cumulatively affect other related HEOs. In doing this, the Category D HEOs were sorted by control room panel and the DRT reviewed these groupings for cumulative effects, for any cumulative effects, the team generated new HEDs that summarized the associated discrepancies. The results of the DRT's actions following initial screening are shown in Tables II-2, 11-3, and II-4. Table II-2 tabulates the new (and old) HEDs by safety category (A.B.C). Table II-3 summarizes the Category A (safety-significant) HEDs by implementation category. Each of the Category A HEDs is discussed individually in Section III. Table II-4 lists the new (and old) HEDs by implementation category. As'in the 1964 survey, the largest share of the new HEDs l (64 out of 164) will be addressed by surface enhancements (Category i 2). Category 8 is the new implementation category for the " EPIC" plant computer, which incorporates the SPDS function. - l' i Appendix B lists all of the HEDs. Table 11-5 defines all of the assessment (safety) and implementation categories. i
!!-15
T/BLE !!-2. HEDs By Safety Category Number of HEDs i Safety Cateaorv 1984* 1989-90 Total 1 A 8 7 15 B 120 84 204 : C _25 _Z2 __91 l Total, HEDs 153 164 317 l
*As originally defined in Reference 1. Some HEDs were later sub-divided. See Table 11-3 of Reference 2. l 11-16
. ~ _-
TABLE 11-3. Category A HEDs by Phase and Implementation Category Implementation Number of Cateaory A HEDs C11ggorv # Cateaory Namt Phase I* Phase II 19111 1 Annunciator 0 1 1 2 Surface Enhancements 4 0 4 j 3 Habitability 0 1 1 4 Equipment type 0 3 3 5 Equipment location 3 2 5 6 Potentially resolved 4 0 4 , 7 Non-engineering resolutions 0 0 0 8 EPIC computer-related lif6 Q _Q TOTAL 11** 7 18
- Status as of April 1989 Supplementary Summary Report to NRC (Reference 2).
Originally identified as 8 HEus; 3 were subdivided in 1987 re-screening. NOTE: Category A HEDs are those that are known to have caused or contributed to an operating error, or which have the potential to cause an error of high safety consequence. l 11-17
Table 11-4. Initial Screening Results Implementation Number of HEDs , Categorv # Caltgory Name (1984 Survey) (1989 Survev) 1g111 1 Annunciator 26 3 29 2 Surface Enhancements 69 61 133 3 Habitability 5 7 12 4 Equipment type 5 14 19 5 Equipment location 7 23 30 6 Potentially resolved 45 11 56 7 Non-engineering resolutions 16 29 45 8 EPIC computer-related KL6 _12 _13 TOTAL 173* 164 337
- NOTE: Some Phase I HEOs were split into 2 or more implementation categories; the original number of whole HEDs is 153.
s e 11-18
TABLE II-5. Category Definitions A. Assessment (Safety) Cateaories
- 1. Crtegory A - Human Engineering Deficiencies (HEDs) associated with t'ocumented or high potential errors with safety consequence. This includes HEDs which are known to have previously caused or contributed to an operating error as documented in a Licensee Event Report (LER) or other historical record, or as established by the interview responses of operations personnel, or which have the PMential to casse an error of high safety consequences.
- 2. Category B - HEDs associated with safety considerations. This includes HEDs which have been determined by documentation or by potential to be of low safety consequence or to cause ** unsafe condition. '
- 3. Category C - HEDs associated with availability or reliability considerations. This includes HEDs which have been determined to have potential for causing or contributing to human error that adversely affects the commercial aspect of electrical generating capabilities.
- 4. Category D - Human Engineering Observations (HEOs) that are minor or non-significant or that are not to be acted upon (with
, justification). This includes HEOs that have been evaluated and l- determined neither to increase the potential for causing or contributing to a human error nor to have adverse safety consequences. B. Imolementation Cateaories (for HEDs only)
- 1. Annunciator-related HEDs.
- 2. HEDs for correction by surface enhancements (paint / label / tape / meter scale), minor relocations of instruments, or switch improvements (handles, escutcheons, rewiring or replacement).
- 3. Control room habitability and environment-related HEDs.
l l 4. Hardware-related HEDs associated with a less-than-desirable choice of equipment type or manufacturer based on human factors concerns. (Example: improper shape or size of component.)
- 5. Hardware-related HEDs associated with a less-than-desirable location for the component relative to the operator's performance of normal or emergency procedure tasks using the component under review.
- 6. HEDs that are potentially resolved, pending verification.
! 7. HEDs with non-engineering (administrative or operations) disposition. (Example: operations procedure changes.)
- 8. HEDs related to the plant monitoring system computer (" EPIC"),
including the Safety Parameter Display System. II-19
- 3. Detailed Streenina
- a. Detailed Streenino Process -- This process provided a detailed analysis of selected HEDs, principally those in Category 4 (hardware type) and Category 5 (hardware location).
HEDs were chosen for the detailed analysis because of their potential cost, complexity, and disruption to the Control Room in the implementation of corrective actions, for the c+.her categories, detailed analysis and prioritiration is either unnecessary because corrective actions for the items are selected without the detailed analysis, or the type of HED is not suited to this type of analysis (e.g., no potential impar.t on plant safety or availability). Nineteen (19) of the new HEDs were subjected to the complete screening analysis. Forty-six (46) of the old HEDs had been reviewed by this , process, as reported in Reference 2. The de' ailed analysis was performed by the Design Review Team using the approved procedure (Reference 9). To guide the j team, the procedure includes forms and tables of HED rating criteria guidelines. Details of the process were provided in l the Program Plan, Reference 6. The impact of risk was determined through two types of ' contributions: (1) potential for the HED to affect operator performance during their response to a plant transient or accident, and (2) potential for the HED to contribute to the initiation of an event by affecting routine operator performance during plant power operation, startup, shutdown, cold shutdown, or refueling. Qualitative evaluations of the . relative significance of each HED are combined with quantitative information from representative probabilistic rit.k assessments (PRA) to evaluate the composite risk impact based on the frequency of possible operator errors and the consequences from those errors. The impact of averted cost (i.e., potential cost if not corrected) was determined through four types of contributions, including the potential for the HED to: (1) cause an inadvertent plant scram, (2) cause damage to plant equipment, (3) cause unanticipated extensions to scheduled plant outages and (4) affect the operators' ability to maintain conditions within the limits set by the plant Technical Specifications. The averted cost impact evaluation follows the same format as E the risk impact e 'uation. Qualitative evaluations of the ' relative significtx of each HED are combined with quantitative cost dan to evaluate the composite cost impact based on the frequency of possible operator errors and the consequences from those errors. 11-20 l
l l l l Performance of the detailed screening included four basic
-tasks:
- 1) Identify and summarize all relevant information -
i concerning the HED impact on the station operations l procedures (normal and emergency) that use the ' equipment. ii) Develop quantitative risk' impact indices for those HEDs that affect plant transient response or that-may contribute to the initiation of an event. , iii) Develop quantitative cost impact indices for those HEDs that affect any of the four cost elements identified earlier. i v') Rank the HEDs according to their risk and averttd cost impact indices. These indices provide the relative benefits resulting from the correction of the HEDs. Thus, the risk indices and the averted cost indices together preaide a basis for ranking the HEDs according to the benefit of correcting them,
- b. Detailed Screenino Results -- Table II-6 summarizes the results of the quantitative impact analyses, including the results (previously reported in Reference 2) of the analyses of the "old" HEDs.
?
s V gkE f i II-21
l h l TABLE 116 RggLnTS OF QUANTITATIVE IMPACT ANALYSES.1 UPDATED) RELATIVE BENEFIT SCORES QQQ1 HED No. QAl Q$ SUBJECT (See Aooendir B for Comolete DescriotioM B@f 139.70 2.80 SB195A 4 New Displays adequacy Panel C905 110.00 20.50 4B131- 4 Old Controls Direction of Movement 109.00 17.90 8A008B 5 Old Panet layout C7 not logical 0.00 New Display completeness of information Panet C7 83.31 5B216 5 New Panet layout lateral spread Panel C7 35.82 17.89 18163 5 71.20 0.00 5B196A 4 New Displays adequacy Panel C905 0.00 Now Controls valve position Indication Panel C903 62.77 SC090B 4 3.00 New Displays adaquacy Panet C903 62.70 5B188 4 New Displays grouping by importance Panel C905 57.73 15.04 4B213 5 K Old Control Room layout secessibility of equipment 0.60 1801 F 5 4.50 57.59 SA016 4 New. Displays adequacy Panel C905 0,00 30.23 4B200 4 New Controls status indication - Panet C903 28.00 7.50 58067 5 Old Displays completeness of information 1.50 readability 27.00 5B119 -4 Old - Displays 7.52 New' Controls & displays availability 23.71 4C066 5 0.00 New Displays adequacy Panel C903 11.77 5B175 4 10.23 0.00 BB211 5 N6w Panel layout not logicat Panel C904 9.20 0.00 4B148 5 New Panel layout functional arrangement C174/175 8.70 1.70 5' Old Panel layout CP600 not logicat BA007B Old Console dimensions display height 7.60 E 10005B 5 4.68 0.00 48191 5 New Controls availability 2.66 0.00 80095 5 New Panei layout assigning panel contents C1 1,56 2.00 SA015 4 New Displays ala .n needed 0.15 62.30 1 A011 ' 4 New Controls status indication Panel C915 0.10 0.40 BB101 5 Old . Panet layout sequence of use 0.00 1.99 80096 5 New Panel layout assigning panel contents C1 0.00 0.00 80214 5 New Panel layout not effective - Panel C904 0.00 0.00 4B051B 4 Old Controls direction of movement E 0.10
=
4B0608 4 Old Controls - unused equipment Old Contro!F adequacy M E 48115 4 Old Panel iayout clusters of components See 18005B 88094B 5 Notos:
' CAT
- means implementation category (defined in text).
Items are listed in order of ' risk
- score, except when related items are grouped.
*010' vs. *new' in O/N column refers to old ('84) or new ('90) HED. set and corresponding set of impact evaluations.
'NE' means HED was not subjected to NEDWI 344 quantitative analysis.
b For definitions of ' risk
- and 'mt ' see text or Reference 6.
9' Scores are on an crbitrary aw with no absolue meaning. Some analyses apply to othe kl.ss not listed here. E.g., analysis of HED 18163 is considered to apply to 1 A012 and othein involving panel C7 layout. This is an update of Table 11-3 in Reference 2. Category 1 HEDs are omitted from this table (four were analyzed see Reference 2). 1822 l l
.m O
SECTION III t L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS' A. INTRODUCTION This Section describes the planned corrective actions for the identified Human Enginee ing Discrepancies (HEDs). Most corrective actions are physical improvements, but others include procedure or process changes and training. Corrective actions fall into three broad groupings: (1) those already completed; (2) those previously committed (in Reference 2) for completion, some of which are completed and some not; and (3) those identified in this report for completion in the future. In all- cases, this report either identifies the planned corrective action or explains why no action will be taken (in the case of safety-significant HEDs). In the case of most of the actions newly identified in this report. conceptual designs have been established, and detailed design will proceed on the schedules shown in Section IV. In some int.tances, detailed design may reveal that the selected conceptual design-should be changed, or that the corrective action is impractical, undesirable, or unnecessary. Boston Edion will inform the NRC if major changes occur in our planned actions, but will not attempt to update this report for changes in plans regarding individual HEDs or other minor scope evolution. To a lar;' extent, HEDs are being addressed in groups according to the
" screening" categories previously described in Section II. Therefore the following text is organized according to the screening categories, following a discussion of Category A (safety-significant) HEDs from all categories. ,
-Table' 111-1 outlines the implementation status of the HEDs by category.
Section IV presents the schedules for the implementation programs. Note that this Section refers to "old" and "new"-HEDs. The new HEDs are those identified by the DCRDR Update effort conducted in 1989-90 and described in Section II, above. This Section wi11' emphasize the discussion of new HEDs and all HEDs for which corrective actions were not identified previously (in Reference 2).
-8. CATEGORY A HEOs Category-A HEDs are those that are known to have caused or contributed to an operating error, or which have the potential to cause an error of high i safety consequence. Table III-2 provides a cross-reference to the (
=l implementation categories for all the Category A HEDs, including both the old (1984) and new set.
l 111-1 l
'l l
m T, L k e 1 u9 A E9 L 1 E SNMF I 2N 9IT O T N9 EO ER X Xmo
)
e Xmo
)
e i S S vNLN ( ( uG M PI CI Y R m NSI O OER CDOF G E T A C Y Y A
;W B i uR ) ) ) S V
t iD tE e e e U C0N Xmo Xmo Xmo T A N5 J ( S S S T O1 E. N ( ( ( S C#cG I S l N E la 0 D n 1 T o A s T l ia N N t E O I e dn o M T AAY ) ri E e oa t TW NR EE X X Xmo S f t x m r o mt MD ( ef t n D F. N i E l t P e Z ele I L Ml Su A d e R sh E e s s c N or E u N po G L ) I OD I e r f u p1 F 1
- t. R CTE 1
D XX X Xmo X 1 1 WC A' E S wn 1 E m C OM N ( kio vt c r L B C ee vS A o T e o e r e f s s p d ao t y e t s
& n T l v al YN e t t n o s g d A RO m n e e n d OI T e c la e R ir es n m m es ze GP EI r
o a t n e g ip i p y en no S i i lao r TR t h n u u qn l ii D r ege AC ia c n mCei nAsh t E q Ei o l a gt nl u P CSE n E oViog t it n Eo S nt ea u l a - s / D v HNU t ec e Gc E D e ir e n n n no t ne C H n a n a aL o oR I P A P E P P P N E e t
- - - - - - o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 N 7
bL
+
t 0 l TABLE III-2 C61[ GORY A (SAFETY-SIGNIFICANT) HEDs IMPLEMENTATION HED NO. TITLE (Note 1)- CATEGORY (Note 2) l 4A003 Mode switch - no detent 6 5A004 Recorders not satisfactory 6 5A005 Reactor water level - zero not consistent 6
'5A009 Torus-water level - zero not consistent 2,6
'5A010 Drywell temperature - no indication by height 6 8A006 Panels need operator enhancement aids 2
'8A007 Panel CP600 not logically arranged 6 8A008 ' Panel C7 not logically arranged 2,5 3A014 Alarm horns too loud /not dist,nct 1 1A017 Need amargency lighting in watch engineer's office 3 1A011 RPS circuit breaL?r position unclear 4
'5A015 No alarm for drywell balk temperature 4 4
'5A016 Inconsistent reactor water level indications 1A012 RBIS switch positions confusing 5 .
1A013 Controls too. low on panel C7 . 5 80111 1)' See Appendix B for more complete description of HED.
- 2) Implementation categories are defined in Section II.
*~ HED for which no corrective action is planned, or whose corrective action will not completely resolve HED; see text for discussion.
III-3 i
l ; [ l The status of each of the Category A HEDs is as follows.
- 1. HED #4A003
- This HED related to the reactor mode switch, which had worn and no !
longer had positive detents. The mode switch was replaced with another of improved construction (SB-9 type vs. original SB-1) but with no change in appearance or function. This HED has been veritied and closed out.
- 2. HED #5A004 This HED concerned eleven (11) recorders with confusing scales and functional problems. ,
Of the total of eleven recorders on panels C170 and C171 3 covered by , the HED, seven were Hestinghouse recorders of conventional type (pen and paper, with a separate scale) and four were Texas Instruments thermographic type (thermal printer, no conventional scale). Additional problems were cited with "GE recorders ...[which) are difficult to read and of ten fall"; 25 recorders on five separate panels were involved (22 conventional, and three step-print types). All Hestinghouse and GE conventional recorders were replaced (total of 29 recorders) with Tracor Westronix " series E" recorders havirg a-scale for each active channel and felt-tip pens which cannot rip t3 paper. Three GE step-print multi-chan al types were replaced witn Leeds & Northrup "Speedomax" type recr ;rs. Of the four TI thermographic type, two were replaced m.th Hestronix type recorders for non-human factors reasons, and two remain installed as satisfactory.- This HED-has been veiified and closed out.
- 3. HED 5A005 This HED cites the differing zeros on the reactor water level
~
indicators.- As part of the Analog Trip System instrumentation - modification, all read-out instruments in the control room associated with Reactor Hater Level are now referenced to a common water level zero. In addition, red zones-have been added to those indicator scales which show top of active fuel and below. This HED has been verified and closed out. 4.- HED 5A009 This HED involves inconsistencies in torus water level instrument zeros. The discrepancy was-found during the previous SFTA effort. J' Two different instrument ranges-and six instruments are concerned. Four instruments are on panels C170/C171, one instrument is on C903, and one instrument is on C7. 3See Figure II-l for Panel Locations. III-4 q
y
- I n
An operator aid plaque was placed at panels C170/171, explaining the
' different ranges of water level in relation to the torus low point ,
and in relation to the torus downtomers. j The two distinct zero points are appropriate for the separate uses of the wide range and narrow range water level meters. The operations personnel are comfortable with the distinction and are not likely to i become confused because the conditions and numerical values differ markedly between the two sets of scales. 4
- 5. HED SA010 This HED was identified during the 1984 task analysis. It cites the discrepancy that E0P entry conditions require knowing the temperature of the drywell air both above and below the 40-foot elevation, but no temperature monitor distinguishes the temperature relative to the 40-foot point.
The E0Ps have been revised to use E0P bulk (average) temperature rather than at two separate elevations. (There is a new HED relating to the bulk temperature; see item #12 below.) This HED requires no further action and has been transferred to Category 6. Note that the original HED may have been in error, or was misinterpreted. The relevant temperatures are available at a multi-point recorder on panel C7.in the control room. The recorder was not clearly marked for those temperatures, however. The recorder labelling will be improved through the surface enhancements program, and its replacement will-be considered as part of the response to HED
#5A015.
- 6. HED 8A006 HED.8A006 involves the lack of' operator enhancement aids on four panels: CP600, C7, C170 and Cl?l. Panel CP600 has since received <
its enhancements. All panels are being enhanced as described in Section III.D.
- 7. HED 8A007 This HED deals with the arrangement of displays and controls on panel l' CP600 (augmented off-gas panel). After completion of the panel enhancements, including mimics and demarcations, b th operator-interviews and human factors review confirmed that no further action l is required. This HED was therefore moved to Category 6.
- 8. - HEDs 8A008 and 1 A013 These HEDs both refer to inadequate layout of panel C7. This panel is being redesigned and will be rebuilt or replaced. In the interim, enhancements will improved the panel's clarity.
III-5
- 9. HED 3A014 The 1989 sound survey found that some of the alarm annunciator horns were too loud, and others were not loud enough; and that the directionality of some horns was poor. Resolution of this HED will be included in the annunciator replacement project to be discussed in Section III.C.
- 10. HED 1A017-This HED identified the lack of emergency lighting in the Hatch Engineer's office. This will be corrected by the control room lighting improvements, previously identified and plann9d for 1991.
- 11. HED 1A0ll' i
This HE0 concerns a circuit breaker in the reactor protective system whose positions are difficult to identify with certainty. To avoid confusion, a modification will be implemented to better identify the status of the breakers.
- 12. HED 5A015 In the validation activity, it was found that there is no alarm for the E0P entry condition of excessive-drywell bulk temperature. The EPIC computer monitors drywell temperatures and provides an indication of bulk _ temperature, however. An existing system of
' temperature monitors may be modified to calculate the bulk temperature and alarm at the E0P entry condition, as part of the.
overall redesign of panel C7 (discussed in Section III.G). Otherwise, no corrective action is considered necessary for this HED.
- 13. - HED SA0lft
- Inconsistent reactor water level indications can result from various instruments, depending upon plant conditions. The planned action is to replace four of the meters with digital meters with greater precision..
While the digital meters will address concerns of readability and precision, they will not resolve the inconsistencies among indicators. Such inconsistencies are inherent in the reactor water level-system, because of the effects of varying coolant temperature and pressure on' indicated water level. Some instruments are calibrated for normal operating conditions and are used during normal power operation. Others are calibrated for startup or shutdown conditions when water temperatures and pressures are_ lower. The reasons for these differences and proper actions are addressed in training. The Operations Department has also~ addressed this concern by posting a " Standing Order" that provides guidance to operators regarding which instruments to use for each plant condition. This is a generic BHR design factor, not an item specific to Pilgrim. III-6
= _ - - - - _ - - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ____ -
1 14. HED #1A012 The RBIS channel A-control switch, mounted low on panel C7, was moved
- to the " test" position instead of the " Test logic" position, resulting in a Reactor Building Isolation and a standby gas treatment
- - system actuation. The intermediate solution is to improve the switch labeling and replace the switch escutcheon, to improve visibility.
(In addition, improved lighting in this area will reduce the risk of error.) The final solution will be to relocate this switch to a higher, more visible position as part of the effort to redesign the entire panel (see item #8, above). In summary, corrective actions are planned for the Category A z (safety-significant) HEDs as described above. No action will be taken on HEDs 5A009 or 5A015 because the conditions are considered acceptable as is. No action will be taken on HED SA010 because the E0Ps have been changed and no action is needed. No further action will be taken on BA007 because completed enhancements work has obviated the need for further work. Partial action will be taken on 5A016; complete resolution is not possible because of generic BWR design characteristics.
~
C. CATEGORY l -- ANNUNCIATOR-RELATED HEDI Category I-HEDs are-annunciator-related HEDs that have been identified for resolution or partial resolution within the Annunciator Design project. Twenty-six annunciator-related HEDs were identified in the DCRDR project work of 1984. Three additional annunciator-related HEDs were identified in the DCRDR update conducted in 1990. These 29 HEDs are summarized in
' Table III-3. Only one of these HEDs is a Category A HED.
BECo committed (in Reference 2) to conduct an annunciator conceptual design study. This study has produced recommendations for resolution or partial resolution of the Category 1 HEDs. These recommendations have-resulted in an annunciator. project that will replace the current annunciator system. The project is scheduled for installation to begin
-during RF0 #9.- Based upon the conceptual design study, we expect that the new system will include the following key features (detailed design will
. finalize these features):
e New annunciator panels that will provide larger annunciator windows that will enhance. readability with improveu engraving. e New lightboxes that will increase the number of windows by 25%, accommodating the need for increased alarm capacity, e A distinct audible signal for ringback that will allow for cleared 5- alarms having a~ different audible tone from incoming alarms, e A silence feature that will allow for silencing the audible signal while allowing the annunciator window to continue flashing. (Text continues on page 111-11) m III-7
-r TABLE III-3 CATEGORY 1--ANNUNCIATOR-RELATED HEDs HED Number Summary Descriotion 1B005 The lamp cabinets are mounted too high l and therefore cause reading difficulties.
30023 The lamp cabinets need to accommodate new alarms to provide information that ! is currently obtained by an auxiliary-operator in response to a general trouble alarm. 3B024' The lamp cabinets need to accommodate
-new alarms created by splitting multi-parameter alarms currently displayed on common windows.
3B025 First-out alarm sequencing needs to be provided-for the reactor system and turbine-generator system alarms. 38027 Cleared alarms should have a distinctly different audible signal (ringback). , 3B037 Alarm windows should address specific conditions, not multiple parameters, and alarms which refer the operator to ' another panel located outside the primary operating area should be minimized. 3B038 Window? tiles should be of sufficient size to accommodate-letter heights that
< are easily viewed from the annunciator ?
y response switch.. h 58066 Graphic recorders should'be relocated L 1 to primary operating area. (This HE0 u is included because it affects the number of annunciator windows.) r ESR 88-824' The annunciator system should provide the ability to silence the horn before= acknowledging the alarm. (Table Continues on Next Page)
- Requests from Plant Department to be included in the new design of the annunciator system.
III-8
= ._ _ _ _ _ _ :_ _ _ _ _
TABLE III-3 (CONTINUED) 3B026 The annunciator windows should be prioritized so that the operators can differentiate the most important alarms from the least important alarms. 3B028 Some annunciator windows should be relocated to above the related controls or displays required for the corrective action. 3B029 Individual annunciator panels need to be labeled. 3B030 The existing annunciator lamp cabinets need to be repaired so that they no longer have the potential to shock personnel.
'38031 The contrast between annunciator windows should be high enough so that the operators can differentiate among alarming, steady on, and non-illuminated windows.
'38032 Annunciator windows should all be non-illuminated under normal operating conditions (" dark board" concept).
3B033 Vertical and horizontal axes of the annunciator panels should be labeled for unique. identification of individual annunciator windows. 3B034 Two light cabinets-(C905 Left and Right) exceed the recommended matrix density of 50 windows (each has 63). 3B035 Annunciator windows should be logically grouped'to facilitate pattern recognition which can help in diagnosing and mitigating problems 3B036 & 3C042** Annunciator window engravings should be consistent and unambiguous. 3B039 Annunciator window engravings should be simple, consistent and only upper-case. (Table Continues on Next Page)
**HEDs identified in 1989-90 DCRDR work.
III-9 i
TABLE III-3 (CONTINUED) Annunciator window lettering should be 3B040 black characters and engraved on a
.* light background.
3B043 The annunciator control stations should all have the same arrangement and relative location, and should be coded by color, shape or demarcation. 4
' Unused engraved annunciator windows 38044 should be replaced with blank windows.
3B045 The audible annunciator alarm volumes. need to be adjusted. 3B047 Provide an audible annunciator alarm at each workstation so that the operators-can identify the system or workstation where tha alarm originated. The Post Accident Monitoring Panel 2C010 audible alarm and audible fire alarm need to be adjustea or replaced so that they no longer cause discomfort to the operators. Annunciator windows with multiple alarm 3C012 inputs need a reflash capability. Annunciator power supply failure ESR 87-465* problems need to be resolved.' A reflash feature or separate windows ESR 88-550* should be added for the diesel generator starting circuit alarm. ESR 89-587* A control room annunciator dark board concept should be adopted. Annunciator horns should vary in sound 3A014** or volume to increase horn discrimination. 6B180** Instrument Bus Power Failure Annunciator alarms should be added in the control room.
- Requests from Plant Department to be included in the new design of the annunciator system.
*HEDs identified in 1989-90 DCRDR work.
111-10
x-1 l
- Improved grouping of annunciator windows so that the windows are co-located with associated controls and displays. J Q
- Annunciator window prioritization through hierarchical positioning.
- A " dark board" concept which means windows will not be illuminated I under normal operating conditions.
- New engraved windows that will allow for consistent presentation of ,
I information, nomenclature, abbreviations and engraving standards.
- A "reflash" capability which will allow two or more abnormal process 4,. conditions to initiate or re-initiate the alarm state of one alarm point at a time, j
- The' capability to separate multiple-input windows where necessary.
- A reduction in annunciator lamp shock hazard and power supply failure. .
' e -
Additional annunciator control stations allowing for the closer proximity of the windows to the separate control stations. D. CATEGORY __2 -- CONTROL PANEL ENHANCEMENT HED1 The Category 2 HEDs represent the bulk of the HEDs for which corrective actions have been identified. These HEDs will be resolved or partially resolved in several Control Pane 1~ Enhancement projects. These projects
' include the'following:
B e Control room standards
*. Enhancements--Improved labels, Jemarcations, meter scales, recorder scales, mimics 1
- Minor. relocations-e Removal of abandoned equipment
- Switch enhancements--improved handles and escutcheons
- Switch modifications and replacements
- Electrical distribution panel enhancements
- Communication improvements Sixty-nine (69) Category 2 HEDs were identified in the DCRDR project work-of 1984. Sixty-four (64) additional Category 2 HEDs were identified in the DCRDR update conducted in 1990. Each of the Enhancement projects and the status of the Enhancement projects described in the Supplementary Summary Report (Reference 2) are discussed below: >
- 1. Control room standards develooment Control room standards have These been drafted human and used factors for the control engineering panel enhancements program.
standards will be finalized and used as' guidelines for future related control panel design changes. l 111-11 L
Standards drafted to date and in trial use are: a). Control Panel Labels and Nameplates I b). Control Panel Demarcation c). Instrument Scales d). Abbreviations & Acronyms (PNPS Procedure 1.3.4-2) e). Control Panel Himics He will also prepare a standard for control panel switch applications, as part of the effort to resolve various switch-related HEDs. He will consider issuance of additional standards as work-proceeds either to document the work or to resolve design issues that may arise. Potential topics for standards include: a), control panel painting I b). control. room lighting c), annunciator window engraving d), color usage >
- Hork on the control room standards is currently ongoing. Revisions to current draft standards have been required as a result of necessary changes that were identified during the implementation of the coatrol panel demarcation. For example, it became necessary for BECo to reconsider the colors used for the control panel demarcation as a result of operator comments and the control room lighting.
- 2. Enhancements
" Enhancements" include improvements generally thought of as " paint, label or tape" plus meter / recorder scale improvements, and resolution of certain HEDs that do not require major panel rework. .
a). Labels. Mimics and Demarcation - The 30 original HEDs assigned to-labels, nameplates. mimics and demarcation are as follows. (Note - these HEDs were identified in the 1984'DCRDR efforts.) HED No. TITLE 1 8A006- Panel layout - enhancements 8A007A Panel CP-600 not logically arranged 8A008A Panel C-7 not logically arranged 4B056 Controls - legend pushbuttons/ displays 48126 Labels - Completeness of information 5B066B Displays - missing labels L 6B072 Need for. labels D 6B073 Hierarchical label scheme 6B074 Label placement. 68075 Label placement 6B076 Label consistency 6B077 Label brevity L: 68078 Label functional groups 68080 Label readability - letter height 6B081 Label readability - contrast (list continues on next page) III-12
Labels. Mimics. Demarcations HEDs. Continued 6B082 Temporary labels 6B084 Demarcation - methods 6B085 Color coding - general 6B087 Color contrast - mimics 6B088 Use of mimics 6B090 Labels - consistency with procedures 6B091 Labels - clarity 68092 Missing labels 6B121 Labels - system function 6B125 Labels - internal consistency Panel layout - clustirs of components 8B094A BB095 Demarcation - groups of components 8B099 Demarcation - spacing / separation 8B100 Demarcation - emergen:y controls 1C005 Labels - shadowing Twenty-three (23) additional HEDs wera identified in the 1990 DCRDR efforts. These HEDs, also assit,ned to the labels, m-nameplates, mimics and demarcation pro;,ect, are as follows.
, g TITLE 6B150 Hierarchical label scheme - Panel C174, C175 6B151 Label placement - Panel Cl?4, C175 6B152 Label readability - Panel C174 Cl?5 6B153 Label content / consistency - Panel C174, C175 6B154 Label content - Panel C174 6B155 Label colors - Panel C174, C175 6B156 Label colors - Panel C174, C175 8B174 Demarcation - emergency indicators 6B176- Label content - Panel C7 6B177 Himic improvements - Panel C7 6B205 Location aids - demarcation - Panel C7 88215 Panel layout - demarcation - Panel C904 6C030 Label readability - Panel C220, C221 8C031A Strings of similar components - Panel C220, C221 9C032 Associated controls & displays - Panel C220, C221 6C038 Label placement - Panel C174, C175 6C040- Label readability - Panel C114 C115 6C043 Label readability . Panel C921 6C044 Label placement - Panel C921 4C068 Demarcation - Emergency controls - Panel C7 6C073 Labels - content - Panel C904:
SC090A Need for labels - Panel C903 6C093 Label content - Panel C1 These HEDs are being addressed by an integrated design of panel enhancements, incorporating new labels, area-type demarcations, and improved or additional mimics. Designs are based upon the control room standards for labels, demarcation, scales, 111-13
l l l I l l abbreviations and acronyms and mimics (as described above). The j enhancement design for each panel will be evaluated in part by , installation of the design in the simulator.Once the ' enhancements are applied to a simulator panel, operating crews are asked to review and comment on the improvements. The enhancements are revised as needed and may be reviewed again. When the design is finalized. the enhancement will be applied to the corresponding panel in the PNPS control room. Three panels in the main control room (CP600, C1 and C2) and five panels in the. simulator had received enhancements by mid-November, 1990. As part of the surface enhancements project, we will appropriately identify instruments and indicators as required by Regulatory Guide 1.97. Details of the label, demarcation and mimic enhancement project are as follows, 1.) Labels A' label standard has been draf ted and a complete new set of labels has been designed for the control room (original
' defined scope). He are resolving operator comments on the ,
entire set of labels. New labels are being installed at the PNPS simulator for review prior to their installation in the control room. . The new labels are based on a hierarchical scheme recommended by NUREG-0700 guidelines and various human factors engineering texts. There will be three types of labelling in the control room: hierarchical system / component labels; operator.information labels; q W operator warning labels.' Additional small-designators (made from label stock) will be used to identify those instruments associated with Regulatory Guide 1.97 and to identify'certain isolation valves. All labels have their character height scaled so that they are visible from the proper viewing distance. The system / component labels are- , v almond color with black characters; the information' labels are agua with black characters; the warning labels are yellow with black characters. All characters are engraved
.to present the most visible appearance. The type font chosen for all labels is "Helvetica".
11.) Demarcation v Demarcation involves use of color shaded areas on the
, control panel faces to designate areas of importance and to identify relationships among components. As many as six
, shades of color will be used. -A seventh color is the - ) " base", or panel, color. III-14 i l
By judiciously varying the extent and shading of the colored areas (" patches"), we can show which controls / instruments are related to others when panel I arrangements do not readily identify the relationships. In l addition, where groups of devices are related to a specific i function, all devices are located on a single color. < Particular areas can be made to stand out on the panel by i using darker shades, and other areas recede into the , I background by using lighter shades. At PNPS, demarcation by the color patch method is intended to accomplish the following:
- Functional grouping of components by task sequence. l e Functional grouping of components by system functioa.
- Functional grouping of components by importance and/or frequency of use.
Design of the PNPS demarcation is currently being re-evaluated. He are re-evaluating the colors that were originally identified as background / base colors because these colors are not distinctive enough under the existing control room lighting. He are considering the following alternatives for demarcation, e Change demarcation colors to beige tones and implement demarcation after the control panels are painted an almond beige. (The control panels are currently green.) Repainting is being planned for the 1991 refueling outage (RF0 #8). ,
.- Eliminate one or two levels of demarcation which will demarcate the panels at the system levels only, iii.) Mimics In selected areas where mimics would be both helpful and ,
feasible, mimics will be applied,to the panels. Mimics will consist of colored plastic strips affixed to.the panels. Himic beginning and end points will be-identified with either component labels or mimic'"end point" labels. Color of mimic labels will be the standard almond color, not the color of the mimic material, b). Instrument Scales - HEDs involving instrument scales are as follows (9 HEDs). (Note - these HEDs were identified in the 1984 DCRDR efforts.) HED No. TITLE 5B061 Usability of displayed values - conversion 5B062 Visual displays - contrast 58063 Visual displays - parameter scales (list continues on next page) III-15
l I Instrument Scales HEDs. Continued 5B064 Visual displays - unit graduations 5B111 Visual displays - zone markings SC016A Visual displays - scale selection SC0lPA Visual displays - quality of information displayed SCO22 Visual displays - scale graduations Eighteen (18) additional instrument scale HEOs were identified in the 1990 DCRDR efforts. These HEDs are as follows.- HED No. TITLE 5B160 Recorder scales - scale graduations - Panel C903 58161 Meter scales - scale graduations - Panel C903 5B162 Recorder scales - scale graduations - Panel C905 5B167 Meter scales - scale-graduations - Panel C170, C171 L Recorder scales - scale graduations - Panel C170, l 5B168 1 C171 5B178 Recorder scale labels - Panel C171 5B192 Meter scales - zone coding - Panel C903 58194 Meter scales - zone coding - Panel C910 l- Meter scales - scale graduations - Panel C903 L SB208 SC048 Recorder scales - scale graduations - Panel C904 L ! SC049 Recorder scales - scale graduations - Panel C1 1C060- Recorder scales - zone coding - Panel C1 SC061 Recorder scales - scale graduations - Panel C2. SC065 Recorder scales - scale graduations - Panel CP600 L Recorder scale - scale graduations - Panel C2 L SC070 SC076 Meter scales -~ zone coding - Panel C3 SC078 Recorder scale - scale graduations - Panel C2 E Meter scales - zone coding - Panel C1. SC081 ll A plant design change (PDC) will be issued to replace all instrument scales with human engineering discrepancies that can bt resolved by replacement of the scale alone. Approximately 70 meter and recorder scales will be replaced with new scales that b meet the PNPS instrument scale standard. Colored zones will be added in the future, if applicable. Please note that several meter scales are too small for proper visibility due to the size or placement of'the meter (e.g., HED
#5B119) and are therefore addressed in Category 4.
- 3. Minor Relocations L
Ten (10) HEDs identified in the 1984 DCRDR efforts have been assigned to a group called " minor relocations". These HEDs generally involve i movement of components on a single panel. Many components are in I clusters where the arrangement of the cluster does not meet human factors considerations, but resolution can-be accomplished by L. l re-arranging the cluster. Conceptual design of resolutions is in III-16
Minor Relocations HEDs. Continued j w progress. If design work shows that any of the corrective actions is not appropriate under the enhancement program (i.e., if the panel I needs significant rearrangement), the HED will be reconsidered for possible assignment to Category 5, or for resolution by other means. The HEDs are as follows: HED No. TITLE
-4B051A Controls - violations of population stereotype 4B057 Controls - barriJrs 8B097A Mirror imaging 88098 Functional grorping 8B103 Logical arranpament ,
8B105 Sequence of v4e 8B122 Layout consistency t- 9B106A Movement relationships 98107A Control / display relationship. 98109A~ Control /dlsplay proximity HED #4B057 is listed in this group but will be reconsidered. The HED cites the lack of barriers between the ptshbuttons in the control rod selection array on the benchboard sectica of Panel C905. Further review indicates that installation of a barrier would probably require re-spacing the switches, which would be a major modification. .No problems were observed with use of this array lduring the validation activity. Furthermore, discussion with the-Operations Section indicates that current operating practice is for a second operator to verify each rod selection step, minimizing the risk of error. Therefore there seems to be no need for a major revision of this panel lay ~ t. HED 48057 will be referred to the DRT for reconsideration of the appropriate corrective action. Three (3) additional HEDs identified in the 1990 efforts have been r designated for minor relocations. The HEDs are as follows: HED No. TITLE 16159 Recorders too high - Panel C902 88185 Functional grouping.- Panel C171 8B204 Functional grouping - Panel C1 Design work for the rearrangement of recorders identified in HED 18159 and the rearrangement of components identified in HED 88185 has-begun. Refer to Section IV for discussion on the implementation schedules.
'The evaluation of HED 88204 assessed the relocation of a compartment ,
door open indicator light to the vertical section of the panel. The i indicator light is currently located on the bench board. It was ., determined that this light is unnecessary. Therefore the indicator light will remain in its current location for now, and it will be considered for abandonment and removal. III-17
t i
, 4.- Removal of Abandoned Eauiement Certain panel devices no longer needed are being removed, to eliminate visual clutter and to provide free space. The three (3)
HEDs in this group, which were identified in the 1984 DCRDR efforts, are as follows: HED No. TITLE 4B060A Equipment not connected or used 58071 Equipment not connected or used 5B124 Equipment not connected or used One additional HED was identified in the 1990 DCRDR efforts. HED Noi TITLE 4C091 Unnecessary equipment - Panel C905 Items cited in the HEDs, plus other known to be abandoned, will be removed from the panels during the enhancements program. (Three of four. panels have been completed as of November 1990.) 4
- 5. Switch Enhancements Switch enhancements HEDs are those related to switch applications but that do not require replacement or rewiring of switches. Seven (7) such HEDs were identified in the 1984 DCRDR efforts.
HED No. lITLE 4B048 Controls - human suitability 48049 Controls - covers or guards
. 48052 Controls - consistency 4B054- Controls - shape coding 4B055 Controls - color coding 48058 Controls.- position.. indication 6B120 Controls - illegible escutcheons Twelve (12) additional HEDs were identified in the 1990 DCRDR effort that require switch enhancements. These HEDs are as follows: i HED No. TITLE ,
68189 Controls - position indications - Panel C905 l 68197 Escutcheons not legible - Panel C3 4B206 Controls - covers or guards'- Panel C903, C904 l 6C072 Escutcheons - position indications - Panel C10 6C074 Controls-- position indications - Panel Cl 6C075 Escutcheons - not legible - Panel C3 6C077 Escutcheons - position indications - Panel C3 6C079 Controls - position indications - Panel C2 6C082 Control - position indication - Panel C904 6C083 Control - position indication'- Panel Cl 6C085 Escutcheons - position indications -' Panel C3 4C089 Control - position indication - Panel C1 III-18
9 These switch enhancement HEDs will be resolved by: (1) handle shape / color coding; (2) escutcheon engraving; (3) engraving of switch , positions not previously identified (e.g., NORMAL, AUTO, etc.); (4) improved means to prevent inadvertent actuation. Approximately 300 switches will be affected. Included in the resolution of this group of HEDs is preparation of a standard for application of switches and associated devices in the PNPS control room. Refer to Section IV for implementation schedules.
- 6. Switch Modificationi Three (3) HEDs related to more complex problems, which require ,
replacement and/or re-wiring of switches, were identified in the 1984 - work and are as follows: HED No. TITLE 4B051B Controls - direction of movement 4Bil5A Controls adequacy 4B131 Controls - direction of movement
'Three (3) additional HEDs were identified in the 1990 DCRDR efforts.
HED No. TITLE 4B149 Controls - direction of mcVemanc - Panels Cl?4 & C175 4C037 Key-operated switches - key orientation conventions - Panels C174, C175 l 4C046 Key-operated switches - key orientation L convention - Panel C903. Approximately 150 switches will be affected by resolving the HEDs in this group. Included.in this group are HEDs related to switch rotation, switch position sequencing, multiple switches with !
-identical positions but' differing arrangements, and mis-application ;
i I. of switch types. Most switches in this group will be replaced or-re-wired to resolve the HEDs. The switch applications standard L l mentioned earlier will be used as-basis for purchases of new switches. The evaluation of HEDs 4C037 and 4C046 assessed the modifications of key-operated switches in order to follow the " teeth up" conventions. for key insertion. It was determined that the switches would have to be replaced and a modification of the current switches-was not possible. Replacement of the key-operated switches was determined to-be unnecessary. The switch specification will be modified to establish a PNPS convention for all key-operated switches, for future switch installations or replacements. 111-19 i
HED # 6.4.024, previously included in this group (now defined as HED 4B217), has been determined not to require action.
- 7. Electrical Systems Panel Enhancements The six (6) Electrical Systems Panel (C3) HEDs, identified in 1984, are as follows:
HED No. TITLE 4B050 Controls - covers or guards 4B053 Controls - mirror imaging 58062 Visual displays - contrast of scales 5B069 Visual displays - consistency 6B086 Himics - color discrimination 6B089 Visual displays - internal consistency Resolving this group of HEDs will involve techniques to prevent inadvertent actuation, color coding of indicator lamps, re-arrangement of certain panel components, replacement of mimics, and replacement of several meters. Criteria and techniques are 1 consistent with other elements of the enhancements program, but tailored to this particular panel.
- 8. Communication Imorovements Two HEDs-identified-in the 1990 DCRDR efforts are designated as communication improvements.
HED No. TITLE 2B179 Communication link needed between Supervisors' Station and Panel C7 20071 Page phone controls - inconvenient , locations Fe will address the need for a direct communication link by installation of a Gai-Tronics paging / intercom station-at or near Panel C7. Replacing the control room page phones with a model that has controls located on the handsets is also planned. Refer to Section IV for implementation schedules. E. CATEGORY 3--HABITABILITY-RELATED HEDs Category 3 HEDs are those related to ambient ,ighting,-sound (noise), heating / ventilation / air conditioning, and architectural design. One Category A HED is- in this group, related to lighting.
- 1. Liahtina Two HEDs related to' lighting were identified in the 1984 survey as follows:
III-20
HED No. TITLE __ , s 18012 Illumination - levels and uniformity 18013 Illumination - glare and reflectance , The 1988 lighting survey, reported in the April 1989 Supplementary Summary Report (Reference 2), identified five HEOs. In the 1990
' Design Review Team meetings, the HE0s were designated as six new HEDs including one Category A (safety-significant) HED. These HEDs are as ,
follows: HED No. TITLE lA017 Emergency lighting needed in Hatch Engineer's Ciftce 18221: Insufficient illumination level, vertical panels 18222 Variations in area light levels - 18223 Insufficient emergency illumination levels IC105 Variations in lighting levels " 1C106 Lighting levels -- shadowing The control room lighting will be modified to resolve these HEDs. This modification will add ceiling light fixtures and dimming features to the PNPS Control Room to increase the intensity _and uniformity of illumination. The lighting modification will be designed to increase normal AC lighting levels to achieve a minimum of 20 foot-candles except ' v operator stations where a minimum of 50 foot-candles is designe + be maintained during normal operation. During emergency opera: m the emergency AC lighting leveJs will be designed to maintain a minimum of ten (10) foot-candles'in operating areas. These minimum illumination values are maintained average foot-candles within the i task areas of the panels. > Upon completion of this modification the lighting in the PNPS Control Room will be consistent with the guidance requirements of NUREG-0700,-
- 2. Control Room Noise
' HED 18014, identified in the 1984 DCRDR effort, is related to control room noise. One major noise source is the existing (old) computer , system peripherals. No action was taken on this HED because the existing computer devices are scheduled to be removed and replaced with different devices related to the new, EPIC computer system.
A new noise survey was taken in 1989 as part of the DCRDR effort. No additional- noise-related HEDs were identifled. < l l l , l III-21
- 3. Heatina/ Ventilation / Air Conditionina Previously-reported HEDs relating to heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) are as follows:
HED No. TITLE 18011 HVAC - insuf ficient fresh air quantity 0B123 HVAC - static electricity from low humidity HED '1B011 has been determined to be resolved by maintenance performed on the HVAC in 1990. HED OB123 relates to the effects of static electricity (during dry winter weather) on instruments. There have been no reports of this problem recurring since the control room carpet was replaced with a
. lower-static carpet in 1987. The HED is considered resolved. .
In 1990, an effort was undertaken to improve operation of the control
-room HVAC. Several maintenance tasks were performed and one modification was installed, the effects of which were to substantially improve air flow and air conditioning performance, following that, a new survey was performed of the air temperatures, humidity, and air flows, in accordance with Section 6.1.5 of NUREG-0700. No HEDs were identified from that survey.
-4. Architectural Item In the 1989-90 DCRDR ef fort,' HED 18147 was identified, which relates to a control panel access door that represents a potential personnel hazard. The Design Review Team suggested that the door be removed.
Recently, however, the Plant Department has raised objections to removal of the door. Nuclear Engineering and Operations will investigate the alternatives and determine what action to take. F. CATEGORY 4 -- HEDs RELATED TO HARDWARE TYPE
. Category 4 HEDs are HEDs associated with a less-than desirable choice of equipment type or manufacturer based on human factoss concerns.' These HEDs will be resolved or partially resolved in several hardware-related ,
projects. The five (5) HEDs identified in the 1984 DCRDR. effort have been resolved or are in-the process of being-resolved. These HEDs are as follows. HED No. TITLE 4B051B Controls - direction of movement
-4B060B Controls - unused equipment 4811SA Controls - adequacy 4B131 Controls - direction of movement 5B119 Display - readability III-22
As discussed in Section 111.0 HED # 4B060B is complete. above. HE0 #_481 Two components enhancements program. identified in the HEDs were determined to be active and removed. Twelve (12) additional HEDs were identified in the 1990 ' These HEDs are as follows. TITLE HED No, 1A011' _ Controls - status indication - Panel C915 Displays - alarm needed 5A015 Displays - adequacy - Panel C905 SA016 Displays - adequacy - Panel C903 5B175 Displays - adequacy Panel C903 5B188 Displays - adequacy Panel C905 5B195A Displays - adequacy - Panel C905 5B196A Panel C905 58202 Displays - adequacy dication - Panel C903 4B209 Controls - status in 4E21C Controls - status indication - Panel C904 Con 5C090B 3C097 Displays - rewire alarms - Panel C904 Control OC099 B The Category A HEDs (1A0ll, 5A015, 5A016) are dis:ussed in Sec several hardware-related projects. These proje above. Replacing conventional analog meters with combined analog displays to-allow better resolution of displayed parameters.
. A redesign of Panel C7.
An improved indication of-the status of the RPS power bus break e Improvements in valve position indications, o Providing a drywell bulk temperature indication, e Improvements in the conductivity alarms for demineralizer outl conductivity. Please refer The projects outlined above are in various stages of design.Also, refer to to Section IV for implementation schedules.a preliminary G. CATEGORY 5--HEDs RELATED TO E001PMENT LOCATIOM Category 5 HEDs are HEDs associated with a less-than-desir for the component relative to the operator's performance These HEDs of norma emergency procedure tasks using the component under tion review. will be resolved or partially resolved in several equipment reloca i projects, I III-23 i l l
o Eight HEDs that_ required the relocation or rearrangement of multiple devices were identified in the 1984 DCRDR efforts. These HEDs are as follows. HED No. TITLE 5A010 Drywell temperature - no indication by height 18005B Console dimensions - display height r 18015 Control. room layout - accessibility of equipment 5B067' Control room layout - accessibility of equipment 8A007B Panel layout - CP600 not logical 8A0088 Panel layout - C7 not Icgical 8B094B Panel layout - clusters of components 8B101 Panel layout - sequence of use The status of the Category A HEDs (8A007B, BA008B and 5A010) is discussed L in Section III.A of this report. Design work for the switch relocations l identified in HED 58067 and the design work to install scram valve po ition indication and MSIV logic _ indications (HED 18015'and 4B213) has L begun. Refer to Section IV of this report for the implementation schedules. The evaluation of HED 8B0948 assessed the relocation of a matrix of indicator lights on Panel C904. Relocation of these indicators was determined to be infeasible. The indicators can benefit from demarcation and have been incorporated into the labeling and demarcation project for Panel C904 (described earlier). The evaluation of HED 18005 assessed the relocation of annunciators and indicator lights that were located more than 80 inches above the floor. The height of the annunciators is being addressed 'in the annunciator project with the propoud improved annunciator tiles that are easier to read. Relocatico of th9 indicator lights was determined to be infeasible. These indicator lights, which !
-include the indicator lights on' Panel C904, will benefit from improved l labeling / demarcation and have been incorporated into the labeling and demarcation projects for each panel, HED 8B101 addresses the sequence of use for RHR controls that are located r
on Panel C903 and Panel Cl. The validation conducted in 1990 determined that, even with minimum shift complement, the sequence of operation for the RHR controls was not a problem.= Therefore, no further action is required for this HED._ It should be noted that the RHR controls will receive improved labels and demarcation within the labeling and demarcation projects for Panels C903 and Cl. Twenty-three=(23) additional Category 5 HEDs were identified in the 1990 DCRDR efforts. The HEDs are as follows. HED No. TITLE 1A012 Control - incorrect operation - Panel C7 1A013 Controls - too low on Panel C7 (list continues on next page) 111-24
t Additional Cateaorv 5 HEDs. Continued 4B148 Panel layout - functional arrangement - Panel C174, C175 BB157 Panel layout - not logical . Panel Cl?4, Cl?5 98158 Panel layout - control /disr.ay association - Panel Cl?4, C175 18163 Panel layout - lateral spread - Panel C7 18164 Controls - too low and too high on Panel C7 1B165 Displays - too low on Panel C7 4B191 Controls - availability 88211 Panel layout - not logical - Panel C904 4B213 Control Room layout - accessibility of equipment 8B214 Panel layout - not effective - Panel C904 58216 Display - completeness of information - Panel C7 8B218 Panel layout - not effective - Panel C904 8C031B Strings of similar components - Panel C220, C221 1C063 Controls - too high on Panel C7 1C064 Controls - too low on Panel CP600
-4C066 Control Room layout - accessibility of equipment
-SC088 Displays -- unnecessary information - Panel C1 8C095 Panel layout - assigning panel contents - Panel Cl BC096 Panel layout -~ assigning panel contents -- Panel C1
-9C098 Panel layout - control / display association -
Panel C1 SC104 Display availability The status'of the Category A HEDs (IA012 and 1A013) is discussed in Section IIIA of this report. A large number of HEOs were written against Panel C7. Twelve HEDS were
. identified in the 1984 DCROR. . Two of those HEDs were Category 5 (equipment relocation) HEDs. He decided to delay the correction of any Panel C7 HEDs until the SFTA upgrade was complete. The~1990 SFTA and surveys identified'another 17 HEOs on the panel, including 7 in Category
- 5. Because of the.significant number of HEDs and their seriousness we have decided.to replace or, redesign Panel C7. This redesign will also consider whether it is necessary-or beneficial to relocate-some components to front panels. The Category 5 HEDs (from the list above) that.will be resolved or partially resolved within this project are IA012, lA013, 18163,18164,18165, 5B216, IC063, and 8A0088.
The remaining Category 5 .EDs will be resolved or partially resolved with several equipment location-related projects. These projects include the following.
- Relocating four RWCU control switenes to co-locate these switches-with the other RHCU components on Panel C904 (HED 88211).
- Relocating the first point heater outlet valve switches from Panel C4 to C1 (HED 4C066 and 58067).
- Rearranging switches on Panels C174 and C175 so that the switches are in a logical order (HEDs 4B148, BB157, 9B158 and Category 2~HED 4B149).
III-25
l ki h I l e Relocating the condensate pump suction conductivity recorder from Panel C904 to C1 (HEDs 9C098 and SC088).
*- Removal of two control switches on Panel C904 and the reloca' ,, )f the N-' flow controller from Panel C904 to C7 (HEOs 88214, 86 possibly in conjunction with the Panel C7 redesign discussed above.
- The addition of two control switches to Panel C903'to provide the capability for securing all drywell fans (NED 4B191).
- The installation of labels, demarcation, and mimics, as required on the fire alarm panels (HED 8CO31B, Category 2 HEDs 6CO30, 6C040, 9C032, BCO31A and Category 4 HED OC099).
The projects outlined above are in various stages of design. Please refer to Section IV for implementation schedules. HED IC064 identifies- two controls on Panel CP600 that are 5.8 inches below the height requirement for a 95th percentile male operator. The operators stated that the heights of the switches is not a problem because the operators normally operate this panel while sitting in front of the panel with a procedure in their lap. The DRT determined that no further action is required. HED 8C095 recommends that the indication for the off-gas holdup line drain valve be relocated from Panel Cl to CP600. Further evaluation determined that, to functionally group this indicator, it should be located on Pardi '
'C902. The operators stated, however, that having the indicator in its !
- current position is useful, therefore it was determined that the indicator would be lef t in its current location.
HED SC104 identified the need for a status indication for the feedwater startup regulator bypass valve. The valve has recently been removed;
-therefore it was determined that a status indication is not required.
H. CATEGORY 6--POTENTIALLY RESOLVED HEDs The HEDs below'were idelt*fied in the 1984 DCRDR efforts and categorized ; as "potentially resolvei This indicates that either investigations or modifications are comple.e and no further action is required before the HED close-out process (i.e., verification) is initiated. Since the DCRDR Summary Report (Reference 2) was issued nineteen (19) HEDs a have been closed-out through the close-out verification process. The -l ' close-out verification process verifies the extent of correction for each HED, documents justifications for partial correction (or no correction), and verifies that no-new HED has been created by the correction methodology. If the close-out' verification process shows that any portion of an HED I requires further action, that portion of the HED will be assigned a new sub-number (e.g., an incomplete portion of #5A009B could be designated as 5A009C) and reassigned to the appropriate category for corrective action. The completed portion of the HED will remain in Category 6. III-26 I r
Table 111-4 lists the HEDs from the 1984 DCROR efforts that are still in - the close-out process. Table 111-5 lists the nineteen (19) HEOs that have been closed-out. 6 Category S HEDs idantified in the 1990 DCRDR efforts are as follows. TITLE El0_h22 SB193 Display - suitability 6B201 Control - worn switch escutcheon 4B212 Controls - switch handle conventions ~~ DC027 Surveillance test missed - (LER 85-024) lll OC028 Removal of fuse - (LEP. 88-007) OC029 Procedure error - (LER 88-025) 10045 Simplex CPU uncovered 6 COB 0 Controls - position indications OC087 R.G. 197 exceptions 4C092 Controls - abandoned equipment 6C094 Recorders - not labeled HEDs 4B212 and OC087 require no further action and are ready for final close-out. HEDs SB193, 6B201, OCO27, OCO28, OCO29, IC045, 6C080, 4C092 and 6C094 require the close-out verification process to be performed. Refer to Section IV for discussions on implementation schedules.
- 1. CATlft0PY 7--NjNN JEINEERED HEQi HEOs in Category 7 are associated with non-engineered corrective actions, such as those involving procedure changes, training, or maintenance.
Sixteen (16) HEDs in this Category were identified in the 1984 DCRDR effort, as follcws. f' TITLE 7 HED No. u_ 16008B Use of procedures at consoles 20017 Communications - coverage in plant areas 2B021 Communications - use of face mask 2B022 Communications - posting of procedures 4B059B Controls - resistance to movement 58134 Displays - ;ferator conversions OB113 Training - maintaining proficiency 1C001 Document storage IC002 Operating expendables and tools - storage IC004 Protective aquipment - availability IC026 Protective equipment - replacement 2C011 Fire station - false alarms 4C013 Protective equipment - use SC014 Matching recorder paper with proper reconver r Change of lamps - proper methods SC017 OCO24 Communications - number of plug-ins 3= 111-27
'fh
1 I TABLE III-4 CATEGORY 6 HEDs NOT Yrf CLOSED-C Q HED No. TITLE 18002 Furniture and equipment layout 18009 Desk dimensions 2B018 Announcing system (volume) 2B019 Lack of priority paging 5B133 Visual displays - information displayed BB102 Frequency of use 8B129 Sequence of use - fun' tional considerations SC019 Graphic recorders .isibility f 5A009B Usability of displayed values - ranges 18001 Accessibility of instrument / equipment 4B051C Direction of movement - controls 4B060C General principles - economy , t 4B115B General principles - control adequacy 4B132 General principles - suitability SB066C Graphic recorders - placement 5806B Light indicators - misinterpretation 58110 Usability of displayed values - scair. 5B135 Visual displays - completeness of information 5B136 Usability of displayed values - scales 6B079 Control position labelling - direction 8B0978 Hirror imaging 98106B Movement relationships 9F1078 Control and display pairs - location
@ 08 Control and display pairs - consistency 9B109B Control and display pairs - proximity ;
1C025 Equipment layout - coverage 2C009 Announcing system - general SC0168 Usability of displayed values - scales SC0182 General characteristics of graphic recorders SC020 Visual displays - unit scales i III-28 ,
/
TABLE III-5 CATEGORY 6 HEDs THAT ARE CLOSED-0UT
}i[M _
TITLE 4A003 Reactor Mode Switch - no detent SA004 Recorders not satisfactory SA005 Inconsistent reactor water level meters 18003 Supervisor access 18008A Procedures / reference materials at consoles 10128 Nitrogen flow to drywell indication 28016 Conventional telephone system 20020 Point-to-point intercom system 4b059A Prevention of accidental activation 50070 Discrete recorders - channel select 50127 Usability of displayed values - scale increments 6B083 Tag-outs IC003 Dimensions - control height 1C006 Personal storage , SC015 Recorder labels 5C021 Usability of displayed values - scales SCO26 Usability of displayed values - operator conversion 6C023 Visibility of labels - cleaning 58065* Visual displays - direction of movement
- HED 5B065 was listed as a Category 2 HED in Reference 2.
111-29
' Corrective actions have been completed for the fo' lowing HEDs: a HID No, TITLE . ; 18008 New procedure racks installed 2B022 Signs posted re: VHF communications 0B113 STA training completed (continuing) IC001 Procedures have been clearly marked 4C013 Adequate periodic training is conducted SC017 Panel indicator bulk changeout tool was purchased. The Plant Department determined that the following HE05 do not present operational problems and that no action is required: HED_Eg., _ _ TITLE _ 20021 Use of face masks is infrequent 48059 Excessive switch spring loading is judgment of individual operators; decreased loading not advisable 5B134 Operator aid is adequate 1C002 Recorder supplies storage is adequate IC004 Emergency equipment storage is adequate 1CO26 Air pack storege and training are adequato 2C011 Fire alarms now very infrequent 5C014 Recorder scales and chart paper coordinated by ; procedure l OC024 Current communications jacks are sufficient i HED 2B017 involved Gai-Tronics paging system problems. A " priority i paging" system was installed in 1989 to address this, but it not yet i ' functioning correctly. Trouble-shooting is underway and is expected to complete the modification. In addition, conceptual design has been i initiated on a major improvement to the PNPS Gai-Tronics system, which is expected to further reduce system noise and improve communications. The 1989-90 DCRDR effort identified twenty-eight (28) additional Category 7 HEDs as follows. , TITLE j ELD _h 58170 Area radiation monitors do not conform to E0Ps > 4B171 Need to hold jog valv. controls for lengthy , periods / 5B172 Torus level instruments not precise enough 58173- E0P may have error in temperature limit 58182 Emergency action level chart color coding 5B183 Need alarms for area temperature monitor 5B184 Drywell temperatures difficult to read precisely 58187 Need to convert units from indicator (gallons) to ;
- 7. (EOP) l (list continues on next page) 111-30 i
4
l Md,ltigmtL,qtecorv 7_ HEDs. Continued 5B195B Reactor pressure diffi: ult to read precisely 5B1968 Reactor water level difficult to read precisely 5B198 No ind'e:ator of torus pressure indication in range requested by E0P 5BH9 Difficult to read EOP values or area temperature indicators 5B200 E0P requires reading drywell water level outside ' l instrument range OB203 Instrument does not indicate radioactivity in , units required by R.G. 1.97 5B219 E0P difficult to road 04220 Torus water level difficult to read precisely at E0P values IC036 Steps are potential tripping hazard E Lack of bulb test capability on fire alarm 5C039 i annunciator panel ! IC041 Missing annunciator tiles - Panel C921 SC047 Pointers obscure minor graduations on stales 5C050 Pointers obscure minor graduations on scales 1C062 Aisle between panels less than 50 inches 1C067 No laydown area for E0Ps ' i 2C069 Confusion between safety valves and safety relief valves , 6C086 Revise operating procedure OC100 Unplanned scram because of leaking feedwater j valves i 20101- Logarithmic schle used on SPDS 5C102 Intermediate scales not used on SPDS screent (conformance to E0Ps) Thc following HEDs will be addressed by appropriate revisions to the E0Ps , or to operating procedures. (In most cases, these changes involve I changing the E0Ps to use rounded-off measurements rather than odd intermediate aieasurements that cannot be read precisely on existing meters or recorders.) In the meantime, certain items are being addressed through training. 1 5B170 581968 1C067 (' 5B198 6C086 5B172 SB173 5B199 l ! 5B183 5B200 5B184 OB203 58187 5B219 l 5B1958 08220 l Two additional HEDs (2C101 and SC102) are indirectly related to pending E0P revisions. These two HEDs relate to SPDS displays that emulate charts in the E0Ps and which do not comply with guidelines regarding minor graduations on scales. The E0P charts are being revised or replaced in the next round of E0P revisioi1. Once that is completed, a decision will l be made regarding how to refle, t the E0P changes in the SPDS displays. i The HEDs will remain open until the SPOS displays are resolved. III-31
l HED 4B17) concerned the occasional need for operators to hold the switch , for certain jog valves for a prolonged period of time. The Design Review j Team suggested that the Training Department address the need for i l I. additional training on the use of these valves. The Training Department has suggested an alternative approach that would require changes to the l valve control logic. This HED will be re-assigned to Category 4 for l' additional engineering effort, to evaluate the Training Department's recommendation. HED 58182 involved the organization and color scheme of the Emergency Action Level chart used in the Control Room. The Design Review Team consensus w35 that the chart is acceptable. This HED will be referred to : the Emergency Response organization for their consideration in any future l revision of the EAL chart. HED 1C036 identifled potential tripping hazards in the control room (e.g., steps into watch engineer's office, shift supervisor's a.ea, back panel area). He will install a colored hazard marking on the steps, consistent with similar locations at PNPS. HED SC039 referred to the lack of bulb-testing on fire alarm panels Cll4 and C115. Investigation determined that these bulbs are rarely illuminated (only for periodic surveillancec and for actual fire alarms) , and therefore have extremely long service lifes. Only one bulb (a power available lamp) has required replacement. No further action is planned. HED IC041 concerns two missing annunciator tiles on Panel C921. Replacement tiles will be ordered and installed as part of the enhancements project for this panel. HEDs SC047 and SC050 refer to meter / recorder pointers that nearly overlap the minor graduations on the scales. The Design Review Team requested that the pointers be adjusted to one side, reducing the degree of obstruction. Investigation determined this is not feasible. These HEDs will be transferred to Category 2 to determine if replacement scales or pointers could improve the situations, i
- l. HED IC062 refers to the width of the aisle between the back of the main control panels (C903, C904) and the panel C7. The aisle is 40 inches, vs'.
the guideline of 50 inches. The DRT requested consideration of a
. guardrail to help prevent personnel from inadvertently striking the p controls on Panel C7. Operations objected to the guardrail, because it l
would result in further reduction of the aisle width, and noted that there no history of personnel inadvertently operating the controls. Nothing
> *ther will be done on the HED. (Note, however, redesign of panel C7, ciscussed in Section III.G will take into account the restricted space at this location.)
HED 2C069 concerned possible confusion between the " safety valves" and the
" safety relief valves." Training, labels and procedures will be changed to refer to these as " safety valves" and " main steam relief valves." This I
' HED will be transferred to Category 2 to be implemented in the label update (enhancements) project. l l III-32
HED OC100 refers to feedwater control problems resulting from leaking feedwater valves. The root cause is a leaking feedwater valve, which recently was repaired. This HED will be closed. J. CATEGORY 8--HEDs RELAir0 TO PLANT COMPUTER (* EPIC") The HEDs in this category are related to the plant monitoring system computer (" EPIC") which includes the Safety Parameter Display System 1 l (SPDS). The computer survey was conducted during the 1990 DCROR effort. Thirteen (13) HEDs were identified in the survey, as follows. HED No. TITLE : 78137 Override of trend plot displays 7B130 Selection of displays 78139 Graphic coding and highlighting ; 78140 Documentation of error messages ! Computer restart and reload time j 7B141 7B142 Computer function controls 7B143 Hultiple-page considerations 7B144 Character luminance 7B1/5 Screen contrast 7B14e Display formats 4C033 Computer function controls 4C034 Computer function controls , 4C035 Computer function controls The status of the Category 8 HEDs is as follows.
- HED 78140, error message documentation has been resolved with Rev. 3 -
' of Procedure 2.6.1.
- HED 78143 has been resolved and HED 78142 has been partially resolved by SPDS keyboard improvements.
- HEDs 4C033, 4C034 and 4C035 will be resolved with the replacement of the old Honeywell computer.-
i
- HEDs 7B144, 7B145, and 7B137 cannot be resolved because of system limitations with the Toshiba terminals. If and when the Toshiba terminals are replaced, we will address the related NUREG-0700 requirements in the specifications for replacement equipment.
l
- HED 78141 requires no action. The 30 minute system reload and l' restart duration is inherent in the generic system design.
l
- HED 7B139, which address dual meanings for the color yellow, will L
receive no action. The number of colors available with the Toshiba l terminals is limited and no other color combination was found to be clearly preferable. l l III-33 l l
i u HEDs 78138 and 7B146 address the use of he trackballs and e tab / cursor. He are not planning to imp sment trackball cursor , control because of previous reliability problems with the i trackballs. Effective cursor control is achieved on EPIC now by i either the tab key or arrow key. ! I l i
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i l l 1 SECTION IV IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE A. INTRODUCTION This Section outlines the schedule for the work described in this report. It includes schedules for the work newly identified in this report, as well as an updated schedule for tht, work previously identified in the Supplementary Summary Report (Reference 2). r The schedules presented here are based upon the relative priority of DCRDR tasks (including consideration of the detailed screening results discussed in Section III), the status of design, and the projected pace of engineering for the projects to be done. Boston Edison has not, however, performed any detailed planning for the outages beyond the 1991 refueling outage (RF08). Therefore the schedules described here are subject to revision as work proceeds, design is completed and other work is defined for completion in the same period. Schedule adjustments, if required, will be provided to NRC by Boston Edison through the semi-annual Long Term Program submittals, for correlation to the text in Section III describing corrective actions, the schedule for DCRDR work will be discussed by implementation category. The schedules described herein are summarized in figure IV-1. B. CATEGORY I -- ANNUNCIATOR The conceptual design has been selected, as described in Section III; the planned modification is to remove the entire annunciator and replace it. The first step will be to perform detailed design, beginning with a ' signal-by-signal review of the type described in EPRI NP-3448-L. That review will begin in 1991. The target schedule is to complete detailed design, order materials, and begin installation of the new annunciator in refueling outage #9 (Rf09), currently scheduled to begin in the Spring of 1993. . Because of the magnitude of this task, it will require two or three refueling outages to complete. Because of the preliminary state of annunciator design and because there has been no planning for the refueling or mid-cycle outages beyond RF08 (in 1991), we cannot say with certainty when the annunciator replacement will be comoleted. He plan to M ain installation in RF09 and will include a schedule for completion of this work in the Long Term Program. C. CATEGORY 2 -- ENHANCEMFNTS
- 1. Previous 1v Committed Scoce.
Hork is underway to complete the implementation of the previously-committed control panel enhancements, including labels, mimics, demarcations; meter and recorder scales; switch handles, escutcheons, and rewiring; and minor relocations. IV-1
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This scope was previously scheduled (in Reference 2) for completion by the end of RF08 in mid-1991. The schedule for the original enhancements scope (referred to in our Long Term Program as LTP 300) is revised as follows:
- a. We will plan to finish all labels, mimics, and demarcations (to be done on-line) in the original scope by June 30, 1992. <
- b. We expect to finish most of the switch improvements by the end of the 1992 mid-cycle outage. The switch rewiring task has been prioritized so that the highest priority switch rewiring will be done in RF08 as originally committee. Handle and escutcheon replacements are expected to be done by the end of RF08 as previously committed.
- c. He plan to complete the switch rewiring and replacement on panel C7 in RF09, nr resolve them as part of the C7 panel reconstruction,
- d. He plan to complete electrical panel enhance? on panel C3) by the end of RF09.
Thus, the on-line portion of the original ses , planned for completion by June 30, 1992 and the outage c: on for completion by RF09. There are three reasons for this schedule re.ssion:
- Other projects judged to be more important than the enhancements
, are scheduled for RF08. In particular, we plan to: l l - Perform panel refurbishment and painting
- Install lights indicating status of scram solenoid valve groups and MSIV trip logic on Panel C905.
- Relocate several instruments and controls In addition, several other newly-identified corrective actions l will be scheduled for the mid-cycle outage, ahead of some of the remaining original enhancements scope, i
He consider the rearrangements in priority to be in the best interest of the control room operators. i e Some work is taking longer than expected. In particular, development and installation of new labels, mimics, and demarcations has encountered several difficulties. Resolving comments on label content has taken much longer than expected. Access to the simulator has been restricted, reducing opportunities for installation and for review by operating crews. Procedure revisions are also taking longer than expected. IV-3
He are substantially increasing the level of vi*mrt in 1991 to accelerate this program.
- RF08 cannot accommodate all the work originally committed. He have prioritized the remaining switch work so that the most important rewiring (considering human factors and operational viewpoints) will be done in RF08, and the balance done in the next o'itages. Panel enhancements that can be done on-line will only be worked during the outage if they cause no interference to other outage work.
- 2. New Sroce Section !!! describes extension of the program of labels, mimics and I' demarcation to additional panels not originally in the CRDR scope.
In addition we plan to refurbish and repaint the main control panels, to facilitate the continued installation of enhancements and other modifications. He plan to complete the outage-related portion of this additional scope by the end of RF09. He plan to complete most of the work on-line, with a target for completion by December 31, 1992. D. CATEGORY 3 -- HABITABILITY Control room lighting improvements were previously scheduled to te completed by the end of RF08. He are currently planning to install the lighting improvements on-line, before RF08. In the event that the lighting work is not completed before L RF08, the installation will be completed by December 31, 1991. The control room rear panel access door will be removed (or modified), tentatively by December 31, 1992. E. CATEGORIES 4 AND 5 -- EOUIPMENT TYPE AND LOCATION He plan to complete the outage-related relocations and replacements of panel hardware in these ca+egories, including the replacement of panel C7, by the end of RF09. He have prioritized the scope of this effort and will perform portions in RF08 in 1991 and portions in the mid-cycle outage. , The on-line portion of this work is planned to be completed by December 31, 1993. The tentative schedule for the individual tasks in this groups is given in Appendix D. 1 IV-4
i F. CATEGORY 6 -- POTENTIAllY RESOLVED These HED's were those classified as resolved (or that required no corrective action). Verification will be done at periodic intervals as implementation proceeds. Any HEDs found not resolved, or new HEDs created, will be reassigned to other categories and reviewed for further action in accordance with project procedures. , G. CATEGORY 7 -- NON-ENGINEERED SOLUTIONS Host of Category 7 HEDs that require corrective actions will involve procedure changes, and most of these involve changes to the E0Ps. E0Ps are only revised on a refueling outage cycle to allow retraining. He plan to resolve current E0P-related HEDs by the end of the next E0P revision cycle, currently planned for RF08. Other procedure changes are planned for completion by December 31, 1991. Other Category 7 HEDs will either be transferred to other categories (see discussion in Section !!.1) or will be resolved by March 31, 1992. H, CATEGORY 8 -- HEDs RELATED TO PLANT COMPUTER (EPIC) All Category 8 HEDs are resolved or require no action. IV-5
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SECTION V RESPGNSE TO NRC COMMENTS A. IN19& DUCTION This See. tion will respond to two NRC documents:
- 1) Reference 3, which reports on an NRC inspection of the Pilgrim DCROR (and SPOS) in March 1989.
- 2) Reference 10, which provided a review of the Supplementary Summary Report (Reference 2) and Program Plan, Revision 2 (Reference 6).
B. RESPONSE TO INSPECTION REPORT NRC performed an inspection of the DCROR program in March 1989, shortly before Boston Edison submitted the Supplementary Summary Report and about four months before the revised Program Plan was submitted. To a large extent, the NRC's audit report deals with issues that we were asked to address in the Supplementary Summary Report or Program Plan. Subsequently (as will be discussed below). NRC expressed the view that the Boston Edison DCROR was expected to satisfy the appropriate criteria of NUREG-0737 so long as the revised Program Plan was carried out. Therefore, we will not address here the various WRC inspection report comments regarding erocess, because they are superseded by the NRC's later comments in Reference 10. The inspection report did, however, tabulate a number of specific human engineering comments regarding the Pilgrim control room, and asked that BECo address these. Following is a response to each of NRC's comments. (Note: item numbering corresponds to the NRC Technical Evaluation Report.)
- 1. Recorder labels
- a. NRC Comment: Labeling of recorders is incomplete (four examples provided).
- b. BECn Resoonse: Labeling of recorders is being addressed by the enhancement program. The specific examples are being addressed by PDC 87-768, C, G.
- 2. Recorder Pen Assianments
- a. NRC Comment: Recorder pen color assignments are inconsistent (two examples provided).
V-1 i
l
- b. BECo Response: BECo disagrees with the first example. Reactor Steam Flow is only on recorder #640-27. BECo concurs with the second example and HE0 6.5.062 has been created and will be screened by the Design Review Team per NEDWI 344 and 392.
- 3. Scram Solenoid Indicator Liahts
- a. NRC Comment: The SCRAM solenoid indicator lights are on a back panel behind the main control panel (horseshoe). It is necessary to check these lights to verify that SCRAM has occurred (that the plant is not in an ATHS condition). These four lights should be up front on Panel 905. >
- b. SECo Response: HEDs 18015 & 4B212 were previously identi,ted for these items. PDC 90-070 will provide lights on C905 that are wired in parallel with the lights on C915/C917. s
- 4. E0P Wordina
- a. NRC Comment: The wording of Caution 1, in E0P-01, is .
confusing. However, it appears to require the operator to determine the usability of RPV water level instrumentation in the control room by one of two methods: (1) comparing temperatures near the instrument reference leg vertical runs to a criterion value, " maximum RB run temperature"; or (2) comparing the control room instrument readings to the criterion value of " minimum usable level." To use the temperature criterion, the control room operator would have to send an A0 to take readings in the plant. Regarding the level criterion, there is insufficient scale range on the Fuel Zone level indicator and recorder to determine in all cases whether level is above the specified minimum of -263 in,
- b. BEco Comment: The caution directs the operator that if the reactor building temperatures are above the temperature listed, the water level indicator will not be valid for trend information below the level indicated.
If there is a temperature control concern in the reactor building, the operators will be determining reactor building temperature, to the best of their abilities. The operators are trained that if there is a potential that the temperatures exceed the Max RB Run Temperature, that the operators not use the water level instruments for trend information below the indicated level.
- 5. E0P-01. Fioure 1.1
- a. NRC Comment: E0P-01, Figure 1.1, requires indication of Torus Pressure in the high range. There is none in the control room.
The PAM panel Containment Pressure High meter, PI-1001-600B, is used (incorrectly) to provide this parameter. V-2
I l
- b. BEco_Resoonse: The E0Ps do require Torus pressure to be read in the high range. Similar to item 6, a calculation is required to determine torus airspace pressure.
The next revision of E0Ps, to be put in place in RF08, will replace torus airspace pressure with torus bottom pressure, taking advantage of the torus bottom pressure indicators.
- 6. Calculate Drvwell to Torus Differential Pressure
- a. NRC Comment: To determine torus pressure >2.5 psig, the operator must perform a calculation using drywell pressure and differential pressure,
- b. BEco Resoonse: HED 5B133 was previously identified to track corrective action for this item.
- 7. Scale faces Incorrectly Labeled
- a. NRC Comment: The scale faces on PID-5067A and 50678 are incorrectly labeled psid. The correct unit of measure is psig,
- b. BEco Resoonse: HED SB192 was previously identified to track corrective action on this item.
7
- 8. Inacorocriate Scale
- a. HRC Comment: E0P-01, Caution 2 requires the operator to ensure !
HPCI turbine speed >715 rpm. The meter scale is in increments of 50 rpm. It is also missing a label,
- b. BECo Resoonse: HED 58192 was previously identified to track corrective action on this item.
l
- 9. ' Abandoned Eauiement
- a. NRC Comment: The HPCI vibration meter on Panel 903 is an
" abandoned" component and is not so labeled. The same is tree of the N2 recycle blower isolation valves. (These and other >
abandoned components should be removed.)
- b. BECo Resoonse: The equipment was removed per PDC 88-47.
- 10. Too of Active Fuel
- a. NRC Comment: E0P-01 specifies top of active fuel (TAF) as l -126.3. An engraved label on Panel 903 gives TAF as -127.5 inches .which is an obsolete value, l
- b. BECo Comment: The label was corrected in accordance with the BECo corrective action program via a PCAQ (Potential Condition Affecting Quality).
1 V-3 I
l I
- 11. Label Nomenclature
- a. NRC Comment: There are numerous problems with labels and l nomenclature (14 examples provided)
- b. ECs_Ruppnt: HEDs 68076 and 6B077 were pr*" ,1y identified to track the corrective actions on these ite
- 12. Himics and Panel layouts
- a. NRC Comment: No mimics for HPCI, RHR (all modes), core spray, MSIVs and bypass / drain valves, RCIC, RHCU, feed and condensate demin (except for backboard heater mimic), CRD drive and cooling, recirr loops, RBCCW, steam seal and SJAEs, and TBCCH
- b. BEco Response: Mimics will be provided (as appropriate) by the l enhancement program. 1
- c. NRC Comment: Steam line drains /MSIV bypasses are separated from the MSIVs by RCIC.
- d. BECo Respanit: HE0 6.8.035 hr.s been identified for this item and will be screened by the Design Review Team per NEDHI 344 and 392,
- e. NRC Comment: RHCU valves are separated from head vents and DH/ torus sample r.ontrols,
- f. BEco Response: HEDs 88211 and 8B214 were previously identified to track the corrective action on this item. (Note: we think the NRC's comment should have read "by" instead of "from".)
- g. NRC Comment: Feedwater heater controls are located on back panel C4, separate from the other feedwater system components.
This is at best, inconvenient, and it could create problems in post-SCRAM response,
- h. SEco Comment: HED 4C066 was previously identified to track corrective action on this item.
- 13. TIS 021-01A is Difficult to Read
- 4. NRC Comment: Torus water temperature meter TI5021-01-A on Panel 903 is difficult to read because of glare and poor contrast,
- b. ECo Resoonse: HEDs 58063, 58188, and 5B119 have notej deficiencies with this meter and will track the corrective action for this item.
- 14. PR3392 Scale is Inacoroprip
- a. NRC Comment: PR3392 on Panel C2 provides information that is inconsistent with operator thinking / expectations. This recorder displays condenser pressure. The parameter of interest to the V-4
-~ . - ~ .
l 4 operators is condenser vacuum. The procedure refers to l condenser vacuum. The recorder is labeled condenser vacuum, but ; is displays absolute pressure (in. of mercury). Operators 1 stated that they would like very much to have this instrument changed.
- b. 31Co Resoonse: HED SB061 was previously written to track corrective action fer this item.
- 15. Annunciator !
l
- a. NRC Comment: A number of annunciator discrepancies were observed (nine examples provided).
- b. BEco Resoonse: An Annunciator Study has been completed to document possible changes to the annunciator system to address the discrepancies provided. A window-by-window review will be i initiated in 1991 and then the exact resolution to the various HEDs will be determined.
- 16. Indicatina Licht Reliability
- a. NRC Comment: Reliability of indication is a potential problem.
Except for the alarm tiles and the isolation mimic, all control I room indication is single bulb, single filament. The licensee should ensure that redundant control illumination is available, particularly for ES systems which are normally dark,
- b. BEco Response: An engineering evaluation will be performed to determine the acceptability of replacing the bulbs with long life LEDs, as an alternate to redundant illumination.
C. RESPONSE TO 1989 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORTS i In reference 10, NRC forwarded two contractor Technical Evaluation Reports (TERs). One included a discussion of our April 1989 Supplementary Report; the second commented on the Program Plan. The TER on the Supplementary Summary Report contained no specific comments on hardware or corrective actions. Its discussions of process concluded by referring to the (later) Program Plan as (essentially) adequate. Therefore, that TER requires no specific comment. The second TER (SAIC-89/1145) provided a review of the revised Program Plan. In essence, it concluded that the Pilgrim DCRDR would be expected to meet NUREG-0737 requirements if it followed the Program Plan, subject to three comments on specific aspects. Boston Edison has followed the Program Plan, as described earlier in this report. Therefore, we will respond here only to the exceptions identified in the TER. V-5
- 1. Adecuary of Human Factors Contractor
- 4. NRC Coment: The TER said (pg. 3), "... the review team could not judge the adequacy of the human factors contractor because the contractor had not been selected by the licensee." ,
- b. BEco Resoonse: As noted earlier, General Physics Corp. was chosen as tre human factors contractor for the 1989-90 effort.
General Physics conducted the inventory upgrade, additional surveys, task analysis, and verification and validation, and participated in the Design Review Team for screening of HEOs and selections of corrective actions. The General Physics effort was led by Dr. Lothar Schroeder (until November 2, 1990). Resumes for the General Physics personnel are included in Appendix C of this report. Ms. Danna Beith of Human Factors Interfaces has continued to participate in the project, particularly in the development of the design manual.
- 2. Selection of Corrective Actioni
- a. NRC Comment: The TER concluded (pg. 9) that the BECo DCRDR would not meet the requirement for design improvements
...unless they included training and emergency operating procedures modifications in the plan."
- b. BECo Resoontit: Boston Edison has not only considered the use of E0P modifications and training as corrective actions, we have selected those approaches for several HEDs.
By procedure, one of the defined types of corrective actions to which the Design Review Team can assign an HED is Category 7. Category 7 is defined in the relevant Nuclear Engineering Department Work Instruction (Reference 11) as: CA.teaorv #7: Administrative changes including operations and administrative procedures as well as other enanges which can be accomplished without hardware changes. Thus the procedure by which all HL'is are screened inherently prompts the DRT to consider either training or procedures (as well as other non-engineering solutions) as a method of correcting HEDs. (This is not a change in our process; it may be that we did not present this information clearly during discussions with NRC.) In the current set of HEDs discussed in Section III of this report, two were assigned to Training for corrective action', and 18 to the E0P project. BothoftheHEDIassignedtoTrainingresultedinfurtherreviewof possible physical improvements to partially resolve the HEDs; see Section III.I. V-6 i
Other non-engineered corrective actions were also assigned to groups responsible for emergency planning, industrial safety, and maintenance. Non-engineered HEDs (i.e., Category 7) assigned to other departments are tracked by the NED HED tracking program (as are all other HEDs), and completion will be verified in accordance with the applicable procedure (Reference 11). It should be noted that coordination with the E0P project is facilitated by the fact that responsibility for E0P development rests with the Nuclear Engineering Department.
- 3. Coordination with Goerator Trainina
- a. NRC Comment: The TER commented that BECo's " coordination process did not include coordination with operator training."
- b. BEco Resonnse: There are two principal elements to the coordination of DCRDR with training. One is formal and generic to all projects, and the other is project-specific.
The formal coordination with training is through the design control process. A control room design change, like any other design change, is implemented through the Plant Design Change (PDC) process. Training-related aspects of this process include the following: i) The PDC preparation procedure (Reference 12) requires that the PDC include recommended changes to operating or maintenance procedures, which later could affect training.
- 11) After issuance of a proposed PDC by Nuclear Engineering, approval of the PDC by the Operations Review Committee (ORC) requires review and sign-off by the Training Department (as well as other affected organizations).
Either the affected department (e.g., Nuclear Operations) or the Training Department can identify the need for , training (or procedure changes) as a prerequisite for accepting the modification. iii) Once a PDC is approved and issued, automatic distribution includes the Training Department. Training reviews each ' issued PDC from two perspectives: Whether the PDC requires specific training (e.g., on-shift triining for current crews on new equipment) or modifica'clon to existing training programs; and whether the PDC affects the hardware or software in the simulator, iv) Before a PDC is accepted by the Plant Department as operational, Operations must agree that necessary training is completed and procedure changes are implemented (or that a waiver of such training is accepted by the plant manager). V-7
Also by procedure, the Engineering Department is required to purchase any panel devices (e.g., new recorders or switches) required for the simulator to emulate the revised plant installation. We consider that this formal process meets the requirement of NUREG-0737 for coordination. In addition, however, the Pilgrim DCRDR has included a number of project-specific activities that linked the training and engineering elements. Several phases of DCROR have involved training personnel, training facilities, and training materials. By utilizing these resources, the DCRDR project has obtained input fram the training process as well as sensitizing the training < organization to DCROR concerns and objectives. These connections have included:
- 1) One of the members of the Design Review Team (Mr. Gerlits) was formerly an instructor in the Training Department and was a licensed SRO, which helped the DRT understand and consider the training perspective when it was screening HEDs and selecting corrective actions,
- 11) Participation by the Training Department in both (1984 and 1989) verification / validation activities, including use of 1 the simulator (in 1989).
tii) Use of the simulator for trial installation of control panel enhancements, and for operator reviews, iv) Use of training materials as one of the reference sources for development of enhancements. In addition, Nuclear Engineering has provided input 19 the training function. The Nuclear Engineering Department prepared , a special information document to assist the Training Department in preparations for training operators on the new system of labels, mimics, and demarcations. He believe that these additional informal coordination steps have helped to insure a successful integration of training and . Control Room Design Review objectives and programs. V-8 l l
L SECTION VI PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND OUALIFICATIONS A. PILGRIM STATION ORGANIZAT104 The Boston Edison nuclear organization is illustrated by Figure VI-1. , Responsibility for the Detailed Control Room Design Review Project is assigned to the Nuclear Engineering Department for technical leadership and project management. Considerable support to the project is provided by departments reporting to the PNPS Station Director, including the Nuclear Training Department and the Plant Department. 1 The engineering department organization is shown in Figure VI-2. A Project Manager, reporting to Depart.t.ent Management, has responsibility 1 for coordinating the DCRDR project. Technical responsibility for the processes, procedures and corrective actions rests with the line managers for the resp 6ctive discipline groups in tha Nuclear Engineering Department. Division nanagers assign personnel, either on a full-time basis or on a ta..k-by-task basis, to I: accomplish project tasks assigned by the project manager. In this fashion the normal Boston Edison engineering and conttruction processes for design control and coordination can be used thus r.inimizing the need for project-specific processes and controls. B. PROJECT STRUCTURE Table VI-1 shows the key activities and the assignments of technical 1 disciplines to each activity. As shown in the table, we assumed the leadership roles, but substantial support was obtained from consultants, particularly for the inventory, survey, and SFTA activities. Data collection was conducted under the direction of personnel from the Control Systems Division (lead on inventory and survey updates) and the Systems and Safety Analysis Division (lead for Task Analysis and associated activities). Consultant assistance for the 1989-90 data 4' collection and analysis efforts was provided by General Physics Corporation. 1 Design of physical corrective actions (i.e., plant design changes) is ; under the diraction of the Control Systems Division in most cases. The corrective action designs will be performed under the normal Boston Edison procedures for Pilgrim Station design changes. Particular emphasis was placed on the need for and value of substantial review and input from the Operations Section; Operations assigned a senior staff SRO to act as liaison to OP/4 and help assure coordination. Table VI-2 lists specific personnel assigned to the project. Appendix B includes resumes for t6.ose personnel and for additional General Physics personnel who participated in DCRDR activities. VI-l l
l k l i i NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION 1 t 5 C CHART i I n i m Serwor VP Nuclear ID i i O = i l l o I VP Nudear I i n = ve, cy I I ga og yp I I Quahty I Business j 4 Z Operatens & Pitipiacc Gie = VP Nudear Assurance Pfannirg & Nudear m PNPS Station Depi= LT+,; Adm7straten Dwiea Budget Contro l j 52 Dkector - Manager Pro $ L s;imi's uanager ocpt. uanaoer [
- U2 -
i O
- Z Nudear Nuclear Z g3p v ent Ecyo w L y g,1, . 4-nt - .
to g support owl.,ent r- Dept. Manager Manager 3 ITI l D i "Il Plantnog & Co m tory i O Outage ^* Affaks g " Dei, M Department
> Csea nohouse Manaw
,l Z
~
N y Nudear Desgn r
-f ~ Tracma sennces O owwt secten 4 z uanage, Man ,
i t a 1
"U Plant ! d "
Depad.T(-nt Manager i [ I i
. . - e . . . .
1 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT l Nuclear i Engineering j Department Man r umumuu Nuclear Engineering ! Dept. Deputy l Manager l ummunu I I 0" Project 3, ;nn Ara ys Mana e e S'CIIOn Manager Manaoer Fluid Systems Nuclear Analysis
, & Mechanical - Division Components Manager M
Power System & Systems , Safety Analysis DMslon Division 1 Manager y er Oontrol 4 Raciologeal Systems , Engineering 1
, J Division Division Man r Manager
\
f i Civil Structural ' Division j Manager l 1 FIGURE VI 2. BOSTON EDISON NUCLEAR ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION l i 11 3 1 l l i
DCROR TASK i MD DESetW TEQWSCAL PUt90NNEL TASK GB ASOETIENT SEECTION VEnrACkTICF4 ASS 00NED TO TASE VERfFICATION WAllDATION SJf74Y SFTA INWEN7087f BYCATEGOsw WECO Personnes (1)* Support Sepport tend tend Sepport Support Lead zu WC Ergrieers (2) Support tand taed Land Support Leed se Leer' un Lead Lead /Seppert Support Systems Ew (3) Support er us we == re Seppert zu Support Support Other Desqr Ergeners (4) Sepport Support Support Support Support Support Support we su Operemons Limeson (5) Support um Support Support Support Support Mrscettaneous Support (6) Centracter Per ownes Support Support weier Major Motor werer Meier un Mejor h- weer er ne HFE Spooeksts Mmor as
< SAO/ OPS Spacialist Major en M nor me un me Mmor Support 7
- Cornputer Soeoshs4 Mejor Mejor me um na weier woor ne rr sn sx xn ar Penet Desse Spooshot ma weice weer ae ae sa sa ae Other Desir SpoosEst xx
- tar Anas ptsast-T=Ma t -
- Leser . Techrucat comership, tyt4t of o85ert mer be dwiegesed merer Maior shore ce enort
-Support . umor ehere of essort TABLE VI-1. TECHNICAL DISCIPUNES ASStGNED. BY TASK
NOTES TO TABLE VI-1
- 1. BECo personnel include seconded contractor personnel working under BECo supervision and BECo QA program.
- 2. 1/C means electrical, electronics, or controls engineers from the BECo Nuclear Engineering Department Control Systems Division. The Principal Investigator (Harren Babcock, Jr.) is included in this category.
- 3. Systems engineer means a senior engineer from the NED Systems and Safety Analysis Division. This discipline corresponds to the nuclear systems engineer in NUREG-0700.
- 4. Other design engineers means civil, mechanical, or electrical engineers assigned to specific corrective actions tasks (e.g., design of lighting improvements); or wh4;e knowledge of existing design is needed for data collection or for decisions on corrective actions.
- 5. Operations liaison for the 1989-90 period included Mr. Ken Taylor, an SRO, ,
who participated in the SFTA and related reviews; and Mr. Charles Leonard, ' a former SRO assigned to coordinate Operations Section involvement in the Design Review Team. Additional control room personnel were used as required in various tasks.
- 6. Miscellaneous support 1.;cludes Training Department personnel for procedure revisions, training on design changes, and coordination with the simulator for access and modification (personnel not specifically assigned to DCRDR). ,
- 7. Other design specialists means contractor eng'ineers delegated to design corrective actions (e.g., lighting improvements).
I i l VI-5
C. KEY INDIVIDUALS Key Boston Edison individuals on the project team for the 1989-90 efforts and their responsibilities were as follows:
- 1. Proiect Manaaer David A. Bryant is the DCRDR Project Manager. He has served as the Project Manager of the DCRDR since 1985 and will continue to have overall management responsibility for implementation of corrective actions and close-out of all items. He is responsible for the DCRDR budget,' schedule, and inter-group coordination. He reports to the Manager of the Nuclear Engineering Department.
- 2. Princioal Investiaator Harren Babcock Jr., is the Principal Investigator of the DCRDR. He has served as the DCRDR Principal Investigator since 1984 and will continue to serve as the technical lead of the Design Review Team.
He reports to the Control Systems Division Manager (in tu. Nuclear Engineering Department) and is responsible for understanding the applicable requirements (NUREG-0700) and applying them through the procedures described in this plan to produce appropriate design standards and corrective actions. Mr. Babcock is an experienced instrumentation and control engineer with substantial experience in panel design and additional training in human factors engineering.
- 3. Lead 1/C Desian Enaineer (Panel Imorovements)
Norman Eisenmann is the Lead I/C Design Engineer for DCRDR corrective actions. He reports to the Control Systems Division Manager (in NED) and is responsible for coordination of the panel-related corrective actions. Mr. Eisenmann supervists a group of contractor engineers preparing the corrective action design change packages, and also supervised portions of the recent data collection effort by General Physics. Mr. Eisenmann is an experienced instrumentation and control engineer with additional training in human factors. Mr. Eisenmann was a member of the Design Review Team.
- 4. Lead I/C Desian Enaineer (Annunciator Reolacement)
Robert Byrne is the Lead I/C Design Engineer for the annunciator replacementproject. He reports to the Control Systems Division Manager (in NED). He was responsible for supervising the recent annunciator conceptual design study, and is assigned to supervise the annunciator replacement design. Mr. Byrne is an experienced instrumentation and control engineer with additional training in human factors. l VI-6 P
E 2
=
- 5. . Lead Systems Enaineer
?
The lead systems engineer assigned to the DCRDR was Mr. David Gerlits II. His principal responsibility was the new System function and 7 - Task Analysis and associated tasks. Mr. Gerlits has held a Senior Reactor Operator's license, which facilitated the integration of the
')(
operating aspects with the engineering aspects of the SFTA. Mr. Gerlits was a member of the Design Review Team. Mr. David Long is _ replacing Mr. Gerlits in this role. Mr. Long is a former shift y technical advisor.
- 6. 0cerations Liaison Mr. Ken Taylor, a senior SRO, was the operations representative during the data collection phase, including the Task Analysis. L Charlie Leonard was assigned more recently as liaison between the engineering organization and the plant operations section.for the .
DCRDR project. Mr. Leonard formerly held a Senior Reactor Operator's license and has more than fifteen years of experience as a nuclear 7 '- plant operator and watch engineer. Mr. Leonard was the operations
-member of the Design Review Team.
E i 5 5 a VI-7
TABLE VI-2 PERSONNEu ASSIGNED TO DCRDR OR PROVIDING MAJOR SUPPORT Position Individual Participation Project Manager David A. Bryant
- Manages entire DCRDR project
.(full-time).
Control Systems Siben Dasgupta e Supervises all Cor. trol Systems Division Manager Division Engineers; responsible - for technical quality of all I/C tasks; manages ongoing HFE review of design changes initiated outside of DCRDR. Principal Harren Babcock, Jr.
- Lead technical advisor to Investigator Control Systems Div. Hgr.
for DCRDR; member of Control Systems Division, ongoing department responsibility for human factors aspects'of design process; responsible for design standards. Leaa W_ Design Norman Eisenmann e Lead for design of panel Engineer - Panel corrective actions; supervises contractor designers; supervised survey and inventory portions of data collection.
< Lead I/C Design Robert Byrne e Lead for annunciator conceptual Engineer - design study; lead for design of Annunctator- replacement annunctator.
Sr. Systems 'Javid H. Gerlits, II e_ Lead for systems engineering; Analysis Engineer- "Javid G. Long responsible for planning and supervision of-SFTA and related tasks. Operations Kenneth N. Taylor
- Coordinates Operations Liaison Charlie Leonard participation in all phases; contact for information and operations input.
I/C Engineers John Turner .
- Responsible for design of Robert L. Poltrino* assigned corrective actions; Robert F. Foley* reporting to Control Systems Richard Poznysz* Division.
1 Charles Greland* (Table continues on next page) VI-8
(Table-VI-2, cont'd) Contractor E.L. (Rett) Considine
- Conceotuti design of control Control Panel (General Atomics) panel enhancements system.
Improvements Designer Human factors Danna M. Beith
- Assistance in program design Consultant (Human Factors and enhancements design; Interfaces) responsible to plan and develop an integrated design manual.
Human factors Generai Physics
- Lead for 1989-90 data collection Consultants for Corporation -- and analysis, including updated 1989-90 DCROR Lotb r Schroeder inventory and survey, SFTA, Update Effort "'.ane Wisniewski and Design K' view Team Neil Danzig Screening Process. Assists in Mark Venters design of corrective actions Jeff Klein and verification of corrective (and others) actions; project lead HFE.
Opet.tions Section Leon Olivier
- Supervises all ccatrol room Manager operators and associated staff; provides guidance on DCRDR scope and direction, and resources for SFTA and related activities.
Simulator Thomas Beneduci e Coordination and support for all Division Hanager activities in simulator. - Notes to Table
- 1. Only currently or recently assigned key individuals are listed. Many other personnel have contributed or will contribute.
- 2. Personnel designated with
- are seconded contractor personnel working under BECo supervision and QA program.
.3. See resumes in Appendix C.
l l VI-9
'l-l I APPENDI2LA REFERENCES A-1
APPENDIX A MfERENCES (1) Detailed Control Room Design Review; Executive Summary Report; Doc. No. BECo/ESR-1 September 1984, Rev. 1; Boston Edison Co. (2) Detailed Control Room Design Review; Supplementary Summary Report; April 1989; Boston Edison Co.; forwarded to NRC by letter BECo 89-064 dated May 2, 1989 (3) In-Progress Audit Reports of Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCROR) and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) -- Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station; reports forwarded by NRC letter dated April 26, 1989, from Daniel G. Mcdonald to Ralph G. Bird, Boston Edison Co.;
Reference:
TAC , Number 59239 (4) Detailed Control Room Design Review; Program Plan; June 1984, Rey, 1; Boston Edison Co. (5) Safety Evaluation by tl.e Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the Detailed Control Room Design Review for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, ! Docket No. 50-293; forwarded by NRC letter dated May 16, 1985 (D. B. Vassallo to H. D. Harrington) (6) = Detailed Control Room Design Review; Program Plan, Rev. 2. July 1989; Boston Edison Co.; forwarded to NRC by letter BECo 89-112 dated July 24, 1989 (7) Report on Control Panel. Enhancements; Boston Edison Co., June 1989; Attachment (A) to letter.BECo 89-102 dated July 6, 1989 (8) Preliminary Engineering Scope of Hork for Control Room Design Review Including SFTA, OER, Inventory and Survey; Boston Edison Co., Nuclear Engineering Department, Specification No. E548, Rev. O, dated July 1989 , (9)' Boston Edison Company Nuclear Engineering Department Hork Instruction No. 344, Revision-1, dated May 18, 1987. " Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancies." (10)- NRC' letter dated November 6, 1989, from Daniel G. Mcdonald to Ralph G. _ Bird, re: " Detailed Control Room Design Review Supplemental Summary Report and Program. Plan, Revision 2 " Reference TAC ~ Number 59329 (11) Boston Edison Company Nuclear Engineering Department Work Instruction l' No. 392, Revision 1, dated December 12, 1988. " Process for Documentation of New Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) and. Verification of Design and Implementation Completion for Correction of HEDs" (12) Boston Edison Company Nuclear Engineering Department Procedure No. 3.02,
" Preparation, Review Verification, Approval and Revision of Design Documents.for Plant Design Char;es" (13) Boston Edison. Company Nuclear Organization Procedure No. N0P 83El, '
" Control of Modifications for Pilgrim Station" A-2
g , l 1 F i5 i APPENDIX B
- HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES v
b
- i .
5 i B-1
APPENDIX B HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES This listing includes al' the Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) referred to throughout this report, including both the "old" HEDs (from the 1984 CROR effort) and the "new" HEDs found in the 1989-90 CROR update. ~ Data included in this listing is as follows: The first 5 digits (e.g., 1B005) are the HED numbers as used in E[0 Number: the first DCROR Summary Report (Reference 1) and in the Supplementary Summary Report (Reference 2). The suffixes used in some places in Reference 1 have been dropped, because they referred to the original program of corrective actions. E.g., HED #4B048.4.4 is referred to here simply as 4B048. As discussed in Section II, some HEDs were assigned to more than ene implementation category. In those cases, the HED number has been suffixed with a letter. For example, HED 18005 has been defined as HE0 180056 in In effect, each such HED part is Category 1 and as HED 1B005B in Category 5. bs being tracked as a distinct HEO. Such In addition, a few HEDs required investigation before the next step. HEDs are identified with the suffix I. The system for numbering HEDs is further defined in the original Program Plc.1 (Reference 4, Section 4.4.2). Imolementation Cateaory: This refers to the pre-screening categories defined in Table 11-5 of this report. 1989-90 CROR Source: A code of "GP" in the column identifies an HED from the update effort. CR Panel #: Panel (s) to which the HED applies. HED Descriotion: This description is reproduced from the computer database.
-Note that the same description is repeated for HEOs that have been divided into two or three categories; the distinct scope for each part of the HED is not described here.
B-2
15:05:31 19 NOV 9990 PCCE 1 1 NED 8.. I MPL . CR P ANE L # . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SOUR CE HED DESCR I P T I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CATEG C3113 7 NA- HOW 00 YOU MAINTAIN YOUR TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY 7 Lack of STA simulator training for retaining and updating technical proficiency. TEMPERATL5RE & HUMIDITY (Comfort Zone): Touching the instrunent f ace to 0B123 3 All ver can influence the instruaent reading due to a static charge due t o f riction of the operators feet on the floor R.G.1.97 (TABLE 2, TYPE C) RE0 VIRES PROVIDING INDICATIONS OF EFFLtKNT OS203 7 C170 GP RADICACTIVITY IN A RANGE OF.10E-6 TO 10E3 MICRO Ci/cc. EFFLUENT RADI OACTIVITY INSTRUMENTATION ON PANEL 170 (RR-1001-608 RAI-T001-608, RA!
-1001-609, AND RAl-1001-610) PROVIDES INFORM GP E0P5 REQUIRE IDENTIFYING TORUS WATER LEVEL AT VALUES OF. 130,127,82.46 08220 7 C17D
-300, AND 183 INCHES. THESE VALUES ARE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE ACCURATEL Y USING EXISTING INSTRUMENTATION ON THE BOARDS (SEE ALSO HEO #208).
OCO24 7 NA DO ANY COPaMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS INTERFERE WITH CONTROL ROOM OPERATIONS 7 General Regairements (Plug-in Jacks): There is er insufficient number of plug-in phone jack positions at the console panets (one at either end of the control room panets). OCO27 6 N/A GP A WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE TEST (REQUIRED BY TECH SPECS) OF STATION 250 VOL T BATTERIES WAS MISSED. OCO28 6 C941 GP THE REMOVAL OF A IUSE FROM THE POWER SUPPLY OF A LOGIC CIRCUIT (WHILE "A" TRAIN VENTILATI SHUTDOWN) RESULTED IN THE AUTOMATIC CLOSING OF THE ON DAMPERS OF THE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AND THE AUTOMATIC ST ART OF THE "A" TRAIN OF THE SCS/ STANDBY GAS TRE OCO29 6 C903 GP WHILE IN COLD SHUTDOWN AND AS PART OF SHUTDOWN COOLING (PROCCDURE 2.2. 86), OPERATORS WERc DIRECTED TO CPEN VALVE MO-1001-53 AND MO-1001-47. THIS ACTION FLOODED THE RHR*s LOOP A SUCTION PIPES AND REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL DECREASED BELOW SETPOINT. R.G.1.97 (TABLE 2, TYPE D) REQUIRES PROV! DING INDICA ,10NS WITH A RANG OC087 6 C903 GP - E OF 40 DEGREES F TO 440 DEGREES F FOR INFORMATION FfGARDING DRYWEtt A TMOSPHERE TEMPERATURE. RECORDER TRU-9044 HAS A RANtE OF 0-400 DEGREES F. OC099 4 C220,C221 GP EQUIPMENT ON PANEL DOES NOT MEET HUMAN FACTORS STANDfItDS. OC100 7 N/A CP AN UNPLANNED SCRAM OCCURRED DURING PLANT STARTUP. WAT R LEVEL WHICH WA S FLUCTUATING WAS BEING CONTROLLED W1TH THE STARTUP RIGutATING VALVE. A LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL OCOiRRED BEFORE OPENING DOWNSTREAM BLOCK VAL VES AND PLACING A L :ECULA".ING VALVE IN SER GP WHILE Iw COLD SHUTDOWN, OPERATOR ATTEMPTED TO RESET BRE AkER SA-CB1A BY 1A011 4 0915 OPENING AND CLOSING IT THUS DE-ENERG12!NG LOGIC CIRCU!TRY AND CAUSING
'A SCRAM SIGNAL.
GP DURING A SEMI-ANNUAL' SURVE1LLANCE TEST, AN OMRATOR INADVERTENTLY "0VE 1A012 5 C7
[n t~jz f .' - _ j .
-13:05:s1. 19 Nov 1990 PRGE 2 SOURCE HED DESCRIPTI0ii.......................................................
kED #.. IMPL. CR PANEL #........;...... CATEG 0 THE ILEY-LOCKED RBis CHANNEL' A CDNTROL SWITCH TO THE
- TEST" POSITION INSTEAD OF THE " TEST LOGIC
- POSITION. THIS RESULTED IN ACTUATION OF SG
' TS.
9A013 5 C7 GP . INVENTORY #1462 TO #1509 CONTROLS ARE ALL SELOW THE STANDARD C 25.8 i NCHES. 1 A *l7 3 N/A :GP EMERGENCY LIGHTING IS NEEDED IN THE WATCH ENGINEER'S OFFICE FOR REVIEW ING THE EMERCENCY CLASSIFICATION CHART (SCENARIO #5). ACCESS 181LITf of INSTRUMENT /EOU1PMENT instru m at3 m requiring contin 18001 6 C7 uous monitcring by operators during emergency oper,'. eons: Pane 1 C7: Drywett tepperatures,' 81358, 1361 Contairment purge and vent controt
, #1412,1413, 1447,1448,1449,1450,1451,1452,1453.1454,1 0 5,1456, 1472
,1473 Torus tenperature, #1427,1428 FURNITURE'AND EQUIPMENT LAYOUT: There is a timited amount of work spac 18002 6 Near 905 e for the operator. The space avaitable is used to hold two printers and a copputer terminal. This observation is st.gported by OER-001.
g NA SUPEenr!SOR ACCESS: Shift Supervisors' Office (Watch Engineer) does not 18003 6 permit pro $t physical access to the control room. In addition, ther e is no dedicated comunications link between these two spaces. This H E0 is supported by observations OER-005' AND OER-010. 18005
$TAND-17 CONSOLE D!MENSIONS (Disptmy Meight and Orientation)i Disptsys 18005A 1 903,04,05,C1,2,3 that exceed 80 in. in height include att the annunicator penets, con tainment isolation mimic and the upper portion of the rod indicator ti ghts. These are: Panet 903: 8538,539,540 and upper portion of the cent ainment isolation mimic.' Panel 904: #780,781,782 Panel 905: #1033,1034 and toper portion of the rod indicator tights. Panet C2: #128,149 Pan
-et C1: #1,38 Panet C3: #234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,24 5, 246,247,243 ST AND-UP CONSOLE O!MENSIONS (Display Height and Orientation): Displays 18005B 5 903,04,05,C1,2,3 that exceed 80 in. in height include att the annunicator panets,' con tainment isolation mimic and the upper portion of the red indicator ti ghts. These are: Panel 903: #538,539,540 and esper portion of the cent ainment isolation mimic. Panet 904: #780,781,782 Panet 905: #1033,1034 and upper portion of the red indicator tights. Panet C2: #128,149 Pan et C1: #1,38 Panet C3: #234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,24 5, 246,247,248 18008 ~
USE OF PROCEDURES AND OTHER PEFE9ENCE MAT'ERIALS AT CONSOLES: No provis 18008A 6 e NA ion for use of procedures and other reference materlat at the console - - -- ,- - a; - - . .,
.M m m .., o f~
_ y -..
.15:05:01 19 NOV 1990 PAGE 3 IMPL. CR PANEL W .............. SOURCE HED DESCRIPTION.......................................................
NED #.. CATEG o s (benchboards). No provis NA tJSE OF PROCEDURES AND OTHER REFERENCE MATERI ALS AT CONSOLES: 180089 7 ion for use of procedures and other reference material at the console s (benchboards). There is inadequate work station (space) to perf orm a DESK DIMENSIONS: 18009 6 NA 4ninistrative tasks. This othervation is stoported by CER-001. VENTILATION (Air Quantity): Fresh air introduced into the controt room 18011 3 NA is not adequate. This observation is supported by UER-006. The variability and control of ( JLLLM] NATION (Levels and Unif ormity): 18012 3 NA ighting levels do not conf orm to the guidelire criteria. See tighting survey - tuminance record. Glare and reflectance on instrum ILLtMINATION (Clare and Reflectance): 18013 3 Att ent f aces is produced by the overhead tight placement. This observati on is supported by CER-003. The continuous ba AUDITORY ENVIRONMENT (Limit and Noise Distractions): 18014 3 NA ekground noise created by the pager system and printers is annoying a nd produces distractions to *he operators. See sound survey record. Th is observation is stpported by OER-007. ACCESSIBILITY OF INSTRtMENT/ EQUIPMENT (Arranged to f acilitate coverage 18015 5 915,917
): Instrumentation requiring continuous monitoring by operators durin g emergency operations located on back penets 915 and 917 are the sera a solenoid lights and MSlv isolation lights (2). This observation is su pported by CER-001.
SEE 18015 180151 ACCESSIBILITY OF INSTRUMENTATION /E0VIPMENT (Present in the Control Roo 18128 6 NCR m): In executing the task " Start N2 Flow to DW for Additional Cooling a (4T: 39.00), verification of N2 system pressure can only be done outs ide the control room. SEE 18128 A DOOR IS LOCATED D: 9ECTLY BEN!ND THIS PANEL THAT SWINGS OPEN TouARD T 181283 GP 18147 3 C220.C221 HE PANEL. SUFFICIENT SPACE DOES NOT EXIST FOR AN OFERATOR AND THE OPE N DOOR. 1645 ARE ABOVE THE 70 INCH LIMIT. GP _ INVENTORY LINE #1641,1642, AND 18159 2 C902 GP THE LATERAL SPREAD FOR C7 IS 120 INCHES. 18163 5 C7 GP INVENTORY #1439,#1448,#1454 TO #T456, AND #1462 To #1509 CONTROLS Att 18164 5 C7 FALL BELOW 34 INCHES. INVENTORY #1351 AND #1352 ARE ABOVE 70 INCHES. GP INVENTORY #1459 To #1463 ALL FALL BELOW 41 INCPES. 18165 5 C7 LIGHTING LEVELS 00 NOT MEET MINIMUM RE001 ret *ENTS ON VERTICAL PATL SUR GP 18221 3 N/A
' FACES.
DOCE 4 55:05:02 ~19 Nov 1990 NED #,. !MPL. CR PANEL #............... SOURCE HED DESCRIPTION..................................;.................;.. CATEG 18222 3 N/A GP LIGHTING OOES NOT MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR UN!FORMITY WITHIN TASK AREAS 0 N CERTAIN PANELS. 18223 3 N/A GP CONTROL' ROOM EMERGENCY ILLtJM14ATION LEVELS ARE LESS THAN 10 FOOTCANDLE S FOR PANELS C1, C2, C3, C905, C904, C903, C171, C170, C7, C902 C910, C911, AND C4 1C001 7 NA ' DOCLNENT ORGANIZATION AND STORAGE: Locatico aids to access a m repriate procedures do not conform to guideline criteria to identify, disting uish and access docunmts. In a<ifition, .the documents are not protecte d against wear.- 10002 7 NA ' SPARE PARTS, OPERATING EXPENDA8tES AND TOOLS: Spare parts are not read
.ity accessible. The storage space is timited and tt'ere is no inventor
'y accounting to ensure that an adequate supply of spares and eypendabi les is readily available.-
1C003 6 903 STAND-tJP CONSOLE DIMENSIEWS (Control Feight): Controts that exceed 63
'in. on the benchboard penets are: Panet 903: vibration meter subpanet
#587,591,592,594,599. Controts that are tocated below 34 in. in heigh t are: Panet 903: HPCI inverter (toggle switch) Panel 904: RCIC invert er (toggle switch) 10004 7 NA OPERATOR PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (Types of Equipment): No protective equi pment other than the Scott Air Paks are available in the controt room 1C005 2 NA ILLUMINATION (Shadowing): Labets below instrumentation on vertical pan ets are shadowed.'This is especially true for recorders which project beyond the panet surface.
1C006 6 NA No space is provided for personal storage. 1CO25 6 905 CONSISTENCY DF MANNING WITH EQUIPMENT LAYOUT (COVERAGE): The overhead TV monitor used to ' display cormuter generated data at the 905 canet i s not located in a convenient position for operator viewing. This obse rvation is supported by OER-002. 1C026 7 NA OPERATOR PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (Expmdables): There are no replacement air tanks that are readity available. 1CO36 7 C76 GP A SINGLE STEP DOWN TO THE PRIMARY CPER7 TING AREA COULD CAUSE A TRIPPIN G HAZARD. 1C041 7 C921 GP THERE ARE TWO HOLES IN PANEL C921 WHERE TWO ANNUNCIATOR TILE ARE MISSI NG. 1C045 6 N/A GP THE $1MPLEX CPU IS tJNCOVERED AND UNPROTECTED. ITEMS COULD ACCIDENTLY D ROP INTO THE PRINTER OR INTO THE KEYBOARD. 1C060 2 C1 CP INVENTORY ITEM #14 IS 80 INCHES FROM THE FLOOR 1C062 7 C7 GP PANEL C7 IS A BACK PA9EL THAT MAS ONLY 40 INCHES OF SEPARATION RETWEEN AN OPPOSING SURFACE m _
~:
PQGE 5 ~ 75:05:02- 19 NOV 1990 HED r . . I MPL . CR PA NE L f .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . SOURCE HED DE SCR I P T I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CATEG 1C063 5 C7 GP INVENTORY #1351 & 1352 CONTROLS ARE 74.25 INCHES H!GH. THEY SHOULO BE NO HIGHER THAM 73.6 INCHES. 1C064 5 CP600 GP INVENTORY #520 To #533 COMPONENTS ARE BELOW THE REQUIREMENT OF THE 95T H PERCENTILE MALE (25.8 INCHES). THESE CONTROLS ARE AT 20 INCHES. 1CO67 7 C76- CP FLOWCMARTS ARE DIFFICULT TO USE BECAUSE THERE IS NO LAYDouN AREA FOR T HEM. THE EASEL NOW BEING USED IS TOO SMALL AND FACES AWAY FROM THE PA NELS (SCENARIO #1,4,5,7,10,12,14,15). 1C105 3 N/A GP LIGHTING LEVELS VARY BETWEEN GIVEN TASK AREAS. 1C106 3 N/A CP LABELS, INSTRUCTIONS, AND OTHER WRITTEN INFORMATION ARE IN SHADouED PO SITIONS WHEN THE OPERATOR'S MAND AND BODY ARE !N THE NORMAL POSITION F OR READING OR OPERATING. 28016 6 NA CONVENTIONAL POWERED TELEDHONE SYST*- (Handsets): The phon *s at the sh ift supervisor *s 6,orkstation are not identified oe coded by circuit o r function. It should be noted that the cormonications equipnent at th is workstation is " jury rigged" and not imettonalty arrangad. Some ph ones are inoperative and others broken or not connected to a tive cire uit. This observation is supported by CER-005. 20017 7 NA ANNOUNCING SYSTEM (Intettigibility and Coverage): Loud speaker voice m essages camot be heard in some rotating machinery areas, e.g., diese l generator space. Speaking from noisy areas masks the voice enessage. This observation is supported by OER-011. 20018 6 NA ANNOUNCING SYSTEMS (Loudspeaker Vot.sne)- Speaker gain control can redu ce volune below audible level. This obsu <ation is supported by CER-0 07. 20019 6 NA ANNOUNCING SYSTEMS (Priority): Chamet 3 is reserved for emergency or control room voice traffic but there is no priority procedure or capa bility for interrupting an announcement in progress. 2B020 6 NA POINT-TO-POINT INTERCOM SYSTEMS: There is no point-to-point intercom b etween the control room and the watch engineer's office. This observe tion is supported by OER-010. 2B021 7 NA EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS (Equipment Usability and voice Comunications
) Voice consnunications white wearing a f ace inask is unsatisf actory. T his observation is supported by OER-008.
2B022 7 NA FIXED BASE VHF TRANSCEIVERS (Procedures): Procedures are written for t his system but not posted. 2B179 2 C7 CP THE SRO HAD TO LEAVE SUPr.RVISOR'S STATION AND WALK BACK TO PANEL C7 TO RECEIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE OPERATOR UNO WAS THERE MONITORING EQUIPMENT
. A DIRECT COMMUNICATION LINE TO C7 WOULD BE BENEFICI AL (SCENARIO #4).
20009 6 NA ANNOUNCING SYSTEM (General): The 5 voice channets are continuously in
~- - - - - - -
M m . 1
-15:05:02 19 NOV 1990 PACE 6 NED #.. IMPL. CR PANEL W............... SOURCE HED DESCRIPTION.......................................................
CATEC use. During plant shutdown, when contractors are at the plant, they g enerate nuisance sounds that interferes with controt room connunicatio ns. This observation is in support of OER-007. C170,C171 SIGNAL INTENStTY (Comfort): The PAM alarm and fire alarm produce sound 20010 1 s inat are a discomfort to the operator. READABILITY (False Alarms): Fire alarm is activated by cigarette smoke 20011 7 NA in areas of the Administration Building, CGntrol Room Annex and Secu rity Alarm Station (SAS). 20069 7 C171 GP THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION AS TO WHETHER SAFETY VALVES AND SAFETY RELIEF VALVES COULD BE USED INTERCHAbGEABLY (SCENARIO R9). 2C071 2 N/A GP THE LOCATION OF CONTR0tS FOR PACE Ptt0NES ON THE LOWER CONS 08.ES NECESSI TATES THAT OPERATORS STOOP AND LOSE SOME MOBILITY WHEN COMMUNICATING W ITH THESE OEVICES (SCENARIO #10). 20101 7 N/A CP SCREEN 040 (max CORE UNCOVERY TIME LIMIT) USES A LOGARITHMIC SCALE. 3A014 1 C3 GP ALARMS ON THE PANEL C3 SIDE OF THE CONTROL ROOM ARE TOO OUIET (SUBJECT IVELY). THOSE ON THE C170/171 ARE TOO LOUD (SCENARIO #1,5,12). OPERAT ORS ALSO hAD SOME DIFFICULTY LOCALIZING ALARMS (SCENARIO #12,15). 3B023 1 NA ALARM PARAMETER SELECTION (General Alarms): There are severat alarms t hat require controt room operators to direct auxiliary or equipment o perators to various parts of the plant to identify trouble, e.g., C60 ventilation problem. This observation is supported by OER-047. 38024 1 902, 904, 905 ALARM PARAMETER SELECTION (Multi-channet or Shared Alarms): There are at least 5 alarms that are shared: Panel 904: TORUS THOUGH ALARM Hl/L 0 #782. Panel 904: RECIRC PUMP OIL LEVEL HI/LO #781. Panel 904: DRyuCL L PRESSURE HI/LO #780. Panel 904: REACTOR WATER HI/LO LEVEL #1033. Pan et C1: A/8/C SERVICE WATER PtAM LOW DISCHARGE PRESSURE #38. This obse rvation is supported by t~d-014. FIRST-OUT ANNUNCI ATORS (Reactor Sys'em and Turbine Generator System): 3B025 1 905,C2 There is no first-out annunciator foe either the. reactor system or th e turbine generator system. This observat'on is subcorted by OER-013. NA PRIORITIZATION (Levels of Priority): There h a lack of a systematic a 38026 1 P nn. prioritization scheme. The tiles that shoud be prioritized are: anet 903: HPCI ISOLMED, OFF GAS T'#E INITI ATED. Panet 904: PCIC ISOLA TELD, CLEAN-tJP HI TEPP, NONREGEN "*, DRYWELL PRESS. HI/LO - RECIRC M/G SET A GEN LOCKOUT, - .RECIRC M/', SET B GEN LOCKOUT. Panet 905: Rn WATE R Hf /LO LEVEL, - Rx Li PRESS. Fanet C1: RIP TRIP - A/B/C TRIP COND'PtM P TRIP, - OFF-GAS L!'JE GAS FULLY OPEN. A OR B SEAVATER PUMP TRIP, - TB CCW PtpP TRIP Panet C2: TURBINE STM SEAT. HDR LO PRESS, - INSTR. AIR OR N2 LV!. TO DRP.rELL Panet 03: INST POWER 1RANSTER, - RFS M/G SET A B(R
' ' ' ~ -
' ^
- ' 'I1 iW ' '_ , _ - --s- 'w .
'--Y -- - " - - - --
- :- -i W-- - - -' -
t
u PDCE F E:05:02- 19 NOV 1990 HE D s. . I MPL . CR P ANE L #. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SOURCE HE D DE SCR I P T I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CATEG TRIP, - RPS M/G SET 8 BKR TRIP, - STATOR COOLING WATER. THIS OBSERVATI ON SUPPORTED BY OER-015. 38027 1 NA CLEARED ALARMS (Auditory Signat): There is no distinct audible signal to distinguish cleared starms from alerting alarms. 38028 1 NA VISUAL ANNUNCIATOR PANELS (Location): Some annunciator 'iles are on di fferent panels than their controts (e.g., the OFFGAS Tl"ER tite is on Panet 903 with associated controt on Panet C1). This observation is s opported by OER-017. 38029 1 NA VISUAL ANNUNCIATOR PANELS (Labeling): Individual annunciator panels er e rot at t labeled. 38030 1 NA VISUAL ANNUNCIA10R PANELS (Lamp Reptacement): Operators have reported being shocked white replacing bulbs as welt as shorting out the entir e annunciator panet. This observation is supported by OER-020. 38031 1 905 VISUAL ALARM RECOGNITION AND IDENTIFICATION (Contrast Detectability): The opaque yettow annunciators on panel 905 (81033) are difficutt to distinguish between 'ON' and '0FF' states. This observation is stgport ed by the annunciator OER-049. 38032 1 NA VISUAL ALARM RECOGNITION AND IDENTIFICATION (" Dark" Annunciator Annunc iators are fit to indicate equipment is out of service (continuous). This observation is in support of OER-019. 38033 1 NA ARRANGEMENT OF VISUAL ALARM TILES (Labeling of Axes): Annunciator pane is are not tabeled to conform with this criteria. 38034 1 905 ARRANGEMENT OF VISUAL ALARM TITLES (Pattern Recognition): There are 63 tiles on each annmciator penet of 905. This exceeds tie maximum mat rix density.of 50 tites suggested in the guideline criteria. 38035 1 NA ARRANCEMENT OF VISUAL ALARM TILES (Pattern Recognition): Tiles are not grouped try togical organization because of changes subsequent to the original design. This Observation is st4 ported by OER-049. 38036 1 NA VISUAL TILE LEGENDS (Unambiguous and Abbreviations) Some contain exces sive information and others contain insufficient information. In addi tion, abbreviations and acronyms are not used consistently on att time s e.g., Delta-;/Diff Press, REAC/ Reactor /Rx. This observation is suppo rted by annunciator OER strenary. 38037 1 NA VISUAL TILE LEGENDS (Singularity and Specificty): Some tiles refer the operator to annunciator penets outside the main control area. In add ition, there are tiles that alarm for two corvJitions, e.g., DRYWELL H!
/LO. Also K COMPUTER alarm on renet 905 refers operator to corputer on panet C7. This observation is supported by OER-014 and OER-17.
38038 1 NA VISUAL TILE READABILITY (Distance and Letter Dimensions and Spacing): m
- - ~ ~ .~ n --n v
~
- 15:05:03 19 NOV 1990 PAGE- 8-
~ . - - - ' -- - ' " ' ' ' ' * ~ '
MCE HED DE SCR I M 10N . m . - - . . ~ ~ . u n HE D W. . I MPL.. CR P ANE L L . . . . - ~ . . - CATEG The lettering size on the amunciator tiles do not conform to the gui
. detine criteriaJ This observation is steported by CER-016.
Y!SUAL TILE REASABILITT (Type Style): The letter type style and size d 35039 1 NA
' if fer on the arvunciator lettering. This observation is stsported by OER-016.
VISUAL ftLE READABILITY (tegend Contrast): There are severat annunciat 38040 1 NA 905 *1034) or tiles that have tight letters on dark background (panel 2 8 and pan
. Other annunciators are tabeled using dynotape (panet C3 # 1.
et 905 W1033). Att contro CONTROL SET DESIGN (Positioning of Repetitive Groups etc.): NA 38043 1 I set designs are not atike, e.g., Panel C7 has two sets, one horizon tat and one vertical. Panet C6 onty has two unhbuttons and CT70 has t bree pushbuttons arranged in a triangular formation. Tiles 1 ARRANGEMENT OF VISUAL ALARM TILES (Out of Service Alarms etc): 38044 T NA abeled far equipment that has not been used and will not be used are stilt included on the anntnciator penets, e.g., PLANT HEAT EXCHANGERS A AND B. This observation le supported by OER-018, SIGNAL DETECTION (Intensity): There is a large discrepancy in the audi 38045 NA 1 ble alarm intensities. The PAM alarm is too high and the alarm intens ity on penets C1, C2 and C3 are too tow. This obsuvation is surported by CER-021. SICNAL DETECTION (Identification): The auditory alarm does not provide 38047 1 NA for workstation or system identification. This observation is stopor ted by OER-019. The annunc ALARM PARAMETER SELECTION (Multi-channet or Shared Alarms): 3C012 1 NA intor system does not have a reftash capability. GP THE "HPCI TORUS PIPING HIGH TEMP" (TS-2340-SA) ANNUNCIATOR HAS A PRESS 3C042 1 C921
-04 OVERSIZED LABEL.
C904 GP THIS SYSTEM USES "HOME-MADE" ALARMS ON PAEEL R ATHER THAM USING ANNUNC1 3C097 4 ATOR SYSTEM. ROTARY SELECTOR CONTROLS (Positioning): No positive detent feedback fo 4A003 6 905 r reactor mode switch on Panet 905 (#1264). handles are the same f Att "J" GENERAL PRINCIPALS (Htsnan Suitability): 4801.5 2 Att or ptrps, valves and switches - some of two position, others are " jog
" - poor discrimination by function or mode of operation. This observa tion is supported by OER-023. Panet PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL ACTIVATION (Movable Instrument air Covers nitrog or Guarcs):
48049 2 C3 C3: Switch 8410 should be guarded. Back Penets: en to drywatt and Fu heater block valves ware identified during the OE
=- ^ - - - ,= n.
35:05:03 thNOV1990 - PGGE 9 HED W.. .!MPL. CR PANEL #............... SOURCE HED DESCRIPT!0N....................................................... CATEG R as' controls.that should be guarded. This observation is supported by CER-026. 48050 '2 C1, C3, %4 PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL ACT!VATION (Movable Covers or Guards): Protec tive covers on controts that interfere with adjacent controts: Panet
- C1: Controt #122 interferes with controt #107,119 and 120. Panet C3:
Controt #425 interferes with controt #403. Panet 904: Contret #955 int erferes with controt #960.' 48051 48051A 2 904, C3, C7 DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT: Controts that violate population stereotype are
- Panet 904: Rotary fi vger switches #945, 951, 952, 956 cconterctockw ise move- ment to open. Panet C3: Lotary handswitch #356, 372, 377, 38 0, 404, 4% cotnterctockwise to increase (raise). Panet C7: Rotary fin ge controt s #1357, 1359, 1360, 1362, 1377, 1379, 1380, 1382, 1385, 13 s 87, 1388, 1390,.1391, 1392, 1394, 1395, 1397, 1398, 1399 increase coun terclockwise. DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT (Cont.) Panet C7: Photos show that "J" handles #1413, 1448, 1454, 1455, 1477 have operator notation that indicates control movement viotates population sterotype permanent tab ets on the controls. Panet C2: #192, 206, 207, 208, 215, 216 turn coun terctockwise to raise and clockwise to tower. This observation is supp orted by OER-024.
48051B 4 904, C3, C7 DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT: Controts that violate population stereotype are
- Panet 904: Rotary finger switches #945, 951, 952, 956 counterctockw ise move- ment to open. Panet C3: Rotary handswitch #356, 372, 377, 38 0, 404, 406 counteretockwise to increase (raise). Panet C7: Rotary fin ger cont roi s #1357, 1359, 1560, 1362, 1377, 1379, 1380, 1382, 1385, 13 87, 1388, 1390, 1391, 1392, 1394, 1395, 1397, 1398, 1399 increase coun terctockwise. DIRECT!ON OF MOVEMENT (Cont.) Panet C7: Photos shes that "J" handtes #1413,14 4,1454,1455,1477 have operator notation that indicates control movement violates population sterotype permanent tab ets on the controls. Panet C2: #192, 206, 207, 208, 215, 216 turn coun terctockwise to raise and clockwise to tower. This observation is st4p orted by OER-024.
48051C 6 904, C3, C7 DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT: Controts that violate population stereotype are
- Panet 904: Rotary finger switches #945, 951, 952, 956 counteretockw ise move- ment to open. Panet C3: Rotary handswitch #356, 372, 377, 38 u, 404, 406 counterctockwise to increase (raise). Panet C7: Rotary fin ger cont rot s #1357, 1359, 1360, 1362, 1377, 1379, 1380, 1'#82, 1385, 13 87, 1388, 1390, 1391, 1392, 1394, 1395, 1397, 1398, 1399 increase coun terctockwise. DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT (Cont.) Panet C7: Photos show that n _ _ __ .. __ _.. . _ . _ . . _ - __ __, - _ _ - . _ - -
13:05:03 19 wCV 1990-POGE1 10 HED #.. I MPL . CR P A NE L #. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SQJRCE HED DE SCR I PT ! 04. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CATEG "J" handtes #1413, 1448, 1454, 1455, 1477 have operator notation that indicates controt movemeat violates population sterotype permanent tab els on the controts. Panet 2: #192. c206, 207, 208, 215, 216 turn coun
' terctockwise to raise and clockwise to tower. This observation is st.pp orted by OER-024.
4B05*! SEE 4B051C C(DING OF CONTROLS (Consistency): There is a limited amount of color e 48052 2 Att oding on the "J" jog controls. On panet C1 and C3 some controts are c
- olor coded but there is no consistent pattern throug* tout the controt r oom.' This observation is supported ty OER-023.
48053 2 C1,C3 CCOING OF CONTROLSL(Location Coding): Mirror imaging of controls. Pane t C3: Mirror image controls #348/351; 349/350; 356/372; 357/371; 358/
" 370; 377/380; 378/379; 388/402. Panet C1: Mirror image controts #97/98
; 99/100. This observation is supported by OER-045.
Att CODING OF CONTROLS (Shape Coding): Shace coding of controts is not use 48054 2
- d. The OER identified that the vacutsn breakers and containment air va tve controts were too close to each other and identical in shape makin 9 accidental activation possible on Panet C7. This observation is supp orted tg OER-023.
Att CODING DF CONTROLS (Color Coding): Except for Panet C3 there is no cot 48055 2 or coding association between controts and displays. The color coded jog 'J' handtes (green) do not adequately contrast with panet backgrou nd. 4B056 2 905 LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS (Discriminability): The rod selector pushbuttons on the bench board are the same in size and appear- ance as the tegend displays on the vertical portion of this penet. In addition, there ere other tegend pushbuttons and tegend labets on the verticot portion of panet 905 which are identical in size and shape. 905 LEGEND PUSHBUTTONS (Barriers): No barriers provided for contiguous pus 48057 2 hbuttons. Panet 905. ROTARY SELECTOR CONTROLS (Position Indication): Centrots on panel C1, 48058 2 C1
#56 and 57 do not have position indicating line down the side of the rotary controt knob. This condition may appear on other controts but c ould not be identified f rom the mockup photogra#ts.
48059 PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL ACTIVATION (Resistance to Movemant): During t 48059A 6 905 he OER, operators reported that rod centrol switch #1268 and notch ov erride switch #1261 have excessive spring toading. This ob ervation is supported by OER-025. -- ==_= - - - - - - - - - - .- a- -- - -- i - - - - - - - - -- ---- _ ~- - - ------ --- - -
15:05:03' 19 Nov 1990 PAGE 19 HED W.. I MPL. CR PA CE L W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SOUR CE HE D DESCR t P T I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CAYEG PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL ACTIVATION (Resistance to Povemmt): During t . 480598 7 905 he OER, operators reported that rod controt' switch #1268 and notch ov erride switch #1261 have excessive spring toeding. This observation is supported by OER-025. 48060 CENERAL PRikCIPtES (Economy): Controls not used or not connected are: 46060A 2 See below Panet 903: #638, 663, 677, 645, 690, 589 Panel 904: 8927,1023,997,100 1,1013,1017 Panet 905: #1257 Panet C2: #221 Panet CP600: #512 GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Economy): The key switch on controt #512 viotates tech sp ecs ard should be removed and circuit frozen in position 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Econerny): Controls not used or not connected are: 480609 4 See tetou - Panet 903: #638, 663, 677, 645, 690, 589 Panet 904: #927,1023,997,100 1,1013,1017 Panet 905: #1257 Panet C2: #221 Panet CP600: #512. GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Economy): The key switch on centrot #512 violates tech sp ecs and should be removed and circuit frozen in position 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Economy): t;ontrols not used or not connected are: 48060C 6 See below Panet 903: #638, 663, 677, 645, 690, $89 Panet 904: #927,1023.997,100 1,1013,1017 Panel 905: #1257 Panet C2: #221 Panet CP600: #512. GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Economy): The key switch on controt #512 violates tech sp ces and should be removed and circuit f rozen in position 2. 48060I SEE 48060A 48115 GENERAL PRINCIPLES (ADEQUACY): The pushbuttorn #666 and 645 on panel 9 48115A 4 903 03 have a " cheater capability" to kup the pushbutton activated GENERAL PRINCIPLES (ADEQUACY): The pushbuttons $666 and 645 on panel 9 481158 6 903 03 have a " cheater capability" to keep the pushbutton activated 48115I SEE 48115A CODING OF CONTROLS (Location Coding): Control 1301 is located on panel 48126 2 905,C1 905 with its associated system tocated on panet C1. DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT: Switches 1434, 1435, 1436, 1443, and 1445 have 48131 4 C7 "open" at the lef t position and " auto" at the right position. Switche s 1400,1401,1402,1403,1404,1405,14% and 1407 have ctose" at th a e left position and " auto" at the right position. Other switches 1410 and 1411 have three tabels and two function positions, i.e., "close-au to" and "open". The functional positions of the controts do not confor m with convention. 481311 SEE 48131 GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Human Suitability): In executing the task " Inhibit 48132 6 903 Auto ADS" (1T: 31.00), the operator must remmber to reset ADS tiner v ~ ~ .
PAGE 12 - 95:05:04 19 NOV 1990 .HED #.. l#PL. CR PANEL #............... SOURCE HED DESCRIPTION.......................................................- CATEG A, 653, and B, 698 (panet 903) within every 120 seconds. Faiture to r eset the timers could alter the plant response such as to erroneously indicate to the operator that additional f ailures have occurred and m neccessarity a99ravate cperator tasks. 48148 5 C174,C175 GP - 'THERE IS POOR GROUP!NG OF CONTROLS ON C174 AND C175 DUE TO POOR COMPON ENT LABELING AND NO HIERARCHIC #L LABELING OR DEMARCATION. 48149 2 C174,C175 CP 42-17A14/CS 04 C174 AND 42-18A14/CS ON C175 BREAK THIS STA C ARD CONVEN TION BY HAVING OFF TO THE RIGHT. 42-17A16/CS 04 C174 AND 42-18A16/CS O N C175 BREAK THIS CONVENTION BY HAVING OFF IN THE MIDDLE FOSITION. 4B166 2 C7 GP THE DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN THE CLOSE AND OPEN POSITIONS IS 45 DEGREES. 48171 7 C1 GP . THE RHR Nx INL vtV B1783 AND 1784 AND E1883 AND 1884 J0G VALVES MAY BE HELD FOR LENGTHY PERIODS (SCENARIO #1,3,6,8,11,13,15). 48191 5 N/A GP SEVERAL PROCEDURES (EOP-03, 5.3.25) REQUIRE STARTING THE DRYWELL COOLI NG SYSTEM FANS. CONTROLS FOR THIS OPERAfl04 ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN THE C ONTROL ROOM. 48206 2 C904,C903 GP TURB!NE TRIP PUSHBUTTON SWITCHES NOT EQUIPPED WITH GUARDS. 48209 4 C903 GP TURBIkE CONTROL & STOP VALVE INDICATORS ARE "OFF" IN MID-STROKE, CONTR ARY TO CONVENil0N. 4B210 4 0904 GP TURB!NE CONTROL & STOP VALVE INDICATORS ARE "CFF" IN MID-STROKE, CONTR ARY TO CONVENTION. 48212 6 C7 GP TORUS VENI SWITCH HAS "T-HANDLE" GRIP. NO OTHER SWITCH IS LIKE THIS. 48213 5 C905 GP THE " HALF SCRAM" & "MSIV" LAMPS ON PANELS C915/C917 BELONG ALSO 04 C90 5. 48217 4 C904, C7 GP LISTED SWITCHES ARE T W POSITION WITH " DEAD" INTERMEDIATE POSITION & N O DETENTS. SEE ATTACHED LIST OF SWITCHE0. 4C013 7 NA GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Conpatibitity with Emergency Gear): Operators have no experience using controts white dressed in protective clothing. 4CO33 8 C77 (P ONE LEGEND PUSHBUTTON ON THE PROCESS COMPUTEst IS NOT READABLE UNDER TH ESE CONDITIONS. 4C034 8 C77 GP THE PUSHBUTTONS ON THE PROCESS COMPUTER ARE 0.625 BY 0.625 INCHES. THI 5 DOES EDT MEET THE MINIMUM REQUIREP'NTS. 4C035 8 C77 GP A 1.lREE POSITION KEYSWITCH (OFF, 04, MEMORY CHANGE) DOES NOT MEET RE00 1REMENTS. THE DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN OFF AND ON IS 150 DEGREES, AND THE DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN ON AND MEMORY CHANGE IS 30 DEGREES. 4C037 2 C174,C175 GP CS-K17X6 04 C174 AND CS-K18X6 ON C175 HAVE THE TEETH FACING DOWN. 4C046 2 C903 GP THE TEETH ARE POINTING DOWN ON INVENTORY LINE #1806,1807, AND 1809. 4C066 5 C4 GP FW BLOCK VALVE CONTROLS / INDICATIONS (MO3427,3428,3471,3472,3477,3478,3 479,3480) ARE 04 C4 IN BACK PANELS AREA RATHER THAN IN PRIMARY OPEEATI NG AREAS. THESE VALVES UERE REQUIRED EARLY DURING SOME SCENARIOS (SCE
M _
-15:05:04 19 NOV 1990 PAGE 13 HED W.. !MPt. CR PANEL #.....;...... 2. SOURCE HED DESCRIPTION..........................................;............
CATEG NAR!OS #1,11). 4C068 2 C7 _ GP .THE DIE 3EL FIRE PtMP START PUSHBUTTON AND THE MOTOR DRIVCN FIRE PUMP A RE S!MILAR IN APPEARANCE TO ALARM ACKuoulEDGE CONTROLS (SCENARIO #4). 4C084 2 C7 GP THE FOLLOUING RBCCW DAMPER CONTROLS DO NOT NAVE UNITS INDICATED ON THE IR SCALES (INVTNTORY NUMBER): 1357,1359,1360,1362,1377,1379,1380,1382, - 1385,1387,1390,1391,1392,1394,1395,1397,1398. ALSO CONTROL DIRECTION I S CLOSE-CLOCKWISE. THIS !S CONTRARY TO POPUL 4089 2 C1 GP SulTCH FOR AIR DRYER BYPASS VALVE HAS CAUTION LABEL (00 NOT OPEN). GP STABILIZING VALVES ARE MECHANICALLY BLOCKED, YET SWITCH IS ON PANEL. S 4C091 2 C905 HOULD SWITCH BE REMOVED? C904 GP Two PUSH 8UTTON SulTCHES LABELLED " ABANDONED IN PLACE". 4C092 6 C170, C171
' SCALE MARKINGS (Mutti-scale Indicators); Recorders on these p nets (43 5A004 6 4,439,441,444,448,449,1327,1332,1334,1337,1339) have enty one scate w ith three different colored pens. Further the metal pens tear the pape
- r. This observation is surported by CER-029.DO THE CHART RECORDERS PRO DUCE INFORMATION THAT IS EASY TO READ L trSE? The GE Recorders are diff icult to read and of ten f ait. Recorder f ailure results in activatir:g i aise annunciator alarms.
SCALE MARK!NGS (Conpatibility): The core water tevet display indicator 5A005 6 SEE ITEM 1 s on panets 903, 904, 905,170 and 171 at t dif fer. Panet 903: 8620, 6 34 Panet 904: #882 Panel 905: 81173,1174,1183,1186 Panet 170: #439 Panet 171: #1332 Board Titte: Rx CLG, Rx Ctntp, Rx cont, PAM- A, PAM-S SA0051 SEE 5A005' 5A009 USABILITY OF DlSPLAY VALUES (Etimination of Operator Conversion): Reco 5A009A 2 C170, 903 rders 439,1429 and 615 display the same parameter but use different s cates requiring conversion to conpare. This observation is supported b y CER-046. tJSABILITY OF O!$ PLAY VALUES (Elimination of Operator Conversion): Reco 5A009s 6 C170, 903 rders439,1429and615dispIaythesameparameterbutusedifferents
. cates requiring conversion to conpare. This observation is stpoorted b y OER-046.
COMPLETENESS OF INFORMATION: Monitoring the drywett (DW) tenverature f 5A010 5 903.C7 or E0P entry conditions and for decision points therein, requires the tenperatures above & betou the 40 f t. point in the Du. The Du tempera ture indicators / recorder 582,637 (panet 903) and " Plant Air Tenperatur e Monitor," KAYE Assembly: 1376, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1 424, 1425, 1426 (panet C7), with cuttiple readout points, do not disti nguish the temperatures relative to the 40 f t. point.
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POCE i4 '15A05:04 19 ser 1990 - a HED #.. IMPL.'CR PANEL W............... SOURCE MED DESCRIPT!CN....................e.... . ............................. CATE G 5A015 4 N/A GP ALARMS ARE NEEDED FOR DRYWELL BULK TEMPERATUPE AT E0P ENTRY CONDITIONS te.g. < 152 AND 281 DEG F) (SCENARIO #1). 9A016 4 C905. CP ~ REACTOR WATER LEVEL INDICATIONS ARE NOT AtuAYS CONSISTENT OR SUFFICIEN T ACPOSS DIFFEREN1 INSTRUMENTS (MISMATCH) (SCENARIO #1,4,5). 58061 2 903, C2, CP600 USAst*ITY OF DISPLAYED VALUES (Etimination of Operator Conversion): In strument en panets requiring conversion are: Panel 903: #603,606,613 require snutSptying by 5. Panet C2: #146 subtract value f rom 30. #147 multipty by 50 Panes vo00: #479 mettiply value by 5 This observation is supported by OER-30 and OER-033. 58062 2 C3, C7 CONTRAST 5 Indicators with white letters on black background are: Panet
'C3: #332, 342, 329, 318. Panet C7: 1459.
58063 2 Att PRINTING ON THE DISPLAY FACE (Provisien of Needed Message): Parameter scates missing: Panel 903. #601,604,608,610. Panel 904: #336,880,814, 912. Pmet 905: #1302, 1303, 1305. Panet C2: #145,146. Panet C1: #24, 25,42,47,26,27,48,46,45. Panel C4: Foxboro indicators. Panal C170: #44 2, 443. Panet CP600: *466. 58064 2 Att SCALE MARKINGS: (Values Indicated by Unit Graduations): Scate graduati on values that do not agree with guideti * .iteria for progression:
.Panet 903: #602,631,632,633,635,583,584,586,618,619,621. Panet 904: #S 29, 830, 831, 875, 876, 877, 878, 889, 890, 907, 908,1025, 813. Panet 905: #1'99, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1188, 1192, 119 3, 1171, 1107, 1108, 1162. Panet C2: #130, 133, 136. Panet C1: #14, 15
, 18, 19, 20, 25. Panet C3: #283, 287, 297, 301, 345. Panet CP600: #46 8, 469. Panet C7: #1367,1368,1369,1374,1375,1358,1378,1386,1393,1384,1 430,1361,1381,1389, 1396,1383.
58065 6 903, 904 DIRECTIONALITY OF MOVEMENT AND NUMBERING WITH MOVING-POINTER METERS (V ertical Straight Scates): values increase in downward movement. Panet 903: #629. Panel 904: #833. 58066 58066A 1 See Below CENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GRAPHIC RECORDERS (Placement of Recorders): Recorders that must be verified and attended shouti be located in th e primary operating area. Panets C7 and 902 both con'ain recorders. Re corder en panet C2 #165 should be on Panet 903. Bo-r; Titte: Cntet ven t, Turbine, Process Rad,Rx Ctg. 580668 2 See Below GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GRAPHIC RECOPDERS (Placement of Recorders): Recorders that sust be verified and attended s!*ould be tocated in th e primary operating area. Panels C7 and 902 both contain recorders. Re corder on panet C2 #165 should be on Panet 903. Board Titte: Cntmt ven t, Turbine, Process Rad,Rx Ctg.
PACE 15 HED i.. IMPL. CR PANEL #............... SauRCE HED DESCRIPTIO*4........ ........................-...- --- --- .------* CAIEG 56066C 6 See Below GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GPAPHIC RECORDERS (Placement of Recorders): Recorders that must be verified and attended should be located in th e primary operating area. Panets C7 and 902 tnth contain recorders. Re Cntet ven corder on panet C2 #165 should be on Panet 903. Board Titte: t, Turbine, Process Rad,Rx Ctg. SEE 58066C' 56066I ~ INFORMATION TD BE DISPLAYED (Conpleteness of Information): Ft.t beater b 5B067 5 NA tock (dtsp)(10) vatwe position is needed on panet C1 as wett as back panet C4. This observation is supported by OER-034. C3, C2 CHARACTERISTICS AND PROBLEMS OF LIGHT INDICATORS (Precautions to Avoid Misinterpretation): The indicator tights above contrets e206, 404, 4 58068 6 06 have red tens on left and green tens on right (reversat from conven tion). SEE 58068 580681 Cot 0R CODING (Consistency of Meaning): BUS trod >te tights on Panet C3 5B069 2 C3 use anber and white covers with the same meaning. DISCRETE RECORDERS (Channet Selection Capability): Recorder 8460 does 58070 '6 CP600 not have the capability of selecting a single channet display. Indicator Light INFORMATION TO BE DISPLAYED (Unnecessary information): 5B071 2 904 s 8870 and 871 not needed or used. Recorder #145 uses dual p USABILITY OF DISPLAYED VALUES (Scale Range): 58110 6 C2 ens and a dual scale for coarse and fine readings. The pointers are n et identified or associated with either colored pen and reading accura cy is made dif ficult Ly the scate markings. 2ONE MARKINGS: The majority of instruments have no zone markings on th 58111 2 e instrument faces to identify opreating ranges, upper 4 tower timit All s and danger zones used throughout the contret room. Existing markings were applied without use of a standard or criteria. The character heights on meter #601 en 903 READABILITY (CHARACTER HEIGHT): 58119 4 d 610 do not st.htend a visual angte of 15 minutes of are The anber tight INFORMATION TO BE DISPLAYED (Unn s 'essary Information): 58124 2 903 s on instruments 720,721,750,751 are disconnected and their function removed. RHW flow indicators 6 (JSABILITY OF DISPLAYED VALUES (Seste Selection): 58127 6 903 17, Loop A and 631, Loop B, and flow recorder 602, toep A/8, att on p anet 903, indicate the same flow within the same range but have differ ent scale increments: o 617 & 631: 500 gpm increments o 602 : 200 gem increments i ) Monitoring f 904, C171 . INFORMATION TO BE DISPLAYED (Conpteteness of In ormat on : 58133 2
15:05:05 19 NOV 1990
.PAGE 16 HE D s . . I MPL . CR P ANE L # . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SOURCE HED D ESCR I P T I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CATEG SP pressure for E0P entry 'and decision points therein requires a rang e of 0-60 psig. SP pressure is available on 862 (panet 904), having a range of -1.0 to +2.0 PS!D, nr by corbining DW/SP Delta-P, 863 (panet 904), with DW prassure,132P or 1330 (panet C171). Th t1SABILITY OF DISPLAYED VALUES (Elimination of Operator Conversion):
$B134 7 905 e plaque, 2004', defining resctor power tevet vs. IRM channet range po sition specifies reactor power in KWT or MWT whereas operator decision with points in the EOPs' require % power. Thus the operator must worft 2 dif f erent sets of power mits during emergency events.
SEE 58134 During the 581341 INFORMATION TO BE DISPLAYED (Coppteteness of Information): 5B135 6 C7 OER operators reported that they do not have feedback as to whether t he torus or the drywelt 0-2 concentration sanple points are being moni tored. This observation is supported by OER-027. SEE 58135 The cooling water flow in 5B1351 IJSABILITY OF DISPLAYED VALUES (Scale Range): 58136 6 905 the CRD hydraulic system is -65 gpm but the flow indicator range, 17 91, is 0-50 gpm. GP
' THE GRADUATIONS WEIGHTS FOR INVENIORY ITEMS #602, #615, AND #636 HAVE 5B160 2 C903
.16 INCH MAJOR, .13 INCH INTERMEDIATE, AND .09 INCH MINOR MARKINGS WHI CH ARE BELOW STANDARD. #636 HAS 19 GRADUAfl0N MARKINGS BETWEEN NUMBER S ON BOTH SCALES 2 C903 GP THE GRADUATION HEIGHTS FOR THE FOLLOWING INVENTORY ITEMS ARE BELOW STA 58161 #583 AND #584 HAVE .16 INCHES FOR MAJORS, .13 INCHES FOR INTERM NDARD:
EDIATES, AND .09 INCHES FOR MINOR MARKINGS. #620 MAS .16 INCHES FOR MA JORS AND .13 FOR MINOR MARKINGS. #1802 AND # GP
#1181, #1188, AND #1194 HAVE .19 IN. FOR MAJORS, .13 IN. FOR INTERMEDI 59162 2 C905 ATES, AND .09 IN. FOR MINOR MARKINGS. #1078 To #1080 & #1082 HAVE .16 IM. FOR MAJORS AND INTERMEDI ATES AND .09 IN. FOR MINOR MARKINGS. #1107
-08 & #1162-63 HAVE .06 IN.' TOR MAJORS AND I C170,C171 GP INVENTORY #438 ON C170 AND #1331 ON C171 HAVE 19 GRADUSTIONS BETWEEN N
$8167 2 UMERALS.
GP INVENTORY #434,8439,8441,#449 ON C170 AND #1327,#1332,#1334,#1339 ON C 58168 2 C170,C171 l 171 DO NOT MEET GUIDELINES FOR THE MAJOR AND INTERMEDI ATE MARKINGS. TH E MAJORS ARE .16 INCHES AND INTEPMEDIATES ARE .125 [NCHES. GP ARMS ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR ALL AREAS CALLED OUT IN TABLE 4.2 0F EOP-4 58170 7 C911 (SCENARIO #1,7). C170,C171 GP TORUS LEVEL INSTRUMENTS (LI-1001-604A AND 8) ARE NOT SENSITIVE ENOUGN 58172 7 TO READ TO NEADEST INCH AS REQUIRtD (SCENARIO #1.3).
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15:05:05 -19 NOV 1990 PAGE 17 MED *.. IMPL. CR PANEL #............... SOURCE HED DESCRIPTION....................................................... CATEG' 38173 7 N/A GP L THE MAX! MUM NORMAL OPERATING MAIN STEAM ttMNEL. AREA TEMPERATURE IN TAB LE 4.3 (EOP-4) IS 105 DEG F. OPERATOR $ INDICATE THAT THIS VALUE MAY BE INCORRECT (SCENARIO #1). 58175 4 C903 GP PRECAUTION IN PROCEDURE 2.2.19 REQUIRES DETERMIntNG UHETHER RNR FLOW (2 ATE' EXCEEDS 5100 GPM. THE SCALE ON RNR FLOW METER 1040-1 A IS NOT SENSI T:VE ENOUGH TO DETERM!NE THIS VALUE ACCURATELY (SCENARIO #2). 58178 2 C171 GP THE CONTAINMENT HI RECORDER (AR-1001-612A) WAS FOUND DIFFICULT TO READ ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THE RED INK CAN BE DIFFICULT 10 READ. ALSO, THE 1 ' RED PEN SHOULD APPEAR AS TPE TOP SCALE AND SHOULD BE SETTER LABELED ( 1 SCENARIO #4,10,15,17). l 58182 7 N/A GP THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION CHART WOULD SE Cot 0R CODED BETTER IF IT u l AS CODED BY CLASSIFICATION AND WOT BY PLANT CONDITION (SCENARIO #8,10, i 18). I 58183 7 C921 GP ALARM POINTS NEED TO BE PROVIDED FCR THE CLEANUP PUMP B AREA TEMP MONI TOR (TABLE 4.3 0F EOP-4) (SCENARIO #9). j . 58184 7 C903 GP DPYWELL TEMPERATURES ARE DIFFICULT TO READ TO THE NEAREST -1 DEGREE ON TRU-9044 (REQUIRES FINDING 152, 212, AND 281 DEGREES F). THE CREW FELT THIS WAS NOT A 5.AJOR PROBLEM FOR THEM (SCENARIO *10). 58187 7 C905 GP THE STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) LEVEL INDICATOR (LI-1140-2) READS IN GALLONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM RATHER THAM PERCENT AS REQUIRED (SCENARIO
#12), ALTHOUGH A CONVERSION IS MADE UlTH AN OPERATOR A10.
58188 4 C903 GP TORUS WATER TEMPERATURE INCICATION (T1-5022-018) !$ NOT SENSITIVE ENOU GH TO PERMIT READINGS OF ONE DEGREE (e.g.,135 DEGREES F) (SCENARIO el l l 3). 58192 2 C903 GP ' PROCEDURE 2.2.21 REQUIRES OPERATING THE TURBINE AT A MINIMUM SPEED OF 715 RPMs. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMlWE THIS VALUE WITH ACCURACY ON THE l EXISTING TURBINE SPEED INDICATOR. ITS RANGE IS 0-6000 RPM AND SCALE 1 l NCREASES FROM TOP TO BOTTOM IN VIOLATION OF 58193 6 C910 GP E0P-04 REQUESTS AN INDICATION OF REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION EXHAUST I l RADIATION OF GREATER THAN 710 CPS. EXISTING METERS HAVE A RANGE TO 10E 6 CPS MAKING THE TASK DIFFICULT TO PERTORM. 5B194 2 0910 GP EOP-04 REQUESTS AN INDICATION OF 16 MR/HR FOR REFUEL EXHAUST RAD LEVEL
. EXISTING METERS HAVE EXTFNDED SCALE (0-1 X 10E3) AND ARE NOT SENSITI l VE ENOUGH IN THE REQUIRED RANGE.
i 58195 58195A 4 C905 GP 'E0PS require indications of reactor pressere of 125, 1085,.181, 246, 376, 767 psig. These values are difficult to determine on existing wide range meters / recorders. The narrow range meter spans a range of 950 to 1050 psig.
. ,y7 15i05:05 19 Nov 1990 PAGE 18 HED 2.. I MP L . CR P A N E L #. . . . . . . . . .. ' . . . . ' SQL*RCE HED DESCR I PT I ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CATEG 581958 7 C905 GP - EOPs require indications of reactor pressure of 125,.1085, 181, 246, 376, 767 psig. These values are dif ficutt to determine on existing vide range meters / recorders. The narrow range meter spans a range of 950 to 1050 psig. 56196 SB196A 4 N/A CP The ECP's require identifying reactor water tevet indications of
-49 in., -126.3 in., -157 in., and -169 in. (see also HEO #207).
Existing instrurentation on boards is dif ficult to read to this tevet of accuracy. 5B1968 7 N/A GP ' The E0P's require identifying reactor water tevet indications of
-49 in., -126.3 in., -157 in., and -169 in. (see also HE0 #207).
Existing instrunentation on boards is dif ficutt to read to this tevet of accuracy. 58198 7 N/A CP EOPs REQUEST AN INDICATION OF 11 PSIG TORUS PRESSURE (SEE ALSO MEO #20 9). THIS INFORMATION IS NOT AVAILABLE. 58199 7 C903 GP E0Ps REQUEST INDICATIONS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURES OF 180, 310, 105, 120, 214, 213, 238, 258, 130, 309, 251, AND 224 DEGREE S F. EXISTING METER (TI-260-19) IS DIFFICULT TO READ TO A 1 DEGREE ACC URACY. 58200 7 C903 GP THE DRYWELL LEVEL INDICATOR (L1-5008) HAS A RANGE APPROXIMATELY 46-80 FT. EOP 5.3.24 REQUIRES READING LEVEL AT 11 FT. 58202 4 C905 GP REACTOR WATER LEVEL NARROW RANGE INDICATORS 263-100A AND 263-100B NAVE MINOR SCALE luCREMENTS OF 2.5 INCHES. THIS MAKES THESE SCALES DIFFICU LT TO READ TO THE NEAREST INCH (SEE ALSO HE0 #207 AND #114). 58208 2 C903 GP METER SCALES DO NOT MEET GUIDELINE 58216 5 C7 GP SBGT SYSTEM STATUS / OPERATION CANNOT BE OBSERVED FROM THE PRIMARY OPERA TING AREA. 5B219 7 N/A GP GRID AXES ON E0P CURVES ARE REPRESENTED AS SMALL DOTS. THESE VARY IN N UMBER FROM CURVE TO CURVE (e.g., FIGUPE 3.2). THE GRID' C NOT PROVIDE ACCEPTABLE MINOR SCALE GRADUATION INFORMATION FOR ACf. ATELY READING CURVES. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GRAPHIC RECORDERS (Scale Corpatibility): Re SC014 7 Att corder scales and recorder paper that are not conpatible are: Panet C 170: #434, 439, 449. Panet C171: #1327,1332,1339. Panel 903: #615. P anet C1: #24, 25, 23. Panet C7: #1430. Panet CP902: Area Rad FR 705-4, AR 5075-A. CP600 SPECIFIC RECORDER TYPES (Continuous Recorders-Latwting): There is no r 50015 6 ecorder labeting on Panet CP600 - 2466. 5C016 u_ .
~ . . . - . . - - - _ . - - .--, _ _ - - - - - . - - --- - - - _ . - - _ . . - - - . ..- . - -~ - - - - - - - .
1 n. 4
-15:05:05 .19 nov 1990' PAGE '. 9
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pr o s. . I MPL . CR P ANE L #. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SOURCE HED DE SCR I P ! 10N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . CATEG The scales on APRM me - 905,C2 USAB!LITY OF DISPLAYED VALUES (Scale Selection): 5C016A 2 eters #1162,1163,1107,1108 on Panet 905 and #168 on Panet C2 do not pr ovide the required precision. This observation is supported try OER-031 The scales on APRM me 905,C2 USABILITY OF DISPLAYED WALUES (Scale Selection): SC0168 6 ters #1162,1163,1107,1108 on Panet 905 and #168 on Pa vt C2 do net pr ovide the required precision. This observation is supoorted by OER-031 Changing a PRECAUTIONS TO ASSURE AVAILABILITY (Bulb Changing Hazard): SC017 7 NA tight bulb on panet C3 caused a short end resulted in a " scram." SEE SC017 SC017I 5C018 Recorder #146 prov C2 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GRAPHIC RECORDERS (Use): SC018A 2 ides confusing values. This NEO is supported by OER-030. Recorder #146 prov C2 GENERAL CHARACTER 1S11CS OF GRAPHIC RECORDERS (Use): SC018B 6 ides confusing values. This MEO is supported by OER-030. The channet GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CtAPHIC PECORDERS (Visibility): 5C019 6 904, C1 being recorded cannot be determined without opening the door and adv ancing the paper on: Panet S)4: #1025 Panet C1: #14'and 15 The tnits on instrume 9t 4 USABILITY OF DISPLAYED VAltf S (Scale Selection): 5C020 2 nts #912 and 894 tre worn a6ay and one is misced with tape. m): The power value is sh USABILITY OF DISPLAYED VALUES (Scate set. for #1120, 1122, 1124, 5C021 6 9C 5 own in percent power to a tevet of 125 p 149, 1151, 1153, 1155, 115 1126, 1128, 1130, 1132, 1134, 1145, 114. 7, and 1159. What does 125 percent refer to? SCALE MARICINGS (Use of Graduations): Scates with more than 9 graduatio 5C022 2 Att ns between numbers: Panet C170: #438, 449. Panet C171: #1339, 1331. P anet 903: c6?8, 619, 621, 583, 584, 632,' 633, 635, 636, 582, 602. Pane#- 1 904: #829,'830, 861, 862, 863, 877, 889, 890, 907, 908. Panet 905: 1078, 1079, 1171, 1192, 1193. Panet C2: #133, 145. Panet CP6')0: #466, 468, 469, 477, 478. Panet C7: #1'60. Th USABILITY OF DISPLAYED VALUES (Elimination of Operator Conversion): SCO26 6 905 1173 1 1
-e plaque identifying reference RPV water levels for use with
-174 (panet 905) contains arrows pointing to various positions on the s cale of 1173 which dif fer from the stated levet by -8 inches. The
- cal e pointer is ty tween the arrows and scale easily allowing the incorrec t association of the pointer with the arrows on the plaque.
C114,C115 GP NO DIPECT BULB-1EST CAPABILITY AVAILABLE. SCO39 7 THE POINTER FOR INVENTORY #814 OVERLAPS NEARLY THE ENTIRE MINOR GRA00A GP 5C047 7 C904 TION C904 GP THE GR ADUATION HEIGHTS FOR #814 ARE .16 INCHES FOR MAJORS. 13 INCHES SC048 2
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15:05:06 19 Nov 1990 PCCE 21 DESCRIPTION..............................................,........ HED #.. IMPL. CR PANEL s............... SOURCE HED CATEG 529. Panet 903: 8604, 608, 587, 592, 594, 599, 591. Panet 904: #'1005, 1022, 836, 866, 868, 880. Panet 905: s1265, 1266, 1299, 1300, 1302, 13 05, many pushbuttons. Panet C1s #26, 27,- 46, 48, 56, 57. Panet C4: #15 20,1521,1522,1523,1524,1525,1526,1527,1528. 6B075 2 All PLACEMENT (Psnel Labeling): Att display labels are placed below the in strunent and does not conform to guideline criteria. 68076 2 Att CONSISTENCY (Internal Consistency and Consistency with Procedures): No standard list of abbreviations or acronyms is used on the tabels, e. g., PREHEATER/PREHTR, BLOCK /BLK, NYOROGEN/H2 This observation is suppo rted by OER-039. Att BREVITY: There is an inconsistency in tabeling, Some tabets use conote 6B077 2 te words for abbreviations that are in corrnon usage by operators, e.g
., RCS/ Reactor Cooling System. This observation is stgported by OER-03 9.
68t,78 2 903 FUNCTIONAL GRf*JPS (Functional Relationship and Locatior'.: Controts for fast start-up test and fast injection procedures require a set of co ntrol actuations in sequential series. The controts associated with th ese sequentiat actions are scattered across the panet requiring the op erator to sench for proper controts in sequence this observation is s opported by OER-036. 68079 6 903,904,C1 CONTROL POSITION LABELING (Direction): The direction of movement does not conform to convention on: Panel 903: 8o26, 599 Panet 904: #842, 9 45, 951, 952, 956 Panet C1: #45, 46, 48 (turn lef t to increase temera t--e) Panet C7: #1448, 1454, 1455, 1413; operator pencit markings indi c- directions differ from tabets Panet C3: #356, 372, 377, 380 Tais oL " *ation is supported by OER-024 Att R). 'ILITY (Character Height): Character heights ere not consistent, 68080 2 e.g., Panet C3 - #411,'415, 421, 423. Also Panet C2: #146, 165. The s matter character size does not meet guideline criteria. This observati on is supported by OER-038. 68081 2 Att READABILITY (Contras'): Att tabets are white characters on black or da rk background. This does not conform with the guideline criteria and contributes to the observation reported under HE0 6.6.005 (NED 6CO23.7 68082 2 NA .USE (Necessity and Hunan Factors Practices): Te!,porary labels have bee o on the penets for en extended period of time, e.g., many dynotape 1 abels as on Panet C3: #246, 247, 248 annunciators or C170: #450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1347
, 1338. On Panet C7 operators have pencited in tabet identificaticn wh ich conflicts with permanent tabet, e.g., #1454. This observation is s
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15:05:06 19 =cy 1990 PAGE 22 DESCRIPT104....................................................... NED r.. IMPL. CR PAwEL f............... SOURCE MED CATEG tcported ty CER-040. s'SE (Adjacect Devices): Panet CT - #1433 covers tabets en #1440. Asses 68083 6 C7 s=* t of this criteria is timited bacausa the tags were renved durin g penet % Ography. Saa Below CEwARCATION (Pn - u ): Stick-en tape is used for aest of the dmarc 68054 2 ation lines en Panets 3903, 904, Cl, CF600 Board fitte: Rx CLG, Re Cl b nup, FW & Cvd, AOG COLOR: Colors are ret associated with specific functicris. Board T ,tte: 68085 2 Sae below Rn CL3, em Ctnup, f u & Cond, Electricot, PAM, Cntet Vent Board fe.:
#903, 904, C1, C3, CP6n0, CT 63086 2 C3 (fSE 08 MfMICS (Color): The mimic linas en Panet C3 are not ceter disce iminative.
68087 2 C3 tfSE OF MIMICS (Color): Mimic lines en Pamt C3 do not have adrauste ce ter contrast with the panat surface. 903 USE OF w!MICS (Color): The origin of att lines for the cents.rwnt iso 68088 2 lation Meic are not clear. This obsarvation is sterorted b - CER-044 tu?ERuAL CONSISTENCY: The bus indicator rurcers do not iner.ase progre 68089 2 C3 ssively (#240 out of sequance). In addition, two dif ferent :etored ti ght caos are used. 903,904,C2 CONSISTENCY (With Proce &res): Panet 903: Contairment spray Signal tab 68070 2 et #755 and 770 should ba changad to Contairwent Spray Perm;ssive. Ps nat 904: Dispisys 685,886,887 read Ibs/hr times 10 to the 6th and Proc e & re 2.2.84 (pg 18) indicates gat / min. Panet C2: 8168 reads in mits; the instructions (2.2.99) reads in inches. CONSISTENCY (Internnt consistency): Panet 904: Labets for 992 and 100S 68091 2 904,C3 are dif ferent tut the centrets parform the same function. Panet C3: tabet wording on controts 429,430 is confusing to relate to controt fu nction. WEED EOR LABELING: Panet C1: Labets for tights above #36 and 37 are mi 68002 2 C1.C2,904 ssing. Panet C2: 4 tights associated with ccntrot #231 do not have != bets. Panet 904: tabets en 888,913 are missing. C04 TROL POSITION LABELING (POSIT 104): The functional centrot positions 68120 2 Att are iern of f or have never been etchad en the controt plate (escutch con) for a large nureer of switches NEED FOR LABELING: There are 8 key centrei selector switches en each o A121 2 C170 and C171 f the PAM penets C170 and C171. The system function for th* use of th ese centrots is not idactified.
#EED FOR LA8 Ell #G: The red and green tights associated with vatve cent 68125 2 903,C171 rots 720,721,759,751 indicate vatve prsition etwend as creosed to va
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15:05:06 77 tt0V T990 PAGE 23 NED f._ I MPL . CR PANE L f. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SW PED DE SCR I P f l 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CATEG twe position for di ether watwe controts in the contret rotw. Vatwe p osition is irdicatev en penet C171, instri. rant 1338. 68150 2 C174,C175 GP 14 CONSISTENT tfSAGE OF LABEL SIZES THRCtr#0UT PA4ELS. CD4790L POSIT 104 LABELS WERE TOO LARGE AND WERE TPE SAME SIZE AS CopPCNENT LARELS. GP TWE LABELS ON C174 AwD C175 ARE INCONSOSTEuTLY PLACED A40 Do m0f FOLLO 68151 2 C174,C175 W THIS GUIDEll4E. 68152 2 C174,C175 GP THE LASELS NAVE mc7 BEEN CLE*uED. THEY NAVE PAINT FARTIALLY 04 THEM A4 D THE LABELS ARE WORM OUT. 68153 2 C174,C175 GP OCCASIONALLY ABBREVI ATIONS USE PU4C'UAfl04 Ac OTNER TIMES tfSE ONLt 88 BREVI ATION. ALSO OCCASIONAL ABSREVI ATION IS MIXED WITM THE FULL SPELLI WG OF WORDS 04 THE SAME PAWL. 68154 2 C174 CP THE LABELS 04 THE H2 0-10% Amo n2 0-20% RA#GE tuDICATOR LIGHTS CLt3tD B F READ AS H20-10% AND W20-20%. GP' 04 PANELS C174 AND C175, THE WAR 414G LABEL "DO NOT RESET ROST LOCA REF 68155 2 C174,C175 ER PROC. 2.3.133* DOES NOT MEET THE COLOR CCWVENTION Few WAcalwS LABEL S. THE OTnER WARNING LABELS ARE RED AND THIS ONE IS BLACK. 68156 2 C174,C175 GP ALL LA MLS MAVE LIGHT CHARACTERS 04 A DARE BACKGROUND. 6817J 2 C7 GP THE SEC04DARY CONTAlumENT ACCESS LOCK INLET DA=PER (40w-114) IS IuCORR ECTLY DESIGNATED AS DA8'PER 81 WHILE TME OUTLET DAWER (AON-116) IS l#C ORRECTLY DESIGWATED DAMPER 82 (SCEMARIO 83). 68177 2 C7 GP THE CREW INDICATES THAT THE MIMIC 04 PA4EL C715 NARD TO FOLLCU AND WE EDS l' opp 0VEMENT (SCEwARio W3). 68180 1 N/A GP OPERATORS SUGGESTED THAT THE APPLICABLE POER SUPPLY SHOULD BE INDICAT ED 04 C04 TROL LABELS (SCENARIO #5,8). 68189 2 C905 GP THE AIR DUMP SYSTEM TEST SWITCn SHOULD BE BETTER LABELED e S TO ITS FUM CTION. 68197 2 C3 GP POSITION INDICATION LABELS ON ESCUTCNEON PLATE FOR THE OtESEL GEuERATO R START CONTROL AND TPE DIESEL GENERATOR A VOLTAGE REGULA10R MODE SELE CTOR CONTROLS ARE WORu A40 UntREADABLE. 6R201 6 C3 GP THE DIESEL GENERATOR GOVER40R SPEED CONTROL MAS ITS LABEL SulTCn POSIT 10h5 WOR 4. 68205 2 C7 GP CONTROLS FOR TORUS VACitJM BREAKERS AuD AIR SUPPLY ARE EASILY C0&USED. VISIBILITY (Cteaning): The ntster of tabets otxcured tw dirt or foreig 6CO23 6 Att
- n cetter would indicate that no procedure for cleaning exists.
C220,C221 GP MOST OF THE LABELS 04 C220 A=D C221 NAVE uMITE Co*4ACTERS 04 A SLACK 8 6C030 2 ACKGROUND. C174,C175 GP THE TAG-0UTS COMPLETELY COVER THE LABELS. 6CO38 2 6C040 2 C112,C115 GP SOME L ABELS ARE ENGRAVED INTO THE *ETAL MAttwG TMEM DIFFICULT TO READ. OTHER MARKINGS ARE 04 DY'90 TAPE. THE LARGER PA4EL DESIGaATORS HAVE LIG
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pgn s.. S m . CR PANEL 0.. - ~ . ~ ~ ~ W O U *""' CATEG CP TME COLOR YELLOW MAS TWO DESIGEATED MEA 41EGS, CAUT104 AND tJuY8.LtDATED 73139 8 N/A D AT A. GP THERE IS 40 DOCUMENTATION EXPLAlatwG THE ERROR MESSAGES READILY AVAILA TC140 8 W/A BLE FOR THE OPERATORS. TPE EP90R MES! AGES ARE NOT SELF-EXPLAMATORY. CP PESTART!wG THE SYSTEM AFTER A CRASR Tool ( A 1/2 p(x!R. 78141 8 N/A TA8 ExtCT KEY 15 WOT CPCUPED utTn OTnER TAB KEYS. ALSO,THERE AFE SEVE GP 78142 8 w/A RAL htW $59S FUNCitom Keys uutCn APE COLORED BLUE (8ttE aEYS MAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO SeOS). m/A GP TME FORMAT MENtf MAS #0 luDICmTIOu FOR THE TOTAL mt.883ER OF PAGES (TPREE 78143 8 PAGES). CP ALL COLORS FELL WELL BELOW THE M .. MUM. 5.74,THE R Foltoul4G YAltES WERE OBTA 78144 8 W/A W4tTE=11, BLtE=5.f., GREEM4.5, CYA4=8.95, TELLOW: IEED 14 FT-L: ED=333, MAGENT A=$.97 78145 8 N/A GP 3.3 FT-t WAS THE MEASURED BACKGROU40. TME RA"C BETWEE4 THE LIGNTEST C MARACTER (WHITE) AND THE BActGROU40 UAS SMAtt 3.5:1. SIZE, DIAtG14G COLORS GP Clet!OR DIFFICULT TO SEE AND FOLLOW DUE TO: 7B146 8 W/A DEPEND!nG 04 LOCATION 04 THE SCREED, A40 tmtSTSTEMATIC TASB1kG. THE CU RSOR IS EASTER TO FOLLOW If THE CROSSHAIRS ARE TtK"vED OW. HOWEVER, THE CROSSMAlt DISAPPEARS WITMIN A SM0RT AMOU4T 90,C7,C170.C171 ( CP600,CT,C170/171 ENHANCEMENT RECOGu1 TION AND TDENTIFICATION Panete Jorted ty OER-0 SA006 2 ack operator enhancement sids. This observatiert is 43. The arrangemerit o BA007 LOGICAL ARRA4tGEMENT A40 LAYOUT (Other Expectations): 8A007A 2 CP600 f Panet CP600 is not arranged for sequentist operatforts. The arrangemer-+, o LOGICAL ARRAmGEMENT AND LAYOUT (Other Espectations): 8A0078 5 CP600 f Panet CP600 is not arranged for sequential operations. 8A008 SEPARATICN OF CONTROLS: Panet CT: Att controts are too close and too e BA008A 2 CT tuttered. CT SEPARAfl04 OF CONTROLS: Panet C7: Att centrots are too close and too e 8A0088 5 tuttered. Panet 904: 88'F14 STRINGS OR CLt1STERS OF SIMII.AR COMPONENTS (String Length): 881 4A 2 904, 905 48 pairs of red / green indicator tights produce Contret a display grouning whi red setrim ch exceeds te wJth criteria of 20 inches. Panet 905: lights exceed snaminun string tength criteria of 20 inches. Panet 904: STRIuGS OR CtuSTERS OF SIMILAR COMPowtwTS (String Length): 880948 5 904, 905 48 pairs of red / green indicator tights produce e dieptny ge w ing whi
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. mar we 15:05 C 19 =0V 1990 pa& 26.
MED 8.. ! *'Pt . CR P AhE L s. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . SOMCE PED DESCR I PT I O4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . CATEG ch exceeds tength criteria of 20 inches. Panet 905: Contret red estrim tights exceed menistra string tength criteria of 20 inches. J04, 905, C3, C7' STR!WGS OR CLUSTERS OR SIwILAR CDs@c4E4YS iwuptser of Conporwants): Cepp 88095 2 onents that exceed 5 in a roi, or cotum are: Panet 904: Secondary con
' tairment lights. panet 905: Centret red drfwe indicators 1187,1183.118 9,1190,1f41,1192,1193. Panal C3: Diesel generator indicators for A and
- b. Canat and Bridgewater line indicators. Panet CT: Controts #1474,14 75, ~ 476,1477,1478,1479,1480,1481,1482,1483, 1484,1485,1486,1487,1488, t 489,1465,1466,1467,1468,1469,1470,1471.
88097 t.1,C2,905 MIRROR IMAGluG: Panet C1: toop A and 8 for RBCCu and 18CCu are mirror 880974' 2 imagad. Panet C3: Diesel generator A and 8 controts are mirror leggad
. Panel C3: tJAT & startto transfer controts 359,369 are mirror img.d.
Panet 905: #1107/1108 mirror imaged with 1162/1163 and their associst ed controts. This observation is supported by OER-045. 880978 6 C1,C2,905 , MIRROR IMAGlwG: Panet C1: Locp A and 8 for RSCCu and TBCCu are mirror imaged. Panet C3: Diesat generator A and 8 controts are mirror imaged
. Panet C3: UAT & startup transfer co, trots 359,369 are mirror imogad.
Panet 905: #1107/1108 mirror insged eith 1162/1163 ard their associat ed controls. This observation is stepwted by CER-045. 88098 2 904 SEQUENCE TREQUENCY OF USE *an) FUNCTioh AL CouSIDERAf t0us (Functionet to nsiderations): Cleanto controts #966, 967, 968, %9, V70, 971 seperat e controts #976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988
, 989, 790, 991.- This observation is supported by CER-022.
905 EWMAeCinG RECOGNITION AND IDENTiflCAfl0N (Specing): Set of controts fo 88099 2 r recorders #1107/1108 and #1162/1163 are net seperated to indicate b oundaries. NA ENMANCEMENT RECOGNITIOu AgD IDENTlf tCATION (Emargency Controts): so di 88100 2 stinctive e+ancements are used for emergency centrots. 903,C1 SEQUENCE; FREQUEmCY OF USE A4D TUuCTionAL CONSIDERATIONS (S*quence of 88101 5 tsse): Oparator must activate controts 8763 and 753 on Panel 903 the v go to Panet C1 to activate controts 8101, 103, or 121, 124. 904, 905, 921 SEQUENCE, FREQUENCY OF USE AuD FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (Functional C 88102 6 onsiderations): Recorder 1171 on Panet 905 and recor*rs 814 and 898 on Panel 904 watues must be taken ateng with TR263-104 on penet 921 ev ery 15 minutes during heatte & cootdown. Instrwent s614 on Panet 903 used with instrwents #861, 362, 863 on Panet 904 881021 SEE 88102 C2, 903 LOGICAL ARRANGEMENT AND LAYOUT (Order and Lebeting): Ptnet C2: #218,21 88103 2
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PAGE 28 15:05:07 19 nov 1990 MED f., IMPL. CR PA4EL 8............... SOU#CE MED DESCRIPT!04....................................................... CATEG 626 increases clockwise, indicator 8629 increases dem.ard. Panet 904
- Controt #542 increases clockwise, indicator *S33 increases downward.
991068 6 903, 904 GENERAL MOVEMENT RELATIONSHIPS (Rotary Controls): Panet 903: Controt 8 626 increases clockwise, indicator 8629 increases downward. Parv t 904
- Contret *J*.2 increases clockwise, indicator r833 increases downward.
98107 98107A 2 905 S!wCLE CD4 TROL Awo DISPLAY PA!RS (Association): Contret #1185 for reto rders 1171 and 1172 and control 1196 for controllers #1299 and 1300 e re not located so that association is a; parent. 981078 6 905 SimCLE CONTROL AwD DISPLAY DAIRS (Association): C mtrot #1185 for reco rders 1171 and 1172 and controt 11% for contrott-rs #1299 and 1300 e re not located so that association is arparent. 99108 6 C2, C3 S!wGLE CONTROL AND DISPLAY PAIRS (Association): The direction of movem ent of controts and tight colors are not consistent with conventics Controts (e.g., #206, 207, 208, 215, 216) mov- comterctockwise to rai se. Red / Green tights etnve controts s206, 404, 406 are reversed. 991081 SEE 99108 99109 98109A 2 .C2 51mGLE CONTROL AND DISPLAY PalRS (Promicity): Indicator 8168 and contr et #191 are not in close proximity to each other. Indicators 8f66 and 167 are distant from ceretrots #229, 230, 231. Indiceters it69, 170 ar e distant from controts 8204, 205. 98109B 6 C2 StacLE CouTROL AND DISPLAY PAIRS (Proximity): Indicator 8168 and contr el #191 are not in close proximity to each other. Indicators 8166 and 167 are distant frem controts #229, 230, 231. treicators 8169, 170 er e distant from controts 8204, 205. 98158 5 C174,C175 GP THE CONTROLS CRE TOO EVENLY SPACED ACROSS THE PAWEL AND If IS DIFFICLM. T TO SEE THE PELATIUNSNIPS BETWEEN CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS. 90032 2 C220,C221 GP TME PETER LOCATED IN SLOT A5 04 C220 A4D C221 15 hof WELL MAREED. IT I S DIFFICULT TO DISCERN untCn SET OF CONTROLS AFFECT 1TS OPEdAf t04 9C098 5 C904, C1 GP RECCWDERS CPU-E1, CRU-E2 ARE 04 C904. THEY SHOULD BE 04 C1 WITH REST O F SYSTEM. 371 itms listed.,
py,y--c., _ . - - - ~ . - -- - i APPENDIX C RESUMES of KEY PERSONNEL t- ) I o h- - C-1 1, m- __ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
_ _ _ _._...._ ._- _ ._ _ .. _ ._ _._ ._ _ .. _ _ _ _y
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,g i l i f', APPENDIX C 1 i RESUMES l m,. , I 3
.; I Resumes are in the following order: ';
-t
- All General Physics Personnel I
. - All Boston Edison Personnel
- Other Contractor Personnel .,
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GENER.AL PHl' SICS CORPORATION gf LOTHAR R. SCHROEDER Consultant EDUCATION Ph.D., Experimental / Applied Psychology, Lehigh University M.S., Engineering Psychology, Lehigh University B.S., General Engineering, University of Illinois B.A., Psychology, University of Illinois EXPERIENCE General Physics Co;noration 1982 Present Dr. Schroeder's areas of expertise include job and task analysis, procedures validation, systems development and equipment design, operations research, and organizational design and management. Representative projects include:
. Research & Develonment of Human Factors Guidelines Cunent managing a two year research program with the Electric power Research Ir.stitute to develop new human factors guidelines for controls system enhancements and human computer interface issues associated with fossil power plant control rooms.
. Development of Human Factors Program Plans Managed a project to assist du Pont in developing a program plan and integrating human factors into the system development cycle for new reactor facilities at DOEs Savannah River Plant.
- Intfgtalion of Distributu Digital Control and Disolay Systems Managed projects providing human factors assistance to
- Baltimore Oas & Electric's Wagner, Crane, and Brandon l Shores Fossil Stations. This effort included support for the development and integration of distributed digital control and display workstations into the control room.
f a l i W N $ &fN-
1 GENERAL PinNICS CORPOR4 TION i l . Control Room Crew Task Analysis. U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission Supported an NRC research project applying control crew task analysis data in areas of human engineering l design and staffing. Managed a follow-on research ' project for the NRC that has used the existing task analysis database tu identify traitJng needs t.nd to evaluate emergency o,)erating procedures. l Emergency Response Capability Suonort Managed p;ojects providing human factors emergency l response capability support services to utilities in control l room redesign, SPDS evaluation, emergency response I facility review, and overall program integration. Procedure Development and Review i , Responsible for developing and supporting the '
- implementation of procedures and verification / validation L programs for plant operations, maintenance and emergency activities.
l-Training Program Evaluation Participated in the evaluation of training programs for the Technology Transfer Group and supported the i devel0pment of job aids for milling machine operators for General Motors' Advanced Engineering Staff.
. Diacnostic Skills and Supervisory Skills TrainInc l Developed and conducts supervisory skills and diagnostic p skills workshop for operations and technical staff of ;
various industries. 1981 1982 UNC Nuclear Industries Dr. Schroeder worked as a human factors specialist, interfacing - with engineers and other staff in identifying and soMng problems relating to equipment design, the use of procedures, and training efforts at Hanford's N Reactor. He also l performed a human factors review of the control room in support of an ongoing coinml room upgrade program. 1974 1980 Department of Psycholom Moravian College Dr. Schroeder's responsibilities as Assistant Professor and I Department Chairperson included planning and coordinating a day and evening program in psychology involving more than 100 1 0*E 4 flete, l
GENEML PinSICS CORPOMT10N majors; sening on several college committees; supenising individual field study, independent study, and honors projects; and serving as academic advisor to day and evening session students having an interest in applied psychology. 1973 Wigdahl Electric Company Dr. Schroeder worked as a consultant, identifying potential organization problems and conducting problem soMng sessions. 1972 Jewish Emoloyment and Vocational Services As an industrial psychologist, Dr. Schroeder consulted with several industries and government agencies to develop, validate, and administer job related personnel selection tests under a U.S. Department of Labor contract. PROFESSIONAL Member, Human Factors Society AFFILIATIONS Member and Past President of Chesapeake Chapter of the Human Factors Society Vice Chairman of ISA Man Machine Interface Committee PUBLICATIONS " Application of GERTS Network Analysis and Simulation Programming to Problem Areas in Psychology," Dissertation, Lehigh University,1976.
"A Human Factors Guided Sun'ey for Systems Development,"
American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, December 1981. Coauthor with D. R. Fowler.
" Control Room Human Factors in Context," American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, November 1982. Coauthor with D. R. Fowler and D. E. Friar.
" Learning Style Data Applied to Nuclear Pow" Piant Training Programs." American Nuclear Society Antai Meeting, June 1983.
" Task Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Crews, Volume 1-4," NUREG/CR-3371, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1983. Coauthor with D. Burgy, C. Lempges, A. Miller, H. Van Cott, and B. Paramore.
" Crew Task Analysis Database: SEEK System Users Manual,"
NUREG/CR 3606, U.S. Nuclear Regulator Commission, March 1984. Coauthor with D. Burgy. l GP $F-40 R% 1
GENEILAL PHl' SICS CORPORATION "An Evaluation of the Equipment Tagging Process in Nuclear Power Stations," Volume I of Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 27th Annual Meeting, October 1983. Coauthor with P. Doyle and S. Brewer.
"How to Apply Ergonomic Principles to Minimize Human Error and Maximize Human Efficiency," Chapter 3 in Handbook of Occupational Safety & Health,1987. Coauthor with C. Gaddy.
" Emergency Operating Procedures in Flowchart Format:
Human Factors Considerations," Volume I of Proceedings of ANS Topical Meeting on Anticipated and Abnormal Transients in Nuclear Power Plants, April 1987.
" Incorporating Human Engineering Principles in Distributed Controls Upgrades", Proc. of the 31st Power Instrumentation Symposium, May 23 25,1988. Co author with S. Stultz.
" Human Factors Considerations at Hazardous Waste Incir.cration Facilities," Sixth National Conference and '
Exhibition on Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Materials, April 1214,1989. Co author with C. Gaddy.
" Developing Human Factors Criteria for a New Reactor Plant",.
Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 33rd Anr ual Meeting, Vol. 2, Oct.1989. Authored with R. Waters and D. Burgy.
"New Control Technologies Require Good Human Factors Engineering", Power Engineering, November 1989, Authored with C. Gaddy and D. Burgy.
5/90 e.,-..
GENERAL PHYSICS CORPOR4 TION n b8 DANIEL E. CIARK Senior Engineer EDUCATION KBA, Virginia Commonwealth University B.S. , Nu'iear Engineering, University of Michigan Vestinghouse Station Nuclear Engineer School General Physics . Fundamentals of Classroom Instruction General Physics Fundamentals of Procedure Writing ( l I LICENSES AND Certified Senior Reactor Operator, Limerick
~ CERTIFICATES EXPERIENCE Ceneral Thysics Corcoration
! 1985 - Present Mr. Clark is currently assigned to the Nuclear l Services Group in Columbia, Maryland. He is responsible for technical and training services for , PWR and BVR utili f clients. Representative projects include: e Nuclear Thermal Performance Advisor Exoert System Assisted in development and testing of a computerized thermal performance expert system used for diagnosing thermal efficiency problems at a nuclear power plant, e NRC Exam Bank Develooment Developed open reference multiple choice j questions for Salem Generating Station. e EOP Lasson Pltns. Yankee Atomic Electric Company Developed lesson plans for the upgraded Emergency Procedures for Yankee Nuclear Power Station. e Detailed Control Room Desien Review. P11erim Nuclear Power Station Analyzed Pilgria E0rs to determine informatioa and control needs for emergency control .oom operator actions as part of the system functions review and task analysis portion of the DCRDR. 08 W 4 A Ni
GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION e EOP Uerrade. Yankee Atomic Electric Comenny Served as Project Supervisor for the upgrade of plant specific Emergency Procedures for Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The project included technical and human factors upgrade of existing procedures and conversion to a dual column format. 0 EOP Unarade. Salem Generatine Station Served as Project Supervisor for the technical and human factors upgrade of WOC based E0Ps and their conversion to a flowchart format. The E0P Writer's Guide was also updated and used to govern the E0P upgrade. The project involved a complete verification and validation of the flowcharts. 0 Emerzenev Deeratine Procedures Developed high level logic diagrams and lesson plans for Emergency Operating Procedures for the Virginia Power Company's F trry Power Station and North Anna Power Station, and the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, 9 OA Audit Assistance. Salem Generatina Station Provided technical assistance to the Salem Nuclear QA audit team during Technical Specification and reactor engineering outage audits, 1978 1983 virrinia Tower connany Mr. Clark was the Reactor Engineer, responsible for start up physics testing and coordinating reactor related projects. He completed the North Anna Senior Reactor Operator training course and qualified as a Shift Technical Advisor. Mr. Clark improved and performed technical specification surveillance at.d test procedures, and provided engineering support for station operations. Mr. Clark performed nuclear fuel quality assurance inspections. He developed procedures for performing inspections, and assisted in performing vendor-quality assurance audits. PROFESSIONAL - Member, American Nuclear Society AFFILIATIONS (9/90)
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GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORA 110N n SAMUEL M. col!EN h# Staff Specialist EDUCATION General Physics Senior Reactor Operator Certification Course U. S. Naval Nuclear Power Training Program LICENSES AND Certified Senior Reactor Operator Instructor: Limerick CERTIFICATIONS Cenerating Station EXPERIENCE Gengral Physics._ColppIAliItD 1985 - Present Mr. Cohen is responsible for the design, development, and implementation of Boiling Water Reactor training programs. Additionally, he is involved in the development and review of nuclear and non-nuclear related technical procedures.
. Procedure Development. Tennersee Vallev Authority. ,
firQvns Ferry Nuclear Plant ' Participated in the production of emergency operating procedure flowcharts in support of the BFN Rev. 4 upgrade program. Responsibilities included development of the BWROG EPG to PSTG conversion l document, development of the PSTG to Flowchart ! conversion document, production of the Rev. 4 cmcrgency operating procedure flowcharts, and lesson plan development. Detailed Control Room Desien Review. Boston Edison CQEPAny. Pilgrim llu.q.lgar Power StatinD Participated in the development of system function review and task analysis and supported the Verification effort.
- Material Development. Public Service Electric and Cal l
Company. Hope Creek Generatine Station Participated in the production of Category B exam questions for the llope Crcok Cenorating Station Licensed and Senior Licensed Operator exam banks. I l 1 - - . - - O*-Si+40 (9/6W I-1 l
GENERAL PilYSICS CORPORATION e License Operator Training. Philadelphia Electric Company. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Participated in the presentation of two nine-week reactor theory and fundamentals courses for PBAPS license operator candidates. Responsibilities include the writing and grading of all course quizzes and examinations, classroom instruction, and all associated administrative duties. e Procedure Development. Burns and Roe Industrial Service Company. Pine Bluff Arsenal Participated in the production and review of logic flowcharts for existing Emergency Operating and i Unusual Event Procedures in support of the Agent BZ Demilitariaation Program, e gaterial Development. Burns and Roe Indugirini l Eg rvi c tl1. Camp a ny. Pine Bluf f Artend ) Participated in the production of instructor lesson l plans, student handouts and exams in support of the i Agent BZ Demilitarization Program, e Nuclear Proisssional Training. Philadelphia Elcetric Company. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Instructed 3-week Nuclear Professional Training Program at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, e Renresent ative Mat erials Development Projects Participated in the development of criterion-refarenced training materials, encompassing all operations disciplines, for the following clients in support of INPO accreditation efforts: e Public Service Electric and Gas Company, llope Creek Generating Station e Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station e Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Vermont Yanlee Generating Station e Boston Edison Company, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-1979 - 1985 United States Navy As a mechanical operator aboard the USS Sea Devil, Mr. Cohen qualified as Engine Room Supervisor. Ilis duties involved operation and maintenance of the nuclear propulsion plant. lie also assumed the duties as Leading Ship's Welder for emergency welding repairs. (10/90) 08'St 40 (9/66)
GENERAL Fin
- SICS CORPOR4T10N NEIL DANZlG D Staff Specialist 6.#
EDUCATION: hi.A. Candidate, Administrative Sciences and liuman Resource hianagement, George Washington University B.S. Psychology and Business hianagement, Frostburg State College EXPERIENCE: General Physics Cornarallon , 1987 - Present hir. Danzig provides liuman Factors support for projects in the l Industrial Systems Technology Group. Project work includes control room modifications as well as Emergency Operating Procedure Upgrades. In addition, hir. Danzig maintains and markets Job / Task Analysis, and CBT, software programs that were designed within the Human Performance Systems Department. Also, hir. Danzig performs job / task analysis and test and training development. Representative projects include: ! e Human Factors Lead Human Factors representative for General Physics in the Public Service Electric & Gas Company's Salem Unit 2 refueling outage. Responsible for applying Human Factor principles to control room modifications as well as maintaining up to-date revisions of control room drawings. Supervised computer support for control room drawing rnodifications on a hiacintosh 11 computer. Performed a control room instrument inventory at Wisconsin Electric Power Company's Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. Created a data bank of instruments and controls used to develop a control room simulator.
- Procedure Uograde Support hir Danzig assists the Industrial Systems Technology Group in the development and preparation of task analysis methodologies to be utilized in the collection of dynamic human performance data. These tasks include procedure
GENERAL P11YSICS CORPORATION l NEIL DANZIG 2 l analyses, verincation, and validation processes. Additionally, hir. Danzig develops Human Factors Standards for both , BWR and PWR commercial power plants and aids those utilities in implementing design changes in accordance with I those standards. e hiath. Physics. and Chemistry Courseware Sole responsibility for converting, modifying, and testing General Physics' 529 hiath, Physics, and Chemistry CBT lessons and modules. The primary tasks for this project included learning the Summit authoring system, adding General Physics copyright / title screens, rebranching screens, and incorporating first revision user comments for each lesson and module. In addition, hir. Danzig developed 10 lessons using the Summit authoring system and wrote the largest section of the user manual, o Job / Task Analysis Software Pesponsible for marketing the software to potential clients in several industries including: the utility industry, educational systems, government agencies, and the privatc sector. Perform demonstrations of the software when requested by potential buyers, o Training Module Development Developed training modules for Con Edison's Power System Operation project. Responsibilities iricluded performing job incumbent interviews, observing job incumbents perform Power System Operation duties, and writing training material. 1984-1987 Iluman Systems Technolony Cornoration As a Staff Industrial Psychologist, hir. Danzig specialized in job / task analysis of technical positions in the utility industry as well as professional positions within the public sector. His other responsibilities included: test development and validation of selection systems for both entry level and promotional purposes; writing training objectives based upon the critical tasks identified in the job / task analysis; and maintaining the computer data bases , for all job / task analyses. Representative projects included: l OP t#-4019 '86.
l l GE: NICK 4L l'if%4ICS CORl* ORATION NEIL DANZIG - 3 e Job / Task Analysis Conducted analyses of technical and professional positions
, using a modified ISD methodology. Analyses included, for example, Plant Equipment Operator, Control Room Operator, Engineering Fieldman, Lineman, Keypunch Operator, and Computer Operator positions. Conducted job incumbent inten'iews and observations, generated job task lists, developed surveys, statistically analyzed survey results, and presented all findings to the client.
- Test Devekpment and Validation Developed and statistically validated entry level and promotional tests for 10 job positions at Delmarva Power.
The tests developed included hands on type tests as well as paper and pencil tests. Test development was based upon a thorough job / task analysis, e Training Obiective Development Developed training objectives for two positions at Delmarva Power based upon critical tasks identified by the job / task analysis, o Performance hicasurement and Improvement Participated in evaluating the impact of the ALARA program at the Public Service Electric & Gas Company. . Conducted interviews with job incumbents affected by the ALARA program at Salem and } tog Creek Nuclear Power Plants. / PROFFSSIONAL AFFILIATIONS: Personnel Testing Council of hietropolitan Washington i l 3/89 l 08-SF 4016'to:
i l GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION 1 I l 2rr]r,i C. EVERETT HABRIS j d[],23r Principal Specialist l l EDUCATION U.S. Navy Nuclear Training Program i LICENSES AND Certified Nuclear Power Plant SRO Instructor by the CERTIFICATIONS National Academy for Nuclear Training Certified SRO Instructor, DAEC Certified Nuclear Power Plant Fire Brigade Team Hember Certified Sk0 Dresden Unit 11 Licensed SRO and RO, TAHU-TRICA EXPERIENCE Cencral Physics Corocration 1985 - Present Mr. Harris is a certified SRO instructor. He teaches hot license training and operator requalification. Representative projects include: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Tennessee Valley Authority
- Currently assisting in all phases of revision of BFNP 2 Emergency Operating Instructions to EPC Rev. 4, including the writing of simulator validation scenarios.
4 Hope Creek. Public Service Electric and_QAs
- Assisted conducting System Engineering SRO course for Salem and Hope Creek System Engineers.
- Supported Engineering Training department in task analysis, exam questions and training materials development, and Technical Staff /Hanager materials and instruction.
- Supported Engineering Analysis of plant electrical loads for all normal operation modes as well as for LOCA.
- Performed simulator testing for major upgrade of Hope Creek simulator models. $
+ Developed Category B NRC Exam Bank questions for Hope Creek.
Limerick Nuclear Power Station. Philadelchia Electric Conanx
- Assisted conducting simulator training for SRO class of System Eng neers and instructors.
Pilgrim. Botton Edison Comenny
- Supported control room design review for E0P Rev. 4 and satellite precedures.
i e Performed pre-NRC Licensed Exam Audit fur 10 SRO License candidates. ' U"M -40 L 9/ Shl
GENERAL PflYSICS CORPORATION e Performed simulator acceptance test procedures at CAE. . Duane Arnold Energy Center. Iowa Electric Light and Power Comenny e Developed simulator training materials for hot license and requalification training on the Vermont Yankee Simulator, e Conducted hot license and requalification simulator training. Conducted all phases of licensed and non-licensed operator and instructor training.
- Developed the training materials for plant modifications and conducted outage training for engineering staff and operations for two plant outages.
- Developed the Simulator Configuration Management System administrctive procedures and procedure outlines for S'mulator Certification administrati~e procedures.
- Administertd Annual Requalification Exams (written, oral and simulator) for licensed operator requal and administered practice audit exams for hot licenso candidates.
Nine Mile Point. Unit 2. diagara Mohawk e Administered hot licenre audit exams (simulator, written, and oral).
- Developed E0P Rev. 4 Training documents for operator training.
1981 - 1985 Singer-Link Mr. Harris, as a Senior Test Operator, developed test procedures for Grand Gulf, Fermi, Nine Mile Unit 2, Clinton, s and Kuosheng nuclear power plant simulators. He participated in the design of mathematical models for system simulation and conducted testing of Grand Gulf, River Bend and Kuosheng simulators. He also worked on the software design of the man-machine interface for SPDS and CTSS Systems. I 1979 - 1981 Mississipel Power and Light Comoany. Grand Culf Nuclear j' Station l Mr. Harris was an On-Shift Control Room Operator responsible for coordinating plant operations during startup testing and operation of systems. 1977 - 1979 Texas A&M University l As an On-Shift Senior Reactor Operator, Mr. Harris participated in reactor operation, system operation and i maintenance, water chemistry, training and scientific research i (sample irradiation and handling), annual report development, and reactor operation record keeping. GP ST -40 (9/6W l. l l
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GENERAL PilYSICS CORPORATION 1970 - 1976 United States Navy Mr. Harris was a Nuclear Mechanical Operator on board the USS Bainbridge. He was responsible for primary and secondary system operation and maintenance and participated in the overhaul and refueling. In addition, he developed special tools and procedures for primary valve maintenance. (10/90) l. { l l l CI'- SF -4 0 (0/66)
GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION n JOHN E. HOUSE GE Principal Specialist EDUCATION U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Training Program LICENSES AND Certified Senior Reactor Operator: Perry Nuclear Power CERTIPICATIONS Plant Licensed Senior Reactor Operator: Zimmer Nuclear Power Plant Certified Senior Reactor Operator Simulator Instructor: Nine Mile Point, Unit Two EXPERIENCE General Physics Corporation 1984 to Present Mr. House is involved with all levels of project supervision and completion. He also continues to provide a vide spectrum of technical services. Representative projects include: e Operations Pre License Audit Examination Mr. House provided full scope audit examinations for the Reactor and Senior Reactor levels for the Long Island Lighting Company, Boston Edison Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, and the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation. e Plant Restart Effort. P11rrim Nucient Power Station Developed and implemented a comprehensive plant restart training program, including classroom lectures and simulator exercises.- Also assisted in acceptance test programs for the simulator and designed the graphic instructor facility for touch screen simulator control, e Cold / Hot License Operator instruction Provided cold license program development and RO/SRO instruction for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant. Provided hot license instruction for RO/SRO classes (.. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Hope Creek Generating Station and Limerick Generating Station. e System Entineer/ Technical Staff and Mananer Instruction Provided SRO certification course for Hope Creek Generating Station staff. 1 L e Simulator Instructor Courses l Designed, developed, implemented and provided instruction L for a sin.ulator instructor course for ti 3 Boston Edison Company and Detroit Edison Company. l l. i cP SF-40 (9/66) l-l
CENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION e Ouality Assurance Traininr/ Audits Provided Quality Assurance Department assistAuce in the performance of operations department and Ter.hnical Specification Surveillance audits for Public Service Electric and Gas Company. Also provided design, development, implementation and evaluation for ar. operations introductory course for quality assurance personnel, e Material Production Froicets e Design / development Shif t Technical Advisor / Engineering Staff Boiling Water Reactor Technology Course for the River Bend Station. , i e Design / development and instruction for Licenced Operator Diagnostics course for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (classroom and simulator), e Design / development and overall project management for an Equipment Operator Training Program for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, j e Design / development and implementation of an NRC Cold License Program for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Station. Also performed a'cceptance testing of the plant specific simulator, e Developed and provided instruction for the Hot License I Program for the Peach Bottom Atomic Posir Station. Developed Category "B" requalification test items for the Hope Creek Generating Station. 1980 1984 Cincinnati Cas and Electric Company , Mr. House was Utility Staff Instructor for licensed and non-licensed operations personnel. He was responsible for cold license preparation classes, license requalification, and in-plant drill evaluation, h As a licensed member of the operations group, Mr. House perfctm J ro'utine on shift tasks. Additional responsibilities included human factors review of the control room and procedure development and verification, 1972 to 1980 United States Navy Served as a classroom and in hull instructor for the DIG Nuclear Prototype. Supported reactor refueling and worked ; extensively in radiological control. Also served as a Nuclear Work Center Coordinator for the nuclear unit squadron. (2/90) cr sr-40 (s/su j
GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION D JEFFREY L. KLEIN Cut # Director, DOE Training & Technical Services Department EDUCATION B.S., Nuclear Engineering, The University of lilinois U.S. Navy Nuclear Power Training Program UCENSES AND Certified Nuclet.r Power Plant Senior Reactor Operator i CERTIFICATIONS Instructor, BWR, Umerick Certificate of Training Completion, Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Task Analysis Training Seminar EXPERIENCE fatDelai Physics Cornoration 1981 Present Mr. Klein is the Director of the DOE Training and Technical Services Department. He has overall responsibility f ar [ coordination and supervision of all General Physice' tralning and technical services provided to DOE facilities,other than Westinghouse Savannah River. In this capacity, ' tis
- responsibilities include marketing and sales, client liason, - technical performance, budgetary and cost controls, and coordination of personnel to meet client needs.
Representative past projects include:
- - Director of the Instructional Services Denartment Directed activities of a diverse group of professionals involved in Instructionaltechnology. Responsibilitiesincluded marketing and sales, technical performance, b idgetary and cost controls, and personnel utilization.
- Manager. Industrial Instructional Services Deoartment Participated in all phases of training and managed a major design and development effort for Talwan Power Company.
- SRO Material production. Long IslancLL!ghting comoany Participated in the design and development of lesson plans for upgrade and direct Senior Reactor Operators at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, w
- Project Manaaer. Boston Edison Comoany Acted as the Project Manager for the Licensed O'perator
- Requalification Program. Additionally, he has acted as lead instructor and program administrator.
m h
GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION l
- Project Coordinator. Boston Edison Comnany Functioned as on site ooordinator for SRP Upgrade Program; participated in materials preparation and lesson plan development using periormance based criteria.
- RO/SRO License Tralning. Boston Edison Comnany Participated in the development and instruction of a Hot License Training Program for Boston Edison Company's Pilgrim Station.
- Engineer Trainino Programs. Philadelohla Electric Comoany. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station As project supervisor, supervised the production of a plant specific textbook with lesson plans and presented portions of the lecture phase for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station engineers.
Sv< tem Descriotion Manual Develooment. Cleveland E[petric liluminatino Comoany Acted as project supervisor, ooordinated the organization of a major System Description Manual project for the Perry Nuclear Power Station. His work included the editing and technical review of manuals prepared by other staff writers. 1974 1978 .Unlied Statta Navy As an instructor at the SIC Prototype Plant. Mr. Klein qualified as an ElectricalOperator. H!s duties included standing allin rate watches with qualifying students, teaching and testing students on plant systems and operation, and general plant maintenance. 1 (11/90)
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J GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION n SAMUEL J. SHOPPELL ([3,;pr Senior Specialist i EDUCATION M.Ed. Candidate, Curriculum and Instruction, Penn State B.S. Behavioral Science, Iona College LICENSES AND Certified Senior Reactor Operator: Limerick Generating CERTIFICATIONS Station , EXPERIENCE Egngral Physics Corporation 1985 - Present Mr. Shoppell designs, develops, and implements training materials. Representative projects include:
- Latritt .JptrAt i n e P r oc ed u r e s (EOP)
Participated in the production of Emergency Operating Procedures in support of Revision 4 upgrades. Developed text and flowchart formet procedures; plant specific technical guidelines and bases; and training basis documents for Hope Creek Generating Station, Nine Mile Point Station Unit 2, and Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2.
. Technient Traininc Conducted BWR Indoctrination Training for Hope Creek Generating Station personel.
Knowledce and Abilities Cataloc Develcoment. Philadelphia Electric Comenny Developed a site specific knowledge and abilities catalog, including: task lists, knowledge and abilities statements, importance factors and the development / verification of the training basis matrio for the Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator, e Control Room Desien Review. Boston Edison Company Supported the Detailed Control Room Design Reviews (DCRDR) for EOP Revision 4 and satellite procedures, e Simulator Instructor Trainine Designs, develops, and conducts " Train-the-Trainer" programs to certify simulator instructors for General Physics Corporation and client personnel, including: Boston Edison Company; Consolidated Edison Company; Detroit Edison Company; EC&C, Idaho; and Gulf States Utilities. Topics include: Effective Simulator Use; Developing Diagnostic and Team Skills; Developing and Conducting Exercises. O'-$f*40 (9/ M)
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. Classroom Instructmr Training j Designs, develops, and conducts " Train-the-Trainer" 3 m programs to certify classroom ints uctors for General Physics Corporation and client pcrsonnel, including:
j - Boston Edison Company, Liberty Technologies, New England Power, Northeast Utilities, and Shell Oil Company. Topics include: Principles of Instructional Design, Lesson Development, Classroom Techniques, Presentation Skills, Training Aids, Adult Learner Characteristics.
. Training Manuni and Materini Develorment. Taiwan Power Company Developed sections of tne Training Manual and full scope training materlat for technical and management positions.
. Simulator Training Program Deyelcoment. Long Island Lighting. Company Revised simulator exercise guides for plant operation, malfunction, and surveillance training on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Simulator.
. Technigni Staff and Manneement Course. Boston Edison Company Developed a ccurse for Pilgrim Station to assist in reducing contamination and radiation expo es.
. Insk Annlyals. Lone Island Lichtine Company Coordinated the task analysis of the equipment operator and radwaste operator positions for INPO accreditation of training at_the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station; designed taxonomy for skill and knowledge statementsl analyzed positinaa for. system, component, and theorct'. cal knowledge; 1rvised sxa technical analysts _and three;$ata entry clerks; modified' computer programs and data bases.
. Job / Task Annivsis. Boston Edison Company Analyzed Pilgrim Station Shift Technical Advisor position; developed skill and knowledge taxonomy and' objectives f3r training programs.
6 .. Ma t e'r i a l s De elopment. Vermont Yankee Nucicar Power I' Corcoration Developed training material for INPO accreditation of the-Verment Yankee Power Station control room operators. 3 g' 1984 .1985 Institute for Resource Management _-Training Instructor assigned to New York-Power Authority at Indi,.r Point III.: Revised instructor outlines and student An handouts. Taught General Employee, Radiation Protection, and Respiratory Protection classes. CP-St-40 (9/66)
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GENERAL PilYSICS CORPORATION 1984 Combustion Encineering a Senior Health Physics Technician at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station responsible for health physics coverage during the 1984 summer refueling outage. 1983 - 1984 Lpnc Island Lightine comoany Senior Health Physics Technician at Shoreham Nuclear Power Station responsible for all phases of hen!th physics, worked extensively on the Who') Body Counting system. Assisted in the development and revision of hsa'.ch physics procedures. ; While on assignmen'; at V.C. Summer Nuclear Generating Station, provided health physics coverage for the 1984 spring outage. 1976 - 1982 United States Navy Qualified as Engine Room Supervisor and served as Leading Engineering Laboratory Technician on board USS Robert E. Lee, ! SSBN601. (10/90) i l h i l ?! l l
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GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION Pa art]p JEFFREY H. STEVENS
& Staff Specialist EDUCATION U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School LICENSES AND Certified Senior Reactor Operator Instructor, Limerick CERTIFICATIONS Cenerating Station Simulator EXPERIENCE Ceneral Physics Corocration 3/89 - Present As Staff Specialist, Mr. Stevens conducts licensed and non-licensed operator training in the theory :.,nd operation of commercial BWRs.
- Conducted a 14 week Senior Reactor Operator Certification ecurse at the Peach Bottc.n Atomic Power Station, with two l
weeks of NRC style generic fundamentals and component theory. Duties included lesson and exam preparation, classroom and simulator instruction and simulator operation.
- Conducted 14 week systems engineers certification course at Hope Crock Generating Station. Duties included classroom instructica at the Senior Reactor Operator Level, exam material generation in the form of multiple choice questions, exam preparation, and simulator instruction.
o During this assignment, Mr. Steven's classroom instructor l techniques were evaluated as part of a INPO training audit which earned a rating of "1".
- Co-authored Hope Creek Cenerating Station Revision 4 E0P documentation, including Bases, Lesson Plans, Conversion l Documents and BWR Knowledge and. Abilities (K/A) Catalog Cross Reference .for Lesson Plans. ;
- Co-authored Hope Creek Cenerating Station Category'B licensed operator requalification examination questions,_
utilizing NUREC/BR 0122. l l [ ! m sr 4o tois6: i
GENERAL FilYSICS CORPORATION 1980-1989 U.S. Navy As Prototy),e Staf f Instructor, Mr. Stevens instructed Navy and contractor studentr. in all disciplines of propulsion pl(.t operations. In addition to full Prototype Staf f Instructor Certification, his advanced qualifications included I Engineering Watch Supervisor and Crew Quality Assurance Inspector and Leading Engineering Laboratory Technician. He has extensive experience instructing anu evaluating students, in both classroom and seminar formats. Mr. Stevens has been noted, on numerous occasions, as the top instructor in his crew, on student's end-of-course feedback and critique forms. His students have consistently been top scoring graduates. (9/90) Le l
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1 1 GENERAL PHYSICS CORPORATION I n MARK D. VENTERS G# Senior Specialist EDUCATION B.S., Geology, University of North Carolina BWR Systems Training, brunswick Nuclear Project, CP&L PWR SRO Certification Training, H.B. Robinson, General Physics BWR SRO Certification Training, Limerick, General Physics LICENSES AND Certified BWR Senior Reactor Operator Instructor: CERTIFICATIONS Limerick Generating Station EXPERIENCE General Physice 1986 - Present Mr. Venters provides project management plus technical and human factors expertise to engineering, operations and training projects. Mr. Venters also assists utilities in NRC audits. Specific disciplines include:
. Emereency Operatine Procedures (EOPs)
Developed !esson plans, textual and flowchart format procedur29, PSTGs, and bases and conversion documents to the BWROG Emergency Procedure Guidelines and WOG Emergency Response Guidelines; supported utilities in NRC audits; managed and performed task analysis, verification, validation, human factors reviews, procedure discrepancy documentation, assessment and resolution for River Bend Revs.3 and 4, Grand Gulf Rev.3, Vermont Yankee Rev.4, Hope Creek Rev.4, Shoreham Rev.4, Hatch Rev.3,' Peach Bottom Rev.3, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Rev.4, Browns Ferry Rev.4, Salem Rev.1A, and Yankee Atomic Power Plant Rev.lA.
- Procedure Writer's Guide / Verification and Validntion Plan Develonment/ Revision Incorporated requirements of NUREG-0899, NUREG/CR-5228, and NUREG-1358; developed, revised, and verified procedure generation packages to include human factored guidelines on format, step construction, vocabulary, and mechanics; checklists on content, format, and technical guidelines; verification and validation on usability. Representative power plants include River Bend, Shoreham, Hope Creek, Nine Mile Point Unit 2, Salem, and Yankee Atomic Power Plant.
. Dglailed Control Room Design Review and Implementation Managed and conducted all NUREG-0700 based phases of Detailed Control Room Design Review as required by NUREG-0737 Supplement 1; supported utilities in NRC audits; '
supervised and developed engineering design change procedures for control room modification, and performed det iled design change analyses at Crand Gulf, Diablo Canyon, Point Beach, Fort Calhoun Station, Pilgrim, Hatch, Shoreham, Salem, San Onofre, Fermi 2, and Fitzpatrick. CP-$-40 (9/66)
GEN &~tAL PHYSICS CORPORATION e Material Develonment Developed and revised system descriptions in support of operator and technical staff training program at Detroit Edison's Enrico Fermi 2.
. Desien and Implementation of TAG OUT PLUS Developed modular TAG OUT PLUS software program designed to
, automate plant specific tag out procedures plus develop, store, and print tag out orders and tag labels; managed implementation of TAG OUT PLUS at Miami Fort Fossil Station.
. Disolav System Orennization Design for Digital Data.
Acquisition and Control Systems (DDACS) Provided initial. design recommendations for action-oriented plant control and information computer display hierarchy at Brandon Shores and Crane Fossil Stations.
. Design and Layout of Computer System Consoles
' Performed various system-design upgrade and control room layout studios for Safety Paramete* Display Systems and
. .DDACS Sysrems at River Bend, Point Beach, and Brandon Shores arid Crane Fossil Stations.
. Contro1~ Room Staff Ucerade !
Performed. control room SRO and RO staff upgrade study based-on detailed analyses-and interviews at Point Beach.
. Control Room Mockun Construction Assisted in the design and building of full scale double layered magnetic control room photographic mockups for
! Salem and Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant.
1983 - 1986 Carolina Power and Light ComnaDX, Brunswick Nuclear Project As an Auxiliary A Operator, Mr. Venters trained and tested-Auxiliary Operators on plant systems for qualification; generated tag outs to support various ISI and refueling programs, ILRTs,-LLRTs, and extensive plant modification projects; performed troubleshooting and tagged out equipment for maintenance and repairl served on operational procedure review committee and fire protection group; provided daily surveillance-testing of' instrumentation and equipment in strict accordance with plant operating manual and technical L specifications; operated power producing equipment as p necessary to meet load demands, and part sipated in a
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i continuous-rel. . technical and on-the-job training program. PROFESSIONAL Hember, Americon Nuclear Society AFFILIATIONS Member, frecican Association of Petroleum Geologirts-l (5/90) o -s, 4 coi.6>
I GENER.4L PHYSICS CORPOR4 TION i n G# DIANE E. WISNIEWSKI Staff Scientist EDUCATION M.A. Candidate, Human Factors, George Mason University B.S., Engineering Psychology, Tnfts University L EXPERIENCE General Physics Corooration 1988 Present Ms. Wisniewski provides human factors implementation and design services to nuclear and fossil power plants, and industrial L facilities. She develops plant specific human factors design , documents and aids clients in implementing design changes and upgrading workstations in accordance with human factors guidelines. Ms. Wisniewski has provided human factors support at various power plants with regard to design changes and control board l enhancement efforts. Ms. Wisniewski has supported ! implementation projects at the following plants: 1 Salem Nuclear Generating Station Point Beach Nuclear Plant Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Onsite Human Factors Sucoort Ms. Wisniewski has acted as lead onsite Human Factors Specialist for the Unit 1 Refueling Outage of the Salem Nuclear Generating Piant. Ms. Wisniewski applied human factors principles during the design of the Unit 1 control room and verified that all m%lifications resolved the related Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs). Ms. Wisniewski also updated all drawings to reDect the control room design changes. Procedure Uperade Support a Ms. Wisniewski asshts the Industrial Services Group in the development and preparation of task analysis methodologies to be utilized in the collection of dynamic human performance data. These tasks include VY & & Ml r-- - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ , . ,
GENERAL Pin'SlCS CORPORATION procedure analyses, verification, and validation processes. Additionally, Ms. Wisniewski develops , Human Factors Standards for both BWR and ! PWRcommercial power plants and aids those utilities in implementing design changes in accordance with those standards.
. Software Design Support Ms. Wisniewski created human engineering system specifications and a ::ystem design document for the proposed design of an Advanced ASW Surface Ship Combat System. Ms. Wisniewski resolved human factors issues involving display size, shape, color, content, and -
layaut for each window of the proposed design. L 1987 GTE Corporation. Waltham, MA Ms. Wisniewski acted as a consultant who conducted research and gathered (Ma on compressed natural and synthetic speech
.in an 7 aft caNr. environment. - As well, Ms. Wisniewski-L des!A speech prompts to provide instruction on the operation of an a5to ground telephone. ;
1987 U.S. Army Research. Develonment & Engineerine Center ~ Ms. Wisniewski served as a contractor for various human factors projects. She conducted human factors and safety analysis in the areas of ' shelters, clothing, and food using
- MANPRINT : methodology. She formulated questionnaires,
- conducted interviews, gathered data, analyzed statistics, and y reported results regarding the various projects. Additionally, Ms.' Wisniewski obtained field experience at various militasy bases.
1 . ADDITIONAL AREAS OF KNOWLEDGE Kinesiology
. Gross Anatomy.
Strategies of Injury Control
, Anthropometry
- Biotechnology in Human Systems 2/90
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l i I HARREN BABC0CK, JR. 1 SR. ELECTRONICS ENGINEER' BOSTON EDISON COMPANY PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR EDUCATION Bachelor of Science, Electrical Engineering, Brown University,1968 Graduate-Study, Industrial Engineering, Ohio University PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION L Control Systems Engineer, State of California
' PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
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' Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Human factors Society PROFESSIONAL TRAINING Training in Humani Factors Engineering:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology - 1980 "ManeHachine Interfacing"
, General Electric Nuclear Training Center - 1980 "BHR Owners' Group Human Factors Engineering Workshop" University of. Wisconsin - '1981
" Human Performance and Nuclear Safety"
. PROFESSIONAL' EXPERIENCE Dnston Edison Comp 3ny fd979 - Present)
- Sr. Electronics Engineer, Control Systems Division, Nuclear. Engineering LDepartment.
. Currently. working as cognizant engineer for Coi. trol Room Design Review Project. : Acted as team leader of a BWR Owners' Group control room survey l- team. Member, BHROG Control Room Improvements Sub-committee. Also
" . responsible for desi]n of new control systems and modifications to existing control. systems at Pilgrim Nuclear. Power Station, including preparation of instructions for installation of new equipment and procedures for check-out and testing of this equipment. Have n'rved as instructor for operator training in electrical / electronic systems operation.
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-EXPERIENCE (Continued)
Burns and Roe. I E (1977 - 1979) Sr. Engineer / Group Supervisor, Instrument and Control Department, Breeder Reactor Division Supervision of I&C engineering group with responsibility for design of balan:e-of-plant ILC systems for a breeder reactor oroject. Lead engineer, solid-state logic systems design. Lead engineer, electronic security systcms. fitsro Services. Inc. Sr. Instrument & Control Engineer (1974 - 1977) Designed ILC systems for application to nuclear and fossil power plants. Reviewed vendor system design documents for compatibility with clients' specifications. Member of engineering team charged with-design and layout responsibilities for control rooms at various power plants, both fossil and nuclear. Crvoaenic Technology. Inc. Electrical Engineer (1974) Designed control panels and control systems for nuclear power applications. Prepared field test procedures for docuraentation of installed system performance. Field engineer for checkout and testing or radioactive. waste process systems. Stone & Hohs_tgr Engineerina Corooration Control Systems Engineer-Designed control panels and control systems for nuclear power applications. Prepared field test procedures for documentation of installed-system performance. Field engineer for checkout and testing of radioactive waste process systems.
. Babcock & Hilcox ComoADY Electrical Engineer, Nuclear Power Generation Department Designed and/or specified electronic' control systems for nuclear steam ,
supply systems when. built in B&W plants. Reviewed vendor specifications ' 1 'and documentation for systems built outside B&H. Instructed. customers' engineering personnel on operation and maintenance-of B&H's systems. l 1
THOMAS BENEDUCI SIMULATOR DIVISION MANAGER BOSTON EDISON COMPANY EDUCATION Associate Degree, Electrical Engineering, Franklin Institute of Boston, 1975 Bachelor of Science, InoQstrial Technology, Northeastern University,1986 ER0EESS10N TRAINING Nuclear systems training course designed specifically for Pilgrim Station, including specific studies on RHR, Core Spray, HPCI, RCIC, TIP, Neutron : Honitoring SBLC, Turbine Generator and Reactor Vessel intervals. L School (five weeks) on BWR 4 Nuclear Instrumentation including studies on i the APRM, IRM, SRM, TIP, Area Rad Monitor, Log Rad Monitor and Process Rad Monitor systems. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Boston Edison Company (1980 - Present) Simulator Division Manager (April 1989 - Present) , Responsibilities encompass overall operation, maintenarcr nd modification of the Simulator Complex. _ This includes management of the Simulator capital and expense budgets and varying number of management, union and contractor personnel in the planning and scheduling of Simulator modifications,- discrepancy corrections, Lnd enhancements. Manages or participates on special. teams in analy" s of plant transients tasked with root- cause corrective actions being identified, initiated and completed. Special projects . include installation of a redundant Simulator computer system, installation of the Simulator EPIC computer syste.n, installation L of Simulator emergency preparedness phone systems and Simulator NRC - l Certification. Active member of the Utility Simulator Users Group Executive Committee, Secretary of the NETA Simulators Advisory Committee and a member of the Employees Speakers Bureau. ? Sr. Simulator Hardware Engineer (October 1987 - March 1989)
- Responsibilities included management of the following: the Simulator L capital and expense budgets, hardware modifications for the SEP, emergency lighting, HPCI Vacuum Breaker, other minor modifications, the computer l room' humidifier upgrade,.and comoleting the Simulator spare parts
' inventory. Assisted in and. conducted Simulator tours for media and L
special interest groups. Special projects were the research and approval of a backup Simulation
. Computer System, managing the installation of the EPIC computer system at the Simulator, and writing purchase specifications for the Simulator EPIC l System and Toshiba Intelligent Display Terminal relocation.
Industry-related activities-included serving as secretary to the NET /. Simulators Advisory Comittee and being an active member of the Employee Speakers Bureau. m
Thomas Beneduci Page 2 - EXPERIENCE (Continued) Sr. Modifications Engineer, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Novembcr 1985 - October 1987) Responsibilities included administering post-construction acceptance t&! ting of all Plant Design Changes (PDC), hiring and directing contract personnel for the administration / coordination of post-construction testing, and providing interface with the plant maintenance, engineering, operatiors, and all other departments involved in the PDC process. Special activities included providing reports to Senior BECo Management and team leadership on CAL 86-10 resolution, presenting positions to NRC on questions relating to CAL 86-10 and other testing /POC issues, and acting as Hodifications Management Group Leader during the absence of the group leader. Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Ncvember 1983 - 1985) Responsibilities included direct supervision of I&C Technicians and Contractors, scheduling personnel, writing and reviewing plant procedures, acting as project manager for Plant Design Change packages, and directing l installation of new plant equipment. This position required interfacing l with other station groups including Nuclear Engineering'for planning and implementing Plant Design Changes. Instrumentation and Controls Technician, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, (August 1980 - November 1983) Responsibilities included performance of maintenance activities on all categories of nuclear power plant equipment, writing and performing surveillance tests and postwork tests required to prove equipment
' performance meets technical specification criterit. and operability
. requirements. Special projects included installation of the Seawater Differential Temperature modification, the new CRD Temperature Recorder, the Drywell Hi-Rad Monitors and various other plant design changes. Also Yesponsible for writing and-performing system logic tests required to satisfy NRC Bulletin 80-06 concerns, o
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l DAVID A. BRYANT PROJECT MANAGER BOSTON EDISON COMPANY DCRDR PROJECT MANAGER R' EDUCATION
, Bachelor of Science, Electrical Engineering, Tufts University, 1966
- HSE, Catholic University of America, 1971 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATION Institute of Electrical and Electronics Enginears PROFESSIONAL TRAINING Certificate in nuclear power plant engineering program, Bettis Reactor
, Engineering School, 1967 1. PROFESSIONAL' EXPERIENCE Boston Edison Cotnp3Byl1976 - Present)
, Project Manager, Control Room Design Review Project, Nuclear Engineering Densrtment (1985 - Present)
Re'ponsible s for overall management of project, including assignment of tasks to project personnel (in-house and contractors);. coordination of efforts by-all involved departments; administration of purchase orders;
' monitoring of progress and developing corrective action as needed; 9.: budgeting,; scheduling and planning; and review and approval of licensing submittals and other correspondence.-
Pilgrim'2 Project Manager (1981-1984) Responsible to manage efforts to close out cancelled nuclear power plant 4 . project,. including negotiation of settlements for at,out 100 cancelled ,
, -contracts; maintenance, marketing, and eventual disposal of $100 million of t cdwwe;' and liaison with regulators, twelve' joint owner utilities, -
.and marious company organizations.
Project Engineer, Pilgrim 2 Project (1976-1981) Project-engineer-and contract administrator for Nuclear Steam Supply
? ! System contract- for 1100 MW PHR. Coordinated the review and approval of y contractor, design documents. Administered NSSS' contract (approximately
.$100 million).- Managed interface among architect-engineer, NSSS supplier,
-and *;tility staff, on technical issues, scheduling, and contractual matters.
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f Dave Bryant g Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Continued) GCA/ Technology Division (1974 - 1976) Senior Engineer and then Group Leader. Transportation and Land Use Planning Department Performed and managed environmental studies, transportation planning, and y land use planning projects for government clients. Fav. Spofford & Thorndike. Inc. (1971 - 1974) Transportation Engineer / Planner Performed traffic engineering, transportation planning, land use studies, and environmental studies for public agencies. Performed field surveys, data collection, analysis, and report preparation, t U.S. Navy (1966 - 19711 _ . Nuclear Power Engineer, Naval Reactors Division, U.S. Atomic Energy
-Commission-Naval officer serving in navy headquarters engineering organization as cognizant engineer supervising contractor efforts for design, procurement, modification and repair of mechanical equipment in nuclear ships.
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l ROBERT M. BYRNE
!NSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL ENGINEER BOSTON EDISON C0.
EDUCATION B.S., Marine Engineering, Massachusetts Maritime Academy,1977 LICENSES Chief Engineer of Motor Vessels of no more than 7000 hp, Mineral and Oil-Industry Third Assistant Engineer--Motor Vessels--any horsepower. Third Assistant Engineer--Steam Vessels--any horsepower. PROFESSIONAL IRAINING
" Applied Human Factors in Power Plant Design and Operation," General Physics Corp., 1987 EXPERIENCE Bolton Edison C.om_pany (Aug.1987 Present)
Instrument & Control Engineer Nuclear Engineering Department, Control Systems Division. Responsible for providing engineering support to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station through designing, analyzing and modifying I&C systems and components. Other duties include preparing Safety Evaluations and procurement documents, drawing reviews and providing engineering su) port to other disciplines within the nuclear organization. Familiar witi NRC Regulatory Guides and IEEE Standards. Assigned to the DCRDR Project as cognizant engineer for Annunciator Conceptual Design study. Stone & Webster Enging.erina Corooration (1980 - 1987) Instrument & Control Systems / Turnover Coordinator Control Systems Division, Beaver Valley II Project. Responsible for ensuring completion of engineering and design of control systems prior to transfer to Dusquesne Light Company. Acted as liaison among engineering (SWEC, DLC, and Site), construction, and operations to ensure testing and start up of plant. Developed engineering analysis reports to management utilizing the Lotus 123 Software. Control' Systems Engineer / Change Mancgement Coordinator Responsible for reviewing potential changes of control systems for feasibility. Evaluated construction impact of change.to system. Instrument & Control Engineer Responsible for developing, revising ar. reviewing logic diagrams and system descriptions. Prepared and re"iewed controls systems section of the Final Safety Analysis Report for BVII. 1. l-l . Q
Robert M. Byrne , Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Continued) Offshore Lugisijcs International. (1977 - 19.8.01 Chief Engineer Ensure safe and proper operation of vessel and all associated machinery. Trained and supervised foreign crews (Brazil, Chile).- Responsible for maintenar.ce and repair of vessel machinery. First Assistant Engineer Assisted chief engineer with vessel's propulsion units. 1
SIBEN DASGUPT' CONTROL SYSTEMS DIVIS,N MANAGER BOSTON EDISON CU.4PANY EDUCATION Electrical Engineer (Power Systems) Northeastern University, 1979 M.S. in Engineering Management (Operations Research), Northeastern University, 1973 Matter of Engineering in Electrical Engineering (Power Systems) Calcutta University, 1969 Bachelor of Engineering in Electrical Engineering (Power Systems), Calcutta University, 1967 PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION Registered Professional Engineer (Massachusetts). PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Member of Institute of. Electrical and Electronics Engineer Chairman, IEEE Educational Committee, Boston Chapter. Member of the Working Group of IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee, Section 4.7, Auxiliary Power Systems. PROFESSIONAL TRAINING Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power Plant Simulator - Training course i' Nuclear Power Plant Operation.
. Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment for Nuclear Power.
Generating Stations - Arranged jointly by Drexel University and IEEE. Kepner-Tregoe Management Train'1g Course. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Baston Edison Company ( 1975 to Present) Control Systems Division Manager, Nuclear Engineering Dept. (December .1981 to present) Responsible for all activities within the Division, which includes planning and scheduling, workload assignments, technical assistance and supervision, and developing new standards and work procedures. Duties of the Division consisted of preparation of process and instrumentation diagrams, logical diagrams, schematic diagrams, selection and specification of all instruments and valves, panels layouts and fabrication drawings, loop drawings, tubing and wiring and installation
Siben Das 'ipta Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Continued) F detail drawings, vendor evaluation, purchasing, field support and startup assistance. Duties also include engineering activities related to Plant . Process Computer and Security Computer Systems. Senior Electrical Engineer, Nuclear Engineering Dept. (1978 - 1981) s Responsible for review and approval of recommendations for electrical designs prepared by the principal contractors for a new power plant (Architect-Engineer, Nuclear Steam Supplier, Turbine-Generator
< manufacturer)-in the fc11owing areas: Station Auxiliary power systems, station auxiliary power system protection, computer applications for load flow and short circuit studies, undervoltage and underfrequency studies, etc. Responsibilities also included design modifications of station auxiliary power systems for an operating plant. This included undervoltage study, relay coordination, electrical equipment selection,
> equipment qualification, etc. Instrumentation and Control Engineer, Nuclear Engineering Dept. (1975 - 1978) Responsible for logic diagrams, loop drawings, control panel layout and fabrication > drawings, tubing and wiring diagrams as well as installation detail drawings. Stone & Hehiter Enaineerina Coro. (1973 - 1975) w Engineer, Control Systems / Advisory Operations Group Served as a.startup engineer at Beaver Valley Power Station #1. Resolved acceptance and startup testing problem items (i.e., control logic troubleshooting) in the field. Prepared specifications for instrumentation. Prepared bid analyses.and recommendations to utility engineers for selection of. instrument suppliers. Designed control loop, , logic, panel layout, P&ID and instrumentation installation drawings. i Formulated' calibration data for process control loops. l Bell & Hoyell Communications Co. (1970 -1973) Engineer, Production Engineering Dept. s Investigated field failures of electronic components wit the aid.of
. computer controlled test system. Investigated manufacturing problems to
. determine cause and to recommend corrective action.- Set up test methods.
trouble-shooting procedures; designed test jigs. Analyzed the production requirements of products and determine the type and sequence of C . operations, establishing work elements, motion patterns and machine cycles.
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' Siben Dasgupta Page 3 EXPERIENCE (Continued)
Northeastern University (1977 - Present) Part-time lecturer in Graduate School of Engineering. i PUBLICATIONS l
" Transient Performance of Three-Phase Induction Motors During Sudden Voltage Depressions": Journal of Technology (India) 1969.
" Degraded or loss of Voltage Protection of Class IE Auxiliary Power Systems in a Nuclear Power Plant"; S. Dasgupta, J. J. Hurphy; presented at j the IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium, Oct. 1978. Published in the IEEE ;
' Nuclear Science Transactions, feb., 1979.
" Maximum Frequency Decay Rate for Reactor Coolant Pump Motors"; R. S.
Hahn, S. Dasgupta, E. M. Baytch, R. D. Hilloughly; Presented at the IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium, Oct., 1978; published in the IEEE Nuclear ; Science Transactions, Feb., 1979. { I i i l- . i L i
NORMAN R. EISENMANN SR. INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS ENGINEER BOSTON EDISON COMPANY EDUCATION-B.S.,' Electronic Engineering Technology, University of Lowell, 1985 A.S., Electronic Engineering Technology, University of Lowell,1982 A.S., New York State Regents External Degree Program, 1979 PROFESSIONAL TRAINING University of Michigan - 1990 " Human Factors Engineering"
" Applied Human factors in Power Plant Design and Operation", General Physics Corporation, 1987 U.S. Navy Training, Nuclear Power School and Prototype Training, 1972.
PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION Professional Engineer, State of New Hampshire PROFESSIONAL AFFLICATIONS Institute of Electrical and Electronic: Engineers. American Nuclear Society.
, Instrument Society of America noman Factors Society, 4
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Boston Ediso'n Co. . Nuclear Enaineerina Dept. (June 1988 to Present)
-Assigned as the lead engineer for the implementi. tion of modifications to
, th' 'NPS Control Room.to meet the criteria of NUREG-0700. Responsible for the supervision of. consultants preparing Scope. and Justification Approvals and Plant Design Changes. Also responsible for supervision of consultants performing Human: Factors Engineering work for Boston Edison. Responsible for close-out documentation packages for HEDs and preparing
- speci fication for new CR Survey, Inventory, SFTA, etc. Also responsible for supporting the ' Equi _pment Qualification Project with updating Equipment
-Qualification Data Files and reviewing test reports. Responsible for answering Engineering Support Requests submitted to NED.
Nuclear Enerav *1grvices Qanuary 1986 - June 1988) Assigned to the Boston Edison Equipment Qualification Project. Consultant to the Control Systems Group of Boston Edison. Compiled data, reviewed te'J reports, prepared analyses, and performed calculations using the
> Artnenius Methodology to complete environmental qualification of control equipment.
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l Norman R. Eisenmann Page 2 i EXPERIENCE (Continued) Cognizant engineer for Plant Design Changes. These plant modifications included changes to air operators, instrument air systems, ATHS panels, 4160 volt switchgear, and Reactor Protection Systems. Prepared production orders to purchase material to support the PDCs.. Reviewed calculations for orifice sizing, relief valve sizing and single failure analysis using Boolean Algebra. CYGNA Enerav Services (April 1981 - January 1986) Engineer for the Control Sp t as Croup of Boston Edison. Cogniant engineer for 5 Plant Design Changes (PDC) at Boston Edison. The PDCs included modifications to control panels, local control switches, and shielding of components. Lead Engineer for Cygna on the Boston Edison Pilgrim 79-01B Equipment Qualification team. Duties included equipment specification and test report evaluation to ensure compliance to D0R Guidelines, NUREG-0588, or 10CFR50.49. Responsible for the preparation of work instructions and procedures for the Equipment Qualification Program. Provided assistance with project budgeting and computerized scheduling. For the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Project, prepared new procedures and' revised. existing procedures for processing of vendor technical
-bulletins, design changes, client' interfaces, and administration of clerical-workers.
Stone & Hebster Enaineerina Coro. (Auaust 1979 - March 1981) As an Engineering Associate in the Operation Services Division, evaluated equipment for the selection of spare and replacement parts requirements for Consumers Power Company's Hidland Station Units 1 and 2, The evaluation encompassed a, thorough analysis of vendor information, Final R Safety Analysis Reports, specifications and industrial experiences. This effort involved- frequent direct contact with_ equipment suppliers in order oe to obtain additional data needed to either' complete documentation Lrequirements or perform equipment performance evaluations. Duties ' included defining the parts by interpreting original equipment technical H specifications,-Quality Assurance packages, equipment qualification requirements.and various codes and standards such as ASTH, ASME, ANSI, and IEEE. of ,' ' While assigned to the Engineering Assurance Division, developed departmental procedures for the Procurement Control Group. U.S. Navy (1971 - 1979) Served seven and one-half years on the U.S. Navy Submarine Force as a Nuclear Plant 0perator. For three years of this time, assigned as a Nuclear Training Instructor and Leading' Electrical Division Petty Officer at the Idaho Nuclear Facility.
+
l i DAVID HILLIAM GERLITS II SR. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ENGINEER BOSTON EDISON COMPANY EDUCATION I B.S., General Science: Physics and Chemistry, University of Iowa, 1977. LICENSE Senior Reactor Operator, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,1986. PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS American Nuclear Society Hensa l PROFESSIONAL TRAINING Station Nuclear Engineer (GE BHR) - 1982 Gould SEL Computer Operating Software - 1986 PNPS Simulator Operating Software - CAE Electronics - 1986 Criterion Referenced Instruction and Instructional Materials Development (Mager/ Pipe) - 1984 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Boiton EdisoD_ Company. (1982 to Present) '~ Senior Engineer, Systems and Safety Analysis Division, Nuclear Engineering Department (1987 - present). General responsibilities encompass review of plant modifications to ensure Final Safety Analysis Report and regulatory compliance, and review and preparation of safety analyses. Specific assignments include: Lead systems engineer for the system function and task analysis portion of the detailed control room design review project; lead systems and safety analysis engineer for the implementation of the' modifications resulting from the PNPS safety enhancement program; NRC audit co-coordinator for inspection of equipment classification, vendor interface, post-maintenance testing, adequacy and reliability of electrical distribution _tystem; individual plant evaluation risk and reliability engineer assisting in the
-development and review of system descriptions and associated computer models for the PNPS IPE; lead engineer for the implementation of the plant specific technical guidelines for emergency operating procedures; and lead systems and safety analysis engineer for the PNPS 10CFR50 Appendix R fire protection analysis.
1 l 1
-David Hilliam Gerlits II Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Continued)
Nuclear Training Specialist, Nuclear Training Department (1982 - 1987) Primary responsibilities focused on preparation and presentation of training material for initie". license and licensed operator requalification training programs. Additional assignments included: project manager for the development of the training material required for INP0 Accreditation all unlicensed and licensed operators; operations training instrut for simulator software, responsible for detailed review of software model changes required by plant modifications. United Sta'es Navy (1977 - 1982). 1 Nuclear Trained Division Officer - USS Ulysses S. Grant (SSBN 631) Af ter completion of;0fficer Candidate School and Nuclear Power Training, assigned to the ship, and held the billets of Electrical Officer, Reactor Controls Officer, Communications Officer, and Ship's Training Officer. Managed the 10-14 man divisions responsible for the operation, testing, and repair of ships engineering and communication equipment. Also responsible for scheduling and budget for the training of all ships personnel, and the maintenance of the ship's training records. L-e l
w FRANCIS CliARLES LEONARD. JR. NUCLEAR OPERATING SUPERVISOR (OPERATIONS SECTION STAFF) OPERATIONS LIAISON TO DCRDR EDUCATION I N.U.S. Nuclear Prep. Course - - Certificate,1971 Penn. State Triga Reactor Training - Peterson School of Steam Engineering Certificate, 3rd Class Engineer, 1969 Certificate, 2nd Class Fireman, 1963 Hentworth Institute, Boston, Mass., 1956 Heymouth, (Mass.) High School, 1950 g - LICENSES NRC Senior Reactor Operator / Reactor 0perator (1972-1989)
. Mass. Nuclear Power Plant Operating Engineer (1972)
SR0 Certification, 1989 - Present PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Boston Edison Comoany (1962 - Present) Operations Section - - Nuclear Operating Supervisor (1973-Present)
'. Currently responsible for various staff assignments related to nuclear operations,-including-staff liaison between DCRDR project and
,0perations;Section. Reviews' prospective design changes, coordinates' operations review and comment,.and participates in Design Review Team.
As-licensed SRO. responsible for supervising the Nuclear Plant
" operations and implementing operating maneuvers in accordance.with approved station procedures and for assistir.g in training the N'iclear Plant Operators in the skill and knowledge required for-the safe and efficient operation of a nuclear facility.
" Operations Section - Nuclear Plant Operator (1970-73)
Interfaced with supervisors and PHPS operating groups for completion of assig ^d tasks in the operation of station equipment. Identified and reportediitems requiring specialized attention. Responsible to i shut the reactor down when determined the safety of reactor is in jeopardy or when operating parameters exceed any of the reactor gg
< protection system setpoints and automatic shutdown does occur.
]
Leon J. Olivier Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Continued) Nuclear Training Specialist - Simulator Procurement (1984 - 1987) Respont hle for assisting in the design and procurement of the Pilgrim Station specific simulator through coordination of internal reviews of design specifications and vendor proposals. This assignment required relocation to the vendor's facility (CAE Electronics, Ltd.) in Montreal, Canada, for a period of nearly three years. Incumbent with these responsibilities was the creation of the Simulator Halfunction Cause and Effect Document, writing and or review of the final Acceptance Test Procedure (ATP), overall responsibility for its implementation, and negotiation of all data base post-freeze modifications and simulator enhancements. Nuclear Watch Engineer (1981 - 1984) In charge of the plant during assigned shift. Responsible for the safe, m efficient operation of PNPS including unit startup, shutdown, scram recovery, and administrative oversight of surveillance testing on plant - cystems.
. Nuclear Operating Supervisor, (1978 - 1981)
Performed diversity of tasks focusing on the supervision for the operation of'the control room facility in accordance with station guidelines. Responsible for maintaining awareness of station conditions, supervising the Nuclear Plant Operator and implementing operating maneuvers in accordance with policies and procedures. Assisted in training Nuclear =- Plant Operators in tasks required for operation of-control facilities. Developed and implemented log and record system of plant operating data. Nuclear Plant Operator, (1975 - 1979) Interfaced with supervisors and PNPS operating groups for completion of' assigned tasks in the maintenance of overall station equipment. Identified and reported items requiring specialized attention. Responsible for performing lubrication checks of station-equipment. In charge of shutting the reactor down when determined the safety of reactor is in jeopardy or when operating parameters exceed any of the reactor protection system setpoints and automatic shutdown does occur. Central Control Operator, Mystic Station Responsible for startup and shutdown and operation of high pressure forced
, flow C-E boilers and station auxiliary equipment. Performed startup and shutdown of GE high pressure tandem compound Turbine-Generator and accompanying auxiliary equipment.
c
KENNETH NORMAN TAYLOR NUCLEAR MATCH ENGINEER (OPERATIONS SECTION STAFF) ' OPERATIONS LIAISON TO DCRDR EDUCATION Currently attending Northeastert. University pursuing a degree in engineering. , i Nuclear Power Training Unit, West Milton, NY - 1960 U.S. Navy Power School, New London, CT (1959) Machinist's Mate "A" School, Great Lakes, IL 1 Cole Trade High School, Southbridge, MA l LICENSES Mass. Nuclear Power Plant Operating Engineer (1978) NRC Senior Reactor Operator License (1977) l NRC Reactor Operator (1975) Mass. License - 1st Fireman (1975) j PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Boston Edison Company Operations Section -- Staff SRO (1988 - Present) Responsible.for various staff assignments related to nuclear operations,
-including staff liaison between DCRDR Project and Operations Section.
Reviews prospective design changes, coordinates operation review and comment, and helps t nsure coordination between Operations and Engineering or major :: 7 ject activities. Day Hatch Engineer-Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (2/81 - 1982) L Responsible for the safe, efficient operation of Pilgrim Station, under L the direction of the Chief Operating Engineer in accordance with the requirements of Station Procedures and Regulatory Agencies. Responsible for. rewriting procedures, update of P&ID's and ensuring a smooth accurate communication with the dcpartments within the station. Nuclear Watch Engineer-Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (11/78 - 2/81 and L 1982'- 1988) l Responsible for. all activities relating to station and safety including, L -fuel loading, startup and shutdown in accordance with.the requirements of L the operating license, Technical Specifications, approved operating
- procedures, regulatory agencies, and the Operations Quality Assurance Program. Responsible for implementing the station radiation protection program, for the monitoring the performance of station equipmerit, for assuring that the reactor is shutdown when a condition has been identified such that continued operation would jeopardize station safety and the station security within the confines of the process building.
Kenneth N. Taylor Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Continued) l Nuclear Operating Supervisor-Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (11/75 - 11/78) , Responsible for supervising the Nuclear Plant Operations and implementing operating maneuvers in accordance with approved station procedures and for assisting in training the Nuclear Plant Operators in the skill and knowledge required for the safe and efficient operation of a nuclear i facility. ! U.S. Navy 5/73 to 11/75 Served on USS Skipjack SS(N) 575 as Engineering Hatch Supervisor 4/72 - 5/73 Served on staff at Engineering Repair Division, New London Conn. 8/65 - 4.72 Served on USS Francis Scott Key SSB(N) 657 as Engineering Officer of the Hatch 12/62 - 8/65 Served on USS Stonewall Jackson (SSB(N) 634 as Engineering Hatch Supervisor 1/61 - 12/62 Served on U.S.S. Ethan Allen SSB(N)607 as Engine Room Supervisor 1/59 - 1/61 Received US Naval Training at various schools 2/57-- 1/59 , Served on USS Skate SS(N) 578 as Engineer Room Operator 12/56 - 2/57 Served on USS Leyte C.V.S 32 as Auxiliary Operator. l 1
DANNA M. BEITH PROJECT HUMAN FACTORS SPECIALIST HUMAN FACTORS INTERFACES EDUCATION B. A., Psychology, University of California,1976 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Human Factors Society l
' Associate Editor, Human Factors Society Bulletin l PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Human Factors Interfaces (1986 - Presentl h President, Responsible for the management and direction of a consulting firm specializing in human factors engineering and research, and nuclear 1 support services, l Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant - Served as the human factors specialist for the verification and validation of the Rev. 4 Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). Duties included a detailed human factors review of the procedures.and flow charts for logical flow, wording and consistency.
Alto updated the E0P Hriters Guide and Users Guide. ; Conducted the human factors validation of operator performance on updated E0Ps and ERFIS displays. Duties included the development and implementation of the Team Operations Performance and Procedure Evaluation (TOPPE), which was developed to e sess operator performance and acceptance of procedures / operator aids; the observation of operator actions on the plant simulator; and operator interviews at the completion of simulator scenarios and data' analysis. Developed a Verification and Validation process for the evaluation of the Alternative Safe Shutdown Procedures. Duties included the training of operators on-the process for the walkdown of the procedures, incorporating operator comments, and the human factors review of the procedures. Wrote the human factors sections of the Verification and Validation procedure for E0P changes / modifications. The procedure ensures that human factors principles are considered with each procedure modification. Participated as the Human factors specialists in the SPDS display development process. Duties included the development of displays, the evaluation of the human-interface requirements and ensured the compatibility of displayed information with the E0Ps. Also conducted the L human factors review of the SPDS. ,
Danna H. Beith Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Continued) H.B. Robinson Nuclear Power Plant - Currently developing a symptom-based flow chart for the Emergency Action Levels for the classification of emergencies. Duties include updating of Plarit Emergency Procedures, developing an operator training package, and EAL User's Guide, and an EAL Hriter's Guide. Planned and conducted a human factors review of operator performance on updated E0Ps. Duties included observations of operator actions on the plant simulator, operator interviews, data analysis, preparation of the final report, and assistance in the resolution of problems identified with procedures and flow paths, i L Conducted a human factors review of the Dedicated Shutdown Procedures. Duties included detailed review of the procedure format, wording, and consistency between procedures; the rewriting / reformatting of the procedures; incorporating operator comments; and the preparation of the final report. Conducted a human factors review of ERFIS/SPDS. Duties included the evaluation of the human-interface requirements, system usability and compatibility with the E0Ps. Conducted a human factors review of Maintenance Test Procedures. Duties included ant analysis of trips related to these procedures, review of procedure usability / format and suggestions for improvements in the implementation of the procedure, and enhancements to the control panels involved. Pilarim Nuclear Power Station - Conducting a human factors review of the control room design review control panel modifications for BECo's Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant. Assist in the planning for the completion of the DCRDR and update the Pilgrim DCRDR Program Plan and Final Summary Report , for resubmittal to the NRC. Nine Mile Point Unit One - Conducting the human factors validation of operator performance and acceptance of the E0Ps. Duties include the implementation of the TOPPE, which was developed to assess operator performance and acceptance of procedures / operator aids; the observation of operator actions on the plant simulator; operator interviews at the completion of simulator scenarios; and data analysis and preparation of interim and final reports. Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - Conducted a human factors review of the Emergency Action Level procedures and flow paths for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. Duties included a detailed review of format, wording and consistency with E0Ps. l l
Danna M. Beith Page 3 EXPERIENCE (Continued) fuis Associates. Inc. (1984 - 1986) Director. Human Factors Services - Managed the (NUREG-0700) Control Room Design Review for Carolina Power and Light Company at the H.B. Robinson, Brunswick, and Shearon Harris nuclear power plants. Duties included task analysis, verification and validation, SPDS reviews, control room surveys, Human Engineering Discrepancies (HED) evaluation, preparatioii of final t report, and assistance in implementation of control room modifications. Wrote the program plan for the operating plant and the final summary report for all three plants. Developed a data base for system function task analysis which incorporated owners' group guidelines. Essex Corporation (1980 - 1984) Staff Scientist - Participated in the Control Room Design Review for Virginia Electric Power Company at North Anna and Surry Units 1 and 2 nuclear power plants. Conducted an operating experience review which consisted of writing operator questionnaires, interviewing operators, data reduction, and a document review of plant documentation, such as License Event Reports. Assisted in writing the VEPC0 program plan and photographing the control panel photo mosaics. Research Scientist - Directed the on-site data collection for Toledo Edison's Control Room Design Review for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Duties included review of operating experience, conduct of control room surveys, SPDS review, and a Human factors review of upgraded E0Ps. Assisted the photographing and construction of a control panel , photo mosaic, data reduction, and preparation of final report. Performed the Human Factors evaluation of the South Texas Project Main Control Panel and Control Room for Bechtel/ Houston Lighting and Power-(subcontract through Torrey Pines Technology). Activities included an evaluation of a full-scale, three dimensional mock-up prior to fabrication of the operational system and the set-up of a computer program for sorting arid reporting data. Project Manager for the development and production'of approximately 300 i nuclear power plant surveillance / test procedures for South Carolina Electric and Gas (SCE&G). work involved technical review and editing of procedures, technical direction for all project staff, and coordination of procedures production from initial writing through word processing. Responsible for technical staff of six to eight technical writers, two editors,'two nuclear power plant operations specialists, and eight word processors. l l l l l l
1 i l Danna M. Beith i Page-4 l l EXPERIrNCE (Continued) l On-site supervisor for the rewriting /reformating of nuclear power plant emergency, normal and standard operating procedures at SCE&G's Virgil Summer Nuclear Station. Directed Human Factors evaluation of the on-site data collection for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant control room. Evaluation included criteria specified in NUREG/CR-1580 and NUREG-0700. Duties also included documenting and identifying human engineering discrepancies and backfits. Research Associate - Participated in the (NUREG/CR-1580) Human factors evaluation of three nuclear power plants for Carolina Power and Light. One plant evaluation included a control board assessment of engineering drawings for a plant under construction. Evaluated procedures developed for control room review; identified, reported, and suggested suitable backfits for human engineering discrepancies found in the control room. XEROX CORPORATION (1978 - 1980) Associate Human Factors Designer - Supported Human Factors Department in the Business Machine and Copier / Duplication Divisions. Duties included control system design, behavioral testing, and new product assessments.' Also. wrote machine operating procedures and developed dialogues used for operator assistance. CANYON RESEARCH GROUP. INC. (1978) Assistant.-Researcher - Contract.research assistant to Xerox corporation, Industrial Design / Human Factors Department, Business Machines Division. Duties consisted of control system design and behavioral testing. L l l l l i o l
E.L. (RETT) CONSIDINE CONTROL PANEL DESIGN SPECIALIST MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS CO. PROFESSIONAL TRAINING United States Navy technical schools: U.S. Nuclear Power School, Mare Island, California Nuclear Power Training Unit, Idaho Falls, Idaho Electronic Technician A. School, Treasure Island, California b Submarine School, New London, Connecticut PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS = Instrument Society of America American Nuclear Society Human Factors Society Professional Reactors Operators Society EXPERIENCE Manaaement Analysis Comoany (1986 - Present) Proiect Manager for Boston Edison control room upgrades, performing anaiysis and application of surface enhancements to the control room panels. Information from the E0Ps, ops, P& ids, System Descriptions were made part of the control panel through the use of demarcation,-labels and meter scales. - Additional work entailed the physical rearrangement of components on the control panels. = Z Held line management position in the Nuclear Training Department at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. As superintendent for Administrative - Services, was also responsible for the Accreditation efforts. Provided expertise in three major areas for assisting control room operator: control room operations, training, and procedures. Bechtel Power Corocration. (1969 - 1986) Engir.eering specialist for control room evaluations and improvements on major nucicar power plants'. Staff engineering specialist for South Texas Project in development and
- implementation of control room design review per NUREG 0700, h
W
/
E.L. Rett Considine Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Continued) Directed the control systems discipline on a 650 MW coal-fired power plant, including costs, scheduling, procurement, evaluations, budget, and performance reviews of personnel. Control systems specialist assigned to a 950 MW nuclear power plant project in Spain. Responsible for development of requirements and preliminary design for control room, computer, and interaction of the control systems on the project. Control systems supervisor on a seawater pipeline; coordinated 3 implementation of 16 interactive control rooms, including all analog instrumentation and control logic. Engineering group leader for the control room design and the control systems integration of a nuclear steam supply system contract. Frovided proposal and Preliminary Safety Analysis Report technical support for domestic and international efforts. Served as start-up field liaison for engineering and construction for 1 computer modifications at South California Edison, Alamitos and Huntington Beach generating stations. Participated on the following projects as staff engineer or in-house consultant to control room design: San unofre Units 2 and 3 -- California Lemoniz -- Bilbao, Spain ASCO -- Madrid, Spain A.H. Vogtle -- Georgia Roy S. Nelson Unit 6 (coal-fired) -- Louisiana -
-Fayette Power Project, 2 units (coal-fired) -- Texas Sayago -- Bilbao, Spain H.A. Parish 2 Unit (coal-fired) -- Texas Vandellos Nuclear Center-Unit 2 -- Madrid,-Spain South Texas Project--- Texas United States Navy (1961 - 1969)
Qualified Senior Reactor Opterator and Chief Reactor Technician. Supervised reactor operat m and technicians, maintenance of reactor control, protection sys'mns and all instrumentation at U.S. Navy nuclear . power training unit AlH. . Also served as senior reactor control instructor for instrumentation, reactor physics, and reactor control for reactor operator trainees. Member of the Reactor Operator Oualification Board. % Qualified SRO on the USS Shark.
1 APPENDIX 0 PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328) L-i 4 D-1
APPENDIX D PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328) This appendix provides a tabulation of engineering design " packages" to implement the panel enhancements, panel hardware replacements, and panel relocations under our Long Term Plan element #328. These scope items are those newly identified in this report (Section III), including portions of Categories 2, 4, and 5. The implementation schedule shown here is preliminary. As explained in Section IV, no detailed schedule has been developed for outages beyond RF08 in 1991. The "PRI" column indicates the relative priority among these items on a ' H(igh)/H(edium)/L(ow) basis. The priority considers the quantitative impact analysis performed during detailed screening (when applicable), as well as other factors including operational preferences, logical engineering i sequences, and condition of existing equipment. This priority is tentative, 1 not a commitment for work sequence. J D-2
APPENDIX. D TO FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT
- PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328) ggpu PKG#
DESCRIPTION PEI SCHED PDC /sJA # (2) (3) (1) H M 13 Replace four Reactor Water Level Metas (L1263-100A,B and L1263-106A,B) with digital meters to allow better resolution of reactor water level. H M 13A Replace two Reactor Pressure Meters (Pl640-25A,B) with digital meters to allow better resolution of reactor pressure. H 9 16 Redesign and replace panel C7; relocate some devices to front panels, as required; including possible addition of new panel in main operating area.
?
w Install scram valve position lights and MSIV fogic lights on panel H 8 SJA 90-047 C905 in parallel with lights on C915/C917. H M 31 Add status light to C915/C917 to indicate when the scram
. breakers are shut November 26,1990
.,3
' APPENDlX D TO FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT PRELIMINARY -SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL SCOF OF PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328) PKG# IMPU PDC /SJA # DESCRIPTION P_RI SCHED (1) (2) (3) SJA 90-050 Relocate control switches for MO1201-2.5,80 from exis.iing M. M location to area where the remainder of the RWCU control switches and instruments are located. 19 Modify HPCl/RCIC control and stop valves so that b3th position M M indication lights are "on" in mid-position. 23 Relocate MO3479 & MO3480 {First Point Heater Outlet Valves) M M from C4 to C1. e I. 14 Remove turbine steam flow signal to recorder PR640-28 such that M 9 Reactor Water Level will always be recorded. In addition, alarm window C905UD4 and the selector switch for PR640-28 will be removed. 15 Install direct indication (from limit switches) of valve positions for M 9 ; Cs068A,B. ; November 26,1990
~ * * '- ~
________________m__m__ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - . _
. APPENDIX D TO FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT PRELIMINASY SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL SCOPE . OF PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328) PKG# IMPu PDC /SJA 8 DESCRIPTION PEI SCHED (1) (2) (3) 39- Remove or replace access door to rear panel space behind C903, M U C904. 06 Replace Tl5021-01 A and Tl5022-02B with digital meters (1 for M M each parameter) to allow better resolution of Torus temperature 42 Rearrange Secondaiy Containment Modules on C921 M M e 17 Add " bands" to meters (to indicate normal ranges, setpoints, etc.) M U SJA 90-052 Rearrange control switches for: main steam relief valves; turbine M 8 oil lift pumps; exhaust discharge valves; and gland seal condenser exhaust valves to achieve a consistent order among all panels. Rearrange four meters for HPCI and four meters for RCIC to achieve a consistent and logical order in the two systems. Also, move the indicators for the safety valves to the right, to allow operators at C903 to distinguish between RV indication and SV indication. November 26,1990
* ' - . - ~ - ' ~ ~ . - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
w.m l APPENDIX' D TO FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328) PKG#. ggpu PDC /SJA # RENCRIPTION EBJ SCHED (1) (2) (3) SJA 90-053 Rearrangement of Panel C174/C175-Remove dual range controls L M ' for H2 and O2 analyzers and rearrange grab sample valves such that supply and return valves are more logically arranged 18 ~ Relocatr Tntrol switch for FV3351 from the existing location to the L M . location vi the control switch for the "A" seawater pump, which will be moved next to the "B" sea water pump. 11 Replace CRU3361 (Condensate Demineralizer inlet Conductivity) L 9 , ! , with a smaller recorder to allow relocation of CRU-E1
& (Condensate Pump Suction Conductivity) from C904 to C1.
20 Remove control switches for AO5035A and AO5036A from C904 L 9 and relocate FC5030B (N2 flo'v controller) from C904 to C7; potential additional rearrangements of other devices within C904 (Needs to be integrated with redesign of C7, item 16). 22 Replace Kaye Recorder to provide alarm at Drywell bulk L 9 temperature'of 152F. ; November 26,1990 t
APPENDIX D TO FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328) PKG# IMPLi PDC /SJA # DESCRIPTION PEI SCHED (1) (2) (3) 29 Rewire conductivity alarms for CRU-E2 (Demineralizer Outlet L 9 Conductivity) to eliminate cutoff switches. The alarm will only be active when the outlet valve is open. 37 Add power available indicating lights to panel C3 for power L 9 supplies Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4. 40 ' Add two switches to C903 to allow the Reactor Operator to secure L 9 all drywell fans. ? ~ l 05 Replace front panel Gai-Tronics units with new units containing L OL "page" button on handle; install new Gai-Tronics station at Panel C7. 07 Replace RBCCW temperature recorder TR3835/3836 with an L M up-to-date Foxboro recorder. 12 Replace F11040-1 A,8 (RHR Flow) with digital meters to allow L M ! better resolution of RHR flow i November 26,1990
APPENDIX D TO FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE FOR ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF ' PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328)
.PKG# IMPu PDC /SJA # DESCRIPTION Elli SCHED
- 0) -(2) (3) 09 Rearrange recorders on C902 to allow the most important L 9 recorders to be at the optimum height SJA 89-074 Replace TRU5021-01 A and TRU5022-01B (Torus Bulk Water L 9 Temperature) with recorders that are easier to read 35 Remove stabilizing valve switch from C905 L 9 44 Replace bulbs in GE ET-16 sockets with long life LEDS L U b
i November 26,1990
~ ~~~
'~t - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . - . _ . -
^ ' ~ ^
, .~. ,* . .. .
~
Ll. .- .
- .. . -':'f -L ': :
APPENDIX D TO FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT-PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE FOR . ADDITIONAL SCOPE OF. PANEL IMPROVEMENTS (LTP 328) PKG# ;MPL\ PDC /SJA .# DESCRIPTION ERI SCHED (1) (2) (3) 01 Patch the main control panels and change the color of the panels (4) 8 87-78L Install labels, mimics, and demarcations on panels C174/175 (4) OL 87-78M Ditto, panels C921, C76, C77, C10 (4) OL 26 Ditto, panels C220, C221 C114, C115 (fire alarm panels) (4) OL Noverrber 26,1990 e
Notes to Ttbla (1) "PKG#" is an arbitrary number for identification purposes. PDC #'s or SJA#'s are listed where known. (2). Relative priority as determined by NEDWI 344 analysis by CRDR Design Review Team, plus Operations preference and with consideration for work sequence and material condition. (3) Planned implementation schedule. 8-RFO8; M-1992 midcycle outage; 9-RFO9; OL=on Lne (after RFOS); U-uncertain. (4) Not prioritized; requireci for consistency with or support to other committed work. Note: Items with low priority or no calculated priority will be reassessed by CRDR Design Review Team as design and planning proceed. D-10
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