ML20096B810

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Protective & ESFAS Instrumentation
ML20096B810
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 01/05/1996
From:
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20096B791 List:
References
NUDOCS 9601160423
Download: ML20096B810 (23)
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Text

. .- . . - - . - . . _ - - ~ . . . . - . - . _ . -. . _ - . . . - . . - . - . ~ . . _ _ . - - . - _ .

Docket No. 50-336 B15476 Attachment 3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Reactor Protective and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Marked-up Pages I

l i

l I

January 1996 9601160423 960105 PDR ADOCK 05000336 p PDR

l - i n- 9 N February 22, 1982 3/2.3 1 N ST E *."'! *iT1710N 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION .

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As e tir.iriu .. the reactor protective instrumentetion channels and

, typesses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE :tth E:!"Z!! 9" :: ; h e a ...

.;ie 0.0-2. g.

ADPLICASILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION: '

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be' demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the sedes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4. 3.1.1. 2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE.

during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation.. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4. 3.1.1. 3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip .

_ function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 1B montns. A Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every'N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown Tn the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

g 4'.-; .1. ; . 0 7;, . ..,,..... ;;...; ef eli RCACTOR TRIr ;Y; TEM . ,;i;;er. e t., .;,,,,, L i ,

detecten (nTn)en11 de we,4<ted te 5: 1::: th: , ;7 ;;; ;; ;; ;h; ,;;,,

sy-4f4=d 4a ve tte 3.3-3 eith' ::: = nth f Oper; tier, fer ...1, ;n.wiir; RTB'< mad aace eue y !! ee-th: th:re:ft:r.

g, g4Ym7 m e%

, Osm d.4m4c,rs cure. nemot. 4mm c swmse G ., issUm.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3 1 o;2 Vf Amend.2ent' No. 7 9

/

May 12, 1979 TABLE 3.3-2 .

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES w

bE 4L !! F TIONAL UNIT RESPONSE TIME

$? Ei ,

, 1. Man 1 Reactor Trip 5.2.0 secon Ei 2. Power Le 1 - High < 0.40 onds*f and < 8.0 secondsif. loo l Il

3. Reactor Cool Flow - Low <

-- . 5 seconds ns

4. Pressurizer Press e - Hi gh 3. 0.90 seconds
5. Containment Pressure - igh Not Applicable
6. Steam Generator Pressure - w < 0.90 seconds
7. Steam Generator Water Level - 5.0.90 seconds
8. Local Power Density - High 5.0.40 seconds *f and 3.8.0 seconds ##

}{ 49 i u, 9. Thermal Margin / Low Pressure 5.0.90 seconds *f and < 8.0 secondsif E* 10. Loss of Turbine--Hydraulic Fluid Pressure - Low Not Applicable

11. Underspeed - Reactor C ant Pungs 5.0.45 seconds Pol
  • Neutron detecto re ex g t from response time testing. Response of the neutron flux signal portion of th hannel shall be' measured from detector output or input first alectronic component in channel .

f3espo e time does not include contribution of RTDs. ,- no 7 D response ti'me only. This value is equivalent to the time interval required for t RTD 's 5 output to achieve 63.2% of its total change when subjected to a step change in RTD temper ure.. _g i

-c e

e

August 1. 1975 N INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 1

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 7

3.3.2.1 The engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation i

channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 # M M th "ISa^"SE T!"It ::.; b T. in TeL1= 3.3-5.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

i ACTION: ,

a. With an engineered safety feature actuation system instru-mentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the A11cwable Values column of Table 3.3-4, either adju'st the trip setpoint to be consistent with the value specified in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 within 2  !

hours or declare the channel inoperable and take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

b. With an engineered safety feature actuation system instru-mentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIR'EMENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each engineered safety feature actuation system instrumen-tation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrate'd -

OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION, testing of each channel affected by bypass operation. ,

e  !

i.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-10 w/9 .

._. .. s... ss - .'. .

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued 1 ,- j

\ '

D P,5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION 5V5itm INSTMINENTATION

  • Ud  :

33g NINIIRIN TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE TO TRIP MODES ACTION F FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS OPERABLE g 9. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER h a. Manual 1/ pump 1/ pump 1/ pump 1, 2, 3 1 1,2,3 '

b. Steam Generator 4 2 3 Level - Low R*

L on N

e e

$ 2 i

= ]/ -

r(

D

~ /

") For Cycle 12 only, OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) automatic initiation logic will rely on g

operator action to ensure successful initiation of AFW. Prior to startup for Cycle 13, modifications to y the automatic initiation logic for AFW will be implemented to eliminate the reliance on operator action.

=

(D

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) -

gm

  • Dt 3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUNENTATION TRIP VALUES:

ALLOWABLE

$ FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT VALUES e 8.

p LOSS OF POWER I

a. 4.16 kw Emergency Bus Undervoltage

, (Undervoltage relays) - level one 1 2912 volts 1 2877 volts

b. 4.16 kw Emenjency Bus Undervoltage 1 3700 volts with 1 3663 volts with (Undervoltage relays) - level two an 8.0 1 2.0 second an 8.0 1 2.0 second time delay time delay
9. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER i
a. Manual Not Applicable Not Applicable

$ b. Steam Generator level - L 1 12% 1 105 Y

3 '

k 5

F R z

M-

?

g Q"' w?

(1) For Cycle 12 only, OPERABILITY of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) automatic initiation logic will rely on d Nw operator action to ensure successful initiation of AFW. Prior to startup for Cycle 13, modifications to (

?? the automatic initiation logic for AFW will be imp 1 nted to eliminate the reliance on operator action J <

a

..__ _____._____ _____ _ _ g_ _ _ _ _ _

Daconber 23. 1992 i -

d 1 ,

i j TABLE 3.3-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES .

\ .

D FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME N SECONDS

! INITIATING SIGNAL -

i l 1. Manual i i j a. SIAS Safety Injectio (ECCS) Not licable Containment Isola ' on Not plicable l

1 Enclosure Building ltration System t Applicable ,

]

b. CSAS Containment Spray Not Applicable i c. CIAS Containment Isolation Not Applicable
d. SRAS j Containment Sump Recircula on Not Applicable l i e. EBFAS

! Not Applicable Enclosure Building Fi ration System l

f. Auxiliary Feedwate ' Initiation Not Applicable 4
g. Main Steam Isola on t Applicable
2. Pressurizer Pressur low
a. Safety Inj ction (ECCS)
1) High' Pressure Safety Injection i 25.0* .0**

. 2) Low Pressure Safety Injection 1 45.0*/5.

3) harging Pumps 135.0*/35.0
4) Containment Air Recirculation s26.0*/15.0** '

System

b. Containment Isolation s 7.5

. Enclosure Building Filtration System 545.0*/45.0**

Amendment No. 167 MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-21 ses s py q 7

6/'//94 3 gq TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION , RESPONSETIMEINSECOND[
3. Conta nt Pressure - Hiah
a. Safat Injection (ECCS)
1) gh Pressure Safety Injection s 25.0*/5.0**
2) Low ressure Safety Injection s 45.0*/5.0
3) Chargi Pumps s35.0*/ .0**
4) Containee t Air Recirculation System 126 /15.0**
b. Containment Isolati 5 .5
c. F.nclosure Building Fil ration System 5 45.0*/45.0**
d. Main Steam Isolation s 6.9
e. Feedwater Isolation i 14
4. Containment Pressure--Hich-Hiah
a. Containment Spray 1 35. 6 *"'/16. 0**"'
5. Containment Radiation-Hiah
a. Containment Purge Valves solation s Counting period plus 7.5
6. Steam Generator Pressure ow
a. Main Steam Isolat n 6.9
b. Feedwater Isol ion 54
7. Refuelina Water torace Tank-Low
a. Contai t Sump Recirculation 5 120
8. Steam Gen ator Level-Low
a. Au liary Feedwater Syste * < 240*/240* <23 k

Millstone Unit No. 2 3/4 3-22 Amendment No. J. J pg.

== H. H1 Od W 176

~'

6/7/94 f. "3 b ' 9 M l . TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES TABLE NOTATI

  • Diesel generator s ing and sequence' loading del included.
    • Diesel generator startin nd sequence ding delays agi included.

Offsite power available.

(1) Header fill time not included.

(2) Includes 3-minute time del  !

, T) For Cycle 12 only, OPE ILITY of the auxiliary fee ater (AFW) automatic i f' nsure successful initiation logic w rely on operator action to initiation of AF Prior to startup for Cycle 13. modi ations to the  ! .

automatic init ion logic for AFW will be implemented to iminate the / i reliance on erator action. j

/ \

l f

Millstone Unit No. 2 3/43-22a Amendment No. J. 1 77.

T?e ,q m.

l J

~

i May 17,1995 ,

i

! PLANT SYSTEMS i

l NAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION COMPONENT 1 1MFlC11 l LIMITING C0W ITION FOR OPERATION i

i 3.7.1.6 Each feedwater isolation component listed in Table 3.7-3 shall be j OPERABLEyf th n00- e ti=; :: giJe,7 tri Teble 3.3-5.

l l i

! FW Isolation Components Description l FW-38A A FP Discharge MOV l FW-388 5 FP Discharge MOV l FW-42A A FW Block MOV l FW-428 8 FW Block MOV

! FW-41A A FW Regulating Bypass Valve f

l FW-418 8 FW Regulating Bypass Valve FW-51A A FW Regulating Valve

{ FW-51B B FW Regulating Valve i H5A A SG Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry H5B B SG Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry Table 3.7-3 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 & 3 EJ,1gg:

a. With one feedwater isolation component inoperable in either or both feedwater flow paths, either:
1. Restore the inoperable component (s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or
2. Close or isolate the inoperable feedwater isolation valve (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and verify that the inoperable feedwater isolation valve (s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days, or
3. Secure or isolate the feedwater pump (s) with inoperable feedwater pump trip circuitry within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and verify that the inoperable feedwater pump (s) is secured or isolated once per 7 days, or
4. Se in H0T SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

MILLSTOME - Lat!T 2 3/4 7-9a Amendment No.188 MM Oc2 3 C

," 2.-In ciq Daccaber 23, 1992

J ,

9 I 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION RASES 2/4.3.' AN) 3/4.3.H PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES MSF) NST tuMINTATLON

- The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained,

3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation 9f accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original i design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses. i No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable, ne h==. h=.r -o ew.oe*va ser.cr/ scam .r.

fsswme 4EspUnse na Aae tigreay c~aen ..o m ume uw De demonstrateTby anyno u imm %.aanra -v.

seNequential,'

lapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests amonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times, The containment spray response time with a loss of normal mer assumes that the LNP occurs simultaneously with the CSAS. Therefore, tie valve. stroke time is bounded by the time required for signal generation, diesel start, sequencer, and time for the spray pumps to reach operating speed.

The containment spray response time without a loss of power is composed of signal generation and valve stroke time.

CAR fan response time is determined for the idle fan and conservatively applied to all four. For the case with a loss of power, signal generation, diesel start, sequencer and the time for the fans to reach o jpering *Pa bounds valve stroke time _

--__ ,_ __ys e.GIsww.cTec.m va -.m - cwen.We4 m e m

  • MM d *
  • d' en a,&

Q(+ w MILLSTONE - UNIT t w v 8 3/4 3- M w n y r eaca. m ?ca.o Amendment No. 167

-eese

/fJ' l

i May 17,1995 l

3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AMD ENGINEERED SAFETY FEA*/URES (ESF)

INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) p-CAR fan respdtime for the case without a loss of power is composed of signal generation and valves stroke time.

Feedwater isolation response time ensures a rapid isoiation of feed flow to the steam generators via the feedwater regulatin valves and, as backup, feed pump discharge valves. The g valves,time response feedwater includesbypass signal generation time and valve stroke. Feed line block valves also receive a feedwater isolation signal since the steam line break accident analysis credits them in prevention of feed line volume flashing in some cases. Since the block valves are not credited with isolation, they are not required to operate as fast as the isolation valves although equal response times for all valves are specified. Feedwater pumps are assumed to trip immediately with an MSI si nal. _

The containment airborne radioactivity monitors (gaseous and particulate) are provided to initiate closure of the containment purge valves upon detection of high radioactivity levels in the containment. Closure of these valves prevents excessive amounts of radioactivity from being released to the environs in the event of an accident.

  • NILL 5 TONE - LalIT 2 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. JR.188

.mn-par /

Docket No. 50-336 B15476 Attachment 4 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Reactor Protective and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Retyped Pages I

January 1996

3/4.3 INSTRUNENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUNENTATION LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the reactor protective instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE. l i

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1. i ACTION:

As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each reactor protective instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.1.1.3 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEN RESPONSE TINE of each reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test l shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of )

redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 77, 0246

THIS PAGE INTENTIALLY LEFT BLANK i

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pfLLSTONE-UNIT 2 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. /p,

- INSTRUNENTATION 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEN INSTRUNENTATION i l

LINITING C0fEITION FOR OPERATION l l

l 3.3.2.1 The engineered safety feature actuation system instrumentation channels and bypasses shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4. l l

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3. l l

ACTION:  !

a. With an engineered safety feature actuation system instru-mentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4, either adjust the trip setpoint to be consistent with the value )

specified in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or declare the channel inoperable and take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

b. With an engineered safety feature actuation system instru-mentation channel inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.3.2.1.1 Each engineered safety feature acutation system instrumen-tation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the modes and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affects by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-10 Amendment No.

0247

i

.i  ;

oz TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) - i 50 ~

i 7 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION ,

l o

5 e MINIMUM  !

3. TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE

" FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION F

9. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER m .

I

a. Manual 1/ pump 1/ pump 1/ pump 1,2,3 1
b. Steam Generator 4 2 3 1,2,3 2 l Level - Low 4' ,

E a .

B a

= -

=

=

i l

l

az TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued) -

3_ ~

% ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES 3 9

o ALLOWABLE g

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT VALUES

, 8. LOSS OF POWER o

, a. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage  ;

(Undervoltage relays) - level one 1 2912 volts 2 2877 volts

b. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage 2 3700 volts with 2 3663 volts with ,

(Undervoltage relays) - level two an 8.0 2.0 second an 8.0 i 2.0 second i time delay time delay '

9. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER r

, a. Manual Not Applicable Not Applicable s

[ b. Steam Generator Level - Low 2 12% 2 10% l E$

r a

E a

F

$b Fi I

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{IgLSTONE-UNIT 2 3/4 3-2I Amendment No. #7,

l This Page Intentionally Deleted 1

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Nillstone Unit No. 2 3/43-22 Amendment No. J, g, pg,

      • 91,191, 119

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This Page Intentionally Deleted 1

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I Millstone Unit No. 2 3/4 3-22a Amendment No. J. E, Jg, 02n 91,191, il9,

PLANT SYSIEni NAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION CONPONENTS (NFICs1 LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Each feedwater isolation component listed in Table 3.7-3 shall be OPERABLE. l FW Isolation Components Description l FW-38A A FP Discharge MOV FW-38B B FP Discharge MOV FW-42A A FW Block M0V l

FW-42B B FW Block MOV FW-41A A FW Regulating Bypass Valve FW-418 B FW Regulating Bypass Valve FW-51A A FW Regulating Valve I FW-51B B FW Regulating Valve H5A A SG Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry H5B B SG Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry f

Table 3.7-3 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 & 3 ACTION:

a. With one feedwater isolation component inoperable in either or both feedwater flow paths, either:
1. Restore the inoperable component (s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or
2. Close or isolate the inoperable feedwater isolation valve (s) within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and verify that the inoperable feedwater isolation valve (s) is closed or isolated once per 7 days, or
3. Secure or isolate the feedwater pump (s) with inoperable feedwater pump trip circuitry within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and verify that the inoperable feedwater pump (s) is secured or isolated once per 7 days, or
4. Be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 7-9a Amendment No. J7p.

0250

. 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 PROTECTIVE AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentation systems and bypasses ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained,

3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of l service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional  ;

capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse l parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall l reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design 1 for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The  !

integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the '

assumptions used in the accident analyses. )

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. ,

1 The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides 1 assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.

No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. The Reactor Protective and Engineered Safety Feature response times are contained in the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Requirements Manual. Changes to the Technical Requirements Manual require a 10CFR50.59 review as well as a review by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

The containment airborne radioactivity monitors (gateous and particulate) are provided to initiate closure of the containment purge valves upon detection of high radioactivity levels in the containment. Closure of these valves prevents excessive amounts of radioactivity from being released to the environs in the event of an accident. J l

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. Jpf, Jpp.

0251

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