05000354/LER-1990-008

LER 90-008-00:on 900604,reactor Bldg Exhaust Radiation Monitor Trip Setpoint Found Nonconservatively High.Caused by Personnel Error.Technicians Disciplined,Rept Reviewed W/All Personnel & Setpoint Included in procedure.W/900705 Ltr

ML20055D914
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	07/05/1990
From:	Cowles R, Hagan J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-008-02, LER-90-8-2, NUDOCS 9007100142
Download: ML20055D914 (5)

LER-2090-008,

Event date:
Report date:
3542090008R00 - NRC Website

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s Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 ,

' Hope Creek Generating Station L.

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July-5, 1990 i

[L U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

Document Control Desk '

Washington, DC 20555 1

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Dear Sir:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 ,

UNIT NO. 1 j LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 90-008-00 -

s Thic Licensee Event Report b,being submitted pursuant to-  !,

. the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (1) . $

1 Sincerely, k _- ~ '

t J.J. gan '

General Manager.- l Hope Creek Operations RBC/=  ;

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On 6/4/90 at 1108, a Radiation Protection Supervisor reported to the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS, SRO licensed) that, during review of the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) data base, the reactor building exhaust (RBE) radiation monitor trip setpoint had been found set non-conservatively high (2X10- 8 uci /cc) . Technical Specification Table 3.3.3-2 requires that the trip setpoint for the subject monitor be set less than or equal to 1X10- 8 uci/cc. Upon discovery, the setpoint was immediately reset to within Technical Specification required parameters.

Followup investigation determined that the trip setpoint had been

' incorrectly entered into the RMS computer during the performance of an I&C department functional test procedure which functionally checks the RBE rad monitor and refuel floor exhaust (RFE) radiation monitor. This occurred on S/29/90. Tho I&C technician who performed the procedure incorrectly  ;

input the setpoint value for the RFE radiation monitor ( 2X10- 8 uci/cc) when }

inputting the RBE radiation monitor trip setpoint. This occurred due to  !

improper recording of "as found" setpoint data when performing the l- procedure and inadequate verification of the data when the procedure was completed. The independent verifier (also an I&C technician) did not ,

catch the error when the "as found" data was recorded or during the 1 data verification process after inputting the setpoint. As such, the error went undetected. Corrective actions included disciplinary action for the technicians involved, reviewing appropriate I&C procedures for possible inclusion of static RMS data within the body of the procedure, and including a review of this incident in thu I&C department continuing training program.

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l PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION  !

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)

Radiation Monitoring System (EIIS Designation: IL)

Reactor Building Ventilation System (EIIS Designation: VA)

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1DENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Technical Specification violation - Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor Set In Excess of Allowable Limits - Personnel Error Event-Date: 5/29/90 i Discovery Dates 6/4/90 Discovery Time: 1108 l This LER was initiated by Incident Report No.90-058 CONDITIONS PRIOR-TO OCCURRENCE i

Plant'in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (Power Operation), Reactor Power 100%, Unit Load 1100MWo.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On 6/4/90 at 1108, a Radiation Protection Supervisor informed the Nuclear shift Supervisor (NSS, SRO licensed) that the trip setpoint for the reactor building exhaust (RBE) radiation '

l monitor had been discovered set in excess of Technical Specification allowable values. The setpoint was discovered set-at 2X10 e uCi/cc rather than .1X10- 8 uC1/cc as required by Technical Specification Table 3.3.2-2. The setpoint_ was immediately restored to the required value, and the NSS initiated an investigation to determine how and when the l setpoint had been incorrectly established in the Radiation l Monitoring System (RMS) computer.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

.. The primary cause of this occurrence was a non-cognitive i

personnel error on the part of two I&C technicians. The technicians incorrectly established the RBE radiation monitor .

trip setpoint in a non-conservative direction during the course '

of performing and verifying an I&C functional test procedure.

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0 0 0 3 G' O 4 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE On 5/29/90, two I&C technicians wore assigned to perform a-monthly functional test procedure on the Channel "A" RFE and RBE radiation monitoring system. The first portion of the procedure requires the technicians to test the RFE radiation monitoring circuitry. As an initial step to the test, the technician is required to record the 3 38 found" setpoints of the RFE in the procedure data table. The escond portion-of the procedure. requires the same steps for the RBE radiation monitor. When recording the RBE radiation monitor trip setpoint, the technician actually recorded the as-found trip setpoint for RFE. The independent verifier (second technician) did not recognize the error, as such, the error was carried through to the completion of the test.

At the completion of the test, the technicians were regiired to verify that the "as-left" trip netpoints agreed with the static data from a controlled hardcopy of the RMS database. Again, the error was not detected, and was carried through to test i completion. . The subject radiation monitors were returned to service and declared operable following test completion.

The RBE radiation monitor remained set unconservatively high until discovered during a scheduled RMS database review by a Radiation Protection Supervisor. ,

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES One previous instance of entering incorrect trip setpoints into I the.RMS system has occurred at ilope Creek (reft LER 87-022).

That' incident resulted from a personnel error on the part of a Radiation Protection Technician in entering an incorrect trip

[" setpoint for the cooling tower blowdown radiation monitor. It-should be noted that the incident described in this report was discovered due to corrective actions implemonted in response to LER 87-022 (thrice weekly RMS database verification).

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SAFETY SIGNIF_ICANCE This occurrence had minimal safety significance. During the period'of time that Channel "A" RBE radiation monitor was set unconservatively high, Channel "B" RBE radiation monitor was set appropriately and would have provided reactor building ventilation capability, if necessary.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The technicians involved in this incident received disciplinary action with regard to the lack of attention to detail exhibited in this occurrence.

2. This report will be - reviewed with all I&C Department personnel an part of the station Operational Experience Feedback program and I&C department continuing training.

Training will stress the importance and need for thorough independent verification. Additionally, this report will be forwarded to the Chemistry / Radiation Protection. Manager and Operations Department Manager for inclusion in departmental training, as necessary.

3. The subject I&C procedure will be reviewed by I&C department with the intent of including permanent, static RMS setpoint data into this and similar I&C department RMS test procedures.

Since oly,

/

.J. agan General Manager -

Hope Creek Operations RBC/

SORC Mtg.90-061