05000354/LER-1917-001, Regarding Secondary Containment Door Not Latched in Closed Position
| ML17188A314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/2017 |
| From: | Casulli E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N17-0112 LER 17-001-00 | |
| Download: ML17188A314 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 3541917001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 LR-N17-0112 JUL 0 7"2017 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001.
Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354 11SErincipal Nuclear Engineer 856-339-1097 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TOEPIX
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 0 YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On May 10, 2017, a Hope Creek secondary containment door was observed to be unlatched in the closed position. The door was being held closed by the negative pressure within the reactor building (secondary containment). The door was determined to have been opened for equipment passage on, May 8, 2017, at 1323. It was concluded that the door was most likely unlatched for passage at that time and notre-latched following the passage. A review of Hope Creek design basis accident (DBA) conditions determined that the secondary containment pressure would become slightly positive for a short period of time, under certain DBA events. Based on the area of the door, and the expected pressure rise within secondary containment, the door could not be assured to remain closed. Hope Creek Technical Specifications require that secondary containment integrity be maintained while in Operational Condition 1. Secondary Containment Integrity is defined as having all doors in the closed position except for normal passage. Since the closed door position could not be assured under all postulated accident conditions, the event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, and under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the
~ulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric-Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Reactor Building - EllS Identifier {NG}
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: May 8, 2017 Discovery Date: May 10, 2017 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 1 at 1 00 percent rated thermal power (RTP).
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE I
SEQUENTIAL I
NUMBER YEAR 2017
- - 001 REV NO.
- - 00 During a walk down of the Reactor Building at Hope Creek on May 10, 2017, at approximately 10:00, door 4302 was found to be closed but the hand wheel not rotated to engage the latches. The door was being held in the closed position by the negative pressure in the Reactor Building. This condition was reported immediately to the control room, and the door handle was repositioned to engage the latches. The door position is indicated in the control room, and the door was verified to indicate closed at the time it was found to be not latched.
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Specifications require that for single door arrangements, the door remain closed except for routine entry and exit.
Technical Specifications require that the Secondary Containment Integrity be re-established within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or the reactor be in Hot Shutdown within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
A review of the door alarm history for*door 4302 indicates that the door was last opened on May 8, 2017 at 1323. The door opening indication lasted approximately one minute, which corresponds to a routine entry or exit, as permitted by the Technical Specifications. There was no indication of the door being left open for an extended period of time and there were no door openings indicated after this transit until the time that the door was re-latched in the closed position on May 10, 2017. During the transit on May 8, 2017, the Reactor Building differential pressure lowered to approximately 0.16 inches of vacuum water gauge and quickly recovered to its normal control point of approximately 0.48 inches of vacuum water gauge, also indicating that the door remained closed following the transit.
Based on the review of door alarm history, the door was not latched for a period exceeding the Technical Specification allowable time period of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and therefore this represents a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
CAUSE OF EVENT
The cause is a failure to properly use human performance tools such as self-check or a peer check to ensure the proper configuration of the door is maintained. Proper use of human performance tools when closing the door and engaging the latches would have identified that the latches on the door were not made up.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The Secondary Containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. In the as found condition, the secondary containment door was in the closed position, supporting the function of the secondary containment.
However, in reviewing the postulated design basis accidents, the door could not be assured to remain closed under all accident conditions during the time when it was unlatched. Based on this, the secondary containment is considered to Page 2 of 3 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 (06-2016)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1 022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www. nrc. gov/readi nq-rm/doc-collections/nu reqs/staff/sr1 022/r3/)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-1 0202, (3150-01 04), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to Impose an Information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the Information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR Hope Creek Generating Station 05000-354 2017 I
SEQUENTIAL I
NUMBER
- - 001 REV NO.
- - 00 have been inoperable from the time of the last transit, May 8, 2017 at 1323, until the discovery and engagement of the door latches on May 10, 2017 at approximately 1000.
The secor\\i::lary containment functions to control the release of radioactive materials by ensuring that any releases from the reactor building are elevated and monitored; therefore the condition could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive materials in the event that the door were to open in response to accident conditions. The conditions under which the door could open were determined to be a seismic event, and a design basis LOCA coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP).
Any condition in which the door were to open, including accident conditions, would result in a control room alarm.
Control room alarm response procedures direct investigation and subsequent closure of the door, restoring the secondary containment function.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This condition is a safety system functional failure as defined in NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
PREVIOUS EVENTS A review of events for the past three years at Hope Creek was performed to determine if similar events had occurred.
No events were identified that involved secondary containment being breached due to mis-positioned doors or hatches.
Extent of condition was performed to determine if there are other Reactor Building secondary containment doors that could inadvertently be left unsecured such as door 4302. All other secondary containment doors have interlocks with a second door that prevent both from being open at the same time. This door is stand alone in this design.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The individuals that did not properly engage the door latches following transit were identified based on reactor building security access records. The individuals' behaviors were addressed in accordance with the station performance management process.
The station operations department has established additional administrative controls for passage through door 4302 to ensure that door latches are engaged following each transit.
COMMITMENTS
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this LER. Page 3 of 3