05000354/LER-2015-001, Regarding Conditions Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Core Spray Lnoperabilities
| ML15149A244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/2015 |
| From: | Carr E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N15-0120 LER 15-001-00 | |
| Download: ML15149A244 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3542015001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 LR-N15-0120 May 29, 2015 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001 Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1 PSl G Nuclear LLC 10CFR50.73 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2015-001-00 In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(v) PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2015-001-00, "Conditions Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Core Spray lnoperabilities."
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Thomas MacEwen at (856) 339-1097.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
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Eric S. Carr Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station ttm Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2015-001-00
LR-N15-0120 Page 2 of 2 Document Control Desk cc:
Mr. Daniel Dorman, Regional Administrator-Region I, NRC Ms. Carleen Sanders-Parker, Project Manager - US NRC Justin Hawkins, NRC Senior Resident Inspector-Hope Creek (X24)
Mr. Patrick Mulligan, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection PO Box420 Trenton, NJ 08625 10CFR50.73 Mr. Thomas MacEwen, Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator (H02)
Mr. Lee Marabella - Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator (N21)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 0113112017 (02-2014) t.'v*-1'"'
, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 6. LER NUMBER YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 20 15
- - 00 1
- - 000
- 3. PAGE 3 OF4 A causal evaluation is in progress to determine the cause of the breaker failure to close. The results of the evaluation will be published in a supplement to this LER.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The Core Spray System consists of two independent subsystems or loops. Each subsystem consists of two centrifugal pumps that can be powered by normal or emergency AC power; a spray sparger in the reactor vessel; piping and valves to convey water from the suppression pool to the sparger; and associated controls and instrumentation. If there is low water level in the reactor vessel or high pressure in the drywall, the core spray system automatically sprays water onto the top of the fuel assemblies in time and at a sufficient flow rate to cool the core and prevent excessive fuel temperature. The Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system starts from the same signals that initiate the core spray system and operates independently to achieve the same objective by flooding the reactor vessel.
The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) network has built-in redundancy so that adequate reactor core cooling can be provided, even with other failures. The primary purpose of Core Spray is to provide reactor vessel inventory makeup and spray cooling during large breaks in which the reactor core is calculated to uncover. LPCI is an operating mode of the RHR system. Four pumps deliver water.from the suppression chamber to four separate reactor vessel nozzles and inject directly into the core shroud region. The primary purpose of LPCI is to provide reactor vessel coolant inventory makeup following large break loss of coolant accidents. The Core Spray System and LPCI also both provide reactor vessel inventory makeup and core cooling following small break loss of coolant accidents after automatic depressu rization.
The accident analyses require various combinations of ECCS components. To meet these combinations, at least one Core Spray Subsystem must remain available. The 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was inoperable for planned maintenance from 02/09/2015 at 0300 until 02/10/2015 at 1532 (36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> and 32 minutes). Consequently, one Core Spray Pump in each subsystem was unavailable, resulting in two inoperable Core Spray Subsystems and a non-compliance with TS 3.5.1 Action a.2.
There were no actual consequences due to the failure of the 'A' Core Spray Pump breaker and the potential impact on nuclear safety was minimal. There were no actual consequences due to the inoperability of both Core Spray Subsystems and there was no significant impact on nuclear safety.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE During the period when the 'A' Core Spray Subsystem was inoperable, planned maintenance was performed on 'B' EDG, resulting in two inoperable Core Spray Subsystems. This condition existed for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> and 32 minutes. This condition is a safety system functional failure as defined in NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
PREVIOUS EVENTS APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 6. LER NUMBER I
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER YEAR 20 15
- - 001 I REVISION NUMBER
- - 000
- 3. PAGE 4 OF4 A review of events at Hope Creek for the past three years was performed to determine if any similar events had occurred. No similar events were identified.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The 'A' Core Spray Pump breaker was replaced. 'A' Core Spray Pump was declared operable after completion of the surveillance test on 03/31 /2015 at 2000.
Other corrective actions may be developed from the cause analysis and will be documented in the Corrective Action Program.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no regulatory commitments.