ML20005E240

LER 89-024-00:on 891129,determined That Surveillance Frequency for Safety Auxiliaries Cooling Sys Valve EG-HV-2302B Should Have Been Increased.Caused by Data Recording Error.Personnel counseled.W/891228 Ltr

ML20005E240
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	12/28/1989
From:	Cowles R, Hagan J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-024-01, LER-89-24-1, NUDOCS 9001040149
Download: ML20005E240 (5)

Text

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O-PSEGi -

6 Public Sen/ico Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, Now Je sey 08038 )

, Hope Creek Operations

p.

1 December 28, 1989 i

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

Document Control Denk ~

C Washington,-DC' 20555 I

Dear Sir:

r HOPE CREEK GENERATING. STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 UNIT NO. 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 89-024-00 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to .

t the requirements of 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) .

Sincerely, r.

.J. an -

General Manager -

, Hope Creek Operations RBC/

i Attachment SORC Mtg.89-141 ')

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On 11/29/89, during a trend analysis of previous Inservice Test (IST) results, it was determined that the surveillance frequency for Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS) valve EG-ilV-2302B (cooling water valve I' for the "B" Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System recirc unit).should have been increased based on previous IST results. During echeduled quarterly testing on 7/17/89, the subject valve exceeded its u Caximum allowable stroke time, which by ASME Section XI, IWV-3417,  !

required increasing the periodicity of surveillance to a monthly basis, i contrary to these requirements (as reflected in the station IST program), I the surveillance frequency was not increased. A personnel error during j the IST data recording was the root cause of this event. A less than cdequate review of the test results contributed to the failure to recognize the need for increasing the surveillance frequency. Corrective '

cctions include counselling for the personnel directly involved in this '

occurrence. Additionally, a failure analysis of the subject valve will be conducted, at the first available opportunity, to determine the cause of the valve failing to meet stroke time requirements. ,

)

LIONSEE INDfr RE3MI (GR) 1EkT (IhTINLATIGi FACILITl NAPE (1) D00ET NL9EER (2) UR WlMER (6) PME (3)

YEAR ** NLMER ** REN 10PE OtEIE ENERATING STATI(N 05000354 89 -

0 2 4 -

0 0 02 G' 0 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION General Electric.- Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)

Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (EIIS Designation: CC) ,

Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System (EIIS: BH)

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Failure to Increase Surveillance Frequency Based on ASME Inservice Test Procedure Results Due to Inaccurate Verification and Inadequate Review of Test Results Event Date: 07/17/89 Date Discovered: 11/29/89 Discovery Time: 1415 This LER was initiated by Incident Report No.89-174 IONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURBENCE Ilant in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (Power Operation), reactor power 100%, unit load ll16MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On 11/29/89, during trend analysis of previous Inservice Test (IST) procedure results, an Operations Department staff engineer (SRO Licensed) determined that the surveillance frequency for a Safety and Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS) valve should have been increased based on the results of an IST conducted on 7/17/89, but was not. The stroke time test results for EG-HV-2302B (cooling water valve for the "B" Filtration, Recirculation, and Ventilation System recirc unit) indicated that the stroke time for this valve fell within the criteria for increased surveillance frequency, but did not exceed its maximum allowable stroke time. The staff engineer informed the control room, and an incident report was initiated to document the findings. The occurrence described in this report constitutes a missed surveillance, and is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (1) .

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The failure to properly increase the surveillance frequency on the subject valve has been attributed to a data recording error (by non-licensed personnel) during the IST data verification process. An inadequate review of the recorded data following test completion also contributed to this occurrence.

I

i uCWIE EWT REKET (IDO HXT (INTIERTim FACILTlY NME (1) DONE'r EMUt (2) 1Dt NIMD (6) PXE (3)

YEAR \\ NlMHt \\ REY 10PE OGK (DIERTDC STATIM 05000354 89 -

0 2 4 -

0 0 0 3 OE' O 4 I

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE On 7/17/89, IST procedure OP-IS.EG-102(Q), " SACS - Subsystem B Valves - Inservice Test" was conducted. Stroke time data recorded on two of the valves tested by the procedure indicated a failure to meet acceptance criteria. During the evaluation of the test results, the Test Evaluation block on the data sheet was mistakenly marked " SAT" by the Equipment Operator (EO, non-licensed) who performed .the test. During an operability review of the test results, the Nuclear Shift r Supervisor (NSS. SRO licensed) determined that one of the subject valves fell within the range for increased surveillance frequency but micsed the second valve. He then initiated the l paperwork necessary to increase tho surveillance frequency on  :~

the first valve as required by ASME Section XI, IWV-3417 and station proceduros. A later review by the Operations Department Surveillance Coordinator also failed to reveal the data recording error.

On 10/6/89, EG-HV-2302B again failed to meet the stroke time acceptance criteria, but was properly notated on the test data sheet, and the surveillance frequency was increased at this time from quarterly to monthly. On 11/29/89, an Operations Department Staff engineer, during the course of trending problems with similar valves, reviewed the test data from 7/17/89 and uncovered the error.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES A review of previous incidents determined that one prior occasion (ref: LER 88-032) of not increasing surveillance frequency as required has occurred at Hope Creek. This previous occurrence was attributed to personnel error on the part of a NSS in not following through with the paperwork l

necessary to increase the surveillance interval of a Gervice l Water System spray pump.

l SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE This occurrence had minimal potential impact on plant safety.

Stroke time testing with results in the " frequency change" range does not affect valve or system operability. It should be noted that the acceptance criteria for stroking of the subject valve is 1 1.5 seconds; the valve actually stroked at i

l 1.87 seconds. Maximum allowable stroke time is 1 5 seconds.

l

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/. Lig3SE IMNT EKRP R&R) EKT (INTINLRTION FACIL11Y NhE (1) DOCKET NLMER (2) .1pt NLMER (6) INE (3) '

iTAR \\ NtDEER \\IEV-EIT OHK ENERATING FTATIN 0$000354 49 -

0 2 4 -

0 0 0 4 or 0 4 ,

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The personnel directly involved in the data recording and review of the subject IST procedure were counselled with regard to their contributions to this occurrence.

2. This report will be forwarded to the Nuclear Training Department for inclusion in licensed operator requalification programs.

3. While not having direct bearing on this occurrence, an -l analysis of the subject valve will be conducted, at the first available opportunity, to determine the cause of the ,

valve not meeting stroke time requirements.

Sinc rely,

.J. H an Gener Manager -

Hope Creek Operations RBC/

SORC Mtg.89-141

.