ML20005E242

LER 89-021-01:on 891013,concluded That Class 1E Electrical Separation Criteria Not Met in Reactor Protection Sys Panel. Caused by Inadequate Review of 1986 Design Change Package. Nonconforming Power Supplies removed.W/891227 Ltr

ML20005E242
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	12/27/1989
From:	Cowles R, Hagan J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-021, NUDOCS 9001040152
Download: ML20005E242 (6)

Text

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i O PSEG i i Pubhc Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 "

Hope Creek Operations December 27, 1989 y

.U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION

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,.- DOCKET NO. 50-354 UNIT NO. 1 i LICENSEE EVENT-REPORT 89-021-01 i This Revised Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant ,

to the requirements of 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (ii) , and as noted in the original report. Please note that unavailability' of personnel involved in the initial investigation precluded submitting this revision by the date originally expected ,

(12/1/89). ,

Sincer ly,

.J.H  :

General Manager -  !

Hope Creek Operations  ;

RBC/ .

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AB67RACT (16)

On 10/13/89, the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS, SRO Licensed) was informed by I&C Systems Engineering that an engineering review of a design change affecting the General Electric Transient Analysis Recording System (GETARS) concluded that Class lE electrical separation criteria had not been met in an Reactor Protection System (RPS) panel. Power from an Gxternal Class lE Engineered Safety Features (ESP) Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) was connected to a GETARS multiplexer which interfaced with RPS circuitry, and adequate electrical separation was not provided. This configuration was in violation of separation criteria as established by Reg Guide 1.75. The root cause of this occurrence was the inadequate review of a 1986 design change package by construction support personnel.

Actions were immediately taken to rectify the electrical separation deviations - primarily, removing the power supplies which did not conform to separation criteria, and re-powering affected GETARS components from internal RPS panel non-UPS power supplies. Other corrective actions l include submitting an UFSAR change request to reflect the as-built design

! of the current configuration, implementing a design change to return the l GETARS MUXs to original power sources, including this event in continuing

! training for engineering personnel on electrical separation, and l

disseminating this report to all engineering personnel.

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0 1 0 2 7 0 5 I' PLANT AND SYSTEM' IDENTIFICATION General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)-

. Reactor Protection System (EIIS Designation: JC)

Transient Analysis Monitoring. System (E1IS Designation: IP)

Engineered Safety Features Panels (EIIS Designation: JE)

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Deviation From Electrical Separation Criteria Between Transient Monitoring Circuitry and Reactor Protection System Panel Circuitry Due to inadequate Review of a Design Change Event Date: 3/5/86 Discovery Date: 10/13/89 Discovery Time: 1350 This LER was initiated by Incident Report No.89-137 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Plant in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5 (Refueling), outage work in progress.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On 10/13/89, the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS, SRO-Licensed) was informed by I&C Systems Engineering that an engineering review of two design changes affecting General Electric Transient Analysis Recording System (GETARS) concluded that class 1E electrical separation criteria had not

'been met in two Reactor Protection System (RPS) panels. Power  !

, from an external Class 1E Engineered Safety Feature (ESP)

L Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) was connected to GETARS multiplexers in RPS panel sections with RPS circuits.

I The method utilized to provide this UPS power did not meet the electrical separation criteria of Reg Guide 1.75.

. APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE l

L The root cause of this occurrence was the inadequate review of  ;

a design change by construction support personnel in 1986. The j' review failed to discover a design deficiency that did not ensure proper electrical separation between the RPS circuitry and GETARS multiplexers, i

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0 1 0 3 7 0 5 ANAbYSIS OF OCCURRENCE -

General Electric Transient Monitoring System (GETARS) multiplexers number 12 and 14 are used to monitor various RPS signals including scram isolation and Main Steam Isolation ,

Valve (MSIV) positions. During system installation, a Startup Deviation Report (SDR) was generated on 1/30/86 stating that multiplexers (MUX) 12 and 14 were not supplied with  !

Uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) as required by the FSAR.  ;

(This FSAR requirement existed due to the necessity of utilizing GETARS for acceptance criteria verification during -

the power ascension boss of Power test.) Because MUXs 12 und 14 interface with RPS, the UPS must be Class 1E. The SDR was subsequently dispositioned to provide a Class 1E UPS to these MUXs. A design change request (DCR) was initiated on 3/5/86 to resolve this issue as well as several other GETARS problem areas.

The closest available Class 1E UPS to the subject MUXs is located in the Engineered Safety Features (ESP) side of the RPS/ ESP panels containing the MUXs. However, in accordance with FSAR section 8.1.4.14.1, RPS and ESF must be separated electrically and physically from one another. The method utilized to provide separation involved penetrating the separation wall in the RPS/ESF panel with wires sealed in conduit to connect each MUX to the UPS. This provided physical separation but not electrical separation.

on 10/9/89, the original DCP was reviewed for closure by the Hope Creek I&C group. In this review, the separation issue for ,

these systems was discovered and analyzed. A re-evaluation of the design determined that it did not adequately address electrical separation as required by Reg Guide 1.75. The circuit was routed from the RPS side of the panel to the ESF side of the panel without required separation mechanisms installed in the circuit. It was determined that electrical separation within the MUXs could not be demonstrated in accordance with the requirements of Reg Guide 1.75. <

A Deficiency Report (DR) was generated and a temporary modification was performed to provide conformance with the FSAR separation criteria by removing the Class 1E UPS power from the MUXs. A safety evaluation was prepared to support the temporary modificatior stating in essence that although each class 1E MUX should ee powered from a UPS, the MUXs which ,

monitor the RPS do not provide any useful information in a loss-of-power scenario, since the RPS interrogation power for the RPS will no longer be available. During the second refueling outage, a permanent design change was implemented to reflect this configuration.

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' PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

,"l A review of past occurrences at Hope Crnet indicates that this l is- the first identified instance of non-conformance with- 1 electrical separation criteria.  !

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE The circumstances described in this report posed minimal safety significance. An' electrical fault could potentially have been -

propagated from the ESF panel to the RPS panel via the as-found electrical arrangement. This scenario -is unlikely, however, because single fuse protection existed between the RPS and ESF

. cabinets, non-safety inputs to GETARS MUXs-were separated via fiber. optic links, and the MUXs are each individually fused at -

.the: power infeeds. Because of the channelized nature of RPS, it is not-possible for such a fault to significantly- degrade the: availability and reliability of RPS.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. An UFSAR change request will be submitted to reflect that MUXs 12 and 14 will not be powered from a UPS.

2. A design change was implemented to reconfigure the MUX poue- to its original source, a non-UPS Class 1E power sol 1

3. The de61gn change process which was in place in 1986 has been superceded by a new design change procedure. This

_ procedure includes a design input checklist and peer review process. The addition of these enhancements should preclude recurrance of a similar event. Specific

. corrective actions witn respect to the personnel errors :Ln the review of the 1986 design change are not possible, as the design change was prepared by construction support l:

personnel no longer on site.

I 4 '. This incident will be discussed during continuing training L for all E&PB electrical engineers with regard to L electrical separation criteria.

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-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, CONT'D

.5. This> report -will be . forwarded to the Vice'- President -

'LNuclear , Engineering for dissemination. to all EEPB-a , personnel.

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.J. a n General Manager - y liope Creek Operations ,

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