05000354/LER-2013-001, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable Due to Control Relay Failure
| ML13161A157 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/2013 |
| From: | Carr E Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LR-N13-131 LER 13-001-00 | |
| Download: ML13161A157 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3542013001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersfy 08038-0236 0 PSEG Nuclear LLC JUN 0 5 2013 1 0CFR50.73 LR-N13-131 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-001
,H6-p eCreek Generating Station Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 Docket No. 50-354
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2013-001-00 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), PSEG Nuclear LLC is submitting Licensee Event Report (LER) Number 2013-001 -00, "High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable due to Control Relay Failure."
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Paul Bonnett at (856) 339-1923.
No regulatory commitments are contained in the LER.
Sincerely, Eric S. Carr Plant Manager Hope Creek Generating Station Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2013-001-00 f\\,,_(
2
Document Control Desk LR-N13-131 Page 2 cc:
Mr. W. Dean, Regional Administrator - Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 Mr. J. Whited, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 08 BlA 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Hope Creek (X24)
P. Mulligan, Manager Bureau of Nuclear Engineering\\
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection PO Box 420 MC 33-01 33 Arctic Parkway Trenton, NJ 08625 Hope Creek Commitment Tracking Coordinator (H02)
Corporate Commitment Tracking Coordinator (N21)
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10°2010)
, the NRC may sfor each block)nnot conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the digits/characters frecblk)information collection.
- 3. PAGE Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 1 OF3
- 4. TITLE High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable due to Control Relay Failure
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SUE RENO.
MONTH DAY YEAR N/A FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 08 2013 2013 - 001 -
00 06 05 2013 N/A
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMI'TED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) o 20.2201(b) 0l 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 10 20.2201(d) 0l 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
[I 20.2203(a)(4)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
[o 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[: 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0l 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
El 73.71(a)(4)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 10 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Paul Bonnett, Sr. Compliance Engineer 856-339-1923CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX E
BJ RLY TYCO Y
X BJ P
T343 N
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION E]YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
At 11:15 a.m., on April 8, 2013, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared INOPERABLE during the performance of HC.IC-FT.BJ-0007 "Logic System Function Test - Containment High Pressure/Low Water Level/Reactor High Water Level HPCI Actuation." During the test, I&C technicians inserted a reactor low water level initiation (Level 2) signal to initiate a start of the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump (10-P-213). The operator noted that the HPCI Stop Valve (FV-4880) did not open as expected and observed that the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump (HCPI AOP) failed to start. Upon recognizing the HPCI AOP failure to start, the Shift Manager declared the HPCI system INOPERABLE.
Troubleshooting identified that the HPCI AOP control relay (1 BJYY-K056-E41A), a normally de-energized relay, had failed. The relay was replaced and the HPCI AOP start signal was successfully retested. Upon completion of the functional test at 6:18 p.m., the Shift Manager declared. the HPCI system OPERABLE.
The cause of the relay failure was age-related. The failure analysis reported that the relay coil had electrically opened. There was no indication of stress or fatigue of the wire.
This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
CONTINUATION SHEET
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION YER NUMBER NUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 2 OF 3 2013 001 000
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
High Pressure Coolant Injection (BJ)
EIIS Identifier - Relay {BJ/RLY}*
EIIS Identifier - Pump {BJ/P}*
- Energy Industry Identification System {EIIS} codes and component function identifier codes appear as
{SS/CCC}
IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT Event Date: April 8, 2013 Discovery Date: April 8, 2013
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT
Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). No structures, systems, or components were INOPERABLE at the start of this event or contributed to the event.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
At 11:15 a.m., on April 8, 2013, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system {BJ} was declared INOPERABLE during the performance of HC.IC-FT.BJ-0007 "Logic System Function Test - Containment High Pressure/Low Water Level/Reactor High Water Level HPCI Actuation." The functional test is performed every 18 months to partially satisfy the surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.3.3.2, which is to simulate automatic operation of the emergency core cooling system logic channels. Specifically, the test inserts initiation signals to generate an auto-start to the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump (HPCI AOP)(1 0-P-213) and HPCI Gland Seal Vacuum Pump (10-P-216). The test directs the operators to open the breaker for the HPCI Steam Isolation Valve (HV-FO01) to remove power from the valve's motor operator. This ensures the valve remains closed because starting the HPCI AOP opens the HPCI Stop Valve (FV-4880).
During the test, I&C technicians inserted a reactor low water level initiation (Level 2) signal to generate an auto-start of the HPCI AOP {BJ/P} and HPCI Gland Seal Vacuum Pump. The operator noted that the HPCI Gland Seal Vacuum Pump started, but the HPCI Stop Valve (FV-4880) did not open as expected. The operator identified that the HPCI AOP failed to start. Upon recognizing the HPCI AOP failure to start, the Shift Manager declared the HPCI system INOPERABLE. This condition was reported to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Troubleshooting of the HPCI AOP failure identified that the control relay, H1 BJ-1 BJYY-K056-E41A (K056){BJ/RLY}, a normally de-energized relay, had failed. Relay K056 starts the HPCI AOP when a reactor low water level or containment high pressure start signal is received. The relay was replaced and the HPCI AOP start signal was successfully retested. On April 8, 2013, at 6:18 p.m., upon completion of the functional test, the Shift Manager declared the HPCI system OPERABLE. The HPCI system was inoperable for seven hours and three minutes. HPCI was capable of being manually started during the period of inoperability.
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPERLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010)
CONTINUATION SHEET
- 1. FACILITY NAME
- 2. DOCKET
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 3. PAGE YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION
- NUMBER NUMBER Hope Creek Generating Station 05000354 30F3 1
2013 001 000
CAUSE OF EVENT
Exelon PowerLabs inspected the HPCI AOP control relay (K056) and found an "open" in the coil that was most likely due to corrosion. This is an age-related failure. The HPCI AOP relay failure prevented the HPCI AOP from automatically starting on demand. The failed relay is an Amerace (TYCO) Model FGPDC750 control relay.
The apparent cause evaluation (Notification #20602498) for this event identified that in 2007, the Preventive Maintenance (PM) replacement activity periodicity was extended from 22 years to 40 years. The change, however, did not consider all applicable references or failure mechanisms.
SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The HPCI system was declared INOPERABLE because of the failure of the control relay (K056), which prevented the HPCI AOP from automatically starting on demand. This is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No other safety systems were INOPERABLE during the time the HPCI system was INOPERABLE, and the HPCI AOP was capable of being started manually. This event is a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A review of Licensee Event Reports for the past three years at Hope Creek was performed to determine if a similar event had occurred. One event occurred in July 2012 involving the failure of a normally energized relay that provided indication in the Remote Shutdown Panel (LER 2012-005).
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. Control relay (K056) for the HPCI AOP was replaced and the HPCI system was satisfactorily retested and declared OPERABLE.
- 2.
The relay was inspected by Exelon PowerLabs.
- 3.
An Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation was completed to determine the cause of failure.
- 4. Completed a re-evaluation of the PM replacement periodicities for the normally energized and de-energized relays.
- 5.
Developed a strategy, based on plant function, to replace the population of relays which had their PM replacement periodicities extended in 2007.
COMMITMENTS
This LER contains no regulatory commitments.
NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER