ML20039F421

Final Deficiency Rept Re Inadequacy of Pressure Door 1A320 to Provide Adequate Shielding Between Main Steam Tunnel & Auxiliary Bldg Corridor.Design Changes Issued.Item Not Reportable Per Part 21

ML20039F421
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	01/04/1982
From:	Mcgaugh J, Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-82-03, AECM-82-3, NUDOCS 8201120442
Download: ML20039F421 (4)

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MISSISSIPPl$bMNR & LIGHT COMPANY

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Edhhilaudd5 P. O.

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B OX 164 0, J AC K S gN, MIS SIS SIP PI 3 9 2 05 as 0 "jsO[UN$d* January 4, 1982 Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-416/417 File 0260/15525/15526 PRD-81/41, Final Report, Main Steam Door Radiation and Pressure Requirements AECM-82/03

Reference:

AECM-81/441, 11/9/81 On October 8,1981, Mississippi Pcwer & Light Company notified Mr. P. 'A.

Taylor, of your of fice, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns the inadequacy of Pressure Door No. lA320 to provide adequate shielding between the Main Steam Tunnel and the Auxiliary Building Corridor as well as its inability to withstand compartment design pressures.

Based on the results of our investigation, we have determined that this deficiency is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) but not under 10CFR21. All details are provided in our attached Final Report.

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Yours truly, g S

UCEtygg '3 pp/ J. P. McGaughy, Jr. d Njy ACP:dr Vh N ,

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• 3'NN ATTACHMENT / '00 k 9 cc: See page 2 u!k OFFI@lAL. COPE,i ..

820112OH&*

Member Middle South Utilities System TC gtf J lll

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly - AECM-82/03 NRC Page 2 cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

~ Washington, D.C. 20555-Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association

-P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 4

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4 Attachment to AECM-82/03 P2g2 1 ef 2 FIdAL REPORT FOR PRD-81/41 I. Description of the Defic)ency, Pressure door 1A320 was detectined inadequate in providing sufficient shield-ing between the Main Steam Tur.ael, which is Zone E, and the Auxiliary Building Corridor, which is Zone B, during normal operating conditions.

Also, it had been determined that the pressure retaining capability of the door was inadequate. The door was built to withstand a pressure of 4 psi, however, the design intent of door 1A320 is that it maintain a pressure of 15.39 psi. The door must maintain its integrity to prevent over-pressuriza-tion of the adjacent rooms in the Auxiliary Building.

Investigative action to determine the extent of the problem has found that door IA216, located in the Auxiliary Building, is also structurally deficient in withstanding a pressure of 15.39 psi. Door 1A216 is not required to provide radiation shielding. Investigative actions have revealed that the deficiencies as described above also apply to the Unit 2 doors 2A216 and 2A320.

These deficiencies are contained in the Auxiliary Building and are not directly associated with any particular plant system. Since the areas have not been turned over to MP&L, 10CFR21 does not apply.

Our Architect / Engineer has determined that tha deficient pressure door prob-lem was caused by inadequate coordination of criteria changes. The insuf-ficient radiation shielding of door 1A320 and 2A320 was determined to have been caused by an oversight to incorporate appropriate radiation shielding during the design of the door.

II. Analysis of Safety Implications The Architect / Engineer has determined, that had the deficiencies remained uncorrected, this could have had an adverse affect on plant safety. Under normal operating conditions door 1A320 and 2A320 would not provide the required shielding, i.e., protection from radiation exposure, from the Steam Tunnel to plant equipment or personnel which may be in the Auxiliary Building. Therefore, the personnel radiation exposure could exceed those dose limits of 10CFR20. In the event of a pipe break in the Steam Tunnel, the harsh environment which could consist of pressure, temperature, and radiation could be released into the Auxiliary Building. Therefore, the safety-related equipment located in the Auxiliary Building could be exposed to this harsh environment. This harsh environment could exceed the safety-related equipment qualification envelope and the safety of operations of GGNS would not be assured. Therefore, the determination has been made that these deficiencies are reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e).

, l. , .ttachment to AECM-82/03 Page 2 of 2 III. Corrective Actions Taken Our Architect /Enginner has determined that the deficiencies were caused by a-lack of communications and human error in describing the change in criteria from the current door design -pressure of 4 psi to the compartment design pressure of 15.39 psi.

Also, our A/E has completed the redesign ef fort and drawing changes required to correct the cited deficiencies have been issued to construction. Doors 1A216' and 1A320 will be worked to the new drawings to correct their cited.

deficiency. Doors 2A216 and 2A320 will be redesigned to meet the require-ments of the newly revised specification. The original Unit 2 doors will be documented as nonconforming and will be dispositioned accordingly. They are presently in storage at the Natchez warehouse.

The design for Units 1 and 2 has been completed. The investigative actions-performed were all inclusive to ensure that all pressure doors for Units 1 and 2 were in compliance with design criteria. Therefore, further actions to preclude recurrence of the cited deficiencies at Grand Gulf nre deemed not necessary.

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