ML20040E643

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Fifth Interim Deficiency Rept Re Alleged Atlas Machine & Iron Works Falsification of QA Documentation Packages for Nine Drywell Framed Embedments,Initially Reported on 810528. Welding Tests Will Be Verified.Next Rept Due by 820618
ML20040E643
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Hartsville, Phipps Bend
Issue date: 01/26/1982
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8202050203
Download: ML20040E643 (3)


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." TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY y g qr . ,,

CH AT TANOOG A. TENN ESSEE 37401 ,

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400 Chestnut Street Tower II January 26, 1982 J Jtn 28 AS 00 HTRD-50-518/81-13, -520/81-11 PBRD-50-553/81-14 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 Q~ y b/g/,, '

c/ 3 101 Marietta Street f/

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 'T s ,

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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\ , . s HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS A1 AND A2 AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR. PLANT UNIT 1 - REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY - QA DOCUMENTATION FOR DRYWELCfRAMED EMBEDMENTS - HTRD-50-518/81-13, -520/81 PBRD-50-553/81-14 ' w _. '

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE, Region II, Inspectors P. A. Taylor and F. S. Cantrell on May 20, 1981 and May 29, 1981, respectively as NCR's HNPA-142 through 150, 2-HTN, 5-HTN, 6-HTN, and 9- through 12-HTN; and to P. A. Taylor on May 20, 1981 as 3-PBN, 4-PBN, and 6-PBN.

The first and second interim reports for Phipps Bend were submitted on June 18 and October 30, 1981, respectively. The first, second, third, and fourth interim reports for Hartsville were submitted on June 17, September 22, October 9, and November 16, 1981, respectively. TVA has decided to discontinue separate submittals on this deficiency; this report and future reports will address both Hartsville and Phipps Bend.

In compliance with paragraph 50.55(e) of 10 CFR Part 50, we are enclosing our fifth interim report on the subject deficiency. (For simplification, there will not be a third or fourth interim report submitted for Phipps Bend.) We anticipate transmitting our next report on or before June 18, 1982.

A five-day extension was discussed with and approved by F. S. Cantrell on January 18, 1982. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.

Very truly yours, TEN p EE VALLEY AUTHORITY M

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4$odou L. M. (lls, Manager

] Nuclear Regulation a Safety Enclosure cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 g,p.M R COPY O O O 8 ^"' ""'PP""Y'*" # b' h S PDR ' [

  • ^' ENCLOSURE
  • . HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS A1 AND A2 PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 DRYWELL FRAMED EMBEDMENTS - QA DOCUMENTATION HTRD-50-518/81-13, -520/81-11 PBRD-50-553/81-14 10CFR50.55(e) -

REPORT NO. 5 (INTERIM) -..

Description of Deficiency The contract with the manufacturer, Atlas Machine and Iron Works, for the drywell framed embedments was cancelled on February 13, 1981, for lack cf performance. TVA was awaiting QA documentation at that time and has subsequently received documentation packages for all of the framed 4

embedments. Of the eleven HTA-1 embedments, two (frames 10 and 11) are embedded in the drywell wall, five (frames 5, 6, 7, 8, and'9) are installed in wall reinforcing steel, and four (frames 1 through 4) are under contract with Chicago Bridge and Iron for repairs and compiution of fabrication. Of the eleven HTA-2 frames, only 2 (frames 10 and 11) are at the site and are installed in wall reinforcing steel. The remaining HTA-2 frames will be repaired and/or completed by CBI. None of the frames for Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant have been installed and, due to the deferral of this plant, no work is being done on these frames.

Inspection and examinations of frames 1 through 4 for HTA-1 and frames for HTA-2 by TVA and its engineering consultants has led TVA to conclude that the adequacy, accuracy, and validity of the QA documentation packages prepared and furnished by Atlas are questionable. It was thus concluded that an investigation to verify the acceptability of the frames installed and embedded at Hartsville Nuclear Plant A unit 1 and those for subsequent units was necessary. These conclusions are drawn for the following reasons:

1. Nondestructive testing (magnetic particle) results obtained by TVA on HTA-1 on frames 1 through 4 and HTA-2 frames do not agree with the nonde7tructive testing reports found in the corresponding documentation packages prepared by Atlas.
2. The results of sectioning and macro-otching of samples taken from

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certain frames at CBI's Cordova facility indicate unacceptable defects in the welds which should have been detected by Atlas' nondestructive testing.

TVA, in its litigation, attempted to show that Atlas falsified nondestructive testing records contained in specific QA documentation packages submitted to TVA. TVA is awaiting a decision.

Interim Progress TVA evaluation of all available documentation prepared independent of Atlas' documentation packages for the nine frames embedded in the drywell wall or installed in wall reinforcing ~ steel at Hartsville has yielded few additional or independent indications of quality. Accordingly, the following course of action is presently being pursued:

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1. Since the type of indications found from sectioning are readily apparent by magnetic' particle examination, all accessible critical structural welds on HTA-1 frames 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 and HTA-2 frames 10 and 11 have been reexamined by the magnetic particle method for both linear and transverse indications. All indications that have '

been found are in the process of being repaired in accordance with HTN's QA program.-

2. Representative sampling and testing of the frames have been done to verify material.

3 A statistical analysis of otherwise inaccesible welds is being made based on data obtained from comparable frames where fabrication is incomplete.

4. A structural analysis based on results obtained in items 1 through 3 above is being performed. The analysis includes an evaluation of STRIDE seismic criteria versus specific site criteria and the interaction of the frames with concrete.
5. A testing program is in process to determine the toughness of the A-572 material used in these frames, and TVA is obtaining assistance from outside of TVA to perform fracture mechanics

, analyses on these frames.

6. Overall quality evaluation based on results of items 1 through 5 will be done.

The welding and nondestructive testing performed by Atlas on all remaining frames which have not been completed and released for construction will be thoroughly inspected, examined, retested, and ,

evaluated independent of the Atlas documentation packages. '

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