ML20044A688

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LER 90-009-00:on 900526,nonlicensed Personnel Performed Step Out of Sequence During Breaker rack-out & Caused LPCS Pump Breaker to Close.Operator Involved Counseled on Failure to Adhere to Breaker Operation procedure.W/900625 Ltr
ML20044A688
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1990
From: Byrd R, Cottle W
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
AECM-90-0119, AECM-90-119, LER-90-009, LER-90-9, NUDOCS 9007020060
Download: ML20044A688 (4)


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l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-29 LPCS Pump Start Due To Personnel Error LER 90-009 AECH-90/0119 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER)'90-009 which is a final report.

Yours truly, e 43 's C+ - :

WTC:

Attachment cc: Mr. D. C. Hintz (w/a)

Mr. T. H. Cloninger (w/a)

Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/a)

Mr. N. S. Reynolds (w/a)

Mr. H. L. Thomas (w/o)

Mr. H. O. Christensen (w/a)

  1. f Mr. Stewart D. Ebneter (w/a)

Regional Administrator a U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission 658 Region 11 3g0- 101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900

_gg Atlanta, Georgia 30323 oso-Mr. L. L. Kintn'er, Project fianager (w/a) of Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 40 88- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .,

Nc Mail Stop 11021 Washington, D.C. 20555 SEto

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) '" aa 8*

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LPCS Pump Start Due To Personnel Error

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AsetR ACT so.,, . ,no . ,. . ,..-P ar .,ar. c. ,,, ,., e.., o ei On May 26, 1990, while attempting to rack-out the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump breaker, a non-licensed operator performed a step out of sequence which-caused the LPCS pump breaker to close.- The action of closing the breaker did not actuate any ESF logic, but energized the LPCS pump motor and initiated the Standby Service Water (SSW) system. The operator immediately recognized what had happened and pressed the manual TRIP button. The SSW system was then returned to its normal lineup.

The operator had limited experience in this type of breaker manipulation and performed the operation alone without a copy of the general breaker operating instruction in-hand. The operator involved was counseled. Shift

- Supervision was informed of the incident and of precautions that could have been taken to compensate for the operators limited experience.

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Attachment to AECM-90/0119

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A. Reportable occurrence j On May 26, 1990 the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump was removed from w- service to support post maintenance testing. In the process c,f racking-out the pump breaker, the breaker closed which started the LPCS pump. The action of closing the breaker did not actuate any ESP logic, but energized the LPCS pump motor and initiated the Standby Service Water (SSW) System. This- event is not considered an ESF actuation nor is it ,

considered reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73. This report '

is submitted as a voluntary report.

B. Initial Conditions i The plant was operating at approximately 83 percent power at the time of '

occurrence.

C. Description of Occurrence on May-26, 1990, preparations were begun to perform a retest-following maintenance of a LPCS system valve (EIIS code: BM ) . . The retest required the LPCS pump breaker to be racked-out. A clearance tag was issued to an operator to perform the task. 'At approximately 0400 during the process of racking-out the breaker, the operator performed an action out of sequence which caused the breaker to close and energize the LPCS pump motor. No ESF logic was actuated and the injection valvo did not receive an open signal. The breaker closure also provides a signal that .

initiates the SSW System-(EIIS code: BI). The operator immediately recognized what had happened and pressed the manual TRIP button. The SSW r.ystem was then returned to its normal lineup. 3 D. Apparent Cause The non-licensed operator who performed the breaker rack-out had limited experience in performing this type of breaker manipulation. When

! assigned the task, the operator was asked if he knew how to rack-out.the.

L breaker. The operator responded afirmatively and proceeded alone to

j. rack-out the breaker without a copy of the general breaker operating
instruction, 04-S-04-2, in hand.

The procedural sequence is to place the local control switch to TRIP, remove control power fuses, turn of f the charging motor, rack the breaker to the TEST position, pull the spring discharge lever, push the TRIP button, and then rack-out the breaker to the DISCONNECT position. After turning off the charging motor, the operator was unsure of which step caiae next and chose to pull the spring discharge lever. This error caused the breaker to close, goam 34W.R90009/SCMPFLR - 4 p

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UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONUNUATION sannes. etwa vasuv man. m ooomst muussa m un nunmen a mee is ve.a a am!'.^6 ly1T:  ;

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Operators are expected to adhere to all procedures. However, operators are not required to have instructions in-hand for routine repetitive-  ;

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tasks that are within their knowledge and skills. The operator erred'in not adhering to the general-breaker operation procedure and in not stopping the task to confirm the correct action when he became unsure of the breaker rack-out sequence.

E. Supplemental Corrective Actions The Incident Review Board convened on May 29, 1990 to review the a circumstances leading.to'the incident and to determine immediate-corrective actions, i 1

l The operator involved was counseled on his failure to adhere to the L breaker operation procedure and failure to stop the-task until the l correct action was' confirmed. An entry was made in the shift night L orders informing shift supervision of the incident and of additional precautions that could have been taken to compensate for the operator's lack of experience in such tasks.

F. ' Safety Assessment The incident did not challenge the ESF actuation system.' The closed -l breaker supplied power to the pump motor and initiated the SSW-system, .

which is an auxiliary support system. The LpCS injection valve did not receive an open signal. All equipment functioned properly.

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