ML20049H471

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RO 82-10/01P:on 820218,determined Apparent Deficiency in Safety Evaluation 218.77-81 Re safety-related Sys.Electrical Fire on 820109 Caused Deluge Sys to Actuate.Ac & Dc Ground Faults Occurred Due to Water Damage
ML20049H471
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 02/19/1982
From: Fiedler P
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
RO-82-10-01P, RO-82-10-1P, NUDOCS 8203030102
Download: ML20049H471 (3)


Text

DESIGNATED ORIGINAL

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Certified By

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r _4 20: Itnald C. Haynes jf Administrator of Regulatory Operations 'J Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PennSilvania 19406 FI n i: Jersey Central Power & Light Cmpany Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 I I 4

SUBJECT:

Peportable Occurrence Report No. 50-219/82-10/0lP j i

The following is a preliminary report being subnitted in cmpliance with the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.0

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P. B. Fiedler Vice President - Director Oyster Creek

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Office of Managment Inform
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Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.

8203030102 820219 PDR ADOCK 05000219

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a OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable occurrence No. 50-219/82-10/0lP Peport Date February 19, 1982 Occurrence Date February 18, 1982 Identification of Occurrence A deficiency existed in the Safety Evaluation #218.77-8.1 as it relates to the sealing of certain safety-related systms, conduits, junction boxes and cable entries to equipent. This could have resulted in operation in a manner less conservative than presented in the safety evaluation.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.9.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was shutdown with reacter water tmperature less than 212 F.

Description of Occurrence on Saturday, January 9, 1982, the deluge system for Reactor Building Elevation 51' south side actuated due to an electrical fire in the Clean-up Syst.m auxiliary puap motor. Smoke minating frm this motor fire caused a logic trip of the south cable tray deluge system. As a precautional'y measure the Core Spray loop affected was renoved frmt service. A D.C. ground condition was traced to the valve ready switch, RE17D, which wula have rendered a logic channel for Core Spray System inoperable. An A.C. ground fault was also traced to the N2 supply to Torus valve indications for valves V-23-15 and 16 with the same results as above for these valves. Inspecti.m of all switches on RKO2 and vicinity was made to determine if additional water damage had occurred. No further problms were identified.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence An assumption made in the Safety Evaluation for the Reactor Building Fire Protection Syst s modification (#218-77-8.1, Section 3.2.3.3) was in error; "The instrumentation on RKO2 is not subject to these effects (dripping water) due to its high location above the level of the cable trays. Pedundant inctrumentation i is located else where". However, the safety evaluation sumrary sheet did reccamend "All terminal boxes should be equipped with gaskets if not already so equipped".

o Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Feport No. 50-219/82-10/01P Analysis of Occurrence

'Ihe Core Spray Systen is an emergency standby systm designed to provide continued cooling of the reactor core during loss of, coolant; accident. There are redundant loops, each capable of performing the design function. Additionally, three other logic channels were unaffected which would have initiated either of the Core Spray Systes. -

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Corrective Action Scaling additional electrical equiprent, switches and corduits is in progress.

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