Text

Forwards Revised Section 5.7.1, Crbrp Fuel Cycle, to Environ Rept.Revision Will Also Be Submitted as Part of Amend 14 to Environ Rept
	ML20052C875
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	05/03/1982
From:	Longenecker J; ENERGY, DEPT. OF
To:	Check P; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NUDOCS 8205060045
	Download: ML20052C875 (89)
	v • d • e

. _ _ _ _ _ _ .

Department of Energy e Washington, D.C. 20545 Docket No. 50-537 HQ:E:82:016

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Mr. Paul S. Check, Director

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kAY 0 31982 CRBR Program Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Check:

CRBRP FUEL CYCLE The enclosure to this letter contains revised Environmental Raport Section 5.7.1, CRBRP Fuel Cycle. Changes resulting from previous reviews ha/e been incorporated.

These changes are indicated by underlining.

It is our intent to also submit this revised Section 5.7.1 as part of Amendment XIV (May 1982) to the Environmental Report. If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact me.

Sincerely,

,v C oc John R. Longenecker, Mnnager Licensing & Environmental Coordination Office of Nuclear Energy ,

i Enclosure cc: Service List Standard Distribution Licensing Distribution Oc>l

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8205060045 820503 F'DR ADOCK 05000 C

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P2ga #1 (82-0034 [7,1]422 Amandasnt XIV May 1982 !

5.7 OTHER EFFECTS OF PLANT OPERATION i

Operation of the CRBRP should institute no changes in land use not already abrogated during the construction phase. Comparison t of the construction phase to the operational phase should, in fact, result in relief of some of the man-induced stresses due to significant reductions in the motion and noise of heavy equipment and vehicular traffic at the plant site. Stabilization of routing should result in greater tolerance of the installation by f

the terrestrial population. The effects of plant. operation are !

discussed in sections 5.1 through 5.6. Because of the plant design and the distance of the site from other industrial or i t

power plants in the Miea (ORGDP is three miles north-northwest) .

j the CRBRP should not have either thermal or radioactive waste j interaction with effluents released by other plants in the area. {

No wastes from the plant are anticipated to be disposed of by [

means other than those discussed in sections 5.3 through 5.5.

5.7.1 CRBRP FUEL CYCLE i

The CRBRP fuel cycle includes mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, j blanket element fabrication, reprocessing, management of the I wastes generated by facilities in the fuel cycle and f transportation of wastes and products among the various f

facilities. Some of the facilities required to support the CRBRP !

fuel cycle are not yet available. Notable examples are a' fuel f

reprocessing plant capable of handling CRBRP fuel, and a federal j repository for disposal. The environmental impacts estimated

{

herein use existing information regarding the most likely design l of these facilities for those that are not yet available. This [

assessment also assumes that appropriate facilities will be f available in time to support the CRBRP fuel cycle such that l l

interim measures like away from reactor fuel storage and product storage are not required.

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5.7-1 !

Phga - 2 (82-0d34) [7,1] 422 Amandmsnt XIV j May 1982 ,

A simplified schematic diagram of the CRBRP fuel cycle employing :

plutonium recycle is shown in Figure 5.7-2. The mass flow l parameters are characteristic of those for the CRBRP under l pseudo-average equilibrium-cycle conditions (where the .

cycle-to-cycle variations in the batch CRBRP fuel management have l

been averaged out). At equilibrium, approximately 0.9 MT of ;

plutonium and 11 MT of depleted uranium are fabricated into l mixed-oxide fuel and blanket assemblies per year. One half of ,

one percent heavy metal has been assumed to be lost in the f fabrication process. In the reactor core, irradiation at 975 MW(th) for 274 equivalent full power days destroys approximately

.28 MT of plutonium and 0.38 MT of uranium per year through ;

fission and nuclear transmutation reactions. 0.27 MT of fission !

product isotopes are produced per year. Because of the breeding l

characteristics of the CRBRP, plutonium is both produced and l destroyed in the core and the discharge fuel and blankets contain approximately 1 QQ MT of plutonium. This spent fuel is i chemically reprocessed, where once again 1/2% of heavy metal isotopes are assumed to be lost or unrecoverable. Fission products, irradiated structural material and other wastes are -

shipped to a waste disposal facility. The recovered plutonium i (Q.11 MT/ year), and perhaps the uranium as Well, is recycled as ,

fresh fuel input to the fuel fabrication facilities. The net j gain of approximately Q la MT of plutonium per year can be stored [

for later use. The contribution of the plant fuel cycle to the environment is in Table 5.7-1, "CRBRP Summary of Environmental Considerations for Fuel Cycle." Below is a description of the facilities and methods used to estimate the Table 5.7-1 impacts. >

DQE_will_auRElE_Elutonium to startup and operate CRBRP during the j five-year demonstration period. The_Elutonium_will_come_ftem l tainting _DQE_inYantoticat_practaand_dnatatic_nucleat_powet ;

l reactor _apent_ fuel _andt_if_nectaantxt_ foreign _acutstam No l i

i !

I 5.7-2 j i

. '. l' P292 - 3 (82-0034)[7,1]#22 Amandacnt XIV May 1982 ,

l impacts are included in the estimate in Table 5.7-1 for production of this material. These impacts haye_been addressed in nther environmental impact documents.

Table _iml:L_includen_eatimatta_of_enyitenmental_impacta_from testonnaning_of_CaaBE_apent_fuelt_ including. oxide _conyersion, Bestatenaing_Q1_CEEEE_apent_ fuel _would_ produce _ adequate _ plutonium tn_ fuel _the_CEEEE.

The DOE-nupplied plutonium EaZ_reEnite_cQuYessiQn to an oxide form at a yet to be determined facility prior to fuel fabrication. Oxide conversion is planned as a step at the reprocessing plant. The impacts of conversion are bounded by the impacts of operating the reprocessing plant given in Table 5.7-1.

5.7.1.1 CRBRP FUEL FABRICATION ;

Fabrication of the mixed oxide core fuel is, planned to be performed at the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) line, to be .

installed in the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF) at DOE's Hanford reservation. CRBRP fuel fabrication will require about 65 percent of the SAF line operational schedule (15 of every 24 months). The data presented in Table 5.7-1 for mixed oxide fuel fabrication are based on the impacts in DOE /EA-Oll6

" Environmental Assessment for the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility," July 1980, and supplement. (6) ,(7)

The Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) Program has as its l

objective to develop and demonstrate an advanced manufacturing line (SAF) for plutonium oxide breeder reactor fuel pins. This line will be the source of fuel for the FFTF and the CRBRP. The SAF line will utilize technology that focuses on improved safety features for plant operating personnel, the public, and the environment. ---

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1 5.7-3 l l

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P2ga - 4 (82-0d34) [7,1] 4.2 '

Amsndm3nt XIV I May 1982 !

Fabrication of fuel on the SAF line in the fully automated and l remotely operated mode results in the following important i advances over current manual fuel fabricaton technology:

o Reduced radiation exposure to plant personnel o Reduced access to Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) o Improved c6ntainment of SNM i o Near real-time accountability of SNM o Improved product cost and quality !

o Increased protection of the public and the environment from !

radiation or contamination {

The basic fabrication process includes receiving and assaying nuclear ceramic powders, blending of the powders, pelletizing and l sintering the powders into fuel pellets, and loading these f pellets into finished fuel pins. The SAF line will include necessary support systems for nondestructive assay, SNM l

accountability, rapid chemical analysis, waste and scrap l handling, maintenance, and material handling. All processing l equipment and support systems will be combined to form an [

interdependent, fully integrated, automated and remotely operated f fuel fabrication system. !

___ i Prior to introduction of feed materials to the fabrication line, :

an analysis and characterization of the feed will be performed.

As the feed material progresses, automatic measurements of the quantity of SNM will be conducted and recorded in the process !

control and safeguards computers to maintain a continuous record

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for process monitoring and for safeguards and accountability j purposes. -

The SAF line is designed to minimize the spread of contamination and the threat of diversion. Process enclosures are designed for 6

5.7-4 ;

Fas o - 5 (82-0'034) [7,1] t22

. Amsndm2nt XIV

, M0y 1982 each subsystem. Glove ports and windows will be incorporated to allow for " hands-on" maintenance.

All containment structures will have built-in shielding, and the process equipment will !

i ~ incorporate supplemental shielding as necessary to meet radiation exposure criteria.

SAF equipment is within contamination control enclosures physically located behind isolation walls that function as a secondary confinement barrier. Plant operating personnel are normally located in an operating corridor that is on the opposite side of the isolation wall or in the operations computer center where all process operations are monitored and coordinated.

Under normal operating conditions, plant personnel located in the operating corridor can control and monitor the performance of process equipment. There will be no renetrations in the isolation walls that would provide direct access to the process ;

equipment by the operators. Under abnormal conditions, the operator can utilite local controls that can be activated to control operation of the process equipment while visually monitoring its performance. If tooling changes must be made or when routine maintenance must be performed that requires the presence of an operator at the working face of the containment, the fuel material will be removed from the equipment as necessary l to maintain personnel exposure limits and to minimize SNM access. l The mechanical assembly of the welded fuel pins produced by the i SAF line into fuel assemblies will be performed in Building 308 on the Hanford Reservation. This is an existing, multi-purpose, plutonium facility that is safeguarded as described in 5.7.1.5.

i The first four cores of the FFTF were assembled into driver fuel

. assemblies here. The CRBRP assembly operation will produce no gaseous, solid or liquid radioactive or toxic effluents and will have no significant environmental impact.

5.7-5

P go - 6 (82-0034) [7,h ] #22 AmIndmsnt XIV MIy 1982 l

Uranium dioxide feed material for the SAF line will be obtained by having existing UF6 at DOE's diIfusion plants converted at a to be determined commercial facility. For the purpose of estimating environmental impacts in Table 5.7-1, conversion is l assumed to take place at the blanket fuel fabrication facility. l The total uranium conversion capacity required to support the CRBRP fuel cycle, including blqnket fabrication, on an annual !

average basis is llMT.

t Blanket fuel fabrication for the CRBRP will be carried out at a yet to be selected commercial facility. An average of approximately 70 blanket fuel assemblies will be required per year. There will be about 100 kg of uranium per assembly. Thus, j a conservative throughput of about 7.5 MT/yr of uranium is assumed. For the purpose of estimating the environmental impacts in Table 5.7-1, the impacts of the model UO fuel fabrication 2 l facility in WASH 1248, were apportioned to a 7.5 metric ton / year throughput.

5.7.1.2 CRBRP 'UEL REPROCESSING Demonattation_of_technologr_fot_tentaceaning_and_tecycle_of_LEEEE fuela_in_ planned _to_hegin_a_few_renta_after_the_ planned _ initial criticality _of_the_CaaEEm__The_ Department _of_Enetsr_ plana _tn demonattate_ technology _for_ commercial _restocenaing_of_LEERR_fuela bz_teproccaning_of_CERRE_ Land _QthetL_fuela_in_the_Derelnsmental ,

Reproccaning_Elant_LDEEL_Lformerly_ called _the_ Hat _ Experimental EacilitrL&__There_han_ keen _anme_preliminatr_ conceptual _ design _of the_DREu_aufficient_ fat _ completion _of_an_enYitonmental_analynia which_indicaten_that_auch_a_faciltiz_can_be_nnerated_within exiating_and_ptaposed_enrironmental_guidelinen_flil m__& ,

deactistion_of_the_DRE_ design _followam l

l 5.7-6 (Hext_page_in_Eml-a)

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. Paga - 7 (82-0034) [7,1] t22 l Am2ndm2nt XIV l May 1982 i Study and plans to date for the DRP have focused cn a new stand-alone facility at a new site, However, some preliminary thought has been given to constructing a " breeder head-end" (fuel receipt and storage, shearing, dissolution, feed clarification, first cycle solvent extraction, and waste processing) at an existing reprocessing plant, Lamgm_at_SaEannah_Bizett_Hanford_QL l BaEnWellt. Final decision on a " stand-alone," " breeder j head-end," or alternative DRP will consider cost, environmental l impact, impact on existing reprocessing plant programs, and ;

importance of a reliable demonstration. l Reprocessing capacity for the DRP has been set at about 1/2 metric ton of heavy metal (MTHM) per day. This capacity is a f compromise between the minimum that will permit scale-up to a production-scale operation with reasonable assurance of success, l and the maximum that will permit a meaningful demonstration of reliable reprocessing systems with the limited quantities of !

LMFBR type fuels that will be available during the demonstration (

period. In order to provide economical operation during the l l

early periods of operation and in order to have a full reprocessing load to provide an adequate demonstration of j operability (300 day-per-year operation is contemplated) , !

reprocessin'J of LMFBR fuels will be supplemented by reprocessing I of LWR fuels in the DRP. ,

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l The DRP design is based on the following philosophy o The DRP will_bg U.S. Government owned developmental fuel reprocessing demonstration facility o Public and worker health and safety are of fundamental j concern f

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5.7-8 00mDDDb -- ---

Pign - 8 (82-0034) [7,1] 422 Amandmant XIV May 1982 o Safety and safeguards-related features will_he designed and will be constructed and operated in accordance with industrial standards applicable to nonreactor nuclear facilities. Nationally recognized codes such as the ASME, ,

ANSI, and similar codes will be followed. The NRC Regulatory Guides, which provide guidelines in meeting those requirements, will be utilized ,

o The DRP will be operated and maintained within the constraints of 10 CFR 20 for radioactive effluents and personnel exposure, and the 40 CFR 190 environmental standards for exposure of the general public to LWB genutated radioactive material will_hg_appligd_to_this fugl. The DRP is also designed to guidelines equivalent to the 10 CFR 100 accidental release limits for power reactors. Nonradioactive effluents will meet applicable state and local air and water quality standards. In additient_thg_aL&E&_ principle _will_hg_analigd_to_ thin facility _and_ita_gminaionam o The DRP will_hg_a developmental facility. Operating flexibility, including the ability to change equipment, is needed to meet U.S. Government program objectives.

DRE_Supp0Lt_Easilitica. The DRP provides all of the facilities and services necessary for routine operation and maintenance of fuel storage and processing activities. The services include water supply, sanitary waste disposal, electrical supply, steam and compressed gas supply, access roads, rail spurs, etc.

Support facilities include on-site maintenance shops, mockup areas, laboratory and routine analytical services, cooling services, warehouses, and offices.

I 5.7-9

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AmOndm2nt XIV May 1982 :

DRE_Eucl_Rectiring_and_ Storage The DRP is capable of receiving l and storing currently conceived types of spent oxide fuel assemblies from plutonium breeder reactors as well as from light- '

water reactors. Space is also provided for future storage and reprocessing of carbide breeder fuel, consistent with U.S.

Government decisions regarding use of carbide fuels. The specific reactors and fuels that the DRP current]y has capability t for reprocessing are listed in Table 5.7-7.

The DRP is copable of receiving fuel assemblies that have cooled a minimum of X50 days. For purposes of calculating . __ ____ _ _ _

transportation impact however, the spent fuel and blanket was assumed to be thipped after 100 days, which is conservative.

DBE_Eucl_ShiEEin2_Cagkg The DRP is capable of (1) unloading casks that have been shipped by either truck or rail, (2) removing road dirt and external surface contamination from casks ,

upon receipt, and (3) decontaminating casks prior tc shipment ;

from the DRP. The DRP is capable of removing fuel from all of I the casks which will be used to ship fuel from the reactors listed in Table 5.7-7.

f Capability is also provided to identify fuel assemblies for '

verification and inventory control, and to assay fuel assemblies for fissile material content.

DRE_Eucl_ Storage A water-filled pool is provided with capacity to store enough fuel for 100 days of operations at 0.5 MT/ day ,

capacity with CRBRP-type fuel assemblies. The storage facility has provisions for detecting, handling, and canning (if necessary) suspect or known failed-fuel assembliep, i

a 5.7-10

Page - 10 (82-dd3k) [7,'l] 422 Amsndm2nt XIV May 1982 DRE_Caak_Haintenance. The capability to perform limited maintenance operations on shipping casks is provided. This capability is limited to removing contaminated water coolant from ,

casks and canisters and placing them in storage tanks; j decontaminating the internal surfaces of casks; and limited l

repair of cask internals and externals.

DEE_Eucl_Baprestaning The reprocessing facility initially provides equipment to reprocess fuel assemblies containing uranium, plutonium, and radioactive fission products, clad in either stainless steel or zirconium alloy. The process functions, as shown in Figure 5.7-3 are:

o Fuel receiving, cleaning, p.gn dggtguqtigg_gnalygig and storage o Mechanical processing anti shearing o Dissolution, feed clarification, and feed adjustment o solvent extraction for purification of uranium and plutonium o Uranium oxide production o Reagent makeup and distribution o Rework of off-specification process liquids o Process heating and cooling n Waste e Off_gaa_callection_and_ confinement 5.7-11

PIga - 11 '('82'-0'0'3k) I7,1] t22 Amsnd30nt XIV May 1982 DEE_ Test _nf_EIQEtna. Separation of the fission products from the fissile and fertile material is based upon liquid-liquid solvent extraction. The EnnYtutinual Purex process, modified as required

' for specific nuclear fuels, is the basic process. The Purex l process utilizes a tributylphosphate (TBP) extractant in a normal j paraffinic hydrocarbon (NPH) solvent. ---

The uranium and plutonium products are converted to oxides in a form to be used i directly in fuel fabrication. !

Storage capacity for all oxide products is provided for 100 days j of operation at the maximum production rate for the two oxide products stated above. Capacity to store liquid products -

---l temporarily for 30 days of operation is also provided. The !

design for storage and shipment of uranium and plutonium is in l accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 70,10 CFR 73, and applicable Department of Energy Orders.

DEE_Etoctaa_Linuid_BecyGlt_and_Diannaitinn. Contaminated water and acid used in the processes will_he recovered, purified, and -

recycled to the extent practical. Water additions to the process will thus he minimized, and excess water will_he decontaminated prior to release from the stack as a vapor. Radioactivity limits l in the vaporized water are consistent,with the design objectives ;

for fission product emission. There are no radioactive liquid 1 releases. !

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Page - 12 (82-0034) [7,1] t22 Am2ndatnt XIV May 1982 l

DRE_Watte_and_Efflutata The DRP will be capable r; being operated and maintained within the environmental constraints

. imposed by Federal, state, and local regulations. This specifically includes consideration of the provisions of 10 CFR 20 and 40 CFR 190 --- for routine operations, and 10 CFR 100 for accident conditions. Consistent with these I regulations, effluent control systems were designed to provide overall plant confinement factors when processing typical breeder reactor fuel as shown in Table 5.7-8. The annual effluent releases from the DRP as a result of processing CRBRP fuel after ;

150 days of decay are also shown in Table 5.'7-8. i l

l DEE_Wante_ Management _Erstema. The high-level liquid waste system '

is designed to accommodate the wastes resulting from the liquid I reprocessing of 150 metric tons per year of heavy metal. The l waste storage capacity is designed for two years' processing capacity, concentrated to 200 gallons per ton of heavy metal. i High-level liquid wastes are concentrated, solidified, and packaged for subsequent transfer to a Federal repository accordance with the requirements of &ppendiK_E,10 CFR 50. The current interpretation of anticipattd_gggnaitagg guidelines is that the centerline temperature of the canistered waste after solidification (assuming solidified glass process) shall not ;

0 '

exceed 800 C, the waste canisters shall not exceed 12 inches in diameter by 10 feet high, and the decay heat output of the individual canisters shall not exceed 5 kW at the time of shipment to a repository. ---

5.7-13 l

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I Pago - 13 (82-0034)[7,1]422 Amandmsnt XIV May 1982 Radioactive metal scrap originating from the fuel assemblies, process operations, and nonrepairable in-cell equipment is

., consolidated and packaged for shipment to a Federal repository.

The overall size, weight, capacity, etc., of waste shipping casks to be handled by the DRP are not yet established. !

i Nonprocess, potentially contaminated wastes, such as change room !

showers, sink effluents, and fire-protection water discharges, f

are routed to a collection system for monitoring (and processing l if_requiredL to assure compliance with the effluent release !

requirements. All liquid wastes discharged to the environment will meet Eederal_and_ State requirements. !

All solid wastes that are potentially contaminated are inspected, I processed or packaged, as required, and shipped to a suitable burial site.

Combustible wastes, including waste process organics, are treated by a suitable combustion process to reduce them to a noncom- l bustible material for disposal. The remaining wastes will be packaged as required and sent to a suitable disposal site. ,

Environmental _Insanta ,

l The_ fuel _resteceaning_ plant _ presented _in_the_EEEE_LM&SH:liliL_ van maanmed_tn_ hare _a_stocessing_nasability_of_ fixe _ metric _tona_of henry _ metal _iuranium_slua_slutoniumL_ser_ dart _which_unuld_serait the_alant_te_attve_aheut_tightx_LMEBR_ sever _slantam_ tach _having_a capacitI_of_10.0-QMWem 5s7-14

P ga - 14 (82-053 )[7,1]S22 Am2ndmInt XIV May 1982 l

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, Environmental _ impact _and_nublic_ health _effectat_due_tn tadiological_eminaiona_that_wnuld_reault_ftna_ncrmal_na_well abnormal _LaccidentaL_ontrationa_of_the_DBEt_ haying _a_ throughput capacity _of_1ZLaetric_tona_of_henzz_ metal _ner_ dart _will_be significantly_ lean _than_those_impacta_fram_the_much_ larger capacity _ reprocessing _ plant _ifive_ metric _tona_ser_dayLdescribed in the_EEESm__Hawarert_impacta'_on_a_ unit _ capacity _bania_ Lime u Rer_HWel_wQuld_be_eanentiallz_the_name_Ra_those_EiYen_in_the EEEE, Ear _the_surmone_of_eatimating_atmansheric_ radiological _ releases from_reprocessina_CBHEE_fuelt_gaatoua_ radioactive _effluenta_were calculated _hz_analying_the_cnnfinement_factora_of_the_model reprocessing _ plant _in_ WASH _lili_to_the_aretage_ annual _CERRE_ fuel anucce_ term _ Late _ Table _E 1:Elkm__Ent_compatiannt_ve_ bare _ alan estimated _the_enrironmental_ impacts _which_would_ result _where_the CEaEE_anent_ fuel _ reprocessed _in_the_Dezelnement_Benrocessing Elant_LDBElm ---

Table'.iml:E_ahown_that_the_tadiological_relenata_from reprocenaing_CRBRE_ fuel _in_the_DRE_are_aisilar_to_thone_for_the model_restaceasing_plantm__The_hnunding_ reprocessing _impactat thone_from_the_DREt_are_ included _in_ Table _E 7-1.__Other_effluenta from_the_Ereproceaning_plantt_prnrided_in_ Table _iml_lt_ vere estimated _by apportioning _the_effluenta_of_the_model_ plant _in WASH _lili_to_the_lLaetric_tanZxear_throughnut_reguired_1or CBERE m_These_are expected _to_ hound _the_ actual _CERRE_ reprocessing impacta_regardlena_of_what_reproceasing_alternatire_in_erentuallr used.

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Piga - 15 (82-003'k) [7,1] #22 Amsndasnt XIV May 1982 I

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l 5.7.1.3 RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM THE CRBRP FUEL CYCLE Radioactive wastes are a by-product of the CRBRP fuel cycle. ;

Table 5.7-10 summarizes the types, quantities, key constituents, and disposition of the wastes from the CRBRP fuel cycle. Table f 5.7-5 compares the quantities of wastes expected to be produced in the CRBRP fuel cycle with those of the once-through and j uranium-only recycle fuel cycles for LWR's. The following l discusses the waste generated at each step in the fuel cycle and l the environmental impacts from disposing of these wastes. (

Adequate supplies of depleted uranium in the form of UF6.are f currently available at DOE enrichment plants to supply ---

l material for the CRBRP indefinitely. The depleted UF is left !

6 over from production of enriched uranium for LWR's. No i incremental waste generation nor environmental impacts are attributed to the CRBRP for production of this material. !

Operation of the CRBRP does not require the use of enriched i uranium for fuel material. This is an important difference l between the LWR fuel cycle and the CRBRP fuel cycle. As such, the CRBRP fuel cycle generates no radioactive wastes nor ;

environmental impacts from uranium grQduntinn_QL enrichment. [

Conversion of depleted UF 6 to UO2 for CRBRP blankets is planned i to be performed at the blanket fuel fabrication facility. As j noted in section 5.7.1.1, both UO for blanket fabrication and 2 [

for fabrication of core fuel would be converted. During UF 6 conversion, CaF2 will be formed. This is the most significant (

waste generated at the blanket fuel fabrication plant. I i

l The CaF2 will be contaminated with about 0.01 uCi/gm of uranium. l The 11 MT/ year of CaF2 generated by the CRBRP fuel cycle is based I l

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.l 5.7-15 ,

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Paga - 16 (82-0034)l7,11622 Amsndmsnt XIV M2y 1982 i

on the production rate of one metric ton for each metric ton of uranium processed as given in section 3.2.5, NURBG 0116(12) The CaF 2 is expected to be disposed of at the blanket fabrication

' facility in bulk form. Based on the solubility of CaF 2 , any ,

' uranium leached out would be present in the leachate at concentrations of about 10~3 of MPC, which io so low as to be insignificant as a potential radiation hazard (see WASH 1248, p.

E-16).

Operation of the SAF line is expected to produce about 200 m3 of transuranic contaminated wastes per year (6) . As CRBRP requires about 65 percent of the SAF line capacity, about 130 m 3 of transuranic wastes will be generated from fabrication of the annual CRBRP core fuel. These wastes will be contaminated with I

uranium, plutonium, and daughter products to levels in excess of 10 nanocuries per gram. The CRBRP wastes will be partially compacted and packaged into about 145, 55 gallon drums annually.

The transuranic wastes generated from operation of the SAF line will be transported to an existing DOE transuranic waste storage site on the Hanford Reservation. Environmental impacts from operation of the Hanford Reservation are addressed in ERDA-1538,

" Waste Management Operations, Hanford Reservation," December 1975. CRBRP transuranic waste will be a small addition to over 155,000 m3 of transuranic waste already in storage at the Hanford facility and will result in an insignificant incremental environmental impact compared with the totality of Hanford waste management.

As the LWR fuel cycle does not involve plutonium recycle, as yet, a key differance between the LWR and CRBRP fuel cycle is the generation < j transuranic contaminated wastes from fuel fabrication. This difference is evident from Table 5.7-5. For the purpose of estimating the environmental impacts from this 5.7-16

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Page - 17 (82-0034) [7,1] G22 Am2ndannt XIV May 1982 unique CRBRP fuel cycle waste stream, it was assumed that these l

wastes would be ultimately disposed of in a Federal respository. I The environmental impacts from disposing of about 85,000 m3 of ,

transuranic waste in the proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Ill) f were apportioned to the 130 m3 annuel generation rate for CRBRP, and included in Table 5.7-1. i I

Wastes generated at the CRBR plant are addressed in section 3.5. f Low-level wastes from the plant will be transported to a shallow !

land burial site for disposal. An estimate of the environmental I impacts from disposal of these wastes is based on section 4.7.3.4 of Reference (12) . Disposal of this waste will require the~ ~

commitment of about 0.006 acres of 73nd annually. As indicated in the reference, the routine atmos,aeric effluents from disposal l of low-level wastes are insignificant. !

Appropriate fuel repr.ocessing capability is expected to be available in t'ime to support the CRBRP fuel cycle. No need is anticipated to supplement the approximately 4. years of spent fuel I storage capacity at CRBRP with away from reactor storage. As such, no wastes are identified from operation of such a facility to support the CRBRP fuel cycle. l The types and quantities of waste in Table 5.7-5 from reprocessing were estimated based on the conceptual DRP design.

The DRP is expected to generate about 25 m3 of miscellaneous low-level wastes annually in support of the CRBRP fuel c.ycle. l These wastes will be generated from fuel storage, handling and l cleaning operations prior to reprocessing. The key contaminants are short lived fission and activation products with a total

)

activity level typically of 10Ci/m 3 . The low-level wastes will contain less than 10 nanocuries per gram of transuranic I contaminants. l 5.7-17

P392 - 18 (82-0034) [7,1] G22 Amandesnt XIV MIy 1982 !

i For the purpose of estimating environmental impacts, it is j assumed that the low-level wastes will be fixed in concrete, packed in about 120, 55 gallon drums annually, and shipped to a I

shallow land burial facility for disposal. Based on the analysis i in section 4.7.3 of NUREG-0116, the reprocessing plant low-level t wastes will require the commitment of approximately 0.0025 acres !

of land annually and result in insignificant routine atmospheric !

i effluents.

l Metal scrap waste is generated at the DRP consisting of hulls and ;

hardware from fuel element disassembly and nonrepairable in-cell l

equipment. The bulk of this waste, that from fuel element l

disassembly, will be contaminated with about 0.05 percent of j residual fuel material and with activation products formed during !

irradiation. The metal scrap is expected to have a total I activity of about 4 X 10 5 Ci/m3 . For the purpose of estimating environmental impacts, the metal scrap is assumed to be partially !

compacted, packaged into about El, 10 inch diameter by 10 feet high stainless steel cylinders annually and shipped to a Federal repository for disposal. I L

Operation of the DRP also produces some transuranic contaminated f

wastes. Essentially all wastes produced from operation of the !

plant, except for fuel storage and handling, are assumed to be contaminated with greater than 10 nanocuries per gram of l transuranics as well as fission and activation products. These !

wastes range from 1000 Ci/m3 3 to 106 Ci/m in total activity. For f the purpose of estimating environmental impacts, these wastes are assumed to be fixed in concrete, packaged in Ea, 55 gallon drums i annually, and shipped to a federal repository for disposal. l Approximately 1 m3 of; solidified high-level waste is expected to l

be generated from reprocessing CRBRP fuel on an annual average ,

[

t 5.7-18 ;

wa n - - . - .

Psgo - 19 (82-0034)' [7',1] 422 Am:ndment XIV May 1982 basis. The high-level waste will be fixed in a matrix with a I very low leach rate (such as borosilicate glass) and packaged in 12-inch diameter by 10 feet long stainless steel cylinders for disposal at a Federal repository. When_QYtE94Gktd_19E_diEDQEtit thtER_szlindtER_Qasuax_abQut_0. 51_a l -tach. About six cylinders of high-level waste will be produced annually from CRBRP fuel reprocessing. Tht_YQluat_fSL_ die 99Eal_ int _thtEtfSEtt_Rhnut 1.1_al-annually.

The key constituents of CRBRP high-level waste are in Table 5.7-6. These were calculated to contain 10% of the tritium, 0.5%

of the uranium and plutonium, and all of the non-volatile fission products and other transuranic elements. The fuel was conservatively assumed to be reprocessed 150 days after reactor

. discharge and the waste is stored as a liquid until solidification 1 year after discharge from the reactor.

NUREG 0116 estimates the environmental impacts from disposal of the transuranic and high-level wastes from reprocessing LWR spent fuel in a uranium only recycle mode. EQE_thig_gtudxt_tht plutonium produced in the LWR is assumed to be disposed of with the high-level wastes in a geologic repository. The constituents of this high-level waste are shown for comparison to those generated from reprocessing CRBRP fuel in Table 5.7-E. These !

constituents were calculated to contain all of the non-volatile )

fission products and transuranic elements, 0.5 percent of the uranium and all of the plutonium for spent fuel 1 year after reactor discharge given in NUREG - 0116, Appendix A.

It is evident from Table 5.7-E that most CRBRP high-level wacte constituents are enveloped by the constituents of LWR high-level wastes f rom U-only recycle. There are three exceptions. Ru-103 and Cm-242 have relatively short half lives and can be expected to decay to negligible levels before any significant release would be anticipated from the waste package. The third is l l

l 5.7-18a l

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ - - . - _ . _ _ . - - .-__ -

Pcga - 20 (82-0034) [7,1] #22 Am2ndernt XIV l May 1982 Am-241. --- Am-lil_in_a_ daughter _staduct_of_the_nuch_shortet half _ lift _Eu_ lib._of_which_the_ LWR _vante_haa_much_ mort _than_that from_CREEE d a_Euch uthe_Am_211_in_LHE_Waatta_will_autsaan_that in_CEREE_wantea_in_lesa_than_i_ year. The environmental impacts of disposal of CRBRP high-level wastes are therefore expected to i be similar to those from the LWR high-level wastes given in :

NUREG-0116. I Similarly, the environmental impacts from geologic disposal of transuranic contaminated and metal scrap waste from LWR fuel reprocessing envelope the impacts from disposal of similar CRBRP wastes. The impacts included in Table 5.7-1 for geologic disposal of fuel reprocessing plan't wastes are those calculated in section 4.4 of NUREG 0116.

The DRP does not vent all of the Kr-85 and I-129 in the CRBRP spent fuel to the atmosphere. Instead, Kr-85 is captured and implanted in a metal (nickel-lanthanum alloy) matrix by a sputtering process.(13) The metal matrix containing the krypton is loa ~ded into 9 inch diameter by 65 inch high steel cylinders.

Approximately one cylinder will be generated for every 28 years of CRBRP operation. These cylinders are expected to be disposed of in shallow dry wells at a federal geologic repository.

I-129 will be fixed in concrete as barium iodate and packaged in about 0.05, 55 gallon drums annually. This waste stream will be '

sent to a Federal repository for disposal, j 1

l l

i l

l l

l 5.7-18b ,

t l -

P292 - 21 (82-003 5)~ [7,1] 422 Am2ndm2nt XIV May 1982 :

For the purpose of estimating the environmental impacts of waste management in Table 5.7-1, the captured Kr-85 is assumed to be retained within the metal matrix for a period of 100 years.

~ After this time, the remaining krypton (about 55 curies) is assumed to be released to the atmosphere.

Disposal of the very long half-life (1.72 x 107 years) but low specific activity I-129 should not result in a.significant incremental environmental impact over those estimated from disposal of other wastes in the Federal repository.

The nonradiological environmental effects of the shipment of materials from the CRBRP fuel cycle are similar to those characteristic of the trucking industry in general. The CRBRP fuel cycle and waste transportation has been estimated to add 450,000 miles of transportation, including the return shipments of empty casks, shipping containers, and protective overpacks.

Based upon NUREG 0116, the emissions from transportation are presented in Table 5.7-1.

e 5.7-19

~

Pago - 22 (82-0034) [7,1] G22 Am:ndm:nt XIV May 1982 5.7.1.4 DOSES FROM CRBRP FUEL CYCLE Desta_from_Easility_Qattationa --- CRBBE_cott_ fuel _faktication in planned _for_the_S&E_ lint &__The_S&E_ lint _in_a_ portion _of_the_EMEE.

Ent_the_nutsont_of_tatisating_atmeasberic_taltaata_and_dcata_from CEBBE_ sort _ fuel _fakticatient_theat_Itaulting_from_ontration_of the_tutire_EBEE_ vert _conattratively_uand __&stual_taltaata_and deata_dut_to_CaaBE_ cort _ fuel _faktication would_he_a_sortion_of thoat_from_the_S&E_linct_vbish_ art _a_nottion_of_theat_from_EMEE operation.

___ Routine atmospheric releases of plutonium from FMEF are given in the following table.

Annual Release 1kl Isotopic l Iantopt ___icitrLi _ Composition _iLL Pu-236

2.0x10-9 8x10-6 Pu-23 8 4.3x10-6 0.5 Pu-239 2.2x10-6 72.

Pu-240 2.2x10-6 20.

Pu-241 3.0x10-4 6.

Pu-242 3.0x10-9 1.5 o

l l

t 5.7-20 82-0034

~

j p g2 - 23 (82-003 )[7,1]622 Amendm:nt XIV May 1982 l

. l These releases are based on the above isotopic composition, ---

release factors (from the SAF line) of 10-3, and cleanup factors of 1.25x10-8* (for 3 HEPA filters in series, where each HEPA -

filter would have a separate tested efficiency of 99.954) . The slutonium throughput _used_vaa_i_BI4xtt_the_ total _EEEE_capacitz.

There are no liquid radioactivity releases associated with SAF line operation.

Routine atmospheric releases of uranium (total _EBEE throughput of 6.0 MT/yr of uranium) and other radionuclides from the SAF line were calculated on essentially the same basis and are given below, unte_that_although_ depleted _ uranium _ia_ expected _to_be-~~ - - ~ ~

used_for_CBBBE_fuelt_ natural _ uranium _waa_conattYatiYely.uand_for those_ calculations.

Annual Release 1EL Isotopic 1EL lactope ___LCiZytL____ Composition _LLL U-232 - -

U-234 5.8x10-11 5x10-3 U-235 2.5x10-12 0.72 U-236 - -

U-238 5.4x10-11 99.27 Th-231 <2.5x10-12 _

Th-234 <5.4x10-ll -

Pa-234 <5.4x10-ll -

Accidental _releasen_of_tadioactivitz_and_teaulting_uonaeguencea are_given_in_Beference_l, The FMEF annual 50-year dose commitments to maximum individuals and the general population within 50 miles of the FMEF are as follows:

Thisisaconsgrvativeassump{gon.

range from 10- to 1.25 x 10-Actual cleanup factors would L.1_11 82-0034

PCg5 - 24 (82-003I) [7,1] e22 Amenda:ni XIV May 1982 Maximum Individual Population Organ Done_Laillicant Deat_Luan:ImmL Whole Body 1.5x10-3 4.6x10-3 Thyroid 2.2x10-4 9.0x10-4 Lung 2.9x10-3 1.1x10-2 Bone 9.5x10-3 4.0x10-2 Liver 5.3x10-3 2.1x10-2 Natural background and medical exposures would give an annual average exposure to individuals of about 150 millirem. The annual whole body population doses due to natural radioactivity would be about 25,000 man-rem for the year 2000 population within 50 miles of the FMEF.

Blanket fuel fabrication for the CRBRP will be carried out at a yet-to-be selected commercial facility. For purposes of this assessment, it is assumed that the commercial facility selected will have three stages of HEPA filters (with an efficiency of 99.9% per stage), yielding an overall confinement factor of 10 9.

Atmospheric releases for blanket fuel fabrication calculated on this basis are given in the following table.

Annual helease laQtope __ICi/stL____

U-234 -

U-235 3.2x10-ll U- 236 -

U-238 2.5x10-9 Th-231 <3.2x10-Il Th-234 <2.5x10-9 Pa-234 <2.5x10-9 L7._1La

PCg2 - 25 (82-003 )[7",1]t22 Amsndm3nt XIV

. May 1982 I

The releases are based on a 7.5 MT/yr throughput and isotopic composition of 0.2% U-235 and 99.8% U-23 8. This 7.5 MT/yr throughput is less than it of the annual throughput of the model ;

fuel fabrication plant described in WASH-1248 (900 Mt/yr), which !

could handle the fuel fabrication requirements of 26 light water :

reactors annually. Thus, CRBRP blanket fuel fabrication i environmental impacts, on an annual basis, would be about 1/4 of I i

the comparable impacts normallited_to_the_andel_LWE_ fuel i requirement given in WASH-1248. --- i i

The_1.i_HIlyr_ throughput _staridea_the_CEBRE_ radial _hlanket l requirementat__Although_not_ fabricated _into_ fuel _reda_at_the ,

blanket _ fabrication _facilitzt_an_ additional _1.5 MT/vr_of_ uranium .

dioxide _would_be_conrerted_from_UEg_to_UQg_at_ thia _ facility _to supplx_the_ core _ fuel _and_ axial _hlanket_reguirementa __The_ total !

HQg_conYeraien_throughnut_would_therefore_he_ll_HT_ annually. I The_bisher_ required _ capacity _for_UQg_conYeraien_would_ increase l the_ land _uand&_the_gaannua_reltaae_of_E t_the_liguid_ chemical l reltaata_and_the_ liquid _radiningical_reltaata_of_the_ blanket _ fuel fabricatint_ facility __Thean_impacta_in_ Table _-5 7-1 were I calculated _to_he_121_of_the_ comparable _impacta_ normalized _to_the l Bodel_LWE_ fuel _ requirement _EiYen_in_W&SH-111E.

Annual 50-year dose commitme..ts to maximum individuals and the general population within 50 miles of the model LMFBR fuel reprocessing plant in WASH-1535 for atmospheric releases given in l Table 5.7-8 would be as follows: [

Maximum l Individual Population i Qtgan Done_imillitemL Done_iMan:reat l Whole Body 0.06 1.01 Thyroid 0.87 9.0 !

Lung 0.10 1.02 !

Bone 0.15 2.33 .

Liver 0.08 1.38 ;

5.7-2g 82-0034

P ga - 26 (82-003k) [7,1] G22 l Amenda:nt XIV May 1982 4

Natural background exposures would give an annual average ;

exposure to individuals in the vicinity of the model plant site ,

of about 102 millirem.I9) The annual whole body population dose l due to natural radioactivity for the population within a 50 mile !

radius of the model plant is estimated to be 1.02x10 5 man-rem.I8)

It should be noted that there would be no liquid releases of radioactivity from the model plant. The C-14 released would l

produce a world-wide population dose commitment, over all time, of 37 man-rem, based on a constant world population of 6x10 9 l

people.(10)

The doses associated with reprocessing spent CRBRP fuel in the l DRP were calculated assuming the model fuel reprocessing plant [

site described in WASH-1535. Conservative confinement factors !

were chosen to estimate radioactivity releases. Table 5.7-8 l gives information on confinement factors and atmospheric releases ;

of radioactivity associated with reprocessing CRBRP fuel in the I DRP.

l Annual 50-year dose commitments to maximum individuals and the general population within 50 miles of the DRP at the model LMFBR

fue'l reprocessing plant site for these atmospheric releases would be as follows:

Maximum I Individual Population t Qtgan Doan_LaillitemL Deat_L5an-temt !

Whole Body 0.06 1.01 l Thyroid 3.9 81.2 Lung 0.10 1.02 Bone 0.15 2.33 Liver 0.08 1.38 :

l 5.7-23 82-0034 l

Pbg3 - 27 (82-003I) [7,1] t22 !

Am2nda nt XIV M y 1982 Natural background exposures would give an annual average I exposure to individuals in the vicinity of the model plant site l of about 102 millirem.3 The annual whole body population dose ;

due to natural radioactivity for the population within a 50 mile '

radius of the DRP is estimated to be 102,000 man-rem.(9) t i

It should be noted that there would be no liquid releases of !

radioactivity from the DRP. The C-14 released would produce a world-wide population dose cc amitment, over all time, of 3.7x103 i man-rem, based on a constant world population of 6x109 people.(10) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

I Note that the DRP doses differ only slightly from those resulting :

from the model reprocessing plant, primarily due to use of different confinement factors for C-14 and I-129. <

Impacts from high level waste product solidification are' included i within the total impact from operation of the reprocessing facility. -

Donea_from_TranaRottation Impacts from transportation of new core anaemblica_ibased_on 84/yr of fuel and 11/yr of blanket) to CRBRP, from operation of CRBRP and from transportation of spent core _naaemblita from CRBRP are identified in Section 5.3. '

l Thia _done_ impact _ conservatively _nanumea_that_no_ partial _abismenta occurt_and that_all_abismenta_contain_E_naaemblicam__Hencet_the number _of_naaemblina_nanused_in_the_ radiation _ impact _in_ greater than_tbat_ described _in_Section_1ma.

The_ transportation _of_ irradiated _ fuel _naaemblita_by_tailt_na described _in_Section_1.E _ ban _heen_aelected_arer_abisment_hr truck _aa_a_reault_of_a_costZbanefit_analrainm__The_ comparison _ ban been_made_between_a_ multiple _aanemblzt_ rail _ car _ transported _ cask !

and_a_aingle:anaamblyt_ truck _ transported _caak J binnent_uaing_a single:assemhiv. truck:tranamorted_cank_vaa_ eliminated _from ;

5.7-24

^

~

POgo-28(82-003k)[7,1]422 Am3ndm2nt XIV M3y 1982 conaideration_due_to the_ higher _ number _of_abismenta_reguired. i Thia _bisher_ number _of_shipmenta_ increased _iLL_the_ontrational conta_of_ mating _the_caak_both_to_CRERE_and_to_the_ fuel reproccanort_11L_the_ radiation _erseaure_to_the_sermonnel bandling the cask _at_hath_the_CBBRE_and_the_ fuel _ reprocessing _aitet_and 11L_the_trananottation_ radiation _ exposure __Eurthermoret_veight limitationa_ imposed _on_a_truckt_with_ resultant limita_on_abield thickneament_would_ require _decax_of_the_ irradiated _ fuel anaemblita_beyond_lRE_ days.

The doses from transportation of wastes from reprocessing are given in_ Table _L2-1L The transuranic wastes from core fuel fabrication are to be stored at the DOE's Hanford Reservation. Transportation from the fuel fabrication plant to the waste management site occurs over a route -completely within the Hanford Reservation, he_there_are_no permanent _inhabitanta_along_ thia _routet_there_will_he_only minimal _Dublic_eKRoaure from this transportation phase. HoweEert to_ke_conservativet_donen_from_trananottation_of_the_tranauranic l wantes_from_the_ core _ fuel _ fabricator _to_a_renonitory_ bare _heen l

calculated _and_are_ presented _in_ Table _5-7 The calculational approach identified in NUREG-0170 wac used to determine the population doses due to all different phases of the fuel cycle. The assumptions made for these calculations are as follows:

5.7-25

P2g3 - 29 (82-0034) [7,1] 422 Am3ndm2nt XIV May 1982 Ebismant_of_Etw_Eucl_from_Eabricater_bz_ Truck _LSST1.

High Med. Low Population Population Population Ebipment_Earamattra __&rtas___ __&rtaa___ __arean___

Average Speed (MPH) 30 50 55 Population Dgnsity (person / mile ) 10,000 2,000 15 Fraction of distance traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90 One way traffic per hr. 3,000 800 500 ;

Additional Assumptions:

o Fuel / food stops in population areas of 200/ mile2 ,

4 hr/ day.

o 14 shipments / year, 2500 miles o Shielding of new fuel gives same external dose as f spent fuel shipping cask. Dose Rate Factor - K = 10 5 o Four lane traffic exists only in high population zones.

This contributes 2% of high-population traffic.

o shipment duration 2.5 days.

5.7-26 82-0034

Phg5-30(8h-003k)[7,1]t22 Am:ndannt XIV M3y 1982 l Shipment _of_ Hew _ Blanket _from_Embricator_by._ Truck High Med. Low Population , Population Population Shipment _Earametern __ArtaE___ __&rtaE___ __Arcan___

Average Speed (MPH) 30 50 55 l 1

PopulationDgnsity (person / mile ) 10,000 2,000 15 '

Fraction of distance tr e- . led 0.05 0.05 0.90 One way traffic Per hr. 3,000 800 500 Additional Assumptions:

o All stops in low population areas for rest.

o Fuel / food stops in med-population areas, I hr/ day o 14 hr/ day lay over o 12 shipments / year, 2500 miles o Dose Rate Factor K=10 o Four lane traffic exists only in high population zones.

This contributes 2% of high-population zones.

o shipment duration 5 days j

5.7-27 82-0034

P ga - 31 (82-0034) [7,1] G22 Amsndm2nt XIV Mny 1982 Ehissant of_TRU_ item _Eucl_Embrication_Elant_hE_ Trunk High Med. Low Population Population Population abiement_Earametern __&ItaE___ __&ttaE___ __Artan ,

Average Speed (MPH) 30 50 55 l

Population D nsity !

(person / mile ) 10,000 2,000 15 I

Fraction of distance ;

traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90 l One way traffic per hr. 3,000 800 500 Additional Assumptions:

o All stops in low population areas for rest.

o Fuel / food stops in med-population areas, 1 hr/ day o 14 hr/ day layover o E shipments / year, 2500 miles o Dose Rate Factor K=103 o Four lane traffic exists only in high population zones. !

This contributes 2% of high-population traffic, o Shipment duration 5 days.

l l

l 5.7-28 82-0034

~' ~

Pcg5 - 32 (82-0d3 )[7 1]422 Am2nd: nt XIV May 1982 Ebisment of_Entat Eucl_fIQu_CEREP__by__ Rail High Med. Low Population Population Population Shipment _Earamateta __attaa___ __attaa___ __arean___

Average Speed (MPH) 15 25 25 Population Dgnsity (person / mile ) 10,000 2,000 15 Fraction of distance traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90

. Stop Duration (hrs) 0 ,

0 36 ,

Additional Assumptions:

o 14 shipments / year, 2500 miles o Dose Rate Factor K=10 3 o - Per NUREG-0170, on-link persons dose considered negligible.

5.7-29 r % firetT\n

~ '

POg2 - 33 (82-003 k) (7,1] G22 Am2ndm2nt XIV May 1982 Shipmen t_of_Spant_Blanktt_f tes_CERR_tE_ Bail High Med. Low Population Population Population Shipment _Earaantata __Attaa___ __Attaa__ __ArtaE___

Average Speed (MPH) 15 25 25 Population Dgnsity (person / mile ) 10,000 2,000 15 Fraction of distance traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90 Stop Duration (hrs) 0 0 36 Additional Assumptions:

o 12 shipments / year, 2500 miles o Dose Rate Factor - no credit taken for eduction in' source strength compared to spent fuel. (K=10 )

o Per NUREG-0170, on-link persons dose considered negligible.

1 5.7-30 82-0034

(

~

Paga - 34 (82-0034)[7,1]#22 Amsndm2nt XIV May 1982 Ehipment_of_ Irradiated _ Control _and_Emm0Yahle'_Badial_ Shield hastablita_from_CERRE_by Bail High Med. Low Population Population Population EhiRatnt_Earamettra __& Lean ___ __&rean__ __Attas _

Average Speed (MPH) 15 25 25 PopulationDgnsity (person / mile ) 10,000 2,000 15 Fraction of distance traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90 Stop Duration (hrs) 0 0 36 Additional Assumptions:

o 4.5 shipments / year, 2500 miles o Dose Rate Factor K=10 o Per NUREGO-0170, on-link persons dose considered negligible.

5.7-31 82-0034

' ~

P ga - 35 (82-0034)[7,'l]G22 Am2ndm2nt XIV May 1982 i

Shitiant_91_Eu0g_ftem_Restentaning_Elant_by_ Truck _1SSTL High Med. Low I Population Population Population Shismant_Earamettra __&ItaE___ __&ttas___ __&renE___ l Average Speed (MPH) 30 50 55 l Population Dgnsity (person / mile ) 10,000 l

2,000 15 Fraction of distance traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90 One way traffic per hr. 3000 800 500 5

Additional Assumptions: [

o Fuel / food stops in population areas of 200/ mile2 , 4 hr/ day r o 14 shipments /yr, 3000 miles o Dose Rate Factor K=103 o Four lane traffic exists only in high population zones. ;

This contributes 2% of high-population traffic.

o Shipment duration 3 days 5.7-32 .

82-0034

~

Pcg5 - 36 ( 82-0034 ) [7,'1] G 22 Am:ndarnt XIV May 1982 i

l Ebiament_of_HLW_from_ Base 9Etamino_Elant_hE_Enil High Med. Low ;

Population Population Population i Ebisment_Earametera __& teas ___ __&tean __Atena___

l Average Speed (MPH) 15 25 25 :

PopulationDgnsity (person / mile ) 10,000 2,000 15 i

l Fraction of distance 1 traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90 Stop Duration (hrs) 0 0 36 Additional Assumptions:

o 3 shipments / year, 2500 miles Assume 36 hour4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months layover in train yards, 65 person / mile 2 o

5.7-33 82-0034

P2ga - 37 (82-00'34) [7',1] 422 Am:nd22nt XIV May 1982 1

Shinment_of_TRU_and_ Metal _ScraE_from_Resrecessing_Elant_b L Truck High Med. Low Population Population Population Shisment_Earametera __arean___ __ arena ___ __areaa___

Average Speed (MPH) 30 50 55 Population D nsity (person / mile ) 10,000 2,000 15 Fraction of distance i traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90 One way traffic i per hr. 3000 800 500 Additional Assumptions o 11mi shipment / year, 2500 miles o Dose Rate Factor K=10 3 2 1_containeratahipment_for_TEU _E_nontaineraLahipment_for metal _acrap o All stops in low population areas for rest, o Fuel / food stops in med-population areas, 1 hr/ day o 14 hrs / day layover l o Four lane traffic exists only in high population zones.

This contributes 2% of high-population traffic. l o Shipment duration 5 days 6

5.7-34 82-0034 .

Pbga - 3 8 (82-0034) [7,1] 422 Am2ndm2nt XIV May 1982 i

i Shisatut_Qf_LLW_frQu_RtREQEtnaing_Elant hLTruck High Med. Low !

Population Population Population Ehismant_EarameterE __&Itas___ __&rtaE___ __&ItaE__ ;

i '

Average Speed (MPH) 30 50 55 l

l Population Dgnsity (person / mile )

10,000 2,000 15 l

i Fraction of distance j traveled 0.05 0.05 0.90 '

One way traffic per hr. 3000 800 500 ,

i I

Additional Assumptions:

o All stops in low populatian areas for rest o ,

Fuel / food stops in med-population areas,1 hr/ day o 14 hr/ day layover l o 2 shipments / year, 2500 miles o Dose Rate factor K=103 o Four lane traffic exists only in high population zones. f This contributes 2% of high-population traffic, o shipment duration 5 days l o 882 ft3 of material / year 0 0.3 Ci/ft3 o 60 drums per truck 5.7-35 82-0034

' ~ ' ~

P5g2 - 3 9 ( 8'2'-0'0'3' )' [7,1] G22 Am:ndm2nt XIV M y 1982 Doses to maximum individuals were calculated for the two different modes of transportation, truck and rail shipment. For i truck shipments, the maximum allowable dose in the cab of an exclusive-use trugk is 2 arem/hr. The dose rate at 3 feet from the surface of a cask containing spent fuel is 10 arem/hr.

Assuming a crew member spends 9 hrs. per day in the truck cab and 1/2 hr. per day inspecting the shipment, the dose is calculated per trip as:

(trip /yr) (day / trip)[(9 hrs / day) (2 mrem /hr)+(0.5 hr/ day) (10 mrem /hr))

For rail shipment, it is assumed that the maximum individual would be a person in the yard where the train stops for rest.

Assuming this person was three feet from the cask for the full duration of the stop, the maximum individual dose would be calculated as:

(10 mrem /hr)(stop duration)

The results of the calculations are presented in Table 5.7-9.

1 i

e 5.7-36

5.7.1.5 Safeguards and Security The principal fuel cycle operations that will support the CRBRP* are-fabrication of mixed-oxide fuel for the reactor core, fabrication of depleted uranium fuel for the radial blanket, reprocessing of spent fuel, transportation between the facilities and storage or disposal of radioactive wastes. The safeguards / security measures to be employed at the supporting facilities and during transportation are individually described.

The CRBRP must meet NRC requirements specified in the Code of Federal Regulations,10CFR 50, 70 and 73. Each licensee is required to submit written plans and procedures for meeting these requirements to NRC. Upon approval, these become conditions of the specific license.

It is assumed that the mixed-oxide fuel for the CRBRP will be fabricated in DOE facilities and the spent fuel will be reprocessed in a DOE facility, subject to the safeguards / security requirements specified in DOE Orders 5630, 5631 and 5632. Pu0 and fresh mixed-oxide fuel will be transported using 2

DOE's Safe Secure Transport System.

The objectives of both NRC and DOE are "to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety." In 10CFR73.1(a), NRC describes, in broad terms, design basis threats for sabotage, theft and diversion. Performance requirements are further explained in 10CFR73.25 and 45.

Safeguards for the CRBRP itself are described in Chapter 13.7 of the CRBRP PSAR.

5.7-37

l l

DOE material control, accounting and physical protection are required by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to provide safeguards and security comparable to that required by NRC. DOE Order 5632.2, paragraph 5 states:

" Policy and Objectives: It is the DOE policy to physically protect all special nuclear material against theft. This order is designed to facilitate effective safeguards and security systems through graded, performance-evaluated physical protection requirements for special nuclear material. The minimum standards have been so designed as to satisfy the policy requirements that the effectiveness of nuclear safeguards and security systems in DOE activities provide comparable effectiveness with that required of licensees by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission".

00E facility operators, like NRC licensees, are required to maintain updated safeguards and security procedures manuals. These procedures and actual performance are reviewed and monitored by DOE safeguards and security personnel. Design basis threats are useful for the drafting of procedures and for preliminary assessment of performance. DOE conducts on-going studies of potential adversary motivations, characteristics, and capabilities and supports a substantial program of research on and implementation of safeguards / security techniques and of assessment methodology.

Material access and vital areas are located within buildings of substantial constrtTtp n. Except during processing, fuel containing plutonium is to be stored in vaults or vault-like rooms. The buildings that contain material access and vital areas are located within a protected area that is surrounded 5.7-38

by two chain-link fences, surmounted with barbed wire. The entrances for personnel and vehicles to the protected area are under the control and super-vision of security personnel in a hardened security post. A second hardened security post is located within the protected area. Outside the fence and the i protected area is an isolation zone, so that activities outside of the fence ,

can be observed, and a controlled area that is posted as Government Property.

The protected area and isolation zone are provided with intrusion detectors, ,

lights, and CCTV or other means to detect intruders.

DOE employees will have Q clearances. Contractor employees will have L or i

Q clearances, depending on task assignments and responsibilities. Only authorized personnel are to be permitted to enter the protected area and only those having assignments within material access or vital areas can enter them.

Persons, vehicles and packages entering the protected and inner areas are to be searched for contraband and similarly, on leaving, for concealed SNM.

Redundant communications are provided between the security posts, security personnel on assignment elsewhere, and with off-site security forces. At the DOE facilities under construction, there will be other DOE or contractor security personnel, as well as local law enforcement agency and state police personnel nearby.

The material control and accounting systems for the proposed mixed-oxide fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities will exploit the latest advances in remotely controlled, automated processing and near-real-time accounting techniques in the interest of quality control, safety, radiation protection, 5.7-39 i

and safeguards. Personnel will only have access to the fuels when feeding materials into the process or loading out the products or when small samples t

are handled for chemical analysis. Special procedures and surveillance will I

be employed to deter and detect diversion (exit searches provide redundancy). l The on-line nondestructive assay instrumentation will provide timely detection of any abrupt, or more protracted, loss of SNM. Items such as containers of l L

Pu0 r fresh or spent fuel assemblies will have idertifying symbols. Seals 2

will be employed where appropriate. Process lines will be shut down and cleaned out for physical inventories periodically, at which time any nuclear material, which may remain as " hold-up" in the equipment, will be confirmed by NDA measurements.

Fabrication of CRBRP Fuel Two general types of fuel will be employed, driver fuel rods which contain plutonium in mixed-oxide pellets in the center section and depleted uranium-oxide pellets in both end sections and the blanket rods containing only depleted uranium-oxide pellets. The former will be fabricated at DOE facilities on the Hanford, Washington, reservation. The latter will be fabricated at com-mercial facilities. Safeguards concerns pertain only to the fuel rods and fuel assemblies which contain mixed-oxide (M0X).

The DOE supplied plutonium may require conversion to stoichiometric plutonium dioxide (Pu02 ) in an as yet undetermined DOE facility. A candidate facility for Pu02 conversion is the Purex Reprocessing facility at the 200 East site of the Hanford reservation.

I 5.7-40 l

i

The P,u02 will be mechanically blended with uranium-dioxide (UO3 ), and processed into pellets. Tha pellets will be inserted into fuel rods and the rods will be sealed and examined in the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) line, which is located within the Fuel and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF).

The finished M0X fuel rods are to be transported to a third facility, the High Energy Development Laboratory (Building 308), where the rods may be examined by NDA, and mechanical operations will be performed to produce fuel assemblies.

The contract guard forces at all of the Hanford sites are managed by the Rockwell Hanford contractor. The whole reservation is posted Government Property. Guard posts and patrols communicate with each other and with the security office in the DOE Richland Operations Office, so that reactions to threats will be efficiently coordinated.

Significant amounts of SNM are frequently transported between buildings and between the security areas. Such transfers are made in dedicated vehicles with armed patrol escorts to meet or exceed the security requirements of DOE Order 5632.

The FMEF building is presently under construction near, but not presently in, the site 300 security area and may have separate fences, hardened guard posts, etc., or it may share some of these features with the 300 area security system.

5.7-41 l l

l 1

I

Assuming conversion of plutonium to Pu0,, is performed in the 200 East crea, this facility would be one of a number of DOE facilities, with security significance, within that controlled area. The 308 building, where assemblies are to be put together and stored, is within the 300 security area, which contains many other DOE facilities with valuable materials.

Since the exact location and design of the conversion process are not determined at this time, the material control and accounting activities can only be described generically. Like the pellet fabrication equipment, which has been designed and is ur.Jer construction, the chemical conversion stages and calcine oven will be designed for remote operation and control and equipped with instrumentation for unit process material accounting. Whenever operators have access to the materials, they will be accompanied by material control and health physics personnel. The feed and products will be measured by weight, and samples will be analyzed for SNM concentration. Feed, product, scrap and waste will also be measured by non-destructive analysis (NDA).

Probably the process area will be treated as one material balance area, with an item control storage vault for items not being processed. The equip-ment will be shut down and cleaned out periodically for physical inventory.

Items (feed, product, scrap) will be counted and verified by NDA as frequently as may be desired. The on-line unit process accountancy data and bulk / chemical analysis data will be continuously fed to a computer and analyzed for abrupt or protracted losses. For an annual throughput of 1500 kg or less of plutonium, the daily througnput would be about 5 kg.

5.7-42

An often quoted study 1of 1975, based on achievable measurement accuracies and frequent draindowns, rather than the use of on-line NDA, suggested that the limit of error of the material unaccounted for (LEMUF) should be approximately:

LEMUF

% of throughput kilograms 1 week 1.5% 0.5 kg 1 month 0.5 0.7 kg 6 months 0.3 2.25kg 1 year 0.2 3 kg Many simulated studies of the DYMAC system, and experience at a somewhat similar instrumented process at Los Alamos, suggest that the shorter tim _e sensitivities for loss or diversion may be rather more sensitive than this.

The fabrication of CRBRP Mixed 0xide (M0X) fuel is planned for the Secure automated Fabrication (SAF) line which will be installed in the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility. Welded fuel pins from the SAF line will then be assembled into fuel assemblies in Building 308 at DOE's Hanford Reservation.

The SAF process line will be fully automated from the blending of powders through the sintering and examination of pellets, and equipped with sensors so that material balances can be drawn about individual processes and for the whole material balance area every day. Whenever operators have access- to the materials, they will be accompanied by material control and health physics personnel .

5.7-43

(

f It is planned to analyze the Pu0 containers 2

received from the conversion facility using a calorimeter and passive neutron instrument. Finished rods will be scanned, using active interrogation, to measure the plutonium content ,

and the location and quality of the M0X pellets. Scrap and waste containers will be measured by NDA. Samples of the Pu0, feed, intermediate products,

=

pellets and recoverable scrap will also be analyzed by bulk and sample analysis.

1 i The equipment will be shut down and cleaned out for physical inventory periodi-cally. At that time, the plutonium which remains trapped in the pipes and vessels will be analyzed by NDA survey instruments.

1 The previously referenced study predicted sensitivities to loss or diversion for a M0X fuel fabrication facility which are very similar to those given previously for a conversion facility. Again, simulation studies and experience with DYMAC at a similar process area at Los Alamos suggest that the short and intermediate time (1 day to 1 month) sensitivity of the system being installed at the SAF line should be somewhat superior to this. Actual measurement data and material balance calculations for an operating M0X fuel fabrication facility indicate that the LEMUF for one year of operation was 0.2% or less of the annual throughput.2 This suggests the capability to detect diversion of 3 kg of plutonium in one year.

The SAF line will incorporate provisions for safeguards and accountability of SNM throughout the fabrication process. The following features will be included:

5.7-44

One Material Balance Area (MBA) will be established on the 70-f t. level of FMEF containing the SAF Line.

- The SAF Line MBA shall generate data that details the quantity of SNM received into the MBA, shipped from the MBA or remaining in the MBA.

All SNM entering and leaving the MBA shall be measured by both the shipper and receiver, unless the SNM is in a container sealed with a Tamper Indicating Device (TID).

- SNM will be carefully characterized before it enters the SAF Line MBA.

SNM will travel through the processing operations using item identifi-cation and weight as the primary accountability measurements.

- In instances where weight and item identification do not sufficiently identify the StM (i.e. . scrap and waste), nondestructive examination of the material will be required.

- Unit Process Accountability areas (UPAAs) will be established around each processing step within the SAF Line MBA. Generally, these will coincide with boundaries established for the purpose of criticality Control . ,

- All SNM entering and leaving UPAAs will be measured. When SNM leaving a UPAA enters another UPAA through a common point, only a single measurement is required.

- Data on all SNM movement within the SAF Line MBA will be available such that a material balance can be drawn around each UPAA within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

5.7-45

Transportation of Fresh M0X Fuel Under contract with Project Management Corporation for the CRBRP, DOE maintains ownership of the fuel for the initial core and first four reloads, and is responsible for delivery of the fuel to the plant. Since October 1976, DOE has required that all shipments of more than two kilograms of plutonium or uranium-233, or five kilograms of uranium-235 in high-enriched uranium, should be made in Safe Secure Transport vehicles with armed escorts and monitored by the 00E radio-communication system. The vehicles are similar to those being used for secure transport of nuclear weapons, and provide a level of assurance in excess of that associated with commercial shipment (10CFR 73.25 .37).

The CRBRP fresh fuel shipments will use the DOE system, which includes the following security measures:

1. The fresh fuel will be carried in a special penetration-resistant vehicle.

The vehicle includes active and passive barriers to protect the cargo, crew connartment armor, and means to immobilize the vehicle.

2. The cargo vehicle itself contains two reliable and trustworthy armed couriers (both drivers) and will be accompanied by a minimum of one escort vehicle carrying three additional armed couriers (all drivers).

3. Couriers are carefully selected for reliability, trustworthiness and physical fitness, and are specially trained, equipped, and armed.

4. Shipments are under the direct control of a central dispatcher. A system for redundant, all-weather communication between shipments anywhere in the continental United States and the dispatcher is in 5.7-46

operation. It provides for 2-way communications, and for emergency signaling under duress. Communication is by means of an array of widely-spaced transmitter-receiver stations connected by land lines to P

the central dispatcher, with automatic switching and acknowledgement.

Both escort and cargo vehicles can communicate with the dispatcher, and routine reports are submitted at frequent intervals. e

5. Specific standing arrangements are .n effect with state police and certain other local law-enforcement agencies to provide timely response in emergencies. Studies have been made to determine expected response [

times at various locations; operations have been geared to realistic response-time estimates. Liaison is maintained with other Federal agencies to facilitate further support in extreme emergencies.

l L

5.7-47

Spent Fuel Transportation Irradiated (spent) fuel removed from CRBRP represents a small incremeatal risk over other fuel cycle operations. The spent fuel is hot, both radio-logically and thermally, and therefore requires special equipment for even the simplest handling operations. The material is highly unattractive as a target for diversion, since chemical and mechanical operations requiring expensive complex facilities and equipment are required to reduce it to a usable form.

Spent fuel assemblies would be transported and protected in large casks weighing many tons. Irradiated fuel assemblies would be contained in a removable canister inserted in the cask. The fuel casks will be designed to De transported on a 100-ton capacity railroad flatcar. The cask / car combina-tion will be designed in accordance with D0T and NRC regulations, which include provision for crash protection and passive cooling capability.

Specific elements which will serve to protect the spent CRBRP fuel while in transit in the cask include multiple heavy steel shells, a thick, dense gamma (radiation) shield, a liquid jacket and sacrificial impact absorbers. These protection elements, while designed to enable the irradiated fuel to withstand crash, also provide substantial protection against sabotage.

Nevertheless, the possibility of sabotage, with release of radioactivity, does exist. However, DOE has instituted interim "D0E Requirements for the Physical Protection of Highway Shipment of Irradiated Reactor Fuel." These upgraded requirements for the protection of irradiated reactor fuel include: !

1. escorts, either two individuals in the vehicle cab or one in the vehicle cab and two additional escorts in a separate vehicle; 5.7-48

l i

2. appropriate communication devices for maintaining continual contact with ;

a central communication center and improved emergency communication and l vehicle location capability; and ,

3. improved coordination with local law enforcement agencies and routing ,

t avoiding urban areas consistent with U.S. Department of Transportation's E (Docket HM-164) regulations. l l

These requirements have been officially accepted by the Department of l Transportation as essentially equivalent to 10CFR73.37 under Section 173.22(b) [

t

(Docket HM-164).

] !

! Radioactive Wastes l Because of the low concentration of plutonium and uranium in radioactive I

wastes, wastes are not considered attractive for diversion purpcses. However, there are certain inherent safeguarc's features within radioactive waste i

handling and management procedures. j

, High level radioactive waste (HLW) will be stored within the physical i

security bounds of the reprocessing plant prior to shipment. Due to the ;

relatively high radioactivity and thermal generation associated with HLW, !

I transport to a repository will be accomplished in a similar fashion to spent !

' fuel. At the repository, the physical security of the site as well as the .

remote location of the wastes deep underground should effectively deter ,

4 diversion. Similarly, transuranic and low level wastes will be packaged in DOT approved shipping containers and transported from points cf origin to ,

, I disposal facilities, where they will be handled within existing physical :

security systems. l.

5.7-49 6

Chemical Reprocessing The safeguards provisions of the reprocessing facility are expected to be similar to those for the model facility in WASH 1535 or those of the Demonstration Reprocessing Plant (DRP) described below.

The safeguards system for the DRP will provide both physical protection and nuclear material control and accounting capabilities to satisfy Federal (NRC and DOE) regulatory requirements. In addition to traditional safeguards capabilities, the system will provide for the protection and control of classified matter and information, and the DRP plant and property (i.e.,

Government property). The system includes mechanisms and provisions for deterrence, detection, delay, communications, assessment, accounting, control, and response as required to meet the above regulations plus anticipated future requirements. The DRP physical protection system includes security zones, facility architectural and design features, personnel and vehicle access ,

control, intrusion detection and assessment, automated alarm reporting, surveillance, communications, and computer security.

Physical security zones include an isolation zone, a protected zone, a hardened area, no access areas, material access areas, vital areas and limited access areas. The isolation zone is an open area surrounding the protected zone except where support facilities for personnel / vehicle / rail egress and ingress control are provided. It will ensure that only authorized entry is made to the protected zone and will detect unauthorized entry attempts. This zone will be bounded by two chain link fences and will be clear of all objects that could conceal or shield an individual. The 5.7-50

l isolation zone will be equipped with intrusion detection equipment and closed-circuit television (CCTV) to allow rapid reviewing and assessment of this zone. This zone also has a vehicle barrier, exterior to the outer of the two zone fences, designed to prevent forced entry with automobiles or light trucks.

The protected zone is the area totally enclosed by the isolation zone tnat contains the Process Building (the hardened Process Building shell included), the open area between the Process Building and the isolation zone boundary fence and any other support structures within the area surrounded by the isolation zone.

The protected zone is further subdivided by the hardened area. The hardened area is the portion of the Process Building enclosed within a tornado missile barrier. This includes the hardened shell of the main Process Building and the hardened control centers. Normal and routine entry is restricted through a hardened guard station, at the hardened shell perimeter.

The facility architectural and design features assure that significant quantities of SNM are physically separated from all personnel during normal operations, and access control to the security areas is provided. The natural phenomena barrier that encloses most of the Process Building is a major barrier of the safeguards system. The limited number of entrances to this hardened area controls access to the Process Building.

The entry-control system will allow surveillance, monitoring and control of personnel, vehicles and materials to and from the controlled zone, the 5.7-51

protected zone, the Process Building, and the hardened areas. Vehicle inspection portals exist at entries to the protected zone to allow search of vehicles prior to entry and upon exit. Personnel access portals exist at entry and exit ways of security areas.

A defense-in-depth concept for physical security depends on the use of electronic devices to detect intruders at each level of defense. Alarms given by the system are both audible and visual and all are received at the safeguards control center and the secondary alarm station. The intrusion i

detection system consists of exterior and interior intrusion detectors and CCTV cameras, secure signal transmission, alarm assessment and display equip-ment and alarm and CCTV recording equipment. This system will be used to detect unauthorized entry into the controlled zone, isolation zone, and protected zone. Interior alarms will annunciate in the continuously-manned safeguards control center and at the secondary alarm station.

To ensure immediate reporting and assessment of possible attempts at intrusion, the intrusion detection sensors and key-card access control system will report through a computer-initiated automatic-alarm switching system.

This systen includes the computer, intrusion detection devices, key-card alarms, response action instructions and outline maps with closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance and alarm assessment system display.

Security surveillance of activities and processes involving special nuclear materials and/or impacting on security of these processes is a fully 5.7-52 i

integrated safeguards subsystem. Primary forms of surveillance used in the {

DRP will include:

- Guard force (fixed, vehicular and foot patrols) l

- Management and supervisory observation

- Closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance, monitored and managed at the safeguards control center (SCC) and the secondary alarm i

station (SAS).

Full-time surveillance is employed for security barrier fencelines, the isolation zone cleared areas and entry / exit-ways through primary barriers.

The communications network for the DRP abysical protection system will allow rapid and continuous communication among on-site security force personnel ,

and between on-site and off-site response forces. Off-site communications '

needs are met using telephones for routine communications and a radio link for emergency communications. Similarly, a radio communication system consisting of base stations, mobile radios and hand-carried portable transceivers will meet on-site communication needs under most conditions.

Since the efficiency and effectiveness of the entry control and intrusion i

detection systems depend on automatic data processing, computer security will i

have a high priority in the overall safeguards system. Access to the computer facilities (the SCC or SAS) requires a key-card reader and digital code i

operated locking system. Safeguards computer transmission lines will be under constant line supervision and all panel boxes, connectors, etc., will be affixed with tamper devices or switches. t' 5.7-53

In addition to physical security, the DRP Safeguards System includes material control and accounting capabilities. Both passive and active mate-rial control features are included. Passive material control is accomplished by placing barriers or impediments between SNM and an inside adversary. All significant quantities of SNM are processed and stored in remotely operated cells which limit direct personnel access during routine operation. Active material control is accomplished by monitoring cell penetrations from sensitive process equipment to occupied areas for the presence of nuclear ma terial s.

The DRP material accounting system will be based on a series of Material Balance Areas (MBA). The MBA is an identifiable physical area around which accurate SNM balances can be performed. The material balance areas will consist of a small pool to store spent fuel assemblies, the chemical separa-tion equipment area, storage vessels for the uranium and plutonium nitrate products of the extraction-purification stages, the chemical processing equipment used to convert plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide, a product storage vault, and the analytical laboratory.

All of the process equipment will be contained within massive shielding, operated under remote control, and with provision for remote repair and maintenance. Material control is achieved primarily by this containment.

Where spent fuel, products or samples are handled, guards and/or materials control personnel will provide continuous surveillance. In addition, person-nel and packages entering or leaving the operations areas will be subject to search for contraband and nuclear materials.

5.7-54

Material accounting will be on a near-real-time basis. Spent fuel assemblies will be accounted for as discrete, numbered items. After disassembly and dissolution of the pellets, an accurate measurement will be made of the volume of solution, the concentration of uranium and plutonium in the solution, and the isotopic compositions of both. For process control and accounting, the quantities of uranium and plutonium in the process vessels and intermediate buffer vessels will be continuously monitored. Intermediate nitrate products, oxide products and all waste streams will be measured.

Spent fuel assemblies are received and accounted for on an item identity basis. The plutonium content is booked at the values calculated by reactor operators until assemblies are dissolved and the actual U and Pu amounts are '

determined on the basis of solution volume and U and Pu concentration. Pu03 products are measured by bulk and by concentration when the product containers are filled. The plutonium in product containers can also be measured reason-ably accurately by NDA.

The chemical reprocessing and conversion processes will incorporate precise bulk / analytical measurements at the input, transfer and product output points. Combinations of NDA, process instrumentation, flow indicators and chemical analysis of samples from between process stages will provide the information for near-real-time accounting on a unit-process basis. The U and Pu content of wastes will be measured in various ways, e.g., NDA of hulls, bulk / sample analysis of hot liquid wastes, alpha counting for discharged reagents, etc. These measures will provide for timely detection of loss or diversion.

5.7-55 L _ _ ___------_-- -

l l

1 l

1 Based on their reprocessing plant experience and knowledge of traditional l

saaterial accounting and measurements, McSweeney, et al estimated in 1975 that the LEMUF could be expected to be about 1.4 percent of the throughput for 1 week, 0.8 percent for 1 month, 0.75 percent for 6 months and 0.7 percent for 1 year.

Since then t'iere have been several developments which should improve the sensitivity, and which would be employed at the DRP. One is to improve the measurement of the volume of solution in the major liquid accountability vessels by design of the vessels themselves and by the use of modern instru-mentation to measure bubbler pressures and to analyze this data with on-line computers. Such systems have been installed and used in the United States and Japan. The systematic error in such measurements should be 0.1 percent or less. The most difficult chemical concentration measurement has been that of the U and Pu concentration of the highly radioactive solution in the input accountability vessel . There have been significant advances in the quality of analysis of such samples for concentration and for the isotopic composition of the U and Pu.3 Experience with near-real-time accounting techniques at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant in Japan and in " cold runs" at the AGNS, Barnwell, S.C. facility give confidence that the combination of improved input-output measurements with unit-process monitoring, real-time computer data analysis, and process simulation should substantially improve on the sensitivity for detection of shorter or longer term loses.

The LEMUF on 900 kg of Pu would be about 7 kg of plutonium for 6 months, using the McSweeney estimate. The improved measurement capabilities, along with 5.7-56

I l

improved data analysis methods, suggest that the short term and longer term diversion sensitivities should be substantially better than the 1975 estimates.

4 Ellis concluded that 5-day balances should have a limit of error (LE) of 2 percent. Over a period of a year, the random errors of individual measure-ments cancel out and the important factors are the systematic errors involved in calibrations of the accountability vessels and the accuracy of the standards used for sample analysis. It is anticipated that annual LEMUF would be substantially smaller than the McSweeney estimate.

It should be noted that it would be very difficult for any domestic adversary to divert any plutonium from the remotely operated, remotely main-tained equipment or the storage areas in this facility. The near-real-time accounting system may have importance for international safeguards. For domestic purposes, the measuring and accounting system is more important for efficient operations. It serves to provide assurance that the physical isolation and protection systems continue to function effectively.

The 6-month or annual inventory balances and error limits referred to assume the shutdown and cleanout of the entire system at 6 month or 1 year intervals. At such a time, all material that it is possible to remove is transferred to vessels where it can be accurately measured. Some of the nuclear material will remain on the surface of pipes and tanks and in crevices.

This " hold-up" could be of the order of 0.1 percent of throughput.

5.7-57

References

1. McSweeney, T.I. et al., " Improved Material Accounting for Plutonium Processing Facilities and a U-235-HTGR Feed Fabrication Facility,"

BNWL-2098, 1975.

2. Beets, C., et al., " Thought and Experience of Belgium with International Safeguards," paper presented at the ANS Winter Meeting, Nov. 30, 1981.

3. Perrin, R.E., "New Measurement Capabilities of Mass Spectrometry in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle," Jour. INMM, VIII, Proceedings Issue, pp. 601-619, 1979.

4. Ellis, J.H., " Development and Testing of a Near-Real-Time Accounting System for the Barnwell Reprocessing Facility," Jour. INMM, X, Proceedings Issue, p. 402, 1981.

Safeguards Costs The incremental cost of safeguarding the facilities in the fuel cycle, apportioned to reflect the part of the facility operations dedicated to the CRBRP fuel cycle, are shown in Table 5.7-11. Costs are included for safe-guarding facilities for fuel fabrication, fuel reprocessing, the CRBRP plant, and transportation of special nuclear materials (SNM) among the facilities. Both initial investment and annual operating costs are given in constant FY 1982 dollars. It is evident from the totals in Table 5.7-11 that the costs of safeguarding SNM in the CRBRP fuel cycle are a small portion of the total facility costs.

5.7-58

P ga - 57 (82-0034) [7,1] G22 Amanda nt XIV May 1982 l l

Costs are given separately for physical security of the facilities, the materials control and accounting (MC&A) l provisions, and the guard forces. Physical security costs I include such things as perimeter and entry controls, video I surveillance and internal security systems. MC&A costs are those incremental costs of upgrading normal process control 1

t and monitoring instrumentation for safeguards application, l non-secure software and communications systems, and the maintenance thereof. The guard force costs include salaries, !

benefits, overhead and equipment. The assumptions and bases f

for these costs are described below for each facility. I i

Eucl_ERhIiERhiQn l

The CRBRP fuel pins are planned to be fabricated at the t Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) line, located within the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF) at DOE's Banford Reservation. The resulting fuel pins will be transported a short distance on the Banford site to the 308 Building where they are formed into final fuel assemblies. The safeguards provisions at these facilities are described above.

The SAF line is an addition to the FMEF. Only the incremental costs for securing the SAF line are attributable to the CRBRP fuel cycle. The SAF line will share the FMEF perimeter security system, guard force center, display ;

consoles, guard forces, etc.

l t

I t

b 5 ;

l P

5 . 7-W, cc _ _

' ' ' ' ' ~'

P595 - 58 (82-d034} }h',1] 422 Am2ndm2nt XIV May 1982 l

l The initial costs of installing the SAF physical security systra include: i

$0.5M - entry control portals, hand geometry controls, key j card controlled doors, map displays, TV monitors, [

alarm processors, TV switchers, video recording l equipment, electrically locked doors, sensors and f closed circuit TV cameras. !

$0.4M - installation of the above equipment ,

Q.15 - software development :

$1.lM l The annual cost of operating the SAF physical security system j is estimated at 15 percent of the hardware costs for repair l and maintenance, plus one additional guard per shift over that required for FMEF. The guard force operates on a 5 shift operation. Therefore, the additional guard per shift is expected to cost $250.000 per year. The annual cost for repair and maintenance is estimated to total $165,000. l The initial investment for the SAF MCEA system is estimated !

as:

$0.5M - computer I i

$1.0M - software development !

Sa.EH - upgraded measurement capability for safeguards purposes (

$2.0M .

i I

1 1

5.7-47tf l Gd) -

Pago - 59 (82-0034) [7,1] 422 Amsndm2nt XIV May 1982 The annual cost of operating the SAF MCEA system assumes one shift operation, except the sintering furnace will continuously operate. i i

$150K - repair and maintenance at 15 percent l

$150K - computer software improvement

$200K - 2 supervisors

$480K - 8 technicians !

t ELEQE - analytical services ;

$1080K As the CRBRP fuel cycle utilizes about 65 percent of SAF's operational schedule, only that portion of the above costs are ;

included in Table 5.7-11.

l The 308 Building is located within the 300 area at DOE's Hanford reservation. Based on discussions with the'Hanford Engineering '

and Development Laboratory staff that operate the 308 Building, ,

the physical security system costs for the 350 area are: a) ,

l initial investment - $7.5 million, b) annual repair and !

maintenance expense at 15 percent of the hardware cost - $1.1 l million, and c) annual guard force expense - $3.2 million. The 300 area is manned by a staff of 70 guards. .

Support of the CRBRP fuel cycle requires about 20% of the 300 area activities, and only that portion of the security, costs are included in Table 5.7-11. The 20% figure is based on the 308 ;

Building being about 1/3 of the major facilities in the 300 area >

requiring physical security (in addition to the 324 and 325 Buildings) and that CRBRP fuel cycle support requires about 65% !

of the fuel assembly capacity of Building 308.

s [

The 308 Building MC&A system accounts for discrete, numbered items only. No liquid or powder process steps are involved and no volume, density or concentration measurements are !

5.7-43e{

~

1. . 1',.....__.. -

Paga - 60 (82-0034) [7,1] G22 l .

Amandmsnt XIV May 1982

~

l i

required. As such, no costs are estimated for upgraded measurement capability. The initial investment for the i 308 Building MC&A system is estimated at $0.5 million for MC&A equipment.

The annual cost of operating the 308 Building MC&A system is estimated as follows:

$75K - repair and maintenance at 15 percent of hardware

$100K - 1 MC&A supervisor 11RQE - 3 MC&A technicians 1

$355K -~

^

Support of the CRBRP fuel cycle requires about 65 percent of the 308 Building fuel assembly capacity, and only that portion of the MC&A costs are included in Table 5.7-11.

The total fuel fabrication safeguards system costs in Table 5.7-11 are a summation of the appropriate portions of the costs for the SAF and 308 Building.

Regrastaning The safeguards provisions for the reprocessing plant where CRBRP fuel is eventually processed will be similar to those descirbed earlier for the DRP. Only very preliminary design information is available for the DRP. Detailed estimates of the DRP costs, including the safeguards provisions, have not been made. The following estimates of the costs of the DRP safeguards provisions are the best now available.

1 The initial cost of the DRP physical security system is expected to cost about $35 million. Maintenance and repair of this system is expected to cost approximately $1.5 million annually. The guard force is expected to consist of about 75 personnel at an annual cost of about $3.5 million.

I 5.7 ,636' l r.9Le i

' ~

Phga '61'(82'-003k)I7,1]G22 Am:ndm2nt XIV May 1982 i

The DRP MCEA system is estimated to cost $15 million initially.

Operation and maintenance of this system is estimated to cost $5 million annually.

l Support of the CRBRP fuel cycle will require about 8 percent of t the DRP 150 tonne annual capacity. Thus, 8 percent of the above l

costs are included in Table 5.7-11.

{

Elant The CRBRP safeguards provisions are described in PSAR Section 13.7. The following is a breakdown of the physical security ;

system costs.

e G

5.7-4 wW"

P2g2 - 62 (82-0034) [7,1] f 22 Am:ndm2nt XIV May 1982 Initial Maintenance InYeatment and_Qaetating Electronic Security System $ 1.80 M S 90 K (includes CCTV, alarms, l computers, access control l electronics)

Gate House (less access 0.42 M 8K control electronics) and Central Alarm Station Fencing and Related Items 0.19 M 4K ;

such As Sewer Pipe Grating and Derailers Electrical (wiring, conduit, 1.33 M -

66 K uninterruptible power supply, batteries)

Communications _0.12 M __E_K

$ 3.86 M $174 K Accountability of fissile and fertile material is inherent in the design of the CRBRP refueling system for reasons other than security. After inspection at receipt, the assemblies are not visually identified again until shipment of the irradiated assemblies. The assemblies are mechanically identified prior to insertion into the core and subsequent to removal from the core as part of the reactor safety program.

All movements of fuel within the plant are monitored and/or 5.7- p

. G4

P;ga - 63 ( 82'-003 )' [ ,'l]622 Am:ndarnt XIV May 1982 recorded on the refueling system computer for inventory purposes and to insure reactor safety during core configuration changes. No incremental cost is assumed for safeguards accountability at the plant. -

The CRBRP security force consists of:

1 - Unit Chief 1 - Operations Captain 1 - Administration Captain 1 - Training Officer 5 - Shift Supervisors 5 - Alarm System Monitors 55 - Public Safety Officers

_1 - Clerk-Typists 72 Personnel The initial investment of hiring, training and equipping this force is estimated to cost $47,000. The bulk of the security force will be onsite when the fuel arrives, approximately 9 months prior to fuel loading. The cost of guards during the year prior to criticality is estimated at $1.1 million. From the year of criticality onward, the guard force is estimated to cost about $2.1 million annually.

TranEnertation .

The number of shipments per year for the different materials in the CRBRP fuel cycle are given on Table 5.7-9. Special safeguards measures are provided for the shipment of fresh >

fuel, Pu0 2, spent fuel and spent blanket assemblies. The ,

i l

5.7-

.___..t......

PIga - 64 (82-0034)[7,1]#22 Am2ndm:nt XIV ,

May 1982 '

I other materials transported within the CRBRP fuel cycle do not contain sufficient quantities of SNM to warrant special safeguards measures.

Transportation of new fuel and Pu0 is planned using DOE's 2

Safe Secure Transport (SST) system. As this system will have i

sufficient capacity and communications capability to accommodate CRBRP transportation requirements, no initial f investment costs are anticipated. Operating costs for SST 1 shipments are estimated to cost S18,000 per 2500 mile ;

shipment, round trip. !

l

~

Transportation of spent fuel and spent blanket assemblies require two escorts and appropriate communications devices.

The incremental cost per escort for these provisions is estimated to be $50,000 per year.

The safeguards cost of transportation within the CRBRP fuel !

cycle is summarized below-

. Annual !

Hattrial ShipmentaZXI. ContLEhipment _ Cont _

Pu0 14 18,000 252,000 2 7 Fresh Fuel 14 18,000 252,000 :

Spent Fuel 14 N/A 100,000 Spent Blankets 12 N/A LQQtQQQ

. $704,000 ;

\

l l

5.7-Mtf

__ _fA

Phga - 65 (82-00'N)I7,1] 422

~~

Amandm2nt XIV M3y 1982 5.7.2 POWER PLANT OPERATIONAL NOISE AND IMPACT

)

The CRBRP will contain a large number of sound sources, most of !

which will be well enclosed in thick concrete structures and l will, thus, pose no noise problems. There are, however, several ;

external sources of noise whose effect on the surrounding area is l described in this section. Estimated ambient noise level, predicted CRBRP noise levels and impact assessment are discussed in subsequent subsections. l t

5.7.2.1 ESTIMATED AMBIENT NOISE LEVEL i i

The area on and around the plant site has an ambient noise level characteristic of a sparsely populated rural area. The only l consistent source of non-natural noise is traffic on Interstate l

40 which is about 1-1/4 miles from the center of the CRBRP Site at ite closest approach. At the nearest dwelling to the CRBRP Site center, trucks passing on the interstate highway can be heard, but not cars. Based on measurements made in other similar rural'-areas, the average A-weighted ambient noise level is estimated to be 40-45 dBA. Traffic on the interstate is believed l to be a major contributor to the ambient noise level.

l 9

i r

5.7- W '

c7

Paga - 66 (82-0034)[7,1]#22 .

Amsndm3nt XIV May 1982 5.7.2.2 PREDICTED NOISE LEVELS i

The major sources of noise from the plant site will be the .

mechanical draft cooling towers, the turbine generator building i and the main power output transformer. Arrangement of main plant structures is shown in Figure 2.1-4, and the location of these structures on the Site is shown in Figure 2.1-3. Cooling tower sound levels were determined from published references (also see ,

Section 5.1.8.4). The transformer sound level estimates were ,

based on the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) !

transformer ratings. The sound levels from the turbine-generator building were based on estimates of the internal machinery noise =-n level corrected for the transmission loss of the metal panel walls.

l The radiated noise levels were determined by assuming that the total sound power emitted by the plant, suitably corrected for directivity (geometry, location and orientation), is radiated ;

hemispherically from the center of the plant site. The sound levels in the surrounding area were calculated by summing the l contribution from each of the sources at each point of interest. t Corrections were made for the shielding effect of the plant on the cooling tower noise and of the turbine-generator building on the transformer noise.

A correction for the molecular absorption of sound in air also l has been included.(1) The magnitude of this correction was determined by assuming a sound spectrum for the cooling tower i noise. (2) Because most of the area surrounding the plant site is l and will remain heavily wooded, a correction for the ground l attenuation was estimated and included in the calculated sound 5.7549" 66 rwman

- '~~ .. .

l ' p[gh - W '('82-00'3'k)' i7,1) #22 Am2ndm2nt XIV $

May 1982 i levels.(3) A significant change in the ground attenuation is l anticipated with a seasonal change from summer to winter because l

. of the loss of foliage from the woods. l The nearest dwellings to the CRBRP Site are located approximately 3,100 feet south-southwest of the plant site and approximately ,

3,200 feet west-southwest of the plant site. Both dwellings are

{

at an elevation of about 800 feet MSL, one on each side of Poplar l Springs Creek. The predicted sound level, due to normal plant !

operation alone, at both of these locations is 42 dBA in the I summer and 45 dBA in the winter. i l

At radial distances greater than several thousand feet, contours of equal sound level are almost circular. At a radial contour i one mile from the plant site center the predicted summer noise I level from the plant is 37 dBA; the corresponding predicted I winter level from the plant is 41 dBA. Ambient levels may be higher than these values particularly for locations nearer l Interstate 40. The one-mile contour and the two nearest '

dwellings are shown in Figure 5.7-1.

i 5.7.2.3 IMPACT OF OPERATIONAL NOISE l The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (4) has ;

provided outdoor noise exposure guidelines for non-aircraft I noise. Three categories of external noise exposure are defined. !

The categories and their respective noise limits are listed in ,

Table 5.7-3. j l

since the noise from the power plant is essentially constant, the j

" acceptable" category corresponds to sound levels below 65 dBA, 5.7- g GT

E Phg5 - 68 (85-dd34) [f,1]t22 y

May 1982 the "normally unacceptable" category levels between 65 and 75 dBA and the " unacceptable" category corresponds to levels above 75 dBA.

Based on the predicted levels and contours described in Section 5.7.2.2, the population distribution from Table 2.2-2F and the peak transient pcpulation from Table 2.2-9 and Figure 2.2-7F, there will be no exposure of the permanent population or of the j transient population including nearby recreation areas to noise levels above 65 dBA.

At many locations, particularly a recreation area at Caney Creek, the ambient noise from the interstate highway will exceed the noise produced by the plant.

The State of Tennessee and Roane County do not have any regulations or zoning restrictions related to noise that are

/

applicable to the CRBRP Site. The City of Oak Ridge has a zoning ordinance (SI which specifies that sound shall not exceed the j decibel levels given in Table 5.7-4 when adjacent to the uses l listed. The ordinance does not indicate whether the sound level limits are linear or A-weighted sound levels. The specified levels are assumed to be A-weighted values since the A-weighting simulates the response of the human ear and is thus used in most such ordinances.

5.7 ,5f' 7*

PIga - 59 i'85'0'03 ) [7 'l]I22 ~~

Am2ndm2nt XIV May 1982 To the north, the CRBRP Site property line adjoins the Clinch River Consolidated Industrial Park. The sound level contour shown in Figure 5.7-i shows that the sound level at this property line will be significantly less than the specified limit in Table 5.7-4. The remainder of the area adjoining the Sice is rural in character and separated from the Site by the Clinch River. The Oak Ridge ordinance does not specifically address this type of area. However, based on the predicted noise levels, the impact of the noise produced by the plant on the surrounding area will be negligible.

5.7->t' ll

-m_ memo

l

= v l i Page - 1 [7,1) (024)

TABLE 5.7-1

CRBRP -

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONNENTAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUEL CYCLE I

Euti Enhtisation I, Mixed Oxide Uraniust Dioxide *** Waste Eatural.Regentgt Dag LCgLt Eutil _181&Dktti Regtggggging**** B404918t01 TERBERSIttt19R TRL&l LBad 1ACISEL Temporarily Committed -

0.011 10.0 1.3 --

11.31 Undisturbed Area --

0.011 9.0 - -

9.01 Disturbed Area -

0.01 1.0 -- --

1.01

.l Permanently Committed - -- - 2.3 - 2.3 .-

gater faa11ons/ day 1 Discharged to air - -

4.2210 6 2.7x102 -

4.2x100

Discharged to water bodies

~

1.3x104 -- -- -- 1.3x10 4 Discharged to ground 7.5x10 2 - - 2.2x103 -

2.95x10 3 Total Water 7.5x102 1.3x10 4 4.2 10 6 2.47x10 3 - 4.2x10 0 Eggail.Fugl Electrical Energy (MW-hr/yr) 9.0x103 ** 4.2x102 -

5.3x102 - 9.9 10 3 squivalent Coal (MT/yr) 3.6x103 ** 1.6x102 3.3:103 2.0x102 - 5.26x103 Efilutats Chemicals GastE* (MT/yr) som 133 5.8 0.4 6x10-2 1.2 140 Nog 35.2 1.5 3.9 9.1x10-2 15.4 56.1 Bydrocarbons 0.36 1.5x10-2 -

5.1x10-3 1.6 1.98 CO 0.86 3.8x10-2 0.13 2.7x10-2 9.4 10.5 Particulates 35.2 - - 6.5x10-2 0.6 35.9 1' - 1.D 10~3 y- --

1 1x10-3 - --

5.7-53 82-0034

P292 - 2 (7,1] (624)

TABLE 5.7-1 (Continued)

Pggl.gghgiggg1GO Mixed Oxide Uranium Dioxide *** Waste ,

Effinanta LCett.Euait _ IBlanketi REElectasing* * *

Hanastaant TKanagertation Total Linuida (NT/yr) ,,

B2804 1.0x10~1 - - -- -

1.0x10~1 BNO3 1.0x10~1 L"l+ -- -- --

Lt i

NH3 -

1.1 -- - -

2.1 F~ -

Lit -- -- -

1.1 po4 3- 1.0x10-2 -- -- -- -

1.0x10-2 .u PO 4 3" (after degrading) 1.0x10~3 -- - -- -

1.0x10-3 ,

nadiological (Curies /yr)

Airbetat Pu-236 2.0x10*I -

1.36x10*I - --

3.36x10"I Pu-238 3.4x10-6 -

8.45x10-5 - -

8.8x10-5 Pu-239 2.2x10-6 - 2.14:10-5 -- --

2.34x10-5 Pu-240 2.2x10-6 _- 2.20:10-5 -- --

2.42x10-5 Pu-241 3.0x10~4 - 2.55x10~3 -- -- 2.85x10~3

, Pu-242 3.0x10~9 - 4.70x10~8 -- -

5.0x10~8 U-232 - - 6.22:10-11 -- --

6.22 10-11 U-234 5.8x10-Il - 1.62x10~' -- -- 1.68x10~9 U-235 2.5x10-12 3.2x10-Il 7.04:10-11 -- -- 1.13:10-10 Ca_lia --- - 5 11110~I -- -

5 42xlati Ca:lti -- - 1.161 6 -- --

7.1Ex101 l

5.7-54 82-0034

__ _ _ ~_. __ . . _ _ _ . . . _ . _ - .__ _ _ _ . . ~ . . _ _ _ _ _ . . . - - . . -_. _ _ - - . . . . _ - . _ - . _ . _ . . - -.__._______ _ _

Page - 3 [7,11 (#24)

TABLE 5.7-1 (Continued)

Engl Eghgigation -

Mixed Oxide Uranium Dioxide *** Waste BRDrecessing*"* Banastaant Tran8portation Total Effinents LCSIt Eue1L _ Lalanitati Radininaisal (Curies /yr)

&lIhStat

- - 1.58:10-10

- -- 1.58x10-10 U-236 7.36:10'3

-- -- 9.9x10~9 0-238 5.4x10-11 2.5x10~9

-- - 1.20:10-12

-- -- 1.20:10-12 Th-228

- -- 4.23x10~11 ,.

Th-231 2.5x10-12 3.2x10-11 7.84 x10-12 2.36:10-10 - - 2.79x10~I Th-234 5.4x10~11 2.5x10-9

- 2 . 0 6 :10-5

-- - 2.06x10-5

~ An-241 -

- 2.09:10-10

- -- 2.08x10-10 NP-237

' - - 3.29x10-9 Pa-234 5.4x10-11 2.5x10-9 7 . 6 :10-1 0

-- 5 .51 :10 3 6.8x10-6 -- 5.51x103 H-3

- 4.75x10 3 5.5x10 1 -- 4.80x10 3 ;

Kr-85 --

-- 1 .44:10I

- -- 1.44x10 1 C-14

-- 3 . 26 :10'4

-- -- 3.26x10-4 1-129

- 3 .61:10-2

-- - 3.61x10-2 I-131 -

- 1.84 10'3 - - 1.84x10~3 Ru-103

- 7 .0 9:10'3

- -- 7.09:10-3 Ru-106

- 5.60 18-5 - -- 5.60x10-5 Cs-134

- 1.60x1F 4 -- -- 1.6Cx10~4 Cs-137

- 3.0x10-4 -- 3.0x10-4 Rn-220'

- , 8.2x10~3 -- 8.2x10~3 Rn-222

- 6.16 1F4 ii 1.1x10-3 -- 1.72x10~3 Particulate Fission --

Products ll 5.7-55 l'l 82-0034

}l tI

Page - 4 (7,1) (924)

TABLE 5.7-1 (Continued)

Ent1_tahtisation Nixed Oside Uranium Dioxide *** Waste Rillaanta LCett_EuclL _LBlanktti testostsaing**** Banastatut Trannasttation Total Radiological (Curies /yr)

Lieulda D-Total' -

LIx10~31 - - -

L1x10~3 Th-234 -

L1x10-31 - - -

L1x10~3 i Pa-234 -

L1x10~31 --

.. -_ L3E10-3 Bellda (C1/yr) -

Other than high level AIPha 1.0x10 5 -

7.0x105 - -

8.0x10 5 Beta-Gamma 34. -

40 - -

74 Righ Level - -

3.ss10 6 - -

3.8x10 6 Thermal Generation (stu/yr) Not 2.2x108 1.6x1010 5.9x1010 8.50x107 7.72x1010 Available

Based upon combustion of equivalent coal for power generation c* Total for FMEF operation

- - Non-radiological estimates from NASE-1248, Table E-1 (divided by 4) .

- - - Non-radiological estimates from NASB-1535, Vol. II, Section 4.4 (1500 NT/yr divided by 100, or 3 days of plant operation).

t WASE_1218 m u E-1 id1Yidtdhg_11..ingttaggdtoinglgdg_ggnyttsign_gi_U(LS_DSLt9_ht_E8td_1R_E9tt_futl_lahK1 Gat 195 5.7-56 82-0034

, , . - , , - - - - - -- - - - n-- _, - , - , . - -,

^

P:ga - 70 (82-0034) [7,1] G22 l Am:nda nt AIV l Nay 1982 t i

TABLE 5.7-3 BUD'S ACCEPTABILITY CATEGORIES FOR NON-AIRCRAFT NOISE I4) (

I Acceptable - Noise level does not exceed 65 dBA more j than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Normally Unacceptable - Noise level' exceeds 65 dBA 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months per 24 ,

hours l Unacceptable - Ncise level exceeds 75 dBA 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and Noise level exceeds 80 dBA 60 minutes per !

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months [

l I

l i

i I

I I

l t

r L

e 5.7-60 82-0034 -

~

' p Page - 2 {7,1] (982) ,

Table 5.7-5 3

Utstt_YRluat_stL_ Ital _la 1 .

1000 pele LWR

1000 IGie LWR

Enal evelt_QatLation utste Tvnt CRRRE __Mo_Resysle__ __U Resrcit__

UF6 Conversion (dry) CaF 2 Chen waste - 92 95 ,

(wet) Car2 Sludge, Chem -

41 35 Wastes Enrichment Low-Level Nisc. -- 28 30 ,.

Fuel Fabrication CaF 2, Misc. 11 (NT) 29 29 ,

i TRU 130 - -

4, ,

Reactor Low-Level 67 620 620 Spent Fuel -- 35 -

Spent Fuel Storage Low-Level - <3 <1 Fuel Reprocessing . Low-Level Nisc. 25 - 7 High-Level L1 -- 8 Misc. TitU 11 - 44 Plutonium - - 6 Kr-85 Cylinders 0.01 - -

I-129 Cylinders 0.01 -- -

NURBG 0116, Table 3.3 5.7-62

P g3 - 71 (8'2-0034)'l7",']#22 l

Ausndmsnt XIV May 1982 TABLE 5.7-6 !

i i

Compatiann_of_ Annual _High Lartl_Wante_Constitutata_icil !

Huclide Half _ life CRERE 10.RQ Mut_LWRIlI !

H-3 12.26Y 5.33x10 2 2.3x103 f St-90 28Y 3.65x105 2.7x106 i Ru-103 40D 1.25x105 7.18x104 l Ru-106 1.0Y 5.28x10 6 9.6x106 I-129 1.72x107Y 3.26x10-1 1.31 I-131 8.05D 3.29x10-7 6.97x10-7 !

i Cs-134 2.19Y 2.32x105 6.2x106 Cs-137 30Y 7.88x105 3.7x106 ;

Ce-144 285D 3.95x10 6 1.6x107 i Th-228 1.91Y 4.83x10-3 1.18x10-1 l U-234 2.48x10 5Y 4.06x10-3 2.66x101 U-235 7.13x10 8Y 1.96x10-4 5.99x10-1 U-236 2.39x107Y 3.96x10-4 1.10x101 !

U-23 8 4.51x10 9 Y 1.84x10-2 1.01x101 l Np-237 2.2x10 6 Y 1.04 1.19x101 Pu-236 285Y 1.53x10-2 9.63 ;

Pu-238 89Y 8.41x102 1.0x105 ,

Pu-239 2.44x10 4Y 2.14x102 1.1x104 !

Pu-240 6.58x10 3Y 2.20x102 1.7x104 '

Pu-241 13Y 2.47x104 3.5x106 Pu-242 3.79x10 5Y 4.70x10-1 4.83x101 :

Am-241 458Y 1.04x105 8.8x103 Cm-242 163D 1.09x106 2.5x105 cm-244 17.6Y 3.5x103 8.2x104 (1) " Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing and Waste Management Portions of the LWR Fuel Cycle," NUREG-0116, Appendix Ar 10% of H-3, 100% of others, multiplied by ;

35 MTEM/ annual LWR charge; 1 year after discharge. This I traluation_aasusta thet_all_of_the_LWB_Elutonium_in_diapaatd of_in_the_wante l

5.7-63

_ _ _ _ . 82-0034

Page - 5 17,1] (424) '

Table 5.7-7 .

DRP PROCESS CAPABILITY Throughput per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months day 1-Fuel Bead- Solvent Mixed-oxide U Spent Fuel extraction, conversion, conversion available, receiving,, end, ;

Reactor fuel, Element / ton kg . kg kg kg t tons /yr elements 3 (30 total ! U 360 PPTP U 72 24 500 Pu 140 250 Pu 28 31.7 by 1991) ,

l D lli CRBRP U R1 500 Pu 111 240 250 n 24 core Pu n _L1* .

i ,

U 490 CEBRP U 12.1 500 Pu 10 40 460

___L1 24 blanket Pu L1 it -

'. U 495 g 99 -

500 Pu 5 20 400 BWR Pu 1 5.3 Unlimited 24

. U 495 0 99 ; Pu 5 20 480 Unlimited 10 500 PWR Pu 1 2.2 U 437 LDP U 78 500 Pu 63 252 248 18 10 ,

c:re Pu 22 7.8 U 485 LDP U 97 500 Pu 15 60 440 5.5 12 10 blanket Pu 3 .

l S

5.7-64 82-0034 .

M

Page - 6 [7,1] (024)

TABLE 5.7-8 Atmospheric Releases from Reprocessing CRBRP Spent Fuel Model Reprocessing DRP Elagt Input Confinement Release Confinement Release .

l Radiengslidt fci/vrL* _ Easter LC14rtl ._ Easter ___ fC1/yr1 l E-3 5.51x10 3 1 5.51x103 1 5.51x103 C-14 1.44x104 **

l 10 2 1.44x10-1 1 1.44x101 4.75x10 2 4.75x103 -

Kr-85 4.75x10 102 10 9 8 7.4x10-5 4 Cr-90 3.70x10 5 1 5xg0 7.4x10-5 5xg0 I-129 10 3.26x10-5 10 3.26x10 2 1-131 3.26x10~1 3.61x10 6 104 3.61x10~3 103 108 1.84x10-3 109 3.61x10 1.84x10-3 Re-103 1.84x10 '

Ru-106 7.09x10 6 108 7.09x10-3 108 7.09:10~3 U-232 3.11:10-2 5x108 6.22x10-11 5x108 6.22x10-Il 8 U-234 8.12x10-1 5x108 1.62x10~3 5x108 3.92x10-2 5x108 7.84x10~11 5x108 1.62x10 Il '

U-235 7.84x10 10 U-236 7.91x10-2 5x10 8 1.58x10-10 5x10 8 5x10 8 7.36x10~II 5x10 8 1.58x10 I D-238 3.68 I 7.36x10~I Pu-236 3.07 2x10 8 IJ1x10~5 2x10' L11x10~5 Pu-238 1.69x10 54 2x10 9 8.45x10- 2x10' 8.45x10-Pu-239 4.27x10 2x10 8 2.14:10-5 2x10 2.14:10-5 Pu-240 4.40x10 46 2x10' 2.20:10-5 2x10 I 2.20x10-5

8 2.55x10~3 Pu-241 S.10x10 1 2x109 2.55x10-3 2x10' Pu-242 9.40x10 2x108 4.70x10-8 2x10 4.70x10~8 Cs-134 2.80x10 5 5x109 5.60x10-5 5.60x10-5 5x109 1.60x10-4 5 x10'9 5x10 1.60x10~4 Cs-137 7.99x105 Th-228 5.98x10-3 5x108 1.20 10-12 5x10' I 1.20:10-12 Th-231 3.92x10-2 5x109 7.84x10-12 5x10 7.84x10-12 10 5x109 7.36x10-10 Th-234 3.68 5x109 7.36x10 5 An-241 1.03x105 5x108 5x108 2.06 10-5 5x10 9 2.06x10 10 2.08:10- 5x109 2.08 10-10 up-237 1.04 9 P;-234 3.68 5x109 7.36x10-10 7.36x10-10 4 5x10' 4 cm-242 2.71x10 6 5x109 5.42x10 Co-244 3.58x10 3 5 109 5.42x10~7 7.16x10- 5x10' 5x10 7.16x10-7

150 days after discharges fission products calculated with RIBD codes actinides calculated with ORIGEN code.

- 200 ppe N in fuel.

i '

Ii 5.7-65 I!

l t

82-0034 lf

- _ -_--_ - . . __. __ _ - . _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ u -_ _ - - - - .__ .-

^

Paga - 72 (82-0034) [7,1] t22 i Amendm2nt XIV May 1982 Table 5.7-9 Transportation Radiological Impact (

l Fuel Cycle Shipment / Distance Pop. Dose Max. Person Dose

_ Element __ ___n ____ ImileaL Herann_ Rest __ Gerson _Emmi ,

t New Fuel 14 2500 0.449 1.40 l i

New Blanket 12 2500 0.0065 0.013 l Plant Radwaste 8 2500 0.430 0.878 I l

Spent Fuel 14 2500 0.489 0.160 I Spent Blanket 12 2500 0.432 0.160 Irradiated Control, RRS 4.5 2500 <0.001 0.004 (

t PuO 14 3000 0.536 1.64 2

EsprQE._Badwante i BLW 3 2500 0.0817 0.360 TRU & Metal 11.1 2500 1.161 1.1EE Scrap LLW 2 2500 0.109 0.220 '

Eucl_EAbriGatSL !

___Badwaate-TRU i ZEqq amlla q gga I

5.7-66 1

82-0034

~ ~

Page - 1 [7,1) (882)

Table 5.7-10 Badioactirt_Wantta_ites_tht.CIRRE_Eutl_CEcle .

t Anngal Generation E&Eilitz Maattifera_Containtra Yelumnia lh of_Containata Et1_Cenatituenta Dinanaitica Fuel Reprocessing Plant ,

Low-Level concrete / drums 25/120 Fission & Activatign Products, 10. C1/n Shallow land burial Nisc. TRU concrete / drums 10/50 Fission Products &

>1gnC Repository g 10-10g/gCi/m{RU, ,

L Metal scrap metal / cylinders 12111 Fuel material, Fission & actigation3 Repository

products, 4x10 C1/m High-Level glass / cylinders 3.3/E Fission Produ9ts, TRU, 1.5 x 10 C1/m3 Repository Ir-85 metal matrix / cylinders 0.01/0,035 Kr in getal getrix Repository 3.4x10 C1/n I-129 concrete / drums 0.01/0.05 Barium2 Iodate3 Repository 1.4x10 C1/m i

Core Fuel Fabrication Plant ,

TRU solid / drums 130/145 ,

U, Pu Store at

' ii_CLla Hanford Blanket Fuel Fabrication Plant ,

~

LLW CaF2 / bulk 11 NT Uranium Onsite disposal 0.01 uC1/g .

CRBR Plant ,

LLW solid-concrete / drums 67/319 Fission, activation shallow land proguets burial

<10 ci/m3

Volume stated is prior to compaction.

5.7-67

Page - 7 [7,1] (924)

TABLE 5.7-11 CBRRE_Euel Cycle _Sasutitz Costa RzJlant Trot .

($ in millions) llaE CRERP Plant g gggigation Plant __ manrocemaing Plant ' , ,'

Casital annual-Qettating Casital annual _Quarating Canital annual-Qaatating Phrysical Security system 3.86 0.17 2.2 0.3 2.8 0.12 Material Control and Accounting - -

1.6 0.9 1.2 0.4 Security Force Lgi M _ gg - Lag ,

3.91 2.27 3.3 2.0 4.0 0.8 O ,

9 e

e 5.7-68 l 82-0034 !

L . . .

. _y - - - - - - . - , - . - - - - - s .,.,-,,-,,w, -.. e -m- ., . . ,w--------.-,.-,,--wy . - - - . _ - , . - - . - - - - - - , . - > - - - , - -

- . _ _ - - - . . - - + -----

t l

Amendmont IIy ,

May, 1982 ;

t

. I i

FIGURE 5.7-2 }

l.

I CastP EQUltinalUM f utt Citti PLUTONIUM AND URAN!Un MA55 FLOW f i

(MT/ year, average) [

}

i l

. i 11.04 MT deal u 10.98 wtU l FutL/SLANKET CRBRP 12 t

_ FABRICATION -

0.59 Ml Fu 0.89 MT Pu I i L li loss assumed 1.0(k! Pu

10. On U I

i 9.?? In re !

1 1 i i ' l 0.99 MT Pu l PLUTONIUM REPROCE551NG + g. gogg ,

STORAGE assumed 0.10 MT/yr !

1 10.55 MT U = 0.27 MT j

, , Fission i

~

Products WA5TE STORAGE l

~

i I

t 5.7-12 :

5U54 LS4f Met #1

, Ut i Ctf Ases4G TO StACE Ib f

TasTIUM pygg f'08eT A888Wl EST S10nant t t t

,,, =- ,, ;;;,,,, '-

C. -

u

sC.A.

a- . O:

a .

Ej[

$5 + 5"' *"'*G

w'E."",">. -

"O > .g. YE +

UO M E>

At.fD q, Rf COvt NT SeCfly to No

'I f

O ATCM CD88108stMIUS DOG 50088er

Ott40t UllO88 f4%50t H fwHe #f MOvat ,, C ,,

I e l '

, 1r 1r AC8 (Mpest A 99ttIV Of fCAS TO

_ C4 8st RAL %f ar.a PtfgtPf t%f WA9ff === C AND 80 e IS =

P CDeeCI N f m a f 904

' '$ Ct A#frera tepet g

500 1 SOtvf Nt _ ,,__.____ 4 fee CTCit 7 v00 sorw4r I Ctf ANUP ll #8 ""W AL f

I {0 t. . .. _ _ . ___

I l e a

t. - _ ____

_- q l , ,

I, ._

.1 e. em enatAre 800 7 sot Vf MT , , . , , , , , _ , , , N CYCit PtWT9mun I PRECWITAft95 l CtfANUP I, Pu PAAff' Inst C9GCitf GATION gg, i ,.

3

I 8

, ! 1r

,gg g 6. e. IPSA44M Nt? RATE M 84"a"ac'"

5' n d =

COseCe Nin Avenes A n s,n. An, le " C'C u eU amwi r retteitAftos purtomuu I

I < r i r g si I %f4 W9NT Alen Mt W f' Al e;58pNes 4tAAagnpM gtseOf b Oncapest Waggt - Asen ens r ert s a t unes agegy gagg ggaeseegg fargagg na t goog yggmetg gegneg W As tr f

Vt1Ref t1D IfR ANM'M qp geAalqqm

.M W ...N Of fGA9 to FUEL REPROCESSING SCHEMATIC FIGU RE S.7-3

l Pago - 2 [7,1] #78 ,

Amendment XIII l March 1982 '

5.7 REFERENCES

1. Standard _Yaluta_of_Atmosphatin_&bantation_na_a_EunctiQu_QL Temperature _and_HumiditE_for_Une_in_Eraluating_ Aircraft ElEQYar_HQian, ARP 86b, Society of Automotive Engineers, New York, N.Y., 1964.

2. Capans, G. and Bradley, W. E., &qquatical_ImpaGh_Qf_CQQling TQweta, Journal Acoustical Society of America, Vol. 55, ;

536(A), 1974.

l

3. Pas, S. P., Ettdiction_of_EKEtaa_&ttenuation_Entattum_fqt !

Hatural_ Ground _CQYtt, Report WR 72-3, Wylie Laboratories, Huntsville, Alabama, February 1972. .

4. U.S., Department of Housing and Urban Development, HQian Akatement_and_CQattQlt__ Departmental _Enliszt_ Implementation r_ a EtapQuaikilitigat_and_Standarda, Departmental Circular ,

1390.2, Washington, D.C., August, 1971.

5. Zone Ordinance, City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Section 6-504 l Noise, June 17, 1959 with May 29, 1975 amendments.

6. FMEP Environmental Assessment, Supplement for Secure ;

Automated Fabrication (SAF), October 1981.

l

7. Environmental Assessment for the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility, DOE /EA-Oll6, July 1980. !

l

8. Projections of Radioactive Wastes to be generated by the ,

U.S. Nuclear Power Industry, ORNL-TM-3965, February 1974.

9. WASH 1535, Volume II, " Proposed Final Environmental i Statement, Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program," l December 1974.

10. ERDA-1535, Volume I,Section III D, " Final Environmental Statement, Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Program" December'1975.

11. NUREG-Oll6, " Environmental Survey of the Reprocessing & ;

l Waste Management Portions of the LWR Fuel Cycle", October [

l 1976.

1 l

l 13.0-34a i I

l 82-0052 '

~

" ~ .~.'..... -. .

P ga - 3 [7,1] #78 Amendment XIII March 1982

12. DOE /EIS-0026, " Final Environmental Impact Statement, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant", Vol. I, Table 4-2, October 1980.

. 13. SAND-81-1957 " Krypton-85 Disposal Program Conceptual Design Phase: Final Report," November 1981.

14. LA-8809-MS, " Materials Management and Accounting in an Operating Plutonium Conversion and Purification Process.

Phase 1: Process Modeling and Simulation." Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. April 1981.

15. ORNL/CFRP-81/4, " Conceptual Design Refort, Hot Experimental Facility", June 1981, Volume 1.

13.0-34b 88-0098

ML20052C875

Contents

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Dear Mr. Check:

SUMMARY

5.7 REFERENCES

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ML20052C875

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Dear Mr. Check:

SUMMARY

5.7 REFERENCES

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