ML20071B030

Forwards Amended PSAR Page 10.4-7 Re Consequences of Flooding Due to Failures in Circulating Water Sys.Pages Respond to NRC Questions & Will Be Included in Next PSAR Amend

ML20071B030
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	02/23/1983
From:	Longenecker J ENERGY, DEPT. OF, CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR PLANT
To:	Grace J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
HQ:S:83:225, NUDOCS 8302250290
Download: ML20071B030 (3)

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O Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Docket No. 50-537 HQ:S:83:225 FEB 2 31983 Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Director CRBR Program Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Dr. Grace:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM, PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (PSAR) SECTION 10.4.5 Enclosed is an amended Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant PSAR page 10.4-7 that provides additional information concerning the consequences of flooding due to failures in the circulating water system. The enclosed pages respond to questions asked by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff reviewer and will be included in the next amendment to the PSAR.

Questions regarding the enclosed pages may be addressed to Mr. J. Inger (FTS 626-6182) or Mr. D. Robinson (FTS 626-6098) of the Project Office Oak Ridge staff.

Sincerely, J n R. Longene er Acting Director, Office of Breeder Demonstration Projects Office of Nuclear Energy Enclosure cc: Service List Standard Distribution Licensing Distribution 0 0) 8302250290 830223 PDR ADOCK 05000537 A PDR

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, ENCLOSURE bal gje The f=t:ca-cell mechanical draft wet cooling tower (two towers f 4ewm cells each) will dissipate the total heat load of the Circula-C 24 ting Water and Nopnal Plant Service Water Systeas at a design wet bulb temperature of 76 F. The cooling tower design anproach is 11gF and the 40l range is 21.340F.

272 The cooling tower basin is sized to maintain Ir4NNF,000 gallons of water. Makeup to the basin from the River Water 3ervice System will maintain the basin level between predetermined limits.

N 40 41 10.4.5.3 Evaluation The cooling tower will be constructed of non-flammable materials.

throughout to minimize the potential for fire. The normal drift from the cooling tower will not affect the electrical switchgear and transformers.

The CWS is a non-safety related system and is not requirei during a plant shutdown. If available, it would be utilized for residual heat removal; if not available, then the SGAHRS (Section 5.6) would be used. Failure of the CWS will not adversely affect the function of any safety related equipment.

The cooling tower is located such that its failure will not jeopardize

( Eserk the safety related equipment.

10.4.5.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements The valves and major components of the Circulating Water System are subject to hydrostatic and performance tests prior to plant operation. Hydro-static leak test prior to initial operation will be made in accordance with the requirements of codes and standards to which the system is designed.

10.4.5.5 Instrumentation Applications 41l Pressure and temperature alarms and pressure control are provided as required on the Circulating Water System. The pump and cooling tower parame-ters are continuously monitored to ensure that Circulating Water System per-formance is optimum.

10.4.6 Condensate cleanup System l 10.4.6.1 Design Bases The Condensate Cleanup System (i.e., Condensate Polishing Unit) is designed to maintain the condensate purity by removal of the following contaminants:

a. Corrosion products that result from the corrosion that occurs in the main steam and Nrbine extraction piping, feedwater heater

(. shells, drains, and cMenser.

Amend. 41 Oct. 1977 l 10.4-7

Insert The volume of water that could drain into the TGB as a result of a failure in the circulating water piping or condenser expansion joints is approximately equivalent to the inventory of the condenser (51,300 gal) plus the circulating water contents of the cooling tower basin (about 1,272,000 gal), i.e., a total of 1,323,000 gal. before the circulating water pumps would cavitate (assuming no operator action).

There is no safety-related equipment located in the TGB. There are two potential pathways (below the maximum circulating water system flood level) for water to enter buildings where safety-related equipment is located, i.e. , the personnel door in the Steam Generator Building Auxiliary Bay of the Steam Generator Building (SGB) and the personnel access corridor leading over the Electrical Equipment Building (EEB) to the Control Building (CB) and other Nuclear Island buildings. Other openings in the TGB through which water could empty before entering the Nuclear Island (NI) buildings include doorways leading to the Maintenance Shop and Warehouse Building and the yard transformer area, as well as the roll-up door for the TGB railroad access bay.

The intended function of the safety-related equipment will not be impaired by the flow of this water into the Nuclear Island buildings since the potential pathways leading into the NI buildings from the TGB will be provided with water tight doors or will be located such that they are above the potential flood level, i

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