ML20012C515

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Special Rept:On 900209,four Missing Fire Dampers in Battery Room Supply & Exhaust Ducts Noted.Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Established.Facility Change Request 90-019 Initiated to Install Fire Dampers
ML20012C515
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/13/1990
From: Denton R
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9003220125
Download: ML20012C515 (3)


Text

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, BALTIMORE J

GAS AND ELECTRIC l CHARLES CENTER

  • P.O. BOX 1475
  • BALTIMORE. MARYLAND 21203 1475 R. E. DENTON MANAuf t

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March 13,1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Penetration Fire Barrier Special Report Technical Soccification 3.7.12n Gentlemen:

Per the - requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12a, we hereby submit the following Special Report concerning' : penetration fire barriers, specifically four missing fire dampers in the battery room supply and exhaust ducts.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to

. discuss them with you.

-Ve.tx truly yours, IXw[

RED /CRS/db Attachment cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E, Silberg, Esquire R. A.Cupra, NRC D. G. Mcdonald, Jr., NRC W. T, Russell, NRC J. E. Beall, NRC p T. Magette, DNR agN 1

9003220125 900313 r' PDR ADOCK 05000317 L / i S PDC ij ({ }

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A'ITACHMENT (1)

PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER SPECIAL REPORT f

NACKGROUND On February 9, 1990, while performing an inspection of Technical Specification fire barrier ventilation penetrations, it was discovered that four fire dampers had not been installed. These four dampers should have been installed in the Battery Room supply and exhaust ventilation ducts where they penetrate the barrier between the Unit 1 Cable t Spreading Room and Cable Chase IB, and the barrier between Cable Chases IB and IA. The Shift Supervisor was immediately notified and Technical Specification Action Statement

l. 3.7.12.a was entered for an inoperable fire barrier. As required by the Action Statement, operable fire detection was verified on at least one side of the barrier and an hourly fire watch patrol established, in the case of the barrier between the Cable Spreading Room and Cable Chase IB. For the barritt between Cable Chase IB and I A the automatic sprinkler system alarms were verified operable in each room, also in accordance with Action Statement 3.7.12.a.

The inspection of the ventilation penetrations through Technical Specification fire barriers was part of a corrective action instituted after concerns were noted with other fire dampers at Calvert Cliffs. These concerns were addressed by LER's 317-89-009, 318-89-010, and 317-89-011. Once required fire damper locations were identified on the ventilation drawings, field inspections were conducted to review the fire dampers, in the case of these four ventilation penetrations it was noted that no inspection hatches exitted by which to inspect the dampers. A Field Engineering Change request was initiated to create the inspection hatches. On December 8, 1989 as a conservative measure, a compensatory measure consistent with the T. S. Action Statement was entered until the hatches could be installed and the presence of the fire dampers confirmed. On February 9, 1990 the inspection hatches were completed and it was determined that no dampers had been installed.

At the time of discovery, Unit I was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and Unit 2 was defueled.

This incident has been determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), and is the subject of LER 317-90-006. This Special Report is being submitted to satisfy Action Statement 3.7.12.a. since this condition was not corrected within 7 days of discovery. This Special Report will provide information as to the actions taken, the cause of the inoperable fire barrier, and the plans and schedule to restore the barrier to its operable condition.

EEFECTS ON UNIT OPER ATIONS Upon discovery of the inoperable fire barrier penetrations (dampers), appropriate actions were taken to satisfy the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.7.12.a, " Penetration Fire llarriers." At the present time Calvert Cliffs is in the Action Statement which permits the continued operation of the facility indefinitely as long as the Action Statement requirements are met. Reliance on the Action Statement does not restrict Unit startup because T. S. 3.0.4 does not apply.

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9- *4 ATTACHMENT fl) h PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER SPECIAL REPORT The effect of the missing fire dampers on the level of fire protection at Calvert Cliffs is mitigated by the following:

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- There are no duct openings in any of the three rooms affected by the missing dampers. Thus, the duct would have to fail on both sides of the barrier for heat and/or smoke to pass between the rooms. Therefore, the potential for fire propagation is limited.

- The rooms involved all have suppression systems installed. Cable Chases I A and IB . both have automatic sprinklers. The Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room (CSR) has a total flooding flalon system. This IIalon system is not affected by the missing fire dampers since there are no openings in the duct work in the CSR. These systems are capable of controlling a fire before the ducts would be threatened.

- The three rooms involved have installed smoke detection. The early notification afforded by smoke detection will allow manual fire fighting activities to occur while the fire is in an incipient stage.

- The combustible loading in the three rooms consists primarily of cable insulation which was chosen for its fire retardant properties.

TASKS TO ASSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCE The inspection process that discovered these dampers to be missing was part of a corrective action item from a previous concern on fire dampers. With the inspection of these ventilation penetrations the initial inspection program of the identified ventilation penetrations of Technical Specification fire barriers has been completed.

The cause of the missing fire dampers is that the Fire llazards Analysis did not verify that the dampers were installed.

A Facilities Change Request (#90-019) has been initiated to install fire dampers in these- four ventilation penetrations. The anticipated completion date for the installation is December 31, 1990. This schedule is based on the lead time needed to obtain fire dampers qualified for Safety-Related duct work. More details on the missing fire dampers are contained in LER 317-90-006.

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