ML20006A333
| ML20006A333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1990 |
| From: | Russell L BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9001260133 | |
| Download: ML20006A333 (3) | |
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BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER. P.O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 LEON B. RUSSELL catvtin curre wcEUS pu a weamein January 19, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Document Control Desk SUDJECT:
Calvert. Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit No.1; Docket No. 50-317 Fire Suppression Water System Special Report Technical Soecification 3.7.ll.l.c REFERENCES-(a) Letter from Mr. L. B. Russell (BG&E) to Document Control Desk (NRC), dated January 11, 1990 Gentlemen:
Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.1, we hereby submit the following Special Report concerning the-potential inoperability of the Unit 'I fire suppression water system. In accordance with our Technical Specifications, this event was reported to you by telephone and telecopy on January 10 and 11,1990, respectively.
Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours, UAA LBR/CDS/bjd Attachment cc:
D. A. Brune, Esquire J. E.
Silberg, Esquire R. A.Capra, NRC D. G. Mcdonald, Jr., NRC
$ Nr)
W. T, Russell, NRC f
I J. E. Beall, NRC 0 Q)'3 T. Magette, DNR 9001260133 900119 C
PDR ADOCK 05000317 S
/
l
s A*ITACHMENT (1)
FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM SPECIAL _ REPORT On January 10, 1990 at 1005, while Unit 1 was in MODE 5 (cold shutdown), it was discovered that the Containment isolation Valve (1-MOV-6200) for the Containment Hose Station Riser would not open upon remote initiation from the Control Room. The isolation valve is addressed by Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.11.1,
" Fire Suppression Water System."
The associated Action - Statement, 3.7.ll.i.b.
was entered as was the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.7.ll.4.a. " Fire llose Stations."
i Establishment of a back-up water supply was provided within one hour by manually opening 1-MOV-6200 which pressurized the Unit I Containment Hose Station Riser.
Therefore, all Unit 1 Containment Fire Hose Stations are currently operable. This action satisfied Action Statement 3.7.ll.l.b.!
and allowed Action Statement - 3.7.ll.4.a to be exited.
At 1700 on January 10, 1990, a telephone notification was made by the Shift Supervisor to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Duty Officer. This telephone notification satisfied Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.1.b.2.a.
A letter providing written confirmation of the telephone report no later than the first working day following the event and-satisfying Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.ll.l.b.2.b was sent by facsimile transmission to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
on January 11, 1990.
This Special Report satisfies Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7 ll.l.b.2.c.
This Action Statement requires a Special Report be submitted ' within 14 days following the event, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.
EFFECT ON UNIT OPERATION 1-MOV-6200 is the Containment isolation Valve for the hose standpipe riser in the Unit 1 Containment. This valve, located in the Unit I east piping penetration room, is normally kept closed and the containment hose-standpipe kept dry. The valve ;can be I
opened remotely by handswitches in the Control Room, East Electrical Penetration Room, and at each hose station within containment. On January 10, 1990 ' an attempt was made to open the valve remotely from the Control Room. This attempt failed and the valve l
was opened manually to pressurize the hose standpipe riser in Containment. At this point the hose stations in the Containment were returned to operability. Therefore, j
there was no actual effect on Unit Operation. The valve was originally to be opened in order to pressurize the containment hose standpipe riser while work was performed on the containment electrical penetration that contains cable for the remote handswitches :
to open MOV-6200 located _ at the hose stations. This was being done as a precautionary measure.
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T ij
.2 ATTACHMENT (I)
FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM SPECIAL REPORT TASKS TO ASSURE FUTURE COMPLIANCE in addition to manually opening MOV-6200 to establish the operability of the containment hose stations, and ' following the Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.1.b.2(a-c), I-MOV-6200 was repaired by = January 12, 1990. The failure of ' the valve to open upon a remote actuation signal was attriboted to dirty contacts within the motor operator. The similar valve for Unit 2, 2-MOV-6200, will be checked for dirty contacts as well. Both the X-MOV-6200 and 2-MOV-6200 will be subjected to the surveillance required by Technical Specification 4.7. l l. l. l.f. ! prior to restart of the respective units. No additional corrective actions are deemed necessary at this
- time, i
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