ML20005D913

Special Rept:On 891211,fire Protection Valves 653 & 413 Not Included in Surveillance Test STP-M-693-0 & Found in Open Position.Both Valves Cycled within 24 H of Telephone Notification & Procedure Revised to Include Both Valves

ML20005D913
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	12/21/1989
From:	Russell L BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9001020239
Download: ML20005D913 (3)

Text

. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

e L.-

A BALTIMORE t

GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER. P.O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE. MARYLAND 21203 LEON B. RUSSELL i

c= vim um mc$a%,, tam on mmm December 21,1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20$$5 ATTENTION:

Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & $0-318 Fire Suppression Water System Special Report Technical l

Snecification 3.7.ll.l.c

REFERENCE:

(a) Letter from Mr. G. C. Creel (BG&E) to Document Control Desk (NRC),

dated December 12,

1989, Technical Specification 3.7.11.1.c Special Report Gentlemen:

Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.1, we hereby submit the following Special Report concerning the potential inoperability of the fire suppression water system. This was reported to you. by telephone and telecopy on December 12 in accordance with our Technical Specifications.

Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours.

O e'

f L%.14,i LBR/CDS/bjd Attachment ec:

D. A. Brune, Esquire J.

E.

Silberg, Esquire R. A.Capra, NRC S. A. McNeil, NRC W. T. Russell, NRC J. E..Beall, NRC l

T. Magette, DNR l

l gge 9001020239 891221

(

PDR ADOCK 05000317 S

PDC

A'ITACilMENT (1) l FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM SPFCI AL REPORT On December 11, 1989, as a result of a Quality Assurance audit, it was discovered that two fire protection valves (653 and 413) were not included on surveillance test STP M-693-0.

This surveillance test fulfills Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.11.t.l.e, which requires that each testable valve in the flow path be cycled at least once every 12 tr.onths. Therefore it cannot be shown that all the valves in the fire protecticr' water system were OPERABLE as required by Technical Specification 3.7.ll.l.c. The Shift Supervisor was notified upon the discovery of the condition at 1400 on 12/11/89, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.ll.l.b was entered.

To fulfill the conditicia of the Action Statements both valves were cycled one complete cycle of full travel and found to be operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery. No backup fire suppression was needed. At 1310 on 12/12/89 a telephone report was made to the NRC duty officer for Region I. This telephone call was confirmed by a letter sent via facsimile transmission to the NRC Document Control Desk on 12/12/89. The final item in this Action Statement is a 14-day Special Report which this document fulfills.

EFFECT ON UNIT OPER ATION Upon discovery that valves 653 and 413 was inadvertently left off S'A P M-693-0 the valves were given a cycle test which included a complete cycle of the travel distance of the valves. Both valves were found in the open position and were left in that position upon completion of the cycle test. These valves are normally in the open position and maintaincJ that way by a chain and lock in the case of valve 653 and a tamper proof seal in the case of 413.

Yalve 653 is located in the Auxiliary Building and is used to isolate two hose stations on the 69' elevation as well as air automatice sprinkler system in an area which does not contain safety related components. This valve was found in the open position and locked in place. There is reasonable assurance that this valve has been opened based on drain tests of the sprinkler system which have been performed within the last 12 months, in addition there are several other hose stations on the elevation were the affected hose station is located. These hose stations are not affected by this valve and could have provided backup capability for manual fire fighting.

Valve 413 is located underground and is a sectionalizing valve for the fire protection water distribution system. This valve is accessed by using a long T-handle wrench through a curb box cover. This valve was found to be open and the tamper proof seal still in place. This valve does not isolate any section of the underground by itself since the underground is looped. Therefore, even if the valve was closed, water would still be available throughout the distribution network.

There is reasonable assurance that these valves have been opened and if they were closed there wculd have been no detrimental effects on the level of plant fire protection. _.

ATTACllMENT (1)

FIRE SUPPRESSION WATER SYSTEM SPECIAl, REPORT TASKS TO ASSURE FUTURE COMPI.IANCE i

The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.7.11.1 Action Statement b,

requires

that, with the fire suppression water system otherwise inoperable, establish a backup fire suppression water system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. in lieu of establishing the backup water supply both valves were shown to be operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and therefore the entire fire suppression water suppiy system was operable. As described above, both a 24-hour telephone notification and confirmatory letter were sent to the NRC within the time period prescribed by the Action Statement. The final requirement is to describe in writing within 14 days the actions taken regarding the event, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

Both valves were cycled within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of notification that the valves had been inadvertently left off STP M-693-0 which fulfills Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.7.ll.l.l.e. STP M-693-0 is being revised to include thesc 'wo valves.

The valves were found to have been omitted from the surveillance test during a Quality Assurance audit that involved a thorough review of the fire suppression water distribution system. Therefore there is reasonable assurance that, once these two valves are included in the surveillance test, those valves required to be cycled on a 12-month basis to show system operability are now being tested. The valves will be added to the surveillance test prior to the next scheduled test.