ML20024F748
| ML20024F748 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1990 |
| From: | England L, Odell W GULF STATES UTILITIES CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LER-90-040, LER-90-40, RBG-34134, NUDOCS 9012170265 | |
| Download: ML20024F748 (4) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. ,s - , 1 . l g GULF STA TES U T.fLX TI E S COMPANY w ,v ,as uma s..s , o na. .s .m i < a <2 A ( f:Di $.:.4 { 4 5, IVf 64 'M { hF.,8 Deccanber 10, 1990 RBG- 3 4134 File ?bs. G9.5, G9.25.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regvlatory Conmission Docunent Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlenun: River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-040 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being subnitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. Sincerely,
,, 1 -
-{
W. f. Odell Manager-Cn/ersight
& River Bend Nuclear Group j)g+,.WT g{ f JAE/PDG/DFJ/JIN/ REC /pg ec: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Caranission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
. Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, IA 70775 INPO Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Mr. C. R. Oberg I.
Public Utility Ccmnission of Texas / 7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North Austin, TX 78757 9012170265 901210 G DR ADOCK 0500 - >g )
.l9t 1
n . . . - - _ jf NRC FORM 3fe U 8 NUCLE AR REQULATOR Y COMMIS$10N apppoygo ogg no 3igoogo4
,' t uPIRES 4 30'92 E$7tM AYt0 BvRDEN PER RE SPON$t TO COM'Lv WTH THIS
L"TN/s'%s%TSub"IN ' 5 '
is'T,'MAe 70'l R(COROi LlCENSEE EVENT REFORT (LER) col AND REPOHTS M ANAGEME NT ORANCH IP 6301 U S NUCLE AR Rt GuL ATOR Y COVMtSSION W ABMINGTON OC 20*iSS. AND TO THE P APERwoRK REDUCYlON PROJECT (31600104) 08 F ICS OF MANAGE ME NT AND SUDGE Y,W ASHINGTON OC 20603
~00 Cati NUMet a (2P ' ' O ' ' 3' 8&CILITY N AMt Ill RIVER BEND STATION o l5 I o Io l ol4 l5 l8 1 lOFl 013 TITL E I4:
Division I Balance-of-Plant Isolation due to an Frror by Desian F.ncineers (VENT DAf t (51 LtR NUMSSR461 AtPORT DAf t 176 OTME R 8 ACILITill INvDLvt0141 QLjN OOcult NvMetR:si MONTH Day vtAR vtam N.$ L'6 MONTM OAv vtAR 8Acisivv NAwas 015101010 1 I I
- ~
1l1 0l8 9 0 9l0 0l 3\ 8 0l 0 1l 2,1 l0 9 l 0 0 is to 1 0 i 0 i I i THit REPORT i$ $USMITTE D PUR$VANT TO TML Rh QUIRtMENTS Of 10 CF R { (Caece oae e, more e' f*e fono* af; till MOOi (si 60 73ieH2H el 73 71161
.) 20 402Lal 20 406tel
] n vuei
.0 nieH2n.i g 20 40.ieHm,> .0 weini 0 01 l l0 TO dosialiiHal 60 seieHai s0 72.eii2Hai _ 4, 0 Ma p g ja,'geg<4 20 406deH1Hi6al 60 7teit2ilal to 736sH2HemHal E6d1
, 20 406telttilevn 60 73aeH2 Het 60 T3'eH211emHB)
.% 406ielH itel 50 7 3$eH2itm) l 60 73isil2Hal LICENSit CONT ACT POR TMil Ltll (126 NAME It LtFMONE NVM9tR Ant A CODI L. A. England, Director-Nuclear Licensin9 51014 3iR11l-I4111415 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR ( ACM COMPONENT F AILUni DitCnittD IN TMit IltPORT till n eORTa t C AUSE Sv5f tM COM*ONENT T
#E O
P R D $' CAV$t Sv 5Tiu COMPONENT MA[[g AC pq E 1 I i 1 1 I I I I I I I I I l l l l l 1 I l l I I I ! l SUPPLEMENTt L REPORY axPECTED M41 MONTu OAv vtAR SvevissiON
- E S !H res een',rere i A9tCTIO Sutw$$ ION DA Tit NO l l l At t r R AC Y w ., , e .,ue. . e e,,,. . -e,e v ,.,r.e. ,y e wu e r, *+e 4 -en u t, At 1610 on 11/08/90 with the reactor in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), while performing maintenance, the loosening of a common neutral connection in the 'A' reactor protection system (RPS) alternate circuit resulted in the momentary interruption of power to the RPS 'A' normal feed. This caused a Division I balance-of-plant (BOP) isolation and consequently, a momentary loss of shutdown cooling. This constitutes an engineered safety feature (ESP) actuation; therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.7 3 (a) (2) (iv) .
The root cause of this event was an error by design engineers in the preparation of a field change notice (FCN). A new drawing issued by the original modification request was revised by the FCN, moving a termination to the wrong location. All electrical design engineers will receive training on this event with emphasis on attention to detail. This training will be completed by March 1, 1991. During this event, all isolations occurred as designed. Upon restoration of valve, shutdown cooling was restored within 2 minutes and reactor vessel water temperature exhibited no change. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public. N . C . .- . -
NRCPORM306a U.S NUCLtam s t0VLQYOR Y COMMi&510N 16 41%i APPROvt0 0Mt NO 31 Mot 04 E APIRt$ 410M LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (5,'g^4',94g,'c'a at$;o25,',,'o co*1'l w ,*o',",'"% u TEXT CONTINUATlON c?*o ,,'ygap,*aggM',g'gy','g",5 r "My
%?"tA,'eaaEi".*a'uM'%'Mi%cMa tilli OF MANAGEMENT AND SVDGif W ASHiNGTON.DC 70803 4 > ACILIIV N AME ill DOCKli NUMBEM (U LE A NUMBI A 461 PAGE13) naa " W.Pt' "tJJ:
RIVER BEND STATION 0 l5 } o j o j o l 415l 8 9l 0 - 0l3l8 - 0l 0 0l 2 OF 0l3 ss m u>.- w.a...u m c, m n REPORTED CONDITION At 1610 on 11/08/90 with the reactor in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), while performing maintenance, the loosening of a common neutral connection in the 'A' reactor protection system (RPS) alternate circuit resulted in the momentary interruption of power to the RPS 'A' normal feed. This resulted in a Division I balance-of-plant (BOP) isolation and an RPS half-scram. The Diviclon I BOP isolation included the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) system (*CE*) and valve 1SFC*MOV121 (loss of alternate shutdown cooling) for approximately 2 minutes. The Division I BOP isolation constitutes an engineered safety feature (ESP) actuation; therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50. 7 3 (a) (2) (iv) . INVESTIGATION This event occurred during the implementation of a modification to add an annunciator relay (*30*), requiring modification of the 'A' RPS alternate circuitry. Field change notice (FCN) 2 to modification request (MR) 89-0056 required loosening the common neutral connection at terminal number JB407-3. When this was implemented, it resulted in a temporary loss of RPS 'A' normal power, resulting in the ESF actuations. The root cause of this event was an error by design engineers in the preparation of FCN 2. A new drawing issued by this MR was revised by FCN 2, moving the termination at JB407-2 to JB407-3. The engineering task was complicated by the involvement of multiple shifts of design engineers. Nevertheless, the change was contrary to the elementary diagram, and ultimately resulted in the RPS actuation. A review of previous LERs has revealed no similar events. CORRECTIVE ACTION A copy of the condition report documenting this event has been routed to the design engineers involved to remind them that careful attention is required on field change notices (FCNs) affecting non-safety-related circuits and thorough review of work performed on previous shifts is required prior to sign-off of documents. All electrical design engineers will receive training on this event with emphasis on attention to detail. This training will be completed by March 1, 1991. SAFETY ASSESSMENT During this event, all isolations occurred as designed. The Diviston I residual heat removal system (RHR) (*BO*), main steam line drains, main steam and radwaste sample systems (*KN*) were out of service; NRC Fenn 166A (640
N,rg.o w . vi t.. .touarox, CoMM, won t sPtRES 4/3042
* ' ' 8 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) f,8,';**Jf,90,vagg,ga o a'j;?,*yi',,'o.,cf*'A' ,*4",',y TEXT CONTINUATION cg*jfjo$j;;o,*ag;;jg?',;n'a"^llJo
, '?
u a$ga;* 1 PAPthWO Rt U f lON JE 13500 0 IC 08 MANAGLVE NT AND SUDGET W ASHINGTON, DC 70601 PLCitif V NAME Hi DOCKSI NUMBE R (21 PAGE 13' Lth NUMSER 141
"*a " tt;' . "'s',T:
RIVER BCMD STATION 0 -l5 l o l o l 014 15 18 910 01318 0 10 0l3 OF 013 aa rus tw E"e r e fo , . t.hu,w re, ese nec in ix,mi,sys ems were unaffected by this event. Flow from the RHR "B" pump (*P*), providing alternate shutdown cooling flow via the < spent fuel pool cooling assist mode, was interrupted upon isolation of l ISPC*MOV121. Shutdown cooling was restored within 2 minutes upon restoration of the valve and reactor vessel temperature exhibited no change. Therefore this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public. NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identifird in the text as (*XX*). I l l
/
NRC Poem 384A 1998
GULF STA TES UTILITIES CONTPANY mm m.a rain % cost oma to 2. u o As sv u em usi r m AHLA CONL 6C4 6M EJM 346PM% December 10, 1990 PKr- 34132 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission Docunent Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemn: River Bend Station - Unit l' Ibcket No. 50-458
'Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-038 for River Dend Station - Unit 1. This report is being subititted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.
Sincerely, I l W. H. Odell Manager-Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group J)lbV*T) h SC/h IhE/PDG/DF47/DCH/JEM/pg cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 , NRC Resident Inspector l P.O. Box 1051 l St. Francisv111e, IA 70775 L INPO Recorrls Center 1100 circle 75 Parkway. Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 Mr. C. R. Oberg / Public Utility Cmmission of 3bxas 7800 Simi Creek Blvd. , Suite 400 North Austin, TX 78757 L 1 l-
) i OC O 00 f gg[
.a s
C poem Me
, U S NUCLE AR fctGulaTOev COMuisstON APPROvt0 OMS NO 3 t20104
- , , i ntimtl 4:30'97 tit MATED tvActN Ptm RISFON$t TO COMSLv WTM
- ill LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER1 Ec'JMtN/iMG'No'5T.o"#EiViMAVi TNE Ic*OUS O!u"T0.VCOJM3"'&';,E'N!?!rd.?M'" '
TMt F APE RWORK RE DUCYlON PROJECT (3150010As Of f tCE 08 M AN AGE ME NT AND tv0 GIT.* AlmtNGTON DC 20503 FACILITY N AME 411 DOCR 4 ? NUM9t h (2) P AGE 638 RIVER BEND STATION o l s l o i o l o g 4 15 ;8 i jorl Oj3
' ' ' ' '
- 1aolations During Realignment of Load Centers due to Insufficient Communication Among Personnel and Failure to Utilize the Procedure t yt NT Da f t 15 Lt m hvMet a 46, a t Pon T D A f t t h OYME A e ACILITit t INv0Lvt0 (to MONYM QAy vtAp vtAn $l k e *'j,[ YONTM
, DAY
- TAR C' Lev %awit DOCat f Nvustm 33 olsjol0loi l l
~ ~
1ll 0l9 90 9l0 0l3l9 0 l0 ll2 ll0 9l0 o isio t o i oi i i g TMig attomT 18 SVSMITTIO Puntuat,T TO TMt at ovim EMENTS 0710 C8 R % IC*.e4 ea, es *'o e e' ra **do**ft 1111 "00' d' 20 402iti ! 5 20 4onici X s0 ni.H2H..i 73 flini s 20 4081eH1Hd 40 Miell11 to 73ieH2Hel 73111st 1101 1 10 20 to**e H' Hai 50 3*ieH2i 50 23ieH2n*=> _ OtM8
,, gso.<g;a,A,*;';<'
20 ef tta10 Hind 80 73ielt2Hs) 60 734al:2itmHI AI 886 A l 20 46tettilovi 60 736eH2Han to 736sH2tivmHei to actieH1Het le 73teH2Hmi 60 73tGsHei LICthlet CONT ACT POR TMil Lt A uit NAME f t Lt*MOC Nuvtt a ARE A CODt L. A. England, Director - Nuclear _LLg_gnsinct 51014 31 8a 1 -1 41 11 415 COMPLif t ONt tlNE 80A G ACH COMPONtNt f aituas otscpistD IN TMit Attoaf (13i 0" CAvst SvlftM COM*0NENT "'[%',[ "'y'g %,I,'[ Cav5E Sv$7tw COMPQNtNT g3 nC R yteQR,T A a l l I I I I I I I I i 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i i SUPPLlutNT AL REPO A Y E RPICTIO 114, MONTM OAV lvtAR Sv 4 MISSION Q vis m ... a ... e orcrso svouac8 od ren T NO l l l A ..T . AC T w, n, , e .,, .. , e . .--. ", ,. u . w.-,m - n . > On 11/09/90 at 2036 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), with the water level grea te r than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, power was lost to 480 volt load center 1NJS-SWG1D causing loss of the 'B' reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator (MG) set. This resulted in isolations of the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU), and the Division II containment isolation valves, resulting in a loss of shutdown cooling. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50. 7 3 (a) ( 2) (iv) to document these engineered safety feature (ESP) actuations. Following completion of maintenance activities, operations personnel were in the process of realigning those load centers normally powered from the 'B' 13.8KV bus back to INPS-SWGlB. The loss of power occurred because a nuclear equipment operator did not perform the verifications required by procedure. This event was caused by inadequate communication between the control operating foreman (COF) and the NEO, and the NEO not using the procedure to perform required verifications. Training on this event will be provided to Operations personnel. All actuations occurred as designed upon loss of power. Shutdown cooling was restored in about 6 minutes and no increase in reactor vessel temperature was observed. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public. l N.C, mM.i.n. 1
= - ~ . . . . . . .
' E xpiRES 4'30M
=",,^45,ogagg,y,"oa '!;pui',,'os *,'J' ,*o',".'"'!
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATlON ?lv",'N/0,",to,^a= o t 5
, gi',M'J"^/UJ 'v"i @fi PAPER 0 R ION R J C 13 60 l' O IC OF MAN AGEME NT AND SUDGET, W AsMINGTON,0C 206C3 F ACIL47Y N AMt lt) DQCKt1 NvMgin gi (g, NuMag n i9 pggg gg; "aa " tM. "f#,W nTvim HEMD qCTON O [5 [ 0 l 0 j o 14 15 18 910 -
01319 - 010 0 12 OF 0l3 su,wmmuo.u w m. man ~ m m menm REPORTED CONDITION On 11/09/90 at 2036 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), with the water level greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, power was lost to 480 volt load center IMJR-SWG1D (
- S WG'i* ) causing loss of the 'B' reactor protection system (RPS) motor gerwrator (MG) set (*MG*). This resulted in isolation of the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) (*CE*), and the Division II containment isolation valves (*ISV*), resulting in a loss of shutdown cooling. These isolaticar m"titute actuations of engineered safety features (ESPs); therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) .
INVESTIGATION Prior to the event, maintenance on INPS-SWGlB (*SWGR*) required it to be de-energized and all 480 volt load centers to be cross-tied to INPS-SWGlA (*SWGR*). Following completion of maintenance activities, operations personnel were in the process of splitting the 480 volt load centers by realigning those load conters normally powered from the 'B' 134 8KV bus back to INPS-SWGlB (*SWGR*). When the nuclear equipment operator (NEO) arrived at load centers INJS-SWG1C and 1NJS-SWG1D, he closed normal supply breaker (*52*) INJS-SWG1D-ACB62 and then opened bus tie breaker 1NJS-SWGlD-ACB52 which caused a loss of power to 1NJS-SWG1D. The loss of power occurred because breaker (*52*) 1NPS-SWGlB-ACB33 was still open. This is the 13.8KV supply breaker to 480V transformer (*XFMR*) INJS-X1D supplying load center INJS-SWG1D. Operations personnel closed INPS-SWG1B-ACB33 (*52*) to restore power to 1NJS-SWG1D. This event was catTe( by inadequate communication between t.he control operating foreman (COF) and the NEO, and the NEO not using the procedure to perform required verifications. Station Operating Procedure (SOP)-004 7 Section 5.3 covers restoring cross-tied 480 volt load centers. The first two steps of this section of the procedure require the operator to verify that the 13.8KV breaker supplying the 480 volt transformers is closed and to verify proper voltage on the low side of the transformer. The NEO did not verify these items because the instructions he received from the COP led him to believe that all of the 13.8KV breakers were closed. The NEO did not have a copy of the procedure with him because he considered this to be a routine evolution. _C_ORRECTIVE ACTION Operations Department personnel will be trained on this event with an emphasic being placed on: 1) Assuring that instructions given to NRC Perm 3ESA (680
~~~~'~;;;;;
"' ~ '
}grDa'M2a unNuedanaida,OnHOsw6N{ ; g, 7 -- -
E mPinE 3 410'92
* ""'5' "" ' 3 '"'"$ .
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ' $' '"* " oflON INSORMA ' u"o'N COLL"f EC lO N R E Qut s' 60'0 HR'5"' ' 5"084W A R
' 5 "' o ^ " o'* 'u"o'**S""^ '"E*'c * $
TEXT CONTINUATION '""p(* AND PORT 5 M AN AGE ME N T 99 A NCH 19 6101US NUCLEAR HIGULATORt COMMIS$ ION W A$HINGTON DC M56 ANO YO 1HE P Al'E NWOR K Rf DuCf TON PAOJE CT I D 50 0104 > 08 8 tC E OF M ANAGE Uf NT AND BUDGE T. W A$NINGTON DC 70503 F Aceta f y N AMt 116 DOCK E T NUMBE R (21 g g , ggggg y (g, P AGt 1)
*I'" k7 gg[' 6
- RIV.dk DEND STATION 0 l5 l0 l 0 l 0 l4 l5 l8 9 l0 __.
0;39 0 l0 Oj 3 or_ 0l3 renpersonne w- u . . ~f are . ass,mac w m emn 2) Reinforcing the importance of the use and concise. prior review of procedures in connection with routine evolutions.
- 3) Detailed briefings prior to performing planned configuration changes. This training will be performed during licensed operator requalification training and will be completed by March 31, 1991.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT All actuations occurred as designed upon loss of power. Shutdown cooling was restored in about 6 minutes and no increase in reactor vessel temperature was observed. There fore , this event did not adversely affeet the health and safety of the public. NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*). l 1 l NRC Form 3saA teet
GULF STATES UTILITfDS COMPANY
.ro se,n n em mst ma m m o m < na unsm nm A4j A COD 4 $M Mi WN .M f SE6 December 10, 1990 RDG- 34133 File !bs. G9.5, G9.25.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccrmtission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-039 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being sulmtitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73. Sincerely, W. H. Odell Manager-Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group
- 2) 2( %%
/PDG/DEJ/DUf/VOC/pg cc: .U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, IA 70775 INPO Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064-Mr. C. R. Obenj Public Utility Cmmission of Texas /[
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North Austin, TX 78757 Ck $$$$$$sg hc
. .- .. eo
l , gcg.OR= U. Nuca AR ucVt.ToRv Co ,ss.ON
.,,,,,no_,,,,,
unn s +,w l
- EST iM AT E D BustDE N PE,4 Hi sPON5 f TO COMPLY vtTH T Ht$
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) nZTNTs'0$$E'NA Es'fuAYi TU"TkEc'"S OL"3? "^a*WTJs"~ ARM WMM'J D',X a;\"U M u?,7? % % % %"" P AGE il f&CILITY h AME 111 DOCII t T PsVMBt R 12 6 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 o is l o ;o l o l 4l 1 1 2 1 lor l0l5 fi1LE I4i Engineered Safety Features Actuations Caused By Partial Loss of Offsite Power Due to High Winds EVENT DATE tSi La m NUMBE R i6r REPO8t T DA f t (71 OTHE R 5 ACislTIES INv0tvED tel SI DOC K E Y NUMBt H 5' MONTH DAY YEAN VEAR j f l '$ M3NYM DAY 4(AR 5 A DLIT V *u A Vf 5 N/A o;5;o oio, , , 1l1 0l 5 90 9l0 0l 1l 9 0l 1 1l 2 1l4 9l0 o,3,o,o,o, , , OPE R AtteeQ THtt MPORT IS SUsMITTED PURSUANT TO THE RtOUIREMENTS OF 10 CF R k (Caed eae or mo<e o' f** fo 'o as' nil
** 5 l 1 20 .o2m 20 eM X .0 ni.H2 H , nnm 20 406 te H1 H t) to 30 cH11 50 73isH2Hel 73 71 tsi no, 1 i0 i o 20 omo H.,
.o. .H2i
.0 ni.H2 H. ,
_ 0;H gso.gggg,_,, 20 406isH11tml 60 7 3istl211.1 60 73teH2HvitiH Al Jei6A> 20 4064alttilM 6013ia H2 Mi 60 73teH2H mH8-20 406mt11M 6C 73=eH2't a 60 F3teH2Hal LICE NEE E CONT Act 80R THis LE R n2i Naut TE LEPHONE NuveER ARE A COOT T.P. Noonan, General Manager Nuclear Operations 4 i 12 64 ii 3l i 1l2 i5i8 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COM*'_*NE NT F AILURt DESCRIGED IN THl1 R E POR T !13i CAUSt Sv8Ttv CourOstNT M gf M' 7O NPR S CAU$t $Y ST t M COMPONENT
# C "I'OR T AB LE TO C F,K X,X,X,X X,X,X,X N , , , , j , ,
1 I I I I I I I 1 1 ! l I I F SUPPLtMINT AL REN)RY ikPECT ED 114 MONTm DAY YEAR SuevisS10N vt$ (19 res cowmos t. Ix!tCTED Suther%110N DA TF) No
} l l s.w R sC T a.,~, to u m ,,a., . . .ao . ..m. . .. <..- ,, u a. no.-,rw. i...e o s, On 11/05/90, with the Unit in Cold Shutdown, the 2A System Station Service Transformer (SSST) was being supplied by offsite power (No. 2 l'38KV Bus). At 1802 hours, a fault occurred on the No. 2 138 KV Bus, causing a loss of power to the "A" Train Normal and Emergency 4KV Busses. The No.1 Emergency Diesel Generator started and loaded the 2AE bus. This loss of power also caused a loss of power to Unit 2 Control Room Radiation Monitor, 2RMC*RQI201, resulting in a Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) actuation. The cause for this event was adverse weather conditions (high winds). The air bottles were isolated at 1807 hours, after verifying a spurious signal actuation. At 1835 hours, the CREBAPS signal was reset and the air bottles were unisolated. At 1904 hours, power was restored to the 2A SSST. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified at 2024 hours. There were no safety implications as a result of this event. The electrical protection circuitry functioned to restore the "A" Train Emergency 4KV Bus. Core cooling capability was available through this transient, as the 21B Residual Heat Pump was started immediately upon the loss of the 21A Residual Heat Pump. CREBAPS air bottle pressure remained above the Technical Specification limit the entire time period.
N R c , .- im. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _.___J
N C ,O!M 346A U.S. NUCL8 All KEQULATOA V COMMi&SloN EXPIRES 4/30/92
, LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) '8,'l"Ro'J'MiMo"'Mo"l',T'
, ,MA so*f74 * ,*o'n".'a'8
' ^
TEXT CONTINUATION C #,',",41 o MN1"d M?'J "'c7^,'M l"' "M "3 N ?"t*,'i..oE?"a".'"N^En?"o?!#M? 0, o 'd MANAotMENT AND BUDG5 7 WASHINGTON.DC 70603
, ACILITY NAME H) DOCE41 NUM4th (2) PADI (3?
LER NUMelR 191 vsaa "t'?.it' -
"'4*.?
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 o ls lo lo lo l4 l1 l2 9[0 - 0l1l9 - 0 l1 0l 2 OF 0 l5 nxT ro ., < ,-c 5-assu nn DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 11/05/90, with the Unit in Cold shutdown at reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure and temperature of 100 PSIG and 84F respectively, Train "A" Priority was in effect. Train "A" Priority signifies that the Train "A" related components are being used to satisfy all Technical Specification required operable components, including the No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator and that no maintenance activities are permitted on these components. The "A" Train Normal and Emergency- 4160 Volt (4 KV) Busses were being supplied offsite power from the No. 2 138KV- Bus through the 2A System Station Service Transformer (SSST) (Figure 1). During normal operations, these busses are supplied by the Unit through the 2C Unit Service Station Transformer (USST). Upon a loss of power to the USST, a fast-bus transfer to the SSST is initiated. At 1700 hours, System operations notified the Control Room of-severe wind warnings. At 1802 hours, a feult occurred on the No. 2 138 KV Bus, causing a loss of power to the 2A SSST and the 2A, 2AE and 2B 4KV Busses (the "B" Train Emergency Bus and the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator were available and operable at all times). This resulted in a loss of power to the following running components: 21C Charging Pump (pump was racked in on the 2AE 4KV Bus), 21A Residual Heat Removal Pump, 21A Component Cooling Water Pump, and the 21C Service Water System Pump (also racked -in on the 2AE 4KV Bus). The No.1 Emergency Diesel Generator-started .and loaded the 2AE bus. The 21A Component Cooling Water Pump started during the diesel generator loading sequence. The 21C Charging Pump was manually started, since the 21A Charging Pump was also racked on the 2AE 4KV Bus but its- control switch was in Pull-To-Lock, and the 21C Charging Pump will not receive the automatic start signal if the preferred pump is also on the bus
-(design feature). The 21A Service Water Pump was manually started.
The 21C Service Water Pump did not start due to the same design feature previously discussed for the Charging Pumps. The 21B Residual Heat Removal Pump was manually started (powered from the 2DF 4KV Bus, which was unaffected) approximately 30 seconds after the loss. of the -21A Residual Heat Removal Pump. No' increase in RCS pressure or temperature were observed. Following verification of *
-Emergency Diesel Generator capacity the 21A Residual Heat removal Pump was- restarted at 1803 hours, and the 21B Residual Heat Removal
-Pump was manually shutdown. System Operations was contacted regarding the loss of the 138 KV Bus. System Operations reported that a Traveling Operator had been dispatched to investigate the l fault. This loss of power also caused a subsequent loss of power to L the Unit 2 Control -Room Radiation Monitor, 2RMC*RQI201, -as it l receives 120VAC power from the 2AE 4KV' Bus. The deenergizing of the radiation monitor resulted in a Control Room Emergency Breathing unce.~ mA m l
NXC 90IM 366A U.S NVCLE AR REQULAf DJtv COMMI55 TON t IPIR E S 4 '3017
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) f,Vs^o','1%17MW,"OR'QNj's,' .#".L'l ,*O,"W TEXT CONTINUATlON f,yL'",'o',"r's o^" 1*aiN"?VA15's"^lls 'u"i' "Efi PA ERWO fto T DN J (3 600 0 IC Of MAN AGEME NT AND $VDGE T, W ASHINGTON. OC 70503
#Acett f y hAME q u DOCE t T NUM4 E R (21 gg g gygggg gg, pAgg (33 via " W." "'#.72 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 o ls lo lo lo l 4l1 l2 9] 0 -
0l 1l 9 - 0l1 0l 3 0F 0 l5 f tXf (# more spece e esgureit. vee e#norW NRC Form JsM'st (1h Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) actuation. The air bottles were isolated at 1807 hours, after verifying a spurious signal actuation, placing Unit 1 (Control Rooms are in a common envelope) into Technical Specification 3.0.3. At 1904 hours, System Operations verified acceptability for the restoration of normal offsite power to the 2A SSST. The No. 1 Emergency Diesel generator was restored to standby after restoring and paralleling 2AE 4KV and 2A 4KV power. CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause for this event was adverse weather conditions (high winds). The spurious fault was self-clearing and 138 KV power was restored automatically. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The following corrective actions have been taken as a result of this event:
- 1. The 21B Residual Heat Removal Pump was started approximately 30 seconds following the loss of power to the 21A Residual Heat Removal Pump.
- 2. The air bottles were isolated at 1807 hours, after verifying a spurious signal actuation. This placed Unit 1 (Contrn1 Rooms are in a common envelope) into Technical Specification 3.0.3.
- 3. At 1835 hours, the CREBAPS signal was reset and the CREBAPS air bottles were unisolated. This allowed Unit 1 to exit '
Technical Specification 3.0.3.
- 4. At 1904 hours, offsite power was restored to the 2A SSST.
The 2A and 2AE 4KV Busses were subsequently restored to offsite power through the 2A SSST. The No. 1 Emergency diesel generator was returned to standby service. REPORTABILITY The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified at 2024 hours in accordance with 10CFR50.72.b.2.ii. This written report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73.a.2.iv, as an event involving an Engineered Safety Features (ESP) System Actuation. NRC perm 366A 16 8P
- . .-. = . . . . . _ -
- C FOMt 306A U.S. NUCLEAR EBOULATOAV COMMISSION AP*ROvt0 DM9 NO.316001C4 EXPints 4/3042 (53^MA%'#MRan"O "'j;?"UnT'o"T!',n'u's
' c
. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION 1%"4"4'R% MAf!"ok't"f',MFC7^/!3R ',"' "$$f! PAPER O RE U l'O N J A 60 IO IC Of MANAotMENT AND SUDQti,WA&HINGTON. DC 20603_ PJ.CILITY NAME n} DOCKET NUMSER (21 PAQt 131 43R NUMetR ISI naa " $7, P. 3*#2 Beaver Valle/ Power Station Unit 2 o p lo lo lo j 4l1l2 9l 0 - 0l 1l 9 - 0l1 0l 4 or 0 l5 ftXT I# eiere spece a tea *ed, ves ameeur Mc Fonn JalL4'st HM SAFETY IMPLICATIONS There were no safety implications as a result of this event. The electrical protection circuitry functioned as designed resulting in the starting and loading of the No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator. Core cooling capability was available throughout this transient, as the 21B Residual Heat Pump was started immediately upon the loss of the 21A Residual Heat Pump. Due to the recent core reload and the time from shutdown, minimal decay heat was present. No increases in RCS pressure or temperature were observed. CREBAPS air bottle pressure remained above the Technical Specification minimum limit the entire time period prior to isolation. DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY In accordance with the Station Commitment to NRC Generic Letter 84-15, the reliability of the Diesel Generators based on the criteria of NUMARC 87-00, Appendix D, "EDG Reliability Program", are included. Last 20 Demands Last 100 Demands Diesel Generator 2-1 1.00 0.976
- Diesel Generator 2-2 1.00 1.00 **
* - Reliability based on 42 Demands.
** - Rollability based on 37 Demands.
A " Demand" is considered a start of the diesel generator for normal monthly surveillance tests, refueling surveillance tests, and unexpected loss of voltage (undervoltage) starts. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES ! The following are previously reported events involving CREBAPS l. actuations: LER 88-019-00 " Inadvertent CREBAPS Actuation" LER 89-002-00 " Inadvertent Control Room Pressurization (CREBAPS) Actuation" The following are previously reported events a loss of power to 4KV emergency busses: LER 87-022-00 " Automatic Start - No.1 Emergency Diesel Generator on L Loss of AC Power to 2AE Emergency Bus" LER 88-004-00 " Diesel Generator Actuation Due to Spurious Overcurrent i Signal" LER 88-005-00 "Overcurrent Relay Trip Leads to ESF Actuation" LER 88-007-00 " Reactor Trip Due To Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Caused By a Loss Of 4KV Bus 2A Loads" LER 89-012-00 " Loss Of Power To Train "A" Emergency Bus" A review of the five- events listed above shows four events due to component failures and one event due to personnel error during relay testing which resulted in the diesel generator loading. NZC Form Je8A t&491
i v... NvCu A. novtAvon, CoMMinioN gR,Cgow =.4 ,,,,,,,, ,,, ,, ,,,,,,,, EXPIRi$ 4!30/92 LlCENSEE EENT REPORT (LER) ',8!a"^','llo',,uRgeN,gR,,g eg;pge,,70,, cgm 7,37 ,g,w,t,H,ig TEXT CONTINUATlON C#R,",'o'J! o*",,1',y" ',*18"^'!E CN , u"/ "ENf! REGULATOR Y COMMIS$10N. WA$HINGTON. DC 20566. AND TO 1HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13160 41041 OF F ICE 08 MANAGEME NT AND BUDGtf, WASHINGTON, DC 20603. P ACILITY NAME til DOCKET NUMSLR (2) LI A NUMSIR 1.P PA06 (3) va 1 - " $ M.'.' MPJJ . Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 o ls l0 lo jo l4l1l2 9l0 , 0l1l9 ,0 1 0l5 OF 0l5 TEXT (# srwe spece e sewed, use edesconer NAC #wm Jews / (17) Figure 1 138 KV Bus 2 f 2A SSS? W Ne NW Ne 'i 2AE 4KV BUS 2A 4KV 2B 4KV BUS BUS
. NW A%
WM 2C USST-UNIT NIC Poem 366A M494}}