Text

Proposed Tech Specs Implementing WCAP-10271,its Assoc Suppls & Other Re Changes W/Respect to RTS & ESFAS
	ML17264A151
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/31/1995
From:	; ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	;
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ML17264A149	List: ML17264A148; ML17264A150; ML17264A151;
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U DN CSUl TABLE 3.5-1 PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATIOH 0

Rm a.

UO Q 5 gO 0 to OPERATOR ACTION KUl 'e TOTAL HO. of MIN. PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS QF CllANHEI.

c'lUI NO. of CllAHHEI,S OPFRABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE OO ro NO. FUNCTIONAL UHIT ClfANNEI.S TO TRIP CIIANNELS CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MET ABOVE OS

'QOM UM~ 1. Manual when RCCA is 4 withdrawn

2. Nuclear Flux Power Range For low setting, 2 Note 1 when RCCA is l

C low setting 4 3 2 of 4 power range withdrawn channels greater than 10% F.P.

high setting 4 when RCCA is q wit.hdrawn

3. Nuclear Flux Intermediat.e 2 1 2 of 4 power range 3 Note 1 when RCCA is Range channels greater withdrawn than 10% F.P.

4. Nuclear Flux Source Range 2 2 1 of 2 intermediate 4 Note 1 Hote 2 range 'channels 10 greater than 10 amps.

Hote 3

5. Overtemperature d T Hot Shutdown

6. Overpower d T Hot Shutdown

7. Low Pressurizer 5/ power Pressure

8. Hi Pressurizer Pressure 3 'Hot Shutdown

9. Presqprizer-lli Water 5% po~er Levql.

10. Low Flow in one loop 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop 5% power

(> 50% F.P.) (either loop) (both loops)

Low Flow both loops 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop 5/ power fe.5X40% F.P.) (both loops) (either loop)

TABLE 3.5-1 CONTINUED PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO. of MIN. PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OF CHANNEL HO. of CHAHHELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE NO. FUNCTIONAL U CHAHHELS TO TRIP CHANNELS CONDITIONS CAHNOT BE MET ABOVE

11. Turbine Trip 50% Po~er Low Au~~

Oih P~3,<~

13.- Lo Lo Steam 3/loop 2/loop .2/loop Hot Shutdown Generator Water Level

14. Undervoltage 4 KV 2/bus 1/bus 2/bus 5% Power Bus (both busses) (on either bus)

15. Underfrequency 4 KV 2/bus 1/bus 2/bus 5% Power Bus (both busses) (on either bus)

16. Quadrant power tilt NA Log individual Hot Shutdown monitor (upper & upper & lower lower ex-core ion chamber neutron detectors) currents once/hr

& after a load change of 10% or after 48 steps of control rod motion

)5

TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3 4 5 OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO. of MIN. PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OF CHANNEL NO. of CHANNELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEI.S TO.TRIP CHANNELS CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MF.T ABOVE

17. Circulating Water Flood Protection

a. Condenser 2 sets 2of3in 2of3in Power operation Hot Shutdown of 3 either set both sets may be continued for a period of up to 7 days with 1 channel ( 1 set of three) inoperable or for a period of 24 hrs. with two channels (2 sets of of three) inoperable.

Otherwise be in hot shutdown in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. Screenhouse 2 sets 2 of 3 in 2 of 3 in Power operation Hot Shutdown of 3 either set. both sets may be continued for a period of up to 7 days with 1 channel (1 set of three) inoperable or for a period of 24 hrs. with two channels (2 sets of of three) inoperahle.

Otherwise be in hot shutdown in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

18. Loss of Voltage 2 sets 1 of 2 2of 2 RCS 480V Safeguards Bus of 2/bus in each in one set in of the one bus two sets

TABLE 3.5-1 Continued PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Il 5

x TOTAL NO. of MIN PERMISSIBLE OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF CHANNEL NO. of CHANNELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS TO TRIP CHANNEIS 'ONDITIONS CANNOT BE MET ABOVE

19. Degraded Voltage 2/bus 2/bus 1/bus T' 350"F 480V Safeguards Bus

20. Automatic Tri Lo ic Note 4 Note 5 Reactor Trx rea ers 2'L.

i/4~~ ~l~~ S.5<+ pb~,

~ 50 Ig Pg~

~+

Ul +o +0 P'Q~

I CO C.M~< g NOTE 1: When block condition exists, maintain normal operation.

NOTE 2 Channels should be operable at all modes below the bypass condition with the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

NOTE 3: Channels shall be operable at all modes below the bypass condition except during refueling defined to be when fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioneJ or with the head removed.

NOTE '4: Onc reactor trip breaker may be bypassed for surveillance testing provided the .other reactor trip breaker is operable.

NOTE 5: Channels shall be operable at all modes above refueling when the control rod drive system is capable of rod withdrawal unless both reactor trip breakers are open.

F.P. Full Power

TABLE 3.5"2 EHCINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 5

OPERATOR ACTIOH TOTAL HO. of MIN. PERMISS I BI,F. IF CONDITIONS OF CIIAHNEI.

NO. of CIIANNELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUHH 1 OR 3 OPERABLE NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHAHHFLS TO TRIP CIIANHEI.S CONDITIONS CANNOT BE HET ABOVE

1. SAFETY IHJECTION

a. Manual

b. Iligh Containment.

Prcssure St.earn Genera t.or Primary 350 I I.ow Steam prcssure

~

Pressure/Loop less than 2000 psig Primary = 3SO.F Pressurizer Low TRCS Prcssure pressure less than 2000 psig

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY

a. Hanual 2":: 10 Cold Shut. down Hi-Hi Containment 2 sets 2of3 2 per set Cold Shutdown Pressure (Contain- of 3 in bot.h in either ment Spray) sets set

~ Must actuate 2 switches simultaneously.

S~ ~n AuWw ~c A~oMn

~+le'Q <c M~'~n

0 TABI.F. 3.5-2 (Continued)

FNGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION IHSTRUHENTATION 5

OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO. of HIN. PERHI SS I BI.F. IF COHDITIONS OF CHAHHEL NO, of CIIAHHEI.S OPERABI.E BYPASS COI.UMH I OR 3 OPF.RABLF.

NO, FUNCTIONAL UHIT CHAHNEI.S TO TRIP CIIAHHF.I.S CONDITIONS CANNOT BF. HET ABOVE

3. AUXILIARY FEEDWATFR Motor and Turhine Driven J ~ Mafrrrrr I I/pump I /pllnlp ]/pump T ltCS

.=35OF 4A- Stm. G<<n. Water I.rrvr'I - low- low

i. !>t, rrl Hotor 3/st.m. g<<n. 2/st.m. ger>. 2/stm. gr n. T .=350 F Driv<<ll Pllmps <<itll<<r grin. bot.h gr!ll.

i i. Start Turbine 3/stm.gcn. 2/stm,gcn. 2/stm.gcn. TRCS 350 F Driven Pump both gcn. either gcn.

Loss of 4 KV 2/bus 1/bus 2/bus RCS Volt.age Start (both buses) (cit.llcr bus)

Turbine* Driven Pwnp Sa fety Inject.ion (scc It.cm 1)

Start. Motor Driven Pumps r

~ Trip of both Fecd- 2/pump I/pump 2/pump 5/ pour r watcr Pumps st.arts l>oth pumps ei the'r pump Motor Driven Pumps St'rndl>y Motor Drivcrl rl ~ Hallua I I/pump I/pump I/p<<rnp

TABLE 3.5-2 (Continued)

FHGIHEERED SAFETY FEATVRE ACTVATIOH IHSTRVMFHTATIOH 5

OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO. of MIH. PFRM I SS I BI,F. IF CONDITIONS OF CHAHHEL NO. of CHAHHF.I.S Ol'L'Rh B I.F. BYPASS COI,VMH 1 OR 3 OPF.RABLF.

NO. FUHCTIONAL UNIT CHAHNEI.S TO TRIP" CIIAHNF.I,S CONI) IT IONS CANNOT BE MET ABOVE

4. COHTAIHMENT ISOl,ATION

4. 1 Cottla itImeni Isolation M.>>>ua 1 10 Co Id Sh>>t.down Safet.y lt>jcct.ion (Scc Table 3.5-2, I t.em ~

1)

(Auto Actuation) 4.2 Containment Ventilat.ion Isolation

a. Manual 13 Cold Shutdown High Containment 13 Cold Sltutdown Radioactivity Manual Spray (See Tab 1 c 3. 5-2, I t.cm 2a)

Safety Injection (Sce Table 3.5-2, Item 1)

TABI.E 3.5-2 (Continnr<l) t:.HOIHEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACrHArIOH INSrRUNEHTATIOH 4 5 OPFRATOR ACTION TOTAI. HO. of HIH. PERIIISS I III.E IF COHI)l'flONS OF CllAHHEL NO. of CllANNEI.S OPERABI,E ByPASS COI.INH I OR 3 OPERABI,E HO. FUHCTIONAL UNIT CIIAHHF.LS TO TR I P CIIANNELS COHDITIOHS CANNOT BF. IIE'f ABOVE STEAN LINE ISOI.ATIOH

a. Ili-lli Steam Flow 2 Ifi"lli SF I SF with "T -"350~F wit.h SafeLy lnjr'.ction with S. I. S. I. in w/%>V's open for each loop each loop 3<m- lli Stcam Flow an<I 2 lli SF and 1 Hi SF an<1 'T = 350 2 of 4 I.ow T with 4 Low T 2 LowT op<'<<

l'/J'18V' Saf<.ty Injcr'Pin wi th S. I. Br wi th S.$ . for each loop each I oop Conta inment T = 150oF Prcssure w/PHV's open

<I. Hanua 1 1/loop 1/loop I/loop T = '150oF.

w/3HV's open

6. FEEDMATER LINF. ISOLATION

a. Safety Injection (Sce Table 3.5-2, Item 1) lli Steam Generator 3/loop 2/loop in 2/loop in "-':T = 350 Level either loop both loops ~)

l'alves open RCS temperature may be above 350 F if HSIV's'rr. close<I.

RCS temperature may bc above 350 F if FM Isol. valves arc closr<l.

"-: " Both trains must be capable of providing a S.l. signal to each loop.

AuM~~

mg~ ~ ~~c~

Mg <Vg <<p~

~~,c-~<< ~

cvf l~

o~

ACTION STATEMENTS With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in hot shutdown with all RCCA's fully inserted within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

2. With the number of operable cb-one?s one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the ino erable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 4 ~um u. and the requirements for the minimum number of channels operable are satis fied. However, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to hours for surveillance testing of

~ ?

other channels. I chaw.

With the number of ope'rable channels less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, be at a condition where operability is not required according to Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

3. With the number of operable channels one less than the

, Minimum Operable Channels requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and have all RCCA's fully inserted within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

With the number of operable channels one less than the

.Minimum Operable Channels requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes. If the channel is not restored to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , open the reactor trip breaker within the next hour.

With the number of operable channels one less than the operation may proceed unti Nu Channel Fun Channels, placed in the trippe number of operable cha dition 'n Test provided the i 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

next, le channel is With the ss than the Minimum Operable C.h Channels require , or at the time e next required Channel onal Test referenced above, be condition w channel operability is not required according Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

With the number of operable channels less an t e Tote of Channels, operation may proceed, provided the Nu inoperab 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Shou annel is placed in the tripped condi next Channel Functiona

'z,thin require the bypass of an inopera hannel to the generation of a reactor trip signal, opera proceed until this Channel Functional Test At t me o next Channel Functional Test, or i.f at mme the number of o le channels is

() less tha Minimum Operable Channels, be a ondtion wh c annel operability is not required according olumn 6 of Table 3.5-1 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Amendment t/0. 24 3.5-13

7. With the number of operable channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided he ino erable channel is placed in the tripped condition within hou ho ld the next anne u zona Test quare e ass of an in erable chan to avo'he generat' of a tr'ignal, ope tion may p ceed unti this Channel unctional u tional Test r f- at any time the number of operable channels is less than the Minimum Operable Channels be at Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and an RCS P~r~ ~

temperature less than 350 wc~~, ~o.~~

M~O~adi ~~~%~a

~+ bQ fb ~

F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months o~ W Z 4aua raha-x-.

8. With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels required, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and at an RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

9. With the number of operable channels one less than the Total Number ha~~+ L2. of Channels required, operation may proceed n provided the inoperable channel zs placed in the on within g~~. 4-@he nex4-Chan

+at any time the number of operable channels is less than l

e Ma.nzmum Operable Channels required, be at Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and at an RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

10. With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels required, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in Hot Shutdown within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and at cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

With the number of operable channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within hours Shoul e nex Channe u etzoOal es r are the by s of an 'inop le channel to avo'he genera n of an a ation signa operation m pro ed until thi hannel Fun a.ona~est A +>e~~e of nnel.punctio,,~et~or Z a any time the number of operableis is less than the Minimum Operable Channels required, be at 'hannels Hot Shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and at Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

~ Q ~M+ 4C ~~

C 40,~ < f3 Ho~~~,

~pO-'5~%f

~,~p~~~

~p

~~~

'rt-Xl V t( eR nor.~ ~O ~i~Z-Amendment No. p, 51 3.5-14

With the number of operable channels less than the Tota N of Channels, operation may proceed provid e inopera channel is placed in the trippe ondition within' hou . Should the next Channe nctional Test require the bypass f an inoperab annel to avoid the Char generation of an actuate.

until this Channel Fu Channel Function

'al '

est, or .if at a operation may proceed At the time of this

'me the number c..

operable c Chan els is less than the Mx required, be at hot shutdown within 6

'perable s and an RCS temperature less than 350'F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

13. With the number of operable channels lese than the Minimum Operable Channels required, operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are 14.

maint awned closed.

i~o~~,~<~~ ~

Shoul one eactor trap breaker

~~M oPPAA8u= S~s ~i~i~ ~ ~~ ac be inoperable he plant must not be z.n e operating mode following six hour time period, and the breaker must be open.

If one of the (undervoltage diverse reactor trip breaker trip features or shunt trip attachment) on one breaker is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months " or declare breaker inoperable. If at the end of the 48 (0 hour period one trip feature is inoperable repaired or the plant must not be in the operating mode, it must be and the reactor trip breaker must be open, following an additional six hour time period. The breaker shall not C~y be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is w5 inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to operable status.

~0~

ch t+

~We 4~ ~~~

a~~ f +f'

traps)

3) Upper and lower chambers for axial offset**

PRJA>~ Mk~wm 4) High setpoint (<109% of rated power) 3L 5) Low setpoint (<25% ot rated power) <.)

2. Nuclear Intermediate S(l) N.A. P(2) 1) Once/shift when in service Range 2) Log level; bistable action (permissivei rod stopi trxp) z3

3. Nuclear Source Range S(l) N.A. P(2) 1) Once/shift when in service

2) Bistable action (alarmi trip) 3)

4. Reactor Coolant CN) ) 1) Over tempera ture-Del ta T Temperature (2) 2) Overpower Delta T l

5. Reactor Coolant Flow S

6. Pressurizer Hater S

'e Level

7. Pressurizer Pressure S or P rotec tion ci rcui ts only.

r ) 8~ 4 Kv Yol tage N.A. c cc)e)) M~ A ) Frequency Q'4)Q Yah A-~ i~& %Q CLkk ) oKon

9. Rod Position S(lr 2) N.A. 1) Hith step counters Indication 2) Log rod position indications each 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when rod deviation monitor is out of service

By means of the movable in-core detector system.

- Not required during hotr cold, or refueling shutdown.but as soon as possible af ter retur:n to power. '

"0 .Channel TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued) ~cack ~eel'bx'ate Test Remarks

10. Rod Position Bank S(1,2) N.A. N.A. 1) Hith rod Counters position indication

2) Log rod position indications each

~ho~ 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when rod deviation monitor

11. Steam Generator Level is out of service R ~~

12. Charging Flow ~ lg , 4<~ amdt'PtMamt N.A. R H.A. v.

13. Residual Heat Removal N.A.

Pump Flow N.A.

14. Boric Acid Storage Tahk Level D N.A. Note 4

15. Refueling Hater N.A.

Storage Tank Level N.A.

16. Volume Control Tank H.A.

Level N.A.

17. 'Reactor Containment Pressure 1) Isolation Valve signal

18. Radiation Monitoring D System Area Monitors Rl to R9 System Monitor R17

19. Boric Acid Control N.A. H.A.

20. Containment Drain N.A. N.A.

Sump Level

21. Valve Temperature H.A. N.A.

Interlocks

22. Pump-Valve Interlock N.A. N.A.

C ho.ea,

23. Turbine Trip H.AD R Set-Point Ptot~>

~+p tA<~

24. Accumulator Level and Pressure N.A. Sdamap VaSbFc. ~~~ ~P-

'C~ Amendment No. P F 1-6 ' TABLE.4. 1-1 (CONTINUED) ek ~Q Channel Descri tion Check Calibrate Teat Remarks

25. Containment Pressure Narrow range containment pressure

~wry (-3.0, +3 psig) excluded

26. Steam, Generator Pressure S R Foc- SY aWcKo~

27. Turbine First Stage Pressure ~ ho

28. Emergency Plan Radiation Instruments

29. Environmental Monitors NA NA

30. Loss of Voltage/Degraded NA Voltage 480 Volt Safeguards Bus

31. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps NA NA

~ g~~ <a~ ~aCX~ ~< ~

32. Steam Flow 'R 33 ~ T. R t~e- $ W oX~m

34. Chlorine Detector, Control Room NA Air Intake

35. Ammonia Detector, Control Room NA Air Intake

36. Radiation Detectors, Control Room NA Air Intake

37. Reactor Vessel Level NA Indication System 38a. Trip Breaker NA Notes 1, and Logic Channel Testing 2 3 38b. Trip Breaker NA NA Note Logic Channel Testing 1

"0 TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued) Channel Desc it o C eck Calibrate Test ema ks

39. Reactor Trip N.A N.A. Function test Includes independent Breakers testing of both undervoltage and shunt trip attachment of reactor trip breakers. Each of the two reactor trip breakers will be tested on alternate months.

40. Manual Trip Reactor N.A. N.A. R Includes independent testing of both undervoltage and shunt trip circ-uits. The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass break-er.

41a. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N. A. M Using test switches in the reactor protection rack manually trip the reactor trip bypass breaker using the shunt trip coil. 41.b Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. R Automatically trip the undervoltage trip attachment. NOTE 1: Logic trains will be tested on alternate months correspondihg to the reactor trip breaker testing. Monthly logic testing will verify the operability of all sets of reactor trip logic actuating contacts on that train (See Note 3). Refueling shutdown testing will verify the operability of all sets of reactor trip actuating contacts on both trains. Xn testing, operation of one set of contacts will result in a reactor trip breaker trip; the operation of all other sets of contacts will be verified by the use of indication circuitry. NOTE 2: Testing shall be performed monthly, unless the reactor trip breakers are open or shall be performed prior to startup if testing has not bee performed within the last 30 days. NOTE 3: The source range trip logic may be excluded from monthly testing provided within 30 days prior to startup. it is tested NOTE 4: Hhen BAST is required to be operable. Amendment Nn. p4, S7 4.a-za Channel De~cCri i~i ~li ~rg T~e ~Rem rk

42. SI Input from ESPAS N.A.

43. RCP Breaker Position Trip N.A.

44. Overtemperature ~T Q(1) 1) Each channel shall be tested at least once every 92 days on a staggered test basis

45. Overpower ~T Q(1) 1) Each channel shall be tested at least once every 92 days on a staggered test basis

46. Safety Injection Manual N.A. N.A.

Initiation (ESFAS)

47. Containment Spray Manual N.A. ,R Initiation (ESPAS)

48. Containment Isolation N.A. N.A.

Manual Initiation

49. Containment Ventilation N.A. N.A.

Isolation Manual Initiation

50. Steam Line Isolation ~ N.A. N.A.

Manual Initiation

51. Auxiliary Peedwater N.A. N.A.

Manual Initiation TABLE 4.1-2 MINIMUM FRE UENCIES FOR E UIPMENT AND SAMPLING TESTS Tost ~re<<ponec.

1. Reactor Coolant Chloride and Fluoride 3 times/week and at least Chemistry Samples every thi.rd day Oxygen 5 times/week and at least every second day except when below 250 F

2. Reactor Coolant Boron Concentration Weekly Boron

3. Refueling Water Boron Concentration Weekly Storage Tank Water Sample

4. Boric Acid Storage Boron Concentration Twice/Week~"

Tank

5. Control Rods Rod drop times of all After vessel head removal full length rods and at least once per 1B months ( 1) 6a. Full Length Move any rod not fully Monthly Control Rod inserted a sufficient number of steps in any one direction to cause a change of position as indicated by the rod posi.tion indi.cation system 6b. Full Longth Move each rod through Each Refueling Shutdown Control Rod its full length to verify that the rod positi.on indication system transiti.ons occur

7. Pressurirer Safety Set point Each Refueling Shutdown Valves B. Main Steam Safety Set point Each Refueli.ng Shutdown Valves Mue 1-iwg-Shutdow Isolati.on Tri.p

10. Refueli.ng System Functioning Prior to Refueling Interlocks Operations Amendment No. , 5T 4;1-8

Table 4.1-5 Radioactive Effluent Monitorin Surveillance Re irements Channel Source Functional Channel Xnstrument Check Check Test Calibration Gross Activity Monitor (Liquid)

a. Liquid Rad Waste (R-18) D(7) M(4) Q(1) R(5)

b. Steam Generator Blowdown (R-19) D(7) M(4) Q(1) R(5)

c. Turbine Building D(7) M(4) Q(1) R(5)

Floor Drains (R-21)

d. High Conductivity Waste D(7} M(4) Q(1} R(5)

(R"22)

e. Containment Fan Coolers D(7) M(4) Q(2) R(5)

(R"16)

f. Spent Fuel Pool Heat D(7) M(4) Q(2) R(5)

Exchanger A Loop (R-20A)

g. Spent Fuel Pool Heat D(7) M(4) Q(2) R(5)

Exchanger B Loop (R-20B) Plant Uentilation

a. Noble Gas Activity (R-14) D(7) Q(1) R(5)

(Alarm and Xsolation of Gas Decay Tanks)

b. Particulate Sampler (R-13) W(7} N.A. N.A. R(5) c Xodine Sampler W(7) N.A. R(5)

(R-108 and R-14A)

d. Flow Rate Determination N.A. N.A. N.A. R(6)

3. Containment Purge No

~0M+

a. Noble Gas Activity (R-12) D(7) PR Q(1) R(5)

b. Particulate Sampler (R-11) W(7) N.A. Q(1) R(5)

c. Xodine Sampler W(7) N.A. R(5)

(R-10A and R-12A)

d. Flow Rate Determination N.A. N.A. N.A. R(6)

Air Ejector Monitor D(7) M(2) R(5) (4 (R-15 and R-15A) Waste Gas System Oxygen N.A. N.A. Q(3) Monitor Main Steam Lines (R-31 and R-32) N.A.

4. 1-17 hmnnr1~er 4 1T~ Z A

,e, TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) ~ 1 TABLE NOTATION (1) The Channel Functional Test shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm occur if any of the following conditions exist:

l. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm and/or trip setpoint.

2. Power failure.

(2) The Channel Functional Test shall also demonstrate that control room alarm occurs if any of the following conditions exist:

1. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm setpoint.

2. Power failure.

(3) The Channel Calibration shall include the use of standard gas samples containing a nominal:

l. Zero volume percent oxygen; and

2. Three volume percent oxygen.

(4) This check may require the use of an external source due to high background in the sample chamber. (5) Source used for the Channel Calibration shall be traceable to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or shall be obtained from suppliers (e.g. Amersham) that provide sources traceable to other officially-designated standards agencies. (6) Flow rate for main plant ventilation exhaust and containment purge exhaust are calculated by the flow capacity of ventilation exhaust fans in service and shall be determined at the frequency specified. (7) Applies only during releases via this pathway.

4. 1-13 Amendmeilt No. 9

Attachment HI Marked Up Copy of R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications Submitted in LAR Dated May 26, 1995 Included Pages: Attachment A 187 223* 279* 315* 188* 224 280* 189 225* 281* 190* 226* 282* 191" 283* 192* 284* 193* 285* 1 94)fc 195* 196* 197* 198 199 Attachment B, Section 3.3: 3.5-5 4.1-5 3.5-6 4.1-6 3.5-7 4.1-7* 3.'5-8 4.1-7a 3.5-9"'.5-10 4.1-8 4.1-12 3.5-1 1 4.1-13 3.5-12 3.5-13* 3.5-14* 3.5-15* Identifies that a change is made to this page. V. TS 3.4.3 - This was revised to require that a backup source of condensate be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when the CSTs are inoperable versus demonstrating the operability of the SW System. Specifying a time limit for verifying the backup condensate source is a conservative change which now provides a clear and concise requirement for plant operators. Revising the Actions to allow any alternate source to be used as a backup source provides additional operational flexibilitysince other condensate sources than the SW System can be used if necessary. These sources are described in the bases for new LCO 3.7.6. These changes are consistent with NUREG-1431 and are Ginna TS Category. (v.a) changes.

15. Technical Specification 3.5 The following changes were made to TS 3.5. 1 or Table 3.5-1:

'a ~ Table 3.5-1, Columns 1, 2, and 3 - The columns for the "Total Number of Channels," the "Number of Channels to Trip," and the "Minimum Operable Channels" were not added for each of the functional units. The columns were replaced with a new column denoting ."Required Channels." System design and operational details are not directly related to the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation and were relocated to the bases or are adequately described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change.

b. Table 3.5-1, Column 6 - The column for the "channel operable above" was revised consistent with the

= changes to the Mode table definitions in ITS Chapter 1.0. Changes to the Applicability different from those discussed in Chapter 1.0 are discussed with the specific changes to the Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (vi) change. c~ Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit 815 - The trip Function was not added to the new specifications. Removal of this trip function is justified in Reference 44 which shows that based on the offsite power system = configuration, this trip Function is not applicable to Ginna Station. Therefore, this trip Function was relocated to the TRM. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. - 187- May 1995

d. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹1 for Functional Unit

¹1 - This action was revised to add requirements for operability of the Manual Reactor Trip function in Modes 3, 4, and 5 when the reactor trip breakers are closed and the rod control system is capable of rod withdrawal (LCO 3.3. 1, Condition C). These actions ensures the plant is placed in a condition in which the trip function is no longer required for the associated modes of operation. This is a Ginna TS Category (vi) change.

e. Table 3.5-1, Note 1 for Functional Units ¹2, ¹3, and

¹4 - The notes or remarks which describe an operational detail that are not directly related to the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation were not added. These details were relocated to the bases or are adequately described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change.

f. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹2 for Functional Units

¹2 ("low setting" and "high setting"), ¹5, ¹6, and ¹7 - This action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within hours (rather than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). This change is iscussed and justified in Reference Ck This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹2 for Functional Units ¹2 ("low setting" and "high setting"), ¹5,, ¹6, and ¹7 This action was revised to allow an ino crab channel. to be bypassed for up to ( ours (rather than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ) during surveillance testing. This change is discussed and justified in Reference i591 This is a Ginna TS Category (v. h. 15) change. Table 3.5-1, Column 4 - This requirement was revised to associate the permissive (or bypass) details with the specific permissive (or interlock) numbers and to clarify the applicability of the Function with an associated Mode. The details of the permissible bypass conditions for the associated Functions are discussed in the,UFSAR and ITS Bases. Changes to the Appl.icability of a Functional Unit different from those discussed in Column 4 are discussed with the specific changes to the Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.c) change. - 188- May 1995 Table 3.5-1, Action Statement /f2 for Functional Unit F2 ("high setting") - This action was revised to add a requirement to either reduce Thermal Power to less than or equal to 75% RTP within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or to perform a flux map every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (consistent with SR 3.2. 1.2 and SR 3.2.2.2). These requirements are in addition to the requirement to place the channel in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months as discussed in Section 0, item 15.i.f. Reducing the power level prevents operation of the core with radial power distributions beyond the design limits. Performing a flux map compensates for the lost monitoring capability due to the inoperable NIS power range channel and allows continued operation at power levels above 75% RTP. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 83 for Functional Unit 83 - This action was revised to clarify the applicability of the intermediate range neutron flux to correspond to the specific permissives with either one or two channels inoperable. The NIS intermediate range neutron flux channels must be OPERABLE when the power level is above the capability of the source range and below the capability of the power range. The associated Required Actions ensure the plant is no longer in the applicable condition through controlled power adjustments and taking into account the low probability of an event during the period" that may require the protection of the NIS trip. This change supersedes that proposed in Reference 61. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 84 for Functional Unit 84 - 'his action was revised to clarify the Applicability and add associated Required Actions for inoperable SRHs. For Hode 2 below the permissive and only one SRH OPERABLE, the plant would not be . required to shut down. However, with two SRHs inoperable the plant would be required to immediately open the RTBs. For Hodes 3, 4, and 5, with the RTBs open, an additional action (LCO 3.3. 1, RA L.2) was added that requires the performance of a SDH verification. These clarifications and additional restriction ensure the plant is no longer in the applicable condition or is in a more stable condition. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. - 189- Hay 1995

l. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹5 for Functional Units

¹8, ¹9, ¹10 ("low flow in one loop" ), ¹ll and ¹13-This action was revised to allow an inoperable > channel to be placed in the tripped condition within hours (rather than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). This change is discussed and justified in Reference Ggt This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change.

m. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹5 for'unctional Units

¹8, ¹9, ¹10 ("low flow in one loop" ), ¹11 and ¹13-This action was revised to replace the current limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable channel for up to ( ours in order to perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a .note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and justified in. Reference ~. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change.

n. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹6 for Functional Units

¹10 ("low flow in both loops" ), ¹14 and ¹15 - This .action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed .in the tripped condition within ours (rather. than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). This change is discussed and justified in Reference GHa. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. a

0. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹6 for Functional Units

¹10 (".low flow in both loops" ), and ¹14 - This'ction was revised to replace the current limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test pb1h1Fptea~ of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and justified in Reference (55). This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. - 190- Hay 1995 Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit ¹16 - This was revised to relocate the gPTR Monitor OPERABILITY requirements to Chapter 3.2. In addition, requirements were added to verify with a calculation that the gPTR is within limits every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the quadrant Power Tilt Honitor is inoperable and THERMAL POWER is < 751. RTP and to verify with a full core flux map that the core power distribution is acceptable every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the quadrant Power Tilt Monitor is inoperable and THERMAL POWER is Z 75% RTP. These are Ginna TS Category (i) and (iv.a) changes, respectively. Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit ¹17 - The trip function requirement for the Circulation Water Flood Protection was not added. The Circulation Water Flood Protection instruments only provide an anticipatory turbine trip and is not assumed in the Ginna Station safety analysis. These instruments do not monitor parameters which are initial assumptions for a DBA or transient, do not identify a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant and do not provide any mitigation of a pressure'oundary, design basis event. Therefore, the requirement specified for this function does not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and is relocated to the TRH. This is. a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 3. 5-1, Functional Units ¹18 and ¹19 - The Functional Unit applicability was revised to require the instruments to, be applicable in all modes associated with DG operability. This ensures that the DG can perform its function on a loss of voltage or de'graded voltage to the 480 V buses. 'his is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹7 for Functional Units ¹18 and ¹19 - This action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (rather than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). This Completion Time is sufficient to allow restoration of the channel and takes into account the redundancy of the trip channels, and the low probability of an event requiring a LOP start occurring during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 16) change. 'Lf M ~~ ~Q - 191- Hay 1995 Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II7 for Functional Units 818 and II19 - This action was revised to replace the current limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable channel (consistent with LCO 3.0.5) in order to perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with the associated logic. Bypassing the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. Additionally, a note was added clarifying that entry into the associate Conditions and Required Actions can be delayed for up to ours for performance of required surveillance. Entering DG actions during testing is not necessary since the Completion Times for an inoperable DG is much greater than the time to perform the SR (72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months vs 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ). The SR Note time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months takes into account the redundancy of the trip channels and the low probability of an event requiring a LOP start occurring during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.17) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II7 for Functional Units 818 and 819 - This action was revised to replace the current shutdown actions with a requirement to restore channels to an OPERABLE status or to enter the applicable conditions for an inoperable DG. The actions of new LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure plant safety. The loss of the minimum requir ed loss of voltage or degraded voltage channels (one bus) should result in actions that are no more restrictive than actions for the loss of one DG. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.b.l) change. Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit 818 and II19 - The number of channel s was re for matted to require only two undervoltage channels per bus versus two channels of the loss of voltage function and two degraded voltage function per bus. The bus undervoltage design is a one-out-of-two taken twice logic such that one degraded voltage channel and one loss of voltage channel comprise each of the two undervoltage channels. However, due to the system design, either of the degraded voltage or loss of voltage . if functions is inoperable, the entire undervoltage channel must be tripped (i.e., both the degraded voltage and loss of voltage functions are tripped). This change provides greater clarity to the operators without any reduction in the system requirements. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 18) change. - 192- May 1995 LCO 3.3. 1, Table 3.3. 1-1, Function 810 was added for the RCP Breaker Position. This function anticipates the Reactor Coolant Flow - Low trips by monitoring each RCP breaker position to avoid RCS heatup that would occur before the low flow trip actuates. The function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to loss of flow in either a single loop or two loop configuration. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 814 was added for the SI Input from ESFAS. This function ensures that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the RTS, the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal that initiates SI. This is a condition of acceptability . for the LOCA. A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit 020 and associated Action Statement /f14 - This requirement was reformatted to separately denote the Reactor Trip Breakers, the Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms, and the Automatic Trip Logic functions (LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3. 1-1, Functions 815, 816, and 817). This is a Ginna TS Category (vi) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 814 for Functional Unit 5'20 (Automatic Trip Logic) - This action was revised to allow 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to restore the channel to OPERABLE status in Modes 1 and 2 prior to initiating a plant shut down to Mode 3 (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition 9). The restoration time of 6 hours is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate.to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 18) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 814 for Functional Unit 820 (Reactor Trip Breaker) - This action was revised to allow 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to restore the RTB to OPERABLE status in Modes 1 and 2 prior to initiating a plant shut down to Mode 3 (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition R). The restoration time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE RTB is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 19) change. Hay 1995 bb. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II14 for Functional Unit //20 (Automatic Trip Logic) - This action was revised to allow 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to restore the channel to OPERABLE status in Modes 3, 4, and 5 prior to initiating action to open the RTBs (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition C). The restoration time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. ~~~ iz 4.<maw' KguseC W This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.20) change. CC. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II14 for Functional Unit 820 (Reactor Trip Breaker) - This action was revised to allow 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status in Modes 3, 4, and 5 prior to initiating action to open the RTBs (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition C). The restoration time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE breaker is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.20) change. dd. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 814 for Functional Unit 820 (Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms) - This action was revised to only allow 1 hour to open the RTBs following the action to restore the RTB to OPERABLE status in Hodes 3, 4, and 5 (new LCO 3.3.1, Condition C). The current Ginna Station TS allows 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . to perform this action but takes into account a shut down from Modes 1 and 2. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months provides sufficient amount of time to accomplish the action in Modes 3, 4, and 5 in an orderly manner. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.a) change. ee. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II14 for Functional Unit 820 (Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Hechanisms) - This action was revised to specify a limit of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to bypass the RTB for surveillance testing and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to bypass the RTB for maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition R, Notes 1 and 2). The current Ginna Station TS for bypassing during maintenance does not specify a time limit. The ITS would set a limit on this time. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. - 194- Hay 1995 The following changes were made to TS 3.5,2, Table 3.5-2, or Table 3.5-4: 'a ~ TS 3.5.2.2, 3.5.2.3 and Table 3.5-2, Columns 1, 2, and 3 - The details describing the operability acceptance criteria for Trip Setpoints including the columns for the "Total Number of Channels," the "Number of Channels to Trip," and the "Minimum Oper able Channels" were not added for each of the functional units. The columns were replaced with a new column denoting "Required Channels." System design and operational details are not directly related to the operability of the instrumentation and were relocated to the bases or are described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna'TS Category (iii) change.

b. Table 3.5-.2, Column 6 - The column for the "Channel Operable Above" was revised consistent with the changes to the Mode table definitions in ITS Chapter 1.0. Changes to the Applicability different from those discussed in Chapter 1.0 are discussed with the specific changes to the Functional Units. This is a gp~~aas~a+ W( Ginna TS Category (vi) change.

~- 14'~ ~ ea.~~ ~Mvhma~z~Q. ~f1.<<> Cag Sb 0" t-S~~~<. Ap~~ ~ ~ ~ choo ~ d ~ Table 3.5-2, Functional Units ¹1.c and ¹1.d - The notes or remarks which describe operational details for the Pressurizer Pressure interlock, were 1 1 n+ S5b'l ~ ~gui~G ~ames Cz a+0,<~~~ ~in, ~~~4 ~04 F KeacWoet reformatted as Mode Applicabilities and default conditions in the new specifications. 3.3.2.6, was added to specifically denote the A new SR ~Q operability requirements for the Pressurizer Pressure iiS ~if'.t C~ ~6 1+4. ~~CJt, interlock. This is.a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. ~afi ai r~, ammo. CX Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹9 for Functional Units ¹1.b, ¹1.c, ¹1.d, ¹3.b.i, ¹S.c and ¹6.b - This action was revised to replace the current limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable channel for up to gb ours in perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and justified in Reference ggb. This is a Ginna T5 Category (v.b.15) change. - 195- May 1995

f. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹9 for Functional Units

¹l.b, ¹l.c, ¹1.d, ¹3.b.i, ¹5.c and ¹6.b - This action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within ours (rather than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). This change is discussed and justified in Reference'k This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change.

g. LCO 3.3.2, Functional Units ¹l.b, ¹2.b, ¹3.b, ¹4.b,

¹5.a, and ¹6.a, "Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays," were ,added for the ESFAS Instrumentation. Actuation logic consists of all circuitry housed within the actuation subsystems, including relay contacts responsible for actuating the ESF equipment. This is merely a presentation change to the Technical Specifications as this logic circuitry is assumed within the operability of the specific Functions. Additionally, the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for various ~ Functions are required OPERABLE in Hode 4 to support system level manual initiation. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change.

h. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹12 for Functional Unit

¹3.c - The action associated with this Function was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within 48,hours (rather than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). This change is discussed and justified in Reference8b. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change.

i. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹11 for Functional Unit

¹2.b - The action associated with this Function was revised to replace the limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of -an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable c anne or up to . hours in order to perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and justified in Reference (<<~@5. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change. 'o Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹11 for Functional Unit ¹2.b - The action associated with this Function was re allow an ino erable channel to be placed in the tripped condition w>>n hours (rather than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ). This change is discussed and justified in Reference Ck This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. c.~ - 196- Hay 1995

k. Table 3.5-2, Functional Unit ¹3.a - The requirements for the Auxiliary Feedwater Hanual Initiation were not added. The individual AFW pump instrument requirements only provide a manual function which is not assumed in the Ginna Station safety analysis.

These instruments do not monitor parameters which are initial assumptions for a DBA or transient, do not identify a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and do not provide any mitigation of a design basis event. Therefore, the requirement specified for this function does not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and is relocated to the TRH. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change.

1. Table 3. 5-2, Acti on Statement ¹12 for Functional Units ¹3.b.ii, ¹3.c, ¹S.a, and 5.b - The 'ction associated with these Functions was revised to replace the limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable channel for

~to (ES hours in order to perform surveillance testingup of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels 'for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and .justified in Reference CD This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change.

m. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹12 for Functional Units ¹3.b.ii, ¹5.a, and S.b - The action associated with these Functions was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped con ition within hours (rather than I hour). .This change is discussed and justified in Reference Cg)s This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change.

n. Table 3.5-2, Action Stat'ement ¹6 for Functional Unit

¹3.e - The action associated with this Function was revised to a more restrictive restoration time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months for an inoperable channel rather than placing the channel in the tripped condition within one hour. The allowance of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to return the train to an OPERABLE status is justified in Reference @P: This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. - 197- Hay 1995 ~ I I Table 3.5-2, Functional Unit ¹3.f - The requirements for the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Manual Initiation were not added. The individual Standby AFW pump instrument requirements only provide a manual function to the Standby AFW pumps which backup the AFW pumps. The Ginna Station safety analysis does not model the individual manual function for these pumps. These instruments do not monitor parameters which are initial assumptions for a DBA or transient, do not identify a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and do not provide any mitigation of a design basis event. Therefore, the requirement specified for this function does not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and is relocated to the TRH. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 3.5-2, Functional Unit ¹4.2 and Table 3.5-4, Functional Unit ¹3.b - The* requirements for the Containment Ventilation Isolation Function were not added. The containment ventilation components include the shutdown purge and mini-purge lines. These lines are automatically isolated on a containment isolation signal from SI. The R-29 and R-30 instruments are not assumed in the Ginna safety analysis as ESFAS isolation functions. These instruments are, however, required to perform a post-accident monitoring function in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 and are retained in new LCO 3.3.3. These instruments do not monitor parameters which are initial assumptions for a DBA or transient, do,not identify a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and do not provide any mitigation of a design basis event. Therefor e, the Hanual Isolation and High Containment Radioactive Functions do not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and are relocated to the TRM. The Manual Spray and Safety Injection Functions are deleted since these functions are duplicated by other Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) and (ii) change, respectively. Table 3.5-4, Functional Units ¹I.b, ¹I:d, and ¹2.b-These Functional Unit Allowable Values were revised to reflect the actual values used in the accident analyses. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.c) change. May 1995 Table 3.5-4, Functional Units f/7.a and II7.b - The Trip Setpoint for the loss of voltage and degraded voltage functions were revised to provide a minimum value. Criteria for the establishment of equivalent values based on measured voltage versus relay operating time was relocated to the bases for new LCO 3.3.4). This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change.

s. Table 3.5-4, Notes 1 and 2 for Functional Units 86.a and 86.c - The notes which describe design details for the Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low Function and Loss of 4 kV Function were not added.

These details are relocated to the bases or are described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. The following changes were made to'TS 3.5.3 or Table 3.5-3: 'a ~ TS 3.5.3.2, TS 3.5.3.3, and Table 3.5-3, Columns 1 and 2 - The columns for the "Total Required Number of Channels," and the "Hinimum Channels Operable," were not added for each of the functional units. The columns were replaced with a new column denoting "Required Channels." System design and operational details are not directly related to the operability of the instrumentation and were relocated to the bases or are described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change.

b. TS 3.5.3.2 - The restoration time requirement of 7 days for one inoperable channel (for Functions with two channels) was revised to 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time was revised based on industry operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERA8LE channel, the passive nature of the instrument, and the low probability of an event requiring PAH instrumentation during this interval.

This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.21) change. C ~ TS 3.5.3.2 - The action for one channel inoperable for more than 7 days (for Functions with two channels) was revised from requiring a plant shutdown to requiring a Special Report. Due to the passive function of these instruments and the operator's ability to respond to an accident utilizing alternate instruments and methods for monitoring, it is not appropriate to impose stringent shutdown requirements for out-of-service instrumentation. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.21) change. - 199- Hay 1995 iv. A new section SR 3.0.4 was added which establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability. This section does not provide any new requirements. Previous guidance provided by the NRC (e.g., Generic Letter 87-09) regarding the intent and interpretation of existing Specifications is consistent with SR 3.0.4. This SR provides clarifying and descriptive information for the SRs applicability consistent with the use and format of the ITS. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.a) change.

28. Technical Specification 4.1 The following changes were made to TS 4. 1.1 or Table 4. 1-1:

a 0 Table 4. 1-1, Columns 2 (Calibrate) and 3 (Test) Various calibration and testing interval requirements for RTS and ESFAS Functions were revised consistent wi -1484 Changes to the testing interval requirements ifferent from those identified and discussed in NUREG-1431 are discussed with the specific changes to the Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.l5) change.

b. The following new requirements were added to Table

4. 1-1 (Ginna TS Category (iv.a) changes):

1. SR 3.4.2.1 - requires verification every 30 minutes that T., for each RCS lonp is > 540 F when any RCS loop T., is known to be < 547 F.

This surveillance is .intended to ensure that the minimum temperature for criticality is not exceeded'hen the RCS is at less than Hot Zero Power conditions (i.e., 547 F). The surveillance is not required to be performed if the low T., alarm in each loop is reset with a setpoint > 540 F.

2. SR 3.4.3.1 - requires verification every 30 minutes that RCS pressure, temperature, heatup and cooldown rates are within limits. This su} veillance is only required during RCS heatup and cooldown operations, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. The 30 minute Frequency is based on the fact that heatup and cooldown rates are specified in hourly increments which provides adequate margin to correct minor deviations.

- 223- May 1995

3. SR 3.4. 1. 1 - requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months that pressurizer pressure is within limits during MODE 1. This surveillance is similar to current Ginna TS Table 4. 1-1, ¹7 which is performed to support reactor trip functions.

SR 3.4. 1.2 - requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months that RCS average temperature is within limits during MODE 1. This surveillance is similar to current Ginna TS. Table 4. 1-1, ¹33 which is performed to support reactor trip functions.

5. SR 3.4.1.3 - requires performance of a precision heat bal ance to veri fy that RCS flow i s wi thin limits every 24 months. This surveillance is required to be performed within 7 days of entering MODE 1 and reaching 95% RTP.

6. SR 3. 1.6. 1 - Requires verification within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s prior to criticality that the critical control bank position is within limits in the COLR.

7. SR 3. 1.6.4 - Requires verification every 12

. hours when critical that the sequence and overlap limits for the control banks not fully withdrawn are within limits specified in the COLR. 8.. SR 3. 1.8.4 - Requires verification every 30 minutes during MODE 2 PHYSICS TESTS that THERMAL POWER < 5% RTP. Verification of the THERMAL POWER level will. ensure that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated. 9 SR 3.2.4. 1 - Verification with a calculation using the power range channels every 7 days that the gPTR is within limits. Table 4.1-1, Functional Units ¹1, ¹2, ¹3, ¹8, ¹17, ¹23, ¹25, ¹38a, ¹38b, ¹39, ¹40, ¹4la, and ¹41b - The notes or remarks which describe an operational detail, were not added. These details were relocated to the bases or are described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. - 224- May 1995 LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Function ¹10 was added for the RCP Breaker Position. This function anticipates the Reactor Coolant Flow - Low trips by monitoring each RCP breaker position to avoid RCS heatup that would occur before the low flow trip actuates. The function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to loss of flow in either a single loop or two loop configuration. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. LCO 3.3. 1, Table 3.3. 1-1, Function ¹14 was added for the SI Input from ESFAS. This function ensures that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the RTS, the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will initiate a reactor trip upon any signal that initiates SI. This is a condition of acceptability for the LOCA. A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. SR 3.3.1.14, SR 3.3.1.15, SR 3.3.1.16, SR 3.3.1.17, SR 3.3. 1. 18 were added for the Reactor Trip System Interlocks (P-6 through P-10). These surveillances are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current plant status. They are provided to back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during plant conditions under which the safety analysis assumes the Functions are not bypassed. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 4. 1-1, Functions ¹34 and ¹35 - The requirements for the chlorine gas and ammonia gas instrumentation monitors for control room habitability ;were not added. No screening criteria apply for these requirements since the monitored parameters are not part of the primary success path in the mitigation of a DBA or transient. These monitors. are not used for, nor capable of, detecting a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. prior to a DBA. Therefore, the requirements specified for these functions do not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification, screening criteria and are relocated to the TRH. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 4.1-1, Function'al Units ¹I and 2 were revised to require a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) on the power range and the intermediate range channels within 7 days prior to reactor criticality. The ITS Bases states that the 7 day time limits is sufficient to ensure that the instrumentation is OPERABLE shortly before initiating the PHYSICS TESTS. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. - 225- Hay 1995 Table 4. 1-1, Functional Unit ¹4 was revised to include a note requiring a channel check every 30 minutes while implementing HODE 2 PHYSICS TEST exceptions. Verification of the RCS temperature will ensure that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated. This is a, Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 4. 1-1, Functional Units ¹18, ¹28, and ¹29 - The Surveillance requirements for radiation monitors R-1 through R-9 and R-17, emergency plan radiation instruments, and environmental monitors, were not added to the new specifications. These process variables are not an initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis. Therefore, the requirements specified for these functions do not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and are relocated to the ODCH and the Effluent Controls Program described in new Specifications 5.5.1 and 5.5.4, respectively. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Tab. e 4.1-1, Functional Unit ¹25 - The calibrati~o and tes 'equirements for the containment ~sure narrow range -r<gsmitter were not adde specifications. T4: credited in any DBA or instrumen 'ot ent analysis. the new used or This instrument is only o ver at containment pressure remai 1.0 psig and Z -2. 'uring normal o ion. These items were relocated e TRH is is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 4.1-1, Functional Unit ¹3 - This was revised to add a requirement which establishes a surveillance for a SRH CHANNEL CALIBRATION in HODE 6. This calibration consists 'of obtaining the detector plateau or preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves to baseline data and is consistent with current Ginna Station procedures. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 4.1-1, Functional Units ¹14, ¹16, and ¹19 were relocated to the TRH for the same reasons in Section D, items 12.i through 12.iv. as'escribed These are Ginna TS Category (iii) changes. - 226- Hay 1995 Based upon the above information, it has been determined that the proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and do not involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b. 15) The proposed changes to the Ginna Station ~~~ 4X echnical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b. 15) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed elow: I Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed changes~ does not involve a significant increase in the probability~i onsequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed c nges increase the Surveillance Test Intervals (STIs) and Agl's for ins umentation supporting a number of TS Functions. The E are no actua related modifications to any of the affect systems. However, he changes are expected to reduce the test elated plant scrams, re ce the test induced wear on the equip nt, and reduce the number o orced outages related to test activ ies. Therefore, there is no sig ficant increase in the probabi ty of occurrence of . a previously eval ted accident. Westinghou topical reports WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 4 and WCAP-14333 ( . 30) and associated supplements showed tha the effects of ese extensions of STIs and AOTs, which produced ne ligible imp t, are bounded by previous analyses. Further, the NR as r evi ed the reports associated with WCAP-10271-P-A and approved he onclusions on a generic basis. Therefore, the change does not significantly increase the consequences of a previously va ted accident.

2. Operation of Ginna Stat n in accorda e with the proposed change does not create the ossibility of a ew or different kind of accident from any cident previously eva ated. The design and functional opera 'on of the affected equipme t are not changed by the proposed r isions. The proposed changes a feet only the STIs and AOTs an will not impact the function of qnitoring system variables ver the anticipated ranges for noRn 1 operation, anticip ed operational occurrences, or accident conditions.

Furth , the proposed changes do not introduce any ne modes of pla operation, make any physical modifications, or a er any o rational setpoints. Therefore, the possibility of a n or ifferent kind of accident from any previously evaluated is t created. - 279- May 1995

3. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed chan does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety he proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety mits,

'miting safety system settings, or limiting condi 'ons for op ation are determined. The impact of reduced testin , other than as a essed above, is to allow a longer time inte al over which instrum t uncertainties (e.g., drift) may act. plementation of the propos changes is expected to result in a verall improvement in safety du to: 1 Reduced sting which results 'ewer inadvertent reactor trips, les frequent act ion of ESF components, and greater equip nt availa ity. Improvements in the ffectiveness of the operating staff in monitoring and c tro ing plant operation resulting from less frequent sstracti to attend to testing. Therefore, the p posed changes do n significantly reduce'he. margin of safe Based upon the ve information, it has been determ> ed that the proposed changes to t Ginna Station Technical Specification do not involve a significan increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previou evaluated, does not create the possibility f a new. or diffe~ nt kind of accident previously evaluated, and does no involve a siyrfificant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is eluded at the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) d do not involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.l6) Rp~A ~ The proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications as discussed in Section D and denoted by Category v.b. 16) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discusse e ow: Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed nge oes not involve a significant increase in the prob ity or const u~ces of an accident previously evaluate The change revises thWA T from I hour to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to place inoperable DG LOP instrumentation nel in the tripped con on (current Table 3.5-I, Functional Units nd 819). T 'nction is not considered as an initiator for any acc' 'n eviously analyzed. Therefore, this change .does not signi previously analyzed a channel in the t perform its 'd 'nt. Since condition, the Func ety function. Therefore, this signifi~ y incr ease the consequences of a previous ~ ~ 'ill increase the probability of a action is to place the continued to e does not nalyzed acc'nt. ~ - 280- Nay 1995

2. Oper ation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind accident from any accident previously evaluated. The pro sed h nge does not involve a physical alteration of the plant .e., no new different type of equipment will be installed). T proposed change introduces no new mode of plant operation or anges in the methods go> ming normal plant operation. Thus, is change does not cr eate t ossibility of a new or differ kind of accident from any acciden reviously evaluated.

Operation of Ginna St on in accord e with the proposed change does not involve a signifs nt red ion in a margin of safety. The proposed changes do not alt r e manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system se i gy, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. hereford'e this change does not involve a significant reductio >n a margin oMafety.'his change is also consistent with NUR -1431 which has been a roved by the NRC Staff. Based upon the abov nformation, it has been determin d.that the proposed changes to the nna Station Technical Specifications %a not involve a significant 'ease in the probability or consequences o an accident previousl evaluated, does not create the possibility of new or differ kind of accident previously evaluated and does not in lve a sig icant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is conc ed t the proposed chan'ges meet .the, requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and not invo'ive a significant hazards consideration. . LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b. 17) ln RaR~a~ 4 4 The proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b.l7) do not involve a ig if' d *id t.i N*

W

. ~Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed ie s not involve a significant increase in the probabil cons nces of an accident previously evaluated. cha 'r change provides exception to allow bypassing of an in able DG LOP instrumentati hannel and to delay entry into ondition for the channel being tes current Table 3.5-1, F tional Units 018 and 819). This Function not consider as an initiator for any accidents previously analy T efore, this change does not significantly increase the pr 'lity of a previously analyzed accident. The change is e cted to uce the test related plant scrams, reduce the tes nduced wear on equipment, and reduce the number of fore utages related to test ac 'ties. Since trip capability is ntained, the Function will continu <o perform its safety fu ion. Therefore, this change does not sSg 'ficantly incre the consequences of a previously analyzed acciden . - 281- Hay 1995 2 Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind ~cident from any accident previously evaluated. The pro ed chal e does not involve a physical alteration of the plant .e., no new or ifferent type of equipment will be installed). T proposed change in oduces no new mode of plant operation or nges in the methods gove ing normal plant operation. Thus, is change does not create the ssibility of a new or differ kind of accident from any accident eviously evaluated.

3. Operation of Ginna Stat in accord e with the proposed change does not involve a signific t red ion in a margin of safety. The proposed changes do not alte e manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system s in or limiting conditions for operation are determined herefor this change does not involve a significant reducti in a margin of fety. This change is also consistent with NU -1431 which has been a roved by the NRC Staff.

Based upon the abov information, it has been determine that the proposed changes to t4e nna Station Technical Specifications not involve a significant crease in the probability or consequences o n accident previousl evaluated, does not create the possibility of new or differ kind of accident previously evaluated, and does not in ve a si 'cant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concl dgd at the proposed changes meet tbe requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and 8b not involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.l8) The proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b.18) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed below: Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The charige revises the required channels for Diesel Generator (DG) Loss of Power (LOP) start instrumentation (current Table 3.5-1, Functional Units 8 18 and 819) from individually specifying the loss of voltage and degraded voltage channels to requiring two channels of undervoltage per 480 V safeguards bus. The start instrumentation function is not considered as an initiator for any accidents previously analyzed. Therefore, this change does not significantly incr ease the probability of a previously analyzed accident. The change does not further degrade the capability of the OPERABLE DG LOP instrumentation channels from performing their intended function. Therefore, this change does not significantly increase the consequences of a previously analyzed accident. - 282- Hay 1995

2. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in the methods governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The change only clarifies the actual design of the DG LOP instrumentation without affecting the safety function of the specified channels. The requirement for a loss of voltage and degraded voltage function is specified in the surveillance requirement for this LCO. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the above information, it has been determined that the proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and do not involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.l9) ,~ a.~~ ~~ The proposed changes to .the Ginna Station echnical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b. 19) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discusse e o . Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed cha does not involve a significant increase in the probabil or co uences of an accident previously evaluated. e change revises e Required Actions for an inoperable reac trip breaker to allow I to restore the inoperable bre before requiring a plant shutdown r rent Table 3.5-1, F ional Unit 820). The reactor trip breaker are only idered an initiator for previously analyzed trans' h respect to their spurious opening. Therefore, this ch e not significantly increase the probability of a pr evio y analyzed a 'dent. The change does not further degrade, er the circumstances, e capability of the reactor trip eaker from performing its nded function. Therefor his change does not significantly 'ease the cons ences of a previously analyzed accident. - 283- Hay 1995

2. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed chan s not create the possibility of a new or different kin of acc ent from any accident previously evaluated. The p posed change oes not involve a physical alteration of the plant >.e., no new or d> event type of equipment will be installed) changes in the methods overning normal plant operation. Th , this change does not crea the possibility of a new or 'erent kind of accident from an ccident previously evaluat

3. Operation of Ginna Sta on in accordanc ith the proposed change does not involve a signify nt reducti in a margin of safety. The change allows a short perio o res re the inoperable reactor trip breaker before requiring a plan utdown. This time to restot e the inoperable breaker is consist 'th NUREG-1431. Therefore, this change does not involve signific t reduction in a margin of safety. This change is so consisten with NUREG-1431 which has been approved by the C Staff.

Based upon the above i ormation, it has been determine that the proposed changes to the Gi Station Technical Specifications not involve,a significant inc se in the probability or consequences o an accident previously e uated, does not create the possibility of new or nd of accident previously evaluated, and does not i olve a it 'ifferent signifi t reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, is conc ded e proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and 'hat no involve a significant hazards consideration. L'ESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.20) The proposed changes to the Ginna Station chnical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b.20) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discusse e ow. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed 'c ge ~ ~ oes not involve a significant increase in the probabi ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ or co s quences of an accident previously evaluated. revise he Required Actions for one inoperable tra'f e change Automatic Trip Logic r reactor trip breaker) to allow 4 ours to restore the channel t PERABLE status in Nodes 3 4, and 5 prior to initiating action open the reactor tr reakers (current Table 3.5-1, Functional Uni 20). The omatic trip logic is only considered an initiator r ev'ly analyzed transients with respect to their spurious oper n. The reactor trip breakers are only consider ed an initiato or pre 'sly analyzed transients with respect to their spurio opening. The re, this change does not significantly incre the probability of reviously analyzed accident. The change does not further de, under the circumstance the capability of the Automatic 'ogic (or reactor p breaker) from performing its intended nction. There e, this change does not significantly increas the co equences of .a previously analyzed accident. - 284- Hay 1995

2. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed chan does not create the possibility of a new or different kin of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The p posed hange does not involve a physical alteration of the plant >.e., no ne or different type of equipment will be installed) changes in the hi hods governing normal plant operation. Th , this change does no create the possibility of a new or fferent kind of accident fr any accident previously evaluat

3. Operation of Gine Station in accordanc with the proposed change does not involve a ss gificant reduct'n a margin of safety. The change allows a period >f time to store the inoperable Automatic Trip Logic and r eactor W p eaker before requiring a pl ant shutdown. The primary accide of concern during MODES 3, 4, and 5 is the rod ejection acci t w h is very unlikely due to the reduced system pressur and temper ures. Therefore, this change does not involve a' nificant reductio in a margin of safety.

Ba'sed upon the above'rmation, it has been determ'd that the proposed changes to the Gi Wa Station Technical Specification do not involve a significant in ase in the probability or consequences f an accident previously aluated, does not create the possibility o a new or different ind of accident previously evaluated, and does not volve a signif ant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is co uded tha he proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) an o involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.21) The proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications as discussed in Section D and denoted by Category (v.b.21) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed below: Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The change revises the current AOT to restore inoperable Post Accident Monitors (PAMs), revises the actions for inoperable PAMs that are not restored to service within the AOT, and revises the PAM testing frequencies (current TS 3.5.3, 3.6.4.2, and 4.4.7). The PAMs are not considered as an initiator for any accidents previously analyzed. Therefore, this change does not significantly increase the probability of a previously analyzed accident. The proposed change does not further degrade the capability of the system to perform its required function under these circumstances. Therefore, this change does not significantly increase the consequences of a previously analyzed accident. - 285- May 1995

49. Letter from O.M. Crutchfield (NRC) to J. Maier (RG8E),

Subject:

Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment, dated October 7, 1981.

50. WCAP-13029, MERITS 'Program, Phase III, Comments on Draft NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications westinghouse Plants, July 1991.

51. WCAP-12159, MERITS Program, Phase II, Technical Specifications and Bases, March 1989.

52. WCAP-11618, MERITS Program, Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application, November 1987.

53. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.

54, EG&E Report, EGG-NTAP-6175, In-Service Leak Testing of Primary Pressure Isolation Valves, February 1983.

55. Letter from V.L. Rooney, NRC, to J.F. Opeka, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company,

Subject:

Issuance of Amendment No. 105 (TAC No. M89518), dated February 22, 1995'.

56. Generic Letter 88-16, Removal of Cycle-Specific Parameter Limits from Technical Specifications, dated -October 4, 1988.

57. Letter from A.G. Hansen, NRC, to R.E. Link,

Subject:

Amendment Nos. 157 and I61 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 (TACS M85689 and M85690), dated Oecember 8, 1994.

58. Ginna Station LER 95-001,

Subject:

Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Settings Found Above Technical Specification Tolerance During Post-Service Test Due to Setpoint Shifts, Results in Independent Train Being Considered Inoperable, dated Harch 6, 1995.

59. Letter from A.R. Johnson, NRC, to R.C. Hecredy, RG&E,

Subject:

Emergency Response Capability - Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 (TAC No. M80439), dated February 24, 1993.

60. Letter from R.C. Hecredy, RG&E, to A.R. Johnson, NRC,

Subject:

Generic Letter 90-06, Resolution of Generic Issue 70, "Power Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability" and Generic Issue 94, "Additional Low Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light Hater Reactors," dated September 15, 1992.

61. Letter from R.E. Smith, RG&E, to C. Stahle, NRC,

Subject:

Change P-10 Permissive, dated Oecember 22, 1988.

- 315- Hay 1995

I5.i.a TABLE 3.5-1 PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 5

OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO. of MIN. PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OF CHANNEL NO. of CHANNE I.S OPERABI,E BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABl.E NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CIIANNEI,S TO TRIP CHANNEI.S CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MET ABOVE 4

Als~ mad ~/

pQ 1 1. Manual Qbc pger Q.t 1 w en R Is'".t,e ithdrawn FIT~2. 2. uclear Flux Power Rang For low sett.ing, when RCCA xs RIB $ . ow setting 2 of 4 power range I5.'c.

wit.hdrawn channe s great.er I than % F.P. IS.I.A.

4'g82a Itigh setting 4 8 2 when RCCA is wit.hilrawn PUW3 3, Nuclear Flux Intermediate 2 2 of 4 power range when RCCA is Range channels great.er withdrawn han

4. Nuclear Flux Source Range A4 lid eg)eJ ~

2 amp'S.t.e 1 of IS.i.

intermediate range channels greater than 10 4 ~~ ote 2 IS-i..~k Ckap4r Jl Note 3 Flk<6 5. Overtemperature 6 T Hot Shutdown FMtI & 6. Overpower h T Hot. Sl>utilown FLI,O 7.a, 7. Low Pressurizer 5'/ power Pressure Ftl<7 b 8. Hi Pressurizer Pressure Hot. Shutdown FU$ 8 9. Pres~rizer-Hi Mater 5 5/ power Levql, Igj F0+ 9.o 10. Low Flow in one loop 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop 5/ power

~ ~ (either loop) (both loops)

F'Ill 9.b Low'-Flow. oth loops 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop 5% power (both loops) (either loop)

0 0

TABLE 3.5-1 COHTIHUED PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3

OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO. of MIH. PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OF CHANNEL HO. of CHANNELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE HO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS TO TRIP CHANNELS CONDITIONS CANHOT BE MET ABOVE

." !41. Turbine Trip 50% Power 9>1&13. Lo Lo Steam 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop Hot Shutdown Generator Hater Level

-0+I).14. Undervoltage 4 KV 2/bus 1/bus 2/bus 5%, Power IS;. ),.-c Bus (both busses) (on either bus)

Underfrequ ncy 4 KV 2/b 1/bus 2/bus 5% Powe Bus (both buss s) (on eithe bus)

16. Quadrant'ower tilt 1 NA Log individual Hot Shutdown monitor'upper G upper 6 lower lower ex-core ion chamber neutr'on detectors) currents once/hr G after a load A,u~ssed we& change of 10% or Cbg.pgs 3. L after 48 steps of control rod motion

TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 4 5 OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO. of MIN. PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OF CHANNEL NO. of CHANNELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEI.S TO TRIP C11ANNELS CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MFT ABOVE 1 . Circulating Water F d Protection

a. Co enser 2 sets 2 of 3 in 2 of 3 in Power operation Ho . hutdown of 3 either set both sets may be continued for a period o p to 7 days 1 channe 1 set of thr inoperable for a period of 24 hrs. with two channels (2 sets of of three) inoperable.

Otherwise be in hot shutdown in an addit.ional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. Screenhouse 2 sets 2 of 3 in 2 of 3 in Power operation Hot Shutdown of 3 eithe et both sets may be continued for a period of up t days with 1 charm (1 set of three) i erable or fora pe dof 24 hrs. with tw channels (2 sets o of three) inoperable.

Otherwise be in hot shutdown in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Loss of Voltage 2 sets 1 of 2 2of 2 RCS 350 F 480V Safeguards Bus of 2/bus in each in one set in of the one bus two set,s 1S.'~

TABLE 3.5-1 Continued PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 5

OPERATOR ACTION TOTAL NO. of MIN. PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OF CHANNEL I5.A.v NO. of CHANNEI S OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN 1 OR 3 OPERABLE NO FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNEI S TO TRIP CHANNELS CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MET ABOVE Co3.3.9 1.9 . Degraded Vol tage 2/bus 2/bus 1/bus T.. = 350"F 480V Safcguards Bus F98 l5j, 0. Automatic Trip Logic Including Reactor Trip Note 4 Note 5

-uN %~a Breakers

'=u< ll lZ, I.,c.

5,i,.

IS.c.c.

NVTE 2s C anne s should be opera e at al mo es e o c bypass condition S Ca+(C,'I ~ with the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

NOTE 3: Channels shall be operable at all modes below the bypass condition PU 49 except during refueling defined to be when fuel is in the reactor

@~ac'e) vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioncJ or with the head removed.

Onc reactor trip breaker may bc bypassed for surveillance testing provided the other reactor trip breaker is operable.

Fu~l7 NOTE 5: Channels shall bc operable at all modes above refueling when thc g~(ip) control rod drive system is capable of rod withdrawal unless both actor trip breakers are open.

TABLE 3.5-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 5 rilrlh 1 2 4 5 OPFRATOR ACTIQH TOTAL NO. of MIH. PERMISSIBI.F. IF COHDITIONS OF CIIAHHEI.

NO. of - CIIAHHELS OPERABLE BYPASS COLUMN I OR 3 OPERABLE NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANHFLS TO TRIP CIIAHHEI,S COHDITIOHS CANNOT BE MET ABOVE SAFETY INJECTION

a. Manual '>.'t't.c. 350 TRCS

b. Iligh Conta inment SM~ati n T =35 Prcssure 5R 3'3.z4

e. Steam Geiicrator Primary is.i .5 9 I.ow Steam prcssure Pressure/I.oop less than 2000 psig Lco 3.3.2, F 4 Io&3 Pll + ),J d. Pressurizer Low Primary 9 TRCS 350 F Pressure pressiire less than 2000 psig

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY

a. Manual 10 Cold Sliutdown

b. Hi-Hi Containmcnt 2 sets 2 of 3 2 per set Co I II SIIUtdowi1 RI4: 2..C. Pressure (Contain- of 3 in both in either ment Spray) sets set e Nest actuate 2 snitcher simultaneeusty. ~lp.it.rc Adh Pundtue 8 t,b) 'u%>> 4 kc W L j a 4 I44&e Qelaga n

lS;ii.

AM Fanchon + 2.lg, "Ao ~cat. k~<+~ 4q'~ ch<J. Ac4ch4~n Llc.qy

TABI.E 3.5-2 (Continued)

EHGIHEFRED SAFFTY FEATURE ACTUATION IHSTRUlfENTATION IS,u,'.4 IS>Lt,. ~

5 OPFRATOlt ACTION TOTAL HO. o f HI H. PERHISSIBI.E lF CONDITIONS OF CHAHHEL NO. of CllAHHEI.S OPERABI,F. BYPASS COI.UHN 1 OR 3 OPF.RABLF-NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CllANHEI.S TO TRIP CllANHFI.S COND IT I OHS CANHOT BF. HET AI30VE AUXILIARY FEED3>'ATER Hotor and Turbine Driven 15.~ V.

1>. Stm. Gl n. Mat<<r I.l vl I - 1 oM- lou

i. Start. Hotor 3/st.m.g<<n. 2/stm.gcli. 2/stm.g<<n. T . = 350 F l)riven I'limps <<it.lier glln. l>otli gl:ii.

i i. Start Turbine 3/st.m.gcn. 2/stm.gcn. 2/stm.gcn. 12 S

F Driven Pump bnt.h gcll. eit.hcr g<<n.

c. Loss of 2/bus I/bus 2/bus =350

~+g g Vol t.age St.art.

4 KV (l>ot,ll l>us<<.s) (cit.lilir hos)

T l.

Turbine Driven Pump

d. Safety Injection (scc Item 1)

Start. Hotor Driven Pumps

e. Trip of both Feed- 2/pomp 1/pomp 2/pomp 5/ powr r F0<LA Matcr Pumps st.arts hotli pumps eit.hl.r piimp Hotor l)rivrli 1'omps 5.'tt.n

.'>L>>ndl>y H Lor l)r ivcli (5.i .o ll, H lI I I u l 1/pomp 1/piimp 1/3>o>np T 1 .S

. =:3.>Ool:

TABLE 3.5-2 (Continued)

ENOIHEERED SAFFTY FFATURE ACTUATIOH INSTRUMEHTATIOH 557<.o.

5 OPFRATOR ACTIOH TOTAL NO. of MIN. PERH1SS I BI.F. IF CONnlrlONS OV CIIANH EL HO. of CIIAHNF.I.S Ol'I RABI.E BYPASS COI.UHH I OR 3 OPI'.BABI.F.

NO. FUHCT I ONAI. UH IT CIIANHEI,S TO TRI I"" C IIAHHI'.I.S :ONI) I 'I' ONS CANHOT Bl'. HE'f ABOVE COH'fh irido)'ent I HHI'.N'I I SOI.A'I'ION

4. I Cor)t )

I sold L i on FLl+3,cr. - .). M)r)r)<) I IO t.o I)l Sh)) t<lown Bl3s('- . I). Safet.y lnjr.ct.ion (Sec T;) b I r. 3. 5-2, I t rm I)

(hr)to Act.uation) 4.2 Containment Ventilat.ion Isolation

a. Hanua l o d Shut rla n

b. Iligh ontainmrnt Co I)I She ilown Rad activit

c. M ua . pray (See Tnl) (. 3.5)-2, t.em 2a)

d. Safety In ct,ion (Sr)e able 3.5, I t.em I)

A4 R ~~4a~W 3 5, "~~4~ 4A ~4-~ L< r~ a.D Ac+ 4 ~ la )

TABI.E 3.S-2 (Cont.in>><<l)

EHGIHEEIIEI) Shl'ETY Fl'.ATURE ACTllh'I'IOH INS'I'RUHI'.NTATION IS.u.. b LS.tL. c<.

4 5 OPERATOR ACTION TOTAI. HO. o f H I H. Pl'.RHISSIBI.E IF CONI)I'flOHS OF CIIAHNEL NO. of CIIANHEI.S OPERABI.E BYPASS COLIIHH I OR 3 OPERABI.E NO. FUHCTIOHAL UNIT CIIANHF.LS TO Tlt I P CIIAHNEI.S CONDITIONS CAHHOT BE HE'f ABOVE

5. STFAH LINE ISOLATION Fg~g ~ a. - Ili-Ili Steam Flou Ili-Ili SF "I wit.h 12 f 350oF vill> Saict.y ln j<.ction 2

uit.h S.I. S.

SF I. in ./IIBV'..

or eac h I oop <!acl> I <>op lli lli "I'

b. Ili Steam Flow and 2 SF a>td I SF anf 4 l.ow T wit.h 4 Low T 2 Iou T u/)IHV's ol>< n AVG Sa I <! t y I 0 I c <' I 0>i ith S.l. Qr with S.f.vg for c>>eh I oop each loop

= 350oF pgII4,< c. Cont.a inment T p~~~(<) Pressure w/N)V's ol>cn

~g.4 ~ <I. Hanua I I/loop I/loop I/ loop "'1' 350 F Feo~ fc. (c3 u/)IHV's open

6. FEEI)MATFR'LIHE ISOI.ATION FLl< $ .C. a. Safety Injection (Scc Table 3.5-2, It.cm I)

Ili Generator 2/loop in 2/loop in "--"I' '3SOol File g;g b. St.earn 3/loop eit.her loop both loops u/FU 'fso I

~~g gQ) Leve I valves open i

RCS tcmperat.>>rc may bc above 350 F i I'SIV's <>rc closed.

I<IoI<-'4"-":< RCS tcm eraturc may be above 350oF i f FM Isol. valves arc clos<!>st. bc capable of providing a. S. l. signal to <.ach loop.

ACTION STATEMENTS With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in hot shutdown with all RCCA's fully inserted within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

LCo 8.3. i 2- With the number of operable dzannels one less than the Total Cond 0 Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the Pong E inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition witHin c<<a M k hour and the requirements for the minimum number of channels are satisfied. However, the inoperable channel may 'perable be bypassed for up to @hours for surveillance testin of other channels. IS,I,. ma an, O.I..( ~O.i.l; With the number of operable channels less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, be at a condition where operability is not required according to Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

gg,l 3. With the number, of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, sus end all o erations

~ ~

~ ~l~/H involvin ositive react'vit changes and ave all RCCA's

( u y 1nserte w1t in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

3.3. l 4. With the number of operable channels .one less than t e Minimum Operable Channels requirement, suspend all operations LCO QInd X/Z/kIL I..k involving positive reactivity changes. If the channel is not restored to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months

'S;I..

Sa C~'"."'" -On mL..1 reactor trip breaker within the next hour ii g J.C03.3.I 5. With th number o oper e c ann s o e ss an the/Total

~QE Numbe of Chan els, ope ation ma roc ed unt'he Bdxt nay Chamuel Funct'nal Tes/ rovide t e 1n perab e c anne 1s:

C r1ppe con it1,on within hour. With the p aced 1n e Cond"'H number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable QonJ P Channels re IS.~

e at, a con 1t1on w ere channe opera 1 1ty 1s not requ1re according to Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within the next 6 I S.i,se

('0 3 3 f 6. With the number o f operable channels less than the Total

(+Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the j,noperable channel is laced in the tripped condition with1n S.In ~hour. S ou the nex C anne nc 1ona Test re 1re t e lao Z.3.< ypass of an i operable channel t avoid e gener t1on of until is Chan el 86 reacto trip s gnal, o eration m y proce l5.C..< Funct onal Te t. At e time o this ne t Charm Funct1o a Test or 1 at any time the number o oper e c anne s 1s less than the Minimum Operable Channels, be at a condt1on where channel operability is not required according to Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

sad N +a ~5:,.o

I$ .i.5

).c0 33% 7- With the number of operable channels les than the Total Number of na P Channels, operation may proceed provided t e inoperable channel is laced in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . S o ld the next C anne nctxona Tes quatre the yp ss o an snop able channel to avoi the generatio of a trip s'gnal, operat' may proceed until is Channel Fu ctional Test At the time f this Channe Funct'al Test, o x a an ne e number of operable channe s xs ess an e Minimum Operable Channels, either If.i.

a) be a Hot Shutdow within the nex 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months an d RCS tern rature less an 350'F withi the following~ hours Cn88 i or Can@ C b) e ergize the a fected bus wit a diesel gen ator.

Lco 3.3.2 With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Conk 6 Operable Channels required, restore, the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in Hot Shutdown within the Q,~nd 0 next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and at ah RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .. ~ ~ ~

lco83.t 9. With the number of 'operable channels one less than the Total Number coh~Z of Channels re uired, era son may procee until the nex anne (I rove e e xnopera e c anne xs place zn. the 6ti.4 trz ed position withe.n hour. t e nex

+ anne unc zona es or a any mme e num er o operable c anne s zs ess than dc the Minimum Operable Channels required, be at Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and at an RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

trna.w. ". With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels required, restore the inoperable channel to t.a~A 8 operable'tatus within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in Hot Shutdown within an a-z E additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and at cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . 5. I.i.j.

C~): I .I..

J.eo 3'3.2-Wi the number of operable channels less han the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided e inoperable channel is C.> X. placed in the tripped condition within g hours. Should the next

~'nd L Channel Functional Test require the bypass of an inoperable channel to avoid the generation of an actuation signal, operation may.

proceed until this Channel Functional Test. At the time of this Channel Functional Test, or if at any time the number of operable channels is less than the Minimum Operable Channels required, be at Hot Sh in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and at. o u own wxthxn owing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .+~

e'fol

is;ii 4 iiS IS:it.m .

LQO g,g.g 12 With t umber of operable channels less than the Total Number Channels., operation may proceed provided the inoper le channel is placed in the tripped condition Q)gA. X within hour. Should the next Channel Funct'o z nal Test require the bypass of an inoperable channel to avoid the generation of an actuation si nal pera a.on may procee un z. zs anne Functional Test. At the time of this ga'ta Ski.

cv a.

Channe tional Test or if at any txme t e n er c .

operable channels is less than the Minimum Operable Channels required, be at hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and at an RCS temperature less than 350 F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

13. With e number operable ch nels less an the Minimum lS.LL,'e Ope le Chan ls require , operati may continue P pr ided the ontainment r e and val iS t.. ask IS'i i,.CC. i S.<. ~;~ )s;.~.44 hould one eactor tri breake or e inoperable the plant must not be in the operating mo e annel of tri lo ic following a sir hour time period, and the breaker must be open.
If one of the (undervoltage diverse reactor trip breaker trip features or shunt trip attachment). on one breaker is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare breaker inoperable. If at the end of the 48.
~
hour period one trip feature is inoperable repaired or the plant must not be in the operating mode, it must be is.<.dd and the reactor trip breaker must be o en, followin an ad it onal six hour time period. T e rea er s a 1 not e bypassed whx e one o e averse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing c a R,Hoke?. maintenance to restore the breaker to operable status.
s l5. c. ee
1
-"'~x 3 3 TABLE 4.-1-1 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS s CALIBRATIOHS AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHAHHELS
\
2 A;o.
Channel 2&,i,b Calibrate 1;:3',, Hu c1 ea r . Power Range Check M
l (3.3.l I 2.D.3.1) cb')
=.
Test ptKEB)
'F63.3. I)
2) Signa 1
WT; b Remarks e action 33I3 "CS,.i.,! 4;;.-;;,t.,:;; ~:,::. S'Cz.s.i)
' (perm'.ss , stop> traps) 3 3 (w.Q S (3.3.>) 3) U and lower cha s for
-":~'6.km='-~~. axial offset**
4 High setpoint < 9% of rated power)
5) Low setpoint (<25% of rated power) 3 (J),l) it (iV.35 e.3333) 2.'.-'.. Huclea r.Dn termed ia te S P (4'otal's'wi
+3(3.3;l)Range.,'..:.~ "~ '.,- ..'.. 2'), og .le 1; b table
" -'-r"m ssi e =ro etio .C..C
":..: '".:.".:,- "QpS3eJW)Ch Hi39 7 ) 1 Z~Ar~ -. -- S(tnSOCX)
'ange 'S.':e.<
3;.:=:='Nu'cl'.ear+Source
,03.l\ ~ ~~~ ~~ 4 e '=i i S
(3.3. 0 i- '=-"'~='-.7."-(.1';1.i) -;-'~-:-
e i4 ~
.rg
~ e3~~1 3
3O (3.~.3)
,~$ ;-=P Re'a c tor,;.=.Coo la n t S R '1~):,". .-1.) Oye r tempera
.2) Overpower ture-Del ta T (2') Delta T
}o (11.3) i <<'(3.'1, ()
o, ., oolant F g3 (1.1.i) R . 4 ..
~
4;-,'L):.~...',
':~,'Reve 3(1.V. I) g> (1.3. 3) . ~(1,>.<);;-;
I (333.I) io (1.3.I) -
V (1.1.3)
".7 ..~=Pr.essurizer Press ure I
~
S (RR g P.3.3I j~>: (>'.s':i)..":-;:,=-=-.=.=:--'-:.-.;.'-:'4a'ow 3 (3'.3.2)
"I C).)
(3-3-4)
~ I '3 2E.i. c iO (331)
Zstc33'ge';-393)='@ii;::~6 H.A wl ii'. ed~4 R-W.'6 k, e "g, f0,3.t')
e
.g ().1.L) l,g i
-9~~Ro,d<'P o~s. %ion ~'~-'~ s(1 2:)~.; -.",: 1.)'- Hith step counters ~i
=.~~3I nd i'ca'.t-i.o n;-..- ." = je 2) Log rod position indications each
':la,', ",.pcp<Ske" ~- 3
" "~
~i.'
-:;:='~.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when -rod deviation monitor
'Qd~aealy 3~~ ~ >'-':~is out of service
.. SQaeyaC3,[";-" ~
i fjbP~RF<W... Tg";~-'Z'i'Pu+;RC ~ KPAg"...
".. P<SN o-tCeb. .n '-=h -'" ':>.or~."re'fueling;.;s ut own,but: as .soon. as. ossible af ter retUrn o power.
.'Cl. i%~> ~ 0".>4i4~4KwC3' i %eidfAMNa)45'CS:e3+ i <%<Wp244Ae"ec '93c3> ~ ' * '4
"4 TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)
Channel 8'4 C eck Calibrate ~est remarks ABceaeJ 2 Ch We 3. I
10. Rod Position Bank S(1,2) N.A. N.A. 1) Hith rod position indication Counters 2) Log rod position indications each
, 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months when rod deviation monitor l . 's out of service (b.'3. 3') ~~ Q.~.h
~+~pa,)l -. -Steam Generator Lev el S R m.~S;S:<'+";~73 ~ t (33,ih g 1',w.c) g 847.x)
Charging Flow
~)'-.'2;:;-
N.A.
~gg'p=,'13'~.'- Residual-. Heat Remov al N.A.
~a'033)
~R.. N. A-. ~"
g~~~=-:- ~~.Pump: Flow '
r
-<=..-=-...'. 14. 'Boric Acid Storage Tank Level D R -,"-,N A
~ ~ Note 4 a
-. f
15. Re uef ing Hater N.A. ~ ~
. Storage Tank Level Add~>eJ H
~~<~ g.4ig.5
='-, = 16.".,Voplume Control Tank N.A. N.A.
,LeVerla, a
17..Reactor Containment (g r(s.a.~)
8
-2 Pressure=- ~ I ~ C V;~(.l'ar'eye(: 34$ .,2 5
-.-'~~;";18;~Radiation Monitoring D Area Monitors Rl to R9, System Monitor R17
'- ".;,-~ 19. Boiic- Acid Control N:A ~ N.A.
20..Containment. Drain N.A. N.A. 4aar~sed we '.
c.4 pW 8.+f3.'5 a
~~'-,a22

-EValve-'-; Tmeperature N.A ~ N.A.
var~-'@=t"',:@zuterleeke ".
~ "=>~r.--"22.">Pump,-.Valve Interlock I
N. A. N.A.
J(..
Q8-:p4-;;.23. .Turbine Trip N.A. 2,1 ~ c,.C.
(3.i.A, "Set-.Point
=..-.-:;.
24..Accumulator Level and
".;Pressure N.A. Add~>D,~
Mpkr 3.+ f36 4
24 '*
C ICJ A<<<<( r TABLB 4. 1-1 (CO&'.INUED) r
,Channel a
Check Call)traka Test Raaarka F::) ~
25. - Containment Pressure (S :R. a rrow
(- 3.0 ange conta ent pr sure psig) eluded
~=--'-.'.j3.-.
+3
.26.:= Stcam Generator Pressure I
--:.w~l ~="Q'~-:z). QS (3A.'() (y;1.%) 'r3.l.t) CC
<<~"'.-:,27,.'~.-T((t;bine First Stage Pressure 5:---- - -=;- .--'=="-. ~((
.-,~~@'.)28..-.=;-;-Eincrlgency. Plan Radiation
-'Instruments:
-'~~@m<29 ..-<Envi:ionmcntal Monitors NA NA
'~pp)-'..30. -.T,ossl of Voltage/Degraded \
"Cc)9v3~+ ,=-; Voltage 480 Volt NA ((.3.a) (3.3A)
"~'='- . ~.. =--.-." Safeguards Bus 3
'.~~~31='-%.<Tii'pa of Maiii"Feedwater Pumps "ifgj(3 tt)"
NA NA .. R
( :
(( (3.).t) j'(3).t)
(SSgq~)
(s's~) z
':-'-~>Chlorine. etector Control'Room
~ J) NA~ .JJr)
~'.-~Aery. I r 3 J
JJ'~ki
-3'5.: -.Ammonia, -- ntake ontrol Room ~* M i
3 la A:) i =.
.jWj 'j;-36.
'i, <<<<l Radi'ation Detectors, Control (si c')" .
J 3'~:
Room NA. 5'f33.+,
,A'ir Intake; R N "3-'y R' -
i(m) -
a(s.s:s3
-'--~~~ -='Indication".= System .CMM : NA
' '6
.( 4 g~~>38a;)-..TripA'.Br(eaker: =
(W.lb;-
NA NA
++~'(7",~j" -.-g Logic 'Charm'el Testing M 2 and 3 NA =.-
AR,
~)k('3 '3;3).
.3.- j~ a+>> <<P i)<<3J '. 28l)l G Jh 3~
33~~~))~i tk~C~r <!3~&-4 -~'- -- '+,--
TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued)
Channel, zs.i.b
~Cetic ~Ca ib a e ~eat pe~ma (s FMp'5: ts ii
'39 --. "-'Reactor Trip N.A N A notion test Includes independe Fg-'Wt6" '
Breakers te 'ing of both undervoltage and sh t (3.j;i) trip attachment of reactor rip break s. Each of the two r actor a
trip b akers will be te ed on alternat months.
c ig>>
F'u o t '.-,:-,.'-;40. Manual Trip Reactor N.A. N.A. Includes inde ndent sting of both (pp.i)'~:, -undervoltage a s nt trip circ-
"e uitsi. -The test all also verify
.the-operability
'er.
f e bypass break-ar pg. ~ S+~41a. -Reactor'..Trip Bypass. Breaker N.A. N.A. Using test switches in e reactor
L~~)+>>"

.~~~- <~~~~a-~-',~,." 'protecti rack manually ip the reactor trip bypass breaker using h,s.0 the s nt trip coil.
plaf (g.l)l.b Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. ON; A omatically trip the undervolta i attachment.
(SR'.3; 3; f~.lq:..~tko'"~4, 5R.-B'.3.-I.)ga NOTE 1: Logic trains will e tested on alternate months corres ondin to the reactor t SR. Q.p.(.< breaker testi Monthly logi es ng w ve fy the operabi ty of all sets of reactor trip ogic actuating c ntacts on that tr in .(See Note 3). Refueling shutdow testing wil verify the oper ility of all set of reactor trip ctuating contacts n both train . Zn testing, op ation of one set f contacts will suit in a reactor ip r..~
r breaker t ipse t: he operatio of all other se of contacts wil be verified by th use of indic ion, circuitry.
~
- .>o -', r.
~
OTE ! T" ting shal be pei'fo med monthly, less the re ctor trip bre ers are op or sha r.
"- -.":-.=.-..-.=."
.-" ~er'formed
" +e'ee,
'ri'or..'t~o.'artu 4f..te . as not ee performed ithin the 1 st 30 da s
'era e a - ++e ".
g .":. e g ea lq'v+8 pd
-.'The,,s'oui e":,range~
'-~."fwi'thin. 0';..days:pri" 6ri ogic> ma'y A'~~~+..aNoTE--'3"e~
.,;to" 'startup'.
b exclude'd. fro monthly:, tes ng provided i: t s teste
.:=:~-~;-'p...'~~
.,:~'~NOTE~4-'.:~:--'Hheri BAST is required=to-.be operable'..
5~ '
'+1
~ << .A.aeM << re
TABLE 4.1-2 MUM PRE UENCXES OR E U P ENT AND SAMPLI ! TESTS Q~Ql~QflC:
1. Reactor Coolant Chlorido and Fluoride 3 timos/week and at loast Chemistry Samples overy thi.rd day Oxygen 5 times/week and at least every second day except when below 250.F
2. Reactor Coolant Boron Concentration Weekly Boron Pdh~od a iA K
3~ Refueling Water Boron Concentration 'Weekly Storage Tank'Water K Qha,pW 8.4'i3 Sam lc
4. Bor c age or oncentra son. ee 5.
Tank Control, Rods Rod
~ ~
drop times of,all K
K I After>>'vessel. head removal ~K full length rods and at least once per 18 months (1) 6a Full Length Movo any,rod not fully Monthly Control Rod inserted a sufficient number of stops in di.rccti.on to cause a change of position as any-'ne gcWrecsel wA indicated by the rod Q,4)hv Z.l position indication system 6b. Full Length Move each rod through Each Refueling Shutdown Control Rod its full length to verify that thc rod position indication, system transitions. occur"'
Pressurizer-Safety Set point Each Refueling Shutdown Valves " 'K J,-. K
8. Main Stcam Safoty Set point Each'efueling shutdown Valves ,~ ~
@~~vs,i.Aa, S8 3.g,p.9
9. Containment'solation Functioning Each Refueling Shutdown Trip K I
10. Refueling System Functioning Prior to Refueling Interlocks Operations rP ~
~
'K 0K K! ~
K K!
K
~.
~~q q)t,.~, .:
$ ,A~~,
N:~KK ~
K
pQreacJ AH C~e BO Table 4.1-5 Radioactive Effluent Monitorin Surveillance Re irements Channel Source Functional C nel Instrument Check Check Test Ca ration Gross Activity Monitor (Liquid)
a. Liquid Rad Waste (R-18) D(7) M(4) Q(1) R(5)
b. Steam Generator Blowdown (R-19) D(7) M(4) Q( R(5)
c. Turbine Building D(7) M(4) (1) R(5)
Floor Drains (R-21)
d. High Conductivity Waste D(7) M(4) Q(1) R(5)
(R-22)
e. Containment Fan Coolers D(7) 4) Q(2) 'R(5)
(R-16) r I Spent Fuel Pool Heat D(7) M(4) Q(2) R(5).
Exchanger A Loop,(R-20A) ge Spent Fuel Pool. He'at'..'>>;"'-.
Exchanger B Loop (R-20B)'(4) '
D(7 Q(2)
I'(5)'lant Ventilation
a. Noble Gas Activity.(R-.14):.,+ ', D(I) Q(1) R(5)
(Alarm and Zsolation of ~
Gas Decay Tanks) r 'e
b. Particulate Sampler ( 13) t W(7) H.A. N.A. R(5) c
c. Zodine Sampler W(7) H.A. R(5)
(R-10B and R-14A) ~' Aj. If en
>> ~ }', ~, =
d. Flow Rate .Dete nation'<}";t ~";,. N.A. N.A. N".A ";t','.'"' sR(6')
$ dlrp<<cd ':wi Containment Purge ~s',.I', ";ClKo'Pie4-
a. Noble Gas Activity (R-,12)' D(7) PR Q(1) R(5)

b. Particulate Sampler (R-ll');;}:;" W(7) N.A. Q(1) R('5) .

c. Xodine Sampler
( 10A and R-12A) ~
': . W(7) H.A. R(5)
d. low Rate Determi.nation".,'", .; ~ s N.A. H.A. N.A- ', 'R(6)}
llr '" K 4' A'jector Monitor;p,,jj';".';-.;~<qx<}'j(>jp}q~s .',
~'(7)~pj ~,. M M(2) -".,~;;;".~AY -K', ".',R(p)";~;:"",>."'aste l Gas System Oxygen ", ".jj~'g'r".'... D N.A. N.A; ..',",';.'Q('3)',"'Monitor
~ e} ~
< ~ ';}ei ~ ~
iver yQ%, ('0 TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) 4". TABLE NOTATION (1) The Channel Functional Test shall also demonstrate that a tic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm occur if any of the 'lowing conditions exist:
1. Instrument indicates measured levels above th alarm and/or trip setpoint;

2. Power failure.
(2) The Channel Functional Test shall also dern strate that control room alaqn occurs if any of the following conditions exist:
1. Instrument indicates measured le
'(
ls above the alarm II setpoint. Ir 5" W
~
2. Power'ailure. ,
~p j '(
(3) The Channel Calibration shall 'lude ,ll5 ~ the use 'of .standard gas samples containing a nominal:
' ;)( .';
Zero'volume percent xygen; 'and
2. Three:. volume per nt oxygen. II '
I I 5 (4) This check may r are the use of an external source due to high background in
-the sample cha (5) Source used. r the Channel Calibration shall be'raceable to the National Bureau of S ndards (NBS) or shall be obtained from suppliers (e.g. Amersham)
that prov' sources traceable to other, officially-,designated standards ag(;ncie l (6) Flow 'te "for main plant ventilation exhaust and,containment purge exhaust are
, (7) 'I ~ ',
ca ulated,by'he',flaw capacity of ventilationexhaust fans in service and s ll:bei'('determined. at the frequency specified;,~ 4.'-.:,, '";. Applies,'only 'during releases via this pathway.'""-"'..;"
~
r( (, ~ ll ((, C
Attachment IV Evaluation of Increased Surveillance Test Intervals
Evaluation of Quarterly Trip Test Instrument Surveillance Intervals Design Analysis Ginna Station EWR 10226 Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 DA-EE" 95" 0136 Revision 0 August 21, 1995 Prepared by: 8-ZZ-SS Design Engineer Date Approved by: 3- x~='l5 Independent or Lead viewer Date Page 1 of 10
REVISION STATVS SHEET Revision Affected Number Sections Descri tion of Revision All Original Xssue Table 1 Attachment A DA-EE-95-0136 Page 2 of 10 Revision 0
TABLE OP CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE NO. 1.0 Pnnnose 4 2.0 Conclusions 4 3.0 Desi In uts 4 3.1 Set oint Anal ses 4 3.2 RPS and ESFAS Tri Test Procedures 5
.3.3 Instrument Calibration Data Records 5 4.0 Referenced Documents 5 5.0 Assum tions 6 6.0 Com uter Codes 6 7.0 A~nal sls ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 6 7.1 Identif in the Drift Stud Po ulation 6 7.2 Discussion of Tri Test Da ta and Set oint Anal ses 6 7.3 ~ Drift Stud Methodolo 7 8.0 ~ Results 8 Table 1 9 Attachment A 10 DA-EE-95-0136 Page 3 of 10 Revision 0
DESIGN ANALYSIS Evaluation of Quarterly Trip Test Instrument Surveillance Intervals 1.0 Puruose Included within the scope of EWR 10226 - Ginna Station Technical Specification Improvement Program (TSIP) is a change in the required surveillance intervals for testing Reactor Trip System (RTS) and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrument trip setpoints. Current Technical Specifications (TS) require monthly channel operational tests of RTS and ESFAS setpoint devices. Under the TSIP, it is proposed that these testing intervals be increased from monthly to quarterly. The purpose of this evaluation is to perform an instrument setpoint drift study based on historical as found/as left calibration records to show that RTS and ESFAS trip test surveillance requirements can be extended to quarterly intervals without exceeding allowable limits. 2.0 Conclusions This analysis has shown that the Ginna Station Instrumentation listed in Table 1 may be a'ssigned a trip test. surveillance interval of up to three months (quarterly) without instrument calibration drift exceeding the allowable limits specified in existing Ginna Station setpoint documents. 3.0 Desi In uts 3.1 Set oint Anal ses 3.1.1 DA-EE-92-090-21, F411 - RCS Flow, Rev. 0 3.1.2 DA-EE-92-087-21, P429 - Pressurizer Pressure, Rev. 0 3.1.3 DA-EE-92-088-21, P468 - S/G Pressure, Rev. 0 3.1.4 DA-EE-92-085-21, P450 - LTOP RCS Pressure, Rev. 0 3.1.5 DA-EE-92-092-21, T405 - Delta T, Rev. 0 3.1.6 DA-EE-92-039-21, AST 63-3 - Turbine Auto Stop", Rev. 0 3.1.7 DA-EE-92-042-21, P946 - Containment Pressure (Wide), Rev. 0 DA-EE-95-0136 Page 4 of 10 Revision 0
3.1.8 DA-EE-92-089-21, F464 - Main Steam Flow, Rev. 0
3. 1.9 DA-EE-92-041-21, P945 - Containment Pressure (Narrow),
Rev. 0 3.1.10 DA-EE-92-081-21, L426 - Pressurizer Level, Rev. 0 3.1.11 DA-EE-92-050-21, L461 - S/G Narrow Range Level, Rev. 0 3.2 RPS and ESFAS Tri Test Procedures 3.2.1 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.10, RPS Trip Test Calibration for Channel 1, Rev. 8 3.2.2 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.20, RPS Trip Test Calibration for Channel 2, Rev. 11 3.2.3 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.30, RPS Trip Test Calibration for Channel 3, Rev. 13 3.2.4 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.40, RPS Trip Test Calibration for Channel 4, Rev. 8 3.2.5 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.50, Trip Test for Turbine Auto Stop Pressure Switches and Relays 3.3 Instrument Calibration Data Records Approximately 75 Instrument Calibration Data Records were, retrieved and used as inputs to this analysis. These records were obtained from Ginna Station Work Orders and completed Instrument Calibration Procedures and are too numerous to be itemized in this analysis. Copies of these records will be retained in the EWR 10226 document file. 4.0 Referenced Documents 4.1 "Guidelines for Instrument Loop Performance Evaluation and Setpoint Verification", EWR 5126, Rev. 1, dated 08/07/92. 4.2 Commonwealth Edison Correspondence: L.D. Butterfield (WOG) to H.R. Denton (NRC);
Subject:
Rev. 1 of Guidelines for Preparation of Submittals Requesting Revisions to RPS Technical Specifications, dated 9/3/85. 4.3 USNRC Correspondence: C.E. Rossi (NRC) to R.A. Newton (WOG);
Subject:
WCAP-10271 Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, dated 2/22/89. DA- EE 0136 Page 5 of 10 Revision'
Tables for ~ 4.4 MIL-STD-105D, Inspection by "Sampling Attributes". Procedures and 5.0 Assum tions Assumptions are noted in Section 7.0 and Attachment A when applicable. P 6.0 Com uter Codes None. 7.0 A~nal sls 7.1 Identif in the Drift Stud Po ulation 7.1.1 References 4.2 and 4.3 require that instrument drift and safety analysis issues be addressed when proposing an increase in RTS and ESFAS surveillance intervals from monthly to quarterly. The following is a summary of the review effort performed under this analysis. 7.1.2 Functional descriptions and model numbers of the instrumentation within the scope of this analysis are provided in Table 1. This population was developed by identifying all components included within the RTS and . ESFAS strings. The specific model numbers for each of these components were then identified; Table 1 was created by sorting on model numbers. There are a total of 59 instruments subject to this evaluation. 7.1.3 Monthly instrument trip test results over a one year period for a sample of the identified equipment were retrieved from Ginna Station Central Records/Document Control. Sample sizes were determined based on Reference 4.4 for a 95/95 confidence level. 7.2 Discus ion of Tri Test Data and Set int Anal ses 7.2.1 RTS and ESFAS setpoint devices are currently checked monthly in accordance with the procedures listed under Reference 3.2. Instrument Setpoint Data Sheets specify the desired setpoint and acceptance criteria for each setpoint device. Each time an instrument is tested, its current setpoint is measured and recorded on the applicable data sheet. These values are the "as found" instrument values. DA-EE-95-0136 Page 6 of 10 Revision 0
7.2.2 The "as found" instrument setpoint values may differ from the "desired/calculated" values specified, on the Data Sheet due to the combined effects of one or more of the following instrument uncertainty terms
a. Instrument accuracy (Ia)

b. Instrument drift (Id)
C. Instrument calibration tolerance (It)
d. Test equipment accuracy (MTE)
The statistical worst-case effects of these uncertainties are incorporated in the design analyses of the Instrument Setpoint Verification Project (Setpoint Analyses) and used to evaluate the adequacy of existing instrument setpoint and calibration values specified in the calibration procedures. The total instrument uncertainty (TIU) is given by: T2'U = [ra' Id~ + I t~ + MTZ~] ~~~ The "as- found" acceptance criteria or allowable tolerance band (ATB) specified on the Data Sheet is typically 1.0% of the instrument's calibrated span and is, in fact, the "It" term described above. If during an instrument calibration an "as found" value is within the ATB, no other action is required. The instrument may be left as is until the next calibration interval. However, if an "as found" value is outside the ATB or approaching the limit of the ATB, the instrument must be adjusted or recalibrated back into the ATB as required by the calibration procedure. In either case, the "as left" calibration data is recorded on the Data Sheet. 7.3 Drift Stud Methodolo 7~3~1 The Data Sheets for the sample instrumentation population were reviewed for the period from January 1994 through January 1995. For the first Surveillance Data Sheet, the "desired/calculated" value was subtracted from the "as found" value and recorded. For the second Surveillance Data Sheet, the "as found" value is subtracted from the first surveillance "as left" value. The third surveillance "as found" value is then compared to the second surveillance "as left" value and so on until one year of data is available. DA-EE-95-0136 Page 7 of 10 Revision 0
The "as found" minus "as left" values represent the observed instrument setpoint variance, in percent of span, for that surveillance interval (typically one month). After examining the surveillance history of each device, the worst-case consecutive five month variance is selected and documented on the Summary Sheet for each instrument manufacturer/model number in the sample population. 7.3.3 The worst "as left/as found" difference is calculated over a period of one month up to five months (i.e. the worst case drift may actually be between two consecutive monthly tests rather than over the maximum five month period). If the worst-case five month setpoint variance is within the TIU band, a quarterly trip test interval has been demonstrated to be, acceptable (with two months margin which encompasses the 25% extension allowed by TS) . 8.0 Results 8.1 Specific results for each manufacturer/model number are provided in the Attachment A Summary Sheets. In one case (PC-478A/B, Attachment A, page 3) the worst case variance was found to exceed the TIU by 0.18%. Per Reference 4.4, one failure out of a sample of 8 specimens is allowed. In all other cases, the worst case setpoint variance was observed to be within the TIU. Therefore, quarterly channel trip test surveillance intervals are considered to be acceptable for the instrumentation included within the scope of this analysis. DA-EE-95-0136 Page 8 of 10 Revision 0
Table 1 Instrumentation Applicable to Increased Surveillance Intervals DA-EE-95-0136 Page 9 of 10 Revision 0
Evaluation of Quarterly Test Intervals for RTS and ESFAS 21 Aug 95 MODEL VENDOR NAME EIN SELECTED SHORT DESC 63S-AR 63S-AR FOXBORO FC411 No RX CLNT FLO LOOP A ALM 63S-AR FOXBORO FCA12 No RX CLNT FLO LOOP A ALM 63S-AR FOXBORO FC-413 No RX CLNT FLO LOOP A ALM 63S-AR FOXBORO FC414 No RX CLNT FLO LOOP B ALM 63S-AR FOXBORO FC415 'o RX CLNT FLO LOOP B ALM 63S-AR FOXBORO FC<16 No RX CLNT FLO LOOP B ALM 63S-AR FOXBORO PC<29A PRZR DUPLEX ALMUNIT 63S-AR FOXBORO PC-429E PRZR ALM-VARIBLELP TRI 63S-AR FOXBORO PC<30A No PRZR DUPLEX ALMUNIT 63S-AR FOXBORO PC-430H No PRZR ALM-VARIBLELP TRI 63S-AR FOXBORO PC-431A No PRZR DUPLEX ALMUNIT 63S-AR FOXBORO PC-431J No PRZR ALM-VARIBLELP TRI 63S-AR FOXBORO PC<49A PRZR PRESS BISTB LO TRIP EWE 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS TABLE 1 DA EE-95-0136 lof5 21 Aug 95
MODEL VENDOR NAME SELECTED SHORT DESC Total 13 63S-BR 63S-BR FOXBORO FC464A No SG A STM FLOW ALARM 63S-BR FOXBORO FCA65A No SG A SF HI/HI-HITRIP 63S-BR FOXBORO FC-474A No S/G B STM FLO ALM/IRIP 63S-BR FOXBORO FC475A No S/G FLOW LOOP B BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO LC426A/B PZR LVLDUPLEX ALM-HIT 63S-BR FOXBORO LC-427A/C No PZR LVLDUPLEX ALM-HIT 63S-BR FOXBORO LC-428A/E No PZR LVLDUPLEX ALM-HIT 63S-BR FOXBORO LC-461A/B No SG ANR HI LVL/RXFW ISOL 63S-BR FOXBORO LCA62A/B No S/G A LO-LO/HILVLALM 63S-BR FOXBORO LCA63C/D No S/G A LEVEL BISTABLE 63S-BR FOXBORO LC-471A/B No S/G B ALARMBISTABLE 63S-BR FOXBORO LCA72A/B No SG B LO-LO/HILVL/RXFW EWR 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS TABLE 1 DA EE-95-0136 2of5 21 Aug 95
MODEL VENDOR NAME SELECTED SHORT DESC 63S-BR FOXBORO LC<73C/D No SG B HI LVLALM/FWISOL 63S-BR FOXBORO PC429D/C No PRZR PRESS DUPLEX ALAR 63S-BR FOXBORO PC<30E/F No PRZR PRESS DUPLEX ALAR 63S-BR FOXBORO PCA31VG No PRZR PRESS DUPLEX ALAR 63S-BR FOXBORO PC468A SG A PRESS BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO PC469A No SG A PRESS LO/LO-LO BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO PC-478A/B Yes S/G B PRESS BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO PC-479A No S/G PRESS LOOP B BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO PCA82A S/G A STM PRESS BISTB AL 63S-BR FOXBORO PC483A No SG B PRESS LO/LO-LO BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO PC-945A/B No CNMT PRESS HI RX TRIP 63S-BR FOXBORO PC-946A/B No CNMT PRESS BISTB HI/HI-HI 63S-BR FOXBORO PC-947A/B Yes CNMT PRESS BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO PC-948A/B No CNMT PRESS BISTB HI/HI-HI 63S-BR FOXBORO PC-949A/B No HI CNMT PRESS TRIP BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO PC-950A/B No HI CNMT PRESS/SPRAY BIST 63S-BR FOXBORO TCROIA/D TAVG HI TEMP TRIP BISTB EWR 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS TABLE 1 DA EE-95-0136 3of5 21 Aug 95
MODEL VENDOR NAME SELECTED SHORT DESC 63S-BR FOXBORO TC-402A TAVG HI & LO TEMP TRIP 63S-BR FOXBORO TC-403A No TAVG HI & LO TEMP TRIP BI 63S-BR FOXBORO TC-404A/D No TAVG LO/HI TRIP BISTB 63S-BR FOXBORO TC-405 A/B DELT SP2 OP TRIP/ROD STO 63S-BR FOXBORO THOS C/D No DELT SP2 OVERTEMP TRIP 63S-BR FOXBORO TC406A/B No DELT SP2 OP TRIP 63S-BR FOXBORO TCA06C/D No DELT SP2 OT TRIP 63S-BR FOXBORO TCA07A/B No DELT SP2 OP TRIP BISTABL 63S-BR FOXBORO TCA07C/D No DELT SP1 OT TRIP BISTABL 63S-BR FOXBORO TCA08A/B No DELT SP2 OP TRIP/ROD STO 63S-BR FOXBORO TC408C/D No OT DELT SP2 TRIP/ROD STO Total 40 63U 63U FOXBORO PCA50 RC OVERPRESS PROT ALM EWE 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS TABLE 1 DA EE-95-0136 4of5 21 Aug 95
MODEL VENDOR NAME SELECTED SHORT DES C 63U FOXBORO PC<51 No RC OVERPRESS PROT ALM 63U FOXBORO PC<52 RC OVERPRESS PROT ALM Total DA-23-127 DA-23-127 MERCOID PS-2019 TURB LO PRESS SW TRIP DA-23-127 MERCOID PS-2020 TURB LO PRESS SW TRIP DA-23-127 MERCOID PS-2026 No TURB LO PRESS SW TRIP Total EWR 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS TABLE 1 DA EE-95-0136 5of5 21 Aug 95
Attachment A instrument Drift Study Summary Sheets DA-EE-95-0136 Page 10 of 10 Revision 0
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Attachment V Evaluation of Differences Between Standard Technical Specifications and Proposed Technical Specifications This attachment discusses the technical differences from WCAP-10271 and standard technical specifications (STS) which would exist ~f11 twin~; implementation of the technical specification changes as proposed in this LAR. These differences are, in general, not created during the implementation of these changes, but are due to existing requirements (e.g., the current Ginna Station technical specifications may be less restrictive than standard technical specifications). The proposed resolution of these differences is also provided. Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-1 Function Difference Resolution STS have separate Required Actions for MODES This issue is addressed in the 1 and 2andMODES3,4, and 5. CTS has the 5/26/95 submittal (see change same Required Actions for all MODES. As such, D.15.i.d on page 188 of STS require opening the reactor trip breakers Attachment A) such that the if within 1 hour in MODES 3, 4, and 5 the 48 CTS Required Actions will hour Completion Time is not met while CTS do be changed to reflect STS. not have this requirement. STS have additional Required Actions for an This issue is addressed in the inoperable channel related to reducing 5/26/95 submittal (see change THERMALPOWER and the Power Range D.15.i.i on page 189 of Neutron Flux trip setpoint gr monitoring QPTR Attachment A) such that the with an inoperable Power Range Neutron Flux- CTS Required Actions will High channel. be changed to reflect STS. STS have additional Required Actions for an This issue is addressed in the inoperable channel related to reducing 5/26/95 submittal (see change THERMALPOWER and the Power Range D.15.i.j on page 189 of Neutron Flux trip setpoint gr monitoring QPTR. Attachment A) such that the CTS Required Actions will be changed to reflect STS.
Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-1 Function Difference Resolution The CTS require opening the reactor trip breakers This issue is addressed in the within 48 hours ifthe Source Range Neutron 5/26/95 submittal (see Flux channel is not restored to OPERABLE Condition I of proposed LCO status while in MODE 2 in addition to stopping 3.3.1) by removing this more all positive reactivity additions. restrictive CTS requirement. Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A No difference after changes. N/A No difference after changes. N/A 10 No difference after changes. N/A No difference after changes. N/A 12 No difference after changes. N/A 13 No difference after changes. N/A 14 No difference after changes. N/A 15 No difference. (Note that the Underfrequency 4 N/A KVBus function is being relocated to the TRM in the 5/26/95 submittal since it is not credited in the accident analyses, nor as a secondary function for Ginna Station.) 16 No difference. (Note that the QPTR monitor N/A function is being relocated to ITS Chapter 3.2, "Power Distribution Limits" in the 5/26/95 submittal since this is not a RTS function.) 17 No difference. (Note that the Circulating Water N/A Flood Protection function is being relocated to the TRM in the 5/26/95 submittal since it is not a RTS function, nor is it credited in the accident analyses.) S 0 I
Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-1 Function Difference Resolution 18 The Loss of Voltage - 480 V Bus function is The reliability of the Ginna comprised of 2 sets of 2 channels each. To Station design is consistent actuate this function, at least 1 channel in boah with that assumed in STS sets must energize. This is different than the STS such that no change to the assumed design of 2/4 logic. proposed technical specifications is required. 19 The Degraded Voltage - 480 V Bus function is The reliability of the Ginna comprised of 2 sets of 2 channels each. To Station design is consistent actuate this function, at least 1 channel in boOh with that assumed in STS sets must energize. This is different than the STS such that no change to the assumed design of 2/4 logic. proposed technical specifications is required. 1 20 a. The CTS do not have any time limit for a. This issue is addressed in performing maintenance on diverse trip the 5/26/95 submittal (see functions while STS limits this to 2 hours. change D.15.i.ee on page
b. The CTS allow 6 hours to open the RTBs ifa 194 of Attachment A) diverse trip function is not restored within 48 such that the CTS hours while STS limits this to 1 hour. Required Actions will be changed to essentially reflect STS.

b. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change D.15.i.dd on page 194 of Attachment A) such that the CTS Required Actions will be changed to reflect STS.
STS contain OPERABILITYrequirements for This issue is addressed in the the RTS permissives while the CTS have no such 5/26/95 submittal (see change requirements. , C.23.xix on page 73 of Attachment A).
Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-2 Function Difference Resolution The CTS only requires the SI ESFAS function At Ginna Station, all above 350'F (with the exception of high functions automatically containment pressure) while STS require this initiated by SI (except function above Cold Shutdown (> 200'F). containment isolation) are only required above 350'F (i.e., there is no system other than containment isolation which requires actuation of SI below this MODE). No change required. The CTS requires that high-high containment The CTS and proposed TS pressure actuation of the Containment Spray requirements are more ESFAS function be OPERABLE above Cold conservative than STS. In Shutdown while STS only require it above 350'F. addition, the CTS Also, this actuation function is comprised of 2 Applicability reflects the sets of 3 channels each at Ginna Station. To actuate this function, at least 2 channels in sets must energize. This is different than the
~ accident analysis assumptions for Ginna Station and is maintained.
WCAP assumed design of 2/4 logic. As such, the proposed TS require an inoperable channel to be tripped within 6 hours versus the WCAP requirement to place the channel in bypass. No difference after changes. N/A STS organize the Containment Isolation function The CTS are equivalent to with respect to "Phase A" and "Phase B" while STS since all containment Ginna Station has no such distinction. isolation valves receive the l. N same signal. Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-2 Function Difference Resolution
a. STS allow the option to declare inoperable the a. The CTS aremore MSIVwith the inoperable manual isolation conservative than STS and channel ifthe channel is not restored to no change is required.
OPERABLE status within 48 hours. The CTS b. The CTS and proposed TS have no Required Actions for an inoperable requirements are more MSIV and therefore require a shutdown. conservative than STS and
b. The Containment Pressure actuation of the considered acceptable.
Steam Line Isolation ESFAS function is 2/3 logic at Ginna Station while the WCAP used 2/4 logic. As such, the proposed TS require an inoperable channel to be tripped within 6 hours versus the STS requirement to place the channel in bypass. The CTS require Feedline Isolation above 350'F The CTS Applicability is while STS only require it above Hot Shutdown. more conservative than STS and reflects the accident analysis assumptions. No change required. STS contain OPERABILITYrequirements for This issue is addressed in the the ESFAS permissives while the CTS have no 5/26/95 submittal (see change such requirements. C.24.ii on page 75 of Attachment A). STS contain OPERABILITYrequirements for No change required. the Automatic Switchover to the Containment Sump which is not incorporated at Ginna Station.
Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Function Difference Resolution
a. The CTS require the daily comparison of the a. This issue is addressed in heat balance calculation with the Power Range the 5/26/95 submittal (see Neutron Flux - High function "as soon as SR 3.3.1.2 of proposed possible after return to power" while STS LCO 3.3.1) such that the require adjustment ifthe difference is > 2% CTS will be changed to when > 15% THERMALPOWER. essentially reflect STS.

b. The CTS require a monthly comparison of the b. This issue is addressed in incore detector measurements to the axial flux the 5/26/95 submittal (see difference while STS require adjustment ifthe SR 3.3.1.3 of proposed difference is > 3%. LCO 3.3.1) such that the

c. The CTS require a quarterly comparison of the CTS will be changed to incore detector measurements to the axial flux reflect STS.
difference "as soon as possible after return to c. This issue is addressed in power" while STS require adjustment when > the 5/26/95 submittal (see 75% THERMALPOWER. SR 3.3.1.6 of proposed LCO 3.3.1) such that the CTS will be changed to reflect STS. STS require refueling interval calibrations and This issue is addressed in the quarterly channel operational tests of the Source 5/26/95 submittal (see Range Neutron Flux function while the CTS do Attachment B, Table 3.3.1-1, not have these surveillance requirements. Functional Unit 84) such that CTS will be changed to reflect STS. STS require a quarterly verification that the This issue is addressed in the permissives are in their required state while the 5/26/95 submittal (see change CTS have no such requirement. C.23.xix on page 73 of Attachment A) such that the CTS will be changed to essentially reflect STS. No difference after changes. N/A No difference after changes. N/A No difference after changes. N/A No difference after changes. N/A
Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Function Difference Resolution No difference after changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A 10 Not affected by changes. N/A No difference after changes. N/A 12 Not affected by changes. N/A 13 Not affected by changes. N/A 14 Not affected by changes. N/A 15 Not affected by changes. N/A 16 Not affected by changes. N/A 17 No difference after changes. N/A 18 Not affected by changes. N/A 19 Not affected by changes. N/A 20 Not affected by changes. N/A 21 Not affected by changes. N/A 22 STS require monthly actuation logic and master The Ginna Station design relay testing and quarterly slave relay testing does not allow for online while the CTS only requires these tests on a testing of this refueling outage basis. instrumentation. The WCAP "acknowledges this design limitation without requiring any changes. Therefore, no change required. 23 No difference after changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A 25 No difference after changes. N/A 26 No difference after changes. N/A Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Function
¹ Difference Resolution 27 No difference after changes. N/A 28 Not affected by changes. N/A 29 Not affected by changes. N/A 30 Not affected by changes. N/A 31 Not affected by changes. N/A 32 No difference after changes. N/A 33 No difference after changes. N/A 34 Not affected by changes. N/A 35 Not affected by changes. N/A 36 Not affected by changes. N/A 37 Not affected by changes. N/A 38a Not affected by changes. N/A 38b Not affected by changes. N/A 39 Not affected by changes. N/A 40 Not affected by changes. N/A 41a Not affected by changes. N/A 41b Not affected by changes. N/A STS include surveillance requirements for the This issue is addressed in the RTS permissives while the CTS have no such 5/26/95 submittal (see change testing. C.23.xix on page 73 of Attachment A).
STS include surveillance requirements for the This issue is addressed in the ESFAS permissives while the CTS have no such 5/26/95 submittal (see change testing. C.24.ii on page 75 of Attachment A). Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Function Difference Resolution The WCAP includes sur veillance requirements This issue is addressed in the for the ESFAS actuation trains including their 5/26/95 submittal (see change slave and master relays. C.24.xv on page 77 of Attachment A). Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-2 Function Difference Resolution Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A No affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A No difference. N/A 10 Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A 12 Not affected by changes. N/A 13 Not affected by changes. N/A 14 Not affected by changes'. N/A 15 Not affected by changes. N/A 16 Not affected by changes. N/A 17 Not affected by changes. N/A 18 Not affected by changes. N/A 19 Not affected by changes. N/A Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-5 Function Difference Resolution l.a Not affected by changes. N/A l.b Not affected by changes. N/A l.c Not affected by changes. N/A 1.d Not affected by changes. N/A l.e Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A 2.b Not affected by changes. N/A 2.c Not affected by changes. N/A 2.d Not affected by changes. N/A 3.a STS require a shift check of the Containment The Containment Ventilation Ventilation Isolation - Containment Radioactivity Isolation function is not High channels while the CTS only require this credited in any accident daily when the plant vent is being used. Also, analysis. This system is STS require a monthly channel calibration while redundant to the Containment the CTS is quarterly. Isolation function. Therefore, the CTS surveillance requirements are considered acceptable. 3.b STS require a shift check of the Containment The Containment Ventilation Ventilation Isolation - Containment Radioactivity Isolation function is not High channels while the CTS only require this credited in any accident weekly when the plant vent is being used. Also, analysis. This system is STS require a monthly channel calibration while redundant to the Containment the CTS is quarterly. Isolation function. Therefore, the CTS surveillance requirements are considered acceptable. 3.c Not affected by changes. N/A Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-5 Function Difference Resolution 3.d Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A Not affected by changes. N/A . 0}}

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