ML17263A210
| ML17263A210 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1993 |
| From: | ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17263A207 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9304090209 | |
| Download: ML17263A210 (13) | |
Text
Attachment A Revise the Technical Specification pages as follows:
Remove Insert.
3.6-4 3.6-4 3.6-6 3.6-6 3.6-7A 3.6-7A 3.6-10 3.6-10 P'DR 9'304090209 930405 PDR ADOCK,05000244
TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM MAXIMUM/
PENT. ZSOLATZON ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION TIME NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY *(SEC) 29 Fuel Transfer tube flange NA (1) NA 100 Charging line to "B" loop CV 370B NA (2) NA 101 SZ Pump 1B discharge CV 889B NA (5) NA CV 870B NA (5) NA 102 Alternate charging to "A" cold leg CV 383B NA (2) NA 103 Construction Fire Service Water welded flange NA MV 5129 NA 105 Containment Spray Pump 1A CV 862A NA (3) NA 106 "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal water CV 304A NA (2) inlet 107 Sump A discharge to Waste Holdup Tank AOV 1728 60 AOV 1723 60 108 RCP seal water out and excess letdown to MOV 313 60 (4) NA VCT 109 Containment Spray Pump 1B CV 862B NA (3) NA 110 "B" RCP seal water inlet CV 304B NA (2) NA 110 SZ test line MV 879 NA (5) NA 111 RHR to "B" cold leg MOV 720 (20) NA (6) NA 112 Letdown to Non-regen. Heat Exchanger AOV 371 60 AOV 200A 60 AOV 200B 60 AOV 202 60 RV 203 NA 113 SZ Pump 1A discharge CV 889A NA (5) NA CV 870A NA (5) NA 120 Nitrogen to Accumulators CV 8623 NA AOV 846 60 120 Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) to Gas AOV 539 60 MV 546 (7) NA Analyzer (GA)
MAXIMUM MAXIMUM/
Pg PENT. ZSOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION TIME NO IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) BOUNDARY *(SEC) 141 RHR-tl pump suction from Sump B MOV 850A (13) NA MOV 851A (13) NA 142 RHR-g2 pump suction from Sump B MOV 850B (13) NA MOV 851B (13) NA g
0 143 RCDT pump suction AOV 1721 60 AOV 1003A 60 AOV 1003B 60 201 Reactor Compart. Cooling Unit A & B MV 4757 (16) NA MV 4636 (16) NA 202 "B" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot & main) MV 1076B NA SOV-IV-3B NA Normally Closed MV 1084B NA SOV<<ZV-5B NA Normally Closed 203 Contain. Press. Transmitter PT-947 & 948 PT 947 NA MV 1819C NA PT 948 NA MV 1819D NA 203 Post accident air sample to "B" fan MV 1563 NA MV 1565 NA MV 1566 NA MV 1568 NA 4P 204 Shutdown Purge Supply Duct [Purge Supply flange (22) NA [5] AOV 5869 (22)
Duct] [AOV 5870]
I 205 Hot leg loop sample AOV 966C 60 MV 956D (14) NA 206 Przr. liquid space sample AOV 966B 60 MV 956E (14) NA 206 "A" S/G sample AOV 5735 60 (17) NA 207 Przr. Steam space sample AOV 966A 60 MV 956F NA 207 "B" S/G sample AOV 5736 60 (17) NA 209 Reactor Compartment. Cooling Units A & B MV 4758 (16) NA NA MV 4635 (16) NA NA 210 Oxygen makeup to A & B recombiners MV 1080A NA SOV ZV-2A NA Normally Closed SOV IV-2B NA Normally Closed 0
0
o'O.
PENT.
IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION ISOLATION BOUNDARY MAXIMUM ISOLATION TZME *(SEC)
ISOLATION BOUNDARY MAXIMUM/
ZSOLATZON TIME
- (SEC)
O315 Service Water from "C" fan cooler MV 4643 (16) NA (11) NA g
316 Service Water to "B" fan cooler MV 4628 (16) NA (ll) 0 317 Leakage test supply flange NA MOV 7443 NA Normally Closed 318 Dead weight tester (decomissioned) welded shut NA welded shut NA 319 Service Water from "A" fan cooler MV 4629 (16) NA (ll) NA 320 Service water to "C" fan cooler MV 4647 (16) NA (11) NA 321 A S/G Blowdown AOV 5738 60 (17) NA 322 B S/G Blowdown AOV 5737 60 (17) NA 323 Service Water from "D" fan cooler MV 4644 (16) NA (11) NA 324 Demineralized water to Containment CV 8419 NA AOV 8418 NA 4P 332 Cont. Press. Trans. PT-944, 949 & 950 PT 944 NA MV 1819G NA PT 949 NA MV 1819F NA I
PT 950 NA MV 1819E NA 332 Leakage test and hydrogen monitor MV 7448 NA cap NA instrumentation lines MV 7452 NA cap NA MV 7456 NA cap NA SOV 921 NA (21) NA SOV 922 NA (21) NA SOV 923 NA (21) NA SOV 924 NA (21) m ~
0 0
(10) The pressure transmitter provides a boundary.
(11) Normally operating incoming and outgoing lines which are connected to closed systems inside containment and protected against missiles throughout their length, are provided with at least one manual isolation valve outside containment (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-2).
(12) The single remotely controlled containment isolation valve is normally open and motor operated. The cooling water return line is not directly connected to the reactor coolant system and, should remain open while the coolant pump is running. A second automatic isolation barrier is provided by the component cooling water loop, a closed system. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-1a)
(13) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-2. Sump lines are in operation and filled with fluid following an accident.
Containment leakage testing is not required. The valves are subjected to RHR system hydrostatic test.
(14) Normally operating outgoing lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System are provided with at least one automatically operated trip valve and one manual isolation valve in series located outside the containment. In addition to the isolation valves, each line connected to the Reactor Coolant System is provided with a remote operated root valve located near its connection to the Reactor Coolant System. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg.
5.2.2-1)
(15) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-17.
(16) The Serv'ice Water system operates- at a pressure higher than the containment accident pressure and is missile protected inside containment. Therefore, these valves are used for flow control only and need not be leak tested.
(17) The S/G tubes and secondary side provide a closed system inside containment.
(18) Fire Service Water will be used only to fight fires inside containment. AOV 9227 is closed during power operation. A containment isolation signal to automatically close this valve is not required because a spurious signal during a fire may be hazardous to personnel and may impede fire suppression activities.
(19) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-16.
(20) Containment leakage testing is not, required per L. D. White, Jr. letter to Dennis L. Ziemann, USNRC dated September 21, 1978.
3.6-10 Proposed
Attachment B Page 1 of 2 Attachment B The purpose of this amendment is to revise several penetration listings in Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 to support an Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) of the Ginna Station containment during the 1993 Refueling Outage. As a result of preparing for this test, RG&E determined that a discrepancy existed between the Technical Specifications and the NRC approved In-Service Test (IST)
Program. Currently, Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 identifies two manual valves (820 and 204A) as containment isolation valves (CIVs) for Penetration 112. As part of the third 10 year IST program submittal for Ginna Station, RG&E identified that valves 820 and 204A would be removed from the IST program since their pressure and containment isolation functions were being performed by valves 200A, 200B, and 202 (Reference a). The NRC accepted this change by Reference (b). Therefore, RG&E requests that Table 3.6-1 be changed to replace valves 820 and 204A with AOVs 200A, 200B, and 202. In addition, relief valve 203, which is located between containment isolation valves 200A, 200B, 202 and 371 for this penetration, will be added to the table. All five valves are currently in the Ginna Station Appendix J testing program. This change will enable Penetration 112 to meet the explicit requirements of GDC 56. The current Table 3.6-1 Note 17 will also be deleted since it is no longer used.
Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 also identifies a manual valve in series with an air-operated valve as the CIVs for Penetrations 206, 207, 321, and 322. These penetrations contain the steam generator (S/G) blowdown and blowdown sample piping. RG&E requests that the manual valves be removed from Table 3.6-1 since the S/G tubes and secondary side provide one containment barrier. These penetrations will then be treated analogous to the main steam and feedwater lines which are of similar configuration. Table 3.6-1 Note 17 will then be revised and added to these four penetrations to reflect the use of the S/G tubes and secondary side as a containment boundary.
Table 3.6-1 Note 7 will also be deleted from these four penetrations. This note was originally applied to the S/G blowdown lines since they penetrate the missile shield inside containment in order to reach the S/Gs. However, the NRC has approved the use of "leak-before-break" (LBB) with respect to large diameter Reactor Coolant System piping at Ginna Station (Reference c). The use of LBB excludes the consideration of the dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures per 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4. In addition, plant walkdowns and a review of Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topic III-S.A, Effects of Pipe Break on Structures, Systems, and Components Inside Containment, (Reference d) confirms that even though these four lines penetrate the missile shield, they are not susceptible to any high energy line sources. This includes the affects of pipe whip and jet impingement. Therefore, the dynamic effects associated with any high energy line break inside containment does not require consideration with respect to the S/G closed system. The blowdown lines inside containment are also Seismic Category I and Safety Class 2. Consequently, the lines are considered missile protected based on their present location and have the necessary closed system design requirements.
Attachment B Page 2 of 2 RG&E will also eliminate 10 CFR 50 Appendix J testing related to the four AOVs for Penetrations 206, 207, 321, and 322 since there are not any requirements to perform this testing. Instead, RG&E will hydrostatically test these valves in accordance with 'the original requirements as outlined in the approved third 10 year IST program for Ginna Station (IWV-3421 through 3425) as a minimum.
This will provide the necessary assurance that the valves will perform their required isolation function. These changes will be documented in the Ginna Station IST Program which will be submitted to the NRC following the conclusion of the 1993 Refueling Outage since RG&E expects to make several other unrelated IST Program changes at that time. These changes will not require NRC approval prior to implementation.
In accordance with .10 CFR 50.91, these changes to the Technical Specifications have the facility in been evaluated to determine if the operation of accordance with the proposed amendment would:
- 1. involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- 2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated; or
- 3. involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
These proposed changes do not increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident or create a new or different type of accident. Furthermore, there is no reduction in the margin of safety for any particular Technical Specification.
The detailed changes are described in Attachment C.
Therefore, Rochester Gas and Electric submits that the issues associated with this Amendment request are outside the criteria of 10 CFR 50.91; and a no significant hazards finding is warranted.
References:
(a) Letter from R.C. Mecredy, RG&E, to A.R. Johnson, NRC,
Subject:
Inservice Pump and Valve Testing Program, dated May 23, 1989.
(b) Letter from A.R. Johnson, NRC, to R.C. Mecredy, RG&E,
Subject:
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power P1ant IST Program for Pumps and Valves, 1990-1999 Third 10-Year Interval, dated April 15, 1991.
(c) Letter from D. DiIanni, NRC, to R. Kober, RG&E,
Subject:
Resol uti on of USI'-2, "Asymmetric LOCA Loads ", dated September 9, 1986.
(d) NUREG-0821, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Systematic Evaluation Program, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, December 1982.
Attachment C Technical Specification Changes I Changes Effect Revise Table 3.6-1 Penetration now satisfies Penetration 112 to delete explicit requirements of valves 204A and 820 and add GDC 56.
valves 200A, 200B, 202, and 203.
- 2. Revise Table 3.6-1 Penetration is now Penetration 206, 207, 321I consistent with the main and 322 to replace manual steam and feedwater isolation valves with S/G penetrations. S/G closed closed system. Also delete system provides an Note 7 from these acceptable containment penetrations. barrier.
- 3. Delete current Table 3.6-1 Current Note 17 is no Note 17 and replace with new longer used. New note Note 17. provides information with respect to S/G closed system. No technical change.
TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES MAXIMUM MAXIMUM/
PENT. ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION TIME NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) ISOLATION BOUNDARY *(SEC) 29 Fuel Transfer tube flange NA (1) 100 Charging line to "B" loop CV 370B NA (2) NA 101 SI Pump 1B discharge CV 889B NA (5) NA CV 870B NA (5) NA 102 Alternate charging to "A" cold leg CV 383B NA (2) NA 103 Construction Fire Service Water welded flange NA MV 5129 NA 105 Containment Spray Pump 1A CV 862A NA (3) NA 106 "A" Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal water CV 304A NA (2) NA inlet 107 Sump A discharge to Waste Holdup Tank AOV 1728 60 AOV 1723 60 108 RCP seal water out and excess letdown to MOV 313 60 (4) NA VCT 109 Containment Spray Pump 1B CV 862B NA (3) NA 110 "B" RCP seal water inlet CV 304B NA (2) NA 110 SI test line MV 879 NA (5) NA 111 RHR to "B" cold leg MOV 720 (20) NA (6) NA 112 Letdown to Non-regen. Heat Exchanger AOV 371 60 ~%4A XOV:'::200A RA 60.
m Sue
+14~+
RV,'.::.:2,03 AOi~~20,0E, AOV,".".:":202:.
i@
~
113 SZ Pump 1A discharge CV 889A NA (5) NA CV 870A NA (5) NA 120 Nitrogen to Accumulators CV 8623 NA AOV 846 60 120 Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) to Gas AOV 539 60 MV 546 (7) NA Analyzer (GA)
MAXIMUM MAXIMUM/
PENT. ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION'TIME NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) ZSOLATZON BOUNDARY *(SEC) 141 RHR-¹1 pump suction from Sump B MOV 850A (13) NA MOV 851A (13) NA 142 RHR-¹2 pump suction from Sump B MOV 850B (13) NA MOV 851B (13) NA 143 RCDT pump suction AOV 1721 60 AOV 1003A 60 AOV 1003B 60 201 Reactor Compart. Cooling Unit A & B MV 4757 (16) NA NA MV 4636 (16) NA NA 202 "B" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot & main) MV 1076B NA SOV-ZV-3B NA Normally MV 1084B NA SOV-IV-5B Closed NA Normally~
Closed 203 Contain. Press. Transmitter PT-947 & 948 PT 947 NA MV 1819C NA PT 948 NA MV 1819D NA 203 Post accident air sample to "B" fan MV 1563 NA MV 1565 NA MV 1566 NA MV 1568 NA 204 Shutdown Purge Supply Duct [Purge Supply flange (22) NA [5] AOV 5869 (22) 4l Duct] [AOV 5870]
Ch 205 Hot leg loop sample AOV 966C 60 MV 956D (14) NA I
Ch 206 Przr. liquid space sample AOV 966B 60 MV 956E (14) NA 206 "A" S/G sample AOV 5735 60 NA 207 Przr. Steam space sample AOV 966A 60 MV 956F NA 207 "B" S/G sample AOV 5736 60 NA 209 Reactor Compartment. Cooling Units A & B MV MV 4758 (16) 4635 (16)
NA NA m ~
210 Oxygen makeup to A & B recombiners MV 1080A NA SOV IV-2A NA Normally SOV ZV-2B Closed NA Normally Closed 8
0
a.
MAXIMUM MAXIMUM/
PENT. ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION'TZ~
NO. IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION BOUNDARY TIME *(SEC) ZSOLATION BOUNDARY *(SEC) 316 Service Water to "B" fan cooler MV 4628 (16) NA (11) NA 317 Leakage test supply flange NA MOV 7443 NA Normally Closed 318 Dead weight tester (decomissioned)- welded shut NA welded shut NA 319 Service Water from "A" fan cooler MV 4629 (16) NA (ll) NA 320 Service water to "C" fan cooler MV 4647 (16) NA (11) NA 321 A S/G Blowdown AOV 5738 60 NA 322 B S/G Blowdown AOV 5737 60 323 Service Water from "D" fan cooler MV 4644 (16) NA (ll) NA 324 Demineralized water to Containment CV 8419 NA AOV 8418 NA 332 Cont. Press. Trans. PT-944, 949 & 950 PT 944 NA MV 1819G NA PT 949 NA MV 1819F NA PT 950 NA MV 1819E NA 332 Leakage test and hydrogen monitor MV 7448 NA cap NA instrumentation lines MV 7452 NA cap NA MV 7456 NA cap NA SOV 921 NA (21) NA SOV 922 NA (21) NA SOV 923 NA (21) NA SOV 924 NA (21) NA
~ P (10) The pressure transmitter provides a boundary.
(11) Normally operating incoming and outgoing lines which are connected to closed systems inside containment and protected against missiles throughout their length, are provided with at least one manual isolation valve outside containment (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-2).
(12) The single remotely controlled containment isolation valve is normally open and motor operated. The cooling water return line is not directly connected to the reactor coolant system and, should remain open while the coolant pump is running. A second automatic isolation barrier is provided by the component cooling water loop, a closed system. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg. 5.2.2-la)
(13) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-2. Sump lines are in operation and filled with fluid following an accident.
Containment leakage testing is not required. The valves are subjected to RHR system hydrostatic test.
(14) Normally operating outgoing lines connected to the Reactor Coolant System are provided with at least one automatically operated trip valve and one manual isolation valve in series located outside the containment. In addition to the isolation valves, each line connected to the Reactor Coolant System is provided with a remote operated root valve located near its connection to the Reactor Coolant System. (FSAR 5.2.2 pg.
5.2.2-1)
(15) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-17.
(16) The Service Water system operates at a pressure higher than the containment accident pressure and is missile protected inside containment. Therefore, these valves are used for flow control only and need not be leak tested.
(17)
MNg+P" >UP 'P~.. 'S%% ..g?N~"y+8%CP ~ MgWC YW:, Ã>Y >g'e QP4CAVPehSWPV Y V ~'P~4Q Tne::,:Sy'G:;;::tubes',:".:::,::and:::;::s'e'conairj:.:."s'iai .':jr'ov'icte ji.:.:,:::,:glosi d~ iyjjtem!rxniiide::,'.:':b'oi"i,0'a!i'n'ieri'iij (18) Fire Service Water will be used only to fight fires inside containment. AOV 9227 is closed during power operation. A containment isolation signal to automatically close this valve is not required because a spurious signal during a fire may be hazardous to personnel and may impede fire suppression activities.
(19) See FSAR Table 5.2.2-1 and Figure 5.2.2-16.
(20) Containment leakage testing is not required per L. D. White, Jr. letter to Dennis L. Ziemann, USNRC dated September 21, 1978.
3.6-10
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