ML17264A151

Proposed Tech Specs Implementing WCAP-10271,its Assoc Suppls & Other Re Changes W/Respect to RTS & ESFAS

ML17264A151
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/31/1995
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17264A149	List: ML17264A148 ML17264A150 ML17264A151
References
NUDOCS 9509080085
Download: ML17264A151 (115)

Text

U DN CSUl 0

Rm a.

UO gO Q

0 to KUl

'e c'lUI OO ro OS

'QOM UM~

4 l

C q

NO.

FUNCTIONAL UHIT 1.

Manual TOTAL NO. of ClfANNEI.S high setting 4

2.

Nuclear Flux Power Range low setting 4

TABLE 3.5-1 PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATIOH HO. of CllAHHEI,S TO TRIP MIN.

PERMISSIBLE OPFRABLE BYPASS CIIANNELS CONDITIONS 5

OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS QF COLUMN 1

OR 3

CANNOT BE MET For low setting, 2

Note 1

3 2 of 4 power range channels greater than 10% F.P.

CllANHEI.

OPERABLE ABOVE when RCCA is withdrawn when RCCA is withdrawn when RCCA is wit.hdrawn 3.

Nuclear Flux Intermediat.e 2

Range 4.

Nuclear Flux Source Range 2

1 2 of 4 power range channels greater than 10% F.P.

2 1 of 2 intermediate range 'channels 10 greater than 10 amps.

3 Note 1

4 Note 1

when RCCA is withdrawn Hote 2

5.

Overtemperature d T 6.

Overpower d T 7.

Low Pressurizer Pressure Hote 3

Hot Shutdown Hot Shutdown 5/ power 8.

Hi Pressurizer Pressure 3

9.

Presqprizer-lli Water Levql.

10.

Low Flow in one loop

(> 50% F.P.)

Low Flow both loops fe.5X40% F.P.)

3/loop 2/loop 2/loop (either loop) (both loops) 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop (both loops) (either loop)

'Hot Shutdown 5% po~er 5% power 5/ power

TABLE 3.5-1 CONTINUED PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION NO.

FUNCTIONAL U TOTAL NO. of HO. of CHAHHELS CHAHHELS TO TRIP MIN.

OPERABLE CHANNELS PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1

OR 3

CAHNOT BE MET CHANNEL OPERABLE ABOVE 11.

Turbine Trip Low Au~~

Oih P~3,<~

50% Po~er 13.-

Lo Lo Steam Generator Water Level 3/loop 2/loop

.2/loop Hot Shutdown 14.

Undervoltage 4

KV Bus 15.

Underfrequency 4

KV Bus 2/bus 2/bus 1/bus (both busses) 1/bus (both busses) 2/bus (on either bus) 2/bus (on either bus) 5% Power 5% Power 16.

Quadrant power tilt monitor (upper lower ex-core neutron detectors)

NA Log individual Hot Shutdown upper

& lower ion chamber currents once/hr

& after a load change of 10% or after 48 steps of control rod motion

)5

TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION NO.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO. of CHANNEI.S NO. of CHANNELS TO.TRIP 3

4 MIN.

PERMISSIBLE OPERABLE BYPASS CHANNELS CONDITIONS 5

OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1

OR 3 CANNOT BE MF.T CHANNEL OPERABLE ABOVE 17.

Circulating Water Flood Protection a.

Condenser b.

Screenhouse 2 sets of 3 2 sets of 3 2of3in 2of3in either set both sets 2 of 3 in 2 of 3 in either set.

both sets Hot Shutdown Power operation may be continued for a period of up to 7 days with 1

channel

(

1 set of three) inoperable or for a period of 24 hrs. with two channels (2 sets of of three) inoperable.

Otherwise be in hot shutdown in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Hot Shutdown Power operation may be continued for a period of up to 7 days with 1

channel (1 set of three) inoperable or for a period of 24 hrs. with two channels (2 sets of of three) inoperahle.

Otherwise be in hot shutdown in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

18.

Loss of Voltage 480V Safeguards Bus 2 sets of 2/bus 1 of 2 in each set in one bus 2of 2 in one of the two sets RCS

TABLE 3.5-1 Continued PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Il x

19.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT Degraded Voltage 480V Safeguards Bus TOTAL NO. of CHANNELS 2/bus NO. of CHANNELS TO TRIP 2/bus MIN PERMISSIBLE OPERABLE BYPASS CHANNEIS

'ONDITIONS 1/bus 5

OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1 OR 3 CANNOT BE MET CHANNEL OPERABLE ABOVE T'

350"F 20.

Automatic Tri Lo ic Reactor Trx rea ers Note 4

Note 5

Ul I

CO 2'L.

C.M~<g NOTE 1:

NOTE 2 NOTE 3:

NOTE '4:

NOTE 5:

F.P.

i/4~~

~l~~

When block condition exists, maintain normal operation.

Channels should be operable at all modes below the bypass condition with the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

Channels shall be operable at all modes below the bypass condition except during refueling defined to be when fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioneJ or with the head removed.

Onc reactor trip breaker may be bypassed for surveillance testing provided the.other reactor trip breaker is operable.

Channels shall be operable at all modes above refueling when the control rod drive system is capable of rod withdrawal unless both reactor trip breakers are open.

Full Power S.5<+ pb~, ~+

~ 50 Ig Pg~

+o +0 P'Q~

TABLE 3.5"2 EHCINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION NO.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO. of CHAHHFLS HO. of CIIANNELS TO TRIP MIN.

OPERABLE CIIANHEI.S PERMISS I BI,F.

BYPASS CONDITIONS 5

OPERATOR ACTIOH IF CONDITIONS OF COLUHH 1

OR 3

CANNOT BE HET CIIAHNEI.

OPERABLE ABOVE 1.

SAFETY IHJECTION a.

Manual

b. Iligh Containment.

Prcssure St.earn Genera t.or I.ow Steam

~

Pressure/Loop Pressurizer Low Prcssure Primary prcssure less than 2000 psig Primary pressure less than 2000 psig 350 I

TRCS = 3SO.F 2.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY

a. Hanual Hi-Hi Containment Pressure (Contain-ment Spray) 2 sets of 3 2"::

2of3 in bot.h sets 2 per set in either set 10 Cold Shut. down Cold Shutdown

~ Must actuate 2 switches simultaneously.

AuWw~c A~oMn

~+le'Q <c M~'~n S~ ~n

0

TABI.F. 3.5-2 (Continued)

FNGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION IHSTRUHENTATION NO, FUNCTIONAL UHIT TOTAL NO, of CHAHNEI.S NO. of CIIAHHEI.S TO TRIP HIN.

OPERABI.E CIIAHHF.I.S PERHI SS I BI.F.

BYPASS CONDITIONS 5

OPERATOR ACTION IF COHDITIONS OF COI.UMH I

OR 3

CANNOT BF. HET CHAHHEL OPF.RABLF.

ABOVE 3.

AUXILIARYFEEDWATFR Motor and Turhine Driven J

~

Mafrrrrr I I/pump 4A-Stm.

G<<n. Water I.rrvr'I-low-low I /pllnlp

]/pump T

.=35OF ltCS i.

!>t, rrl Hotor Driv<<ll Pllmps i i. Start Turbine Driven Pump 3/st.m. g<<n.

2/st.m. ger>.

2/stm. gr n.

<<itll<<r grin.

bot.h gr!ll.

3/stm.gcn.

2/stm,gcn.

2/stm.gcn.

both gcn.

either gcn.

T

.=350 F

TRCS 350 F

Loss of 4 KV Volt.age Start Turbine* Driven Pwnp 2/bus 1/bus 2/bus (both buses)

(cit.llcr bus)

RCS Sa fety Inject.ion Start. Motor Driven Pumps r

~ Trip of both Fecd-watcr Pumps st.arts Motor Driven Pumps (scc It.cm 1) 2/pump I/pump 2/pump l>oth pumps ei the'r pump 5/ pour r St'rndl>y Motor Drivcrl rl ~ Hallua I I/pump I/pump I/p<<rnp

TABLE 3.5-2 (Continued)

FHGIHEERED SAFETY FEATVRE ACTVATIOH IHSTRVMFHTATIOH NO.

FUHCTIONAL UNIT 4.

COHTAIHMENT ISOl,ATION TOTAL NO. of CHAHNEI.S NO. of CHAHHF.I.S TO TRIP" MIH.

Ol'L'RhB I.F.

CIIAHNF.I,S PFRM ISS I BI,F.

BYPASS CONI)IT IONS 5

OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COI,VMH 1

OR 3

CANNOT BE MET CHAHHEL OPF.RABLF.

ABOVE 4.

1 Cottla itImeni Isolation M.>>>ua 1

10 Co Id Sh>>t.down Safet.y lt>jcct.ion (Auto Actuation)

(Scc Table 3.5-2, I t.em

~ 1) 4.2 Containment Ventilat.ion Isolation a.

Manual High Containment Radioactivity Manual Spray Safety Injection (See Tab 1 c 3. 5-2, I t.cm 2a)

(Sce Table 3.5-2, Item 1) 13 13 Cold Shutdown Cold Sltutdown

TABI.E 3.5-2 (Continnr<l) t:.HOIHEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACrHArIOH INSrRUNEHTATIOH HO.

FUHCTIONAL UNIT TOTAI.

NO. of CIIAHHF.LS HO. of CllANNEI.S TO TR I P HIH.

OPERABI,E CIIANNELS 4

5 OPFRATOR ACTION PERIIISS I III.E IF COHI)l'flONS OF ByPASS COI.INH I

OR 3

COHDITIOHS CANNOT BF. IIE'f CllAHHEL OPERABI,E ABOVE STEAN LINE ISOI.ATIOH a.

Ili-lli Steam Flow 2 Ifi"lliSF wit.h SafeLy lnjr'.ction with S. I.

for each loop 3<m-lli Stcam Flow an<I 2 lli SF and 2 of 4 I.ow T

< with 4

Low T Saf<.ty Injcr'Pin wi th S. I. Br each loop Conta inment Prcssure I

SF with S. I. in each loop 1 Hi SF an<1 2 LowT wi th S.$. for each I oop "T

-"350~F w/%>V's open

'T

= 350 l'/J'18V' op<'<<

T

=

150oF w/PHV's open

<I.

Hanua 1 6.

FEEDMATER LINF. ISOLATION 1/loop 1/loop I/loop T

= '150oF.

w/3HV's open a.

Safety Injection lli Steam Generator Level 3/loop 2/loop in either loop (Sce Table 3.5-2, Item 1) 2/loop in both loops

"-':T

~)

= 350 l'alves open RCS temperature may be above 350 F i f HSIV's'rr. close<I.

RCS temperature may bc above 350 F i f FM Isol. valves arc closr<l.

"-: " Both trains must be capable of providing a S.l. signal to each loop.

AuM~~ <

mg~ ~ ~~c~

Mg <Vg <<p~

~~,c-~<<

~

cvfl~o~

ACTION STATEMENTS With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in hot shutdown with all RCCA's fully inserted within the next 6

hours.

2.

With the number of operable cb-one?s one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the ino erable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 4 ~um u.

and the requirements for the minimum number of channels operable are satis fied.

However, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to hours for surveillance testing of other channels.

I chaw.

~ ?

With the number of ope'rable channels less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, be at a condition where operability is not required according to Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

C.h 3.

With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and have all RCCA's fully inserted within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With the number of operable channels one less than the

.Minimum Operable Channels requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

If the channel is not restored to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, open the reactor trip breaker within the next hour.

With the number of operable channels one less than the Nu

Channels, operation may proceed unti

next, Channel Fun Test provided the i le channel is placed in the trippe dition 'n 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

With the number of operable cha ss than the Minimum Operable Channels require

, or at the time e next required Channel onal Test referenced

above, be condition w

channel operability is not required according Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

()

With the number of operable channels less an t e Tote Nu of Channels, operation may proceed, provided the inoperab annel is placed in the tripped condi 'z,thin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Shou next Channel Functiona require the bypass of an inopera hannel to the generation of a reactor trip signal, opera proceed until this Channel Functional Test At t me o next Channel Functional

Test, or i.f at mme the number of o le channels is less tha Minimum Operable

Channels, be a

ondtion wh c annel operability is not required according olumn 6 of Table 3.5-1 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Amendment t/0.

24 3.5-13

7.

With the number of operable channels less than the Total Number of

Channels, operation may proceed provided he ino erable channel is placed in the tripped condition within hou ho ld the next anne u

zona Test quare e

ass of an in erable chan to avo'he generat' of a tr'ignal, ope tion may p

ceed unti this Channel unctional u

tional Test r

f-at any time the number of operable channels is less than the Minimum Operable Channels be at Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and an RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> wc~~, ~ ~o.~~ ~~~%~a o~ W Z 4aua P~r~ M~O~adi ~+

bQ fb~

raha-x-.

8.

With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels

required, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and at an RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ha~~+ L2.

9.

10.

With the number of operable channels one less than the Total Number of Channels required, operation may proceed n

provided the inoperable channel zs placed in the on within g~~.

4-@he nex4-Chan l

+at any time the number of operable channels is less than e Ma.nzmum Operable Channels required, be at Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and at an RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels

required, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in Hot Shutdown within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and at cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

With the number of operable channels less than the Total Number of

Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within hours Shoul e nex Channe u etzoOal es r are the by s of an 'inop le channel to avo'he genera n of an a

ation signa operation m

pro ed until thi hannel Fun a.ona~est A +>e~~e of is nnel.punctio,,~et~or Z

a any time the number of operable

'hannels is less than the Minimum Operable Channels required, be at Hot Shutdown within 6

hours and at Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Ho~~~, ~,~p~~~ ~~~ ~~

C 40,~

< f3

~pO-'5~%f

~p ~ Q ~M+ 4C

'rt-Xl V t( eR nor.~ ~O ~i~Z-Amendment No. p, 51 3.5-14

Char With the number of operable channels less than the Tota N

of Channels, operation may proceed provid e

inopera channel is placed in the trippe ondition within' hou Should the next Channe nctional Test require the bypass f an inoperab annel to avoid the generation of an actuate.

, operation may proceed until this Channel Fu 'al At the time of this Channel Function est, or.if at a

'me the number c..

operable c

els is less than the Mx 'perable Chan

required, be at hot shutdown within 6 s and an RCS temperature less than 350'F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

(0 C~y w5 13.

14.

With the number of operable channels lese than the Minimum Operable Channels

required, operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maint awned closed.

i~o~~,~<~~ ~ ~~M oPPAA8u= S~s ~i~i~ ~~~ ac If one of the diverse reactor trip breaker trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) on one breaker is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />" or declare breaker inoperable.

If at the end of the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period one trip feature is inoperable it must be repaired or the plant must not be in the operating

mode, and the reactor trip breaker must be open, following an additional six hour time period.

The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to operable status.

Shoul one eactor trap breaker be inoperable he plant must not be z.n e operating mode following six hour time period, and the breaker must be open.

ch t+ a~~ f +f'

~ Mk~wm 3L N.A. P(2) N.A. P(2) CN) ) (2) Calibra te Test D(1) (2)(4) Q*(3) P(2)(5 Cc Remarks

1) Heat balance calcula tion**

2) Signal to WT; bistable action (permzssiver rod stop>

traps)

3) Upper and lower chambers for axial offset**

4) High setpoint

(<109% of rated power) 5) Low setpoint (<25% ot rated power) <.)

1) Once/shift when in service

2) Log level; bistable action (permissivei rod stopi trxp) z3

1) Once/shift when in service

2) Bistable action (alarmi trip) 3)

1) Over tempera ture-Del ta T

l

2) Overpower Delta T

S 4 Kv Yoltage Frequency N.A. ) 9. Rod Position Indication S(lr 2) 6. Pressurizer Hater Level 'e 7. Pressurizer Pressure S r ) ) 8 ~ N.A. c or P rotec tion circui ts only. Q'4)Q Yah cc)e)) M~ A %Q CLkk A-~ i~&oKon

1) Hith step counters 2)

Log rod position indications each 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when rod deviation monitor is out of service By means of the movable in-core detector system. Not required during hotr cold, or refueling shutdown.but as soon as possible af ter retur:n to power. .Channel "0 TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued) 10. Rod Position Bank Counters 11. Steam Generator Level

12. Charging Flow

13. Residual Heat Removal Pump Flow

~cack S(1,2) N.A. N.A. N.A. ~ho~ R ~~~ lg R N.A. 1) 2) H.A. N.A. ~eel'bx'ate Test Remarks Hith rod position indication Log rod position indications each 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when rod deviation monitor is out of service , 4<~ amdt'PtMamt v.

14. Boric Acid Storage Tahk Level D

N.A. Note 4

15. Refueling Hater Storage Tank Level N.A.

N.A. 16. Volume Control Tank Level H.A. N.A.

17. 'Reactor Containment Pressure

1) Isolation Valve signal

18. Radiation Monitoring System

19. Boric Acid Control D

N.A. H.A. Area Monitors Rl to R9 System Monitor R17 20. Containment Drain Sump Level N.A. N.A.

21. Valve Temperature Interlocks H.A.

N.A. 22. Pump-Valve Interlock

23. Turbine Trip Set-Point

24. Accumulator Level and Pressure H.AD N.A.

N.A. C ho.ea, R Ptot~> N.A. ~+p tA<~ Sdamap VaSbFc. ~~~ ~P- 'C~ Amendment No. P F 1-6 ' TABLE.4.1-1 (CONTINUED) ek ~Q Channel Descri tion Check Calibrate Teat Remarks 25. Containment Pressure 26. Steam, Generator Pressure S 27. Turbine First Stage Pressure ~ ho 28. Emergency Plan Radiation Instruments ~wry R Narrow range containment pressure (-3.0, +3 psig) excluded Foc-SY aWcKo~ 29. Environmental Monitors 30. Loss of Voltage/Degraded Voltage 480 Volt Safeguards Bus NA NA NA 31. Trip of Main Feedwater Pumps NA 32. Steam Flow 33 ~ T. NA 'R ~ R g~~ <a~ ~aCX~ t~e- $~<~ W oX~m 34. Chlorine Detector, Control Room NA Air Intake 35. Ammonia Detector, Control Room Air Intake NA 36. Radiation Detectors, Control Room NA Air Intake 37. Reactor Vessel Level Indication System NA 38a. Trip Breaker Logic Channel Testing 38b. Trip Breaker Logic Channel Testing NA NA NA Notes 1, 2 and 3 Note 1 "0 TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued) Channel Desc i t o 39. Reactor Trip Breakers C eck N.A Calibrate Test N.A. ema ks Function test Includes independent testing of both undervoltage and shunt trip attachment of reactor trip breakers. Each of the two reactor trip breakers will be tested on alternate months. 40. Manual Trip Reactor N.A. N.A. R Includes independent testing of both undervoltage and shunt trip circ-uits. The test shall also verify the operability of the bypass break-er. 41a. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N. A. M Using test switches in the reactor protection rack manually trip the reactor trip bypass breaker using the shunt trip coil. 41.b Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker N.A. N.A. R Automatically trip the undervoltage trip attachment. NOTE 1: NOTE 2: Logic trains will be tested on alternate months correspondihg to the reactor trip breaker testing. Monthly logic testing will verify the operability of all sets of reactor trip logic actuating contacts on that train (See Note 3). Refueling shutdown testing will verify the operability of all sets of reactor trip actuating contacts on both trains. Xn testing, operation of one set of contacts willresult in a reactor trip breaker trip; the operation of all other sets of contacts will be verified by the use of indication circuitry. Testing shall be performed monthly, unless the reactor trip breakers are open or shall be performed prior to startup if testing has not bee performed within the last 30 days. NOTE 3: NOTE 4: The source range trip logic may be excluded from monthly testing provided it is tested within 30 days prior to startup. Hhen BAST is required to be operable. Amendment Nn. p4, S7 4.a-za Channel De~cCri i~i ~li~rg T~e ~Rem rk 42. SI Input from ESPAS N.A. 43. RCP Breaker Position Trip N.A. 44. Overtemperature ~T Q(1)

1) Each channel shall be tested at least once every 92 days on a staggered test basis 45.

Overpower ~T Q(1)

1) Each channel shall be tested at least once every 92 days on a staggered test basis 46.

Safety Injection Manual N.A. Initiation (ESFAS) N.A. 47. Containment Spray Manual N.A. Initiation (ESPAS) ,R 48. Containment Isolation Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. 49. Containment Ventilation N.A. Isolation Manual Initiation N.A. 50. Steam Line Isolation ~ N.A. Manual Initiation N.A. 51. AuxiliaryPeedwater Manual Initiation N.A. N.A. TABLE 4.1-2 MINIMUM FRE UENCIES FOR E UIPMENT AND SAMPLING TESTS Tost 1. Reactor Coolant Chloride and Fluoride Chemistry Samples Oxygen ~re<<ponec. 3 times/week and at least every thi.rd day 5 times/week and at least every second day except when below 250 F 2. Reactor Coolant Boron Boron Concentration Weekly 3. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Sample Boron Concentration Weekly 4. Boric Acid Storage Boron Concentration Tank Twice/Week~" 5. Control Rods 6a. Full Length Control Rod 6b. Full Longth Control Rod Rod drop times of all full length rods Move any rod not fully inserted a sufficient number of steps in any one direction to cause a change of position as indicated by the rod posi.tion indi.cation system Move each rod through its full length to verify that the rod positi.on indication system transiti.ons occur After vessel head removal and at least once per 1B months ( 1) Monthly Each Refueling Shutdown 7. Pressurirer Safety Set point Valves B. Main Steam Safety Set point Valves Isolati.on Tri.p Each Refueling Shutdown Each Refueli.ng Shutdown Mue 1-iwg-Shutdow

10. Refueli.ng System Interlocks Functioning Prior to Refueling Operations Amendment No.

5T 4;1-8 Table 4.1-5 Radioactive Effluent Monitorin Surveillance Re irements Xnstrument Channel Source Functional Channel Check Check Test Calibration Gross Activity Monitor (Liquid) a. Liquid Rad Waste (R-18) D(7) b. Steam Generator Blowdown (R-19) D(7) c. Turbine Building D(7) Floor Drains (R-21) M(4) Q(1) M(4) Q(1) M(4) Q(1) R(5) R(5) R(5) d. High Conductivity Waste (R"22) e. Containment Fan Coolers (R"16) D(7} D(7) M(4) Q(1} M(4) Q(2) R(5) R(5) f. Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger A Loop (R-20A) g. Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger B Loop (R-20B) Plant Uentilation a. Noble Gas Activity (R-14) (Alarm and Xsolation of Gas Decay Tanks) D(7) D(7) D(7) M(4) Q(2) M(4) Q(2) Q(1) R(5) R(5) R(5) b. c Particulate Sampler (R-13) Xodine Sampler (R-108 and R-14A) W(7} W(7) N.A. N.A. N.A. R(5) R(5) d. Flow Rate Determination N.A. N.A. N.A. R(6) 3. No ~0M+ Containment Purge a. Noble Gas Activity (R-12) b. Particulate Sampler (R-11) c. Xodine Sampler (R-10A and R-12A) d. Flow Rate Determination D(7) W(7) W(7) N.A. PR N.A. N.A. N.A. Q(1) Q(1) N.A. R(5) R(5) R(5) R(6) (4 Air Ejector Monitor (R-15 and R-15A) Waste Gas System Oxygen Monitor D(7) N.A. M(2) N.A. R(5) Q(3) Main Steam Lines (R-31 and R-32) N.A.

4. 1-17 hmnnr1~er 4

1T~ Z A ,e, TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) ~ 1 TABLE NOTATION (1) The Channel Functional Test shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm occur if any of the following conditions exist: l. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm and/or trip setpoint. 2. Power failure. (2) The Channel Functional Test shall also demonstrate that control room alarm occurs if any of the following conditions exist: 1. Instrument indicates measured levels above the alarm setpoint. 2. Power failure. (3) The Channel Calibration shall include the use of standard gas samples containing a nominal: l. Zero volume percent oxygen; and 2. Three volume percent oxygen. (4) This check may require the use of an external source due to high background in the sample chamber. (5) Source used for the Channel Calibration shall be traceable to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or shall be obtained from suppliers (e.g. Amersham) that provide sources traceable to other officially-designated standards agencies. (6) Flow rate for main plant ventilation exhaust and containment purge exhaust are calculated by the flow capacity of ventilation exhaust fans in service and shall be determined at the frequency specified. (7) Applies only during releases via this pathway.

4. 1-13 Amendmeilt No. 9

Attachment HI Marked Up Copy ofR.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications Submitted in LARDated May 26, 1995 Included Pages: Attachment A 187 188* 189 190* 191" 192* 193* 1 94)fc 195* 196* 197* 198 199 223* 224 225* 226* 279* 280* 281* 282* 283* 284* 285* 315* Attachment B, Section 3.3: 3.5-5 3.5-6 3.5-7 3.'5-8 3.5-9"'.5-10 3.5-1 1 3.5-12 3.5-13* 3.5-14* 3.5-15* 4.1-5 4.1-6 4.1-7* 4.1-7a 4.1-8 4.1-12 4.1-13 Identifies that a change is made to this page. V. TS 3.4.3 - This was revised to require that a backup source of condensate be verified within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when the CSTs are inoperable versus demonstrating the operability of the SW System. Specifying a time limit for verifying the backup condensate source is a conservative change which now provides a clear and concise requirement for plant operators. Revising the Actions to allow any alternate source to be used as a backup source provides additional operational flexibilitysince other condensate sources than the SW System can be used if necessary. These sources are described in the bases for new LCO 3.7.6. These changes are consistent with NUREG-1431 and are Ginna TS Category. (v.a) changes. 15. Technical Specification 3.5 The following changes were made to TS 3.5. 1 or Table 3.5-1: 'a ~ b. c ~ Table 3.5-1, Columns 1, 2, and 3 - The columns for the "Total Number of Channels," the "Number of Channels to Trip," and the "Minimum Operable Channels" were not added for each of the functional units. The columns were replaced with a new column denoting."Required Channels." System design and operational details are not directly related to the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation and were relocated to the bases or are adequately described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 3.5-1, Column 6 - The column for the "channel operable above" was revised consistent with the = changes to the Mode table definitions in ITS Chapter 1.0. Changes to the Applicability different from those discussed in Chapter 1.0 are discussed with the specific changes to the Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (vi) change. Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit 815 - The trip Function was not added to the new specifications. Removal of this trip function is justified in Reference 44 which shows that based on the offsite power system = configuration, this trip Function is not applicable to Ginna Station. Therefore, this trip Function was relocated to the TRM. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. - 187-May 1995 d. e. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹1 for Functional Unit ¹1 - This action was revised to add requirements for operability of the Manual Reactor Trip function in Modes 3, 4, and 5 when the reactor trip breakers are closed and the rod control system is capable of rod withdrawal (LCO 3.3. 1, Condition C). These actions ensures the plant is placed in a condition in which the trip function is no longer required for the associated modes of operation. This is a Ginna TS Category (vi) change. Table 3.5-1, Note 1 for Functional Units ¹2, ¹3, and ¹4 The notes or remarks which describe an operational detail that are not directly related to the OPERABILITY of the instrumentation were not added. These details were relocated to the bases or are adequately described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. f. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹2 for Functional Units ¹2 ("low setting" and "high setting"), ¹5, ¹6, and ¹7 - This action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within hours (rather than 1 hour). This change is iscussed and justified in Reference Ck This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹2 for Functional Units ¹2 ("low setting" and "high setting"), ¹5,, ¹6, and ¹7 This action was revised to allow an ino crab channel. to be bypassed for up to ( ours (rather than 2 hours) during surveillance testing. This change is discussed and justified in Reference i591 This is a Ginna TS Category (v. h. 15) change. Table 3.5-1, Column 4 - This requirement was revised to associate the permissive (or bypass) details with the specific permissive (or interlock) numbers and to clarify the applicability of the Function with an associated Mode. The details of the permissible bypass conditions for the associated Functions are discussed in the,UFSAR and ITS Bases. Changes to the Appl.icability of a Functional Unit different from those discussed in Column 4 are discussed with the specific changes to the Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.c) change. - 188-May 1995 Table 3.5-1, Action Statement /f2 for Functional Unit F2 ("high setting") - This action was revised to add a requirement to either reduce Thermal Power to less than or equal to 75% RTP within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or to perform a flux map every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (consistent with SR 3.2. 1.2 and SR 3.2.2.2). These requirements are in addition to the requirement to place the channel in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> as discussed in Section 0, item 15.i.f. Reducing the power level prevents operation of the core with radial power distributions beyond the design limits. Performing a flux map compensates for the lost monitoring capability due to the inoperable NIS power range channel and allows continued operation at power levels above 75% RTP. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 83 for Functional Unit 83 This action was revised to clarify the applicability of the intermediate range neutron flux to correspond to the specific permissives with either one or two channels inoperable. The NIS intermediate range neutron flux channels must be OPERABLE when the power level is above the capability of the source range and below the capability of the power range. The associated Required Actions ensure the plant is no longer in the applicable condition through controlled power adjustments and taking into account the low probability of an event during the period" that may require the protection of the NIS trip. This change supersedes that proposed in Reference 61. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 84 for Functional Unit 84 - 'his action was revised to clarify the Applicability and add associated Required Actions for inoperable SRHs. For Hode 2 below the permissive and only one SRH

OPERABLE, the plant would not be required to shut down.

However, with two SRHs inoperable the plant would be required to immediately open the RTBs.

For Hodes 3, 4, and 5, with the RTBs

open, an additional action (LCO 3.3. 1, RA L.2) was added that requires the performance of a

SDH verification. These clarifications and additional restriction ensure the plant is no longer in the applicable condition or is in a more stable condition. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. - 189-Hay 1995 l. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹5 for Functional Units ¹8, ¹9, ¹10 ("low flow in one loop" ), ¹ll and ¹13-This action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within hours (rather than 1 hour). This change is discussed and justified in Reference Ggt This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. m. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹5 for'unctional Units ¹8, ¹9, ¹10 ("low flow in one loop"), ¹11 and ¹13-This action was revised to replace the current limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable channel for up to ( ours in order to perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a.note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and justified in. Reference ~. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change. n. 0. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹6 for Functional Units ¹10 ("low flow in both loops" ), ¹14 and ¹15 - This .action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed.in the tripped condition within ours (rather. than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />). This change is discussed and justified in Reference GHa. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. a Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹6 for Functional Units ¹10 (".low flow in both loops" ), and ¹14 - This'ction was revised to replace the current limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an pb1h1Fptea~ perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and justified in Reference (55). This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. - 190-Hay 1995 Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit ¹16 - This was revised to relocate the gPTR Monitor OPERABILITY requirements to Chapter 3.2. In addition, requirements were added to verify with a calculation that the gPTR is within limits every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the quadrant Power Tilt Honitor is inoperable and THERMAL POWER is < 751. RTP and to verify with a full core flux map that the core power distribution is acceptable every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the quadrant Power Tilt Monitor is inoperable and THERMAL POWER is Z 75% RTP. These are Ginna TS Category (i) and (iv.a) changes, respectively. Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit ¹17 - The trip function requirement for the Circulation Water Flood Protection was not added. The Circulation Water Flood Protection instruments only provide an anticipatory turbine trip and is not assumed in the Ginna Station safety analysis. These instruments do not monitor parameters which are initial assumptions for a DBA or transient, do not identify a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure'oundary, and do not provide any mitigation of a design basis event. Therefore, the requirement specified for this function does not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and is relocated to the TRH. This is. a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table

3. 5-1, Functional Units

¹18 and ¹19 The Functional Unit applicability was revised to require the instruments to, be applicable in all modes associated with DG operability. This ensures that the DG can perform its function on a loss of voltage or de'graded voltage to the 480 V buses. 'his is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement ¹7 for Functional Units ¹18 and ¹19 - This action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (rather than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />). This Completion Time is sufficient to allow restoration of the channel and takes into account the redundancy of the trip channels, and the low probability of an event requiring a LOP start occurring during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 16) change. 'Lf M~~ ~Q - 191-Hay 1995 Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II7 for Functional Units 818 and II19 - This action was revised to replace the current limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable channel (consistent with LCO 3.0.5) in order to perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with the associated logic. Bypassing the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. Additionally, a note was added clarifying that entry into the associate Conditions and Required Actions can be delayed for up to ours for performance of required surveillance. Entering DG actions during testing is not necessary since the Completion Times for an inoperable DG is much greater than the time to perform the SR (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> vs 6 hours). The SR Note time of 6 hours takes into account the redundancy of the trip channels and the low probability of an event requiring a LOP start occurring during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.17) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II7 for Functional Units 818 and 819 - This action was revised to replace the current shutdown actions with a requirement to restore channels to an OPERABLE status or to enter the applicable conditions for an inoperable DG. The actions of new LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2 provide for adequate compensatory actions to assure plant safety. The loss of the minimum requir ed loss of voltage or degraded voltage channels (one bus) should result in actions that are no more restrictive than actions for the loss of one DG. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.b.l) change. Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit 818 and II19 - The number of channel s was re formatted to require only two undervoltage channels per bus versus two channels of the loss of voltage function and two degraded voltage function per bus. The bus undervoltage design is a one-out-of-two taken twice logic such that one degraded voltage channel and one loss of voltage channel comprise each of the two undervoltage channels.

However, due to the system design, if either of the degraded voltage or loss of voltage.

functions is inoperable, the entire undervoltage channel must be tripped (i.e., both the degraded voltage and loss of voltage functions are tripped). This change provides greater clarity to the operators without any reduction in the system requirements. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 18) change. - 192-May 1995 LCO 3.3. 1, Table 3.3. 1-1, Function 810 was added for the RCP Breaker Position. This function anticipates the Reactor Coolant Flow - Low trips by monitoring each RCP breaker position to avoid RCS heatup that would occur before the low flow trip actuates. The function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to loss of flow in either a single loop or two loop configuration. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 814 was added for the SI Input from ESFAS. This function ensures that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the

RTS, the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will initiate a

reactor trip upon any signal that initiates SI. This is a condition of acceptability. for the LOCA. A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Functional Unit 020 and associated Action Statement /f14 This requirement was reformatted to separately denote the Reactor Trip

Breakers, the Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms, and the Automatic Trip Logic functions (LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3. 1-1, Functions

815, 816, and 817).

This is a Ginna TS Category (vi) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 814 for Functional Unit 5'20 (Automatic Trip Logic) - This action was revised to allow 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to restore the channel to OPERABLE status in Modes 1 and 2 prior to initiating a plant shut down to Mode 3 (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition 9). The restoration time of 6 hours is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate.to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 18) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 814 for Functional Unit 820 (Reactor Trip Breaker) - This action was revised to allow 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to restore the RTB to OPERABLE status in Modes 1 and 2 prior to initiating a plant shut down to Mode 3 (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition R). The restoration time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE RTB is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 19) change. Hay 1995 bb. ~~~ iz 4.<maw' KguseC W CC. dd. ee. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II14 for Functional Unit //20 (Automatic Trip Logic) - This action was revised to allow 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to restore the channel to OPERABLE status in Modes 3, 4, and 5 prior to initiating action to open the RTBs (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition C). The restoration time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE channel is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.20) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II14 for Functional Unit 820 (Reactor Trip Breaker) - This action was revised to allow 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status in Modes 3, 4, and 5 prior to initiating action to open the RTBs (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition C). The restoration time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering that the remaining OPERABLE breaker is adequate to perform the safety function and given the low probability of an event during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.20) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement 814 for Functional Unit 820 (Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms) - This action was revised to only allow 1 hour to open the RTBs following the action to restore the RTB to OPERABLE status in Hodes 3, 4, and 5 (new LCO 3.3.1, Condition C). The current Ginna Station TS allows 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. to perform this action but takes into account a shut down from Modes 1 and 2. The 1 hour provides sufficient amount of time to accomplish the action in Modes 3, 4, and 5 in an orderly manner. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.a) change. Table 3.5-1, Action Statement II14 for Functional Unit 820 (Reactor Trip Breaker Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Hechanisms) - This action was revised to specify a limit of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to bypass the RTB for surveillance testing and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to bypass the RTB for maintenance on undervoltage or shunt trip mechanisms (new LCO 3.3. 1, Condition R, Notes 1 and 2). The current Ginna Station TS for bypassing during maintenance does not specify a time limit. The ITS would set a limit on this time. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. - 194-Hay 1995 The following changes were made to TS 3.5,2, Table 3.5-2, or Table 3.5-4: 'a ~ b. gp~~aas~a+ W( ~- 14'~ ~ vhmaea.~~ ~M ~z~Q. ~f1.<<> S b 0"t- ~ choo~ d ~ Cag S~~~<. ~ Ap~~ ~gui~G ~ames ~ KeacWoet 1 n+~ Cz a+0,<~~~ 1 S5b'l ~in, ~~~4 ~04 F ~Q iiS ~if'.tC~ ~ 1+4. ~~CJt, 6 ammo. CX ~afi air~, TS 3.5.2.2, 3.5.2.3 and Table 3.5-2, Columns 1, 2, and 3 The details describing the operability acceptance criteria for Trip Setpoints including the columns for the "Total Number of Channels," the "Number of Channels to Trip," and the "Minimum Oper able Channels" were not added for each of the functional units. The columns were replaced with a new column denoting "Required Channels." System design and operational details are not directly related to the operability of the instrumentation and were relocated to the bases or are described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna'TS Category (iii) change. Table 3.5-.2, Column 6 - The column for the "Channel Operable Above" was revised consistent with the changes to the Mode table definitions in ITS Chapter 1.0. Changes to the Applicability different from those discussed in Chapter 1.0 are discussed with the specific changes to the Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (vi) change. Table 3.5-2, Functional Units ¹1.c and ¹1.d The notes or remarks which describe operational details for the Pressurizer Pressure interlock, were reformatted as Mode Applicabilities and default conditions in the new specifications. A new SR 3.3.2.6, was added to specifically denote the operability requirements for the Pressurizer Pressure interlock. This is.a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹9 for Functional Units ¹1.b, ¹1.c, ¹1.d, ¹3.b.i, ¹S.c and ¹6.b - This action was revised to replace the current limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable channel for up to gb ours in perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and justified in Reference ggb. This is a Ginna T5 Category (v.b.15) change. - 195-May 1995 f. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹9 for Functional Units ¹l.b, ¹l.c, ¹1.d, ¹3.b.i, ¹5.c and ¹6.b - This action was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within ours (rather than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />). This change is discussed and justified in Reference'k This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change. g. LCO 3.3.2, Functional Units ¹l.b, ¹2.b, ¹3.b, ¹4.b, ¹5.a, and ¹6.a, "Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays," were ,added for the ESFAS Instrumentation. Actuation logic consists of all circuitry housed within the actuation subsystems, including relay contacts responsible for actuating the ESF equipment. This is merely a presentation change to the Technical Specifications as this logic circuitry is assumed within the operability of the specific Functions. Additionally, the automatic actuation logic and actuation relays for various ~ Functions are required OPERABLE in Hode 4 to support system level manual initiation. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. h. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹12 for Functional Unit ¹3.c - The action associated with this Function was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within 48,hours (rather than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />). This change is discussed and justified in Reference8b. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change. i. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹11 for Functional Unit ¹2.b - The action associated with this Function was revised to replace the limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of -an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable c anne or up to. hours in order to perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and justified in Reference (<<~@5. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b. 15) change. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹11 for Functional Unit ¹2.b - The action associated with this Function was re 'o allow an ino erable channel to be placed in the tripped condition w>>n hours (rather than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />). This change is discussed and justified in Reference Ck This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. c.~ - 196-Hay 1995 k. Table 3.5-2, Functional Unit ¹3.a - The requirements for the Auxiliary Feedwater Hanual Initiation were not added. The individual AFW pump instrument requirements only provide a manual function which is not assumed in the Ginna Station safety analysis. These instruments do not monitor parameters which are initial assumptions for a DBA or transient, do not identify a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure

boundary, and do not provide any mitigation of a design basis event.

Therefore, the requirement specified for this function does not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and is relocated to the TRH. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. 1. Table

3. 5-2, Action Statement

¹12 for Functional Units ¹3.b.ii, ¹3.c, ¹S.a, and 5.b The 'ction associated with these Functions was revised to replace the limitation of operation (tied to the next channel functional test of an OPERABLE channel) to allow the bypassing of an inoperable channel for up ~to (ES hours in order to perform surveillance testing of other channels. The current requirement limits the ability to perform channel functional tests on OPERABLE channels 'for Functional Units with two-out-of-three logic. Providing a note to bypass the inoperable channel provides a sufficient timeframe to perform the required surveillance testing in a safe and orderly manner. This change is discussed and .justified in Reference CD This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. m. n. Table 3.5-2, Action Statement ¹12 for Functional Units ¹3.b.ii, ¹5.a, and S.b - The action associated with these Functions was revised to allow an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped con ition within hours (rather than I hour). .This change is discussed and justified in Reference Cg)s This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.15) change. Table 3.5-2, Action Stat'ement ¹6 for Functional Unit ¹3.e - The action associated with this Function was revised to a more restrictive restoration time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> for an inoperable channel rather than placing the channel in the tripped condition within one hour. The allowance of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to return the train to an OPERABLE status is justified in Reference @P: This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. - 197-Hay 1995 ~ I I Table 3.5-2, Functional Unit ¹3.f - The requirements for the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Manual Initiation were not added. The individual Standby AFW pump instrument requirements only provide a manual function to the Standby AFW pumps which backup the AFW pumps. The Ginna Station safety analysis does not model the individual manual function for these pumps. These instruments do not monitor parameters which are initial assumptions for a DBA or transient, do not identify a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure

boundary, and do not provide any mitigation of a

design basis event. Therefore, the requirement specified for this function does not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and is relocated to the TRH. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 3.5-2, Functional Unit ¹4.2 and Table 3.5-4, Functional Unit ¹3.b The* requirements for the Containment Ventilation Isolation Function were not added. The containment ventilation components include the shutdown purge and mini-purge lines. These lines are automatically isolated on a containment isolation signal from SI. The R-29 and R-30 instruments are not assumed in the Ginna safety analysis as ESFAS isolation functions. These instruments are, however, required to perform a post-accident monitoring function in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 and are retained in new LCO 3.3.3. These instruments do not monitor parameters which are initial assumptions for a DBA or transient, do,not identify a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure

boundary, and do not provide any mitigation of a

design basis event. Therefor e, the Hanual Isolation and High Containment Radioactive Functions do not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and are relocated to the TRM. The Manual Spray and Safety Injection Functions are deleted since these functions are duplicated by other Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) and (ii) change, respectively. Table 3.5-4, Functional Units ¹I.b, ¹I:d, and ¹2.b-These Functional Unit Allowable Values were revised to reflect the actual values used in the accident analyses. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.c) change. May 1995 s. Table 3.5-4, Functional Units f/7.a and II7.b - The Trip Setpoint for the loss of voltage and degraded voltage functions were revised to provide a minimum value. Criteria for the establishment of equivalent values based on measured voltage versus relay operating time was relocated to the bases for new LCO 3.3.4). This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 3.5-4, Notes 1 and 2 for Functional Units 86.a and 86.c - The notes which describe design details for the Steam Generator Water Level Low Low Function and Loss of 4 kV Function were not added. These details are relocated to the bases or are described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. The following changes were made to'TS 3.5.3 or Table 3.5-3: 'a ~ b. C ~ TS 3.5.3.2, TS 3.5.3.3, and Table 3.5-3, Columns 1 and 2 - The columns for the "Total Required Number of Channels," and the "Hinimum Channels Operable," were not added for each of the functional units. The columns were replaced with a new column denoting "Required Channels." System design and operational details are not directly related to the operability of the instrumentation and were relocated to the bases or are described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. TS 3.5.3.2 - The restoration time requirement of 7 days for one inoperable channel (for Functions with two channels) was revised to 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time was revised based on industry operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERA8LE channel, the passive nature of the instrument, and the low probability of an event requiring PAH instrumentation during this interval. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.21) change. TS 3.5.3.2 - The action for one channel inoperable for more than 7 days (for Functions with two channels) was revised from requiring a plant shutdown to requiring a Special Report. Due to the passive function of these instruments and the operator's ability to respond to an accident utilizing alternate instruments and methods for monitoring, it is not appropriate to impose stringent shutdown requirements for out-of-service instrumentation. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.21) change. - 199-Hay 1995 iv. A new section SR 3.0.4 was added which establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability. This section does not provide any new requirements. Previous guidance provided by the NRC (e.g., Generic Letter 87-09) regarding the intent and interpretation of existing Specifications is consistent with SR 3.0.4. This SR provides clarifying and descriptive information for the SRs applicability consistent with the use and format of the ITS. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.a) change. 28. Technical Specification 4.1 The following changes were made to TS 4. 1.1 or Table 4. 1-1: a 0 b. Table

4. 1-1, Columns 2 (Calibrate) and 3

(Test) Various calibration and testing interval requirements for RTS and ESFAS Functions were revised consistent wi -1484 Changes to the testing interval requirements ifferent from those identified and discussed in NUREG-1431 are discussed with the specific changes to the Functional Units. This is a Ginna TS Category (v.b.l5) change. The following new requirements were added to Table

4. 1-1 (Ginna TS Category (iv.a) changes):

1. SR 3.4.2.1 requires verification every 30 minutes that T., for each RCS lonp is > 540 F when any RCS loop T., is known to be < 547 F. This surveillance is.intended to ensure that the minimum temperature for criticality is not exceeded'hen the RCS is at less than Hot Zero Power conditions (i.e., 547 F). The surveillance is not required to be performed if the low T., alarm in each loop is reset with a setpoint > 540 F. 2. SR 3.4.3.1 requires verification every 30 minutes that RCS pressure, temperature, heatup and cooldown rates are within limits. This su} veillance is only required during RCS heatup and cooldown operations, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. The 30 minute Frequency is based on the fact that heatup and cooldown rates are specified in hourly increments which provides adequate margin to correct minor deviations. - 223-May 1995 3. SR 3.4. 1. 1 requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that pressurizer pressure is within limits during MODE 1. This surveillance is similar to current Ginna TS Table

4. 1-1,

¹7 which is performed to support reactor trip functions. SR 3.4. 1.2 requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that RCS average temperature is within limits during MODE 1. This surveillance is similar to current Ginna TS. Table

4. 1-1,

¹33 which is performed to support reactor trip functions. 5. 6. SR 3.4.1.3 - requires performance of a precision heat bal ance to veri fy that RCS flow is within limits every 24 months. This surveillance is required to be performed within 7 days of entering MODE 1 and reaching 95% RTP. SR

3. 1.6. 1 Requires verification within 4

hour s prior to criticality that the critical control bank position is within limits in the COLR. 7. SR

3. 1.6.4 Requires verification every 12

. hours when critical that the sequence and overlap limits for the control banks not fully withdrawn are within limits specified in the COLR. 8.. 9 SR

3. 1.8.4 Requires verification every 30 minutes during MODE 2 PHYSICS TESTS that THERMAL POWER 5%

RTP. Verification of the THERMAL POWER level will. ensure that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated. SR 3.2.4. 1 - Verification with a calculation using the power range channels every 7 days that the gPTR is within limits. Table 4.1-1, Functional Units ¹1, ¹2, ¹3, ¹8, ¹17, ¹23, ¹25, ¹38a, ¹38b, ¹39, ¹40, ¹4la, and ¹41b - The notes or remarks which describe an operational detail, were not added. These details were relocated to the bases or are described in the UFSAR. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. - 224-May 1995 LCO 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Function ¹10 was added for the RCP Breaker Position. This function anticipates the Reactor Coolant Flow - Low trips by monitoring each RCP breaker position to avoid RCS heatup that would occur before the low flow trip actuates. The function ensures that protection is provided against violating the DNBR limit due to loss of flow in either a single loop or two loop configuration. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. LCO 3.3. 1, Table 3.3. 1-1, Function ¹14 was added for the SI Input from ESFAS. This function ensures that if a reactor trip has not already been generated by the

RTS, the ESFAS automatic actuation logic will initiate a

reactor trip upon any signal that initiates SI. This is a condition of acceptability for the LOCA. A reactor trip is initiated every time an SI signal is present. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. SR 3.3.1.14, SR 3.3.1.15, SR 3.3.1.16, SR 3.3.1.17, SR 3.3. 1. 18 were added for the Reactor Trip System Interlocks (P-6 through P-10). These surveillances are provided to ensure reactor trips are in the correct configuration for the current plant status. They are provided to back up operator actions to ensure protection system Functions are not bypassed during plant conditions under which the safety analysis assumes the Functions are not bypassed. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 4. 1-1, Functions ¹34 and ¹35 - The requirements for the chlorine gas and ammonia gas instrumentation monitors for control room habitability ;were not added. No screening criteria apply for these requirements since the monitored parameters are not part of the primary success path in the mitigation of a DBA or transient. These monitors. are not used for, nor capable of, detecting a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. prior to a DBA. Therefore, the requirements specified for these functions do not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification, screening criteria and are relocated to the TRH. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 4.1-1, Function'al Units ¹I and 2 were revised to require a CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT) on the power range and the intermediate range channels within 7 days prior to reactor criticality. The ITS Bases states that the 7 day time limits is sufficient to ensure that the instrumentation is OPERABLE shortly before initiating the PHYSICS TESTS. This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. - 225-Hay 1995 Table

4. 1-1, Functional Unit

¹4 was revised to include a note requiring a channel check every 30 minutes while implementing HODE 2 PHYSICS TEST exceptions. Verification of the RCS temperature will ensure that the initial conditions of the safety analyses are not violated. This is a, Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 4. 1-1, Functional Units ¹18, ¹28, and ¹29 - The Surveillance requirements for radiation monitors R-1 through R-9 and R-17, emergency plan radiation instruments, and environmental

monitors, were not added to the new specifications.

These process variables are not an initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis. Therefore, the requirements specified for these functions do not satisfy the NRC Final Policy Statement technical specification screening criteria and are relocated to the ODCH and the Effluent Controls Program described in new Specifications 5.5.1 and 5.5.4, respectively. This is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Tab. e 4.1-1, Functional Unit ¹25 - The calibrati~o and tes 'equirements for the containment ~sure narrow range -r<gsmitter were not adde the new specifications. T4: instrumen 'ot used or credited in any DBA or ent analysis. This instrument is only o ver at containment pressure remai 1.0 psig and Z -2. 'uring normal o ion. These items were relocated e TRH is is a Ginna TS Category (iii) change. Table 4.1-1, Functional Unit ¹3 - This was revised to add a requirement which establishes a surveillance for a SRH CHANNEL CALIBRATION in HODE 6. This calibration consists 'of obtaining the detector plateau or preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those

curves, and comparing the curves to baseline data and is consistent with current Ginna Station procedures.

This is a Ginna TS Category (iv.a) change. Table 4.1-1, Functional Units ¹14, ¹16, and ¹19 were relocated to the TRH for the same reasons as'escribed in Section D, items 12.i through 12.iv. These are Ginna TS Category (iii) changes. - 226-Hay 1995 Based upon the above information, it has been determined that the proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and do not involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b. 15) ~~~ 4X The proposed changes to the Ginna Station echnical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b. 15) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed elow: I Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed changes~ does not involve a significant increase in the probability~i onsequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed c nges increase the Surveillance Test Intervals (STIs) and Agl's for ins umentation supporting a number of TS Functions. The E are no actua related modifications to any of the affect systems.

However, he changes are expected to reduce the test elated plant

scrams, re ce the test induced wear on the equip nt, and reduce the number o orced outages related to test activ ies.

Therefore, there is no sig ficant increase in the probabi ty of occurrence of. a previously eval ted accident. Westinghou topical reports WCAP-10271-P-A (Ref. 4 and WCAP-14333 ( 30) and associated supplements showed tha the effects of ese extensions of STIs and

AOTs, which produced ne ligible imp t, are bounded by previous analyses.

Further, the NR as r evi ed the reports associated with WCAP-10271-P-A and approved he onclusions on a generic basis. Therefore, the change does not significantly increase the consequences of a previously va ted accident. 2. Operation of Ginna Stat n in accorda e with the proposed change does not create the ossibility of a ew or different kind of accident from any cident previously eva ated. The design and functional opera 'on of the affected equipme t are not changed by the proposed r isions. The proposed changes a feet only the STIs and AOTs an will not impact the function of qnitoring system variables ver the anticipated ranges for noRn 1 operation, anticip ed operational occurrences, or accident conditions. Furth the proposed changes do not introduce any ne modes of pla operation, make any physical modifications, or a er any o rational setpoints. Therefore, the possibility of a n or ifferent kind of accident from any previously evaluated is t created. - 279-May 1995 3. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed chan does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety he proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety

mits,

'miting safety system

settings, or limiting condi

'ons for op ation are determined. The impact of reduced testin , other than as a essed

above, is to allow a longer time inte al over which instrum t uncertainties (e.g., drift) may act.

plementation of the propos changes is expected to result in a verall improvement in safety du to: 1 Reduced sting which results 'ewer inadvertent reactor

trips, les frequent act ion of ESF components, and greater equip nt availa ity.

Improvements in the ffectiveness of the operating staff in monitoring and c tro ing plant operation resulting from less frequent sstracti to attend to testing. Therefore, the p posed changes do n significantly reduce'he. margin of safe Based upon the ve information, it has been determ> ed that the proposed changes to t Ginna Station Technical Specification do not involve a significan increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previou evaluated, does not create the possibility f a new. or diffe~ nt kind of accident previously evaluated, and does no involve a siyrfificant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is eluded at the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) d do not involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.l6) Rp~A ~ The proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications as discussed in Section D and denoted by Category v.b. 16) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discusse e ow: Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed nge oes not involve a significant increase in the prob ity or const u~ces of an accident previously evaluate The change revises thWA T from I hour to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to place inoperable DG LOP instrumentation nel in the tripped con on (current Table 3.5-I, Functional Units nd 819). T 'nction is not considered as an initiator for any acc' eviously analyzed. Therefore, this change.does not signi 'n increase the probability of a previously analyzed a 'nt. Since action is to place the channel in the t 'd condition, the Func 'illcontinued to perform its ety function. Therefore, this e does not signifi~ y incr ease the consequences of a previous nalyzed ~ ~ ~ acc'nt. - 280-Nay 1995 2. Oper ation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind accident from any accident previously evaluated. The pro sed h nge does not involve a physical alteration of the plant .e., no new different type of equipment will be installed). T proposed change introduces no new mode of plant operation or anges in the methods go> ming normal plant operation.

Thus, is change does not cr eate t ossibility of a new or differ kind of accident from any acciden reviously evaluated.

Operation of Ginna St on in accord e with the proposed change does not involve a signifs nt red ion in a margin of safety. The proposed changes do not alt r e manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system se i gy, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. hereford'e this change does not involve a significant reductio >n a margin oMafety.'his change is also consistent with NUR -1431 which has been a roved by the NRC Staff. Based upon the abov nformation, it has been determin d.that the proposed changes to the nna Station Technical Specifications %a not involve a significant 'ease in the probability or consequences o an accident previousl evaluated, does not create the possibility of new or differ kind of accident previously evaluated and does not in lve a sig icant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is conc ed t the proposed chan'ges meet.the, requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and not invo'ive a significant hazards consideration. . LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b. 17) ln RaR~a~ 4 4 The proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b.l7) do not involve a ig if' d

• id t.i N

• W

. ~Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed cha ie s not involve a significant increase in the probabil 'r cons nces of an accident previously evaluated. change provides " exception to allow bypassing of an in able DG LOP instrumentati hannel and to delay entry into ondition for the channel being tes current Table 3.5-1, F tional Units 018 and 819). This Function not consider as an initiator for any accidents previously analy T

efore, this change does not significantly increase the pr

'lity of a previously analyzed accident. The change is e cted to uce the test related plant

scrams, reduce the tes nduced wear on equipment, and reduce the number of fore utages related to test ac 'ties.

Since trip capability is ntained, the Function will continu <o perform its safety fu ion. Therefore, this change does not sSg 'ficantly incre the consequences of a previously analyzed acciden - 281-Hay 1995 2 Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind ~cident from any accident previously evaluated. The pro ed chal e does not involve a physical alteration of the plant .e., no new or ifferent type of equipment will be installed). T proposed change in oduces no new mode of plant operation or nges in the methods gove ing normal plant operation.

Thus, is change does not create the ssibility of a new or differ kind of accident from any accident eviously evaluated.

3. Operation of Ginna Stat in accord e with the proposed change does not involve a signific t red ion in a margin of safety. The proposed changes do not alte e manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system s in or limiting conditions for operation are determined herefor this change does not involve a significant reducti in a margin of fety. This change is also consistent with NU -1431 which has been a roved by the NRC Staff. Based upon the abov information, it has been determine that the proposed changes to t4e nna Station Technical Specifications not involve a significant crease in the probability or consequences o n accident previousl evaluated, does not create the possibility of new or differ kind of accident previously evaluated, and does not in ve a si 'cant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concl dgd at the proposed changes meet tbe requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and 8b not involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.l8) The proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b.18) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed below: Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The charige revises the required channels for Diesel Generator (DG) Loss of Power (LOP) start instrumentation (current Table 3.5-1, Functional Units 8 18 and 819) from individually specifying the loss of voltage and degraded voltage channels to requiring two channels of undervoltage per 480 V safeguards bus. The start instrumentation function is not considered as an initiator for any accidents previously analyzed. Therefore, this change does not significantly incr ease the probability of a previously analyzed accident. The change does not further degrade the capability of the OPERABLE DG LOP instrumentation channels from performing their intended function. Therefore, this change does not significantly increase the consequences of a previously analyzed accident. - 282-Hay 1995 2. 3. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in the methods governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The change only clarifies the actual design of the DG LOP instrumentation without affecting the safety function of the specified channels. The requirement for a loss of voltage and degraded voltage function is specified in the surveillance requirement for this LCO. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based upon the above information, it has been determined that the proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident previously evaluated, and does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and do not involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.l9) ,~ a.~~ ~~ The proposed changes to.the Ginna Station echnical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b. 19) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discusse e o Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed cha does not involve a significant increase in the probabil or co uences of an accident previously evaluated. e change revises e Required Actions for an inoperable reac trip breaker to allow I to restore the inoperable bre before requiring a plant shutdown r rent Table 3.5-1, F ional Unit 820). The reactor trip breaker are only idered an initiator for previously analyzed trans' h respect to their spurious opening. Therefore, this ch e not significantly increase the probability of a pr evio y analyzed a 'dent. The change does not further degrade, er the circumstances, e capability of the reactor trip eaker from performing its nded function. Therefor his change does not significantly 'ease the cons ences of a previously analyzed accident. - 283-Hay 1995 2. 3. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed chan s not create the possibility of a new or different kin of acc ent from any accident previously evaluated. The p posed change oes not involve a physical alteration of the plant >.e., no new or d> event type of equipment will be installed) changes in the methods overning normal plant operation. Th , this change does not crea the possibility of a new or 'erent kind of accident from an ccident previously evaluat Operation of Ginna Sta on in accordanc ith the proposed change does not involve a signify nt reducti in a margin of safety. The change allows a short perio o res re the inoperable reactor trip breaker before requiring a plan utdown. This time to restot e the inoperable breaker is consist 'th NUREG-1431. Therefore, this change does not involve signific t reduction in a margin of safety. This change is so consisten with NUREG-1431 which has been approved by the C Staff. Based upon the above i ormation, it has been determine that the proposed changes to the Gi Station Technical Specifications not involve,a significant inc se in the probability or consequences o an accident previously e

uated, does not create the possibility of new or

'ifferent nd of accident previously evaluated, and does not i olve a signifi t reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is conc ded 'hat e proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and no involve a significant hazards consideration. L'ESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.20) The proposed changes to the Ginna Station chnical Specifications as discussed in Section 0 and denoted by Category (v.b.20) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discusse e ow. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed c ge ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oes not involve a significant increase in the probabi or co s quences of an accident previously evaluated. e change revise he Required Actions for one inoperable tra'f Automatic Trip Logic r reactor trip breaker) to allow 4 ours to restore the channel t PERABLE status in Nodes 3 4, and 5 prior to initiating action open the reactor tr reakers (current Table 3.5-1, Functional Uni 20). The omatic trip logic is only considered an initiator rev'ly analyzed transients with respect to their spurious oper n. The reactor trip breakers are only consider ed an initiato or pre 'sly analyzed transients with respect to their spurio opening. The re, this change does not significantly incre the probability of reviously analyzed accident. The change does not further de, under the circumstance the capability of the Automatic 'ogic (or reactor p breaker) from performing its intended nction. There e, this change does not significantly increas the co equences of.a previously analyzed accident. - 284-Hay 1995 2. 3. Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed chan does not create the possibility of a new or different kin of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The p posed hange does not involve a physical alteration of the plant >.e., no ne or different type of equipment will be installed) changes in the hi hods governing normal plant operation. Th , this change does no create the possibility of a new or fferent kind of accident fr any accident previously evaluat Operation of Gine Station in accordanc with the proposed change does not involve a ss gificant reduct'n a margin of safety. The change allows a period >f time to store the inoperable Automatic Trip Logic and r eactor W p eaker before requiring a pl ant shutdown. The primary accide of concern during MODES 3, 4, and 5 is the rod ejection acci t w h is very unlikely due to the reduced system pressur and temper ures. Therefore, this change does not involve a' nificant reductio in a margin of safety. Ba'sed upon the above'rmation, it has been determ'd that the proposed - changes to the Gi Wa Station Technical Specification do not involve a significant in ase in the probability or consequences f an accident previously

aluated, does not create the possibility o

a new or different ind of accident previously evaluated, and does not volve a signif ant reduction in a margin of safety. Therefore, it is co uded tha he proposed changes meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92(c) an o involve a significant hazards consideration. LESS RESTRICTIVE CHANGE CATEGORY (v.b.21) The proposed changes to the Ginna Station Technical Specifications as discussed in Section D and denoted by Category (v.b.21) do not involve a significant hazards consideration as discussed below: Operation of Ginna Station in accordance with the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The change revises the current AOT to restore inoperable Post Accident Monitors (PAMs), revises the actions for inoperable PAMs that are not restored to service within the

AOT, and revises the PAM testing frequencies (current TS 3.5.3, 3.6.4.2, and 4.4.7).

The PAMs are not considered as an initiator for any accidents previously analyzed. Therefore, this change does not significantly increase the probability of a previously analyzed accident. The proposed change does not further degrade the capability of the system to perform its required function under these circumstances. Therefore, this change does not significantly increase the consequences of a previously analyzed accident. - 285-May 1995 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54, 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. Letter from O.M. Crutchfield (NRC) to J. Maier (RG8E),

Subject:

Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment, dated October 7, 1981.

WCAP-13029, MERITS 'Program, Phase III, Comments on Draft NUREG-1431, Standard Technical Specifications westinghouse

Plants, July 1991.

WCAP-12159, MERITS Program, Phase II, Technical Specifications and Bases, March 1989.

WCAP-11618, MERITS Program, Phase II, Task 5,

Criteria Application, November 1987.

ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code,Section XI.

EG&E Report, EGG-NTAP-6175, In-Service Leak Testing of Primary Pressure Isolation Valves, February 1983.

Letter from V.L. Rooney, NRC, to J.F.

Opeka, Northeast Nuclear Energy

Company,

Subject:

Issuance of Amendment No.

105 (TAC No. M89518), dated February 22, 1995'.

Generic Letter 88-16, Removal of Cycle-Specific Parameter Limits from Technical Specifications, dated -October 4,

1988.

Letter from A.G. Hansen, NRC, to R.E. Link,

Subject:

Amendment Nos.

157 and I61 to Facility Operating License Nos.

DPR-24 and DPR-27 (TACS M85689 and M85690), dated Oecember 8,

1994.

Ginna Station LER 95-001,

Subject:

Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Settings Found Above Technical Specification Tolerance During Post-Service Test Due to Setpoint

Shifts, Results in Independent Train Being Considered Inoperable, dated Harch 6, 1995.

Letter from A.R. Johnson, NRC, to R.C. Hecredy, RG&E,

Subject:

Emergency

Response

Capability - Conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3

(TAC No. M80439), dated February 24, 1993.

Letter from R.C.

Hecredy, RG&E, to A.R. Johnson, NRC,

Subject:

Generic Letter 90-06, Resolution of Generic Issue 70, "Power Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability" and Generic Issue 94, "Additional Low Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light Hater Reactors,"

dated September 15, 1992.

Letter from R.E.

Smith, RG&E, to C. Stahle, NRC,

Subject:

Change P-10 Permissive, dated Oecember 22, 1988.

- 315-Hay 1995

I5.i.a TABLE 3.5-1 PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION NO.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT

~/

Als~

mad pQ 4 1 1.

Manual Qbc pger Q.t TOTAL NO. of CIIANNEI,S 4'g82a Itigh setting 4

FIT~2.

2.

uclear Flux Power Rang RIB $.

ow setting NO. of CHANNE I.S TO TRIP MIN.

OPERABI,E CHANNEI.S PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS For low sett.ing, 2 of 4 power range channe s great.er than

% F.P.

8 5

OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1

OR 3

CANNOT BE MET 1

Is'".t,e I5.'c. I IS.I.A.

2 CHANNEL OPERABl.E ABOVE w en R

ithdrawn when RCCA xs wit.hdrawn when RCCA is wit.hilrawn 4.

Nuclear Flux Source Range 2

A4 lid eg)eJ ~

Ckap4r J l Flk<6 5.

Overtemperature 6 T FMtI&

6.

Overpower h T FLI,O 7.a, 7.

Low Pressurizer Pressure Ftl<7 b 8.

Hi Pressurizer Pressure FU$8 9.

Pres~rizer-Hi Mater

Levql, Igj PUW3 3,

Nuclear Flux Intermediate 2

Range 2 of 4 power range channels great.er han IS.i.

1 of intermediate range channels greater than 10 amp'S.t.e 4 ~~

5 when RCCA is withdrawn ote 2

IS-i..~k Note 3

Hot Shutdown Hot. Sl>utilown 5'/ power Hot. Shutdown 5/ power F'Ill 9.b

~

~

Low'-Flow. oth loops F0+ 9.o 10.

Low Flow in one loop 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop (either loop) (both loops) 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop (both loops) (either loop) 5/ power 5% power

0 0

TABLE 3.5-1 COHTIHUED PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3

HO.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT

." !41.

Turbine Trip TOTAL HO. of CHANNELS NO. of CHANNELS TO TRIP MIH.

OPERABLE CHANNELS PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1

OR 3

CANHOT BE MET CHANNEL OPERABLE ABOVE 50% Power 9>1&13.

Lo Lo Steam Generator Hater Level 3/loop 2/loop 2/loop Hot Shutdown

-0+I).14.

IS;. ),.-c Undervoltage 4

KV Bus Underfrequ ncy 4 KV Bus 2/bus 2/b 1/bus 2/bus (both busses)

(on either bus) 1/bus 2/bus (both buss s)

(on eithe bus) 5%, Power 5% Powe 16.

Quadrant'ower tilt 1

monitor'upper G

lower ex-core neutr'on detectors)

NA A,u~ssed we&

Cbg.pgs 3. L Log individual Hot Shutdown upper 6 lower ion chamber currents once/hr G after a load change of 10% or after 48 steps of control rod motion

TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued)

PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION NO.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO. of CHANNEI.S NO. of CHANNELS TO TRIP MIN.

OPERABLE C11ANNELS 4

5 OPERATOR ACTION PERMISSIBLE IF CONDITIONS OF BYPASS COLUMN 1

OR 3

CONDITIONS CANNOT BE MFT CHANNEL OPERABLE ABOVE 1

Circulating Water F

d Protection a.

Co enser b.

Screenhouse 2 sets of 3 2 sets of 3 2 of 3 in 2 of 3 in either set both sets 2 of 3 in 2 of 3 in eithe et both sets Ho

. hutdown Power operation may be continued for a period o

p to 7 days 1

channe 1 set of thr inoperable for a period of 24 hrs. with two channels (2 sets of of three) inoperable.

Otherwise be in hot shutdown in an addit.ional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Power operation Hot Shutdown may be continued for a period of up t

days with 1

charm (1 set of three) i erable or fora pe dof 24 hrs. with tw channels (2 sets o

of three) inoperable.

Otherwise be in hot shutdown in an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Loss of Voltage 480V Safeguards Bus 2 sets of 2/bus 1 of 2 in each set in one bus 2of 2 in one of the two set,s RCS 350 F

1S.'~

TABLE 3.5-1 Continued PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION NO I5.A.v FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO. of MIN.

NO. of CHANNEIS OPERABLE CHANNEIS TO TRIP CHANNELS PERMISSIBLE BYPASS CONDITIONS 5

OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS OF COLUMN 1 OR 3

CANNOT BE MET CHANNEL OPERABLE ABOVE Co3.3.9 1.9.

F98 l5j, 0.

-uN %~a

'=u< ll Degraded Voltage 480V Safcguards Bus Automatic Trip Logic Including Reactor Trip Breakers 5,i,.

2/bus 2/bus lZ, I.,c.

1/bus Note 4

T..

= 350"F Note 5

IS.c.c.

NVTE 2s S Ca+(C,'I

~

NOTE 3:

PU 49

@~ac'e)

Fu~l7 NOTE 5:

g~(ip)

C anne s should be opera e at al mo es e o c bypass condition with the reactor trip system breakers in the closed position and control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.

Channels shall be operable at all modes below the bypass condition except during refueling defined to be when fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioncJ or with the head removed.

Onc reactor trip breaker may bc bypassed for surveillance testing provided the other reactor trip breaker is operable.

Channels shall bc operable at all modes above refueling when thc control rod drive system is capable of rod withdrawal unless both actor trip breakers are open.

TABLE 3.5-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 5 rilrlh NO.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1

2 TOTAL NO. of NO. of

- CIIAHHELS CHANHFLS TO TRIP MIH.

OPERABLE CIIAHHEI,S 4

5 OPFRATOR ACTIQH PERMISSIBI.F.

IF COHDITIONS OF BYPASS COLUMN I OR 3

COHDITIOHS CANNOT BE MET CIIAHHEI.

OPERABLE ABOVE SAFETY INJECTION a.

Manual

b. Iligh Conta inment Prcssure e.

Steam Geiicrator I.ow Steam Pressure/I.oop Pll + ),J

d. Pressurizer Low Pressure 2.

CONTAINMENT SPRAY a.

Manual Primary prcssure less than 2000 psig Primary pressiire less than 2000 psig

'>.'t't.c.

SM~ati n 5R 3'3.z4 is.i.5 9

Lco 3.3.2, F 4 Io&3 9

10 TRCS 350 T

=35 TRCS 350 F

Cold Sliutdown

b. Hi-Hi Containmcnt RI4: 2..C.

Pressure (Contain-ment Spray) 2 sets of 3 2 of 3 in both sets 2 per set in either set Co I II SIIUtdowi1 e Nest actuate 2 snitcher simultaneeusty.

~lp.it.rc n

Adh Pundtue 8 t,b) 'u%>> 4 kc W

Lj a 4 I44&e Qelaga AM Fanchon + 2.lg, "Ao

~cat. k~<+~ 4q'~

ch<J.

Ac4ch4~n Llc.qy lS;ii.

IS>Lt,.~

TABI.E 3.5-2 (Continued)

EHGIHEFRED SAFFTY FEATURE ACTUATION IHSTRUlfENTATION IS,u,'.4 NO.

FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL HO.

of HIH.

NO. of CllAHHEI.S OPERABI,F.

CllANHEI.S TO TRIP CllANHFI.S PERHISSIBI.E BYPASS COND ITI OHS 5

OPFRATOlt ACTION lF CONDITIONS OF COI.UHN 1

OR 3

CANHOT BF. HET CHAHHEL OPF.RABLF-AI30VE 15.~

V.

AUXILIARYFEED3>'ATER Hotor and Turbine Driven 1>. Stm.

Gl n. Mat<<r I.l vl I - 1 oM-lou i.

Start. Hotor l)riven I'limps ii. Start Turbine Driven Pump 3/st.m.g<<n.

2/stm.gcli.

2/stm.g<<n.

<<it.lier glln. l>otli gl:ii.

3/st.m.gcn.

2/stm.gcn.

2/stm.gcn.

bnt.h gcll.

eit.hcr g<<n.

12 T

= 350 F

F S

~+g g c.

Loss of 4 KV Vol t.age St.art.

Turbine Driven Pump

d. Safety Injection Start. Hotor Driven Pumps 2/bus I/bus 2/bus (l>ot,ll l>us<<.s) (cit.lilir hos)

(scc Item 1)

T

=350 l.

F0<LA

e. Trip of both Feed-Matcr Pumps st.arts Hotor l)rivrli 1'omps 2/pomp 1/pomp 2/pomp hotli pumps eit.hl.r piimp 5.'tt.n 5/ powr r (5.i.o

.'>L>>ndl>y H Lor l)rivcli ll, HlI IIu l 1/pomp 1/piimp 1/3>o>np T

. =:3.>Ool:

1

.S

557<.o.

TABLE 3.5-2 (Continued)

ENOIHEERED SAFFTY FFATURE ACTUATIOH INSTRUMEHTATIOH NO.

FUHCT I ONAI. UH IT TOTAL HO. of CIIANHEI,S NO. of CIIAHNF.I.S TO TRI I""

MIN.

Ol'I RABI.E C IIAHHI'.I.S PERH1SS I BI.F.

BYPASS

ONI) I 'I' ONS 5

OPFRATOR ACTIOH IF CONnlrlONS OV COI.UHH I

OR 3

CANHOT Bl'. HE'f CIIANH EL OPI'.BABI.F.

ABOVE COH'fh I HHI'.N'I I SOI.A'I'ION

4. I Cor)t )

irido)'ent I sold L i on FLl+3,cr.

-.).

M)r)r)<) I IO t.o I)l Sh)) t<lown Bl3s('-

I).

Safet.y lnjr.ct.ion (hr)to Act.uation)

(Sec T;)b I r. 3. 5-2, I t rm I )

4.2 Containment Ventilat.ion Isolation a.

Hanua l b.

Iligh ontainmrnt Rad activit o d Shut rla n

Co I)I She ilown c.

M ua

. pray d.

Safety In ct,ion (See Tnl)

(. 3.5)-2, t.em 2a)

(Sr)e able 3.5, I t.em I)

A4 R ~~4a~W 3 5, "~~4~ 4A ~4-~

L< r~ a.D Ac+ 4

~

la

)

TABI.E 3.S-2 (Cont.in>><<l)

EHGIHEEIIEI) Shl'ETY Fl'.ATURE ACTllh'I'IOH INS'I'RUHI'.NTATION LS.tL. c<.

IS.u.. b NO.

FUHCTIOHAL UNIT TOTAI.

NO. of CIIANHF.LS HO.

o f H IH.

CIIANHEI.S OPERABI.E TO TltI P CIIAHNEI.S 4

5 OPERATOR ACTION Pl'.RHISSIBI.E IF CONI)I'flOHS OF BYPASS COLIIHH I OR 3

CONDITIONS CAHHOT BE HE'f CIIAHNEL OPERABI.E ABOVE 5.

STFAH LINE ISOLATION Fg~g ~

a.

- Ili-Ili Steam Flou vill> Saict.y ln j<.ction 2 Ili-Ili SF uit.h S.I.

h I

or eac oop "I SF wit.h S. I. in

<!acl>

I <>op 12 f

350oF

./IIBV'..

AVG Sa I <!t y I 0 I c <'

I 0>i ith S.l. Qr c>>eh I oop pgII4,< c.

Cont.a inment p~~~(<)

Pressure b.

Ili Steam Flow and 2 lli SF a>td 2

<>f 4 l.ow T wit.h 4

Low T I lli SF an< n T

= 350oF w/N)V's ol>cn

~g.4 ~ <I.

Hanua I Feo~ fc. (c3 6.

FEEI)MATFR'LIHE ISOI.ATION I/loop I/loop I/loop

"'1' 350 F

u/)IHV's open FLl< $.C.

a.

Safety Injection File g;g b.

Ili St.earn Generator

~~g gQ)

Leve I (Scc Table 3.5-2, It.cm I) 3/loop 2/loop in 2/loop in eit.her loop both loops

"--"I'

'3SOol u/FU 'fso I valves open i

RCS tcmperat.>>rc may bc above 350 F

i I'SIV's <>rc closed.

I<IoI<-'4"-":<

RCS tcm eraturc may be above 350oF i f FM Isol. valves arc clos<!>st.

bc capable of providing a. S. l. signal to <.ach loop.

ACTION STATEMENTS With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in hot shutdown with all RCCA's fully inserted within the next 6

hours.

LCo 8.3. i 2-Cond 0 Pong E c<<a M With the number of operable dzannels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition witHin k hour and the requirements for the minimum number of channels

'perable are satisfied.

However, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to @hours for surveillance testin of other channels.

IS,I,.

ma an, O.I..( ~O.i.l; With the number of operable channels less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, be at a condition where operability is not required according to Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

~

~

gg,l 3.

(

~ ~l~/H LCO 3.3. l 4.

QInd X/Z/kIL Sa I..k C~'"."'" -On mL..1 With the number, of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels requirement, sus end all o erations involvin ositive react'vit changes and ave all RCCA's u

y 1nserte w1t in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With the number of operable channels

.one less than t e Minimum Operable Channels requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

If the channel is not restored to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> reactor trip breaker within the next hour g ii'S;I..

J.C03.3.I 5.

~QE C nay Cond"'H QonJ P ypass of an i operable channel t avoid e gener t1on of reacto trip s gnal, o eration m y proce until is Chan el Funct onal Te t.

At e time o this ne t Charm Funct1o a

l5.C..<

86 Test or 1

at any time the number o

oper e c anne s

1s less than the Minimum Operable

Channels, be at a condt1on where channel operability is not required according to Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

sad N +a ~5:,.o With th number o

oper e c ann s

o e

ss an the/Total Numbe of Chan els, ope ation ma roc ed unt'he Bdxt Chamuel Funct'nal Tes/

rovide t e 1n perab e c anne 1s:

p aced 1n e

r1ppe con it1,on within hour.

With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels re IS.~

e at, a con 1t1on w ere channe opera 1 1ty 1s not requ1re according to Column 6 of Table 3.5-1 within the next 6

IS.i,se

$('0 3 3 f 6.

With the number of operable channels less than the Total

(+Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the j,noperable channel is laced in the tripped condition with1n S.In

~hour.

S ou the nex C anne nc 1ona Test re 1re t e lao Z.3.<

).c0 33% 7-na P Cn88 i Can@ C I$.i.5 With the number of operable channels les than the Total Number of

Channels, operation may proceed provided t e inoperable channel is laced in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

S o ld the next C anne nctxona Tes quatre the yp ss o an snop able channel to avoi the generatio of a trip s'gnal, operat' may proceed until is Channel Fu ctional Test At the time f this Channe Funct'al Test, o

x a

an ne e number of operable channe s

xs ess an e Minimum Operable

Channels, either If.i.

a) be a Hot Shutdow within the nex 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> an tern rature less an 350'F withi the following~

or d

RCS hours b) e ergize the a fected bus wit a diesel gen ator.

Lco 3.3.2 Conk 6 Q,~nd 0 lco83.t 9.

coh~Z (I

6ti.4 trna.w. ".

t.a~A 8 a-z E J.eo 3'3.2-C.> X.

~'nd L With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels

required, restore, the inoperable channel to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and at ah RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />..

~

~

~

With the number of 'operable channels one less than the Total Number of Channels re uired, era son may procee until the nex anne rove e

e xnopera e c anne xs place zn. the trz ed position withe.n + hour.

t e

nex anne unc zona dc es or a any mme e num er o operable c anne s zs ess than the Minimum Operable Channels required, be at Hot Shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and at an RCS temperature less than 350 F within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With the number of operable channels one less than the Minimum Operable Channels

required, restore the inoperable channel to operable'tatus within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in Hot Shutdown within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and at cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

C~):

I.I..

5. I.i.j.

Wi the number of operable channels less han the Total Number of

Channels, operation may proceed provided e inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within g hours.

Should the next Channel Functional Test require the bypass of an inoperable channel to avoid the generation of an actuation

signal, operation may.

proceed until this Channel Functional Test.

At the time of this Channel Functional Test, or if at any time the number of operable channels is less than the Minimum Operable Channels required, be at Hot Sh in 6

hours and at.

o u

own wxthxn e'fol owing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

+ ~

LQO g,g.g 12 Q)gA. X ga'ta Ski.

cv a.

is;ii 4 IS:it.m umber of operable channels less than the Total Channels.,

operation may proceed provided the le channel is placed in the tripped condition hour.

Should the next Channel Funct'o iiS With t Number inoper within z nal Test require the bypass of an inoperable channel to avoid the generation of an actuation si nal pera a.on may procee un z.

zs anne Functional Test.

At the time of this Channe tional Test or if at any txme t e n er c

operable channels is less than the Minimum Operable Channels

required, be at hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and at an RCS temperature less than 350 F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

lS.LL,'e P 13.

With e number operable ch nels less Ope le Chan ls require operati pr ided the ontainment r e and iS t.. ask IS'i i,.CC.

an the Minimum may continue val iS.<. ~;~ )s;.~.44 hould one eactor tri breake or annel of tri lo ic e inoperable the plant must not be in the operating mo e following a sir hour time period, and the breaker must be open.

is.<.dd c

a R,Hoke?.

If one of the diverse reactor trip breaker trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment).

on one breaker is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />

~

or declare breaker inoperable.

If at the end of the 48.

hour period one trip feature is inoperable it must be repaired or the plant must not be in the operating

mode, and the reactor trip breaker must be o en, followin an ad it onal six hour time period.

T e rea er s a 1 not e bypassed whx e one o

e averse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to operable status.

s l5. c. ee

1

TABLE 4.-1-1

-"'~x 3 3 MINIMUM FREQUENCIES FOR CHECKS s CALIBRATIOHS AND TEST OF INSTRUMENT CHAHHELS

\\

2 A;o.

Channel 1;:3',, Huc1 ea r. Power Range 33I3 "CS,.i.,!4;;.-;;,t.,:;; ~:,::.

3

'"--":~'6.km='-~~.

2.'.-'.. Huclea r.Dn termed ia te

+3(3.3;l)Range.,'..:.~ "~ '.,-..'..

":..: '".:.".:,- "QpS3eJW)Ch Hi39 Z~Ar~

3;.:=:='Nu'cl'.ear+Source 'ange

\\

4 e '=i i

,03.l ~ ~~~ ~~

,~$ ;-=P Re'a c tor,;.=.Coo la nt 4;-,'L):.~...',

':~,'Reve o,

., oolant F

".7..~=Pr.essurizer Press j~>: (>'.s':i)..":-;:,=-=-.=.=:--'-:.-.;.'-:

Zstc33'ge';-393)='@ii;::~6

'4a'ow ure

-9~~Ro,d<'P o~s. %ion ~'~-'~

.~~3Ind i'ca'.t-i.o n;-..-."

Check l (3.3.l I M

3 (w.Q 3 (J),l)

S S

3 (3.3. 0 S

g3 (1.1.i) 3(1.V. I)

I (333.I)

S 3 (3'.3.2)

H.A wl ii'. ed~4 s(1 2:)~.;

je

':la,', ",.pcp<Ske"

"~

~-

3 " ~i.'

fjbP~RF<W... Tg";~-'Z'i'Pu+;RC ~ KPAg"...

Calibrate 2.D.3.1)

S (3.3.>)

it(iV.35 i-3O (3.~.3)

R

}o (11.3)

R g> (1.3. 3) io (1.3.I)

(RR g P.3.3I iO (331) f0,3.t')

R-e W.'6 k, e"g, l,g Test

'F63.3. I) cb')

=. ptKEB)

S'Cz.s.i) '

e.3333)

P 7

(4'otal's'wi

)

-- S(tnSOCX)

'=-"'~='-.7."-(.1';1.i) -;-'~-:-

'1~):,".

(2')

<<'(3.'1, ()

i

~

4..

. ~(1,>.<);;-;

2&,i,b Remarks 2) 3)

4 5) 1 Signa WT; b e action (perm'.ss stop>

traps)

U and lower cha s for axial offset**

High setpoint 9% of rated power)

Low setpoint

(<25% of rated power) 2'),

og.le 1;

b table etio

" -'-r"m ssi e

=ro 1

e i 4

~

.C..C

'S.':e.<.rg

~ e3~~1

.-1.)

Oye rtempera ture-Del ta T

.2) Overpower Delta T

- V (1.1.3)

I (3-3-4)

"I C).) ~ I '3

~.g ().1.L) 2E.i. c

'Qd~aealy

.. SQaeyaC3,[";-" ~

~i i

i 1.)'- Hith step counters 2)

Log rod position indications each

-:;:='~.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when -rod deviation monitor 3~~ ~ >'-':~is out of service

"..P<SN o-tCeb.

.n

'-=h

':>.or~."re'fueling;.;s ut own,but: as.soon. as.

ossible af ter retUrn o power.

.'Cl. i%~>

~ 0".>4i4~4KwC3' i

%eidfAMNa)45'CS:e3+ i <%<Wp244Ae"ec '93c3>

~

• '4

Channel C eck Calibrate ~est "4

TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued) 8'4 remarks ABceaeJ 2

Ch We 3. I 10.

Rod Position Bank Counters

~+~pa,)l

-. -Steam Generator Lev m.~S;S:<'+";~73 ~

~)'-.'2;:;-

Charging Flow

~gg'p=,'13'~.'- Residual-. Heat Remov g~~~=-:- ~~.Pump: Flow

-<=..-=-...'. 14. 'Boric Acid Storage a

-. 15.

Refuef ing Hater

. Storage Tank Level el al Tank Level S(1,2) l (b.'3. 3')

S t (33,ih N.A.

N.A.

D N.A.

N.A.

~~ Q.~.h R

g 1',w.c)

~a'033)

~R..

g 847.x)

N. A-.

~"

r R

-,"-,N~ A ~

Note 4

~

~

Add~>eJ H

~~<~ g.4ig.5 N.A.

1) Hith rod position indication

2) Log rod position indications each 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when rod deviation monitor

. 's out of service

='-, = 16.".,Voplume Control Tank

,LeVerla, a

17..Reactor Containment

-2 Pressure=-

V;~(.l'ar'eye(: 34$.,2 5

-.-'~~;";18;~Radiation Monitoring

'- ".;,-~ 19. Boiic-Acid Control 20..Containment.

Drain

~~'-,a22

-EValve-'-;

Tmeperature var~-'@=t"',:@zuterleeke

~ "=>~r.--"22.">Pump,-.Valve Interlock J(..

Q8-:p4-;;.23..Turbine Trip (3.i.A, "Set-.Point 24..Accumulator Level and

=..-.-:;.

""--'". ".;Pressure 4

24 N.A.

D N:A ~

N.A.

N.A ~

N.A.

r (g

(s.a.~)

a N.A.

N. A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Area Monitors Rl to R9, System Monitor R17 4aar~sed we '.

- c.4 pW 8.+f3.'5 I

2,1 ~ c,.C.

Add~>D,~

Mpkr 3.+ f36 8 ~ I ~ C

C A<<<<( r ICJ TABLB 4. 1-1 (CO&'.INUED) r

,Channel a

25.

- Containment Pressure F::) ~ '-

~=--'-.'.j3.-.

.26.:= Stcam Generator Pressure

--:.w~l ~="Q'~-:z).

<<~"'.-:,27,.'~.-T((t;bine First Stage Pressure 5:----

- -=;-

.--'=="-.

.-,~~@'.)28..-.=;-;-Eincrlgency. Plan Radiation

-'Instruments:

-'~~@m<29..-<Envi:ionmcntal Monitors

'~pp)-'..30.

-.T,ossl of Voltage/Degraded "Cc)9v3~+,=-; Voltage 480 Volt

"~'='-. ~..

3 =--.-." Safeguards Bus

'.~~~31='-%.<Tii'pa of Maiii"Feedwater Pumps Check (S

I QS (3A.'()

NA NA

(

(SSgq~)

(s's~)

':-'-~>Chlorine. etector Control'Room

~'.-~Aery.

-3'5.: -.Ammonia, ontrol Room ~*

-- ntake

=.

NA~.JJr)

I

~ J)

JJ'~ki A:)

i l

'i,<<<<

.jWj 'j;-36.

Radi'ation Detectors, Control Room NA.

,A'ir Intake; R'

i(m)

.CMM

-'--~~~ -='Indication".=System

.( 4 g~~>38a;)-..TripA'.Br(eaker:

=

NA

++~'(7",~j" -.-g Logic 'Charm'el Testing 33~~~))~i Call)traka Test Raaarka

R.

(y;1.%)

a(-

'r3.l.t)

~((

NA

((.3.a)

NA \\

(3.3A)

-'- "ifgj(3tt)"

NA R

(( (3.).t) j'(3).t)

z 3

J r

i 3 la M

J

> (si c')".

R 5'f33.+, 3'~:

N "3-'y

- a(s.s:s3 NA

' '6 (W.lb;-

NA M

~)k('3'3;3).

NA

=.- AR,

.3.- j~

2 and 3

a+>> <<P i)<<3J '.

28l)l G Jh 3 ~

tk~C~r <!3~&-4 -~'- -- '+,--

rrow ange conta ent pr sure 3.0

+3 psig) eluded CC

Channel, TABLE 4.1-1 (Continued) zs.i.b

~Cetic N.A N.A.

ar Breaker N.A.

Bypass Breaker N.A.

FMp'5: '39

--. "-'Reactor Trip Fg-'Wt6" Breakers (3.j;i) a c

ig>>

F'u o t '.-,:-,.'-;40.

Manual Trip Reactor (pp.i)'~:,

"e pg.

~ S+~41a. -Reactor'..Trip Bypass.

L~~)+>>"

.~~~-

<~~~~a-~-',~,."

plaf (g.l)l.b Reactor Trip (SR'.3; 3; f~.lq:..~tko'"~4, 5R.-B'.3.-I.)ga

~Ca ib a

e ~eat N A ts ii pe~ma (s N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

h,s.0 ON; notion test Includes independe te

'ing of both undervoltage and sh t

trip attachment of reactor rip break s.

Each of the two r actor trip b

akers will be te ed on

alternat months.

Includes inde ndent sting of both

-undervoltage a

s nt trip circ-uitsi.

-The test all also verify

.the-operability f

e bypass break-

'er.

Using test switches in e reactor

'protecti rack manually ip the reactor trip bypass breaker using the s

nt trip coil.

A omatically trip the undervolta i

attachment.

NOTE 1:

SR. Q.p.(.<

r..~

~r

- ~.>o

-', r.

Logic trains will e tested on alternate months corres ondin to the reactor t breaker testi Monthly logi es ng w

ve fy the operabi ty of all sets of reactor trip ogic actuating c ntacts on that tr in.(See Note 3).

Refueling shutdow testing wil verify the oper ility of all set of reactor trip ctuating contacts n

both train Zn testing, op ation of one set f contacts will suit in a reactor ip breaker t ipse t:he operatio of all other se of contacts wil be verified by th use of indic ion, circuitry.

OTE T" ting shal be pei'fo med monthly, less the re ctor trip bre ers are op or sha

"- -.":-.=.-..-.=."

.-" ~er'formed

'ri'or..'t~o.'artu 4f..te as not ee performed ithin the 1 st 30 da s r.

'era e

a

++e

+e'ee, g

.":. e g

ea lq'v+8 pd A'~~~+..aNoTE--'3"e~

-.'The,,s'oui e":,range~ 6ri ogic> ma'y b exclude'd. fro

.:=:~-~;-'p...'~~ '-~."fwi'thin. 0';..days:pri".,;to" 'startup'.

.,:~'~NOTE~4-'.:~:--'Hheri BAST is required=to-.be operable'..

5 ~ '

'+1

~

.A.aeM monthly:, tes ng provided i:t s teste

<< re

TABLE 4.1-2 MUM PRE UENCXES OR E U P ENT AND SAMPLI TESTS 1.

Reactor Coolant Chemistry Samples 2.

Reactor Coolant Boron Chlorido and Fluoride Oxygen Boron Concentration Q~Ql~QflC:

3 timos/week and at loast overy thi.rd day 5 times/week and at least every second day except when below 250.F Weekly 3 ~

Refueling Water Storage Tank'Water Sam lc K

Boron Concentration K

'Weekly Pdh~od a iA Qha,pW 8.4'i3 4.

Bor c Tank 5.

Control, Rods age or oncentra son.

~ ~

K K

Rod drop times of,all full length rods ee I

After>>'vessel.

head removal and at least once per 18 months (1)

~ K 6a Full Length Control Rod Movo any,rod not fully inserted a sufficient number of stops in any-'ne di.rccti.on to cause a

change of position as indicated by the rod position indication system Monthly gcWrecsel wA Q,4)hv Z.l 6b. Full Length Control Rod Move each rod through Each Refueling Shutdown its full length to verify that thc rod position indication, system transitions. occur"'

Pressurizer-Safety Set point Valves "

Each Refueling Shutdown

'K 8.

Main Stcam Safoty Valves S8 3.g,p.9 9.

Containment'solation Trip

10. Refueling System Interlocks Set point Functioning Functioning J,-.

K Each'efueling shutdown

, ~

~

Each Refueling Shutdown Prior to Refueling Operations

@~~vs,i.Aa, K

I

~.

~

'K

~~q q)t,.~,

N:~KK

,A~~,

~.:

K!

K rP ~

0K K!~

K K

pQreacJ AH C~e BO Table 4.1-5 Radioactive Effluent Monitorin Surveillance Re irements Instrument Channel Source Functional C

nel Check Check Test Ca ration Gross Activity Monitor (Liquid) a.

Liquid Rad Waste (R-18)

D(7) b.

Steam Generator Blowdown (R-19) D(7) c.

Turbine Building D(7)

Floor Drains (R-21)

M(4)

Q(1)

M(4)

Q(

M(4)

(1)

R(5)

R(5)

R(5) e.

Containment Fan Coolers (R-16) r I

Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger A Loop,(R-20A) d.

High Conductivity Waste (R-22)

D(7)

D(7)

D(7)

M(4)

Q(1) 4)

Q(2)

M(4)

Q(2)

R(5)

'R(5)

R(5).

ge Spent Fuel Pool. He'at'..'>>;"'-. '

D(7 Exchanger B Loop (R-20B)'(4)

Q(2)

I'(5)'lant Ventilation a.

Noble Gas Activity.(R-.14):.,+ ',

D(I)

(Alarm and Zsolation of

~

Gas Decay Tanks) r 'e b.

Particulate Sampler

(

13)

W(7) t c.

Zodine Sampler W(7)

(R-10B and R-14A)

>> ~ }', ~,

d.

Flow Rate.Dete nation'<}";t ~";,. N.A.

$ dlrp<<cd ':wi Containment Purge

~s',.I', ";ClKo'Pie4-H.A.

H.A.

N.A.

Q(1)

R(5)

N.A.

R(5) c R(5)

Aj. Ifen

~' = N".A ";t','.'"' sR(6') K l ~ $ llr '" 4' e} a. Noble Gas Activity (R-,12)' D(7) PR R(5) b. Particulate Sampler (R-ll');;}:;" W(7) N.A. R('5) Q(1) Q(1) H.A. c. Xodine Sampler W(7) R(5) ( 10A and R-12A) ~ d. low Rate Determi.nation".,'", .; ~ s N.A. H.A. N.A- ', 'R(6)} A'jector Monitor;p,,jj';".';-.;~<qx<}'j(>jp}q~s .', ~'(7)~pj ~,. M M(2) -".,~;;;".~AY -K', ".',R(p)";~;:"",>."'aste Gas System Oxygen ", ".jj~'g'r".'... D N.A. N.A; ..',",';.'Q('3)',"'Monitor ~ < ~ ';}ei~ ~

iver yQ%, ('0 TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) 4". TABLE NOTATION (1) The Channel Functional Test shall also demonstrate that a tic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm occur if any of the 'lowing conditions exist: 1. Instrument indicates measured levels above th alarm and/or trip setpoint; 2. Power failure. (2) The Channel Functional Test shall also dern strate that control room alaqn occurs if any of the following conditions exist: 1. Instrument indicates measured le ls above the alarm setpoint. '( IIIr 2. Power'ailure. ,ll5 ~ (3) The Channel Calibration shall 'lude the use 'of.standard gas samples containing a nominal:

)(

Zero'volume percent xygen; 'and 2. Three:. volume per nt oxygen. ~ 5"W ,j '( ~p I I 5 This check may r are the use of an external source due to high background in -the sample cha (5) Source used. r the Channel Calibration shall be'raceable to the National Bureau of S ndards (NBS) or shall be obtained from suppliers (e.g. Amersham) that prov' sources traceable to other, officially-,designated standards ag(;ncie (6) Flow 'te "for main plant ventilation exhaust and,containment purge exhaust are ca ulated,by'he',flaw capacity of ventilationexhaust fans in service and s ll:bei'('determined. at the frequency specified;,~ 4.'-.:,, 'I ~ ~ r( (, ~ ll> , (7) Applies,'only 'during releases via this pathway.'""-"'..;" ((, C (4) II' l

Attachment IV Evaluation ofIncreased Surveillance Test Intervals

Evaluation of Quarterly Trip Test Instrument Surveillance Intervals Design Analysis Ginna Station EWR 10226 Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 DA-EE"95" 0136 Revision 0 August 21, 1995 Prepared by: Design Engineer 8-ZZ-SS Date Approved by: Independent or Lead viewer 3-x~='l5 Date Page 1 of 10

REVISION STATVS SHEET Revision Number Affected Sections All Descri tion of Revision Original Xssue Table 1 Attachment A DA-EE-95-0136 Page 2 of 10 Revision 0

TABLE OP CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE NO. 1.0 2.0 Pnnnose Conclusions 4 4 3.0 Desi In uts 3.1 Set oint Anal ses 3.2 RPS and ESFAS Tri Test Procedures .3.3 Instrument Calibration Data Records 4 4 5 5 4.0 Referenced Documents 5 5.0 Assum tions 6 6.0 Com uter Codes 6 7.0 A~nal sls 7.1 Identif in the Drift Stud 7.2 Discussion of Tri Test Da Set oint Anal ses 7.3 Drift Stud Methodolo ~ ~ 8.0 Results ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Po ulation ta and 6 6 6 7 8 Table 1 9 Attachment A 10 DA-EE-95-0136 Page 3 of 10 Revision 0

DESIGN ANALYSIS Evaluation of Quarterly Trip Test Instrument Surveillance Intervals 1.0 Puruose Included within the scope of EWR 10226 - Ginna Station Technical Specification Improvement Program (TSIP) is a change in the required surveillance intervals for testing Reactor Trip System (RTS) and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrument trip setpoints. Current Technical Specifications (TS) require monthly channel operational tests of RTS and ESFAS setpoint devices. Under the TSIP, it is proposed that these testing intervals be increased from monthly to quarterly. The purpose of this evaluation is to perform an instrument setpoint drift study based on historical as found/as left calibration records to show that RTS and ESFAS trip test surveillance requirements can be extended to quarterly intervals without exceeding allowable limits. 2.0 Conclusions 3.0 3.1 This analysis has shown that the Ginna Station Instrumentation listed in Table 1 may be a'ssigned a trip test. surveillance interval of up to three months (quarterly) without instrument calibration drift exceeding the allowable limits specified in existing Ginna Station setpoint documents. Desi In uts Set oint Anal ses 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.1.6 3.1.7 DA-EE-92-090-21, F411 RCS Flow, Rev. 0 DA-EE-92-087-21, P429 - Pressurizer

Pressure, Rev.

0 DA-EE-92-088-21, P468 - S/G Pressure, Rev. 0 DA-EE-92-085-21, P450 LTOP RCS Pressure, Rev. 0 DA-EE-92-092-21, T405 - Delta T, Rev. 0 DA-EE-92-039-21, AST 63-3 - Turbine Auto Stop", Rev. 0 DA-EE-92-042-21, P946 - Containment Pressure (Wide), Rev. 0 DA-EE-95-0136 Page 4 of 10 Revision 0

3.1.8

3. 1.9 DA-EE-92-089-21, F464

- Main Steam Flow, Rev. 0 DA-EE-92-041-21, P945 - Containment Pressure (Narrow), Rev. 0 3.1.10 3.1.11 3.2 DA-EE-92-081-21, L426 - Pressurizer

Level, Rev.

0 DA-EE-92-050-21, L461 - S/G Narrow Range Level, Rev. 0 RPS and ESFAS Tri Test Procedures 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4 3.2.5 3.3 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.10, RPS Trip Test Calibration for Channel 1, Rev. 8 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.20, RPS Trip Test Calibration for Channel 2, Rev. 11 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.30, RPS Trip Test Calibration for Channel 3, Rev. 13 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.40, RPS Trip Test Calibration for Channel 4, Rev. 8 CPI-TRIP-TEST 5.50, Trip Test for Turbine Auto Stop Pressure Switches and Relays Instrument Calibration Data Records Approximately 75 Instrument Calibration Data Records were, retrieved and used as inputs to this analysis. These records were obtained from Ginna Station Work Orders and completed Instrument Calibration Procedures and are too numerous to be itemized in this analysis. Copies of these records will be retained in the EWR 10226 document file. 4.0 Referenced Documents 4.1 4.2 4.3 "Guidelines for Instrument Loop Performance Evaluation and Setpoint Verification", EWR

5126, Rev.

1, dated 08/07/92. Commonwealth Edison Correspondence: L.D. Butterfield (WOG) to H.R. Denton (NRC);

Subject:

Rev. 1 of Guidelines for Preparation of Submittals Requesting Revisions to RPS Technical Specifications, dated 9/3/85. USNRC Correspondence: C.E. Rossi (NRC) to R.A. Newton (WOG);

Subject:

WCAP-10271 Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, dated 2/22/89. DA-EE 0136 Page 5 of 10 Revision'

~ 4.4 5.0 MIL-STD-105D, "Sampling Procedures and Tables for Inspection by Attributes". Assum tions 6.0 7.0 Assumptions are noted in Section 7.0 and Attachment A when applicable. P Com uter Codes None. A~nal sls 7.1 Identif in the Drift Stud Po ulation 7.1.1 References 4.2 and 4.3 require that instrument drift and safety analysis issues be addressed when proposing an increase in RTS and ESFAS surveillance intervals from monthly to quarterly. The following is a summary of the review effort performed under this analysis. 7.1.2 Functional descriptions and model numbers of the instrumentation within the scope of this analysis are provided in Table 1. This population was developed by identifying all components included within the RTS and ESFAS strings. The specific model numbers for each of these components were then identified; Table 1 was created by sorting on model numbers. There are a total of 59 instruments subject to this evaluation. 7.1.3 Monthly instrument trip test results over a one year period for a sample of the identified equipment were retrieved from Ginna Station Central Records/Document Control. Sample sizes were determined based on Reference 4.4 for a 95/95 confidence level. 7.2 Discus ion of Tri Test Data and Set int Anal ses 7.2.1 RTS and ESFAS setpoint devices are currently checked monthly in accordance with the procedures listed under Reference 3.2. Instrument Setpoint Data Sheets specify the desired setpoint and acceptance criteria for each setpoint device. Each time an instrument is tested, its current setpoint is measured and recorded on the applicable data sheet. These values are the "as found" instrument values. DA-EE-95-0136 Page 6 of 10 Revision 0

7.2.2 The "as found" instrument setpoint values may differ from the "desired/calculated" values specified, on the Data Sheet due to the combined effects of one or more of the following instrument uncertainty terms a.b. C. d. Instrument accuracy (Ia) Instrument drift (Id) Instrument calibration tolerance (It) Test equipment accuracy (MTE) The statistical worst-case effects of these uncertainties are incorporated in the design analyses of the Instrument Setpoint Verification Project (Setpoint Analyses) and used to evaluate the adequacy of existing instrument setpoint and calibration values specified in the calibration procedures. The total instrument uncertainty (TIU) is given by: T2'U = [ra' Id~ + It~ + MTZ~] ~~~ The "as-found" acceptance criteria or allowable tolerance band (ATB) specified on the Data Sheet is typically 1.0% of the instrument's calibrated span and is, in fact, the "It" term described above. If during an instrument calibration an "as found" value is within the ATB, no other action is required. The instrument may be left as is until the next calibration interval. However, if an "as found" value is outside the ATB or approaching the limit of the ATB, the instrument must be adjusted or recalibrated back into the ATB as required by the calibration procedure. In either case, the "as left" calibration data is recorded on the Data Sheet. 7.3 Drift Stud Methodolo 7 ~ 3 ~ 1 The Data Sheets for the sample instrumentation population were reviewed for the period from January 1994 through January 1995. For the first Surveillance Data Sheet, the "desired/calculated" value was subtracted from the "as found" value and recorded. For the second Surveillance Data Sheet, the "as found" value is subtracted from the first surveillance "as left" value. The third surveillance "as found" value is then compared to the second surveillance "as left" value and so on until one year of data is available. DA-EE-95-0136 Page 7 of 10 Revision 0

7.3.3 The "as found" minus "as left" values represent the observed instrument setpoint

variance, in percent of

span, for that surveillance interval (typically one month).

After examining the surveillance history of each device, the worst-case consecutive five month variance is selected and documented on the Summary Sheet for each instrument manufacturer/model number in the sample population. The worst "as left/as found" difference is calculated over a period of one month up to five months (i.e. the worst case drift may actually be between two consecutive monthly tests rather than over the maximum five month period). If the worst-case five month setpoint variance is within the TIU band, a quarterly trip test interval has been demonstrated to be, acceptable (with two months margin which encompasses the 25% extension allowed by TS). 8.0 Results 8.1 Specific results for each manufacturer/model number are provided in the Attachment A Summary Sheets. In one case (PC-478A/B, Attachment A, page 3) the worst case variance was found to exceed the TIU by 0.18%. Per Reference 4.4, one failure out of a sample of 8 specimens is allowed. In all other cases, the worst case setpoint variance was observed to be within the TIU. Therefore, quarterly channel trip test surveillance intervals are considered to be acceptable for the instrumentation included within the scope of this analysis. DA-EE-95-0136 Page 8 of 10 Revision 0

Table 1 Instrumentation Applicable to Increased Surveillance Intervals DA-EE-95-0136 Page 9 of 10 Revision 0

Evaluation of Quarterly Test Intervals for RTS and ESFAS 21 Aug 95 MODEL 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR 63S-AR VENDORNAME FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO EIN FC411 FCA12 FC-413 FC414 FC415 FC<16 PC<29A PC-429E PC<30A PC-430H PC-431A PC-431J PC<49A SELECTED No No No No'o No No No No No SHORT DESC RX CLNTFLO LOOP AALM RX CLNTFLO LOOP AALM RX CLNTFLO LOOP AALM RX CLNTFLO LOOP B ALM RX CLNTFLO LOOP B ALM RX CLNTFLO LOOP B ALM PRZR DUPLEXALMUNIT PRZR ALM-VARIBLELP TRI PRZR DUPLEXALMUNIT PRZR ALM-VARIBLELP TRI PRZR DUPLEXALMUNIT PRZR ALM-VARIBLELP TRI PRZR PRESS BISTB LO TRIP EWE 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS DAEE-95-0136 lof5 TABLE 1 21 Aug 95

MODEL VENDORNAME SELECTED SHORT DESC Total 13 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FC464A FCA65A FC-474A FC475A LC426A/B LC-427A/C LC-428A/E LC-461A/B LCA62A/B LCA63C/D LC-471A/B LCA72A/B No No No No No No No No No No No SG ASTM FLOW ALARM SG A SF HI/HI-HITRIP S/G B STM FLO ALM/IRIP S/G FLOW LOOP B BISTB PZR LVLDUPLEXALM-HIT PZR LVLDUPLEXALM-HIT PZR LVLDUPLEXALM-HIT SG ANRHILVL/RXFW ISOL S/G ALO-LO/HILVLALM S/G ALEVELBISTABLE S/G B ALARMBISTABLE SG B LO-LO/HILVL/RXFW EWR 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS DAEE-95-0136 2of5 TABLE1 21 Aug 95

MODEL VENDORNAME SELECTED SHORT DESC 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO LC<73C/D PC429D/C PC<30E/F PCA31VG PC468A PC469A PC-478A/B PC-479A PCA82A PC483A PC-945A/B PC-946A/B PC-947A/B PC-948A/B PC-949A/B PC-950A/B TCROIA/D No No No No No Yes No No No No Yes No No No SG B HILVLALM/FWISOL PRZR PRESS DUPLEXALAR PRZR PRESS DUPLEXALAR PRZR PRESS DUPLEXALAR SG APRESS BISTB SG APRESS LO/LO-LOBISTB S/G B PRESS BISTB S/G PRESS LOOP B BISTB S/G A STM PRESS BISTB AL SG B PRESS LO/LO-LOBISTB CNMTPRESS HIRXTRIP CNMTPRESS BISTB HI/HI-HI CNMTPRESS BISTB CNMTPRESS BISTB HI/HI-HI HI CNMTPRESS TRIP BISTB HI CNMTPRESS/SPRAY BIST TAVGHI TEMP TRIP BISTB EWR 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS DAEE-95-0136 3of5 TABLE1 21 Aug 95

MODEL VENDORNAME SELECTED SHORT DESC 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR 63S-BR FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO FOXBORO TC-402A TC-403A TC-404A/D TC-405 A/B THOS C/D TC406A/B TCA06C/D TCA07A/B TCA07C/D TCA08A/B TC408C/D No No No No No No No No No TAVGHI&LO TEMP TRIP TAVGHI &LO TEMP TRIP BI TAVGLO/HI TRIP BISTB DELT SP2 OP TRIP/ROD STO DELT SP2 OVERTEMP TRIP DELT SP2 OP TRIP DELT SP2 OT TRIP DELT SP2 OP TRIP BISTABL DELT SP1 OT TRIP BISTABL DELT SP2 OP TRIP/ROD STO OT DELT SP2 TRIP/ROD STO Total 40 63U 63U FOXBORO PCA50 RC OVERPRESS PROT ALM EWE 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS DAEE-95-0136 4of5 TABLE1 21 Aug 95

SELECTED MODEL 63U 63U Total DA-23-127 DA-23-127 DA-23-127 DA-23-127 Total EWR 10226 DESIGN ANALYSIS DAEE-95-0136 VENDORNAME FOXBORO FOXBORO MERCOID MERCOID MERCOID 5of5 PC<51 PC<52 PS-2019 PS-2020 PS-2026 No No SHORT DES C RC OVERPRESS PROT ALM RC OVERPRESS PROT ALM TURB LO PRESS SW TRIP TURB LO PRESS SW TRIP TURB LO PRESS SW TRIP TABLE1 21 Aug 95

Attachment A instrument Drift Study Summary Sheets DA-EE-95-0136 Page 10 of 10 Revision 0

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Attachment V Evaluation ofDifferences Between Standard Technical Specifications and Proposed Technical Specifications This attachment discusses the technical differences from WCAP-10271 and standard technical specifications (STS) which would exist ~f11 twin~; implementation of the technical specification changes as proposed in this LAR. These differences are, in general, not created during the implementation of these changes, but are due to existing requirements (e.g., the current Ginna Station technical specifications may be less restrictive than standard technical specifications). The proposed resolution ofthese differences is also provided. Function Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-1 Difference Resolution STS have separate Required Actions for MODES 1 and 2andMODES3,4, and 5. CTS has the same Required Actions for all MODES. As such, STS require opening the reactor trip breakers within 1 hour in MODES 3, 4, and 5 ifthe 48 hour Completion Time is not met while CTS do not have this requirement. STS have additional Required Actions for an inoperable channel related to reducing THERMALPOWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint gr monitoring QPTR with an inoperable Power Range Neutron Flux-High channel. STS have additional Required Actions for an inoperable channel related to reducing THERMALPOWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux trip setpoint gr monitoring QPTR. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change D.15.i.d on page 188 of Attachment A) such that the CTS Required Actions will be changed to reflect STS. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change D.15.i.i on page 189 of Attachment A) such that the CTS Required Actions will be changed to reflect STS. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change D.15.i.j on page 189 of Attachment A) such that the CTS Required Actions will be changed to reflect STS.

Function Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-1 Difference Resolution 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 The CTS require opening the reactor trip breakers within 48 hours ifthe Source Range Neutron Flux channel is not restored to OPERABLE status while in MODE 2 in addition to stopping all positive reactivity additions. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. No difference. (Note that the Underfrequency 4 KVBus function is being relocated to the TRM in the 5/26/95 submittal since it is not credited in the accident analyses, nor as a secondary function for Ginna Station.) No difference. (Note that the QPTR monitor function is being relocated to ITS Chapter 3.2, "Power Distribution Limits" in the 5/26/95 submittal since this is not a RTS function.) No difference. (Note that the Circulating Water Flood Protection function is being relocated to the TRM in the 5/26/95 submittal since it is not a RTS function, nor is it credited in the accident analyses.) This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see Condition I ofproposed LCO 3.3.1) by removing this more restrictive CTS requirement. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A S 0 I

Function Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-1 Difference Resolution 18 19 20 The Loss ofVoltage - 480 VBus function is comprised of 2 sets of 2 channels each. To actuate this function, at least 1 channel in boah sets must energize. This is different than the STS assumed design of 2/4 logic. The Degraded Voltage - 480 V Bus function is comprised of 2 sets of 2 channels each. To actuate this function, at least 1 channel in boOh sets must energize. This is different than the STS assumed design of 2/4 logic. a. The CTS do not have any time limitfor performing maintenance on diverse trip functions while STS limits this to 2 hours.

b. The CTS allow 6 hours to open the RTBs ifa diverse trip function is not restored within 48 hours while STS limits this to 1 hour.

STS contain OPERABILITYrequirements for the RTS permissives while the CTS have no such requirements. The reliabilityofthe Ginna Station design is consistent with that assumed in STS such that no change to the proposed technical specifications is required. The reliabilityof the Ginna Station design is consistent with that assumed in STS such that no change to the proposed technical specifications is required. 1

a. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change D.15.i.ee on page 194 ofAttachment A) such that the CTS Required Actions willbe changed to essentially reflect STS.

b. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change D.15.i.dd on page 194 ofAttachment A) such that the CTS Required Actions willbe changed to reflect STS.

This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change , C.23.xix on page 73 of Attachment A).

Function Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-2 Difference Resolution The CTS only requires the SI ESFAS function above 350'F (with the exception ofhigh containment pressure) while STS require this function above Cold Shutdown (> 200'F). The CTS requires that high-high containment pressure actuation ofthe Containment Spray ESFAS function be OPERABLE above Cold Shutdown while STS only require it above 350'F. Also, this actuation function is comprised of 2 sets of3 channels each at Ginna Station. To actuate this function, at least 2 channels in~ sets must energize. This is different than the WCAP assumed design of2/4 logic. As such, the proposed TS require an inoperable channel to be tripped within 6 hours versus the WCAP requirement to place the channel in bypass. No difference after changes. STS organize the Containment Isolation function with respect to "Phase A" and "Phase B" while Ginna Station has no such distinction. N l. AtGinna Station, all functions automatically initiated by SI (except containment isolation) are only required above 350'F (i.e., there is no system other than containment isolation which requires actuation of SI below this MODE). No change required. The CTS and proposed TS requirements are more conservative than STS. In addition, the CTS Applicabilityreflects the accident analysis assumptions for Ginna Station and is maintained. N/A The CTS are equivalent to STS since all containment isolation valves receive the same signal. Function Current Technical Specification Table 3.5-2 Difference Resolution a. STS allow the option to declare inoperable the MSIVwith the inoperable manual isolation channel ifthe channel is not restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours. The CTS have no Required Actions for an inoperable MSIVand therefore require a shutdown.

b. The Containment Pressure actuation of the Steam Line Isolation ESFAS function is 2/3 logic at Ginna Station while the WCAP used 2/4 logic. As such, the proposed TS require an inoperable channel to be tripped within 6 hours versus the STS requirement to place the channel in bypass.

The CTS require Feedline Isolation above 350'F while STS only require it above Hot Shutdown. STS contain OPERABILITYrequirements for the ESFAS permissives while the CTS have no such requirements. STS contain OPERABILITYrequirements for the Automatic Switchover to the Containment Sump which is not incorporated at Ginna Station.

a. The CTS aremore conservative than STS and no change is required.

b. The CTS and proposed TS requirements are more conservative than STS and considered acceptable.

The CTS Applicabilityis more conservative than STS and reflects the accident analysis assumptions. No change required. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change C.24.ii on page 75 of Attachment A). No change required.

Function Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Difference Resolution

a. The CTS require the daily comparison ofthe heat balance calculation with the Power Range Neutron Flux - High function "as soon as possible after return to power" while STS require adjustment ifthe difference is > 2%

when > 15% THERMALPOWER.

b. The CTS require a monthly comparison ofthe incore detector measurements to the axial flux difference while STS require adjustment ifthe difference is > 3%.

c. The CTS require a quarterly comparison of the incore detector measurements to the axial flux difference "as soon as possible after return to power" while STS require adjustment when >

75% THERMALPOWER.

a. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see SR 3.3.1.2 of proposed LCO 3.3.1) such that the CTS willbe changed to essentially reflect STS.

b. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see SR 3.3.1.3 ofproposed LCO 3.3.1) such that the CTS willbe changed to reflect STS.

c. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see SR 3.3.1.6 ofproposed LCO 3.3.1) such that the CTS willbe changed to reflect STS.

STS require refueling interval calibrations and quarterly channel operational tests ofthe Source Range Neutron Flux function while the CTS do not have these surveillance requirements. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see Attachment B, Table 3.3.1-1, Functional Unit84) such that CTS willbe changed to reflect STS. STS require a quarterly verification that the permissives are in their required state while the CTS have no such requirement. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change C.23.xix on page 73 of Attachment A) such that the CTS willbe changed to essentially reflect STS. N/A N/A N/A N/A

Function Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Difference Resolution 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 26 No difference after changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. No difference after changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. No difference after changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. STS require monthly actuation logic and master relay testing and quarterly slave relay testing while the CTS only requires these tests on a refueling outage basis. No difference after changes. Not affected by changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A The Ginna Station design does not allow for online testing ofthis instrumentation. The WCAP "acknowledges this design limitationwithout requiring any changes. Therefore, no change required. N/A N/A N/A N/A Function ¹ Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Difference Resolution 27 No difference after changes. N/A 28 Not affected by changes. 29 Not affected by changes. 30 Not affected by changes. N/A N/A N/A 31 32 33 34 35 36 Not affected by changes. No difference after changes. No difference after changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 37 Not affected by changes. 38a Not affected by changes. 38b Not affected by changes. N/A N/A N/A 39 Not affected by changes. N/A 40 Not affected by changes. 41a Not affected by changes. 41b Not affected by changes. STS include surveillance requirements for the RTS permissives while the CTS have no such testing. STS include surveillance requirements for the ESFAS permissives while the CTS have no such testing. N/A N/A N/A This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change C.23.xix on page 73 of Attachment A). This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change C.24.ii on page 75 of Attachment A). Function Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Difference Resolution The WCAP includes sur veillance requirements for the ESFAS actuation trains including their slave and master relays. This issue is addressed in the 5/26/95 submittal (see change C.24.xv on page 77 of Attachment A). Function Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-2 Difference Resolution Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. No affected by changes. Not affected by changes. No difference. 10 Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. 12 Not affected by changes. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 13 14 15 Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes'. Not affected by changes. N/A N/A N/A 16 Not affected by changes. 17 Not affected by changes. N/A N/A 18 19 Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. N/A N/A Function Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-5 Difference Resolution l.a l.b l.c 1.d l.e 2.b 2.c 2.d 3.a 3.b 3.c Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. STS require a shift check ofthe Containment Ventilation Isolation - Containment Radioactivity High channels while the CTS only require this daily when the plant vent is being used.

Also, STS require a monthly channel calibration while the CTS is quarterly.

STS require a shift check ofthe Containment Ventilation Isolation - Containment Radioactivity High channels while the CTS only require this weekly when the plant vent is being used.

Also, STS require a monthly channel calibration while the CTS is quarterly.

Not affected by changes. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A The Containment Ventilation Isolation function is not credited in any accident analysis. This system is redundant to the Containment Isolation function. Therefore, the CTS surveillance requirements are considered acceptable. The Containment Ventilation Isolation function is not credited in any accident analysis. This system is redundant to the Containment Isolation function. Therefore, the CTS surveillance requirements are considered acceptable. N/A Function Current Technical Specification Table 4.1-5 Difference Resolution 3.d Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. Not affected by changes. N/A N/A N/A N/A . 0}}