ML17265A246

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Proposed Tech Specs Revising Requirements Associated W/Sfp to Reflect Planned Mod to Storage Racks & Temporarily Addressing Boraflex Degradation within Pool
ML17265A246
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Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/27/1998
From:
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
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ML17265A244 List:
References
NUDOCS 9805060159
Download: ML17265A246 (53)
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Attachment II Marked up copy of R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications Included pages:

3.7-27 3.7-28 3.7-29 3.7-30 3.7-31 4.0-2 4.0-3 B 3.7-86*

B 3.7-87*

B 3.7-88*

B 3.7-89*

B 3.7-90*

B 3.7-91*

B 3.7-92~

B 3.7-93*

i B 3.7-94*

B 3.7-95*

B 3.7-96*

  • These bases pages are under the control of RG8'cE and are being provided for information only.

9805060%59 980427 PDR ADOCK 05000244 P PDR

SFP Boron Concentration 3.7.12'.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 2~oo:

l 3.7. 12 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration c,-t.i LCO 3.7.12 The SFP boron concentration shall be z 0 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: Whe uel s 's stored in the P nd a SFP veri ication has not een per ormed since the last ovement of fuel assemblies in the SFP.

ACTIONS CONDITION RE(UIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SFP boron ------------NOTE-------------

concentration not LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

within limit.

A.l Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in the SFP.

AND A.2 1 Initiate action to Immedi ately restore SFP boron concentration to within limit.

0 A.2.2 Initiate action to Immedi ately perform SFP verification.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-27 Amendment No. 61

SFP Boron Concentration 3.7.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FRE(UENCY SR 3.7.12. 1 Verify the SFP pool boron concentration is @ ays within limit.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-28 Amendment No. 61

SFP Storage 3.7.13 Can< a<a33. he.vq i ~i&o3.

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4K% 0 ~O 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

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3.7. 13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage LCO 3.7.13 Fuel assembly storage in the spent fuel pool shall be maintained as follows:

a. Fuel assemblies in~Region 1 shall have a K-infinity of

< 1.458'. and

b. Fuel assemblies in Region 2 shall have initial

~

enrichment and burnup within the acceptable area of the Figure 3.7.13 l.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the spent fuel pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION RE(VIREO ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.l --------NOTE---------

( LCO not met d'or either LCO 3.0.3 is not region. applicable.

Initiate action to Immediately move the noncomplying Q.Z ~ 1 ue asse rom app vocable region.

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SFP Storage 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 -NOTE Not required to be performed when transferring a fuel assembly from Region 2 to Region 1.

C.i,Z Verify by administrative means the ~

Prior to.

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A1 - Acceptable burnup domain for storage in any location within Region 2.

A2 - Acceptable burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a Type A1 or A2 assembly, or a water cell.

B - Acceptable burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a Type A1 assembly or a water cell.

C - Acceptable burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a water cell only. Storage 3.7.13 Region 2 Loading Curve I'

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Figure 3.7.13-2 Fuel Assembly Burnup Limits in Region 2 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7- 3)Q

Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.2 Reactor Core (continued) 4.2.2 Control Rod Assemblies The reactor core shall contain 29 control rod assemblies. The control material shall be silver indium cadmium.

4.3 Fuel Storage 4.4.1 4.3.1.1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be:

maintained with:

Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.05 weight percent;

b. k.<< w 0.94i if fully flooded with uoborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR;
c. Consolidated rod storage canisters may be stored in the spent fuel storage racks provided that the fuel assemblies from which the rods were removed meet all the requirements of LCO 3.7<< 13 for the re ion in which the nister is to be store However e consols ate ro storage canister located i Region RGAF2 may ex eed these re u' n T e a er age ecay ea o he ue assembly from which the rods were removed for all consolidated fuel assemblies must also be x 2150 BTU/hr.

4.3.1.2 The new. fuel storage dry racks are'esigned and shall be maintained with:

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.05 weight percent;
b. k.<< ~ 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR; and
c. k,<< s 0.98 if moderated by aqueous foam, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9. 1 of the UFSAR.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Amendment No. 61

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Design Features 4.0

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4.3 Fuel Storage -(continued)-

~ a i 4.3.2 ~0naina e The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 257'0" (mean sea level).

4.3.3 ~Ca acit The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than QQP fuel assemblies.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 4.0-3 Amendment No. 61

SFP Boron Concentration B 3.7.12 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7. 12 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration BASES BACKGROUND The water in the spent fuel pool (SFP) normally contains soluble boron, which results in large subcriticality margins under actual operating conditions. However, the NRC guidelines, based upon the accident conditi'on in which all soluble poison is assumed to have been lost, specify that a limiting k, of 0.95 be maintained in the absence of soluble boron. Hence, the design of both SFP regions is based on the use of unborated water such that on igura ion contro (i.e., controlling the movement of the fuel assembly and checking the location of each assembly after movement) maintains each region in a subcritical condition during normal operation with the regions fully loaded.

The double contingency principle discussed in ANSI N-16. 1-1975 (Ref. 1) and Reference 2 allows credit for soluble boron under abnormal or accident conditions, since only a single accident need be considered at one time. For example, the most severe accident scenarios are assoc'iated with the movement of fuel from Region 1 to Region 2, and accidental misloading of a fuel assembly in Region 2.

Either scenario could potentially increase the reactivity of Region 2. To mitigate these postulated criticality related accidents, boron is dissolved in the pool water. Safe operation of the storage racks with no movement of assemblies may therefore be achieved by controlling the l ~ CA4<A4,aug pg location of each assembly in accordance with LCO 3.7. 13, "Spent ue oo . orage." Within 7 days prior .to movement of an assembly into a SFP region, it is necessary

~v~~Q 4 oh~if to perform SR 3.7. 12. 1; Prior to moving an assembly into a lcL~~h. 6Jlg vbak~~

SFP region, it is also necessary to perform SR 3.7. 13. 1 or 3.7. 13.2 as applicable.

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(continued)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-86 Revision 0

SFP Boron Concentration

' 3.7;12

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BASES (continued)

SP'f'PPLICABLE The postulated accidents in the SFP can be divided into two SAFETY ANALYSES . basic categories (Ref:. 3. and 4). The first category are events which cause a loss of cooling in the SFP. Changes in the SFP temperature could result in an increase in positive eactivit . However,'t-the positive reactivit is timatel -

limited by voiding (which would result in t e add tion of ne at' reactivit n e SFP eometr hich is designe assuming e of unborated water even u soluble boron is vailable see Specificat'on 3. . e second c eg is re a e to t e movement of fuel assemblies in the SFP (i.e., a fuel handling accident) and is the most limiting accident scenario with respect to reactivity. The types of accidents within this category include an incorrectly transferr ed fuel assembly (e.g., transfer from Region 1 to Region 2 of an unirradiated or an insufficiently depleted fuel assembly) and a dropped fuel assembly. However, for both of these accidents, the negative reactivity effect of the soluble boron compensates for the increased reactivity.

By closely controlling the movement of each assembly and by t'r'od checking the location of each assembl ol bl af r m vem nt, the fo potential accidents h'c cr d't se o or may be limited to a small raction o the to a operating time.

The concentration of dissolved boron in the SFP satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

Z.goo LCO The SFP boron concentration is required to be a 00 ppm.

The specified concentration of dissolved boron sn the SFP preserves the assumptions used in the analyses of the potential critical accident scenarios as described in References 3 and 4 (i.e., a fuel handling 'accident). This concentration of dissolved boron is the minimum require conc ntration for fuel assembly stora n e withi he S unti e e ssem )es ave. been verified to tored correctly.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-87 Revision 0

SFP Boron Concentration B 3.7.12 BASES (continued)

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APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever fue assem lies are stored in the SFP nts a err ica son P e last movement of fuel assemblies in the SFP. The SFP verification is accomplished by performing SR 3.7.13.1 or SR 3.7. 13.2 after movement of fuel assemblies depending on which SFP region was affected by 'the fuel movement. If fuel was moved into both regions, then both SR 3.7.13.1 and SR 3.7.13.2 must be performed after the completion of fue]

movement before exiting the Applicability of this LCO.. This

l.CO does not'pply following the verification, since the verification would confirm that there are no misloaded fuel assemblies. With no further fuel assembly movements in progress, there is no potential for a misloaded fuel ssembly or a dropped fuel assembly.

This LCO does not apply to fuel movement within a SFP region since the accident analyses assume each region is completely filled in an infinite array.

ACTIONS A. A.2 1 and A.2.2 When the concentration of boron in the SFP is less than required, immediate action must be taken to preclude the occurrence of an accident or to mitigate the consequences of an accident in progress. This is most efficiently achieved g ~~4~~ o~ b immediately suspending the movement of fuel asse b ies.

canoe ko T e oncentration of boron is s o e simultaneou with suspen ing movemen of fuel assem se . accep a le ernatsve is o >mme sa '

y sate action to perform a .

SFP verification,(SR 3.7.13.1 and SR 3.7.13.2). The performance of this verification removes the plant from the 4r wraHm Applicability of this LCO,. This does not preclude movement

~ CPP racKt of a fuel assembly to a,safe position (e.g., movement to an available rack position)'.

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The Required Actions are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply since if the LCO is not met while moving irradiated fuel assemblies in HODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not be applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in NODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-88 Revision 0

SFP Boron Concentration 8 3.7.12 BASES (continued)

SURYEILLANCE SR 3.7.12.1 RE(UIREHENTS This SR verifies that the concentration of boron in the SFP is within the limit. As long as this SR is met, the Sos',t4 ~MCaM M mo,~,~,~~ S

  • ana'lyzed accidents are fu11 requency s appropriate cau ddressed.

e The volume

~a and oron ta~ ~L t=i'&4t.'M concentration in the pool is normally stable and all water

~s)~~ 4,tears).h~h, level changes and boron concentration changes are contr'oiled

.+lao, .by plant procedures.

'his SR is required to be performed prior to fuel assembly movement into Region 1 or Region 2 and must continue to be performed until the necessary SFP verification is accomplished (i.e., SR 3.7. 13. 1 and 3.7. 13.2).

REFERENCES I. ANSI N16.1-1975, "American National Standard for Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors."

2. Letter from B.K. Grimes, NRC, to All Power Reactor Licensees,

Subject:

"OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications," dated April 14, 1978.

3 ~ Mestinghouse, "Criticality Analysis of the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Fresh and Spent Fuel Racks, and Consolidated Rod Storage Canisters," dated June 1994.

4. UFSAR, Section 1S.7.3.

S. W~ Cn)~ R.C.. Me.~ L,C <6s +o C < Va4ta~z),s 4<<)

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3. Framatome Technologies, Inc.s "R. E. Ginna Nudear Power Phnt, Spent Fuel Pool Re-racking Licensing Report," Section 4, February 1997.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 8 3.7-89 Revision 0

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SFP Storage B 3.7.13 Q(l KaSL ~~%4m ~~9 2 I- tw4w ~ ~~ e~pithy Wm B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS a ~ ps',

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B 3.7. 13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage BASES BACKGROUND The spent fuel pool (SFP) is divided into two 'separate and

'o distinct regions (see Figure B 3.7. 13-1) which, for the purpose of criticality considerations, are considered as separate pools (Ref. 1). Region 1, with ++tora e positions, is d accommodate new or spen fuel utilizing a c eckerboard arran ement fuel

assem i an enric m z . w . can be stored at any available location in Region 1 since the accident analyses were performed assuming that Region 1 was filled

, with fuel assemblies of this enrichment. A fuel assembly with an enrichment > 4.05 wt% U-235 can also be stored in Region 1 provided that integral burnable poisons are resent in the assemblies such that k-infinity is s 1.458. he exis ing esign uses ntegra ue Bur na e sorbers IFBAs the poison for fuel assemblies with enrichments

> 4.05 wt%. IFBAs consist of neutron absorbing material k-a ~%~'~ which provides equivalencing reactivity holddown (i.e.,

neutron poison) that allows storage of higher enrichment fuel. The neutron absorbing material is a non-removable or integral part of'he fuel assembly once it is applied. The infinite multiplication factor, K-infinity, is a reference criticality point of each fuel assembly that maintained if

~ 1.458, will result in a k,<< ~ 0.95 for Region 1. The ~

K-infinity limit is derived for constant conditions of normal reactor core configuration (i.e., typical geometry of fuel assemblies in vertical position arranged in an infinite array) at cold conditions (i.e., 68'F and 14.7 psia).

egion 2, wi 840 s orage positions, is designed to accommodate fue of various initial enrichments which have accumulated minimum burnups i hin the acceptable domain according to Figure 3.7. 1 , in the accompanying LCO. .The s orage o ue hich are within the acceptab e ran e of Figure 3.7. 13 in Region 2 ensures a K,<< ~ 0.95 in this region.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-90 Revision 0

Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments and burnups within domain A1 of Figure 3.7.13-2 may be stored in any location in Region 2. Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments and burnups within domain A2 of Figure 3.7.13-2 shall be stored face-adjacent to a Type A1 or A2 assembly, or a water cell (empty cell).

Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments and burnups within domain 8 of Figure 3.7.13-2 shall be stored face-adjacent to a Type Al assembly or a water cell (empty cell). Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments and burnups within domain C of Figure 3,7.13-2 shall be stored face-adjacent to a water cell (empty cell) only. The word "face-adjacent" on Figure 3.7.13-2 is defined to mean that the flat surface of a fuel assembly in one cell faces the flat surface of the assembly in the next cell.

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SFP Storage B 3.7;13 BASES BACKGROUND Consolidated rod tor e nisters can also be stored in (continued) either region i t rovid burnu of Figure 3.7.13-1

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~ et. In addition, all canisters p ace in o service a er 1994 must have s 144 rods or a 256 ro (Ref. 2).

~ e canis ers. are s ain ess s ee con ainers contain the fuel rods of a maximum of two fuel

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assemblies (i.e., 358 rods). All bowed, broken, or otherwise failed fuel rods are first stored in a stainless steel tube of 0.75 inch outer diameter=before being placed in a canister. Each canister will accommodate 110 failed fuel rodttubes.

The water in the SFP normally contains soluble boron, which .

results in large subcriticality margins under actual operating conditions. However, the NRC guidelines, based upon the accident condition. in which all soluble poison is assumed to have been lost, specify that a limiting k, of 0.95 be maintained in the absence of soluble boron. Hence,

~ sFP the desi n of both regions is based on the use of unborated wa er such that configuration control (i.e., controlling the movement of the fuel assembly and checking the location of each assembly after movement) maintains each region in a subcritical condition during normal operation with the regions fully loaded.

~SFP MZ ~ o~ The double contingency principle discussed in ANSI N16.1-1975 (Ref. 3) and Reference 4 allows credit for R~ ~eat..

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soluble boron under abnormal or accident conditions, since only a single accident need be considered at one time. For example, the most severe accident scenarios are associated with the movement. of fuel from Region 1 to Region 2, and

~~~~ ~4M+ accidental misloading of a fuel assembly in Region 2.

Either scenario could potentially increase the reactivity of

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LC Region 2. To mitigate these postulated criticality related accidents, boron is dissolved in the pool water. Safe 8- t Q ) ~ operation of the storage racks with no movement of.

assemblies may therefore be achieved by controlling the location of each assembly in accordance with this LCO.

Within 7 days prior-to movement of an assembly into a SFP region, it is necessary to perform SR 3.7.12.1. Prior to moving an assembly into a SFP region, it- is also necessary to perform SR 3.7.13.1 or 3.7.13.2 as applicable.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-91 Revision 0

SFP Storage B 3.7.13 BASES (continued) c~ ~

BC'~ mew RAP APPLICABLE The postulated accidents in the SFP can be divided into two SAFETY ANALYSES basic categories (Refs. 2 and 5). The first category are events which cause a loss of cooling in the SFP. Changes in the SFP temperature could result in an increase in positive reactivit . However, the positive reactivit is ultimately imite by oiding (whic would result in the a i ion o negative reactivity) e SFP geometry ic is esigne as u g use o n a wa ev ou h soluble, bor n available (see Specification 4.3.1.1 . he second category is re ate o e movement o ue assemblies in the SFP (i.e., a fuel handling accident) and is the most limiting accident scenario with respect to reactivity. The types of accidents within this category include an incorrectly transferred fuel assembly (e.g., transfer from Region 1 to Region 2 of an unirradiated or an insufficiently depleted fuel assembly) and a dropped fuel assembly. However, for both of these accidents, the negative reactivity effect of the soluble boron compensates for the increased reactivity.

By closely controlling the movement of each assembly and by checking the location of each assembly fter movement, the time period for potential accidents ich cre i. u so u e oro may be limited to a smal fraction of the tota opera ing time.

The configuration of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy'tatement.

LCO The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblies within the SFP ensure the k f th P wil alwa s remain < 0.95, assumihg t e pool o be flooded with unborate wa e S cification 4.3:l. 1

~ .~ or ue . assem ies stored in Re ion , eac assem must have a K-infinity of s 1.458.

or fuel assemblies stored in Region 2, in>>a enric men and burnu 3.7. - .

shall be within the acce tab he x-ax>s o . .

e is the nominal

~iggr enrichment wt/ whic does not include the + 0.05 wt%

tolerance that is allowed for fuel manufacturing and listed in Specification 4.3.1.1.

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-92 Revision 0

SFP Storage B 3.7.13 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the SFP.

ACTIONS A.l When Region the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in .either the necessary h i di ti i*t iitit 1 or Region 2 of the SFP is not within the LCO fuel assembly movement(s) to bring t configuration into compliance with Specif' This compliance can be made by rel ti k~

4.3. 1. 1.

in the fuel assembl

~ o~P H to a different regio~ ~~ +

Required Action A.l is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply since if the LCO is not met while moving irradiated fuel assemblies in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not be applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the action is independent of reactor operation. Therefore, inability to move fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a

( reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE 3.7.13.1 REQUIREMENTS'R This SR verifies by administrative means that the K-infinity of each fuel assembly is ~ 1.458 prior to storage in Region 1., If the initial enrichment of a fuel assembly is z 4.05 wt/, a K-infinity of s 1.458 is always maintained.

fuel assemblies with enrichment > 4.05 wt%, a minimum 'or

,number of IFBAs must be present in each fuel assembly such that k-infinity s 1.458 prior to storage in Region 1. This verification is only required once for each fuel assembly since the burnable poisons, if required, are an integral part of the fuel assembly and will not be removed. The initial enrichment of each assembly will also not change (i.e., increase) while partially burned assemblies are less reactive than when. they were new (i.e., fresh). Performance of this SR ensures compliance with Specification 4.3. 1. 1.

(continued)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-93 Revision 0

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SFP Storage B 3.7.13 BASES SURYEILLANCE SR 3.7.13.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS Though not performed required for this LCO, this SR mus also be after completion of fuel movement -ice- Region exit the Applicability of LCO 3.7.12, "SFP Boron Concentration."

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This SR is modified by a Note which states that this verification is not required when transferring a fuel assembly from Region 2 to Region l. The verification is not required since Region 2 is the limiting SFP region, and as such, the fuel has already been verified to be acceptable for storage in Region l.

SR 3.7.13.2 This SR verifies by administrative means that the initial enrichment and burnug of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Fi ure 3.7.13+ in the accompanying LCO prior to storage in. Region . Once a fuel assembly has been ver~Fied to be within the acceptable range of Figure 3.7. 13 further verifications are no longer required since

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the initial enrichment or burnup will not adversely @tlat change. For fuel assemblies in the unacceptable range of Figure 3.7. 13-1, performance of this SR will ensure compliance with Specification 4.3. 1. 1.

Though not required for this LCO, this SR mu iso be performed after completion of fuel movement Region 2 to exit the Applicability of. LCO 3.7. 12. <~

REFERENCES l. UFSAR, Section 9. 1.2.

2. Westinghouse, "Criticality Analysis of the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Fresh and Spent Fuel Racks, and Consolidated Rod Storage Canisters,"'ated June 1994.
3. ANSI N16.1-1975, "American National Standard for Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors."
2. Framatome Technologies, Inc., "R. E. Ginna Nudear Power Plant, Spent Fuel Pool Re-racking Licensing Report," Section 4, February (continued) 1997.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 8 3.7-94 Revision 0

r

.SFP Storage B 3.7.13 BASES REFERENCES 4. Letter from B.K. Grimes, NRC, to All Power Reactor (continued) Licensees,

Subject:

"OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications," dated April 14, 1978.

5. 'FSAR, Section:15.7.3.

(continued)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-95 Revision 0

SFP Storage 8 3.7.13

.h Spent Fuel Storage Racks N

3 vh1ERBoxES C7 snahoaczus RCKORhQK CAPhCKF174

~IOThLCAPAC?lYN16FUELhSEELBLGZ Figure B 3.7.13-1 Spent Fuel Pool R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-96 Revision 0

SFP Storage B 3.7.13 Fuel North Elevator Area Receion 1 294 Spent Fuel Cells

~Re ion 2

-1,075 Spent Fuel Cells Cas Area Figure B 3.7.13-1 Speht Fuel Pool R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-96a Revision XX

Attachment III Proposed Technical Specifications Included Pages:

3.7-27 3.7-28 3.7-29 3.7-30 3.7-31 3.7-31a I

4.0-2 4.0-3

SFP Boron Concentration 3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7. 12 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Boron Concentration I LCO 3 ~ 7 ~ 12 The SFP boron concentration shall be ) 2300 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the SFP.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SFP boron ------------NOTE-------------

concentration not LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

within limit.

A.l Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in the SFP.

AND A.2 Initiate action to Immedi atel y restore SFP boron concentration to within limit.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3 ~ 7 27 Amendment No. Q

SFP Boron Concentration 3.7.12 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7. 12. 1 Verify the SFP pool boron concentration is 7 days within limit.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-28 Amendment No. g

I SFP Storage 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage LCO 3.7.13 Fuel assembly storage in the spent fuel pool shall be maintained as follows:

a. Fuel assemblies in Region 1 shall have a K-infinity of

~ 1.458 and shall have initial enrichment and burnup within the acceptable area of Figure 3.7. 13-1; and

b. Fuel assemblies in Region 2 shall have initial enrichment and burnup within the acceptable area of the Figure 3.7. 13-2.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the spent fuel pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the A.1 --------NOTE---------

LCO not met for either LCO 3.0.3 is not region. applicable.

Initiate action to Immediately move the noncomplying fuel assembly to an acceptable storage location.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-29 Amendment No. g

SFP Storage 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY I SR 3.7.13.1 Verify by administrative means the Prior to K-infinity of the fuel assembly is ~ 1.458 storing the and that the initial enrichment and burnup fuel assembly is in accordance with Figure 3.7. 13-1. in Region 1 SR 3.7. 13.2 Verify by administrative means the initial Prior to enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly storing the is in accordance with Figure 3.7. 13-2. fuel assembly in Region 2 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-30 Amendment No. Pg

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SFP Storage 3.7.13 30000 I

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~ 6 9 10000 I

0 081 1S 2 25 3 3S 4 4S 5 Assembly Initial Enrichment, Wt%

A - Acceptable burnup domain for storage in any location within Region 1.

B - Acceptable burnup domain for storage in cells with lead-in funnels only.

Figure 3.7.13-1 Fuel Assembly Burnup Limits in Region 1 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-31 Amendment No. g

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SFP Storage 3.7.13 s

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~ s s s 84J 20000 I >> I s ] ~ I II'! ~l I

~ s L5 1 142 25 5 JS 4 45 5 Assembly Initial Enrichment, Wt%

Al - Acceptable burnup domain for storage in any location within Region 2.

A2 - Acceptable burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a Type Al or A2 assembly, or a water cell.

B - Assembly burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a Type Al assembly or a water cell. 's C - Acceptable burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a water cell only.

Figure 3.7.13-2 Fuel Assembly Burnup Limits in Region 2 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-31a Amendment No. g

Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.2 Reactor Core (continued) 4.2.2 Control Rod Assemblies The reactor core shall contain 29 control rod assemblies. The control material shall be silver indium cadmium.

4.3 Fuel Storage 4.3.1 ~Ci i 4.3. 1. 1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.05 weight percent;
b. k,<< ~ 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water*,

which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9. 1 of the UFSAR; c ~ Consolidated rod storage canisters may be stored in the spent fuel storage racks provided that the fuel assemblies from which the rods were removed meet all the requirements of LCO 3.7. 13 for the region in which the canister is to be stored. The average decay heat of the fuel assembly from which the rods were removed for all consolidated fuel assemblies must also be z 2150 BTU/hr.

4.3. 1.2 The. new fuel storage dry racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.05 weight percent;
b. k,<< ~ 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as

.described in Section 9. 1 of the UFSAR; and

c. k,<< x 0.98 if moderated by aqueous foam, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9. 1 of the UFSAR.
  • Until

~

December 31, 1999, the spent fuel storage racks shall be maintained with a k,<< ~ 0.95 when flooded with water containing ~ 2300 ppm soluble boron

~

(continued)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 4.0-2 Amendment No. g

Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued) 4.3 Fuel Storage (continued) 4.3.2 ~Draina e The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 257'0" (mean sea level).

4.3.3 ~Ca acit The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained with a storage capacity limited to no more than 1879 fuel assemblies and 1369 storage locations.

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 4.0-3 Amendment No. Pg

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Attachment IV R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Pool Re-racking Licensing Report February 1997 See Letter from R.C. Mecredy, RGB, to G.S. Vissing, NRC,

Subject:

Application for Amendment to Facility Operating License, Revised Spent Fuel Pool Storage Requirements, dated March 31, 1997.

Attachment V Letter from Brian McKenzie, Westinghouse, to Peter Bamford, RGB', 98RG-G-0003

Subject:

Boron Concentration for Region 2 Spent Fuel Pool, dated February 25, 1998

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98RG-G-0003 Box 355 Westinghouse Energy Systems Pittsburgh Pennsylvania 1523M355 Electric Company February25, 1998 Mr. Peter Bamford

'R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 1503 Lake Road Ontario, NY 14519

Dear Mr. Bamford:

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION R. E. GINNA Boron Concentration for Re ion 2 S ent Fuel Pool On February 10 and 11, 1998, we had a number of conference calls to discuss a condition in the Ginna spent fuel pool in which there could be a,significant loss of boron from some of the Region 2 boraflex panels. One of the scenarios discussed was the moving of spent fuel to areas in Region 2 where there was not a signiTicant boron loss in the borafiex panels. This scenario of moving some spent fuel would create some empty cell locations in Region 2 of the spent fuel pool.

It was agreed to on February 11 that an evaluation should be performed to determine a revised boron concentration to address a fuel assembly misload accident, i.e., a fuel assembly is placed into an empty cell location whose boundaries do not have boron in the boraflex panels. This revised boron concentration was calculated to be 1450 ppm. The attached no+ evaluation, "Ginna Misload Boron Concentration for Region 2 Criticality Analysis with the Loss of Boraflex in Some Cells" documents this result and supplements the criticality analysis for P~s i Region 2 of the Ginna spent fuel pool performed in 1994.

This evaluation was performed in accordance with our agreement on February 11th for the fixed price of $ 7500.

If you should have any questions on the attached evaluation, please give us a call.

Sincerely, Brian McKenzie Project Engineer CNFD Fuel Marketing & Projects cc: J. Ortiz R. W. Eliasz G. Wrobel

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