ML17306B255

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Special Rept 2-SR-92-004:on 921222,PASS Declared Inoperable for Period Greater than 7 Days Due to Failure of Containment Air Flow Indicator & Indication of Water Leakage at PASS Rcs.Pass Returned to Operable Status on 930105
ML17306B255
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 01/24/1993
From: James M. Levine
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00823-JML-T, 192-823-JML-T, 2-SR-92-004, 2-SR-92-4, NUDOCS 9302010151
Download: ML17306B255 (10)


Text

ACCELERATE DOCUIVIENT DISTRIJTION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

~ r ACCESSION NBR:9302010151 DOC.DATE: 93/01/24 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-,529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi '05000529 AUTH. NAME. AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE J.M. Arizona Public Service Co.. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk) R

SUBJECT:

Special rept 2-SR-92-004:on 921222,Control Room personnel declared PASS inoperable due 'to failure of containment air flow indicator & indication of water leakage. Actions to D prevent recurrance will be developed.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I Event Report (LER),

ENCL Incident

/ SIZE:

Rpt, etc.

V TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee

/

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000529 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL D PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 TRAMMELLPC 1 1 D INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA 2,2 1 1 ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB 2

1 2

1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 RR/~ST/SPLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG FjL 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 GN FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCEP J ~ H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYPG.A 1 1 NSIC POOREPW. 1 1 QUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 r

D D

D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM PI-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31

Q Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA 85072-2034 192-00823-JML/TRB/NLT JAMES M LEVINE VICE I RESiDENT January 24, 1993 NUCLEAR PRODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATlN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (Ucense No. NPF-51)

Special Report 2-SR-92404 File: 93-020-404 "Attached please find Special Report 2-SR-92-004 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven (7) days. A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas R. Bradish, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (602) 393-5421.

Sincerely, I I'L /

JML/TRB/NLT Attachment cc: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)

J. B. Martin J. A. Sloan eQAt'>":

930124 '302010151 PDR ADOCK 05000529 8 PDR

~"

II 1'

ATTACHMENT PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTE M INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS Docket No. 50-529 4

License No. NPF-51 Special Report No. 2-SR-92-004

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 POST ACCIDENT SAMPUNG SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS Docket No. 50-529 Ucense No. NPF-51 Special Report No. 2-SR-92404 INITIALCONDITIONS:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven (7) days. The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 0830 MST on December 29, 1992.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

On December 22, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) when Control Room personnel declared PASS inoperable at approximately 0830 MST due to the failure of the containment air flow indicator and the indication of water leakage at the PASS reactor coolant system sample septum. The Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program was initiated in accordance. with TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28.

The failures were identified during the performance of the TS monthly functional surveillance. On December 23, 1992, the containment air flow indicator was repaired and tested. On December 24, 1992, troubleshooting commenced to identify the source of the leakage. The troubleshooting involved extensive, coordination between Unit 2 Maintenance and Unit 2 Chemistry personnel to simulate system parameters and valve lineups necessary to draw the reactor coolant system pressurized sample.. The source of the leakage was difficultto identify and the replacement of multiple valves was required in order to obtain a pressurized sample and declare the system operable.

5

~

NRC Document Control Desk Special Report 2-SR-92-004 Page 2 On January 3, 1993, following restoration of PASS, a pressurized sample was obtained and the acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement was met.

The work documents were closed on January 5, 1993.

CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:

An investigation is being performed in accordance with the PVNGS Incident Investigation Program. As part of this investigation, the cause of the inoperability is being evaluated and appropriate actions to prevent recurrence will be developed. The investigation is scheduled to be completed by March 31, 1993. The results of the investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report. The supplement is expected to be submitted by April 30, 1993.

PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE:

Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 1545 MST on January 5, 1993.

I I