ML17306B191

Special Rept 3-SR-92-004-01:on 920201 PASS Declared Inoperable for Period Greater than Seven Days.Caused by Tubing Being Rerouted.Pass Reworked & Operability Restored on 920905

ML17306B191
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	12/21/1992
From:	James M. Levine ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00819-JML-T, 192-819-JML-T, 3-SR-92-004-01, 3-SR-92-4-1, NUDOCS 9212290028
Download: ML17306B191 (10)

Text

ACCEI.ERMED DOCUMENT DIS VTION SYSTEM REGU~ZORY INFORMATION DISTRIBU SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9212290028 DOC.DATE: 92/12/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Special rept 3-SR-92-004-01:on 920201 PASS declared inoperable for period greater than seven days. Caused by tubing being rerouted. PASS reworked & operability restored on 920905.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000530 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 PD5 PD 1 1 TRAMMELLiC 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 RR/iDSTj4QPLBSDl 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 EG=FIErM 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G BRYCE g J H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYiG.A 1 1 NSIC POOREiW. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM PI-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31

Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85072-2034 CORRECTED COPY JAMES M. LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT 192-00819-JML/TRB/JJN NUCLEAR PRODUCTION December 21, 1992 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)

Special Report 3-SR-92-004-01 File: 92-020-404 Enclosed please find Supplement 1 to Special Report 3-SR-92-004 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2. This report is being resubmitted to correct the supplement date from February 1, 1992, to February 1, 1993 (page 2 of 2 of the enclosure). This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven days. This supplement is being submitted to provide additional information regarding the cause of the event and the corrective action. A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas R. Bradish at (602) 393-5421.

Sincerely, JM4ITRB/J JN/pmm Enclosure cc: J. B. Martin (ail w/enclosure)

J. A. Sloan W. F. Conway

'TI212290028 921221 PDR ADOCK 05000530 S PDR 8(

ENCLOSURE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS LICENSE NO. NPF<<74 DOCKET NO. 50-530 SPECIAL REPORT 3-SR-92-004-01 INITIALCONDITIONS:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven days. The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 1005 MST on August 17, 1992.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressurized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

On August 10, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (power operation) when PASS was declared inoperable at approximately 1000 MST for maintenance. The maintenance involved rerouting field tubing to permit easier access for future maintenance. Following the completion of work at approximately 1503 MST on August 10, 1992, PASS was declared operable.

On September 2, 1992, Chemistry Technicians discovered that the PASS was unable to draw a vacuum on the gaseous sample bomb. Initial troubleshooting determined on September 4, 1992, that the maintenance performed on August 10, 1992, may have caused the PASS to be inoperable. The PASS was reworked and operability was restored on September 5, 1992.

1 of2

CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:

The investigation determined that the tubing was rerouted using additional 1/4 inch tubing and modifying the existing 1/2 inch tubing. The additional 1/4 inch tubing was installed between the same diameter tubing that extended from the PASS station and the rerouted 1/2 inch tubing. Due to the additional length and number of turns in the rerouted vent line, sufficient vacuum could not be established after the modification.

The planner had intended the line to be rerouted using 1/2 inch tubing and prescribed inventory numbers which corresponded to 1/2 tubing. However, the mechanic rerouted the line using shop stock material and did not have to order any more material. APS is continuing to investigate this issue to determine what actions are appropriate for similar circumstances in the future. This investigation is expected to be completed by December 30, 1992. The results of this investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report.

This supplement is expected to be submitted by February 1, 1993.

In addition to the work which resulted in the PASS being inoperable, an appropriate retest was not conducted to identify that PASS was inoperable prior to declaring the PASS operable. An Inservice Leak Test was originally specified but later deleted since the tubing was open ended and could not have been readily pressurized. Operations, Chemistry, and the Work Group Supervisor concurred with the decision to delete the retest requirement and determined that no further'testing was required.

Appendix A of the retest procedure (30DP-9WP04) lists parameters (pressure, temperature, flow) to be checked for work involving tubing. Flow requirements could have been checked by attempting to draw a vacuum.

The Chemistry System Status procedure, 74DP-9ZZ04, was revised to direct Chemistry personnel to ensure that a functional test is performed following maintenance which may affect the sampling capability.

PLANS AND'SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE:

Following satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was ~

returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 2137 on September 5, 1992.

2of2

k 5

?