ML17306B254

Special Rept 3-SR-92-006:on 921217,PASS Declared Inoperable Following Failure to Meet Pressurized Sample Portion of Acceptance Criteria for Monthly Functional Sr.Pass Returned to Operable Status Following Satisfactory Repairs & Testing

ML17306B254
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	01/22/1993
From:	James M. Levine ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00822-JML-T, 192-822-JML-T, 3-SR-92-006, 3-SR-92-6, NUDOCS 9302010055
Download: ML17306B254 (8)

Text

ACCEI ERAT1jQ DOCUMENT DIST UTION SYSTEM REGULATO~INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION TEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9302010055 DOC.DATE: 93/01/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Special rept 3-SR-92-006:on 921217,PASS declared inoperable following failure to meet pressurized sample portion of acceptance criteria for monthly functional SR.PASS returned to operable status following satisfactory repairs & testing.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR J ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

2 SIZE:

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000530 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 TRAMMELL,C 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 NRR DST SPLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 G FIL 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN5 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL EGStG BRYCE g J ~ H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYiG.A 1 1 NSIC POOREPW. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTEI CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31

Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 192-00822-JML/TRB/KR JAMES M LEVINE VICE'IIESIOENT January 22, 1993 f

NUCL IIII +IIODUCTION U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-37 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 (Ucense No. NPF-74)

Special Report 3-SR-92-006 File: 93-020-404 Attached please find Special Report 3-SR-92-006 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System being inoperable for greater than seven (7) days.

A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (602) 393-5421.

Sincerely, JML/TRB/KR Attachment cc: W. F. Conway (ail with attachment)

J. B, Martin J. A. Sloan 2960"-3 9302010055 930122 PDR ADOCK 05000530 S PDR

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PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE GREATER THAN SEVEN DAYS Docket No. 50-530 Ucense No. NPF-74 Special Report No. 3-SR-92406 INITIALCONDITIONS:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and TS 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was inoperable for a period greater than seven (7) days.

The seven-day period for returning PASS to service was exceeded at approximately 1515 MST on December 24, 1992.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant and containment atmosphere under post accident conditions. The liquid sample portion of the system provides pressurized and depressuiized reactor coolant samples as required for analysis. The gas sample portion of the system provides containment atmosphere samples as required for analysis.

ACTIONS TAKEN:

On December 17, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) when Control Room personnel declared PASS inoperable at approximately 1515 MST following the failure to meet the pressurized sample portion of the acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement. On December 19, 1992, following troubleshooting, two valves (HV-22 and HV-23) were replaced due to suspected leakage. An additional valve (PSV-101) was replaced when Chemistry technicians could not establish a vacuum on the PASS pressurized sample flask. When Chemistry technicians were unable to obtain the proper flow for the PASS pressurized sample, following troubleshooting, it was discovered that an incorrect actuator was installed during the replacement of HV-22. Following replacement of the actuator, at approximately 1625 MST on December 22, 1992, a pressurized sample was obtained and the acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement was met.

NRC Document Control Desk Special Report 3-SR-92-006 Page 2 However, on December 22, 1992, a new revision of the monthly functional surveillance procedure, which included intent changes, became effective and Unit 3 Chemistry management determined that the pressurized portion of the surveillance testing (ST) should be reperformed using the new ST procedure. PASS failed to meet the pressurized sample portion of the new acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement.

On December 23, 1992, during attempts to reperform the PASS pressurized sample portion of the ST, Chemistry technicians discovered seat leakage on valve HV-22 and packing leakage on HV-23. Further troubleshooting, performed on December 24, 1992, discovered that HV-22 had been installed backwards. At approximately 1815 MST on December 24, 1992, the Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program was initiated in accordance with TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28. On December 26, 1992, following replacement of HV-22 and restoration of PASS, a pressurized sample was obtained and the acceptance criteria for the monthly functional surveillance requirement was met.

CAUSE OF THE INOPERABILITY:

An investigation is being performed in accordance with the PVNGS Incident Investigation Program. As part of the investigation, the cause of the inoperability is being evaluated and appropriate actions to prevent recurrence will be developed. The investigation is schecfuled to be completed on March 31, 1993. The results of the investigation will be provided in a supplement to this report. The supplement is expected to be submitted by April 30, 1993.

PLANS AND SCHEDULE FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO SERVICE'ollowing satisfactory completion of repairs and required surveillance testing, PASS was returned to OPERABLE status at approximately 1100 MST on December 26, 1992.

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