ML17306A797

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Special Rept 3-SR-92-003:on 920520,RMs RU-145 & 146 Declared Inoperable & Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Errors in Documenting Clearance for Retest of RU-146.Shift Supervisor Disciplined & Technician Verified That Pumps Were Energized
ML17306A797
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 06/18/1992
From: James M. Levine
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00789-JML-T, 192-789-JML-T, 3-SR-92-003, 3-SR-92-3, NUDOCS 9206260248
Download: ML17306A797 (10)


Text

ACCELERATED DQTRJBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION%STEM (RIDE)

ACCESSION NBR:9206260248 DOC.DATE: 92/06/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Sexvice Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Contxol Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Special= rept 3-SR-92-003:on 920520,RMs RU-145 & 146 declared inoperable & removed from svc.Caused by personnel errors in documenting clearance for retest of RU-146.Shift supervisor disciplined & technician verified that pumps were energized.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

J ENCL J SIZE:

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000530 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PDS LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 TRAMMELLFC 1 1 THOMPSONFM 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 N ~SPURT B8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG FILE 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 GN FILE Ol 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYFG A ~ 1 1 NSIC POOREFW. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS'LEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LIS1$ FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL 33

Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072-2034 192-00789-JML/TRB/KR JAMES M. LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT June 18, 1992 NUCLEAR PRDDUCTIDN U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Mail Station Pl-37 Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)

Special Report 3-SR-92-003 File 92-020-404 Attached please find Special Report 3-SR-92-003 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.8 ACTION 42(b) and 6.9.2. This report discusses a radiation monitor being inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. A copy of the Special Report is being forwarded to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region V.

If you have any questions, please contact Thomas R. Bradish, Compliance Manager, at (602) 393-5421.

Very truly yours, JML/TRB/KR Attachment cc: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)

J. B. Martin D. H. Coe w)

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PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 3 Radiation Monitor Inoperable Greater Than 72 Hours License No. NPF-74 Docket No. 50-530 Special Report 3-SR-92-003 nitial Conditions:

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 ACTION 42(b) and TS Administrative Controls 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Fuel Building Ventilation System High Range Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor (RU-146) was inoperable for a period greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72-hour period for returning the monitor to service was exceeded at approximately 0522 MST on May 25, 1992. On May 25, 1992, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at approximately 100 percent power.

ack round Information:

Radiation monitors RU-145 (Fuel Building Ventilation System Low Range Radioactive Effluent Monitor) and RU-146 monitor the Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust for release of radioactivity due to a fuel handling accident. RU-145 and RU-146 work as a pair with RU-145 being the low range monitor for normal radioactive gaseous effluents and RU-146 being the high range monitor for post-accident radioactive gaseous effluents. Normal configuration consists of RU-145 operating and RU-146 in standby. When RU-145 reaches a predetermined setpoint, RU-146 starts, and RU-145 goes to standby. RU-145 also initiates a Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal (FBEVAS) when the activity exceeds a predetermined setpoint. Since RU-145 and RU-146 work in tandem, RU-146 must be declared inoperable if RU-145 is out-of-service.

Actions Taken:

At approximately 0840 MST on May 20, 1992, radiation monitors RU-145 and RU-146 were declared inoperable and removed from service for planned maintenance in accordance with an approved work document. Technical Specification Component Condition Record (TSCCR) 3-92-0185 documented the equipment identification (3J-SQB-RU0145 and 146), condition or deficiency (replace components per Equipment Qualification Program), related documents (clearance 92-00606, 607), TS LCO (3.3.3.8 and 3.9.2), applicability, and ACTION(s) required. In accordance with TS 3.3.3.8 ACTIONS 36, 37, 40 and 42, as applicable, Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program (PASP) sampling was initiated to monitor the Fuel Building Ventilation System. Both RU-145 and RU-146 were de-energized and clearances were hunged for each of the air sample pump's power supply. The maintenance for RU-146 was completed by 0253 MST on May 22, 1992. Both clearances were temporarily released to perform a retest of RU-146 and, following a satisfactory retest, TSCCR 3-92-0185 was signed off and both monitors were restored to OPERABLE at approximately 0301 MST on May

L C

NRC Document Control Desk Special Report 3-SR-92-003 Page 2 22, 1992. The'onitors had been inoperable for approximately 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> and 15 minutes.

At approximately 0527 MST on May 22, 1992, radiation monitors RU-145 and RU-146 were declared inoperable and removed from service to complete the planned maintenance for RU-145. TSCCR 3-92-0188 documented the equipment identification (3J-SQB-RU0145), condition or deficiency (perform Equipment Qualification planned maintenance), TS LCO (3.3.3.8 and 3.9.2), applicability, and ACTION(s) required. In accordance with TS 3.3.3.8'CTIONS 36, 37, 40 and 42, as applicable, Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program (PASP) sampling was initiated to monitor the Fuel Building Ventilation System, Both RU-145 and RU-146 were de-energized and the clearances were rehunged on each of the air sample pump's power supply. The maintenance for RU-145 was completed by 0018 MST on May 23, 1992. Only the clearance for RU-145 was released to perform a retest of RU-145 and, following a satisfactory retest of the air sample pump for RU-145, TSCCR 3-92-0188 was signed off and both monitors were restored to OPERABLE at approximately 0059 MST on May 23, 1992 ' The monitors had been inoperable for approximately 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> and 32 minutes. The Control Room personnel and the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) technicians were not aware that the tag for clearance 92-00606 remained on RU-146, and consequently, the air sample pump for RU-146 remained de-energized, At approximately 0901 MST on May 27, 1992, radiation monitors RU-145 and RU-146 were declared inoperable and removed from service for performance of minor maintenance. In accordance with TS 3.3.3.8 ACTIONS 36, 37, 40 and 42, as applicable, Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program (PASP) sampling was initiated to monitor the Fuel Building Ventilation System. At approximately.

1515 MST on May 27, 1992, following several attempts to operate the air sample pump for RU-146, the RMS technicians discovered that the tag for clearance 92-00606 remained on RU-146. The clearance had been hunged since approximately 0522 MST on May 22, 1992.

During the period that the clearance remained in effect on RU-146, the TS Surveillance Requirements 4.3.3.8 for RU 145 and RU-146 (daily CHANNEL CHECK)

Information, RU-146 remains in standby until RU-145 reaches a predetermined setpoint and a demand is placed on RU-146. Therefore, an equipment failure alarm for RU-146 would not have occurred during the time period that RU-146's air sample pump was de-energized and in accordance with the surveillance testing procedure, no unusual indication would have been noted.

During the period that RU-146 was inoperable, no fuel movement within the storage pool or crane operation with loads over the storage pool occurred.

Cause of the Ino erabilit As described above, it is necessary to release both clearances from RU-145 and RU-146 to perform a retest of RU-146. Following a satisfactory retest of RU-146, TSCCR 3-92-0185 was signed off and both monitors were restored to

NRC Dbcument Control Desk Special Report 3-SR-92-003 Page 3 OPERABLE. Based on a discussion with the electrical personnel assigned to complete the planned maintenance for RU-145, the assistant shift supervisor rehunged the clearances on both RU-145 and RU-146. However, contrary to good work practices, the assistant shift supervisor documented the equipment as RU-145 and did not include RU-146 or document the clearances on TSCCR 3-92-0188.

The maintenance for RU-145 was completed, however, only the clearance for RU-145 was removed to perform a retest of RU-145. Following a satisfactory retest of the air sample pump for RU-145, TSCCR 3-92-0188 was signed off and both monitors were restored to OPERABLE. The cause of the inoperability of RU-146 was due to cognitive personnel error on the part of the assistant shift supervisor who forgot to release the clearance for RU-146, As corrective action, the assistant shift supervisor was disciplined in accordance with the APS Positive Discipline Program.

Contributing to the inoperability of RU-146 greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, was the fact that an equipment failure alarm for RU-146 would not have occurred during the time period that RU-146's air sample pump was de-energized and, in accordance with the surveillance testing procedure, no unusual indication would have been noted. In addition, the indications from the RMS computer terminal located in the Control Room were "green 1" (ports all reachable, no equipment failure, and available for service) during the period that RU-146's air sample pump was de-energized. Based on the satisfactory completion of the surveillance requirements and RMS computer indications, the assistant shift supervisor determined that the monitor was satisfactorily retested and placed RU-145 and RU-146 back in service. As immediate corrective action, RMS technicians verified that the RMS monitors'ir sample pumps were energized and that the pump handswitches were in the correct position. APS has considered upgrading the daily surveillance testing procedure to include a check of the air sample pump's power supply for all high range radioactive gaseous effluent monitors. However, APS regards this to be an isolated event and that had appropriate actions been taken by the assistant shift supervisor, this event would not have occurred. Therefore, no further action is being taken.

Plans and Schedule for Restorin the S stem to Service:

Following a satisfactory retest of RU-145 and RU-146, clearance 92-00606 was released from RU-146 and both monitors were restored to OPERABLE at approximately 1136 MST on May 28, 1992, The RMS technicians verified that RU-146's air sample pump was energized and that the pump handswitch was in the correct position. Since RU-146's air sample pump had remained de-energized since approximately 0527 MST on May 22, 1992, the monitor was out of service for approximately 6 days.

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