ML18004B968

LER 87-055-00:on 870917,containment Integrity & Tech Spec 3.6.1.3,Action a Violated.Caused by Personnel Error. Personnel Being Trained on Proper Use of Containment Personnel Access doors.W/871019 Ltr

ML18004B968
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	10/19/1987
From:	Schwabenbauer, Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-870519-(O), LER-87-055, LER-87-55, NUDOCS 8710220193
Download: ML18004B968 (6)

Text

ACCESSION NBR: 8710220193 DOC. DATE: 87/10/19 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantI Unit 1 I Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Carolina Power 5 Light Co.

NATSONI R. A. Carolina Power 5 Light Co.

REC IP. NAME REC IP IENT AFF I LIAT ION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-055-00: on 870917I containment integritg 8c Tech Spec

3. 6. 1. 3i Action A violated. Caused bg personnel error..

Personnel being trained on proper use of containment per sonnel access doors. W/871019 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR Q ENCL g SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)I Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES: Application foT permit renewal filed. 05000400 REC IP IENT COPIES RECIP IENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BUCKLEYr B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON f . ACRS, MOELLER 2 2

• EOD/DOA f AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 DEDRO 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1

'RR/DEST/ELB NRR/DEST/ ICSB 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB  ! NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 R SIB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ ILRB 1 R F 02 1 1 RES DEP Y G I 1 1 RES" TELFORDI J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RGN2 F I LE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGhG GROHz M 5 5 H ST LOBBY NARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRISI J 1 1 NSI C MAYS> G 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44

NRC Form 358 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150410(

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 8/31188 FACILITY NAME (1I DOCKET NUMBER (2) PACE 3 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 1 40 01 DF 03 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY BREACH CAUSED BY PERSONNEL OPENING INNER PERSONNEL ACCESS D L. ER DOOR WAS OPEN EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI MONTH 'AY YEAR YEAR $ EOVENTIAL NUMBER R LVr$ION MONTH DAY YEAA FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI 0 5 0 0 0 0 917 8 7 8 7 0 5 5 0 0 101 9 8. 7 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SVBMI'TTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF R ((: (Check one or more of the forlovfinpl (11)

OPERATINO MODE (9) 20A02(rr) 20A05(c) 60,73(s) (2) (iv) 73.7)(BI POWER 20A05(s I I I I I I) 50>>8(c)(I)- 50.73(e) (2)(vl 73.71(cl LEYEL 0 0 0 20A05(e) l1) IN) 50.38 (2 I " (vill)(BI 60.73(s)(2)(vill Ic I DTHER (specify In Aostrsct beiovr end In Tert. HIIC Form 20A05(e)(1)(ilil 60.73(el(2) Ii) 60.73(s) (2) (vill) (Al 356AI y..yi pri?j 20A05 (s) (I ) (iv) 50.73(sl(2) (ii) 60,73(s) (2) vsm . O.

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20A06(e) (1)(v) 60.73(e I (2)(ill) 50.73(sl(2l(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I.

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE R. SCHWABENBAUER, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TECHNICIAN INCOMPLETE ONE LINE fOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPOAT (13) 919 362 -26 69 MANUFAC.

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CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER TO NPADS "o+gpprg+y~ TURER

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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (1 ~ I MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SV 8 M I SS ION YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBhrISSIOH OA TEI DATE 116I NO ABSTRACT (Limit to IC00 sprees, I.e., epprosimeteiy fifreen sinpie specs typevrrirren linml (15)

ABSTRACT:

The plant was in Mode 4, Hot Shutdown, at 0 percent reactor power on September 17, 1987.

Plant personnel had exited the Containment Building through the Personnel Access Hatch.

As the outer door was i.n the process of closing, the doors'ocking ring did not engage to shut the door after coming in contact with the door seals.. This resulted in the door being partially open and not locked closed as required. Health Physics personnel who were in containment trying to exit could not, as the inner access door would not respond to the normal opening sequence while the outer door is not locked closed.

'I At 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />, the personnel who were in containment pushed the emergency stop and manually pumped the inside door open. Both personnel access hatch doors were open for approximately two minutes while personnel exited. This violated containment integrity and Technical Specificat'ions 3.6.1.3 Action a. Personnel exiting noticed the outer door was open and notified Operations personnel.

All door interlocks and .indicating lights were checked for proper function and all conditions were found normal immediately after incident occurred.

The cause of the .event was personnel error due to an incomplete understanding of the personnel access doors indicating system.

Action to prevent recurrence is Health .Physics personnel are bei,ng trained on the proper use of the Containment personnel access doors.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a violation of Technical Specifications.

87 1 o>

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'pDR ADOCK 0 gog0400 pDR NRC Form 388 (Nl3) 8

NRC FINm 388A U.S. NUCI.EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (983)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3(50-0')04 ~

EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME ('I l DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR Qg SEOUENTIAL NUMBER pe REVISION NUMBER UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 8 7 0 5 5 0 0 2 OF 0 3 TEtT //P /I>>/8 4/>>Ce /4//I/I/IE I/44/////44/P/RC FPnn 38843/ (IT)

DESCRIPTION:

The plant was in Mode 4, Hot Shutdown, at 0 percent reactor power on September 17, 1987.

Plant personnel had exited the Containment Building (EIIS:NH) through the Personnel Access Hatch (E1IS:BD). As the outer door was in the process of closing, the doors'ocking ring did not engage upon contact with the doors seals. This resulted in the outer access door being partially open and not locked closed as required. When the outer door is not locked.

closed, it'provides an interlock to prevent the normal opening sequence of the inner door.

Health Physics (HP) personnel, who were in Containment at the time, tried to exit but could not as the inner door would not go through the automatic opening sequence because of the interlock. At 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />; the HP personnel inside Containment pressed the emergency stop to engage manual operation. This bypassed the interlock and allowed the personnel to manually pump the inner door open.

Both personnel 'access hatch doors were open for approximately two minutes while the personnel exited. This violated Containment, integrity and Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Action a. Upon exiting from inner door, the. personnel noticed the outer door was already open and notified Operations personnel of the event.

All door interlocks and indicating lights were checked for proper operation immediately after event and were found to be functioning properly.

.CAUSE:

The "cause of th'e event was the outer door not closing and locking when personnel exited containment and personnel error due to an incomplete understanding of the airlock doors indicating system.

When the outer door was=in the process of closing, it did not close far enough to actuate the locki'ng ring to 'seal the door closed. Once the locking ring rotates to its correct position, a locking pin is actuated which provides an indication that the door is in its correct locked closed position.

Before an individual enters/exits containment through the Personnel Access Hatch, the status of the airlock doors must be checked for:

1) the =condition of the airlock doors, (indicated by a red light if open or a green light if locked closed)

2) for pressure equalization (indicated by a green light if equal or a red light if unequal)

Thus with three green lights indicated the inner or outer door can be opened (inner door pressure'qual, outer door closed). In this case, the personnel exiting failed to 'losed, wait for the proper lights, the outer door closed light was not green, and pushed the emergency stop to open the inner door.

NRC FORM SSSA *U.S.GPO:19884).824 538/455 (94)3)

4 NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)3)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OM8 NO. 3(9)-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

VEAA +@ SEQVENTIAL 'IP~E REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Iris': NVMSEA '4$ 'I NVMSEA UNIT 1 TEXT N moro EPSco CAUSE:

ir FA/AEA/, Irw (continued)

~ HRC Form 36843/ (17) 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 7 05 5 00 03 QF 0 3 The reason the personnel performed this action was because the red light, indicating the outer door is open, did not give an indication because the door was partially closed. It

'only indicates when the door is fully open. However, the green light, indicating the outer door is closed and locked was also not indicated due to the door .only being

~

partially closed, as it will only indicate when the door is closed and locked with the locking ring and pin in place.

ANALYSIS:

~

This event is being reported in accordance with 1GCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a breach of Containment integrity and a violation of Technical Specifications 3.6.1.3 Action a.

No safety consequences resulted from this event.

The worst case would occur during accident conditions where a breach in Containment integrity could result in radioactive activity releases in excess of allowable limits.

Similar events'eported where the Containment Airlock Technical Specifications were violated are LER-87-034-00 and LER-87-052-00. The previous reportable events were caused by the lack of awareness, by the persons using the airlock door, of the inoperability of a .

door. In these cases, the operable door was opened when the inoperable door was in the fully closed position and correct position indication existed.

r The corrective actions addressed the cause of th'e door failure and increased administrative .controls. on the use of the door and notification of personnel when a door was declared inoperable. LER-87-052-00 included the requirement to post "a door operator at the door to ensure whenever entries are made into Containment that proper operation of the door and adequate communication exists when a door is declared inoperable. This corrective action would have prevented this LER, but it was not implemented until after this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The personnel access hatch doors interlocks and indicating lights were checked for proper function and all conditions were found normal.

ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Health Physics personnel are being traiT(ed on the proper use of the personnel access hatch doors and indicating system.

NAC FOAM 366A *U.S.GPO:1988.0 624 538/455 (983)

L'SHRC Carolina Power & Light Company 1'l810CT >9 A lo 02 HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 OCT 1 S 1987 File Number: SHF/10-13510C Letter Number'HO-870519 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-055-00 Gentlemen.'n accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.

fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirtyreport This (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Very truly yours,.

~MA A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW'skm Enclosure cc'. Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP)

MEM/LER-87-055/1/OS1