Text

Discussion of TMI Lessons Learned Short-Term Requirements.
	ML17249A296
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	11/19/1979
From:	; ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	;
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ML17249A295	List: ML17249A294; ML17249A296;
References
	RTR-NUREG-0578, RTR-NUREG-578 NUDOCS 7911260290
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DISCUSSIONOFTMILESSONSLEARNEDSHORTTERNREQUIRENENTSThisdocumentprovidesonlyaportionoftheRochesterGasand.ElectricCorporationresponsetoTMILessonsLearnedShortTermRequirements.AdditionalinformationisfoundinRochesterGasandElectricletterfromL.D.White,Jr.toDennisL.Ziemann,USNRC,datedOctober17,1979.v911260+90 TABLEOFCONTENTSSectionTitlePacae2.1.1EmergencyPowerSupply-PressurizerHeaters.............1-PressurizerLevelandReliefBlockValves..32.1.2PerformanceTestingforBWRandPWRReliefandSafetyValves................42.1.3.a2.1.3.bDirectIndicationofPower-OperatedReliefValveandSafetyValvePositionforPWRsandBWRSInstrumentationforDetectionofInadequateCoreCooling-SubcoolingMeter-AdditionalInstrumentation57112.1.42.1.5.a2.1.5.c2.1.6.aDedicatedH2ControlPenetrations.CapabilitytoInstallHydrogenRecombinerateachLightWaterNuclearPowerPlant1819integrityofSystemsOutsideContainmentLikelytoContainRadioactiveMaterialsforPWRsandBWRS................20ContainmentIsolation.............122.1.6.b2.1.7.aDesignReviewofPlantShieldingandEnviron-mentalQualificationofEquipment.forSpaces/SystemsWhichMayBeUsedinPostAccidentOperations.AutoInitiationoftheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystems(AFSW)22242.1.7.bAuxiliaryFeedwaterFlowIndicationtoSteamGenerators.................262.1.8.a2.1.8.bTables2.1.8.b.12.1.8.b.22.1.8.b.3ImprovedPost.-Accident,SamplingCapability..28IncreasedRangeofRadiationMonitors.....32InterimProceduresforQuantifyingHighLevelAccidentalRadioactivityReleases...36HighRangeEffluentMonitor..........37HighRangeContainmentRadiationMonitor...38 l0Section2.1.8.cTitleTABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued)PacCeImprovedIn-PlantIodineInstrumentationUnderAccidentConditions.............402.1.92.2.1.a2.2.l.b2.2.1.G2.2.2.a2.2.2.b2.2.2.cTransientandAccidentAnalysis.Containment,PressureIndication.ContainmentWaterLevelIndicationContainmentHydrogenIndication.'ReactorCoolantSystemVenting.ShiftSupervisorResponsibilities.ShiftTechnicalAdvisor.ShiftandReliefTurnoverProceduresControlRoomAccess.OnsiteTechnicalSupportCenter.OnsiteOperationalSupportCenter.4243444546495254555663 Section2.1.1-ENERGENCYPOWERSUPPLYPressurizerHeatersPOSITIONConsistentwithsatisfyingtherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria10,14,15,17and20ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50fortheeventoflossofoffsitepower,thefollowingpositionsshallbeimplemented:PressurizerHeaterPowerSu1Thepressurizerheaterpowersupplydesignshallprovidethecapabilitytosupply,fromeithertheoffsitepowersourceortheemergencypowersource(whenoffsitepowerisnotavailable),apredeterminednumberofpressurizerheatersandassociatedcontrolsnecessarytoestablishandmaintainnaturalcirculationathotstandbyconditions.Therequiredheatersandtheircontrolsshallbeconnectedtotheemergencybusesinamannerthatwillprovideredundantpowersupplycapability.2.Proceduresandtrainingshallbeestablishedtomaketheoperatorawareofwhenandhowtherequiredpressurizerheatersshallbeconnectedtotheemergencybuses.Ifrequired,theproceduresshallidentifyunderwhatconditionsselectedemergencyloadscanbeshedfromtheemergencypowersourcetoprovidesufficientcapacityfortheconnectionofthepressurizerheaters.3.Thetimerequiredtoaccomplishtheconnectionofthepreselectedpressurizerheatertotheemergencybusesshallbeconsistentwiththetimelyinitiationandmaintenanceofnaturalcirculationconditions.4.Pressurizerheatermotiveandcontrolpowerinterfaceswiththeemergencybusesshallbeaccomplishedthroughdevicesthathavebeenqualifiedinaccordancewithsafety-graderequirements.CLARIFICATIONl.Inordernottocompromiseindependencebetweenthesourcesofemergencypowerandstillprovideredundantcapabilitytoprovideemergencypowertothepressurizerheaters,eachredundantheaterorgroupofheatersshouldhaveaccess,toonlyoneClass1Edivisionpowersupply.2.Thenumberofheatersrequiredtohaveaccesstoeachemergencypowersourceisthatnumberrequiredtomaintainnaturalcirculationinthehotstandbycondition.3.ThepowersourcesneednotnecessarilynavethecapacitytoprovidepowertotheheatersconcurrentwiththeloadsrequiredforLOCA.4.Anychange-overoftheheatersfromnormaloffsitepowertoemergencyonsitepoweristobeaccomplishedmanuallyinthecontrolroom.

5.Inestablishingprocedurestomanuallyreloadthepressurizerheatersontotheemergencypowersources,carefulconsiderationmustbegivento:a.WhichESFloadsmaybeappropriatelyshedforagivensituation.b.ResetoftheSafetyInjectionActuationSignaltopermittheoperationoftheheaters.c.Instrumentationandcriteriaforoperatorusetopreventoverloadingadieselgenerator.6.TheClasslEinterfacesformainpowerandcontrolpoweraretobeprotectedbysafety-gradecircuitbreakers.(SeealsoReg.Guide1.75)7.Beingnon-ClassIEloads,thepressurizerheatersmustbeautomaticallyshedfromtheemergencypowersourcesupontheoccurrenceofasafetyinjectionactuationsignal.(SeeitemS.b.above)RGSEResonsesThepressurizerheaterpowersupplyattheGinnaNuclearPlantconformstoallrequirementssetforthabove.ProcedurestomanuallyloadtheheatersontoemergencypowersourceswillbecompletedbyJanuary1,1980.Theywillincludecriteriatopre-ventoverloadingadieselgenerator.ConsiderationwillbegiventothenecessitytoshedESFloadsandtheresetofthesafetyinjectionsignal.

e>~~~1 Section2.1.1-EMERGENCYPOWERSUPPLYPressurizerLevelandReliefBlockValvesPOSITIONHConsistentwithsatisfyingtherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria10,14,15,17and20ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50fortheeventoflossofoffsitepower,thefollowingpositionsshallbeimplemented:PowerSu1forPressurizerReliefandBlockValvesandPressurizerLevelIndicators1.Motiveandcontrolcomponentsofthepower-operatedreliefvalves(PORVs)shallbecapableofbeingsuppliedfromeithertheoffsitepowersourceortheemergencypowersourcewhentheoffistepowerisnotavailable.2.MotiveandcontrolcomponentsassociatedwiththePORVblockvalvesshallbecapableofbeingsuppliedfromeithertheoffsitepowersourceortheemergencypowersourcewhentheoffsitepowerisnotavailable.3.MotiveandcontrolpowerconnectionstotheemergencybusesforthePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesshallbethroughdevicesthathavebeenqualifiedinaccordancewithsafety-graderequirements.4.Thepressurizerlevelindicationinstrumentchannelsshallbepoweredfromthevitalinstrumentbuses.Thebusesshallhavethecapabilityofbeingsuppliedfromeithertheoffsitepowersourceortheemergencypowersourcewhenoffsitepowerisnotavailable.CLARIFICATION1.WhiletheprevalentconsiderationfromTMILessonsLearnedisbeingabletoclosethePORV/blockvalves,thedesignshouldretain,totheextentpractical,thecapabilitytoopenthesevalves.2.ThemotiveandcontrolpowerfortheblockvalveshouldbesuppliedfromanemergencypowerbusdifferentfromthatwhichsuppliesthePORV.3~AnychangeoverofthePORVandblockvalvemotiveandcontrolpowerfromthenormaloffsitepowertotheemergencyonsitepoweristobeaccomplishedmanuallyinthecontrolroom.4.Forthosedesignswhereinstrumentairisneededforoperation,theelectricalpowersupplyrequirementshouldbecapableofbeingmanuallyconnectedtotheemergencypowersources.RG&EResonsesTheattachedFailureModeandEffectsAnalysissystematicallyreviewstheconsequencesofallsinglefailuresinthepressurizerPORV/blockvalvesystem,includingthemotiveandcontrolpowersystems.Thesystemisshowntobecapableofperformingitssafetyfunction(closure)afteranysinglefailure.It,isalsoshownthatpressurizerpressurerelief(usingPORVs)maybeaccomplishedafteranysinglefailure.

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Section2.1.2-PERFORMANCETESTINGFORBWRANDPWRRELIEFANDSAFETYVALVESPOSITIONPressurizedwaterreactorandboilingwaterreactorlicenseesandapplicantsshallconducttestingtoqualifythereactorcoolantsystemreliefandsafetyvalvesunderexpectedoperatingconditionsfordesignbasistransientsandaccidents.'LARIFICATION2.ExpectedoperatingconditionscanbedeterminedthroughtheuseofanalysisofaccidentsandanticipatedoperationaloccurrencesreferencedinRegulatoryGuide1.70.Thistestingisintendedtodemonstratevalveoperabilityundervarious'flowconditions,thatis,theabilityofthevalvetoopenandshutunderthevariousflowconditionsshouldbedemonstrated.3.Notallvalvesonallplantsarerequiredtobetested.Thevalvetestingmaybeconductedonaprototypicalbasis.4.Theeffectofpipingonvalveoperabilityshouldbeincludedinthetestconditions.Noteverypipingconfigurationisrequiredtobetested,buttheconfigurationsthataretestedshouldproducetheappropriatefeedbackeffectsasseenbytherelieforsafetyvalve.5.Testdatashouldincludedatathatwouldpermitanevaluationofdischargepipingandsupportsifthosecomponentsarenot,testeddirectly.6.AdescriptionofthetestprogramandtheschedulefortestingshouldbesubmittedbyJanuary1,1980.7.TestingshallbecompletebyJuly1,1981'G&EResonseRGSEisamemberofanOwnersgroupformedbyutilitiesowningandoperatingWestinghousereactors.TheWestinghouseOwnersGroupisworkinginconjunctionwithotherPWRownersandtheElectricPowerResearchInstitute(EPRI)todevelopaprogramforqualificationofreliefandsafetyvalvesunderexpectedoperatingconditions.WewillfollowtheprogramandscheduledevelopedandcarriedoutbyEPRI.Althoughtheprogramisnotyetcomplete,theintent,istocomplywiththeNRCclarifications.

Section2.1.3.a-DIRECTINDICATIONOFPOWER-OPERATEDRELIEFVALVEANDSAFETYVALVEPOSITIONFORPWRSANDBWRSPOSITIONReactorsystemreliefandsafetyvalvesshallbeprovidedwith-apositiveindicationinthecontrolroomderivedfromareliablevalvepositiondetectiondeviceorareliableindicationofflowinthedischargepipe.CLARIFICATION1.Thebasicrequirementistoprovidetheoperatorwithunambiguousindica-tionofvalveposition(openorclosed)sothatappropriateoperatoractionscanbetaken.2.Thevalvepositionshouldbe.indicatedinthecontrolroom.Analarmshouldbeprovidedinconjunctionwiththisindication.3.Thevalvepositionindicationmaybesafetygrade.Ifthepositionindicationisnotsafetygrade,areliablesinglechanneldirectindicationpoweredfromavitalinstrumentbusmaybeprovidedifbackupmethodsofdeterminingvalvepositionareavailableandarediscussedintheemergencyproceduresasanaidtooperatordiagnosisandaction.4.Thevalvepositionindicationshouldbeseismicallyqualifiedconsistentwiththecomponentorsystemtowhichitisattached.IftheseismicqualificationrequirementscannotbemetfeasiblybyJanuary1,1980,ajustificationshouldbeprovidedforlessthanseismicqualificationandascheduleshouldbesubmittedforupgradetotherequiredseismicqualifi-cation.5.Thepositionindicationshouldbequalifiedforitsappropriateenvironment(anytransientoraccidentwhichwouldcausetherelieforsafetyvalvetolift).IftheenvironmentalqualificationprogramforthispositionindicationwillnotbecompletedbyJanuary1,1980,aproposedscheduleforcompletionoftheenvironmentalqualificationprogramshouldbeprovided.RGSEResonseThepoweroperatedreliefvalveshavedirectstempositionindi-cationfunctionallyconformingwiththeStaffposition.Functionalindicationofsafetyvalvepositionisprovidedinaccordancewiththefollowingposition.Thethermocouplelocatedinthedischargepipeofeach(oftwo)pressurizersafetyvalveprovidesunambiguousindicationofvalvemovement,orsignificant.seatleakage.OpeningofasafetyvalvewillcausearapidelevationindischargetemperaturewhichisalarmedandannunciatedintheControlRoom.Thethermocoupleresponsetimeisshortwithrespecttooperator"capabilitytoobserve,evaluateandtakeaction.SincetheonlyothervalveswhichcannormallydischargesteamintothissystemarethePORV's,whichhavedirectindicationofstemposition,anypossibleambiguityisremovedbycheckingthePORVpositionindication.

Whentheoperatorhasdeterminedthatapressurizersafetyvalvehasopened,hemustinitiateacourseofactionbasedontheassumptionthatthesafetyvalvewillnotreseat.ItshouldbenotedthatthisdiffersinprinciplewithactiontakeninresponsetoanopenPORV,whereinitialoperatoractionistoeitherclosethevalveitselfortoclosetheassociatedblockvalve.Theoperator'ssubsequentactionsfollowingtheopeningofthesafetyvalvemustbebasedonprimarysystemtemperatureandpressureandnotonthesafetyvalveposition.Inthiswaytheoperatorisnotdependentonsafetyvalveclosureforsaferecoveryoftheplant.Reseatingofasafetyvalveafteropeningwillresultinarapidinitialdropindischargetemperature'lthoughnottonormallevels.Thisindicationmaybeusedwiththeprimarypressureandtemperatureandpressurizerrelieftanklevel,temperatureandpressuretoprovideabasisforthedecisiontoterminateactionstakentomitigatetheeffectsofanopensafetyvalve.However,itshouldbenotedthatsuchactionshouldneverbetakenonsafetyvalvepositionindicationalone,sinceunlikePORV's,thesafetyvalvesdonothavebackupblockvalves,andincorrectpositionindicationcouldleadtheoperatortoterminatemitigatingactionsprematurelyunlessprimarysystemparametersareproperlyconsidered.VItisourpositionthat.theabovetechnicalreviewprovidesatotallyadequateandsoundbasisforsafeplantoperationuntilatleastthescheduledrefuelingoutageofMarch1980.Littleadditionalsafetymarginisprovidedbydirectsafetyvalveposi-tionindication.Nevertheless,RG&Eproposestoinstalldirectvalvestempositionindicationduringtherefuelingoutage'toaugmenttheinstrumentationdescribedabove.TheRG&Edesignwillutilizelinearvariabledifferentialtransformers(LVDTs)topro-videcontinuousvalvestempositionindication,fromfullyclosedtofullyopen.TheenvironmentalqualificationofelectricalcomponentshasbeenreviewedwithrespecttoaccidentsassociatedwithsafetyandPORVlifting.Thematerialsandcomponentsaresuitableforsuchenviron-ments.WebelievethisresponsetobetechnicallysoundandtotallyresponsivetotheStaffconcernsinthismatter.

Section2.1.3.b-INSTRUMENTATIONFORDETECTIONOFINADEUATECORECOOLINGSUBCOOLINGMETERPOSITIONLicenseesshalldevelopprocedurestobeusedbytheoperatortorecognizeinadequatecorecoolingwithcurrentlyavailableinstrumentation.Thelicenseeshallprovideadescriptionoftheexistinginstrumentationfortheoperatorstousetorecognizetheseconditions.Adetaileddescriptionoftheanalysesneededtoformthebasisforoperatortrainingandproceduredevelopmentshallbeprovidedpursuanttoanothershort-termrequirement,"AnalysisofOff-NormalConditions,IncludingNaturalCirculation"(seeSection2.1.9ofNUREG-0578).Inaddition,eachPMRshallinstallaprimarycoolantsaturationmetertoprovideon-lineindicationofcoolantsaturationcondition.Operatorinstruc-tionastouseofthismetershallincludeconsiderationthatisnottobeusedexclusiveofotherrelatedplantparameters.CLARIFICATION1.TheanalysisandproceduresaddressedinparagraphoneabovewillbereviewedandshouldbesubmittedtotheNRC"BulletinsandOrdersTaskForce"forreview.2.Thepurposeofthesubcoolingmeteristoprovideacontinuousindicationofmargintosaturatedconditions.Thisisanimportantdiagnostictoolforthereactoroperators'.Redundantsafetygradetemperatureinputfromeachhotleg(oruseofmultiplecoreexitin(sic)T/C's)arerequired.4.Redundantsafetygradesystempressuremeasuresshouldbeprovided.5.Continuousdisplayoftheprimarycoolantsaturationconditionsshouldbeprovided.6.EachPWRshouldhave:(A.)Safetygradecalculationaldevicesanddisplay(minimumoftwometers)or(B~)ahighlyreliablesinglechannelenviron-mentallyqualified,andtestablesystemplusabackupprocedureforuseofsteamtables.Iftheplantcomputeristobeused;itsavailabilitymustbedocumented.7.Inthelongterm,theinstrumentationqualificationsmustberequiredtobeupgradedtomeettherequirementsofRegulatoryGuide1.97(Instrumenta-tionforLightMaterCooledNuclearPlantstoAssessPlantConditionsDur-ingandFollowinganAccident)whichisunderdevelopment.8.In.allcasesappropriatesteps(electrical,isolation,etc.)mustbetakentoassurethattheadditionofthesubcoolingmeter'doesnotadverselyim-pactthereactorprotectionorengineeredsafetyfeaturessystems.9.Theattachmentprovidesadefinitionofinformationrequiredonthesub-coolingmeter.

I'~(ptRGSEResonsesRGSEisinstallingtworedundant.channelsofsubcoolingmarginmonitoring.Eachchannelwillbecomposedof1)existingRCStemperatureandpressuremeasurements,2)adedicated,fullyqualified,analog,saturationtemperaturecalculatorandalarm,and3)ananalogdisplayshowingsubcoolingmargin.Theprinciplecomponentsforthissystemareonorder,withprojecteddeliverydatesinmidDecember.Delaysinprocurementwhichmightbecausedbycomponenttesting,manufacturingdifficultiesorshippingproblemsmayresult,inanextendedschedule,however,weareexpeditingthedeliverytotheextentpossible.BasedontheprojecteddeliveryscheduleRG&Ewillinstallthisequipment,priortoJanuary1,1980.TheequipmentdatarequestedbytheStaffisattached.Procedureguidelinesthat.areusedbytheoperatorinrecognizinginadequatecorecoolingwillbesubmittedbytheWestinghouseOwnersGroupforreviewbytheBulletinsandOrdersTaskForce.

INFORIIATIONREUIREDONTHESUBCOOLINGHETERD~ialaInformationDisplayed(T-Tsat,Tsat,Press,etc.)DisplayType(Analog,Digital,CRT)ContinuousoronDemandSingleorRedundantDisplay.LocationofDisplaySAT-HOTAnaloContinuousSinledislachannelControlRoomAlarms(includesetpoints)Overalluncertainty(OF,PSI)RangeofDisplayQualifications(seismic,environmental,IEEE323)CalculatorType(processcomputer,dedicateddigitaloranalogcalc.)oneperTchannel/SAT-HOT<50F25oF0-100FNoneDislanon-1E)AnaloIfprocesscomputerisusedspecifyavailability.(~of(time)SingleorredundantcalculatorsSelectionLogic(highestT.,lowestpress)onecalculator/channelNoneQualifications(seismic,environmental,IEEE323)SeismicEcEnvironmental,IEEE-323&344CalculationalTechnique(SteamTables,FunctionalFit,ranges)functiontofittosaturationcurve~innaTemperature(RTD'sorT/C's)RTD-200ohmPt.Temperature(numberofsensorsandlocations)Rangeoftemperaturesensorsonesensor/channelRCShotle500-700F 10Uncertainty*oftemperaturesensors('Fat1)Qualifications(seismic,environmental,IEEE323)Pressure(specifyinstrumentused)seenote1seenote2Foxboro611GI1Pressure(numberofsensorsandlocations)RangeofPressuresensorsUncertainty*ofpressuresensors(PSIat1)one/channel,Pressurizer1700-2500si2siQualifications(seismic,environmental,IEEE323)Qualifiedfor60psigand286'Fnote3BackuCaabilitAvailabilityofTemp&PressCoreexitTCandpres-surizerpressureindica-tioninthecontrolroomAvailabilityofSteamTablesetc.TrainingofoperatorsProceduresavailableincontrolroomcornletecornlete*UncertaintiesmustaddressconditionsofforcedflowandnaturalcirculationNote1:AccuracyofRTD'sTemperature('F)Accuracy(4F)32525625.011~055.065Note2:RTDQualifications(

Reference:

RosemountEngineeringCo.Drawing176JA)1.RTD(exceptleadwires)capableofexposureof-30to650OF.Leadwires:-30to200F2.Vibration:10Gpeakfrom20to2000HZalongandthroughmutuallyperpendicularaxisfor15minutes.3.Radiation:200R/hourNote3:QualificationinformationisgiveninRG&EletterfromL.D.White,Jr.toA.Schwencer,USNRC,datedFebruary24,1978.

11Section2.1.3.b-INSTRUHENTATIONFORDETECTIONOFINADEUATECORECOOLINGADDITIONALINSTR'ENTATIONPOSITIONLicenseesshallprovidea.descriptionofanyadditionalinstrumentationorcon-trols(primaryorbackup)proposedfortheplanttosupplementthosedevicescitedintheprecedingsectiongivinganunambiguous,easy-to-interpretindica-tionofinadequatecorecooling.Adescriptionofthefunctionaldesignrequire-mentsforthesystemshallalsobeincluded.Adescriptionoftheprocedurestobeusedwiththeproposedequipment,theanalysisusedindevelopingthesepro-cedures,andascheduleforinstallingtheequipmentshallbeprovided.CLARIFICATION1.Designofnewinstrumentationshouldprovideanunambiguousindicationofinadequatecorecooling.Thismayrequirenewmeasurementstoorasynthesisofexistingmeasurementswhichmeetsafety-gradecriteria.2.Theevaluationistoincludereactorwaterlevelindication.3.AcommitmenttoprovidethenecessaryanalysisandtostudyadvantagesofvariousinstrumentstomonitorwaterlevelandcorecoolingisrequiredintheresponsetotheSeptember13,1979letter.4.Theindicationofinadequatecorecoolingmustbeunambiguous,inthat,itshouldhavethefollowingproperties:a)itmustindicatetheexistenceofinadequatecorecoolingcausedbyvariousphenomena(i.e.,highvoidfractionpumpedflowaswellasstagnantboiloff).Pb)itmustnoterroneouslyindicateinadequatecorecoolingbecauseofthepresenceofanunrelatedphenomenon.Theindicationmustgiveadvancedwarningoftheapproachofinadequatecorecooling.6.Theindicationmustcoverthefullrangefromnormaloperationtocompletecoreuncovering.Forexample,ifwaterlevelischosenastheunambiguousindication,thentherangeoftheinstrument(orinstruments)mustcoverthefullrangefromnormalwaterleveltothebottomofthecore.RG&EResonseAnalysesofsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents,symptomsofin-adequatecorecoolingandrequiredactionstorestorecorecooling,andanalysisoftransient,andaccidentscenariosincludingoperatoractionsnot,previouslyanalyzedhavebeenperformedonagenericbasisbytheWestinghouseOwnersGroup,ofwhichRG&Eisam'ember.

I~~l~pSection2.1.4-CONTAINMENT'ISOLATIONPOSITION1.Allcontainmentisolationsystemdesignsshallcomplywiththerecommenda-tionsofSRP6.2.4;i.e.,thattherebediversityintheparameterssensedfortheinitiationofcontainmentisolation.2.Allplantsshallgivecarefulreconsiderationtothedefinitionofessentialandnonessentialsystems,shallidentifyeachsystemdeterminedtobeessential,shallidentifyeachsystemdeterminedtobenonessential,shalldescribethebasisforselectionofeachessentialsystem,'shallmodifytheircontainmentisolationdesignsaccordingly,andshallreporttheresultsofthere-evaluationtotheNRC.3.Allnonessentialsystemsshallbeautomaticallyisolatedbythecontain-mentisolationsignal.4.Thedesignofcontrolsystemsforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvesshallbesuchthatresettingtheisolationsignalwillnotresultintheautomaticreopeningofcontainmentisolationvalves'eopeningofcontain-mentisolationvalvesshallrequiredeliberateoperatoraction.CLARIFICATION1.Providediversecontainmentisolationsignalsthatsatisfysafety-graderequirements.'.Identifyessentialandnon-essentialsystemsandprovideresultstoNRC.3.Non-essentialsystemsshouldbeautomaticallyisolatedbycontainmentisolationsignals.4.Resettingofcontainmentisolationsignalsshallnotresultintheauto-maticlossofcontainmentisolation.RG&EResonseTheexistingcontainmentisolationsystemattheGinnaNuclearPlantconformswiththediversityrequirementsoftheStaffposi-tion.SeeWestinghousedrawing882D612sheet.6submittedinalettertoD.L.ZiemannonNovember22,1978.Thisdrawingalsoshowswhichsensorsprovidecontainmentisolationandcontainmentventilationisolation.Thesystemautomaticallyisolatesallnonessentialsyst;emsnotalreadyisolated.Essentialandnon-essentialsystemsareidentifiedonTable2.1.4.Theeffectofresettingcontainmentisolationandcontainmentventilati'onisolationwasdiscussedindetailinourresponsestoitem9ofIEBulletin79-06AdatedApril28,1979andJune22,1979andinourletterstotheNRCdatedJanuary2,1979,February16,1979andMarch30,1979.Asidentifiedinthoseletters,therearecertainvalveswhichcouldreopenuponresetofthecontainmentisolationorcontainmentventilationisolationiftheircontrollersweresetintheopenposition.

13Thereopeningofvalvesiscurrentlyprecludedbyseveralmeans.First,theoperatorisdirectedtoplaceallvalvepositioncon-trollersintheclosedpositionsothatno'valvewillopenoninitiationofthereset.Theresetofcontainmentventilationisolationcanbeactuatedonlythroughuseofakeyswitch.Thekeyisunderthecontroloftheshiftforeman.Therefore,nosingleoperatorerrorcanresultinimproperuseofthisresetfunction.Theresetforcontainmentisolation,originallyareset.button,hasbeenreplacedwithakeyswitch.Tofurtherreducethelikelihoodofinadvertentreopeningofvalves,asystemmodificationhasbeendesignedtoprovideforindividualresettingofallisolationvalvestoeliminateanypossibilityofaninadvertentopening.Equipmentforthismodificationwasrecentlyordered,followingthenecessaryphasesofpreliminaryengineering,bidrequests,andbidevaluationsandeveryeffortisbeingmadetoexpeditedelivery.Thevendorestimatestwenty-twoweeksfordelivery.ItshouldbenotedthatinordernottodegradetheClass1Esystemofwhichitwillbeapart,thisequipment(includingover1SOrelays)must,befullyqualifiedseismicallyandenvironmentally.Theequipmentbeingprocuredishousedinfourlargecabinetswhichwillbelocatedintherelayroom.Installationalsoinvolveswiringbetweentherelayroomandthecontrolroom.

I f~I~~~r14-'Table2.1.4EssentialandNonessentialSystemContainmentPenetrationsPENT.NO.29100101102105106107108109110110112113120120121121121121123124IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTIONFueltransfertubecharginglineto"B"loopSIPump1BdischargeAlternatechargingto"A"coldlegContainmentSprayPump1A"A"ReactorCoolantPump(RCP),sealwaterinletSumpAdischargetoWasteHoldupTankRCPsealwaterout,andexcessletdowntoVCTContainmentSprayPump1B"B"RCPsealwaterinletSItestlineRHRto"B"coldlegEssentialletdowntoNon-regen.HeatexchangerSIPump1AdischargeNitrogentoAccumulatorsPressurizerReliefTank(PRT)toGasAnalyzer(GA)NitrogentoPRTReactorMakeupwatertoPRTCont.Press.transmitterPT-945Cont.Press.transmitterPT-946ReactorCoolantDrainTank(RCDT)toGAExcessletdownsupplyandreturntoheat.exchangerESSENTIALVS.NONESSENTIALNonessentialNonessentialEssentialNonessentialEssentialEssentialNonessentialNonessentialEssentialEssentialNonessentialNonessentialEssentialNonessentialNonessentialEssentialNonessentialEssentialEssentialNonessentialNonessential PENT.NO.125126127128129130131132140142143201202203203204205206206207207209210300Table2.1.4(continued)IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTIONPostAccidentairsample"C"fanComponentCoolingWater(CCW)from1BRCPCCWfrom1ARCPCCWtolARCPCCWto1BRCPRCDT&PRTtoVentHeaderCCWtoreactorsupportcoolingCCWtoreactorsupportcoolingDepressurizationatpowerRHRpumpsuctionfrom"A"HotlegRHR-51pumpsuctionfromSumpBRHR-52pumpsuctionfromSumpBRCDTpumpsuctionReactorCompart.coolingUnit-A&BHydrogenrecombinerpilot&main"B"Contain.Press.transmitterPT-947&948Postaccidentairsampleto"B"fanPurgeSupplyDuct,HotlegloopsamplePrzr.liquidspacesample"A"S/GsamplePrzr.SteamspacesampleBiiS/GsampleReactorCompart.coolingUnitA&BOxygenmakeuptoA&BrecombinersPurgeExhaustDuctESSENTIALVS.NONESSENTIALNonessentialEssentialEssentialEssentialEssentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialEssentialEssentialEssentialNonessentialEssentialNonessentialEssentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialEssentialNonessentialNonessential lI~~r 16Table2.1.4(continued)PENT.NO.301303304305IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTIONAux.steamsupplytocontainmentAux.steamcondensatereturnHydrogenrecombinerpilotandmainto"A"RadiationMonitorsR-ll,R-12&R-10AAutoInletIsol.ESSENTIALVS.NONESSENTIALNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessential305305308309310310311312313315317318319320321322323324332332R-ll,R-12&R-10AOutletPostAccidentairsample(containment)ServiceWaterto"A"fancoolerleakagetest.depressurizationServiceAirtoContain.InstrumentAirtoContain.ServiceWaterfrom"B"fancoolerServiceWaterto"D"fancoolerleakagetestdepressurizationServiceWaterfrom"C"fancoolerServiceWaterto"B"fancoolerleakagetestsupplyDeadweight.testerServiceWaterfrom"A"fancoolerServicewaterto"C"fancoolerAS/GBlowdownBS/GBlowdownServiceWaterfrom"D"fancoolerDemineralizedwatertoContainment,Cont.Press.Trans.PT-944,949&950Leakagetestinstrumentationlines.NonessentialNonessentialEssentialNonessentialNonessentialNonessentialEssentialEssentialNonessentialEssentialEssentialNonessentialNonessentialEssentialEssentialNonessentialNonessentialEssentialNonessentialEssentialNonessential 17PENT.NO.40140240340410002000Table2.1.4(continued)IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTIONMainsteamfromAS/GMainsteamfromBS/GFeedwaterlinetoAS/GFeedwaterlinetoBS/GPersonnelHatchPEquipmentHatchESSENTIALVS.NONESSENTIALNonessential*Nonessential*Essential,usedforAuxiliaryFeedwaterEssential,usedforAuxiliaryFeedwaterNonessentialNonessential*SignalswhichcausemainsteamlineisolationareshownonWestinghousedrawing882D612sheet6.

18Section2.1.5.a-DEDICATEDH2CONTROLPENETRATIONSPOSITIONPlantsusingexternalrecombinersorpurgesystemsforpost-accidentcombustiblegascontrolofthecontainment-atmosphereshouldprovidecontainmentisolationsystemsforexternalrecombinerorpurgesystemsthatarededicatedtothatserviceonly,thatmeettheredundancyandsinglefailurerequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria54and56ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50,andthataresizedtosatisfytheflowrequirementsofthe,recombinerorpurgesystem.CLARIFICATION1.Thisrequirementisonlyapplicabletothoseplantswhoselicensingbasisincludesrequirementsforexternalrecombinersorpurgesystemsforpost-accidentcombustiblegascontrolofthecontainmentatmosphere.2.Anacceptablealternativetothededicatedpenetrationisacombineddesignthatissingle-failureproofforcontainmentisolationpurposesandsingle-failureproofforoperationoftherecombinerorpurgesystem.3.Thededicatedpenetrationorthecombinedsingle-failureproofalternativeshouldbesizedsuchthattheflowrequirementsfortheuseoftherecom-binerorpurgesystemaresatisfied.4.Componentsnecessitatedbythisrequirementshouldbesafetygrade.5.AdescriptionofrequireddesignchangesandascheduleforaccomplishingthesechangesshouldbeprovidedbyJanuary1,1980.DesignchangesshouldbecompletedbyJanuary1,1981.RGGEResonseGinnaStationhastwohydrogenrecombinerswhicharelocatedinsidecontainment.Therefore,dedicatedpenetrationsarenot.required.

19Section2.1.5.c-CAPABILITYTOINSTALLHYDROGENRECOMBINERATEACHLIGHTWATERNUCLEARPOWERPLANTPOSITIONTheproceduresandbasesuponwhichtherecombinerswouldbeusedonallplantsshouldbethesubjectofareviewbythelicenseesinconsideringshieldingrequirementsandpersonnelexposurelimitationsasdemonstratedtobenecessaryinthecaseofT>11-2.CLARIFICATION1.ThisrequirementappliesonlytothoseplantsthatincludedHydrogenRecombinersasadesignbasisforlicensing.2.Theshieldingandassociated.personnelexposurelimitationsassociatedwithrecombineruseshouldbeevaluatedaspartoflicenseerespons'etorequirement2.1.6.B,"DesignreviewforPlantShielding."3.Eachlicenseeshouldreviewandupgrade,asnecessary,thosecriteriaandproceduresdealingwithrecombineruse.ActiontakenonthisrequirementshouldbesubmittedbyJanuary1,1980.Thepresentlyavailableprocedureswhichgoverntheuseofhydrogenrecombinershavebeenreviewedandfoundtobeadequate.Inviewofthefact,thatourrecombinersareinsidecontainment,nofurtherreviewisrequiredtoconsidershieldingrequirementsandpersonnelexposurelimitationsresultingfromtherecombiners.AccesstothecontrolpanelwillbeconsideredinresponsetoSection2.1.6.b.

1(20Section2.1.6.a-INTEGRITYOFSYSTEMSOUTSIDECONTAINMENTLIKELYTOCONTAINRADIOACTIVEMATERIALSFORPWRsANDBWRsPOSITIONApplicantsandlicenseesshallimmediatelyimplementaprogramtoreduceleakagefromsystemsoutsidecontainmentthatwouldorcouldcontainhighlyradioactivefluidsduringaserioustransientoraccidenttoas-low-aspracticallevels.Thisprogramshallincludethefollowing:ImmediateLeakReductiona.b.Implementallpracticalleakreductionmeasuresforallsystemsthatcouldcarryradioactivefluidoutsideofcontainment.HeasureactualleakagerateswithsysteminoperationandreportthemtotheNRC.2.ContinuingLeakReductionEstablishandimplementaprogramofpreventivemaintenancetoreduceleakagetoas-low-aspracticallevels.Thisprogramshallincludeperiodicintegratedleaktestsatafrequencynottoexceedrefuelingcycleinter-vals.CLARIFICATIONLicenseesshall,byJanuary1,1980,provideasummarydescriptionoftheirpro-gramtoreduceleakagefromsystemsoutsidecontainmentthatwouldorcouldcon-tainhighlyradioactivefluidsduringaserioustransientoraccident.ExamplesofsuchsystemsaregivenonpageA-26ofNUREG-0578.OtherexamplesincludetheReactorCoreIsolationCoolingandReactorMaterCleanup(Letdownfunction)SystemsforBMRs.Includealistofsystemswhichareexcludedfromthisprogram.Testingofgaseoussystemsshouldincludeheliumleakdetectionorequivalenttestingmethods.ConsiderinyourprogramtoreduceleakagepotentialreleasepathsduetodesignandoperatordeficienciesasdiscussedinourlettertoyouregardingNorthAnnaandRelatedIncidentsdatedOctober17,1979,.RGSEResonseThescheduleforcompletionoftheNRCstaffrequirementsisgiveninourresponseofOctober17,1979andisinagreementwithstaffrequirements.WewillconsiderinourprogramforreducingleakagetheNRClettertoRG&EdatedOctober17,1979regardingtheNorthAnnaandrelatedincidents.Wearereviewinganddiscussingwithconsultantsasatisfactorymethodfordeterminingtheleakagerateforthe"'wastegassystem.WeintendtocomplyasrequiredbyJanuary1,1980.

(rI~~~~WewillprovidetotheNRCbyJanuary1,1980,asummarydescriptionofourprogramtoreduceleakagefromsystemsoutsidecontainmentthatcontainhighlyradioactivefluidsduringaserioustransientoraccident.

LII,~~gI ItjI~g'22Section2.1.6.b-DESIGNREVIEWOFPLANTSHIELDINGANDENVIRON-MENTALUALIFICATIONOFEUIPMENTFORSPACESSYSTEMSWHICHMAYBE,USEDINPOST-ACCIDENTOPERATIONSPOSITIONWiththeassumptionofapost-accidentreleaseofradioactivityequivalenttothatdescribedinRegulatoryGuides1.3and1.4,eachlicenseeshallperformaradiationandshieldingdesignreviewofthespacesaroundsystemsthatmay,asaresultofanaccident,containhighlyradioactivematerials.Thedesignreviewshouldidentifythelocationofvitalareasandequipment,suchasthecontrolroom,radwastecontrolstations,emergencypowersupplies,motorcontrolcenters,andinstrumentareas,inwhichpersonneloccupancymaybeundulylimitedorsafetyequipmentmaybeundulydegradedbytheradiationfieldsduringpost-accidentoperationsofthesesystems.Eachlicenseeshallprovideforadequateaccesstovitalareasandprotectionofsafetyequipmentbydesignchanges,increasedpermanentortemporaryshield-ing,orpost-accidentproceduralcontrols.Thedesignreviewshalldeterminewhichtypesofcorrectiveactionsareneededforvitalareasthroughoutthefacility.CLARIFICATIONAnyareawhichwillormayrequireoccupancytopermitanoperatortoaidinthemitigationoforrecoveryfromanaccidentisdesignatedasavitalarea.Inordertoassurethatpersonnelcanperformnecessarypost-accidentoperationsinthevitalareas,weareprovidingthefollowingguidancetobeusedbylicenseestoevaluatetheadequacyofradiationprotectiontotheoperators:SourceTermTheminimumradioactivesourcetermshouldbeequivalenttothesourcetermsrecommended,inRegulatoryGuides1.3,1.4,1.7andStandardReviewPlant15.6.5withappropriatedecaytimesbasedonplantdesign.a.LiquidContainingSystems:100%ofthecoreequilibriumnoblegasinventory,50~ofthecoreequilibriumhalogeninventoryand1',ofallothersareassumedtobemixedinthereactorcoolantandliquidsbyHPCIandLPCI.b.GasContainingSystems:100~ofthecoreequilibriumnoblegasin-ventoryand25~ofthecoreequilibriumhalogenactivityareassumedtobemixedinthecontainmentatmosphere.Forgascontaininglinesconnectedtotheprimarysystem(e.g.,BWRsteamlines)theconcentra-tionofradioactivityshallbedeterminedassumingtheactivityiscontainedinthegasspaceintheprimarycoolantsystem.

)Il)~yl232.DoseRateCriteriaThedoserateforpersonnelinavitalareashouldbesuchthattheguide-linesofGDC19shouldnotbeexceededduringthecourseoftheaccident.GDC19limitsthedosetoanoperatorto5Remwholebodyoritsequivalenttoanypartofthebody.Whendeterminingthedosetoanoperator,caremustbetakentodeterminethenecessaryoccupancytimeinaspecificarea.Forexample,areasrequiringcontinuousoccupancywillrequiremuchlowerdoseratesthanareaswhereminimaloccupanyisrequired.Therefore,allowabledoserateswillbebaseduponexpectedoccupancy,aswellastheradioactivesourcetermsandshielding.However,inordertoprovideageneraldesignobjective,weareprovidingthefollowingdoseratecriteriawithalternativestobedocumentedonacase-by-casebasis.Therecommendeddoseratesareaverageratesinthearea.Localhotspotsmayexceedthedoserateguidelinesprovidedoccupancyisnotrequiredatthelocationofthehotspot.Thesedosesaredesignobjectivesandarenottobeusedtolimitaccessintheeventofanaccident.a.AreasReuirinContinuousOccuanc:<15mr/hr.Theseareaswillrequirefulltimeoccupancyduringthecourseoftheaccident.TheControlRoomandonsitetechnicalsupportcenterareareaswherecon-tinuousoccupancywillberequired.ThedoseratefortheseareasisbasedonthecontrolroomoccupancyfactorscontainedinSRP6.4.AreasReuirinInfreuentAccess:GDC19.Theseareasmayrequireaccessonaregularbasis,butnotcontinuousoccupancy.Shieldingshouldbeprovidedtoallowaccessatafrequencyanddurationestimatedbythelicensee.TheplantRadiochemical/ChemicalAnalysisLaboratory,radwastepanel,motorcontrolcenter,instrumentationlocations,andreactorcoolantandcontainmentgassamplestationsareexampleswhereoccupancymaybeneededoftenbutnotcontinuously.RG&EResonseAradiationandshieldingdesignreviewwillbecompletedbyJanuary1,1980whichidentifiesthelocationofvitalareasandequipmentinwhichpersonneloccupancymaybelimitedorsafetyequipmentundulydegradedbyradiationfieldsduringpost,-accidentconditions.Thereviewwillusethesourcetermanddoseratecriteriaofthisposition.Thedesignreviewwilldeterminethetypesofcorrectiveactionsneededfortheaffectedvitalareas.WeexpecttoimplementplantshieldingmodificationsandprocedurechangeswhichmayberequiredbyJanuary1,1981unlessmajormodificationswhichareaffectedbySystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)topicsareidentified.Theremaybeaselectednumberofmodificationswhichwewillrecommendincludingintheintegratedassessment,oftheSEP.Thiswouldbeinthosecaseswherethemodificationcouldpotentiallyinteractwithreviewsbeingcon-ductedunderSEPsuchastopicsIII-4.A,III-4.B,III-4.C,III-4.D(missiles),III-5.B(pipebreakoutsidecontainment),III-6(seismic),andVI-8(controlroomhabitability).RecommendationsforinclusioninSEPwillbereachedonacase-by-casebasisandwillbepresentedtotheNRCforconcurrence.

Section2.1.7.a-AUTONATICINITIATIONOFTHEAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPOSITIONConsistentwithsatisfyingtherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriterion20ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50withrespecttothetimelyinitiationoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem,thefollowingrequirementsshallbeimplementedintheshortterm:1.Thedesignshallprovidefortheautomaticinitiationoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.2.Theautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothatasinglefailurewillnotresultinthelossofauxiliaryfeedwatersystemfunction.3.Testabilityoftheinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbeafeatureofthedesign.4.Theinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergencybuses.5.Nanualcapabilitytoinitiatetheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemfrom,thecontrolroomshallberetainedandshallbeimplementedsothatasinglefailureinthemanualcircuitswillnotresultinthelossofsystemfunctions.6.Thea-cmotor-drivenpumpsandvalvesintheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemshallbeincludedintheautomaticactuation(simultaneousand/orsequential)oftheloadstotheemergencybuses.7.TheautomaticinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothattheirfailurewillnotresultinthelossofmanualcapabilitytoinitiatetheAFWSfromthecontrolroom.IntheLongTerm,theautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsshallbeupgradedinaccordancewithsafetygraderequirement.CLARIFICATIONControlGrade(Short-Term)1.Provideautomatic/manualinitiationofAFWS.2.Testabilityoftheinitiatingsignals,andcircuitsisrequired.3~Initiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergencybuses.4.Necessarypumpsandvalvesshallbeincludedintheautomaticsequenceoftheloadstotheemergencybuses'erifythattheadditionoftheseloadsdoesnotcompromisetheemergencydieselgeneratingcapacity.

01Pg~

-255.FailureintheautomaticcircuitsshallnotresultinthelossofmanualcapabilitytoinitiatetheAFHSfromthecontrolroom.6.OtherConsiderationsa.Forthosedesignswhereinstrumentairisneededforoperation,'heelectricpowersupplyrequirementshouldbecapableofbeingmanuallyconnectedtoemergencypowersources.RG&EResonsesWemeettherequirementsof'thisposition.PleaseseeourresponseofOctober17,1979.

CII~~'26Section2.1.7.b-AUXILIARYFEEDWATERFLOWINDICATIONTOSTEANGENERATORSPOSITIONConsistentwithsatisfyingtherequirementssetforthinGDC13toprovidethecapabilityinthecontrolroomtoascertaintheactualperformanceoftheAFllSwhenitiscalledtoperformitsintendedfunction,thefollowingrequirementsshallbeimplemented:1.Safety-gradeindicationofauxiliaryfeedwaterflowtoeachsteamgeneratorshallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.2.TheauxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentchannelsshallbepoweredfromtheemergencybusesconsistentwithsatisfyingtheemergencypowerdiversityrequirementsoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemsetforthinAuxiliarySystemsBranchTechnicalPosition10-1oftheStandardReviewPlan,Section10.4.9.CLARIFICATIONA.ControlGradeShort-Term1.Auxiliaryfeedwaterflowindicationtoeachsteamgeneratorshallsatisfythesinglefailurecriterion.2.Testabilityoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterflowindicationchannelsshallbeafeatureofthedesign.3.Auxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentchannelsshallbepoweredfromthevitalinstrumentbuses.B.Safet-GradeLon-Term1.Auxiliaryfeedwaterflowindicationtoeachsteamgeneratorshallsatisfysafety-graderequirements.C.Other1.FortheShort-Termtheflowindicationchannelsshouldbythemselvessatisfythesinglefailurecriterionforeachsteamgenerator.Asafall-backposition,oneauxiliaryfeedwaterflowchannelmaybebackedupbyasteamgeneratorlevelchannel.2.Eachauxiliaryfeedwaterchannelshouldprovideanindicationoffeedflowwithanaccuracyontheorderof210~.RG&EResonseA.Theauxiliaryfeedwaterflowindicationtoeachsteamgeneratordoesnot,byitself,satisfythesinglefailurecriterion.However,asallowedbyclarificationC.l,redundantindicationisprovidedbysteamgeneratorlevel.

~~~27,2.Theauxiliaryfeedwaterflowindicationchannelsaretestable.3.Auxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentchannelsarepoweredbyvitalinstrumentbuses.B.1.I,ongtermauxiliaryfeedwaterflowindicationtoeachsteamgeneratorwhichmeetssafetygradereguirementswillbeinstalledbyJanuary1,1981.

~~~1128Section2.1.8.a-INPROVEDPOST-ACCIDENTSAMPLINGCAPABILITYPOSITIONAdesignandoperationalreviewofthereactorcoolantandcontainmentatmospheresamplingsystemsshallbeperformedtodeterminethecapabilityofpersonneltopromptlyobtain(lessthan1hour)asampleunderaccidentconditionswithoutincurringaradiationexposuretoanyindividualinexcessof3and183/4Remstothewholebodyorextremities,respectively.AccidentconditionsshouldassumeaRegulatoryGuide1'or1.4releaseoffissionproducts.Ifthereviewindicatesthatpersonnelcouldnotpromptlyandsafelyobtainthesamples,addi-tionaldesignfeaturesorshieldingshouldbeprovidedtomeetthecriteria.Adesignandoperationalreviewoftheradiologicalspectrumanalysisfacilitiesshallbeperformedtodeterminethecapabilitytopromptlyquantify(lessthan2hours)certainradioisotopesthatareindicatorsofthedegreeofcoredamage.Suchradionuclidesarenoblegases(whichindicatecladdingfailure),iodinesandcesiums(whichindicatehighfueltemperatures),andnon-volatileisotopes(whichindicatefuelmelting).Theinitialreactorcoolantspectrumshouldcor-respondtoaRegulatoryGuide1.3or1.4release.Thereviewshouldalsocon-sidertheeffectsofdirectradiationfrompipingandcomponentsintheauxiliarybuildingandpossiblecontaminationanddirect,radiationfromairborneeffluents.Ifthereviewindicatesthattheanalysesrequiredcannotbeper-formedinapromptmannerwithexistingequipment,thendesignmodificationsorequipmentprocurementshallbeundertakentomeetthecriteria.Inadditiontotheradiologicalanalyses,certainchemicalanalysesarenecessaryformonitoringreactorconditions.Proceduresshallbeprovidedtoperformboronandchloridechemicalanalysesassumingahighlyradioactiveinitialsample(RegulatoryGuide1.3or1.4sourceterm).Bothanalysesshallbecapableofbeingperformedpromptly,i.e.,theboronanalysiswithinanhourandthechloridesampleanalysiswithinashift.DISCUSSIONTheprimarypurposeofimplementingImprovedPost-AccidentSamplingCapabilityistoimproveeffortstoassessandcontrolthecourseofanaccidentby:1.Providinginformationrelatedtotheextentofcoredamagethathasoccurredormaybeoccurringduringanaccident;2.Determiningthetypesandquantitiesoffissionproductsreleasedtothecontainmentintheliquidandgasphaseandwhichmaybereleasedtotheenvironment;3.Providinginformationoncoolantchemistry(e.g.,dissolvedgas,boronandpH)andcontainmenthydrogen.Theaboveinformationrequiresacapabilitytoperformthefollowinganalyses:1.Radiologicalandchemicalanalysesofpressurizedandunpressurizedreactorcoolantliquidsamples;

'I1g~

292.Radiologicalandhydrogenanalysesofcontainmentatmosphere(air)samples.CLARIFICATIONThelicenseeshallhavethecapabilitytopromptlyobtain(inlessthan1hour)pressurizedandunpressurizedreactorcoolantsamplesandacontainmentatmos-phere(air)sample.Thelicenseeshallestablishaplanforanonsiteradiologicalandchemicalanalysisfacilitywiththecapabilitytoprovide,within1hourofobtainingthesample,quantificationofthefollowing:1.certainisotopesthatareindicatorsofthedegreeofcoredamage(i.e.,noblegases,iodinesandcesiumsandnon-volatileisotopes),2.hydrogenlevelsinthecontainmentatmosphereintherange0to10volumepercent,3.dissolvedgases(i.e.,H,0andboronconcentrationofliquids.orhavein-linemonitoringcapabilitiestoperformtheaboveanalysis.Plantproceduresforthehandlingandanalysisofsamples,minorplantmodificationsfortakingsamplesandadesignreviewandproceduralmodifications(ifnecessary)shallbecompletedbyJanuary1,1981.Duringthereviewofthepostaccidentsamplingcapabilityconsiderationshouldbegiventothefollowingitems:1.Provisionsshallbemadetopermitcontainmentatmospheresamplingunderbothpositiveandnegativecontainmentpressure.2.Thelicenseeshallconsiderprovisionsforpurgingsampleslines,forreducingplateoutinsamplelines,forminimizingsamplelossordistortion,forpreventingblockageofsamplelinesbyloosematerialintheRCSorcontainment,forappropriatedisposalofthesamples,andforpassiveflowrestrictionstolimitreactorcoolantlossorcontainmentairleakfromaruptureofthesampleline.3.Ifchangesormodificationstotheexistingsamplingsystemarerequired,theseismicdesignandqualitygroupclassificationorsamplinglinesandcomponentsshallconformtotheclassificationofthesystemtowhicheachsamplinglineisconnected.Componentsandpipingdownstreamofthesecondisolationvalvecanbedesi'gnedtoqualityGroupDandnonseismicCategoryIrequirements.Thelicensee'sradiologicalsampleanalysiscapabilityshouldincludeprovisionsto-a.IdentifyandquantifytheisotopesofthenuclidecategoriesdiscussedabovetolevelscorrespondingtothesourcetermsgiveninLessonsLearnedItem2.1.6.b.Hherenecessary,abilitytodilutesamples-toprovidecapabilityformeasurementandreductionofpersonnelexposure,shouldbeprovided.Sensitivityofonsiteanalysiscapabilityshouldbesuchastopermitmeasurementofnuclideconcentrationintherangefromapproximately1pCi/gmtotheupperlevelsindicatedhere.

1fl~~V I~130'b.Restrictbackgroundlevelsofradiationintheradiologicalandchemicalanalysisfacilityfromsourcessuchthatthesampleanalysiswillprovideresultswithanacceptablysmallerror(approximatelyafactorof2).Thiscanbeaccomplishedthroughtheuseofsufficientshieldingaroundsamplesandoutsidesources,andbytheuseofventilationsystemdesignwhichwillcontrolthepresenceofairborneradioactivity.c.Haintainplantprocedureswhichidentifytheanalysisrequired,measurementtechniquesandprovisionsforreducingbackgroundlevels.Thelicenseeschemicalanalysiscapabilityshallconsiderthepresenceoftheradiologicalsourcetermindicatedfortheradiologicalanalysis.Inperformingthereviewofsamplingandanalysiscapability,considerationshallbegiventopersonneloccupationalexposure.Proceduralchangesand/orplantmodificationsmustassurethatitshallbepossibletoobtainandanalyzeasamplewhileincurringaradiationdosetoanyindividualthatisaslowasreasonablyachievableandnotinexcessofGDC19.Inassuringthattheselimitsaremet,thefollowingcriteriawillbeusedbythestaff.1.Forshieldingcalculations,sourcetermsshallbeasgiveninLessonsLearnedItem2.1.6.b.2.Accesstothesamplestationandtheradiologicalandchemicalanalysisfacilitiesshallbethroughareaswhichareaccessibleinpostaccidentsituationsandwhichareprovidedwithsufficientshieldingtoassurethattheradiationdosecriteriaaremet.3.Operationsinthesamplestation,handlingofhighlyradioactivesamplesfromthesamplestationtotheanalysisfacilities,andhandlingwhileworkingwiththesamplesintheanalysisfacilitiesshallbesuchthattheradiationdosecriteriaaremet.Thismayinvolvesufficientshieldingofpersonnelfromthesamplesand/orthedilutionofsamplesforanalysis.Iftheexistingfacilitiesdonotsatisfythesecriteria,thenadditionaldesignfeatures,e.g.,additionalshielding,remotehandlingetc.shallbeprovided.Theradioactivesamplelinesinthesamplestation,thesamplesthemselvesintheanalysisfacilities,andotherradioactivelinesofthevicinityofthesamplingstationandanalysisfacilitiesshallbeincludedintheevaluation.4.Highrangeportablesurveyinstrumentsandpersonneldosimetersshouldbeprovidedtopermitrapidassessmentofhighexposureratesandaccumulatedpersonnelexposure.Thelicenseeshalldemonstratetheircapabilitytoobtainandanalyzeasamplecontainingtheisotopesdiscussedaboveaccordingtothecriteriagiveninthissection.RG&EResonseWeareperforminganoperationalanddesignreviewofthereactorcoolantandcontainmentatmospheresamplingsystemstodeterminetheimprovementsnecessaryforpromptcollection,handlingand 01Iy~

analysisofrequiredpost-accidentsampleswithoutincurringex-cessivepersonnelexposure.Samplingprocedure'changesandminorsamplecollectionmodificationswillbecompletedbyJanuary1,1980.TheongoingdesignreviewwillconsiderthoseitemsidentifiedintheCommission'sOctober30,1979clarificationletterandwillimplementbyJanuary1,1981thenecessarymajorplantmodi-ficationswiththepossibleexceptionofselectedmodificationsthatmaybeaffectedbySEPreview.ThesemaybeincorporatedintotheSystematicEvaluationProgram.(seeresponseto2.1.6.b) iI~~~32Section2.1.8.b-INCREASEDRANGEOFRADIATIONMONITORSPOSITIONvTherequirementsassociatedwiththisrecommendationshouldbeconsideredasadvancedimplementationofcertainrequirementstobeincludedinarevisiontoRegulatoryGuide1.97,"InstrumentationtoFollowtheCourseofanAccident,"whichhasalreadybeeninitiated,andinotherRegulatoryGuides,whichwillbepromulgatedinthenear-term.Noblegaseffluentmonitorsshallbeinstalledwithanextendedrangedesignedtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsaswellasduringnormaloperatingconditions;multiplemonitorsareconsideredtobene'cessarytocovertherangesofinterest.a.Noblegaseffluentmonitorswithanupperrangecapacityof105uCi/cc(Ze-133)areconsideredtobepracticalandshouldbeinstalledinalloperatingplants.b.Noblegaseffluentmonitoringshallbeprovidedforthetotalrangeofconcentrationextendingfromnormalcondition(ALARA)concentra-tionstoamaximumof10uCi/cc(Ze-133).1Iultiplemonitorsareconsideredtobenecessarytocovertherangesofinterest.Therangecapacityofindividualmonitorsshalloverlapbyafactoroften.2.Sinceiodinegaseouseffluentmonitorsfortheaccidentconditionsarenotconsideredtobepracticalatthistime,capabilityforeffluentmonitoringofradioiodinesfortheaccidentconditionshallbeprovidedwithsamplingconductedbyabsorptiononcharcoalorothermedia,followedbyon-sitelaboratoryanalysis.3.In-containmentradiationlevelmonitorswithamaximumrangeof108rad/hr[totalor10rad/hrphoton]shallbeinstalled.Aminimumoftwosuchmonitorsthatarephysicallyseparatedshallbeprovided.Honitorsshallbedesignedandqualifiedtofunctioninanaccidentenvironment.DISCUSSIONTheJanuary1,1980requirement,werespecificallyaddedbytheCommissionandwerenotincludedinNUREG-0578.ThepurposeoftheinterimJanuary1,1980requirementistoassurethatlicenseeshavemethodsofquantifyingradioactivityreleasesshouldtheexistingeffluentinstrumentationgooffscale~CLARIFICATIONRadiologicalNobleGasEffluentNonitorsA.January1,1980RequirementsUntilfinalimplementationinJanuary1,1981,'alloperatingreactorsmustprovide,byJanuary1,1980,aninterimmethodforquantifyinghighlevelreleaseswhichmeetstherequirementsofTable2.1.8.b.l.Thismethodistoserveonlyasaprovisionalfixwiththemorede-33tailed,exactmethodstofollow.Hethodsaretobedevelopedtoquantifyreleaseratesofupto10,000Ci/secfornoblegasesfromallpotentialreleasepoints,(e.g.,auxiliarybuilding,radwastebuilding,fuelhandlingbuilding,reactorbuilding,wastegasdecaytankreleases,maincondenserairejector,BWRmaincondenservacuumpumpexhaust,PWRsteamsafetyvalvesandatmospheresteamdumpvalvesandBWRturbinebuildings)andanyotherareasthatcommunicatedirectlywithsystemswhichmaycontainprimarycoolantorcontainmentgases,(.e.g,letdownandemergencycorecoolingsystemsandexternalrecom-biners).Heasurements/analysiscapabilitiesoftheeffluentsatthefinalreleasepoint(e.g.,stack)shouldbesuchthatmeasurementsofindividualsourceswhichcontributetoacommonreleasepointmaynotbenecessary.Forassessingradioiodineandparticulatereleases,specialproceduresmustbedevelopedfortheremovalandanalysisoftheradioiodine/particulatesamplingmedia(i.e.,charcoalcanister/filterpaper).Existingsamplinglocationsareexpectedtobeade-quate;however,specialproceduresforretrievalandanalysisofthesamplingmediaunderaccidentconditions(e.g.,highairandsurfacecontaminationanddirectradiationlevels)areneeded.Itisintended,thatthemonitoringcapabilitiescalledforintheinterimcanbeaccomplishedwithexistinginstrumentationorreadilyavailableinstrumentation.Fornoblegases,modificationstoexistingmonitoringsystems,suchastheuseofportablehighrangesurveyinstruments,setinshieldedcollimatorssothatthey"see"smallsectionsofsamplinglinesisanacceptablemethodformeetingthein-tentofthisrequirement.Conversionofthemeasureddoserate(mR/hr)intoconcentration(pCi/cc)canbeperformedusingstandardvolumesourcecalculations.Amethodmustbedevelopedwithsufficientaccuracytoquantifytheiodinereleasesinthepresenceofhighback-groundradiationfromnoblegasescollectedoncharcoalfilters.SeismicallyqualifiedequipmentandequipmentmeetingIEEE-279isnotrequired.Thelicenseeshallprovidethefollowinginformationonhismethodstoquantifygaseousreleasesofradioactivityfromtheplantduringanaccident.NobleGasEffluentsa.System/Hethoddescriptionincluding:i)Instrumentationtobeusedincludingrangeorsen-sitivity,energydependence,andcalibrationfrequencyandtechnique,ii)Honitoring/samplinglocations,includingmethodstoassurerepresentativemeasurementsandbackgroundradia-tioncorrection, s>~~34iii)Adescriptionofmethodtobeemployedtofacilitateaccesstoradiationreadings.ForJanuary1,1980,Controlroomread-outispreferred;however,ifim-practical,in-situreadingsbyan,individualwithverbalcommunicationwiththeControlRoomisacceptablebasedon(iv)below.iv)Capabilitytoobtainradiationreadingsatleastevery15minutesduringanaccident.v)Sourceofpowertobeused.IfnormalACpowerisused,analternateback-uppowersupplyshouldbepro-vided.IfDCpowerisused,thesourceshouldbecapableofprovidingcontinuousreadoutfor7consecutivedays.b.Proceduresforconductingallaspectsofthemeasurement/analysisincluding:i)Proceduresforminimizingoccupationalexposuresii)Calculationalmethodsforconvertinginstrumentread-ingstoreleaseratesbasedonexhaustairflowandtakingintoconsiderationradionuclidespectrumdistri-butionasfunctionoftimeaftershutdown.iii)Proceduresfordisseminationofinformation.iv)'roceduresforcalibration.B.January1,1981RequirementsByJanuary1,1981,thelicenseeshallprovidehighrangenoblegaseffluentmonitorsforeachreleasepath.ThenoblegaseffluentmonitorshouldmeettherequirementsofTable2.1.8.b.2.ThelicenseeshallalsoprovidetheinformationgiveninSections1.A.l.a.i,1.A.l.a.ii,1.A.l.b.ii,1.A.l.B.iii,and1.A.l.b.ivaboveforthenoblegaseffluentmonitors.'.RadioiodineandParticulateEffluentsA.ForJanuary1,1980thelicenseeshouldprovidethefollowing:System/Methoddescriptionincluding:a)Instrumentationtobeusedforanalysisofthesamplingmediawithdiscussiononmethodsusedtocorrectforpotentiallyinterferingbackgroundlevelsofradioactivity.b)Monitoring/samplinglocation.\c)Methodtobeusedforretrievalandhandlingofsamplingmediatominimizeoccupationalexposure.

~~35d)Methodtobeusedfordataanalysisofindividualradio-nuclidesinthepresenceofhighlevelsofradioactivenoblegases.e)IfnormalACpowerisusedforsamplecollectionandanalysisequipment,analternateback-uppowersupplyshouldbepro-vided.IfDCpowerisused,thesourceshouldbecapableofprovidingcontinuousread-outfor7consecutivedays.2.Proceduresforconductingallaspectsofthemeasurementanalysisincluding:a)Minimizingoccupationalexposureb)Calculationalmethodsfordeterminingreleaseratesc)Proceduresfordisseminationofinformationd)CalibrationfrequencyandtechniqueB.ForJanuary1,1981,thelicenseeshouldhavethecapabilitytocontinuouslysampleandprovideonsiteanalysisofthesamplingmedia.Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovidetheinformationrequiredin1.Aabove.ContainmentRadiationMonitorsProvidebyJanuary1,1981,tworadiationmonitorsystemsincontainmentwhicharedocumentedtomeettherequirementsofTable2.1.8.b.2.Itispossiblethatfutureregulatoryrequirementsforemergencyplanninginter-facesmaynecessitateidentificationofdifferenttypesofradionuclidesinthecontainmentair,e.g.,noblegases(indicationofcoredamage)andnon-volatiles(indicationofcoremelt).Consequently,considerationshouldbegiventothepossibleinstallationorfutureconversionofthesemonitorstoperformthisfunction.

I's~'~~1 lf~~~TABLE2.1.8.b.1INTERIHPROCEDURESFORUANTIFYINGHIGHLEVELACCIDENTALRADIOACTIVITYRELEASESLicenseesaretoimplementproceduresforestimatingnoblegasandradio-iodinereleaseratesiftheexistingeffluentinstrumentationgoesoffscale.Examplesofmajorelementsofahighlyradioactiveeffluentreleasespecialprocedures(noblegas).Preselectedlocationtomeasureradiationfromthe'exhaustair,e.g.,exhaustductorsampleline.Provideshieldingtominimizebackgroundinterference.Useofaninstalledmonitor(preferable)ordedicatedportablemonitor(acceptable)tomeasuretheradiation.Predeterminedcalculationalmethodtoconverttheradiationleveltoradioactiveeffluentreleaserate.

37TABLE2.1.8.b.2HIGHRANGEEFFLUENTMONITORNOBLEGASESONLYRANGE:(OverlapwithNormalEffluentInstrumentUNDILUTEDCONTAINMENTEXHAUSTDILUTED(>10:1)CONTAINMENTEXHAUSTMARKIBWRREACTORBUILDINGEXHAUSTPWRSECONDARYCONTAINMENTEXHAUSTBUILDINGSWITHSYSTEMSCONTAININGPRIMARYCOOLANTORGASESOTHERBUILDINGS(E.G.,RADWASTE)Range)10pCi/CC10pCi/CC10pCi/CC10pCi/CC10pCi/CC10pci/CCNOTREDUNDANT-1PERNORI1ALRELEASEPOINTSEISMIC-NOPOWER-VITALINSTRUMENTBUSSPECIFICATIONS-PER.R.G.1.97ANDANSIN320"1979.DISPLAY*:CONTINUOUSANDRECORDINGWITHREADOUTSINTHETECHNICALSUPPORTCENTER(TSC)ANDEMERGENCYOPERATIONSCENTER(EOC)QUALIFICATIONS-NO+Althoughnotapresentrequirement,itislikelythatthisinformationmayhavetobetransmittedtotheNRC.Consequently,considerationshouldbegiventothispossiblefuturerequirementwhendesigningthedisplayinterfaces.

TABLE2.1.8.b.3HIGHRANGECONTAINMENTRADIATIONNONITORRADIATION:TOTALRADIATION(ALTERNATE:PHOTONONLY)RANGE:UPTO10RAD/HR(TOTALRADIATION)ALTERNATE:10R/HR(PHOTONRADIATIONONLY)7SENSITIVEDOWNTO60KEVPHOTONS*REDUNDANT:TWOPHYSICALLYSEPARATEDUNITSSEISHIC:PERR.G.1.97POWER:VITALINSTRUNENTBUSSPECIFICATIONS:PER.R.G.1.97REV.2andANSIN320-1978DISPLAY:CONTINUOUSANDRECORDINGCALIBRATION:LABORATORYCALIBRATIONACCEPTABLE*Honitorsmustnotprovidemisleadinginformationtotheoperatorsassumingdelayedcoredamagewhenthe80KEVphotonZe-133isthemajornoblegaspresent.

JiI]eS39RGSEResonses2.1.8.b1Noblegaseffluentmonitorwithanupperrangecapacityof10pCi/cc(Xe-133)isbei'ngprocuredtobeinstalledontheplantventbyJanuary1,1981.InordertomeetthisdatestaffapprovalofourdesignisrequiredbyMarch1,1980.Theadditionalinforma-tionrequiredbythestaffpositionconcerningourinterimmethodsforquantifyinghighlevelreleaseswillbesubmittedbyJanuary1,1980.2.1.8.b.2RGGEcurrentlyhasthecapabilitytomonitoriodinegaseous"releases.Thisequipmentisinplaceandusedforroutineanalysis.PriortoJanuary1,1980wewillprovidetheinformationrequiredbyparagraph2.A.oftheclarificationsabove.2.1.8.b.3TwohighrangecontainmentradiationmonitorshavebeenorderedforinstallationinthecontainmentpriortoJanuary1,1981.Inordertomeetthisdatestaffapprovalofourdesignisrequired'yMarch1,1980.Thesemonitorswillmeet7therequirementsofTable2.1.8.b.3andwillhavearangeof10R/hr(photononly).

Section2.1.8.c-IMPROVEDIN-PLANTIODINEINSTRUMENTATIONUNDERACCIDENTCONDITIONSPOSITIONEachlicenseeshallprovideequipmentandassociatedtrainingandproceduresforaccuratelydetermingtheairborneiodineconcentrationinareaswithinthefacilitywhereplantpersonnelmaybepresentduringanaccident.CLARIFICATIONUseofPortableversusStationarHonitorinEuimentEffectivemonitoringofincreasingiodinelevelsinthebuildingsunderaccidentconditionsmustincludetheuseofportableinstrumentsforthefollowingreasons:a.Thephysicalsizeoftheauxiliary/fuelhandlingbuildingprecludeslocatingstationarymonitoringinstrumentationatallareaswhereairborneiodineconcentrationdatamightberequired.b.Unanticipatedisolated"hotspots"mayoccurinlocationswherenosta-tionarymonitoringinstrumentationislocated.c.Unexpectedlyhighbackgroundradiationlevelsnearstationarymonitoringinstrumentationafteranaccidentmayinterferewithfilterradiationread-ings.d.Thetimerequiredtoretrievesamplesafteranaccidentmayresultinhighpersonnelexposuresifthesefiltersarelocatedinhighdoserateareas.IodineFiltersandHeasurementTechniues,A.Thefollowingareshort-termrecommendationsandshallbeimplementedbythelicenseebyJanaury1,1980.Thelicenseeshallhavethecapabilitytoaccuratelydetectthepresenceofiodineintheregionofinterestfol-lowinganaccident.Thiscanbeaccomplishedbyusingaportableorcart-mountediodinesamplerwithattachedsinglechanne$3~nalyzer(SCA).TheSCAwindowshouldbecalibratedtothe36SkeVyf1I.ArepresentativeairsampleshallbetakenandthencountedforIusingtheSCA.Thiswillgiveaninitialconservativeestimateofpresenceofiodineendcanbeusedtodetermineifrespiratoryprotectionisrequired.CaremustbetakentoassurethatthecountingsystemisnotsaturatedasaresultoftoomuchactivitycollectedonthesamplingcartridgesB.ByJanuary1,1981:Thelicenseeshallhavethecapabilitytoremovethesamplingcartridgetoalowbackground,lowcontaminationareaforfurtheranalysis.Thisareashouldbeventilatedwithcleanaircontainingnoairborneradionuclideswhichmaycontributetoinaccuraciesinanalyzingthesample.Here,thesampleshouldfirstbepurgedofanyentrappednoble'ases'usingnitrogengasorcleanairfreeofnoblegases.The.licenseeshallhavethecapa-bilitytomeasureaccuratelytheiodineconcentrationspresentonthesesamplesandeffluentcharcoalsamplesunderaccidentconditions.

RGSEResonseWehavemobileinstrumentationlocatedinvariousareasthroughouttheplanttomonitorairborneiodineconcentrations.PortableairsamplersareavailableintheHealthPhysicsofficeandattheEmergencySurveyCenterforuseincollectingiodinesamples.Bothcharcoalandsilverzeoliteareavailableasiodinecollectors.WehavethecapabilitytoaccuratelydetectthepresenceofiodineusingmobileairmonitorswhichhaveasinglechannelanalyzercalibratedtotheI131energy.Wealsohavealowbackground,lowcontaminationcountingfacilitywhereasamplecanbepurgedofnoblegasestoassureaccurateiodinemeasurements.ProceduresareinuseandHealthPhysicstechniciansaretrainedtousetheGeLidetectorinisotopicanalysis.ThisprocedureisusedroutinelytodetermineMPChoursofexposure.

Section2.1.9-TRANSIENTANDACCIDENTANALYSISPOSITIONSeeNUREG-0578,pageA-44.DISCUSSIONThescopeoftherequiredtransientandaccidentanalysisisdiscussedinNUREG-0578.TheschedulefortheseanalysesisincludedinNUREG-0578andisrepro-ducedintheImplementationScheduleattachmenttothisletter.TheBulletinsandOrdersTaskForcehasbeenimplementingtheserequiredanalysesonthatschedule.Theanalysisof.thesmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidenthasbeensubmittedbyeachoftheownersgroups.TheseanalysesarepresentlyunderreviewbytheBMTaskForce.Thescopeandschedulefortheanalysisofinadequatecorecoolinghavebeen"discussedandagreeduponinmeetingsbetweentheownersgroupsandtheB&0TaskForce,andaredocumentedintheminutestothosemeetings.Theanalysisoftransientsandaccidentsforthepurposeofupgradingemergencyproceduresisdueinearly1980andthedetailedscopeandscheduleofthisanalysisisthesubjectofcontinuingdiscussionsbetweentheownersgroupsandtheB&PTaskForce.AnalysesofsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidentswerereportedtotheNRCinWCAP-9600,submittedbytheWestinghouseOwnersgrouponJune29,1979.ThesensitivitytoreactorcoolantpumptripwasaddressedinWCAP-9584whichwassubmittedonAugust31,1979.NRCapprovaloftheprocedureguidelinescontainedinthesetworeports,asamended,wastransmittedbyletterdatedNovember5,1979fromMr.D.F.Ross,Jr.AnalysesofinadequatecorecoolingwassubmittedbytheOwnersgrouponOctober30,1979.AsidentifiedinaletterfromCordellReed,Chairman,WestinghouseOwnersGroup,toMr.D.F.Ross,Jr.,datedOctober29,1979,weexpecttosubmittheanalysisoftransientsandaccidentsbyJanuary1,1980.

Section2.1.9-CONTAINMENTPRESSUREINDICATIONPOSITIONAcontinuousindicationofcontainmentpressureshouldbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.Heasurementandindication.capabilityshallincludethreetimesthedesignpressureofthecontainmentforconcrete,fourtimesthedesignpressureforsteel,andminusfivepsigforallcontainments.CLARIFICATION1.ThecontainmentpressureindicationshallmeetthedesignprovisionsofRegulatoryGuide1.97includingqualification,redundancy,andtestability.2.ThecontainmentpressuremonitorshallbeinstalledbyJanuary1,1981.RG&Ewillinstallcontainment,pressureindicationinconformancewiththeStaffposition.

~l4 Section2.1.9-CONTAINNENTWATERLEVELINDICATIONPOSITIONAcontinuousindicationof'containmentwaterlevelshallbeprovidedinthecontrolroomforallplants.AnarrowrangeinstrumentshallbeprovidedforPHRsandcovertherangefromthebottomtothetopofthecontainmentsump.AwiderangeinstrumentshallalsobeprovidedforPHRsandshallcovertherangefromthebottomofthecontainmenttotheelevationequivalenttoa600,000galloncapacity.ForBHRs,awiderangeinstrumentshallbeprovidedandcovertherangefromthebottomto5feetabovethenormalwaterlevelofthesuppressionpool.CLARIFICATION1.Thenarrowrangesumplevelinstrumentshallmonitorthenormalcontainmentsumplevelvicethecontainmentemergencysumplevel.2.Thewiderangecontainmentwaterlevelinstrumentsshallmeettherequire-mentsoftheproposedrevisiontoRegulatoryGuide1.97(InstrumentationforLight-HaterCooledNuclearPowerPlanttoAssessPlantConditionsDuringandFollowinganAccident).3.Thenarrowrangecontainmentwaterlevelinstrumentsshallmeettherequire-mentsofRegulatoryGuide1.89(QualificationofClassIEEquipmentofNuclearPowerPlants).4.TheequivalentcapacityofthewiderangePHRlevelinstrumenthasbeenchangedfrom500,000gallonsto600,000gallonstoensureconsistencywiththeproposedrevisiontoRegulatoryGuide1.97.Itshouldbenotedthatthismeasurementcapabilityisbasedonrecentplantdesigns.Forolderplantswithsmallerwatercapacities,licenseesmayproposedeviationsfromthisrequirementbasedontheavailablewatersupplycapabilityattheirplant.5.ThecontainmentwaterlevelindicationshallbeinstalledbyJanuary1,1981.RGSEResonsesRGSEwillinstallcontainment,waterlevelindicationinconformancewiththeStaffposition,except,that.thedepthmaynotbegreaterthanthatequivalentto500,000gallons.Themaximumcapacityoftherefuelingwaterstoragetank(338,000gal.)plusthereactorcoolantsystem(approximately50,000gal.)plustheaccumulators(lessthan10,000gal.each)isconsiderablylessthan500,000gallons.

Section2.1.9-CONTAINNENTHYDROGENINDICATIONPOSITIONAcontinuousindicationofhydrogenconcentrationinthecontainmentatmosphereshallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.measurementcapabilityshallbeprovidedovertherangeof0to10~hydrogenconcentrationunderbothpositiveandnegativeambientpressure.CLARIFICATION1.ThecontainmenthydrogenindicationshallmeetthedesignprovisionsofRegulatoryGuide1.97includingqualification,redundancy,andtestability.2.ThecontainmenthydrogenindicationshallbeinstalledbyJanuary1,1981.RG&Eintendstoinstallcontainmenthydrogenindicationinstrumenta-tioninconformancewiththeStaffposition.

IC~~

Section2.1.9-REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMVENTINGPOSITIONEachapplicantandlicenseeshallinstallreactorcoolantsystemandreactorvesselheadhighpointventsremotelyoperatedfromthecontrolroom.Sincetheseventsformapartofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,thedesignoftheventsshallconformtotherequirementsofAppendixAto10CFRPart50GeneralDesignCriteria.Inparticular,theseventsshallbe.safetygrade,andshallsatisfythesinglefailurecriterionandtherequirementsofIEEE-279inordertoensurealowprobabilityofinadvertentactuation.Eachapplicationandlicenseeshallprovidethefollowinginformationconcerningthedesignandoperationofthesehighpointvents:Adescriptionoftheconstruction,location,size,andpowersupplyfortheventsalongwithresultsofanalysesofloss-of-coolantaccidentsinitiatedbyabreakintheventpipe.Theresultsoftheanalysesshouldbedemon-stratedtobeacceptableinaccordancewiththeacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46.2.Analysesdemonstratingthatthedirectventingofnoncondensablegaseswithperhapshighhydrogenconcentrationsdoesnotresultinviolationofcom-bustiblegasconcentrationlimitsincontainmentasdescribedin10CFRPart50.44,RegulatoryGuide1.7(Rev.1),andStandardReviewPlanSection'.2.5.3.Proceduralguidelinesfortheoperators'seofthevents.Theinformationavailabletotheoperatorforinitiatingorterminatingventusageshallbediscussed.CLARIFICATIONA.GeneralThetwoimportantsafetyfunctionsenhancedbythisventingcapability'recorecoolingandcontainmentintegrity.Foreventswithinthepresentdesignbasisfornuclearpowerplants,thecapabilitytoventnon-condensiblegaseswillprovideadditionalassuranceofmeetingtherequirementsof10CFR50.46(LOCAcriteria)and10CFR50.44(containmentcriteriaforhydrogengeneration).Foreventsbeyondthepresentdesignbasis,thisventingcapabilitywillsubstantiallyincreasetheplant'sability-todealwithlargequantitiesofnoncondensiblegaswithoutthelossofcorecoolingorcontainmentintegrity.2.ProceduresaddressingtheuseoftheRCSventsarerequiredbyJanuary1,1981.Theproceduresshoulddefinetheconditionsunderwhichtheventsshouldbeusedaswellastheconditionsunderwhichtheventsshouldnotbeused.Theproceduresshouldbebasedonthefollowingcriteria:(1)assurancethattheplantcanmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.46and10CFR50.44forDesignBasisAccidents;and(2)asub'stantialincreaseintheplant'abilitytomaintaincorecoolingandcontainmentintegrityforeventsbeyondtheDesignBasis.

Jl~~

B.BWRDesignConsiderations1.SincetheBWRownersgrouphassuggestedthatthepresentBWRdesignsinherentcapabilityofventing,thisquestionrelatestothecapa-bilityofexistingsystems.TheabilityofthesesystemstoventtheRCSofnoncondensiblegasmustbedemonstrated.InadditiontheabilityofthesesystemstomeetthesamerequirementsasthePWRventsystemsmustbedocumented.Sincethereareimportantdif-ferencesamongBWR's,eachlicenseeshouldaddressthespecificdesignfeaturesofhisplant.2.Inadditiontoreactor.coolantsystemventing,eachBWRlicenseeshouldaddresstheabilitytoventothersystemssuchastheisola-tioncondenser,whichmayberequiredtomaintainadequatecorecool-ing.Iftheproductionofalargeamountofnoncondensiblegaswouldcausethelossoffunctionofsuchasystem,remoteventingofthatsystemisrequired.ThequalificationsofsuchaventingsystemshouldbethesameasthatrequiredforPWRventingsystems'.PWRVentDesignConsiderationsThelocationsforPWRVentsareasfollows:a.EachPWRlicenseeshouldprovidethecapabilitytoventthereactorvesselhead.b.Thereactorvesselheadventshouldbecapableofventingnon-condensiblegasfromthereactorvesselhotlegs(totheeleva-tionofthetopoftheoutletnozzle)andcoldlegs(throughheadjetsandotherleakagepaths).Additionalventingcapabilityisrequiredforthoseportionsofeachhotlegwhichcannotbeventedthroughthereactorvesselheadvent.TheNRCrecognizesthatitisimpracticaltoventeachofthemanythousandsoftubesinaU-tubesteamgenerator.However,webelievethataprocedurecanbedevelopedwhichassuresthatsufficientliquidorsteamcanentertheU-tuberegionsothatdecayheatcanbeeffectivelyremovedfromthereactorcoolantsystem.SuchaprocedureisrequiredbyJanuary1981.c.Ventingofthepressurizerisrequiredtoassureitsavailabilityforsystempressureandvolumecontrol.Theseareimportantconsiderationsespeciallyduringnaturalcirculation.2.Thesizeofthereactorcoolantventsisnotacriticalissue.Thedesiredventingcapabilitycanbeachievedwithventsinafairlylargerangeofsizes.Thecriteriaforsizingaventcanbedevelopedinseveralways.Oneapproach,whichweconsiderreasonable,istospecifyavolumeofnoncondensiblegastobeventedandaventingtimei.e.,aventcapableofventingagasvolumeof1/2theRCSinonehour.Othercriteriaandengineeringapproachesshould,becon-sideredifdesired.

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3.WherepracticaltheRCSventsshouldbekeptsmallerthanthesizecorrespondingtothedefinitionofaLOCA(10CFR50AppendixA).ThiswillminimizethechallengestotheECCSsincetheinadvertentopen-ingofaventsmallerthantheLOCAdefinitionwouldnotrequireECCSactuationalthoughitmayresultinleakagebeyondTechnicalSpeci-ficationLimits.OnPWRstheuseofneworexistingvalveswhicharelargerthantheLOCAdefinitionwillrequiretheadditionofablockvalvewhichcanbeclosedremotelytoterminatetheLOCAresultingfromtheinadvertentopeningofthevent.4.Anindicationofvalvepositionshouldbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.5.Eachventshouldberemotelyoperablefromthecontrolroom.6.Eachventshouldbeseismicallyqualified.7.TherequirementsforasafetygradesystemisthesameasthesafetygraderequirementonotherShortTermLessonsLearneditems,thatis,itshouldhavethesamequalificationsaswereacceptedforthereactorprotectionsystemwhentheplantwaslicensed.Theexceptiontothisrequirementisthatwedonotrequireredundantvalvesateachventinglocation.Eachventmusthaveitspowersuppliedfromanemergencybus.Adegreeofredundancyshouldbeprovidedbypoweringdifferentventsfromdifferentemergencybuses.8.Forsystemswhereablockvalveisrequired,theblockvalveshouldhavethesamequalificationsasthevent.9.SincetheRCSventsystemwillbepartofthereactorcoolantsystemsboundary,effortsshouldbemadetominimizetheprobabilityofaninadvertentactuationofthesystem.Removingpowerfromtheventsisonestepinthedirection.Otherstepsarealsoencouraged.10.Sincethegenerationoflargequantitiesofnoncondensiblegascouldbeassociatedwithsubstantialcoredamage,ventingtoatmosphereisunacceptablebecauseoftheassociatedreleasedradioactivity.Ventingintocontainmentistheonlypresentlyavailablealternative..Withincontainmentthoseareaswhichprovidegoodmixingwithcontainmentairarepreferred.Inaddition,areaswhichprovideformaximumcoolingoftheventedgasarepreferred.Thereforetheselectionofalocationforventingshouldtakeadvantageofexistingventilationandheatremovalsystemsll.TheinadvertentopeningofanRCSventmustbeaddressed.ForventssmallerthantheLOCAdefinition,leakagedetectionmustbesufficienttoidentifytheleaka'ge.ForventslargerthantheLOCAdefinition,ananalysisisrequiredtodemonstratecompliancewith10CFR50.46.RG&EResonseWeareplanningtoinstallreactorcoolantsystemandreactorvesselheadhighpoint,ventsinaccordancewiththestaff'srequirements.WeintendtosubmitthedesigndetailsbyJanuary1,1980;andhavetheventingsysteminstalledbyJanuary1,1981asrequired.InordertomeettheinstallationdatestaffapprovalofourdesignwillberequiredbyMarch1,1980.

~~4,)Section2.2.l.a-SHIFTSUPERVISORRESPONSIBILITIESPOSITIONSThehighestlevelofcorporatemanagementofeachlicenseeshallissueandperiodicallyreissueamanagementdirectivethatemphasizestheprimarymanagementresponsibilityoftheShiftSupervisorforsafeopera-tionoftheplantunderallconditionsonhisshiftandthatclearlyestablisheshiscommandduties.2.Plantproceduresshallbereviewedtoassurethattheduties,responsi-bilities,andauthorityoftheShiftSupervisorandcontrolroomoperatorsareproperlydefinedtoeffecttheestablishmentofadefinitelineofcommandandcleardelineationofthecommanddecisionauthorityoftheshiftsupervisorinthecontrolroomrelativetootherplantmanagementpersonnel.Particularemphasisshallbeplacedonthefollowing:a.TheresponsibilityandauthorityoftheShiftSupervisorshallbetomaintainthebroadestperspectiveofoperationalconditionsaffectingthesafetyoftheplantasamatterofhighestpriorityatalltimeswhenondutyinthecontrolroom.TheideashallbereinforcedthattheShiftSupervisorshouldnotbecometotallyinvolvedinanysingleoperationintimesofemergencywhenmultipleoperationsarerequiredinthecontrolroom.b.TheShiftSupervisor,untilproperlyrelieved,shallremaininthecontrolroomatalltimesduringaccidentsituationstodirecttheactivitiesofcontrolroomoperators.PersonsauthorizedtorelievetheShiftSupervisorshallbespecified.C.IftheShiftSupervisoristemporarilyabsentfromthecontrolroomduringroutineoperations,aleadcontrolroomoperatorshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.Thesetemporaryduties,responsibilities,andauthorityshallbeclearlyspecified.3.TrainingprogramsforShiftSupervisorsshallemphasizeandreinforcetheresponsibilityforsafeoperationandthemanagementfunctiontheshiftsupervisoristoprovideforassuringsafety.4.TheadministrativedutiesoftheShiftSupervisorshallbereviewedbytheseniorofficerofeachutilityresponsiblieforplantoperations.Administrativefunctionsthatdetractfromoraresubordinatetothemanagementresponsibilityforassuringthesafeoperationoftheplantshallbedelegatedtootheroperationspersonnelnotondutyinthecontrolroom.CLARIFICATIONTheattachmentprovidesclarificationtotheaboveposition.

~4~SOAttachmentSection2.2.1.A-SHIFTSUPERVISORRESPONSIBILITYNUREG-0578POSITIONPOSITIONNO.HighestLevelofCorporateManagement(1.)PeriodicallyReissue(1.)ManagementDirection(1.)ProperlyDefined(2.0)UntilProperlyRelieved(2.B)TemporarilyAbsent(2.C)ControlRoomDefined(2.C)CLARIFICATIONV.P.ForOperationsAnnualReinforcementofCompanyPolicyFormalDocumentationofShiftPersonnel,AllPlantManagement,CopytoIERegion7DefinedinWritingin..aPlantProcedureFormalTransferofAuthority,ValidSROLicense,RecordedinPlantLogAnyAbsenceIncludesShiftSupervisorOfficeAdjacenttotheControlRoomDesignated(2.C)InAdministrativeProceduresClearlySpecifiedSROTrainingAdministrativeDuties(4.)AdministrativeDutiesReviewed(4.)DefinedinAdministra-tiveProceduresSpecifiedinANS3.1(Draft)Section5.2.1.8NotAffectingPlantSafetyOnSameIntervalasReinforcement:i.e.,AnnualbyV.P.forOperations 51RGSEResonsesWewillcomplywiththestaffpositionandclarifications.SeeourresponseofOctober17,1979.

52Section2.2.l.b-SHIFTTECHNICALADVISORPOSITIONEachlicenseeshallprovideanon-shifttechnicaladvisortotheshiftsuper-visor.Theshifttechnicaladvisormayservemorethanoneunitatamulti-unitsiteifqualifiedtoperformtheadvisorfunctionforthevariousunits.TheShiftTechnicalAdvisorshallhaveabachelor'sdegreeorequivalentinascientificorengineeringdisciplineandhavereceivedspecifictrainingintheresponseandanalysisoftheplantfortransientsandaccidents.Theshifttechnicaladvisorshallalsoreceivetraininginplantdesignandlayout,includingthecapabilitiesofinstrumentationandcontrolsinthecontrolroom.Thelicenseeshallassignnormaldutiestotheshifttechnicaladvisorsthatpertaintotheengineeringaspectsofassuringsafeoperationsoftheplant,includingthereviewandevaluationofoperatingexperience.DISCUSSIONTheNRCLessonsLearnedTaskForcehasrecommendedtheuseofShiftTechnicalAdvisors(STA)asamethodofimmediatelyimprovingtheplantoperationstaff'scapabilitiesforresponsetooff-normalconditionsandforevaluatingoperatingexperience.IndefiningthecharacteristicsoftheSTA,wehaveusedthetwoessentialfunctionstobeprovidedbytheSTA.Theseareaccidentassessmentandoperat-ingexperienceassement.AccidentAssessmentTheSTAservingtheaccidentassessmentfunctionmustbededicatedtocon-cernforthesafetyoftheplant.TheSTA'sdutieswillbetodiagnoseoff-normaleventsandadvisetheshiftsupervisor.ThedutiesoftheSTAshouldnotincludethemanipulationofcontrolsorsupervisionofoperators.TheSTAmustbeavailable,inthecontrolroom,within10minutesofbeingsum-moned.ThequalificationsoftheSTAshouldincludecollegeleveleducationinengineeringandsciencesubjectsaswellastraininginreactoroperationsbothnormalandoff-normal.DetailsregardingthesequalificationsareprovidedinparagraphsA.l,2and3ofEnclosure2toourSeptember13,1979letter.Inaddition,theSTAservingtheaccidentassessmentfunctionmustbecognizantoftheevaluationsperformedaspartoftheoperatingexperienceassessmentfunction.0eratinEerienceAssessmentThepersonsservingtheoperatingexperienceassessmentfunctionmustbededicatedtoconcernforthesafetyoftheplant.Theirfunctionwillbetoevaluateplantoperationsfromasafetypointofviewandshouldin-cludesuchassignmentsaslistedonpagesA-50andA-51ofNUREG-0578.Theirqualificationsareidenticaltothosedescribedpreviouslyunderaccidentassessmentandcollectivelythisgroupshouldprovidecompetenceinalltechnicalareasimportanttosafety.Itisdesirablethatthisfunctionbeperformedbyonsitepersonnel.

CLARIFICATIONDuetothesimilarityintherequirementsfordedicationtosafety,train-ingandonsitelocationandthedesirethattheaccidentassessmentfunc-tionbeperformedbysomeonewhosenormaldutiesinvolvereviewofoperat-ingexperiences,ourpreferredpositionisthatthesamepeopleperformtheaccidentandoperatingexperienceassessmentfunctions.Theperformanceofthesetwofunctionsmaybesplitifitcanbedemonstratedthepersonsassignedtheaccidentassessmentroleareaware,onacurrentbasis,oftheworkbeingdonebythosereviewingoperatingexperience.2.ToprovideassurancethattheSTAwillbededicatedtoconcernforthesafetyoftheplant,ourpositionhasbeenthatSTA'smusthaveaclearmeasureofindependencefromdutiesassociatedwiththecommercialopera-tionoftheplant.Thiswouldminimizepossibledistractionsfromsafetyjudgmentsbythedemandsofcommercialoperations.Wehavedeterminedthat,whiledesirable,independencefromtheoperationsstaffoftheplantisnotnecessarytoprovidethisassurance.Itisnecessary,however,toclearlyemphasizethededicationtosafetyassociatedwiththeSTApositionbothintheSTAjobdescriptionandinthepersonnelfillingthisposition.Itisnotacceptabletoassignaperson,whoisnormallytheimmediatesupervisoroftheshiftsupervisortoSTAdutiesasdefinedherein.3.ItisourpositionthattheSTAshouldbeavailablewithin10minutesofbeingsummonedandthereforeshouldbeonsite.TheonsiteSTAmaybeinadutystatusforperiodsoftimelongerthanoneshift,andthereforeasleepatsometimes,ifthetenminuteavailabilityisassured.Itispreferabletolocatethosedoingtheoperatingexperienceassessmenton-site.ThedesiredexposuretotheoperatingplantandcontactwiththeSTA(ifthesefunctionsaretobesplit)maybeabletobeaccomplishedbyagroup,normallystationedoffsite,withfrequentonsitepresence.Wedonotintend,atthistime,tospecifyoradvocateaminimumtimeon-site.TheimplementationschedulefortheSTArequirementsistohavetheSTAondutybyJanuary1,1980,andtohaveSTAs,whohaveallcompletedtrain-ingrequirements,ondutybyJanuary1,1981.WhileminimumtrainingrequirementshavenotbeenspecifiedforJanuary1,1980,theSTAsondutybythattimeshouldenhancetheaccidentandoperatingexperienceassess-mentfunctionattheplant.ResonseSeeourresponseofOctober17,1979.Additionalinformationcon-cerningourtrainingprogramwillbeprovidedbyJanuary1,1980.

Section2.2.1.c-SHIFTANDRELIEFTURNOVERPROCEDURESPOSITIONThelicenseeshallreviewandreviseasnecessarytheplantprocedureforshiftandreliefturnovertoassurethefollowing:Achecklistshallbeprovidedfortheoncomingandoffgoingcontrolroomoperatorsandtheoncomingshiftsupervisortocompleteandsign.Thefollowingitems,asaminimum,shallbeincludedinthechecklist:a.Assurancethat,criticalplantparametersarewithinallowablelimits(parametersandallowablelimitsshallbelistedonthechecklist).b.Assuranceoftheavailabilityandproperalignmentofallsystemsessentialtothepreventionandmitigationofoperationaltransientsandaccidentsbyacheckofthecontrolconsole(whattocheckandcriteriaforacceptancestatusshallbeincludedonthechecklist).2.c.IdentificationofsystemsandcomponentsthatareinadegradedmodeofoperationpermittedbytheTechnicalSpecifications.Forsuchsystemsandcomponents,thelengthoftimeinthedegradedmodeshallbecomparedwiththeTechnicalSpecifi-cationsactionstatement(thisshallberecordedasaseparateentryonthechecklist).Checklistorlogsshallbeprovidedforcompletionbytheoffgoingandoncomingauxiliaryoperatorsandtechnicians.Suchchecklistsorlogsshallincludeanyequipmentundermaintenanceortestthatbythemselvescoulddegradeasystemcriticaltothepreventionandmitigationofoperationaltransientsandaccidentsorinitiateoperationaltransients(whattocheckandcriteriaforacceptablestatuswillbeincludedonthechecklist.)3.Asystemshallbeestablishedtoevaluatetheeffectivenessoftheshiftandreliefturnoverprocedures(forexample,periodicindependentverificationofsystemalignments).CLARIFICATIONNoclarificationprovided.RG&EResonsesWewillcomplywiththestaffpositionasdescribedinourresponseofOctober17,1979.

55Section2.2.2.a-CONTROLROONACCESSPOSITIONThelicenseeshallmakeprovisionsforlimitingaccesstothecontrolroomtothoseindividualsresponsibleforthedirectoperationofthenuclearpowerplant(e.g.,operationssupervisor,shiftsupervisor,andcontrolroomoperators),totechnicaladvisorswhomayberequestedorrequiredtosupporttheoperation,andtopredesignatedNRCpersonnel.Provisionsshallincludethefollowing:1.Developandimplementanadministrativeprocedurethatestablishestheauthorityandresponsibilityofthepersoninchargeofthecontrolroomtolimitaccess.Developandimplementproceduresthatestablishaclearlineofauthorityandresponsibilityinthecontrolroomintheeventofanyemergency.Thelineofsuccessionforthepersoninchargeofthecontrolroomshallbeestablishedandlimitedtopersonspossessingacurrentseniorreactoroperator'slicense.Theplanshallclearlydefinethelinesofcommunica-tionandauthorityforplantmanagementpersonnelnotindirectcommandofoperations,includingthosewhoreporttostationsoutsideofthecontrolroom.CLARIFICATIONNoclarificationprovided.WewillcomplywiththestaffpositionasdescribedinourresponseofOctober17,1979.

56Section2.2.2.b-ONSITETECHNICALSUPPORTCENTERPOSITIONEachoperatingnuclearpowerplantshallmaintainanonsitetechnicalsupportcenterseparatefromandincloseproximitytothecontrolroomthathasthecapabilitytodisplayandtransmitplantstatustothoseindividualswhoareknowledgeableofandresponsibleforengineeringandmanagementsupportofreactoroperationsintheeventofanaccident.Thecentershallbehabitabletothesamedegreeasthecontrolroomforpostulatedaccidentconditions.Thelicenseeshallrevisehisemergencyplansasnecessarytoincorporatetheroleandlocationofthetechnicalsupportcenter.Recordsthatpertaintotheas-builtconditionsandlayoutofstructures,systemsandcomponentsshallbereadilyavailabletopersonnelintheTSC.CLARIFICATIONByJanuary1,1980,eachlicenseeshouldmeetitemsA-Gthatfollow.EachlicenseeisencouragedtoprovideadditionalupgradingoftheTSC(items2-10)assoonaspractical,butnolaterthanJanuary1,1981.A.EstablishaTSCandprovideacompletedescription,B.Provideplansandproceduresforengineering/managementsupportandstaffingoftheTSC,C.InstalldedicatedcommunicationsbetweentheTSCandthecontrolroom,nearsiteemergencyoperationscenter,andtheNRC,D.Providemonitoring(eitherportableorpermanent)forbothdirectradiationandairborneradioactivecontaminants.Themonitorsshouldprovidewarningiftheradiationlevelsinthesupportcenterarereachingpotentiallydangerouslevels.Thelicenseeshoulddesignateactionlevelstodefinewhenprotectivemeasuresshouldbetaken(suchasusingbreathingapparatusandpotassiumiodidetablets,orevacua-tiontothecontrolroom),E.AssimulateorensureaccesstoTechnicalData,includingthelicensee'sbestefforttohavedirectdisplayofplantparameters,necessaryforassessmentintheTSC,F.DevelopproceduresforperformingthisaccidentassessmentfunctionfromthecontrolroomshouldtheTSCbecomeuninhabitable,andSubmittotheNRCalongerrangeplanforupgradingtheTSCtomeetallrequirements.2.LocationItisrecommendedthattheTSCbelocatedinclosep'roximitytothecontrolroomtoeasecommunicationsandaccesstotechnicalinformationduringanemergency.Thecentershouldbelocatedonsite,i.e.,withintheplantsecurityboundary.ThegreaterthedistancefromtheCR,themoresophisticatedandcompleteshouldbethecommunicationsandavailabilityoftechnicalinformation.ConsiderationshouldbegiventoprovidingkeyTSCpersonnelwithameansforgainingaccesstothecontrolroom.

57Phsical'Size6StaffinTheTSCshouldbelargeenoughtohouse25persons,necessaryengineeringdataandinformationdisplays(TVmonitors,recorders,etc.).EachlicenseeshouldspecifystaffinglevelsanddisciplinesreportingtotheTSCforemergenciesofvaryingseverity.ActivationThecentershouldbeactivatedinaccordancewiththe"Alert"levelasdefinedintheNRCdocument"DraftEmergencyActionLevelGuidelines,NUREG-0610"datedSeptember,1979,andcurrentlyoutforpubliccomment.InstrumentationintheTSCshouldbecapableofprovidingdisplaysofvitalplantparametersfromthetimetheaccidentbegan(t=0definedaseitherreactororturbinetrip).TheShiftTechnicalAdvisorshouldbeconsultedonthe"NotificationofUnusualEvent"however,theactivationoftheTSCisdiscretionaryforthatclassofevent.InstrumentationTheinstrumentationtobelocatedintheTSCneednotmeetsafety-graderequirementsbutshouldbequalitativelycomparable(asregardsaccuracyandreliability)tothatinthecontrolroom.TheTSCshouldhavethecapabilitytoaccessanddisplayplantparametersindependentfromactionsinthecontrolroom.CarefulconsiderationshouldbegiventothedesignoftheinterfaceoftheTSCinstrumentationtoassurethatadditionoftheTSCwillnotresultinanydegradationofthecontrolroomorotherplantfunctions.InstrumentationPowerSulThepowersupplytotheTSCinstrumentationneednotmeetsafety-graderequirements,butshouldbereliableandofaqualitycompatiblewiththeTSCinstrumentationrequirements.ToinsurecontinuityofinformationattheTSC,thepowersupplyprovidedshouldbecontinuousoncetheTSCisactivated.Considerationshouldbegiventoavoidlossofstoreddata(e.g.,plantcomputer)duetomomentarylossofpowerorswitchingtransients.Ifthepowersupplyisprovidedfromaplantsafety-relatedpowersource,carefulattentionshouldbegiventoassurethatthecapa-bilityandreliabilityofthesafety-relatedpowersourceisnotdegradedasaresultofthismodification.TechnicalDataEachlicenseeshouldestablishthetechnicaldatarequirementsfortheTSC,keepinginmindtheaccidentassessmentfunctionthathasbeenestablishedforthosepersonsreportingtotheTSCduringanemergency.Asaminimum,data(historicalinadditiontocurrentstatus)shouldbeavailabletoper-mittheassessmentof:

58PlantSafetySystemsParametersfor:ReactorCoolantSystemSecondarySystem(PHRs)ECCSSystemsFeedwater&MakeupSystemsContainmentIn-PlantRadiologicalParametersfor:ReactorCoolantSystemrContainmentEffluentTreatmentReleasePathsOffsiteRadiologicalMeteorologyOffsiteRadiationLevelsDataTransmissionInadditiontoprovidingadatatransmissionlinkbetweentheTSCandthecontrolroom,eachlicenseeshouldreviewcurrenttechnologyasregardstransmissionofthoseparametersidentifiedforTSCdisplay.Althoughthereisnotarequirementatthepresenttime,eachlicenseeshouldinvestigatethecapabilitytotransmitplantdataoffsitetotheEmergencyOperationsCenter,theNRC,thereactorvendor,etc.StructuralInteritA.TheTSCneednotbedesignedtoseismicCategoryIrequirements.Thecentershouldbewellbuiltinaccordancewithsoundengineeringpracticewithdueconsiderationtotheeffectsofnaturalphenomenathatmayoccuratthesite.B.Sincethecenterneednotbedesignedtothesamestringentrequire-mentsastheControlRoom,eachlicenseeshouldprepareabackupplanforrespondingtoanemergencyfromthecontrolroom.

59ThelicenseeshouldprovideprotectionforthetechnicalsupportcenterpersonnelfromradiologicalhazardsincludingdirectradiationandairbornecontaminantsasperGeneralDesignCriterion19andSRP6.4.A.Licenseeshouldassurethatpersonnelinsidethetechnicalsupportcenter(TSC)willnotreceivedosesinexcessofthosespecifiedinGDC19andSRP6.4(i.e.,5Remwholebodyand30Remtothethyroidforthedurationoftheaccident).Hajorsourcesofradiationshouldbeconsidered./B.PermanentmonitoringsystemsshouldbeprovidedtocontinuouslyindicateradiationdoseratesandairborneradioactivityconcentrationsinsidetheTSC.Themonitoringsystemsshouldincludelocalalarmstowarnpersonnelofadverseconditions.Proceduresmustbeprovidedwhichwillspecifyappropriateprotectiveactionstobetakenintheeventthathighdoseratesorairborneradioactiveconcentrationsexist.C.Permanentventilationsystemswhichincludeparticulateandcharcoalfiltersshouldbeprovided.TheventilationsystemsneednotbequalifiedasESFsystems.ThedesignandtestingguidanceofRegulatoryGuide1.52shouldbefollowedexceptthatthesystemsdonothavetoberedundant,seismic,instrumentedinthecontrolroomorautomaticallyactivated.Inaddition,theHEPAfiltersneednotbetestedasspecifiedinRegulatoryGuide1.52andtheHEPA'sdonothavetomeettheQArequirementsofAppendixBto10CFR50.However,sparepartsshouldbereadilyavailableandproceduresinplaceforreplacingfailedcomponentsduringanaccident.Thesystemsshouldbedesignedtooperatefromtheemergencypowersupply.D.DosereductionmeasuressuchasbreathingapparatusandpotassiumiodidetabletscannotbeusedasadesignbasisfortheTSCinlieuofventilationsystemswithcharcoalfilters.However,potassiumiodideandbreathingapparatusshouldbeavailable.RG&EResonseThefollowingtaskswillbeaccomplishedbyJanuary1,1980.ThoseitemsdescribingdesignofthefacilityapplytotheinterimTSC.Ourintentistoprovidetheequipmentasdescribed,althoughchangesindesignmayberequiredasthedesignisfinalized.A.AninterimTSCwillbeestablishedandadescriptionprovided.B.C.PlansandproceduresforsupportandstaffingoftheTSCwillbecomplete.TheTSCwillbemannedbydesignated-personnel.CommunicationsbetweentheTSCandthecontrolroom,siteemergencyoperationscenterandtheNRCwillbeestablished.AtietotheTSCwiththeexistingdirectlinefromthecontrolroomtotheNRCwillbeinstalled.Ahardwired D.intercomsystemwithamasterunitintheTSCandslaveunitsinthecontrolroom,emergencycenter,alternateemergencycenterandtheoperationscenterwillbein-stalled.TheTSCwillalsohavephonecommunicationsandportableradios.AradiationmonitorwillbeprovidedintheTSC.Inadditionportableairbornemonitorsarealreadyavail-ableintheplant.Guidelineswillbeestablishedasanaidforqualifiedpersonneltodecidewhenprotectivemeasuresshouldbetaken.E.Tomeettheshort.termrequirementsplantdatawillbemadeavailableintheTSCbymeansofadatalinkterminal.Avideosystemcapableofscanningthecontrolboardisbeinginvestigated.F.ProcedurestousethecontrolroomasabackupTSCwillbedeveloped.G.PlansforourpermanentTSCwillbeprovided.Designdetailsgiveninitems2through10applytothepermanentTSC.Ourintent,istoprovideafacilitywiththefeaturesdescribedbelowalthoughchangesmaybemadeasthedesignprogresses.Asnotedin1.Gabove,adescriptionofourlongerrangeplanswillbesubmittedbyJanuary1,1980.2.TheTSCwillbeonsitewithameansforgainingaccesstothecontrolroom.ProceduresarebeingpreparedtodirectstafftotheTSCforemergenciesofvaryingseverity.Thedesignofthepermanent,TSCisnot,completebutit,willbecapableofhousingapproxi-mately25peopleandtheequipment.necessarytoassesstheemergencysituation.GuidelinesforactivationoftheTSCarebeingpreparedwhicharebaseduponspecificplantconditions.Theguidelinesarenotinconsistentwiththe"Alert"levelasdefinedinNUREG-0610.VitalplantparametersfortheperiodfromthebeginningoftheeventuntilactivationoftheTSCwillberecoverableintheTSC.5.6.InstrumentationtobelocatedintheTSCwillbeofgoodqualityandwillbecapableofdisplayinginformationindependentfromactionsinthecontrolroom.Thecontrolroomandotherplant.functionswillnotbedegradedbytheTSC.AnuninterruptablepowersupplywillbeprovidedforTSCinstru-mentationwhichisindependentfromexistingemergencypowersupplies.

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617.TechnicaldatareguirementsfortheTSCwillbeestablishedwhichpermitassessment.oftheplantsafety.systemsandin-plantandoffsiteradiologicalconditionslistedabove.8.Thetechnologybest,suitedtomeetthereguirementsfortheTSCwillbeimplemented,however,RGSEalwaystriestoremainflexibletomeeteverchangingrequirements.9.TheTSCwillbedesignedandbuiltinaccordancewithsoundengineeringpractice.10.A.Wewillprovideappropriateradiologicalprotectionforthetechnicalsupportcenterpersonnelsothat.doselimitations.sp'ecifiedinGDC19andSRP6.4willnot,beexceeded.WeexpecttofulfillthisobjectiveutilizingacombinationofaninstalledHVACsystem,radiationshieldingandadministrativedosecontrolmeasures.

je62Permanentmonitoringsystemsandprocedureswillbepro-videdtomeetthisrequirement.Aventilationsystemwhichmeetsthisrequirementwillbeinstalled.Breathingapparatusandpotassiumiodidewillbeavail-ablebutitwillnotbeusedasadesignbasisfortheTSC.

~4/~63Section2.2.2.c-ONSITEOPERATIONALSUPPORTCENTERPOSITIONAnareatobedesignatedastheonsiteoperationalsupportcentershallbeestablished.Itshallbeseparatefromthecontrolroomandshallbetheplacetowhichtheoperationssupportpersonnelwillreportinanemergencysituation.Communicationswiththecontrolroomshallbeprovided.Theemergencyplanshallberevisedtoreflecttheexistenceofthecenterandtoestablishthemethodsandlinesofcommunicationandmanagement.CLARIFICATIONNoclarificationprovided.Wewillcomplywiththestaffposition.SeeourresponseofOctober17,1979.

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