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Other: ML13135A229, ML13135A230, ML13135A231, ML13135A233, ML13135A234, ML13135A235, ML13135A236, ML13135A237, ML13135A238, ML13135A240, ML13135A241, ML13135A242, ML13135A243, ML13135A244, ML13135A245, ML13135A246, ML13135A247, ML13135A248, ML13135A249, ML13135A251, ML14134A517
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MONTHYEARML13135A2422012-08-10010 August 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Cover Through Page 176 Project stage: Other ML13135A2432012-08-10010 August 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix a - Resumes and Qualifications Project stage: Other ML13135A2442012-08-10010 August 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 1 of 379 Through Sheet 201 of 379 Project stage: Other ML13135A2452012-08-10010 August 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 202 of 379 Through Sheet 379 of 379 Project stage: Other ML13135A2462012-08-10010 August 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix C - Area Walk-by Checklists (Awcs) Through End Project stage: Other ML13135A2292012-09-28028 September 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendices C Through End Project stage: Other ML13135A2482012-09-28028 September 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix a - Resumes and Qualifications Project stage: Other ML13135A2492012-09-28028 September 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walk-Down Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 1 of 461 Through Sheet 203 of 461 Project stage: Other ML13135A2512012-09-28028 September 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walk-Down Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 204 of 461 Through Sheet 461 of 461 Project stage: Other ML13135A2472012-09-28028 September 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Cover Through Page 153 Project stage: Other ML13135A2302012-10-23023 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report Project stage: Other ML13135A2312012-10-23023 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix a - Resumes and Qualifications Project stage: Other ML13135A2332012-10-23023 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 1 of 439 Through Sheet 200 of 439 Project stage: Other ML13135A2342012-10-23023 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 201 of 439 Through Sheet 439 of 439 Project stage: Other ML13135A2352012-10-23023 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendices C Through E Project stage: Other ML13135A2382012-10-31031 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 1 of 513 Through Sheet 301 of 513 Project stage: Other ML13135A2362012-10-31031 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report Project stage: Other ML13135A2372012-10-31031 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix a - Resumes and Qualifications Project stage: Other ML13135A2402012-10-31031 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 302 of 513 Through Sheet 513 of 513 Project stage: Other ML13135A2412012-10-31031 October 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix C - Area Walk-by Checklists (Awcs) and Appendix D - Component List for Anchorage Configuration Check Project stage: Other L-13-118, Resubmittal of FENOC Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima.2013-04-29029 April 2013 Resubmittal of FENOC Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima. Project stage: Response to RAI ML13340A1472013-11-26026 November 2013 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant - Response to RAI Associated with Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (TAC Nos. MF0116 & MF0 Project stage: Response to RAI ML14134A5172014-05-30030 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident Project stage: Other 2012-09-28
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000346/20244032024-09-27027 September 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000346/2024403 L-24-025, Submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 352024-09-25025 September 2024 Submittal of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 35 05000346/LER-2021-001, Emergency Diesel Generator Speed Switch Failure Due to Direct Current System Ground2024-09-19019 September 2024 Emergency Diesel Generator Speed Switch Failure Due to Direct Current System Ground ML24134A1522024-09-17017 September 2024 Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) Final Safety Analysis Report Update Schedule (EPID L-2024-LLE-0005) - Letter ML24260A2382024-09-16016 September 2024 Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and Request for Information ML24255A8032024-09-11011 September 2024 Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report ML24255A8642024-09-0606 September 2024 Rscc Wire & Cable LLC Dba Marmon Industrial Energy & Infrastructure - Part 21 Retraction of Final Notification ML24249A1602024-09-0505 September 2024 Information Request to Support Upcoming Material Control and Accounting Inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station L-24-188, Submittal of Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 302024-08-27027 August 2024 Submittal of Quality Assurance Program Manual, Revision 30 ML24239A3972024-08-23023 August 2024 Rssc Wire & Cable LLC Dba Marmon - Part 21 Final Notification - 57243-EN 57243 IR 05000346/20240052024-08-22022 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Report 05000346/2024005) L-24-186, Response to RAI for Exemption Request from 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) Final Safety Analysis Update Schedule2024-08-15015 August 2024 Response to RAI for Exemption Request from 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) Final Safety Analysis Update Schedule IR 05000346/20240022024-08-0101 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2024002 IR 05000346/20244012024-07-30030 July 2024 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000346/2024401 ML24208A0962024-07-25025 July 2024 57243-EN 57243 - Rssc Wire & Cable LLC, Dba Marmon - Part 21 Notification L-24-032, Cycle 23 and Refueling Outage 23 Inservice Inspection Summary Report2024-07-15015 July 2024 Cycle 23 and Refueling Outage 23 Inservice Inspection Summary Report L-24-063, License Amendment Request to Remove the Table of Contents from the Technical Specifications2024-07-0808 July 2024 License Amendment Request to Remove the Table of Contents from the Technical Specifications L-24-024, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2024-06-19019 June 2024 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models L-23-214, Submittal of Relief Request for Impractical American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Examination Requirements2024-06-0505 June 2024 Submittal of Relief Request for Impractical American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Examination Requirements L-24-019, Unit No.1 - Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments2024-05-22022 May 2024 Unit No.1 - Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments ML24142A3532024-05-21021 May 2024 Station—Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection L-24-111, Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2024-05-15015 May 2024 Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations L-24-072, Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report - 20232024-05-15015 May 2024 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report - 2023 L-24-031, Unit No.1 - Steam Generator Tube Circumferential Crack Report - Spring 2024 Refueling Outage2024-05-14014 May 2024 Unit No.1 - Steam Generator Tube Circumferential Crack Report - Spring 2024 Refueling Outage IR 05000346/20240012024-05-0303 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2024001 L-24-069, Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 20232024-04-30030 April 2024 Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 2023 L-24-018, Submittal of Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 24, Revision 02024-04-16016 April 2024 Submittal of Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 24, Revision 0 ML24089A2582024-04-0101 April 2024 Request for Information for the NRC Quuadrennial Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection: Inspection Report 05000346/2024010 L-24-013, Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage2024-03-26026 March 2024 Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage ML24036A3472024-03-0707 March 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0076 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) ML24057A0752024-03-0101 March 2024 the Associated Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations IR 05000346/20230062024-02-28028 February 2024 Re-Issue Annual Assessment Letter for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Report 05000346/2023006) ML24057A3362024-02-28028 February 2024 Annual Assessment Letter for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Report 05000346/2023006) L-23-264, Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) Final Safety Analysis Report Update Schedule2024-02-23023 February 2024 Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) Final Safety Analysis Report Update Schedule CP-202300502, Notice of Planned Closing of Transaction and Provision of Documents to Satisfy Order Conditions2024-02-23023 February 2024 Notice of Planned Closing of Transaction and Provision of Documents to Satisfy Order Conditions L-24-050, Retrospective Premium Guarantee2024-02-22022 February 2024 Retrospective Premium Guarantee IR 05000346/20243012024-02-0202 February 2024 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000346/2024301 IR 05000346/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2023004 ML23313A1352024-01-17017 January 2024 Authorization and Safety Evaluation for Alternative Request RP 5 for the Fifth 10 Year Interval Inservice Testing Program ML23353A1192023-12-19019 December 2023 Operator Licensing Examination Approval Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, January 2024 L-23-260, Corrections to the 2022 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station2023-12-0707 December 2023 Corrections to the 2022 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML23338A3172023-12-0606 December 2023 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000346/2024001 L-23-243, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-12-0606 December 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation IR 05000346/20234032023-11-0202 November 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000346/2023403 ML23293A0612023-11-0101 November 2023 Letter to the Honorable Marcy Kaptur, from Chair Hanson Responds to Letter Regarding Follow Up on Concerns Raised by Union Representatives During the June Visit to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant ML24045A0322023-10-26026 October 2023 L-23-221 Proposed Exam Submittal Cover Letter L-23-215, Changes to Emergency Plan2023-10-19019 October 2023 Changes to Emergency Plan ML23237B4222023-09-28028 September 2023 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. - Vistra Operations Company LLC - Letter Regarding Order Approving Transfer of Licenses and Draft Conforming License Amendments ML23269A1242023-09-27027 September 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure IR 05000346/20234012023-09-13013 September 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000346/2023401 (Public) 2024-09-06
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARL-23-214, Submittal of Relief Request for Impractical American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Examination Requirements2024-06-0505 June 2024 Submittal of Relief Request for Impractical American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Examination Requirements L-23-188, Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-08-0707 August 2023 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments L-22-253, Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 52023-01-10010 January 2023 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 5 L-22-211, Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report2022-09-29029 September 2022 Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report L-22-216, Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 42022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 4 L-22-149, Post Accident Monitoring Report2022-06-23023 June 2022 Post Accident Monitoring Report ML22202A4362022-04-0808 April 2022 Enclosure F: Updated Inputs to 52 EFPY P-T Operating Curves ML22202A4372022-03-0202 March 2022 Enclosure G: Framatome Inc. Document 86-9344713-000, Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Fluence Reconciliation Through 60 Years IR 05000346/20210902021-12-16016 December 2021 Reissue Davis-Besse NRC Inspection Report (05000346/2021090) Preliminary White Finding ML21322A2892021-12-0909 December 2021 Approval of Plant-Specific Analysis of Certain Reactor Vessel Internal Components in Accordance with License Renewal Commitment No. 53 ML20302A3022020-09-25025 September 2020 1 to Technical Requirements Manual ML19255H0992019-10-10010 October 2019 Staff Assessment of Flooding Focused Evaluation L-19-189, 54010-CALC-01, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station: Evaluation of Risk Significance of Permanent ILRT Extension.2019-07-29029 July 2019 54010-CALC-01, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station: Evaluation of Risk Significance of Permanent ILRT Extension. ML22262A1522019-05-0101 May 2019 Framatome Inc., Document ANP-2718NP, Revision 007, Appendix G Pressure-Temperature Limits for 52 EFPY for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML22202A4332019-04-30030 April 2019 Enclosure C: Framatome ANP-2718NP, Rev. 7, Appendix G Pressure-Temperature Limits for 52 EFPY for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station L-18-108, Request to Extend Enforcement Discretion Provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15-002 for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Non-Conformance Identified in Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2015-06, Tornado Missile....2018-04-12012 April 2018 Request to Extend Enforcement Discretion Provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15-002 for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Non-Conformance Identified in Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2015-06, Tornado Missile.... ML18149A2812018-02-16016 February 2018 2017 ATI Environmental Inc. Midwest Laboratory Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program L-17-270, Notification of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Model Change Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.462017-09-0101 September 2017 Notification of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Model Change Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 ML17086A0322017-03-31031 March 2017 Enclosure B to L-17-105, Areva Report ANP-3542NP, Revision 1, Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) Regarding Reactor Vessel Internals Loss of Ductility at 60 Years L-17-088, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests and Experiments2017-03-27027 March 2017 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests and Experiments ML17026A0082016-12-31031 December 2016 Areva Report ANP-3542NP, Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) Regarding Reactor Vessel Internals Loss of Ductility for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 at 60 Years (Non Proprietary) L-16-229, Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 32016-07-28028 July 2016 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 3 L-16-148, Fatigue Monitoring Program Evaluation of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Components for Effects of the Reactor Coolant Environment on Fatigue Usage (I.E., Environmentally-Assisted Fatigue)2016-04-21021 April 2016 Fatigue Monitoring Program Evaluation of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Components for Effects of the Reactor Coolant Environment on Fatigue Usage (I.E., Environmentally-Assisted Fatigue) L-15-288, Response to NRC Letter. Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1. 2.3. and 9.3. of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2015-10-0202 October 2015 Response to NRC Letter. Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1. 2.3. and 9.3. of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML15230A2892015-08-25025 August 2015 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review L-14-401, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Reports Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Review of In2014-12-19019 December 2014 First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Reports Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation.1 of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Review of In ML14353A0602014-11-0303 November 2014 2734296-R-010, Rev. 0, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station L-14-289, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 22014-09-22022 September 2014 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 2 L-14-259, Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company'S (Fenoc'S) Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051)2014-08-28028 August 2014 Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company'S (Fenoc'S) Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) ML14141A5252014-06-30030 June 2014 Staff Assessment of the Flooding Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident L-14-167, Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments for the Period Ending May 26, 20142014-06-18018 June 2014 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments for the Period Ending May 26, 2014 ML14134A5172014-05-30030 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident L-14-148, CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2014-05-19019 May 2014 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models ML14112A3152014-04-21021 April 2014 Review of Draft Plant-Specific Supplement 52 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Regarding L-14-104, Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co. Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 (F) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2014-03-11011 March 2014 Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co. Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54 (F) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML14007A6702014-02-21021 February 2014 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies) ML14042A2942014-02-19019 February 2014 Mega-Tech Services, LLC, Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, TAC No.: MF0961 ML13340A1592013-11-26026 November 2013 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report Revision 1, Appendix a ML13340A1472013-11-26026 November 2013 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station & Perry Nuclear Power Plant - Response to RAI Associated with Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (TAC Nos. MF0116 & MF0 ML13340A1632013-10-0909 October 2013 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report Revision 1, Appendix C to Appendix G ML13340A1622013-10-0909 October 2013 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report Revision 1, Appendix B (2 of 2) ML13340A1602013-10-0909 October 2013 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report Revision 1, Appendix B (1 of 2) ML13340A1582013-10-0909 October 2013 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report Revision 1 L-13-154, CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2013-05-28028 May 2013 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models L-13-157, Generic Safety Issue 191 Resolution Plan2013-05-15015 May 2013 Generic Safety Issue 191 Resolution Plan ML13009A3752012-12-12012 December 2012 Enclosure B to L-12-444, Calculation No. 32-9195651-000, Equivalent Margins Assessment of Davis-Besse Transition Welds for 52 EFPY - Non-Proprietary. L-12-347, FENOC Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2012-11-27027 November 2012 FENOC Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML13135A2442012-08-10010 August 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix B - Seismic Walkdown Checklists (Swcs), Sheet 1 of 379 Through Sheet 201 of 379 ML13135A2432012-08-10010 August 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix a - Resumes and Qualifications ML13135A2422012-08-10010 August 2012 Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Cover Through Page 176 2024-06-05
[Table view] Category:Technical
MONTHYEARL-23-214, Submittal of Relief Request for Impractical American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Examination Requirements2024-06-0505 June 2024 Submittal of Relief Request for Impractical American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI Examination Requirements L-22-253, Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 52023-01-10010 January 2023 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 5 L-22-211, Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report2022-09-29029 September 2022 Technical Specification 5.6.6 Steam Generator Tube Inspection 180-Day Report L-22-216, Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 42022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 4 L-22-149, Post Accident Monitoring Report2022-06-23023 June 2022 Post Accident Monitoring Report ML22202A4362022-04-0808 April 2022 Enclosure F: Updated Inputs to 52 EFPY P-T Operating Curves ML22202A4372022-03-0202 March 2022 Enclosure G: Framatome Inc. Document 86-9344713-000, Davis-Besse Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Fluence Reconciliation Through 60 Years ML21322A2892021-12-0909 December 2021 Approval of Plant-Specific Analysis of Certain Reactor Vessel Internal Components in Accordance with License Renewal Commitment No. 53 ML20302A3022020-09-25025 September 2020 1 to Technical Requirements Manual ML19255H0992019-10-10010 October 2019 Staff Assessment of Flooding Focused Evaluation L-19-189, 54010-CALC-01, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station: Evaluation of Risk Significance of Permanent ILRT Extension.2019-07-29029 July 2019 54010-CALC-01, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station: Evaluation of Risk Significance of Permanent ILRT Extension. ML22262A1522019-05-0101 May 2019 Framatome Inc., Document ANP-2718NP, Revision 007, Appendix G Pressure-Temperature Limits for 52 EFPY for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML22202A4332019-04-30030 April 2019 Enclosure C: Framatome ANP-2718NP, Rev. 7, Appendix G Pressure-Temperature Limits for 52 EFPY for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML18149A2812018-02-16016 February 2018 2017 ATI Environmental Inc. Midwest Laboratory Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program L-17-270, Notification of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Model Change Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.462017-09-0101 September 2017 Notification of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Model Change Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.46 ML17086A0322017-03-31031 March 2017 Enclosure B to L-17-105, Areva Report ANP-3542NP, Revision 1, Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) Regarding Reactor Vessel Internals Loss of Ductility at 60 Years ML17026A0082016-12-31031 December 2016 Areva Report ANP-3542NP, Time-Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) Regarding Reactor Vessel Internals Loss of Ductility for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 at 60 Years (Non Proprietary) L-16-229, Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 32016-07-28028 July 2016 Submittal of Pressure and Temperature Limits Report, Revision 3 L-15-288, Response to NRC Letter. Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1. 2.3. and 9.3. of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2015-10-0202 October 2015 Response to NRC Letter. Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1. 2.3. and 9.3. of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident L-14-289, Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 22014-09-22022 September 2014 Pressure and Temperature Limits Report. Revision 2 ML14134A5172014-05-30030 May 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima DAI-ICHI Nuclear Power Plant Accident L-14-148, CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2014-05-19019 May 2014 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models ML14112A3152014-04-21021 April 2014 Review of Draft Plant-Specific Supplement 52 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Regarding ML14007A6702014-02-21021 February 2014 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies) ML14042A2942014-02-19019 February 2014 Mega-Tech Services, LLC, Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, TAC No.: MF0961 L-13-154, CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2013-05-28028 May 2013 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models ML13009A3752012-12-12012 December 2012 Enclosure B to L-12-444, Calculation No. 32-9195651-000, Equivalent Margins Assessment of Davis-Besse Transition Welds for 52 EFPY - Non-Proprietary. ML13008A0612012-08-10010 August 2012 Davis-Besse Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Report, Appendix C, Area Walk-By Checklists, Sheet 21 of 139 Through End L-15-328, Enclosure B, Bechtel Report No. 25593-000-G83-GEG-00016-000, Effect of Laminar Cracks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars Based on Testing Conducted at Purdue University and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shield Building. Part 7 of 72012-07-30030 July 2012 Enclosure B, Bechtel Report No. 25593-000-G83-GEG-00016-000, Effect of Laminar Cracks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars Based on Testing Conducted at Purdue University and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shield Building. Part 7 of 7 ML15299A1502012-07-30030 July 2012 Enclosure B, Bechtel Report No. 25593-000-G83-GEG-00016-000, Effect of Laminar Cracks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars Based on Testing Conducted at Purdue University and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shield Building. Part 6 of 7 ML15299A1492012-07-30030 July 2012 Enclosure B, Bechtel Report No. 25593-000-G83-GEG-00016-000, Effect of Laminar Cracks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars Based on Testing Conducted at Purdue University and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shield Building. Part 5 of 7 ML15299A1482012-07-30030 July 2012 Enclosure B, Bechtel Report No. 25593-000-G83-GEG-00016-000, Effect of Laminar Cracks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars Based on Testing Conducted at Purdue University and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shield Building. Part 4 of 7 ML15299A1472012-07-30030 July 2012 Enclosure B, Bechtel Report No. 25593-000-G83-GEG-00016-000, Effect of Laminar Cracks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars Based on Testing Conducted at Purdue University and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shield Building. Part 3 of 7 ML15299A1462012-07-30030 July 2012 Enclosure B, Bechtel Report No. 25593-000-G83-GEG-00016-000, Effect of Laminar Cracks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars Based on Testing Conducted at Purdue University and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shield Building. Part 2 of 7 ML15299A1442012-07-30030 July 2012 Enclosure B, Bechtel Report No. 25593-000-G83-GEG-00016-000, Effect of Laminar Cracks on Splice Capacity of No. 11 Bars Based on Testing Conducted at Purdue University and University of Kansas for Davis-Besse Shield Building. Part 1 of 7 ML12209A2602012-07-26026 July 2012 Attachment 31, Fauske & Associates, Inc. Technical Bulletin No. 1295-1, BWR MSIV Leakage Assessment: NUREG-1465 Vs. MAAP 4.0.2 ML1017400422010-06-0404 June 2010 0800368.407, Rev. 0, Summary of Design and Analysis of Weld Overlays for Reactor Coolant Pump Suction and Discharge, Cold Leg Drain, and Core Flood Nozzle Dissimilar Metal Welds for Alloy 600 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking Mitigati L-10-132, 0800368.408, Revision 0, Summary of Weld Overlay Ultrasonic Examinations for Reactor Coolant Pump Suction and Discharge Nozzle Welds, Core Flood Nozzle Welds, and Cold Leg Drain Nozzle Welds2010-04-25025 April 2010 0800368.408, Revision 0, Summary of Weld Overlay Ultrasonic Examinations for Reactor Coolant Pump Suction and Discharge Nozzle Welds, Core Flood Nozzle Welds, and Cold Leg Drain Nozzle Welds ML1002501322010-01-11011 January 2010 0800368.404, Revision 1, Leak-Before-Break Evaluation of Reactor Coolant Pump Suction and Discharge Nozzle Weld Overlays for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Enclosure B ML11301A2222008-12-0101 December 2008 Reference: Combined Heat and Power Effective Energy Solutions for a Sustainable Future ML0821900132008-08-0707 August 2008 Monthly Operating Reports Second Quarter 2008 L-08-105, Reactor Head Inspection Report2008-04-11011 April 2008 Reactor Head Inspection Report L-08-005, Submittal of the 2007 Organizational Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment Independent Assessment Report for Davis-Besse2008-01-27027 January 2008 Submittal of the 2007 Organizational Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment Independent Assessment Report for Davis-Besse ML0726105652007-09-17017 September 2007 Confirmatory Order, 2007 Independent Assessment of Corrective Action Program (FENOC) ML0708602822007-03-15015 March 2007 Review and Analysis of the Davis-Besse March 2002 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Wastage Event, Appendix B, Crack Driving Force and Growth Rate Estimates ML0708602812007-03-15015 March 2007 Review and Analysis of the Davis-Besse March 2002 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Wastage Event, Appendix a, Finite Element Stress Analysis of Davis-Besse CRDM Nozzle 3 Penetration ML0708602802007-03-15015 March 2007 Review and Analysis of the Davis-Besse March 2002 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Wastage Event, Section 10. the Unique Nature of the Davis-Besse Nozzle 3 Crack and the RPV Head Wastage Cavity ML0708602762007-03-15015 March 2007 Review and Analysis of the Davis-Besse March 2002 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Wastage Event, Section 9. Cfd Modeling of Fluid Flow in CRDM Nozzle and Weld Cracks and Through Annulus ML0708602712007-03-15015 March 2007 Review and Analysis of the Davis-Besse March 2002 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Wastage Event, Section 8. Stress Analysis and Crack Growth Rates for Davis-Besse CRDM Nozzles 2 and 3 ML0708602842007-03-15015 March 2007 Review and Analysis of the Davis-Besse March 2002 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Wastage Event, Appendix C, Cfd Analysis 2024-06-05
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON , D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. Raymond A. Lieb Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Mail Stop A-DB-3080 5501 North State , Route 2 Oak Harbor , OH 43449-9760 May 30, 2014
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION , UNIT 1 -STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0116)
Dear Mr. Lleb:
On March 12 , 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Paragraph 50.54(f) to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations , (50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11 , 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the methods and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures. By letter dated November 27 , 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12056A049), FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) submitted its Seismic Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter. By letter dated November 26 , 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13340A277), FENOC provided a response to the NRC request for additional information (RAI) dated November 1 , 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13304B418), needed for the staff to complete its assessments.
By this same letter , the licensee updated their seismic walkdown report to incorporate the response to the RAI and to address similar issues identified at Beaver Valley Power Station by a self-assessment and NRC site audit. The NRC staff acknowledges that a supplemental letter will be provided within 120 days following completion of the spring 2014 refueling outage addressing the remaining inaccessible items consistent with the regulatory commitment.
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and , as documented in the enclosed staff assessment , determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
R. Lieb If you have any questions , please feel free to contact me at 301-415-2315. Docket No. 50-346
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv Sincerely , IRA/ Eva Brown, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing 111-2 and Planning and Anaylsis Branch Divis i on of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT FIRST ENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY (FENOC) DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (DBNPS) DOCKET NO. 50-346
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Paragraph 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter) to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 3 , " Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12056A049) to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded , nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP), verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC. The 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to provide the following: a. Information concerning the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.
- b. Information related to the implementation of the w_alkdown process. c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them. d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming , or unanalyzed conditions. e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features.
- f. Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review. In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Required Response Item 2 , licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the seismic walkdown process. By letter dated May 29 , 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 121640872), the Nuclear Energy Institute submitted Electric Power Research Institute document 1025286 , "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Enclosure Recommendation 2.3: Seismic ," (walkdown guidance) to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement.
By letter dated May 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12145A529), the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance. By letter dated November 27 , 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13008A029), First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC , or the licensee) provided a response to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2 , for Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS). The NRC staff reviewed the walkdown report and determined that additional supplemental information would assist the staff in completing its review. In a letter dated November 1 , 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13304B418), the NRC staff requested additional information concerning the processes and procedures used by the licensee in conducting the walkdowns and walk-bys.
The licensee responded in a letter dated November 26 , 20 1 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13340A277). By th i s same letter , the licensee updated their seismic walkdown report to incorporate the responses to the staff's request and to address similar issues identified at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) by a self-assessment and NRC site audit. BVPS is part of FENOC's fleet and seism i c walkdowns were performed by the same group of contractor and plant personnel.
BVSP was audited by the NRC staff on July 2013. The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The structures , systems , and components (SSCs) important to safety in operat i ng nuclear power plants are designed e i ther in accordance with , or meet the intent of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 , General Design Criter i a (GDC) 2 , " Design Bases for Protect i on Against Natural Phenomena ," and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 , " Reactor S i te Criteria." GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes , tornadoes , hurricanes , floods , tsunami , and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. For initial licensing , each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2 , identify the specific funct i ons that an sse of a facility must perform , and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design. The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropr i ate cons i deration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and su r rounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy , quantity , and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.
The current licensing basis is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, including the l i censee's docketed commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis , including all modifications and add i tions to such commitments over the life of the facility operating license. 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION 3.1 Seismic Licensing Basis Information The licensee provided information on the plant-specific licensing basis for the Seismic Category I SSCs for DBNPS in Section 2 of the walkdown report. Consistent with the walkdown guidance , the staff noted that the report includes a summary of the safe-shutdown earthquake and a description of the codes , standards , and methods that were used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements. Based on the NRC staff's review , the staff concludes that the licensee has provided information on the plant-specific seismic licensing basis , and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing bases evaluation , are consistent with Section 8 , Submittal Report , of the walkdown guidance.
3.2 Seismic Walkdown Methodology Implementation Sections 2 and 5 of the walkdown guidance provided information to licensees regarding the implementation of an appropriate seismic walkdown methodology. By letter dated July 10 , 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12192A615), the licensee confirmed that it would utilize the walkdown guidance in the performance of seismic walkdowns at DBNPS. The walkdown report dated November 27 , 2012, and updated on November 26 , 2013 , did not identify deviations from the walkdown guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the following sections of the walkdown methodology implementation prov i ded in the walkdown report:
- Development of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWELs)
- Implementation of the Walkdown Process
- Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results 3.2.1 Personnel Qualifications Section 2 , " Personnel Qualifications
," of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with qualif i cation information for personnel involved in the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 2 and Appendix A of the walkdown report, which includes information on the walkdown personnel and their qualifications. Specifically , the staff reviewed the summary of the background , experience , and level of involvement for the following personnel involved in the seismic walkdown activities
- equipment selection personnel , seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs), licensing basis reviewers , IPEEE reviewers , peer review team , and operations staff. Based on the review of the licensee's submittals , the NRC staff concludes that those involved in the seismic walkdown activities have the appropriate seismic background, knowledge and experience, as specified in Section 2 of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.2 Development of the SWELs Section 3, " Selection of SSCs ," of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees for selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the SWELs , so that they can be walked down by qualified personnel.
The NRC staff reviewed the overall process used by the licensee to develop the DBNPS base list , SWEL 1 (sample list of designated safety functions equipment), and SWEL 2 (sample list of spent fuel pool related equipment). The overall equipment selection process followed the screening process shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the walkdown guidance.
Based on Tables 4-2 and 4-5 of the updated walkdown report, DBNPS SWELs 1 and 2 meet the inclusion requirements of the walkdown guidance.
Specifically , the following attributes were considered in the sample selection:
- A variety of systems, equipment and environments
- Major new or replacement equipment
- Risk considerations Due to individual plant configurations and the walkdown guidance screening process followed to select the final SWEL equipment , it is possible that some classes of equipment will not be represented on the SWEL. The walkdown guidance recognizes this is due to the equipment not being present in the plant (e.g., some plants generate direct current power using inverters and , therefore, do not have motor generators) or the equipment being screened out during the screening process (the screening process is described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance). Based on the information provided , the NRC staff noted that a detailed explanation was provided justifying cases where specific classes of equipment were not included as part of the SWEL and concludes that these exclusions are acceptable.
In Section 4.2 of the walkdown report , the licensee described the approach used to identify items that can lead to a rapid drain-down of the spent fuel pool (SFP). Based on the discussions provided in this section , the licensee determined that no rapid drain-down items were added to the SWEL 2. After reviewing this information , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee provided sufficient information to justify that there are no items that could lead to a rapid drain-down of the DBNPS SFP. After reviewing SWELs 1 and 2 , the NRC staff concludes that the sample of SSCs represents a diversity of component types and assures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions, thereby meeting the intent of the walkdown guidance.
In addition , the NRC staff notes that the equipment selection personnel were appropriately supported by plant operations staff as described in the walkdown guidance. 3.2.3 Implementation of the Walkdown Process Section 4, "Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys," of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for each site. The NRC staff reviewed Sections 5 and 6 of the walkdown report , which summarizes the results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys , including an overview of the number of items walked down and the number of areas walked-by. The walkdown report states that a two-person team of trained SWEs conducted the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys together during the period of July 11 to July 14 , 2012. The SWEs were assisted by plant operation personnel during the walkdown activities. The SWEs were also assisted by a senior structural engineer who served as a structural mentor and provided overall support to the walkdown team. The walkdown report also states that the SWEs discussed their observations and judgments with each other during the walkdowns. Addit i onally , the SWEs agreed on the results of their seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys before reporting the results of their review. Appendices B and C of the walkdown report provide the completed seismic walkdown checklists (SWCs) and area walk-by checklists (AWCs) documenting the results for each item of equipment on the SWEL (SWEL 1 and SWEL 2) and each area containing SWEL equipment.
The licensee used the checklists provided in Appendix C of the walkdown guidance report w i thout modification. The NRC staff reviewed these checklists and noted that SWCs and AWCs were all signed on July 25, 2012. The updated report provides additional details on the internal process followed by the SWEs which included team discussions and further evaluat i ons at the daily meeting immediately after the walkdown. Observations identified during the walkdowns were evaluated with respect to their seismic l i censing bas i s. If these observations could not be readily shown to meet its seismic licensing basis, the condition was immediately documented in a condition report (CR) to be further evaluated under the plant's CAP. The results of these assessments were then documented in their respective SWC or AWC. The SWCs and AWCs were not signed until all of the documentation , which included reviewer comments , was incorporated into the checklists.
For this reason , according to the licensee , the SWCs and AWCs were signed when the final report was prepared and not when the in-f i eld walkdowns were completed. The licensee documented cases of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs) in the checklists for further evaluation. Table 6-5 of the updated walkdown report lists each PASC identified during the initial area walk-bys. The licensee stated that no PASC was identified during the seismic walkdowns , and that findings identified during the seismic walkdowns were resolved and judged not to be present credible and/or significant concerns based on engineering judgment and precendent design documentation.
Field notes and finding resolution were presented in their respective SWCs included in Appendix B. Table 6-5 describes the PASCs and how the condition has been addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP). Based on the review of the initial checklists , the NRC staff was unable to confirm that all t he PASCs identified during the walkdowns and area walk-bys were included in this summary table. The staff requested the licensee to provide further explanation regarding how a field observation was determined to be a PASC , and to ensure that the basis for determination was addressed using normal plant processes and documented in the walkdown report. In a letter dated November 26 , 2013 , the licensee stated that the walkdown report has been updated to address the staff's concerns and included insights from observations and discussions from the BVPS seisimc walkdown audit. The licensee confirmed that any PASCs identified in the seismic walkdowns or area walk-bys was evaluated with respect to the seismic licensing basis at the end of each day. Some conditions were resolved by additional calculations or by plant documents that substantiated the as-built condition. Reference to these calculations and plant documentation was provided in the SWCs and AWCs. If the PASC could not be readily shown to meet the licensing basis, the condition was immediately documented in a CR to be further evaluated using the plant's CAP. Furthermore , the licensee stated that each CR entered into the CAP has either had corrective actions closed or has been closed to another action tracking process, such as a notification in the work order process. After evaluating the licensee's response , reviewing Table 6-5 and additional clarification provided in the updated report, the NRC staff concludes that the PASCs were properly identified and documented and summary Table 6-5 is considered complete.
In addition to the information provided above , the NRC staff notes that anchorage configurations were verified to be cons i stent with existing plant documentation for at least 50 percent of the SWEL items , in accordance with Section 4 of the walkdown guidance. The walkdown report does not clearly state whether the licensee opened cabinets as part of the walkdowns. The NRC staff reviewed the SWCs provided in the walkdown report and confirmed that accessible cabinets were opened to determine if any adverse conditions existed of internal equipment.
Table 6-3a of the updated report includes a list of inaccessible cabinets and panels that will have their walkdowns completed by opening the cabinet doors and inspecting the internals by the plant's next redueling outage. The equipment and areas that were inaccessible during the 180-day period are listed in Tables 6-3 and 6-3a of the updated walkdown report. The list of inaccessible items also includes the condition which caused the delay of the walkdown.
A limited number of SWEL components (total of 15) were inaccessible or were not walkdowned at the time of the initial walkdowns. The licensee stated that the internally mounted items on seven cabinets and panels will be inspected during the next refueling outage. However, the external anchorage conditions for these components were assessed during the initial walkdowns. The other eight SWEL components located in the containment building were inaccessible during the plant's normal operations. The walkdowns for all of these items were committed to be completed by the end of the next scheduled refueling outage (spring 2014). In the November 27, 2012, submittal , the licensee committed to provide a supplemental submittal with the results of these walkdown items within 120 days following the completion of the spring 2014 refueling outage. Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. 3.2.4 Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results Section 5, " Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations," of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of licensing basis evaluations for items identified during the seismic walkdowns as degraded , nonconforming , or unanalyzed that might have potential seismic significance. The NRC staff reviewed Section 7.0 of the walkdown report, which discusses the process for conducting the seismic licensing basis evaluations of the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. Based on the information provided in the walkdown report, any PASC identified in the seismic walkdowns or area walk-bys was evaluated with respect to the seismic licensing basis at the end of each day. Some conditions were resolved by additional calculations or by plant documents that substantiated the as-built condition.
Reference to these calculations and plant documentation was provided in the SWCs and AWCs. If the PASC could not be readily shown to meet the licensing basis , the condition was immediately documented in a CR to be further evaluated using the plant's CAP. Table 6-5 in the walkdown report list each PASC identified during the initial area walk-bys , respectively. This table describes how each condition has been addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP). The NRC staff reviewed the CAP entries and the description of the actions taken or planned to address deficiencies.
The staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified degraded, nonconforming , or unanalyzed conditions and entered them into the CAP, which meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.5 Conclusion Based on the discussion above , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance for personnel qualifications, development of SWELs , implementation of the walkdown process , and seismic licensing basis evaluations. 3.3 Peer Review Section 6, " Peer Review ," of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with information regarding the conduct of peer reviews for the activities performed during the seismic walkdowns.
Page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance identifies the following activities to be conducted during the peer review process:
- Review the selection of the SSCs included on the SWELs.
- Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.
- Review the licensing basis evaluations.
- Review the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP.
- Review the walkdown report.
- Summarize the results of the peer review process in the walkdown report. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 9 of the walkdown report , which describes the conduct of the peer review. In addition, the staff reviewed the response to RAI 2. In RAI 2, the staff requested the licensee to provide additional information on the overall peer review process that was followed as part of the walkdown activities. Specifically , the staff requested the licensee to confirm that the activities identified in page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were assessed and documented in the report. The licensee was also requested to confirm that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a peer reviewer for that same activity.
The licensee updated the walkdown report to address the staff's requests and included insights from observations and discussions of the BVPS seisimc walkdown audit. The licensee confirmed that all the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were included as part of the peer review process. In addition , the licensee provided additional information in the updated report to better document the level of involvement of the peer review team and its leader i n order to further demonstrate the independence of the peer review process. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's summary of each of these activities , which included the peer review team members' level of involvement , the peer review findings , and resolution of peer review comments. After rev i ewing the licensee's submittals , the staff concludes that the licensee sufficiently documented the results of the peer review activities and how these reviews affected the work described in the walkdown report. Based on the discussion above , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's results of the peer review and subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review meets the intent of Section 6 of the walkdown guidance. 3.4 IPEEE Information Section 7 , " IPEEE Vulnerabilities
," of the walkdown gu i dance provides i nformat i on to licensees regarding the reporting of the evaluations conducted and act i ons taken in response to seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program. Through the IPEEE program and Generic Letter 88-20 , licensees had previously performed a systematic examination to identify any plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents.
The NRC staff reviewed Section 8.0 of the walkdown report which makes reference to Table 4-3 and Appendix G of the updated report. Table 4-3 provides a list of equipment enhanced due to
- vulnerabilities identified during the A-46 (Seism i c Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants)/ IPEEE programs. Appendix G provides dates and modification numbers that document the closure of the vulnerabilities. Based on the NRC staff's review of Section 7 of the walkdown report, the staff concludes that the licensee's identification of plant-specific vulnerabilities (i ncluding anomalies , outliers , and other f i ndings) identified by the IPEEE program , as well as actions taken to eliminate or reduce them , meets the intent of Section 7 of the walkdown guidance. 3.5 Planned Upgrades The licensee did not identify any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features in the walkdown report. 3.6 NRC Oversight 3.6.1 Independent Verificat i on by Resident Inspectors On July 6 , 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12156A052), the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/188 " Inspect i on of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns." In accordance with the Tl , NRC inspectors independently verified that the DBNPS licensee implemented the seismic walkdowns in accordance w i th the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of seismic protection features. The inspection report dated January 25 , 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13025A 126), documents the results of this inspection and states that no findings were i dentified.
4.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS The equipment and areas that were inaccessible during the 180-day period are listed in Tables 6-3 and 6-3a of the updated walkdown report. The list of inaccessible items also includes the condition which caused the delay of the walkdown. As discussed above , a limited number of SWEL components (total of 15) were inaccessible at the time of the initial walkdowns. The walkdowns for all of the remaining inaccessible items were committed to be completed by the end of the next scheduled refueling outage (spring 2014). The licensee committed in the November 27 , 2012 , subm i ttal , to provide a supplemental submittal with the results of these walkdown items within 120 days following the completion of the spring 2014 refueling outage.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter. The staff concludes that , through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities and , in accordance with plant processes and procedures , the licensee verified the plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis; addressed degraded , nonconforming , or unanalyzed seismic conditions
- and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features. Furthermore , the staff no t es that no i mmediate safety concerns were identified. The staff acknowledges that a supplemental letter will be provided within 120 days following completion of the spring 2014 refueling outage addressing the remaining inaccessible items consistent with the regulatory commitment.
R. Lieb If you have any questions , please feel free to contact me at 301-415-2315. Docket No. 50-346
Enclosure:
Sincerely , IRA/ Eva Brown, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing 111-2 and Planning and Anaylsis Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION
- PUBLIC LPL3-2 R/F RidsNroDsea RidsNrrDorl Resource LRegner , NRR DJackson , NRO MJardaneh, NRO RidsOgcMaiiCenter Resource RidsOpaMail Resource RidsNrrLASRohrer Resource RidsNrrDavisBesse Resource NChokshi , NRO RKaras, NRO ADAMS Accession Number: ML 14134A517 OFFICE LPLIII-2/PM LPLIII-2/LA NAME EBrown SRohrer DATE 05/20/14 05/21/14 OFFICE LPLIII-2/BC NAME TTate DATE 05/30/14 RidsRgn2MaiiCenter Resource BRini, EDO Rl , Rll , Rill, RIV RidsAcrsAcnw MaiiCTR Resource RidsNrrDorllpl3-2 Resource SFianders, NRO FVega, NRO
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NDiFrancesco DJackson 05/22/14 2/4/2014 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY