IR 05000322/1985018

Insp Rept 50-322/85-18 on 850301-31.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Procedures for Racking Out 4 Kv Bus 11 Circuit Breakers,Crd Orifice Cleaning Efforts & Tdi Diesel Starting Air Check Valves

ML20205A452
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	04/04/1985
From:	Eselgroth P, Strosnider J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205A421	List: IR 05000322/1985018 ML20205A418
References
50-322-85-18, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8504250520
Download: ML20205A452 (10)

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REPORT N '5-18

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' DOCKET N '50-322' -

LICENSE N NPF-19 LICENSEE: Long Island Lightin' Company g P. O. Box 618 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Wading River, New York 11792 INSPECTION AT: Shoreham, New York INSPECTION C0f, DUCTED: March 1 f March 31, 1985'

INSPECTOR: M 9/3/8F P. W/ Esegoth, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed APPROVED- [ Y[@ [

J.'R. Strosni'd,er, Chi [ef, Reactor Projects Date Signed r Section 1B, Division 5f Reactor Projects SUMMARY: The resident inspector reviewed procedures for racking out one of the 4KV bus 11 circuit breakers, CRD orifice cleaning efforts, inspection of TDI diesel starting air check valves, Colt diesel generator end coil guard welds, Colt testing status and a site evacuation. This report also includes follow-up reviews of previous unresolved inspection items covering the areas of plant management / shift communications, fire brigade records, Quality Assurance deficiency follow-up and radwaste building flexible joint failures. This report also reviews the licensee's response to a bulletin on reactor cavity seal The inspector closed four previous inspection items and one bulletin and opened one new item. No violations were identifie This report involved 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> of insoection by the resident inspecto PDR ADOCK 05000322 .

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted R. Kubinak, Director, OA, Safety & Compliance (L)

A. Muller, QC Division itinager (L)

J. Scalice, Operations Division Manager (L)

W.Steiger,PlantManager-(L)

D. Terry, Maintenance Division Manager (L)

L - Long Island Lighting Company The inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspectio .0' Status of Previous Inspection Items (closed) Violation 84-50-02: Plant Management / Shift Personnel Communication This item pertained to written directives from a member of plant management to shift operations personnel that met the station definition of standing orders,

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Specifically, Station Procedure N0. 21.008.01, Operations Standing Orders, requires that written directives to operations personnel of continuing applic-ability be approved by the Chief Operating Engineer, or in his absence the Chief Technical Engineer. On January 10,-1985 the resident inspector found typewritten directives,sapproved only by the Operating Engineer, in a binder in the control' room entitled "0perationsf Administrative Directives" covering the following ' types _ of activities:

. Mai ntai ni ng Sys t' ems ' Ope ra bi l i ty l Status

. Annunciator Status and'Res'ponse- .

. 0peration'of Radwaste Systems 'i

. > Surveillance' Test Pro' gram , ,

Failure of. the licensee to comply with the approval requirements of SP21.008.01 constituted a violation of 10 CFR 50- Appendix B, Criterion V and Shoreham FSAR Section '17.2.5. requirement In a formal reply to this violation, the licensee stated that the following

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corrective action steps were taken: When the discrepancy was brought to the attention of LILC0 management on January 11, the OADS were imediately withdrawn from the Control Room. To prevent recurrence, the licensee stated that the Operations Administrative Directives will no longer be used to transmit any material to the Operations Staff. The licensee further stated that the mechanism for relaying the types-of information that was in the OADS will be eith'er the Night Orders or the Administrative Procedures both of which receive appropriate levels of review and approva The resident inspector had no further questions. This item is considered close ,

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2.2 - (closed) Bulletin No. 84-03: Refueling Cavity Water Sea This bulletin described an event at another Nuclear Power Plant in which the pneumatic reactor cavity water seal failed, during preparations fo refueling, causing the water level in the flooded refueling cavity to drop'

to the level of the reactor vessel flange in approximately twenty minute The subject bulletin requested each licensee to review the adequacy of plant reactor cavity water seals and the consequences of seal failur The licensee reviewed the type of cavity seal and physical arrangements in the reactor cavity / spent fuel storage pool area and provided the following assessments: . Shoreham utilizes a metal bellows-type seal on both its inner and outer seal assemblies. The bellows, unlike pneumatic seals, do not require air pressure; rather they are constructed of 304SS and are welded in plac The refueling seal assembly consists of a bellows element, backing plate, secondary seal, and an outer circumference of the bellows element for mechanical protection. The secondary seal is a self-energizing spring seal located in the area between the bellows and the backing plate. This spring seal is designed to make a tight fit to the backing plate to limit water loss through the refueling seal assembly when subjected to the design hydrostatic oressure in the event of a bellows rupture. A guard ring is attached to the seal assembly within the inner circumference of the bellows element and serves as a pro-tective barrier against small dropped objects, such as hand tools. The guard ring is removable from above to permit access to and visual insoection of, the bellows element. The licensee has assessed that in the event of a seal failure during a refueling operation, there would be sufficient time to complete a fuel bundle transfer without uncovering the fuel. In addition, since the bottom of the fuel transfer gate is above the top of the spent fuel storage racks, spent fuel would not become uncovered. The licensee estimates that approximately fifteen minutes is necessary to reclose the fuel pool transfer

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The licensee concluded that no further action,'beyond this review for Shoreham, is necessary relative to a catastrophic. reactor cavity seal failure used on the fact that Shoreham's refueling cavity water seal design' consists of a welded (in place) metal bellows-type seal which is'not susceptible to this type of failure. Also, it is provided with a backup spring seal to limit leakage in the unlikely event of a rupture of the main seal, and since spent fuel would not become uncovered, Shoreham would not be . subject to the type of, failure nor the potential consequences described 'in the bulleti The inspector had no further questions. '.This iten is considered close' ,.

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- 2.3 f(closed) Unresolved Item (84-38-01): Fire Brigade Member Annual Physical-

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Examination '

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During a previous inspection of the fire protection program, a region-based-

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' inspector reviewed -licensee compliance with St'ation Procedure Number 39.500.03 ~

Lwhich requires that members of the Fire Brigade receive ~a physical examination

. _-annually, to determine their fitness and ability to perfonn the physically strenuous. work' associated with fire fighting activities. The inspector foun . that the members of the fire brigade had not as yet received this physical

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examination.s. The licensee explained that this was because this fire brigade

, was established:in November.1983, in order to succeed the construction fire

' brigade, who until that time had the responsibility for, fire fighting. The

. li' censee comnitted,during the previous inspection,to medically certify all members of the fire brigade within 45 day During this inspection period, the resident. inspector reviewed.this area, and ,

found:that currently qualified Fire. Brigade members have received their,. annual ,

physicals and that the licensee has aTtracking system to aid in keeping the

. physical exams current with the annual-requirement. M .5 c ,t

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2.4 :(closed) Unresolved Item (84-38-02): Fire"Briqade Member Training Record DuHng a' previous inspection of the. fire protection"progfam, a reg on-based inspector reviewed the training records of fire briga.de members for calendar

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years 1983 and 1984 to ascertain that they.hadtsuccessfully' completed the required quarterly training / meeting, quarte'r ly' drill,fand yearly , hands-on fire extinguisher practice. The inspector.found the records to be, acceptabl However, the inspector. noted that the licensee didLnot.have a monitoring program that would assure that all members of the; fire brigade receive the'rdquired

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-training or. participate in drills at the' required frequencie :

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The licensee was cognizant of this deficiency and stated that they were ,

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establishing a procedure (a computer run) that would monitor these training activities. . The licensee committed to have this procedure established within -

30 days. 1 ing this. inspection period the resident inspector reviewed this

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training sta 3 report printout and verified it to be a' functional means of

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monitoring the fire brigade training progra The' resident inspector had no further questions; this item is considered close ~

2.5 - (open) Violation 84-50-03:. Quality Assurance Deficiency System Management

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L During a previous inspection period the resident inspector reviewed the

Quality Assurance deficiency reporting / tracking system and found that the l licensee's program for ensuring that LILCO Deficiency Report (LDR) findings ,

p 'have corrective actions identified in a timely manner was lacking. Specifically, the inspector found twenty-three LDR's greater than ninety days old for which no '

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licensee corrective action had been established. This situation resulted in

. issuance of a Severity Level V violation (supplement I) to the licensee against 10CFR50, Appendix B requirement During this inspection period the resident inspector reviewed corrective actions submitted by the licensee to the NRC for this violation. The inspector also

~ reviewed the licensee approved dispositions which had been established subsequent to the violation for some of the LDR's and found the dispositions acceptable without-further questioning on LDR's 1538, 1736, 1759, 1840, 1844, 1982, 2092, 2155, 2215 2324, 2368, 2379, 2403, 2457, 2466 and 2488. The inspector will re-view the renainino LDR dispositions, when they are ready, during a subsequent inspectio The violation corrective actions, submitted _in a timely manner by the licensee, stated that if an LDR has " remained unanswered" after ninety days, the QA Manager will transmit a request to the responsible action party requesting evaluation of LDR significance and information concerning an estimated completion date. The licensec response further states, with' regard 'to the NRC request for a date when full compliance will be achieved, that theLabove described.ninety (90) day notification to responsible parties by the~ QA Minager willlbe,in.effect April

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1, 1985. This. response appears >to incorporate some follow-up shortcominas similar to those which may have contributed.to the condition of non-compliance found by the resident inspector. lSpecifically, the licensee response short-comings are as follows:

1. The corrective action stateNent' focuses on! unanswered" LDR's whereas many of the delinquent LOR's had been answered,.but lacked QA Department approval of the proposed corrective actio At some point, if acceptable " corrective actions have not been t provided by the responsible organization to the QA Department, some means should exist for imposing a corrective action that is L acceptable to the QA Departmen . The licensee response to the citation stated that "The LILC0 Deficiency Report (LDR) was the method adopted by Quality Assurance in 1976 to implement the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criteria 15. The program that LILC0 uses to document and track significant deficiencies or trends adverse to quality will continue to be the Corrective Action Request." Considering the lesser significance of the deficiencies tracked by the LDR versus the CAR system, the deficiencies should be more readily solvable and the corrective actions should therefore be identified and approved for implemen-tation by the QA Department with less time and effort. However, the licensee response indicates that at the ninety day point, absent a OA Department approved corrective action for the steps to be taken to clear the deficiency, the QA Manager will then request more information of the responsible party. This course of action, at this point in time, is a weak approach to resolving the matter of unapproved corrective actions for minor items which have existed for an already prolonged period of time.

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, The licensee gave April 1,1985 as the date when full compliance will' be achi aved. . This date corresponds to when the plan to have

'the QA Manager transmit requests to responsible action parties

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(of LDR's older than ninety days) requesting evaluations of LDR significance a'nd information concerning an estimated completion date will become effective. The discrepant condition cited in the violation was programmatic as well as specific to certain LDR's'

greater than ninety days old, as of January 3,1985, having no QA Department approved corrective action. The licensee reply was not responsive to the NRC request for a date when these LDR's would all have QA approved corrective actions identifie Prompt attention by management to the resolution of these QA program discrepancies

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. is necessary in order to restore full program effectiveness and credibilit .This item remains open pending resolution of these NRC concern .6-(open)UnresolvedItem(84-18-01): Radwaste Building Floodin A previous inspection report documents the status of resolution on this item

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as pending completion ~ of a sample survey of piping system flexible joints

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for proper installatio On May 9, 1984 7,000 gallons of uncontaminated water were spilled from the regenerative evaporator portion of the liquid radwaste system when a flexible

= rubber piping joint ruptured in the 12 inch discharge side of the regenerative evaporator pump. The rupture hole size was estimated to be 3/4 inch in diamete An inspection by the licensee of the ruptured flexible rubber joint, in the regenerative evaporator portion of the liquid radwaste system, revealed that the joint had been improperly installed. Specifically, the joint (1G11-EXJ-046),

as documented in Engineering and Design Coordination Report L-586 (dated

June 5,1984) was over-stretched by approximately 0.70 inches, and the' control rods for this joint were installed improperly with nuts on .the inside face of the Joint flange faces. This installation was contrary to the requirements of E&DCR F25796A issued September 24, 198 During'this inspection period, the resident inspector conducted a follow-up inspection on this item and was informed by the licensee that the sample survey of other' piping system flexible joints had identified additional-installation problems as .follows

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TurbineBuildingClosedWaterExp. Joint (1R41-EXJ-012A)(LDR#85-049)

During the expansion joint reviews for correct installation, it was

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determined that the flange to flange dimension was 111/2 inches while the spec. requirement is 11 inches plus 7/16 inches allowable elongation. Also, the rubber exo. joint control rods are improcerly adjuste ,. ,

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. Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water Exp. Joint (1P41-EXJ-011A&B)

(LDR#85-050)

During the expansion joint review for correct installation, it was determined that the flange to flange dimension for "B" joint

'during operation of the equipment was too large, i.e.12 3/16 inches vs a nominal of 11 inches. In both cases the joints were elongated beyond the vendors allowable of 7/16 of an inch. The control rods were in both cases incorrectly adjuste . Turbine Building Service Water Exp. Joint (IP41-EXJ-049A) (LDR#85-051)

During the expansion joint review for correct installation, it was determined that the flange bolts were 1 inch rather than 11/8 inch which is required for an 18 inch 125 pound flang . Circulating Water Exp. Joint (IN74-EXJ-001C) (LDR#85-052)

During the expansion joint review for proper installation, it was determined that the joint had missing control rods, which are required per Spec. SH1-2 The licensee has indicated that these findings will result in an increased number of piping system' flexible joint installations being inspected. The resident inspector will make a follow-up review of this area during a subsequent inspection perio This item remains' unresolve .0 Lead Acid Battery Installation Review _

The resident inspector reviewed the installation of safety related batteries and their battery racks at the plant, along with the licensee's maintenance engineer. This inspection was prompted.by an NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, memorandum which, informed the regional office that analysis by GNB Batteries, .Inc. (formerly Gould, Inc.) indicates that battery racks and tetteries at some nuclear power plants may be installed with an improper end gap between the stringers and cells. This memorandum stated that this end gap should be between 1/8 and 1/4 inch and that improper end gap installations are not consistent with seismic qualification testin The resident inspector and maintenance engineer inspected the A, B and C battery rooms and found that at several locations on the bank Cl in ttery installation the stringer to cell end gap measurement exceeded 1/4 inc The licensee initiated Maintenance Work Request (MWR) No. 85-1833 to correct this conditio This is unresolved item 85-18-01 until the above identified discrepant condition at the bank C1 battery installation is correcte _

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4.0 4160 Volt Normal Bus Breaker 460 Rackdown Board Notification 85-009 submitted the NRC staff conclusion that if 4160 volt normal bus breaker 460 is placed in a racked down position that the SSER No. 6 conclusions relative to meeting the single failure criteria during low power testing (phases III and IV) remain vali The resident inspector reviewed the station procedures for establishing this condition for breaker 460. The licensee has prepared a temporary procedure change notice for Station Procedure No. 23.308.01(4160 volt Normal Bus Distribution) that would be implemented by the licensee upon receipt of a low power testing-license for phases III and IV. This temporary procedure change notice calls for the racking down of 4160 volt normal bus breaker 11-1 (FSAR breaker 460) and verification of same. This procedure change would also modify the SP No. 23.308.01 steps pertaining to the alignment and status of alternate power supply feeder breakers to reflect the racked down position of breaker 460.

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The inspector had no further question .0 Control Rod Drive Cooling Orifice Clogging During this inspection period the licensee commenced a control rod drive (CRD)

cleaning program as a result of indications of clogging in the CRD cooling water flow path of 60 CRD's. When a control rod is fully inserted, attempts to insert the rod further typically results in a CRD " stall" flow in the control rooni of 1.3-1.5 gpm associated with flow through unohtructed CRD cooling water passages. Although CRD operability has not been affected, the " stall" flow on 60 of the CRD's has dropped to the 0-0.8 gpm range. Attempts to free up the cooling water flow path by flushingwere not successful and the licensee concluded, following consultation with General Electric, that inspection of the CRD cooling water orifice in each of the CRD's was necessar Inspection of the orifice in CRD (22-31) found a[ sliver of plastic like material measuring about 1/4 inch long by 1/16 inch at maximum diameter. This splinter was later determined,by laboratyry analysis, to be. teflon. Ei.ght of the next nine CRD orifices were found, by the licensee, to have similar appearing slivers of material lodged in the orifice which has a 1/32 inch hole. The licensee suspected the slivers probably came from scram inlet valve teflon seats which the licensee assumed had previously been changed out and replaced by a stronger seating material called tefzell. However, inspection of one of'the scram inlet valves by the licensee, determined that the seat material:is teflon. The

< resident inspector observed the teflon seat to' be shredded at the inside diameter, which appears to be the source of the orifice clogging splinter Flow tests conducted following removal of the splinters from the orifices has shown a return to normal " stall" flow >

Completion of the CRD inspection program and resolution of the proper seating material for the scram inlet valves is unresolved item 85-18-0 .

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6.0 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Start Check Valves By copy of a letter to the NRC from Trans America DeLaval, Inc. (TDI), the licensee was formally notified of an air start check valve problem that occurred at Grand Gul At Grand Gulf on March 11, during operational testing on Engine 74033, flames were noticed coming out of a flexible coupling on the Air Start Header Assembl The Engine was shutdown and number 6 right bank Air Start Valve was remove A 3/8 diameter, 7/8 long non-magnetic piece was observed lying on top of the Pis to This resulted in further examination, and it is felt that this piece broke off of a Starting Air Check Valve Disk. This Disc has a top and a bottom guide. It was found upon examination of the valves that this piece broka off of the bottom guide of one of these valves. The TDI EDG's at Shoreham utilize the same type of air start check valves which are manufactured by Williams Gauge Co., of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvani During this report period the licensee commenced an inspection of the air start check valves on all three TDI engines. Each engine utilizes two of these valves and the inspection of the EDG-102 check valves revealed apparently rejectable NDE-PT indications on one of the two valve disks. These findings were documented on LDR 85-05 The resident inspector will continue to follow this licensee inspection effort and provide a follow-up status report in next month's inspection repor .0 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Coil Guard Welds During preparations for run-in testing of the Colt EDG's the licensee observed that four of the generator end coil guard stitch welds are broken on the EDG-902 generator. Inspection of the coil guard stitch welds on EDG's-901 and 903 revealed similar broken welds. These discrepancies have all been documented on LDR 85-03 The licensee has received approval from the generator manufacturer (Louis Allis Divisionof Magnetek, Inc.) of a repair weld procedure for these coil guard stitch welds and is proceeding to make the necessary repairs on sit The resident inspector had no further question .0 Colt Diesel Generator Testing During this inspection period the licensee commenced prerequisite checks for the EDG-903 engine run-in test on March 4,1985, started the test on March 7 and successfully completed it on March 9,1985. The run-in test performed was the same as that described in last month's report for EDG-901. The licensee estimates that EDG-902 run-in test prerequisite checks will commence on April 2 and that the testing will be~ completed by April 11, 1985.

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9.'0. Site # Evacuation Exercise

' At_11:45 March 20, 1985, the licensee initiated a practice evacuation of the Restricted Area by sounding the " warble" tone on the public address-

-system. Personnel.were-informed via the public address system that this was'

a drill and that all personnel, except fire brigade, fire watch and emergenc response personnel were to evacuate the protected area. The resident inspector observed the evacuation and found it to be conducted smoothly. The evacuation of personnel was complete by 12:05 ~10.0 ' Site Tours

, I The resident inspector conducted periodic tours of accessible areas in the plant, in the new Colt Diesel Generator Building and around the site in genera '

During these tours the following specific items were evaluated:

> - Fire Equipment.'- Operability and evidence of periodic inspection-

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of fire suppression equipment;

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-- Housekeeping - Maintenance of required cleanliness levels

- Equipment Preservation - Maintenance of special precautionary measures-

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for installed equipment, as applicable; *

- QA/QC Surve111anse - Pertinent ' activities were being surveilled on a-

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- Security - Adequate security coverage 'for areas: toured;g ,

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- Component Tagging ~ ' Implementation of ' appropriate equipment tagging for safety, equipment protection, and jurisdiction. ,

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All-items observed during general- sit'e/ plant tour,s were fouhd't'o be. satisfactor >

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.11.0 ' Unresolved Items- +-

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4  ; Areas for which more informatio issequiredtoldetierminea'cceptsbilityare considered unresolve Unresolved items ~are contained in paragra'phs 2.5, 2.6, K 3.0 and +

12.0 . Management Meetings _

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At periodic' intervals during the course ~of this inspection, meetings were held

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with licensee management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspectio Based on the _NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee

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representatives on April 3,1985, it was determined that'this report does 'not-contain information subject to 10 CFR 2.790 restriction '

The resident inspector also attended the entrance and exit meetings for inspections conducted by region-based inspectors during the oeriod,