IR 05000461/1988008

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Insp Rept 50-461/88-08 on 880424-28.No Violations, Deficiencies or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Response Facility Appraisal,Reviews of Radioactive Release Assessment & Meteorological Info
ML20195G745
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/17/1988
From: Foster J, Snell W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195G743 List:
References
50-461-88-08, 50-461-88-8, NUDOCS 8806280123
Download: ML20195G745 (18)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-461/88008(ORSS)

Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-55 Licensee: Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525 Facility Name: Clinton Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection hi..- Clinton Site, Clinton, Illinois Inspection Conducted: April 25-28, 1988 Inspector: ko { 5 dszt$-i 1 Foster / /

[//9/g eam Leader Dy(e /

Accompanying Personnel: D. Adams G. Bethke G. Martin

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y ell, CliieT Wilpiam&' . cjf Approved By: 6N?/2k Emergency Preparedness Date Section Inspection Summary Inspection on April 24-28, 1988 (Report No. 50-461/88008(ORSS)) ,

Areas Inspected: Special, announced inspection of the following areas of ,

the Clinton Power Station emergency preparedness program: Emergency Response Facility Appraisal; reviews of radioactive release assessment and meteorological information; and reviews of the design and operation of the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations. Facility. The inspection involved one NRC inspector and three contractor personne Results: The Emergency Response Facilities of the licensee were found to be adequate (IP 82412). No violations, deficiencies, or deviations were identifie '

8806280123 880621 PDR ADOCK 05000461 O DCD &

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Details Persons Contacted Assessment of Radioactive Releases Source Term 2. 2 Dose Assessment Meteorological Information Technical Support Center Location and Habitability Functional Capabilities 4. Power Supplies 4. Data Analysis Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable Availability 4. Computer Data 4. Manual Data -

4. Data Adequacy 1 Data Collection, Storage, Analysis and Display 4. Methods of Data Collection

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4. Data Displays 4.4. Time Resolution 4.4. Signal Isolation 4.4. Data Communications 4.4. Processing Capabilities 4.4. Data Storage Capacities 4.4. Model and System Reliability and Validity 4.4. Reliability of Computer Systems 4.4. Manual Systems 4.4. Environmental Control Systems Emergency Operations Facility Location and Habitability _

Functional Capabil.ities . . _ _ _

5. Data Analysis Adequacy i 5. Backup EOF l 5. Reliability l Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable Availability i Data Collection, Storage, Analysis and Display  ;

i Exit Interview

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DETAILS 1. 0 Persons Contacted Illinois Power Company

  • J. Perry, Manager - Nuclear Program Coordination
  • R. Gardner, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
  • D. Waddel, Project Manager, Simulator Support
  • J. Brownell, Project Specialist, Licensing
  • R. Campbell, Manager - Quality Assurance
  • J. Weaver, Director - Licensing
  • W. Connel, Manager - Nuclear Planning & Support
  • R. Freeman, Manager - Nuclear Station Engineering

, *F. Spangenberg, Manager - Licensing and Safety

  • J. Cook, Manager, NPS
  • S. Hall, Director, Ema gency Planning
  • D. Hall, Vice President
  • J. Miller, Manager, Schedule & Outage Management
  • J. Greenwood, Manager, Power Supply (Soyland/WIPCO)
  • J. Wilson, Diant Manager
  • R. Wyatt, Manager, Nuclear Training
  • F. Thomas, Computer Engineer
  • R. Snelson, Software Manager W. Yaroz, Emergency Planner F. Wolking, Superintendent Plant Radiological Protection W. Evans, Emergency Planner N. Huber, Radiological Engineer D. Hillger, Assistant Power Plant Manager - Radiation Protection M. Dodds, Radiation Protection Specialist C. Anderman, Computer Specialist M. Lazarowitz, Supervising Engineer NSED Electrical Design M. Gandhi, Project Engineer NSE0 HVAC P. Thompson, Supervising Engineer NSED Electrical Design T. Stephenson, Staff Engineer I&C C. Anderman, Computer Systems Engineer A. Raiha, Administrator Facilities G. Connolly, GTE Telephone Service Technician R. Baldwin, Supervisor of Facilities S. Krucias, EOF Maintenance Technician J. Uffert, Site Maintenance Technician - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  • Denotes those personnel listed above who attended the exit interview on April 28, 198 .0 Assessment of Radioactive Releases 2.1 Source Term Procedure RA-15, "Predictive Release Rates", provides a means for

, estimating release rates and source term for leakage through the containment structure. The procedure uses data from the

containment high range radiation monitors or the drywell high range radiation monitors. These monitors are described in the Clinton FSAR Section 7.6.1.10.1 Three additional methods for obtaining source term information are the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS), environmental sampling results and core damage estimation. The PASS is designed to sample reactor coolant, suppression pool water, drywell and containment atmospheres, and ef fluent from the reactor water clean-up syste A description and evaluation of the PASS was found in "Illinois Power Company, Clinton Power Station - Unit #1, Post Accident Sampling System Evaluation Report", March 1985. Source term and

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dose rate can be determined from environmental-samples using procedure RA-14, "Dose Rate Determination Based on Environmental Air Samples". Procedure EC-13, "Reactor Core Damage Estimation" provides the ability to estimate percent core damage based upon PASS results, hydrogen analysis, drywell radiation monitors, and core uncovery tim .2 Dose A:sessment The two primary monitored release pathways are the Plant Stack and the Standby Gas Treatment Stack (SGTS). The sole identified unmcnitored release pathway is through the containment structur Both the main plant vent and the SGTS are equipped with high range radiation monitoring systems. The systems are designed to monitor noble gas, particulates and iodines under accident condition Documentation for an inplace calibration of the systems was reviewed and found acceptable. A complete description of the systems is contained in the Clinton FSAR Section 7.6.2. Othat plant radiological information which would be potentially useful for dose assessment and protective action recommendations is available on the area radiation and plant radiation monitoring (AR/ PRAM) computer system. System terminals are available in the Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), and radiation protection offices. No terminal was available in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Selected parameters are fed to the dose assessment computer and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).

The dose assessment computer system receives main plant vent and SGTS vent information and the SPDS receives the same vent data points as well as the containment and drywell- high-range radiation-- - -

monitor data points.

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The primary method of performing dose calculations is with the Emergency Dose Calculation (EDC) computer program supplied by Nuclear Data. The program is part of the Station Radiological Monitoring Systerr. (SR). Operation of the dose assessment computer program is described in procedure CPS No. 7410.64, Emergency Offsite Dose Calculation Using the SR Computer System. The dose assessment method used in the CR and the manual backup method for the EOF and TSC are contained in procedure RA-01, Manual Radiological Dose Assessment, Revision .

The EOC code is a variation of the straight line Gaussian model (segmented plume) as described in U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145, Revision 1. The model is designed to account for the time varying nature of site meteorology ~and source term. For each monitored release point, the gross monitor reading is converted into a relative release rate representing an assumed distribution of radionuclides. The radionuclide mix is derived from a design basis

LOCA described in the FSAR. Correction factors applied by the model are building wake ef fect, dry deposition, nuclide decay, and finite plume correctio Plume depletion factors are derived from the graph in Regulatory Guide 1.111, Revision 1. Dose calculations are based upon inhalation of radioiodines and particulates, immersion in a cloud of noble gases and direct exposure due to radionuclides deposited on the ground. All dose conversion factors used within the code a' > obtained from Regulatory Guide 1.109, Revision Thyroid dose is calculated using inhalation factors and breathing rates for a chil A validation and verification study, which also incorporates a model comparison study, has been performed and documente The results were contained in a report titled "Illinois Power Company E00 Sof tware Verification and Validation and Model Comparisons",

performad by Atlan-Tech Inc., and dated September 12, 1986. The study identified several errors in the code methodology and made a number of suggestions for code improvement. Discussions with i licensee personnel indicate that all identified errors have been eliminated and that many of the suggestions have been incorporate I Responsibility for modification and maintenance of the code rests with the site computer services group. All changes to the computer ,

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code are thoroughly controlled, documented and tested in accordance '

with established procedure. The comparison portion of the study j compared calculational results from the EDS code to NRC's IRDAM i model, the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) model and I hand calculations. The study attempts to identify and describe the j differing model methodologies which result in calculational l differences. It was noted that at the time of the comparisons some l of the information about the IDNS methodology needed to fully I understand and explain calculational differences was not available l (e.g. , X/Q values and dose conversion factors).

The primary method for performing dose assessment in the CR and the backup method for the TSC and EOF is contained in Procedure RA-01, Revision 3. The dose conversion factors in the procedure are bLsed upon those provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, and the X/Q values used were generated by the EDC model. The model also incorporates a finite plume correction, building wake effects, time dependent detector corrections, and energy decay of the nuclide mixture. The i methodology employed in the manual method is consistent with that j of the EDC model. During the annual exercise conducted the week of this inspection the scenario events caused the SR system and thus the EDC code to be unavailable. Therefore, all dose assessment was performed manually. At the General Emergency level the manual dose

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n assessment Procedure (RA-01) instructs the user to update calculations every 15 minutes. Implementing the manual model on a personal computer would help dose assessment personnel meet this 15 minute update requirement and reduce the possibility of human erro Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate. However, the following items are suggested for program improvement:

  • An attempt should be made to more fully explain the differences between the Nuclear Data EDC model and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety mode * Consider making the radiological data from the AR/PR system available in the EOF (as it is in the CR and TSC).
  • Consider implementing the backup dose assessment model on a personal compute .0 Meteorological Information A review was performed of documentation associated with the 1 pre-operational appraisal of the meteorological system, observations of the system, cnd documentation from licensee submittals to the NRC. This review indicated that the system meets ,

NRC requirements for adequacy, representativeness, and reliabilit Documentation reviewed in making this determination included:

Clinton SSER 1, Dated July 1982, Section 13. i'

Clinton SSER 2, Dated May 1983, Section 13. i NRC Report 461/85039(DRS), Dated December 1985, Section 4. i

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NRC Report 461/85040(DRSS), Dated December 1985, Section 4 NRC Report 461/86021(DRSS), Dated March 1986, Open Items 39-17 through 39-21 NRC Report 461/86061(DRS), Dated October 1986, Section 2 <

NRC Report 461/87003(DRSS), Dated February 1987, Section 2

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Therefore, this portion of the inspection procedure was not l conducted during this ERF appraisa . _ _ . . .

4.0 Technical Support Center 4.1 Location and Habitability The TSC is located in the Contrcl Building on the 800' elevation, adjacent to the Unit 1 control roo The TSC meets the same structural requirements as the CR and is shielded by the same walls that shield the CR.

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Two safety grade radiation monitors at each of the normal make-up air HVAC intake structures detect gamma radiation from 10 2 to 104 mR/h These monitors will automatically initiate the main CR HVAC system when the setpoint is reache Radiation levels in the TSC is monitored by a local area radiation monitor (ARM).

The TSC is located within the control room envelope and is therefore served by the normal and emergency control room ventilation system. The inspectors reviewed the most recent surveillance tests of the control room ventilation system, including both operability tests and filter test No problems were noted in the content or performance of these procedure Based upon the above findings this portion of the licensee's program is adequat .2 Functional Capabilities 4. Power Supplies Power for the TSC loads is from Standby Lighting Cubicle 161 (SLC-Irl). SLC-161 receives power from Auxiliary Building MCC-1A3, which receives power from 480 VAC Dus 1A, which receives power from 4160 VAC Bus 1A1. Bus 1Al is powered from either the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 1 or from the Diesel Generator 1 Therefore, power to the TSC is very reliabl All telephones used in the TSC and the EOF are supplied with reliable power. Most of them receive backup power from a manual transfer switch in the basement of the Service Building (0CQ04EA). This transferable power supply can be powered from offsite sources, the plants main generator and the 1A Diesel. The switch will be referred to in the table below as "FOCUS". The backup power supplies for each of the major phone systems are provided in the table below:

PHONE POWER ENS (To NRC) FOCUS NRC Conference Room FOCUS CENTREX Microwave Diesel l FTS FOCUS l EAR (Ringdown to State & Local) FOCUS l l

Hand held radios are available as a backup to the !

telephone System Based upon the above findings this portion of the licensee's program is adequat .

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4. Data Analysis The TSC is equipped with satisfactory drawings, status

. boards, and other supplies necessary to analyze available dat .

Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat .3 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable Availability All Regulatory Guide 1.97 variables are available on one of.the three computer systems serving the TSC. This approval of selected variables for the purpose of the ERF appraisal does not affect Clinton licensing condition Number 15 which specifies that "Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the applicant shall install and have operational separate class 1E power sources-on the fuel zone reactor vessel level instrumentation; and that

, instrumentation is also to be environmentally qualified in-accordance with 10 CFR 50.49."

The PMS/DCS displays contain several computer points which were ,

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reading erroneously. These points are mostly those for which the respective systems are shut down or where the value being monitored is at the low end of the expected range scale. Examples include:

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Steam Line A & B reading L****.

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RCIC Flow reading L****.

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The Radiological Critical Safety Function (CSF) Alarm was in RED status because of failed ARMS and PRMs from the Eberline syste Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Stack Radiation was I showing poor qualit I

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The Vessel Level CSF Alarm was in RED status because of all four Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) having an isolation demand signal and because of poor quality on three of four reactor vessel level inputs to the algorith ,

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High Pressure Core Spray (PPCS) flow was indicating 3569 CPM

with the pump not running and no suction path open.

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Secondary Containment Differential Pressure (DP) is a l composed point (VA-DD010). The point is not being computed, i due to a bad input. The individual computer point inputs cannot be viewed to determine which input is failed, l

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Both Drywell and both Containment high range gamma radiation monitors are not providing data, because levels are below the lowest expected range set in the syste l l

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The type of problems noted above decrease operator and manager confidence in the data acquisition system. Most of the problems can be coriected by widening the range of expected low range values (typically 32 millivolts from the instrument loop) for the affected

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computer point The SPOS variables were selected based on the guidance provided by NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97. A report "Clinton Power Station Safety Parameter Display System Parameter Set Validation" was-available for inspectio Also provided was a Technical Evaluation Report confirming that the instrumentation used at Clinton-is acceptable to meet RG 1.97 requirement . Computer Data Three computer systems'are available in the TSC as sources of data. These systems are the SR, AR/PR, and PMS/DCS systems. Of these systems,-only the AR/PR systems has trending capability for historical dat The other two systems do not archive data (i.e., only the current update data set is retained in the system, and is replaced about every 250 milliseconds on the next update scan). The TSC has one status board available for the X-Y plotting of a single parameter and one matrix type status board which can be used for the recording of parameter values versus time for about 12 time slot Either improved computer based or improved status board trending capability should be added to the TSC. This was considered as an open item (461/88008-01).

, The AR/PR is dual redundant and gathers information from

area radiation monitors located in vital and protected areas within the plant. The Safety Parameter Display ;

System gathers a subset of data available from the Plant Process Computer (also called the Display Control System /

Performance Monitoring System) for use as SPOS displays.

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Additional displays are available to the TS In fact,

any display available to the operator in the control room j is available to the TSC, if requeste . Manual Data TSC status boards are satisfactory as a backup to the computer generated data available in the TS . Data Adequacy The combination of computer generated data and i telephone / status board data are adequate for the TSC.

i Based upon the above findings, with the exception of the l Open Item in Section 4.3.1, this portion of the i licensee's program is adequate.

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4.4 Data Collection, SM age, Analysis and Display 4. Methods of Data Collection In both the AR/PARM and the Plant Process Computer Syctems data is collected using real-time analog and digital instrumentation. The AR/PARM uses a combination of Eberline and Nuclear Data Computers to collect, display, and trend '

data concerning radiation release. -A Polaroid camera is available to record data from this system. Additionally, telephone communications and status boards are available as-backup de. ices should any one of these systems fai The Display Control System is composed of four Honeywell 6500s processors with two processors providing data acquisition (DAP 1 and 2) and two processors providing display control (DCP 1 and 2). In a normal operating configuration one OAP and one DCP are "master" with the other DAP and DCP in a "hot standby" mode. Analog signal conditioning, scanning, and analog to digital conversion is provided by the Remote Analog Units (RAUs). Remote Digital Units (RDUs) scan the digital instruments, provide signal conditioning and pass the information to the DAPs. There are two sets of RAus and RDUs configured to accommodate the redundant sensors in the system. The OAPs control the scanning rate of the RAUs and the ROUs. If any data has changed beyond a predetermined range, it is converted to engineering units and sent to the DCPs for further processin The system also has a Test and Reconfiguration Unit (TRU)

, which continually checks the operation of the OAPs, OCPs and provides status information to the operators through a mimic panel in the control room. When the TRU senses a failure, it switches control to the "hot standby" DAP, OCP, and RAU-RDU set. Configuration switching can also be controlled by the operator in the control roo The remaining information provided to the SPDS (or more generally the Display Control System) comes from the Performance Monitoring System (PMS). The PMS performs the ,

Balance of Plant (B0P) calculations, and Nuclear Steam Supply (NSS) calculations using Honeywell 6500 processor Information is shared botween the B0P-NSS processors and the DCPs using a common memory interfac Software is under stringent configuration control, and a rigorous change control process with design iterations, 3 validation, and testing requirements is enforce ,

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The DCS processes approximately 300 analog and 300 digital signals with the remainder of the signals coming from the

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PM Information can be scanned at a speed of up to .

four times a second (with a maximum of no greater than one second, PMS calculated and transferred variables are updated'in five seconds maximum). Information is not archived and trend data can not'be requested in the TSC or the E0 *

As configured the DCS/PMS is highly redundant with dual-noninterruptible power supplies providing up to four hours battery backup, i The TSC has hard copy units to copy the SPDS screen displays and status boards allocated to record informatio ,

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat .4.2 Data Displays The TSC uses the same SPDS displays as used in the control roo In fact, one of the CRTs in the TSC is paralleled with the SPDS CRT located in the control room providing the TSC with the same display as used by the control room i

operato The second CRT in the control room can be used to view any of the other displays in the DCS/PMS syste l The displays appear to be well designed and are accurate

and legible. The DCS/PMS provides a large number of displays with supporting information concerning the status of the plan Display development is well documented with evidence of a human factors program and a previous review of the fPDS by the NRC. Changes to the SPDS have been made based on the NRC review findings. A par. meter set evaluation report was written as a basis for the SPDS variable selection and a comparison of SPDS parameters to Regulatory Guide 1.97 was provided for review. Excaptions to RG. 1.97 were also documented.

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The displays are updated adequately with some variables being scanned as fast as four times a second (with maximum of one second for the DCS and five seconds for 4 the PMS). Changing displays is accomplished within a i few seconds of the request, under steady state conditions .

(with no load on the system).  !

1 l l Data validation is provided on-line by the system, with :

the operator being warned if'some sensors or calculations

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indicate poor data qualit l

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The DCS/PMS does not provide generalized. parameter trending information. Data can be logged on trend boards or by using hardcopy units to record information in the TSC. In the control room and computer room, information is printed as log Points can be investigated to determine the-reason for the

"bad" status indication. A display provides a list of the input points and a' logic tree used to determine the "bad"

. indication. For computed points (or calculated points),

the calculation and input variables are not available in the TS Thus the TSC may have an alarmed point with a

"bad" indication and the operator may not be able to determine the significance or the cause of the "bad" indicatio The sensor I/O list was available as hardcopy at both the TSC and the E0F, but the list had ten out standing Design Change Notices (DCNs), not incorporated in the documen Some of the pages appear to be missing, and some pages were not legibl !

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate. However, tha following item is suggested for program improvement:

! * It is recommended that the I/O list be kept up to date '

and that careful attention be paid so that missing pages, if intentional, be marked as such, and that the pages be legibl '

4 4.4.2.1 Time Resolution .

l The DCS/PMS has a variable scanning rate so that some

parameters can be scanned faster than others, depending on requirements. The fastest scanning rate is four times a second with the display being updated at about

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every two seconds. Data acquisition tasks are assigned ;

a high priority and even when the system is loaded,

data will continue to be take Based on the above findings, this portion of the l l licensee's program is adequate, l

4.4.2.2 SignalIsolation l

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The TSC and the EOF use the SPDS software and hardwar l The SPOS signal isolation was reviewed by the NRC as  !

part of the "Safety Evaluation Report", January 1986, Docket No. 50-46 It was concluded ". . . that these devices are qualified isolators that are acceptable for )

interfacing the SPDS with safety systems, and that this i equipment meets the requiretents of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1."

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Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat .4.2.3 Cata Communications The data is transmitted to the TSC and E0F via optical video links. The video generators are located in the computer room. These data links provide adequate video qualit The internal data transmissions from the various CPUs in the DCS/PMS appear to be adequate (as

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viewed with the system in steady state). The Test and Reconfiguration Unit (TRU) is utilized to detect errors, provide online and offline diagnostic checks, retransmit data in the event that a bulk transmission error occurs, detect memory errors, and monitor input and output devices for error Given the frequency that data is updated and the speed that new displays are generated, the communications bandwidth appears to be adequate (under steady state conditions). The system appeared tc have no communications problems and data appeared to be accurately represente Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat .4.2.4 Processing Capabilities The Honeywell 6500s used in the DCS/PMS (these systems provide the SPDS capability) operate in a multi-tasking environment to allow several software functions to be processed concurrentl The maximum reported CPU utilization, steady state, is 65% and system response is goo CPU utilization is not available in real-time and no records are kept of the utilizatio There are no document tests of the system under load or accident scenarios in which numerous sensors are out of range )

and user demands on the system are hig ,

Based on the above findings, this portion of the j licensee's program is adequate. However, the following j item is suggested for program improvement:

It is recommended that load tests be conducted (and documented) to simulate accident conditions and thus ,

verify the operation of the system under load. This test I should as a minimum verify that the printers can respond !

adequately, that no data is lost, that CPU utilization is i not excessive for long periods of time, that alarmed !

variables are on the alarm list, and that system

responso is adequat ,

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4.4. Data Storace Capacities i This system does not store dynamic data or provide for trending of parameters. As previously discussed, data is trended manually using status boards in both the TSC and E0F. Trend histories would greatly enhance the information available to management in the TSC and E0 Historical data (the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, for example) is

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often needed as a basis for decisions. This data may not have been recorded on the status boards, but be crucial to the understanding of accident initiating events and thus the understanding of the proble The trend boards are limited in the amount of data available and cannot provide ad hoc information, often needed in the analysis of a problem. Code and display format storage is provided by a solid state l memory device. If a CPU fails the system is re-booted from this device. Media updates are provided via a magnetic tape (and local disk) attached to the 80P CP Code is transmitted from the 80P CPU to the DCS (or the NSS) CPUs using the common memory interface devic Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequate. However, the following

item is suggested for program improvement
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It is recommended that the capability to trend data points be added to the syste .4.2.6 Model and System Reliability and Validity i' A validation of the SPDS was conducted that included '

SPDS/ Emergency Operating Procedure walkthroughs and j dynamic simulation test Dose calculation software i verification was performed by Atlan-tech, Inc., an l independent company. Due to time limitations, the SPDS !

validation documentation was not reviewed by the NRC i tea 'i Based on the above findings, this portion of the i

licenste's program is adequat .4.2.7 Reliability of Computer Systems

The hardware architecture is highly redundant and i should be highly available. A study was conducted to i predict SPDS availability using a fault tree model.

] The predicted values for reliability are acceptable.

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Recently the common drum (a type of disk storage device) was replaced with a solid state large core

- storage device, with no moving parts. This device

should further enhance availability. Maintenance logs are kept in the computer room but these logs do not record the availability of the system.

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Based on the above findings,-this portion of the

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licensee's program is adequate. 'However, the following

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item is suggested for program improvement:

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It is recommended that system availability records be kept and that availability be calculated once a month. Actual availability values can be used to confirm the.model predictions and detect system problems that may be cause'd-oy software and hardware changes.

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4.4. Manual Systems l

See Section 4. .4. Environmental Control Systems ,

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The computer-room air conditioning was functional with ventilation to the computers provided through the floor. There were no indications of problems with the .

air conditioriing syste , [

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Based on the above findings, this portiun of the licensee's program is adequat !

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5.0 Emergenes Operations Facility

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5.1 Location and Habitability

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The EOF is located approximately 1500 feet east of the C It is

contained wi kin a prefabricated metal building. The perimeter j walls are eight inch thick t,olid concrete block and the ceiling ,
is eight inch thick reinforced concret The chielding provided by the walls and ceiling provides a protection factor (for 0.7 MeV gammas) of greater then fiv ;

t 4 Radiation monitoring is provided by a constant air monitor (CAM) '

and an area radiation monitor (ARM). The CAM is an Eberline <

PING-1A and can be lined up to draw air from room, supply, or ,

retur The ARM is an Eberline with detector model DAl-6CC, its !

readout covers the range 10 1 - 104 mR/hr. While searching for  ;

4 calibration information on the ARM and CAM it was discovered that

in October of 1987 responsibility for calibration of the E0F ARM c

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and CAM passed from Health Physics to Controls and Instrumentation ,

(C&I). It was discovered that these two systems had not yet been l l entered into C&Is computerized tracking and scheduling system. It '

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i was also noted that there are no periodic operational checks of the

ARM and CAM except during drills and exercises when they are ,

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, There has been considerable correspondence between-NRC and IP over the past three years concerning power supplies to the onsite EO The present status of power supplies to the E0Fs is summarized below:

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The Primary EOF is served by a single 12 KV feed from the site-construction loop. This 12 KV loop is served by a single feed i from a 138 KV Offsite line which originates at the Clinton substation about seven miles to the west of the plant. At the EOF, a provision has been made for attachment of a portable '

480 V diesel generator. Discussions with IP personnel indicate that procuring such a diesel and completing a connection to the EOF would optimistically take 1.5 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. In summary, there is no immediate backup source of power to the onsite EOF should the Clinton substation 138 KV line fai ,

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The Backup EOF, located in the IP Decatur Dispatch Center does have a backup power supply. The primary source of power is a

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Decatur area 138 KV line (which to the north connects tn the Clinton substation which supplies the onsite EOF). The backup i

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source of power is an emergency diesel generato !

A review of the IP electrical grid maps shows that the primary and backup EOFs are separated by two substations and numerous disconnects along the north-south 138 KV line between the '

facilitie Each end of the line has separate sources of power, thereby making the possibility of a common mode failure remot The inspection team noted that while the Clinton EOFs meet the

basic requiremente of WUREG-0737 for power supply reliability, .

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primary EOF's power supply reliability could be improve '

The E0F HVAC system was tested during the appraisal and the following problems noted-i

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Procedures for activation of the HVAC system are 3 procedures ;

removed from the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)

making it cumbersome to locate. The activation procedure is

, found in Procedure CPS No. 3415.02, "E0F HVAC", which is

, referenced in RA-17 "Radiological Contiol of the EOF", which in turn is referenced in FE-03, "Operation of the E0F".

Activation of the E0F HVAC is not required in Clinton procedures

until after a radiological airborne problem is detected in the -

i EO Most licensees activate such systems as part of EOF

activation or as a minimum at the point where a Site Area l

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Emergency is declared or there is a threat of a release from the plan ,

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Upon test activation of the system, the normal outside air

inlet flowpath damper (No. 242) went to the mid position

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instead of shutting as required. This failure would have i 1 allowed bypass of unfiltered outside air around the HEPA filte This problem was apparently caused by out of position l

l a 16 i

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i i limit switch trip levers which stalled damper operation when i they prematurely contacted the limit switches. This problem i j was repaired prior to the inspection team leaving the site.

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The EOF HVAC system is presently under a generic preventive maintenance procedure. The procedures do not include a comprehensive functional or operational test of the system which Suld identify problems such as the damper failure noted abov This was considered as an open item (461/88008-02).

The EOF battery backed DC lighting system worked satisfactorily when tr.sted during the appraisal, but is not included under a '

preve:itive maintenance procedur Based upon the above findings with the exception of the open item (above), this portion of the licensee's program is adequat However, the following items are suggested for program improvement:

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  • Insure that the E0F ARM and CAM are entered into the proper tracking system for scheduling routine calibntion * Place the E0F CAM and ARM on a routine schedule to receive operational check * IP should add the EOF emergency lights to the E0F building maintenance progra !

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  • Consider installing an E0F differential pressure indicator i to indicate how effectively the HVAC syster. is working.

4 5.2 Functional Capabilities

5. Data Analysis Adequacy

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With one exception the EOF has the same capabilities as i

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the TSC (see Section 4.2). As discussed in the TSC sections of this report, the EOF lacks access to most ARM and PRM data via the AR/PR system.

Based upon the above finding, this portion of the licensee's-program is adequate. However, the following item is

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suggested for program improvement:

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  • It is recommended that an AR/PR terminal be added to i the EOF.

J l 5. Backup EOF i

The backup EOF contains ample workspace and communications j! equipment, and is supplied with reliable powe ;

) Based upon the above finding, this portion of the licensee's ,

program is adequate, j

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5. Reliability Reliability of the E0F was considered adequate, and would be improved by the actions for the HVAC and Lighting systems discussed in Section Based upon the above finding, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat . 3 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variable Availability Same as availability in the TSC, with the exception of ARM and PRM data nated in Sections 4.3 and 5.3 abov Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is adequat .4 Data Collection, Storage, Analysis and Display

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The same computers supporting the.TSC are used to support the E0 The ARM /PRM CRTs, however, are not available in the E0F. With their exception the remaining hardware, the CRTs, keyboards, and hardcopy device function identically to those a cated in the TS The comments made previously concerning the TSC computer systems thus apply to the EO .0 Exit Interview (30703)

The inspector and consultants met with the licensee representatives denoted in Section 1 on April 28, 1988. The inspector summarized the scope and tesults of the inspection and discussed the likely content of the inspection repor The licensee did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur .

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