Text

Forwards Summary Which Includes Brief Description of Changes,Tests & Experiments Completed Under Provisions of 10CFR50.59 for 1996
	ML20137N017
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	03/31/1997
From:	Mccollum W; DUKE POWER CO.
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	NUDOCS 9704080226
	Download: ML20137N017 (226)
	v • d • e

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IIL I DukeIburr Contparty H1wsvR M:Cowx Je Catauha Nuclear Generation ikpartinent lice Pmident Gl4 ConcordRxd (803)3311% Ottice krk SCD115 (Rat)S3/X5 Fax DUKEPOWER March 31, 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Catawba Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 1996 10 CFR 50.59 Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, find attached a. summary which includes a brief description of any changes, tests, and experiments, which were completed under the provisions of 10 CFR50.59 through December 31, 1996.

Index Section 1.0 Exempt Changes Pages 1 - 90 Section 2.0 FSAR Changes Pages 1 - 6 Section 3.0 Miscellaneous Changes Pages 1 - 2 Section 4.0 Modifications Pages 1 - 23 Section 5.0 Operable but Degraded Pages 1 - 6 Section 6.0 Operability Evaluations Pages 1 - 14 Section 7.0 Procedure Changes Pages 1 - 76 pfl?;_ $$$ .

William R. McCollum, Jr. /N Attachment xc:- L. A. Reyes 080046 Regional Administrator, Region II (

R. J. Freudenberger Senior Resident Inspector 9

P. S. Tam Senior Project Manager - ONRR 9704090226 970331' N Mhh, '

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bec: w/ attn G. A. Copp EC050 M. L. Birch .CN01SA M. S. Kitlan CN0lRC Masterfile CN04DM ELL EC050 l

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EXKMPT A

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CATANBA NUCLEAR STATION

SUMMARY

OF NUCLEAR EEEMPT CHANGES RELATED 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS Exempt Change CE-1593 ,

Description !

The Flowmeters being replaced are not functionally safety-related. The present instruments have a scale of 0-13.5 GPH and are staying pegged high. The new instruments have a scale of 0-21.5 GPH and will provide an accurate reading of the flowrate.

Evaluation The function of the system is not being changed; therefore, this modification will not cause any unreviewed safety questions and further 10CFR50.59 Evaluation is not required.

i Exempt Change CE 3176 Description i Supports 1-A-NV-8066, 1-A-WL-8001 and 1-A-WS-8062 were originally part of NSM CN-11005, Rev. 01. This NSM identified supports that could have their associated snubbers deleted or replaced. The t NSM was based on new support / restraint technology that allowed a reduction in the plant snubber population. The supports referenced above are located around high radiation areas and could not be accessed at the time the NSM was being implemented.

To avoid delaying completion of NSM CN-11005, Rev. 01, the modification to the supports referenced above were transferred to exempt change CE-3176. Chemistry and Radiation Protection will determine the appropriate time for accessing the supports so they can be modified.

Evaluation Per this evaluation, there are no unreviewed safety questions associated with exempt change CE-3176. Therefore, this exempt change does not increase the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction already evaluated in the FSAR. This exempt change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in any technical specification bases.

Exempt Change CE-3316 Description Exempt Change CE-3316 will replace the currently installed starter assemblies used in Cooling Tower 2C's fan power circuits with Joslyn Clark Vacuum Switch starter assemblies (catalog Exempt Changes Page 1

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number XVS13003515-76) . Duefto duty cycle requirements,Jthe l starters currently installed have experienced numerous breaker j trips as well as-high rates of contractor pitting and burning. i The new vacuum starters are physically interchangeable with the l ones currently installed and were designed to provide frequent !

switching duties without main contact pitting or burning.

The new starter assemblies will not be equipped with flashers, j

~Per Jim Herrington'of Design, these flashers are not necessary- i and should not be added. The overload relay will be wired-to !

trip out the contractor but no indication wil1~be provided via l the flasher. 4/0 copper welding cable (ID #01091053) will be !

used to replace the Bus Bar connecting the breaker and the 600 amp vacuum contractor when the new starters are installed. This l will provide the required flexibility between the breaker and the :

contractor. l t

Evaluation !

The starter being replaced are not safety related and the system's function will not be affected in any way by the implementation of CE-3316. Also, the FSAR is not affected and i does not need to be changed. The effectiveness of any equipment j important to safety will not be degraded during any design basis ;

events as there has been no operational change to the plant. The !

margin of safety as defined in the basis to the Technical i Specifications will not be reduced. This modification does not l create an unreviewed safety question ~and further 10CFR50.59 ;

Evaluation is not required. :

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Exempt Change CE-3474 ;

Description !

This evaluation is for CNCE-3474, which revises the circuitry for j installing a new type of CCTV camera for the Security system. l l

Evaluation j This installation is not safety related and is not involved in ,

any equipment and/or system safety related. The probability or I consequences of an malfunction of equipment fmportant to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. This )

installation does not induce any new failure modes; therefore, the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. No operating parameters, safety limits, or setpoints will be changed; ;

therefore, no margins of safety as defined in_the bases to any l Technical Specifications will be reduced. In conclusion, there will be no unreviewed safety questions created by this change and Exempt Changes l Page 2

i it'will not require any changes to the' Technical Specifications j or FSAR-Exempt Change.CE-3488 !

Description .

There are currently no high point vents located on the KF (Spent Fuel Cooling) piping downstream of valves KF7, 22, and 36.

Because of this lack of a high point vent, some of the water in [

the fuel pool is usually siphoned out whenever this portion of j the KF piping is being drained. . To facilitate draining of KF piping downstream of valves KF7, 22, and 36, a vent will be installed on the high point of the piping. The-valve will be j installed per Duke Power's typical vent and drain drawing CN-1680-47.

Evaluation f Therefore, no possibility creating an accident or equipment ,

malfunction different from those already evaluated in the FAR. -

The margin of safety as defined in any Technical Specification j will not be reduced. Based on these conclusions, there are no j unreviewed safety questions associated with this 10CFR50.59 l evaluation. ;

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Exempt Change CE-3604 i Description Exempt Change CE-3604 will replace the existing Main Stream Line radiation monitor detectors (IEMF26, 27, 28, and 29) with General i Atomic (GA) Model #RD-1-01 detectors. The EMFs are located ;

adjacent to the main steam lines to detect secondary radioactivity due to a steam generator tube rupture. The present j detectors, GA Model #RD-1-04, have a range of 0.01 to 1000 R/hr :

which is too high for the expected range of activity for these >

EMFs (Ref. Design Calculation CNC-1229.00-00-0018 Rev. 1). The i detectors are approximately 6" from the outside diameter of the ;

pipe. From the Design Calculation, the upper limit for the dose !

- rate at a 6" distance is 4.26E03 mR/hr and the lower / limit is !

.426 mR/hr. The new detectors will have a range of 0.1 to 1.0E04 i mR/hr as suggested by the' Design Calculation. By the Technical Specifications all four of the EMFs are required to be operable j j in Modes 1, 2, and 3. An alternate method of monitoring the i appropriate parameters must be initiated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and the l l inoperable channel must be restored to operable status within 72 ,

hours and the inoperable channel must be restored to operable j l

i-Exempt Changes l Page 3 l 1

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status with seven days. The detectors will be replaced one at a time which will put the plant in an action statement.- However, all calibrations will be performed on the new detectors prior to removal of.the old detectors from operable status.- Each' EMF will be: inoperable ONLY while it is being replaced. After the new detectors are installed, a simple verification of operability will be performed and the EMPs will be returned to operable status.

Evaluation Implementation of this Exempt Change will not affect systems, structures, or components that are addressed in the FAR in a significant manner, nor will it require a change to the Technical Specifications. The new detectors have the same fit, form and function'as the old one. Only the range is different. An unreviewed safety question does not exist and no further 10CFR50.59 Evaluation is needed. Table 12-29 of FSAR will be revised.

Exempt Change CE-3605 Description ;

Exempt Change CE-3605 will replace the existing Main Stream Line j radiation monitor detectors (2 EMF 10, 11, 12, and 13) with General !

Atomic (GA) Model #RD-1-01 detectors. The EMFs are located l adjacent to the main steam lines to detect secondary :

radioactivity due to a steam generator tube rupture. The present i detectors, GA Model #RD-1-04, have a range of 0.01 to 1000 R/hr

. which is too high for the expected range of activity for these l EMPs (Ref. Design Calculation CNC-1229.00-00-0018 Rev. 1). The i L detectors are approximately 6" from the outside diameter of the :

' From the Design Calculation, the upper limit for the dose >

pipe.

rate at a 6" distance is 4.26E03 mR/hr and the lower / limit is i

.426 mR/hr. The new detectors will have a range of 0.1 to 1.0E04 l 4

mR/hr as suggested by the Design Calculation. By the Technical l i Specifications all four of the EMFs are required to be operable !

in Modes 1, 2, and 3. An alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameters must be initiated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months and the i inoperable channel must be restored to operable status within 72 l hours and the inoperable channel must be restored to operable status with seven days. The detectors wi be replaced one at a time which will put the plant in an actior. tatement. However, all calibrations will be performed on the r,4 detectors prior to removal of the old det ctors from operable status. Each EMF will ;

be inoperable ONLY while it is being replaced. After the new

. detectors are installed, a simple verification of operability .

will be performed and the EMFs will be returned to operable status.

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i Evaluation _

j Implementation of this Exempt Change will not affect systems, ;

structures, or components that are addressed in the FAR in a significant manner, nor will11t require a change to the Technical ;

Specifications. The new detectors have the same fit, form and !

function _as the old one. -Only the range is different. An unreviewed safety question does not exist and no further 10CFR50.59 Evaluation is needed. Table 12-29 of FSAR will be i revised.

Exempt Change CE-3608 Description j Exempt Change CE 3608 revises nameplate information for the ;

Diesel Generator Neutral Grounding Cubicals. The nameplates !

attached to the cubicals will be replaced with nameplates that :

conform to the color code described in Catawba Nuclear Station Directive 3.0.5, the new nameplates will also list the equipment !

identification number for each cubical. Descriptive information ,

listed on drawing CNM-1301.00-0244-001 for the resister in each ,

cubical will be changed to match actual wire size of the conductors between the transformers and the resistors. Drawing CNM-1301.00-0297-001 will be deleted. This drawing contains the !

same information as CNM-1301.00-0245-001, CNM-1301.00-0297-001 has not been updated to show the latest variation notice for the _

cubicals.

Evaluation The Diesel Generator Neutral Grounding Cubicals are safety related. Station equipment will be modified as a result of this l exempt change, the nameplates will be replaced. No equipment !

will be deenerized or made inoperable by this exempt change. No changes to control logic of any station equipment will be made.

Therefore, no changes to the FSAR will be required and the '

effectiveness of any equipment important to safety will not be degraded. This change does not create an unreviewed station question. No further evaluation is required.

Exempt Change CE-3696 Description .

-Minor Modification CE-3696, replaces pressure switch ODWBPS5063 I which opens valve OWGSV0230 on high pressure to prevent a j compressor stall on the Waste Gas Separator Skid. Pressure i switch OWGPS5063 has failed and the existing mode #604-GCl is l obsolete. This modification replaces that model with model #604- '

G11-7029, which serves the same form, fit and function. In Exempt Changes Page 5 1

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f addition, this modification corrects the setpoint in the I&C list i

to read 145 PSIG-INCR instead of 145 PSIG DECR. This will correct the I&C list to agree with truefoperation of the switch.

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Evaluation This modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident-or a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. Neither does it i

create the possibility for an accident or a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR. The modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis'for j any technical specifications. Therefore, it is determined that no unreviewed safety question is created as a result of this !

modification.

Exempt Change CE-3705 ,

Description .

i Exempt Change CE-3705 will replace the 4" carbon steel inlet piping-with stainless steel piping for all the following relief valves: 2RN235, 2RN290, 2RN350 and 2RN295. The h" carbon steel inlet line to the re.1.ief valves listed above has shown severe corrosion and blockage. Design Engineering has determined that stainless steel piping will resist corrosion better that carbon 1 steel piping and can be used as a suitable substitute. There >

will be no stress problems due to changing the RN materials and '

no changes to existing hangers. The carbon steel piping will be replaced with stainless steel piping using existing maintenance procedures. It will be tested to assure no external leakage exist upon installation. Replacing the carbon steel piping with :

i stainless steel will improve the reliability of the RN relief ;

valves. 1 i

4 Evaluation Therefore, the function or operation of the RN system will not be

affected in any way by this change. Exempt Change CE3705 will not create an unreviewed safety question nor required a change to

! the Technical Specifications or FSAR.

Exempt Change CE-3718 Description +

Exempt Change CE 3718 replaces the streaming current detectors on ,

the YF system. The existing detectors are no longer available.

The replacement detectors will perform the same function as the Exempt Changes Page 6 e

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l existing detectors. These detectors sense.the amount of charged particles in the YF water and control the addition of coagulant to the system. The coagulant is pumped into the YF system prior to the upflow filters to aid the filters in the removal of solids.

Evaluation -

The.YF system is not safety related. The detectors are not referenced in the FSAR; therefore, no structures, or components that are addressed in the FAR will be affected. The replacement detectors perform the same function as the existing detectors; therefore,.this modification will not required an inclusion in -

the FSAR. This modification will not affect procedures or tests ;

addressed in the FSAR. No setpoints or system limits will be affected by this modification. This will not require a change to '

the Technical Specifications, and it will not created an unreviewed safety question. No further evaluation is required. ;

4 Exempt Change CE-3759 Description The Nuclear 06 Program has been modified to be a 15 minute average, thereby eliminating spurious instantaneous alarms caused by core power swings due to NC flow fluctuations and anomalies.

The NIS equipment continues to sense instantaneous spike and core deviations generating nuisance alarms. Exempt Change CE-3759 adds a Note 3 to Items llA,.2 & 3 on Page 39 of manual CNM-1201.00-0039. Note will allow alarm setpoints to adjusted during startup and subsequent operation such that they are just beyond -

the range of normal operating variations. The T/S monitoring will still be the same.

Evaluation Exempt Change is screenable; therefore, USQ evaluation is not !

applicable. There are no changes made to the technical .

specifications or the FSAR.

Exempt Change CE-3823 Description This minor modification changes the connectors that terminate the 13.8 kv power cables to the six electrodes of each tuxiliary electric boiler. The original method of terminating the power cables to the boiler electrodes employed connectors that were clamped to the cable conductor by a bolted cable clamp. These cable clamps become loose due to vibration and result in arcing Exempt Changes Page 7 o

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and failure of the cable. This modification will replace thel

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cable connector with a copper compression connector with both holes suitable for the bolted connection to the electrode's stud Connector.

Evaluation An Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation ~1s not required for this modification because: Although the auxiliary boiler are mentioned in the FSAR, they are neither evaluated, nor are.they safety related Structure, System, or Component (SSC). Changing-the connectors for the auxiliary. boiler power cables is merely replacing an existing component with an equipment component that ,

is better able to perform under the existing conditions. !

Changing the power cable connectors for the auxiliary boiler will ;

not degrade the effectiveness of an SSC important to safety in any design accident or event. Modification of the aux boiler power _ cable connectors does not appear to require inclusion in the FSAR because; neither a new system signification to plant ;

operation is installed, not is a significant addition to an existing system made. :

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Exempt Change CE-3995 Description Minor Modification No. CE-3995 will replace Control Room Area Ventilation (VC) System air flow monitor transmitters, add quick- ;

disconnects to the associated process tubing, and add instrument numbers for the transmitters.

Evaluation )

No Unreviewed Safety Questions will be involved, and station l Technical Specifications will not be affected. However, two FSAR I figures will be revised to reflect the new instrument numbers l which are No 's 9-108 and 9-109.

Exempt Change CE-4080 Description Exempt change CE-4080 will move cable tray support which is rubbing up against a main steam line in the turbine building.

Due to expansion of the main steam line the cable tray support is current 2y up against the steam line. Some of the insulation on i the steam line has been rubbed off the support is bowed due to the steam line being against it. The exempt change will move the support l' so that it will not be against the steam line.

The cable tray being supported as not nuclear safety related.

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" Moving the support 1' will still be within the maximum limits for j distances between supports for cable tray. ;

I Evaluation .!

i Exempt Change CE-4080 will not involve a Structure, System, or !

Component (SSC) that is evaluated in the FSAR in any way nor does i it do more than replace a' component with an equivalent component. l This modification will not degrade the effectiveness of an SSC j important to safety in any_ design basis accident or event. This !

modification does not require. inclusion in the FSAR due to'the

installation of a new system significant to plant operation, or i installation of a significant addition to existing system. This l

modification has been screened not to be applicable for USQ l Evaluation for the reasons stated above. j i

i 1 Exempt Change CE-4134 l I ; Description >

Minor Modification CE-4134, changes drawings to reflect the 4

circuit board layout for OWGLS6190 AND OWGLS6230. These level i switches are used as part of the Waste Gas System low point drain j i level monitoring controls. They are not used in a safety related .

application _and the replacement boards will perform the same !

function. This change reflects the manufactures latest revision to the board.

Evaluation i This modification does not increase the probability or ;

consequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. Neither does it 1 create the possibility for an accident or a malfunction of a i different type than any evaluated in the FSAR. The modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for

! any technical specifications. Therefore, it is determined that i no unreviewed safety question is created as a result of this ;

modification.

l Exempt Change CE-4149 Description The original design for the Recycle Monitor Tanks (RMT) was to receive evaporate distillates to supply makeup water to the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank. Due to system modifications, ,

these-tanks'are no longer required. The Recycle Monitor Tanks l are now used store non recyclable waste from the unit condense l Vents. The two tanks were designed and built with reinforced i rubber polymer diaphragms. These diaphragms are not required to l Exempt Changes Page 9

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i provide storage for' waste water. .This minor mod is to eliminate '!

- the diaphragms-from the Recycle Monitor Tanks. The elimination l j-'

of the diaphragms will not' affect the structural integrity of the i tanks. In actuality, the tanks will better serve their present l purpose without the diaphragms. Also, the removal of the diaphragms will eliminate.the cost,' radiation exposure, and possible contamination associated with periodic inspections and i j

replacements.when their service life expires. This modification does'do more than replace the original component with eauivalent components. The elimination of the diaphragm will alter the original design of the tanks; however, the tanks are not used for ,

their original intent. Per conversations with design and 6 chemistry personnel, the present and future use for the tanks !

will not required the use of a diaphragm. The elimination of the ;

diaphragms will not degrade effectiveness for the RMT's. i Evaluation ,

. This modification will not require inclusion in the FSAR. This !

i modification does not increase the probability of an accident {

evaluated in the FSAR nor does it increase the consequence of an i accident evaluated in the FSAR. This modification does not !

] increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of l l equipment important to safety. The tanks are used for waste l l storage and are not important to the safe operation of the plant.

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This modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined !

in the technical specifications. l 1 l Exempt Change CE-4157 l Description i

The referenced minor modification will replace the fuses in the Unit 2 Containment Mechanical Equipment Building (CMEB) unit heater fan motor circuits. The fuse sizes are being increased from a 1 Amp to a 2 Amp rating. New fan motors were recently purchased from the heater supplier, and installed in the six Unit 2 CMEB unit heaters. Though the replacement motors were the same horsepower rating, the full load current of the new motors had an increase from 2.29 Amps to 3.5 Amps. This caused the transformer primary 1 Amp fuses to blow upon start of the heaters, d

Evaluation This modification does not involve any unreviewed safety questions. No changes are necessary to the FSAR or the Technical Specifications.

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Exempt Change CE-4203 Description

-The only concern with this Minor Modification is the impact of removing the grating on the analysis and design of the platform.

The removal of this section'of grating will not adversely affect the seismic integrity of the platform (reference # 3).

Additionally, the adjacent sections of grating will be clipped or tack welded to the platform steel in accordance with general note number 5 on drawing CN-1220-96.

Evaluation Per this discussion, an unreviewed safety question evaluation is-not required for this modification. There are no inclusion in the FSAR due to this modification or any technical specification changes.

Exempt Change CE-4217 Description Exempt Change CE-4217 will change the Unit 2 CA I&C list for 2 CAPS 5130 and 2CAPSS140 to close on an increasing pressure of 1290 PSIG rather than opening on decreasing pressure. These pressure switches provide a computer digital input for response time testing of CA motor driven pumps A and B and need to provide indication as pressure is increasing.

Evaluation This exempt change does not affect systems or components addressed in the FSAR-in a significant manner, nor does this change require a change to the Technical Specifications. For these reasons, no further 10CFR50.59 Evaluation is needed.

Exempt Change CE-4261 Description Minor Modification CE-4261 will move wire 1RL199L from terminal A of ORLPS5970 to terminal C of ORLS5970. This will change the contact status of ORLPS5970 to allow 1RL199 to open and supply RY backup cooling water to RL Pump Motor Bearing Oil Cooler when the pressure of RL decreases to 50 PSIG. Therefore, implementation of motor bearings as intended by design of the system.

Evaluation Minor Modification CE-4261 does not affect structures, systems, or components that are addressed in the FSAR, require inclusion in the FSAR, nor does it involve procedures described in or test and experiments not addressed in the FSAR. CE-4261 will not Exempt Changes Page 11

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required a change to Technical Specification. Furthermore, this ;

modification does.not created an unreviewed safety question and {

no'further 10CFR50.59 evaluation is needed. ;

i Exempt Change CE-4321 ,

2 Description-Minor Mod CE-4321 will add a pneumatic high limit relay to each of the control-loops for valves 2HW65 and 2HW66. These additions are necessary to prevent positioner damage when greater than 6 ,

PSI is applied. Each valve's positioned shares a common control header with another control valve positioner that operates in a 3 ;

to 15 PSI range with 9 PSI normally applied. The constant :

application of 9 PSI has been found to damage the 3 to 6 PSI !

, positioner's flapper and require rebuild of the positioner. The high limit relay will limit the air signal tx) between 3 and 6 ,

PSI. 2HW65, 2C1 Heater Drain Tank Recirc. Valve, and 2HW59, 2C1 l

- Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve, are both controlled by j i

selector station 2HWSS5400 to maintain approximately 50% 2C1 Heater Drain level. 2HWSS5480's output for this level is 9 PSI, which maintains 2HW59 at 50% OPEN and 2HW65 fully CLOSED but also ;

exceeds the 3 to 6 PSI range of 2HW65 and results in flapper i damage to the positioner. The identical situation exists for 2C2 Heater Drain Level Control and valves 2HW66 and 2HW60. The l addition of the High Limit Relays will allow the valves to !

function in the designed control loop process range without ;

experiencing damage.

Evaluation .

This cha'nge does not affect the function of valves 2HW65, 2HW66, l 2HW59, or 2HW60 as addressed in the FSAR in a significant manner, 2

nor does it require change to Technical Specifications. For ,

these reasons, no further 10CFR50.59 Evalustion is necessary.

1 Exempt Change CE-4373 Description i Steam generator tubes are inspected each refue13'g outage, in accordance with station Technical Specification Defective I tubes are either repaired by sleeving, or removed from service by the installation of plugs in both end of the tube. Both plugging and sleeving are authorized by station Technical Specifications.

Due to unresolved problems with the sleeving process all sleeved ,

tubes were taken out of service by plugging the affected tubes. l This exempt change documents the installation of plugs in the l unit 1 Steam Generators during the 1EOC7 Refueling Outage.

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l-i Evaluation The possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment . .

important to safety which is different than already evaluated in !

the FSAR will'not be created. The margin of safety as defined in ;

the bases to the Technical specification will not be reduced. .

Based on the considerations, there are not no unreviewed safety ,

questions concerning.CE-4373. i Exempt Change CE-4429 Description Minor Modification CE-4429 reorders the reflash module ;

annunciator engravings for devices AA and DA in 1TBOX0295. These ;

alarms monitor the functions of the Volumetrics Leak Rate ,

Instrument for the Upper and Lower Personnel Airlocks. Labels '

N0003 and N0006 will also be revised to better describe the Power Failure Alarm. This Minor Mod reorders the alarms such that ;

alarm #1 will be " Leak Rate Inst Airlock Seal Test Required"; ,

' alarm #2 will be " Leak Rate / Inst Airlock Seal Flow / Press Fail"; ;

alarm #3 will be " Upper (Lower) Airlock Leak Rate Inst Power l Failure". This reordering is in agreement with CNM-1144.13-0160 ;

001 Sheet 821121, and CN-1769-02.02. :

Evaluation This mod. does not affect structures, systems, or components j referenced in the FSAR in a significant manner, does not appear ;

significant enough to be included in the FSAR, does not involve i procedures as described in the FSAR, does not involve tests or l experiments as described in the FSAR, nor does it require a .

change to Technical Specifications. For these reasons, no <

further 10CFR50.59 Evaluation in necessary, l 1

l Exempt Change CE-4430 Descr1ption j Minor Modification CE-4430 reorders the reflash module l annunciator engravings for devices AA and DA in 2TBOX0295. These i alarms monitor the functions of the Volumetrics Leak Rate l Instrument for the Upper and Lower Personnel Airlocks. Labels -

N0003 and N0006 will also be revised to better describe the Power Failu'r Alarm. This Minor Mod reorders the alarms such that alarm #1 will be " Leak Rate Inst Airlock Seal Test Required"; l alarm #2 will be " Leak Rate / Inst Airlock Seal Flow / Press Fail";

alarm #3 will be " Upper (Lower) Airlock Leak Rate Inst Power Failure". This reordering is in agreement with CNM-1144.13-0160 001 Sheet 821121, and CN-1769-02.02.

Exempt Changes ,

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i Evaluation l

- This mod does not affect structures, systems, or components , j

' referenced in.the FSAR in a significant manner, does not appear ~ l

. significant enough to be included in the FSAR, does not involve j

- procedures as described in the-FSAR, does not involve tests or ;

experiments'as described in the FSAR, nor does-it require a ;

change to Technical Specifications. For these reasons, no l further 10CFR50.59 Evaluation in necessary. j h

i Exempt Change CE-4435 ,

Description l Minor Mod. CE-4435 will replace 1KGTT5270, the controller for ,

valve KG-5. The old model is obsolete. The new controller, will

- be a Moore Products model 55M and Nullmatic temperature transmitter. The Moore Products equipment does not change the function of the control loop it only replaces obsolete equipment.

The operation or the controlling setpoint of the loop will not be >

change by this minor mod. 1KGTT5270 controls KG-5 which .

regulates cooling water flow to the main generator. The Moore .

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Products controller is being installed because it is widely used in the plant and is.very reliable. {

Evaluation

- The controller is not nuclear safety related. This change does not affect structures, systems, or components referenced in the FSAR in a significant manner. This change is not significant enough to be included in the FSAR, and does not involve procedures, test, or experiments described in the FSAR. This ,

change is not addressed by Technical Specifications. A USQ ,

Evaluation is not applicable for this change. l Exempt Change CE-4472 <

Description While troubleshooting implementation of Exempt Change CE-1885, it was discovered that the original scaling of two flow elements was incorrect. An investigation into the matter found that the terms used by Vickery Simms on flow, and how they were interpreted ;

within Duke Power Company were different. Specifically, Vickery Simms lists flows (GPM) in terms of BASE CONDITIONS. For Vickery

Simms, their base conditions are established as atmospheric !

pressure and 60*F. When information is forwarded to Vickery l Simms regarding flow rates, Duke specifies flow (GPM) in terms of !

the flow rate at the flowing conditions. On many applications, ,

the flowing conditions are close to the base conditions defined j by Vickery Simms. The farther away from 60*F, the larger the ;

Exempt Changes i Page 14 t

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i error will be due to density changes. Loops with different normal operating temperatures were recalculated to determine at i what temperature the error becomes significant. It was determined that at 120*F and above were recalculated using the ORIFICE

~

program. Each of these loops was then reviewed by Mechanical Systems and Performance. Neither Group found any operability ;

concerns. (Reference PIP 0-C91-0284). Minor Modification CE- 1 4472 will re-scale all affected loops that have elevated i temperature applications as well as update the I&C lists. ;

Included in this modification package are the Orifice Calculation Sheets provided by Electrical Design Engineering.

Evaluation This exempt change does not affect systems or components addressed in the FSAR in a significant manner, nor does this !

change require a change to the Technical Specifications. For ,

these reasons, no further 10CFR50.59 evaluation is needed. i Exempt Change CE-4486 ;

Description l The 12"x8" reducers welded to the inlet and outlet of valve !

2HS088 will not allow enough clearance for removal of bolts from the flanged connections on the valve. Minor Modification CE-4486

will add a 6" spool piece on the inlet and outlet of valve 2HS088 to allow proper clearance for bolts removal.

Evaluation The HS system is not safety related and do not perform any safety function. No components, systems or structures addressed in the l FSAR will be affected by this change. No changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications will be caused by this implementation of-this modification. This change will only enhance maintenance activity to allow removal of valve 2HS088. No evaluation beyond i 10CFR50.59 Applicability Screening will be required.

Exempt Change CE-4444 Description The current design , for the Main Feedwater system (CF) recirc piping, has to 10 inch carbon steel 90 degree elbows welded to i the outlet of valves 1CF006, 1CF013, 2CF013. The location of these elbows creates a situation where pipe erosion has and will cause through wall leaks. Seat leakage on the associated valves will cause flashing against the back side of the elbows which ,

induces wall thinning in a localized area. This situation has been evaluated by Design with the conclusion to install welded tees and pipe caps on the outlet of these valves. This will Exempt Changes Page 15 t

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l provide a water cushion which will allow the steam to dissipate. )

(loose energy) prior to striking the fitting wall. Also, the l associated drain valves and piping.will be moved to the inlet ]

side on the down stream isolation valves. ,

Evaluation ,

This modification will not create any unreviewed-safety questions !

evaluated in the FSAR. It will not affect any procedures !

addressed in the FSAR or Tech. Specs. It will not require a l change to any CNS operating procedures. A USQ is not required. j i

l Exempt Change CE-4473 i Description i While troubleshooting implementation of Exempt Change CE-1885, it ;

i

-was discovered that the original scaling of two flow elements was Lincorrect. An investigation in to the matter found that the ;

terms incorrect. An investigation into the matter found that the l terms used by Vickery Simms on flow, and how they were l interpreted within Duke Power Company were different. l Specifically, Vickery Simms listed flows (GPM) in terms of BASE i CONDITIONS. For Vickery Simms, their base conditions are j established as atmospheric pressure and 60 deg. Fahrenheit. When information is forwarded to Vickery Simms regarding flow rate at the flowing conditions. On many applications, the flowing ;

conditions are not close to the base conditions defined by Vickery Simms. The farther away from 60'F Fahrenheit, the larger ;

the error will be due to density changes. Loops with different l normal operating temperatures were recalculated to determined at what temperatures were recalculated to determine at what -

temperature the error becomes significant. It was determined that at 120 degrees F, the errors were not yet significant. For conservatism, all loops with normal-temperatures of 120 degrees F l and above were recalculated using the ORIFICE program. Each of these loops was then reviewed by Mechanical Systems and ,

Performance. Neither Group found any operability concerns. .

(Reference PIP 0-091-0284) Minor Modification CE-4473 will re- '

scale the affected loops that have elevated temperature applications as well as update the I&C lists. Included in this '

modification package are the Orifice Calculation Sheet provided by Electrical Design Engineering.

Evaluation [

This exempt change does not affect systems or components .

addressed in the FSAR in a significant manner, nor does this !

change required a change to the Technical Specifications. No USQ Exempt Changes Page 16 i f

i.

evaluation is available. For these reasons, on further 10CFR50.59 evaluation is needed.

Exempt Change CE-4519 l Description -

The purpose of CE-4519 is to replace. existing "Kamlock" type I drain connections in the LD Systr.a with stand threaded pipe caps.

The-Kamlock connectors leak small amount of-leakage does not pose

.any; operability concern; the concern is primarily one of personnel ~ safety and housekeeping. The optimum time to perform ,

this modification is while the system is drained, which only j occurs,during an outage. ,

E Evaluation Replacing the Kamlock connector with a threaded pipe cap will not i degrade the effectiveness of the LD System. This mcdification will not change the design intent of the Emergency Diesel Generator of the LD System, and does not inclusion in the FSAR.

A USQ evaluation is not necessary. :

i i

Exempt Change CE-4569 ;

Description l The referenced modification will replace the Containment Purge r Ventilation (VP) System air flow monitor transmitters. Isolation valves and quick-disconnects will be added for calibration and system testing purposes. :

Evaluation f This modification does not involve any Unreviewed Safety l Question. No Technical Specifications changes are required. i FSAR Figure 9-129 will need to be revised to reflect new transmitter instrument numbers.

t Exempt Change CE-4570 Description :

The referenced modification will replace the Containment Purge .

Ventilation (VP) System air flow monitor transmitters. Isolation valves and quick-discernects will_be added for calibration and -

system testing purposes. ,

l Exempt Changes i Page 17 l

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Evaluation i This modification does not involve any Unreviewed Safety -

Question. No FSAR or. Technical Specification changes are required.

Exempt Change CE-4596 Description Currently, the label for 1 ASP 5040 on 1MCl3 reads " AUX STEAM HDR t PRESS". This is misleading to the operators since the measured pressure is actually from the. unit crosstie piping and not a unit specific pressure measurement as implied by the Unit specific -l label. Minor Mod CE-4596 revises the label for lASP5040 to read >

"AS UNIT CROSSTIE PRESSURE". Reference PIP 0-C94-0293 for more ;

details. ,

Evaluation Minor Mod. CE-4596 will not involve a Structure, System, or Component (SSC) that is evaluated in the FSAR in any way nor does ,

it do more than replace a component with an equivalent component.

This modification will not degrade the effectiveness of an SSC ;

important to safety in any design basis accident or event. This modification does not require inclusion in the FSAR due to the '

installation of a new system significant to plant operation, or '

installation of a significant addition to an existing system.

This modification has been screened not to be applicable for USQ Evaluation for the reasons stated above. ,

1 l

l Exempt Change CE-4597 Description Currently, the label for 2 ASP 5040 on 2MC13 reads " AUX STEAM HDR t PRESS". This is misleading to the operators since the measured ,

pressure is actually from the unit crosstie piping and not a unit specific pressure measurement as implied by the Unit specific l label. Minor Mod CE-4597 revises the label for lASP5040 to read "AS UNIT CROSSTIE PRESSURE". Reference PIP 0-C94-0293 for more 4 details. l l

Evaluation i Minor Mod. CE-4597 will not involve a Structure, System, or l Component (SSC) that is evaluated in the FSAR in any way nor does )

it do more than replace a component with an equivalent component.

This modification will not degrade the effectiveness of an SSC important to' safety in any design basis accident or event. This modification does not require inclusion in the FSAR due to the Exempt Changes Page 18 1

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i e installation of a new system significant to plant operation, or installation of a significant addition-to an existing system. ;

This modification has been screened not to be applicable for USQ Evaluation for the reasons stated above. l Exempt Change a-4628 Description.

This minor modification is to allow the substitution of stainless 4

steel material-(A351 CF8M) for "Y" type strainer, Mueller No.761. l This strainer is carbon steel (A216 WCB) and is currently being i 4 used in the RL system supply to the "VI" and "VS" Aftercoolers, t The RL system contains raw water that is corrosive to mild carbon steel. The strainers have degraded in the seating areas of the .

flanges and screens. The substitution of an stainless steel will .

eliminate the corrosion problem and make the strainers more reliable structurally, and from a maintenance aspect, easier to i

' clean. ;

Evaluation i This minor modification will not affect the operation of any i safety related system or component. The original intent of the strainer or the affected systems will not be degraded by this !

minor modification. The structural integrity of the strainer will be enhanced from a corrosion aspect. A USQ is not required. ,

There are no Tech Specs changes or any FSAR changes.

i Exempt Change CE-4665 [

Description !

The change proposed by minor modification CE-4665 will result in the 2" carbon steel pipe supply header to the motor bearing ,

coolers on RL Pumps A, B, and C being replaced with a_4" line. l The new 4" line will be a combination of stainless steel and ;

polyethylene piping sections. This header also provides cooling :

water to the RF Pump A motor bearing cooler, as well as an [

assured source of cooling water for the RL pump bearing coolers.

The existing branches off of the 2" supply header will be flanged ,

and reconnected to the new 4" supply header. One new valve (lRL834) will be added to prevent freezing of the supply header

-between RL Pumps B and A during periods of cold weather when the supply to RL Pump A motor bearing cooler may be isolated. In addition, the existing connection for the line to the RS Backwash l Pump bearing cooler will be removed form the supply header. This pump was removed several years ago and no plans exit to replace

it. Minor modification CNCE60145 covers the deletion of the RS ;

I Exempt Changes Page 19 I

- . . . .. - .- - -. - . -. . - - - - . . = . -. . -

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Backwash' pump and will provide the required 50.59 review for this !

aspect. l 1

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Evaluation ,

This minor modification does not involve any safety related equipment. There'are no USO required.or no: technical '

specification changes. The document sections which need revision ,

in the FSAR are Figures 9-63 and 9-65. l l

Exempt Change CE-4686 {

Description- l The. Installation Specification, CNS-1390-01.00-0161, Procedure l for sealing Class 1E Electrical Components was written to ensure -

that QA1_ enclosures that are spray targets would be sealed to i meet NEMA-4. To ensure that C-H E-30 devices would meet NEMA 4, ,

'the need to utilize the E30KT3 plastic boot _over the E-30 devices l was created. Since we have found E-30 pushbutton operators that .!

no longer require the use of the boot to meet NEMA 4, have l

, '~-learned that the E-30 indicating light units using the inner lens l or diffuser to meet NEMA 4 never required the boot, and that the !

West. VX252 receiver gauges located on 1CPCC1,2 are no longer i i

spray targets, this specification can be voided. Should the need ,

arise in the future to locate VX252's on enclosures which are j spray targets, a note will be added to the Electrical layout i drawing stating that a bead of caulk is to be applied between the ;

enclosure and the VX252 bezel. This will ensure that water does not leak around the installed VX252. Present stocks of the pre Jan. 1990 E-30 pushbutton operators will purged from our ;

inventory. Future purchases will procure only post Jan. 1990 E- ,

30 pushbutton operators. The following enclosures associated with the Diesels do not require the use of the new date coded E30 ;

pushbutton operator even though they are spray targets. It has j been determined that these enclosures are not required to l function for a MELB, For additional information, see ;

calculation, CNC-1206.03-00-0148, 1 1

4 Evaluation i The decision to remove the E30KT3 boots from nuclear safety !

related enclosures, does not affect structures, systems, or i components referenced in the FSAR in a significant manner, does '

not appear significant enough to be included in the FSAR, does

, not involve tests or e.periments as described in the FSAR, nor does it require a change to the Tech. Specs. For these reasons, j no further 10CFR50.59 Evaluation is necessary, i Exempt Changes Page 20 l

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d e-,---- -- - , ----

I Exempt Change CE-4687 Description l The' Installation Specification, CNS-1390-01.00-0161, Procedure ;

for_ sealing Class lE Electrical Components'was written to ensure ,

that QAl enclosures that are spray targets would be sealed to i meet NEMA 4. To ensure that C-H E-30 devices would meet NEMA 4, !

-the need to utilize the E30KT3 plastic boot over the E-30 devices was created. Since we have found E-30 pushbutton operators that l no longer require the use of the boot to meet NEHA 4, have i

learned that the E-30 indicating light units using the inner lens or diffuser to meet NEMA 4 never required the boot, and that the West. VX252 receiver gauges located on 1CPCC1,2.are no longer spray targets, this specification can be voided. Should the need arise in the future to locate VX252's on enclosures which are spray targets, a note will be added to the Electrical layout !

drawing stating that a bead of caulk is to be applied between the :

enclosure and the VX252 bezel. This will ensure that water does !

not leak around the installed VX252. Present stocks of the pre ;

Jan. 1990 E-30 pushbutton operators will purged from our !

inventory. Future purchases will procure only post Jan. 1990 E- }

30 pushbutton operators. The following enclosures associated j with the Diesels do not require the use of the new date coded E30 ;

pushbutton operator even though they are spray targets. It has i been determined that these enclosures are not required to !

function for a MELB. For additional information, see ;

calculation, CNC-1206.03-00-0195. r Evaluation [

The decision to remove the E30KT3 boots from nuclear safety :

related enclosures, does not affect structures, systems, or l components referenced in the FSAR in a significant manner, does !

not appear significant enough to be included in the FSAR, does i

not involve tests or experiments as described in the FSAR, nor does it require a change to the Tech. Specs. For these reasons, ,

no further 10CFR50.59 Evaluation is necessary.

Exempt Change CE-4706 l Description Minor Mod. CE-4706 will correct the loss of flow alarm for H EMF ,

35 and 38. The change will keep the alarm "ON" anytime the !

vacuum pump is off. The problem that existed was when the inlet !

valve to the vacuum pump is closed the loss of flow alarm would ,

come in due to the HIGH vacuum. Also, the pump would shut off on i HIGH vacuum as designed. As the vacuum bled down the loss of l flow alarm would clear. The alarm would come back in later after !

the vacuum bled down to the LOW vacuun setpoint. This ,

modification will add a relay to the vacuum pump motor control :

Exempt Changes !

Page 21

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r circuit so that'when the vacuum pump is OFF the loss of flow l alarm will be "ON". The relay being added will-be powered by 5 !

amp fuses F1 and F2. Design load for the fuses could not be l determined. Actual current for, fuse F1 and F2 was measured under i operating conditions, by Work Request 94064153-01 and found to'be l 0.9 amps. The additional load on fuse F1 and F2 is not !

significant and will not effect the operation of the circuit. l r

Evaluation !

l This change does not increase.the probability, consequences, or create the possibility of an accident evaluated in the FSAR.

This change does not increase the probabilit'y, consequences, or !

he possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety j evaluated in the FSAR. The change does not reduce the margin of i safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications. !

[

j Exempt Change CE-4719 !

2 Description !

The location of the Chemistry Hot E.nd Cold Labs were swapped via {

1 minor mod CE-60038.. 1 EMF 14, the Hot lab radiation monitor, was :

inadvertently left out of the scope of the mod and therefore is j now located in the Cold lab. This minor mod, CE-4719, is being :

written to relocate lEMF14 to the Hot lab. The function of this l' 3

FMF is not changing. This relocation will allow the monitor to

] perform its original design function. Th?.s mod involves splicing l a new piece of cable from a splice box, which is located on the 594' elevation of the Aux Bldg., to the new location of 1 EMF 14 in

! the Hot lab. CNS Installation Spec # CNS-1390.01-00-0113, Section ,

8.1.1, says the spliced length cannot exceed 50 feet. The 4 purpose of this portion of the spec is to ensure that cables are l not continuously spliced such that the total length of cable will g

not have a detrimental effect on the circuit performance {

(specifically, the resultant voltage drop due to the length of j cable). In order to relocate 1 EMF 14, a spliced length of :

approximately 80 feet is required. This exceeds the value given in the installation spec. The radiation monitor vendor was !

contacted about the effect of this longer cable run. They stated j that we should not have any problems if we do not exceed about i 600' using 18 AWG conductors. Our new length, including the splice, will be around 520' which is less than the value !

specified by the vendor. In addition, our conductors are 12 and l 16 AWG. This larger cable will-reduce the voltage drop even more. For these reasons, it has been determined to be acceptable

to exceed the limit given in the installation spec. l Exempt Changes l' Page 22 i

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Evaluation ;

This minor mod will have no effect on the Tech Specs. The FSAR i (Table 12-29) will need to be revised to show the correct ;

location for this. EMF. This minor mod will not increase the {

probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR [

or an accident not evaluated in the FSAR. The probability or ,

consequences of a malfunction of equipment will not be increased, i Also, the margin of safety defined by Tech Specs will not be j reduced as a result of this mod. Moving the monitor to this new '

location will allow it to perform its design function. ,

Therefore, an unreviewed safety question is not involved and i further 10CFR50.59 evaluation is not required.

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Exempt Change CE-4745 j Description Drawing CN-1782-01.11, Connection Diagram Rod Control System j (IRE) CRDM Microphone System, will be revised to allow the !

I Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) microphones to be installed for testing and/or monitoring as required. The CRDM microphones [

and cables between junction boxes 1JNBX0207 & IJNBX0208 and the t reactor vessel head will removed and stored, available for future [

use. i Evaluation This Minor Modification will not create a revision to the margin i

of safety as stated in the basis to the Tech. Specs, nor will it create any Tech. Speco. or FSAR changes. For the reasons stated ;

above, an Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation is not ;

applicable. 1 i

Exempt Change CE-4746 i Description Drawing CN-2782-01.ll, Connection Diagram Rod Control System I (IRE) CRDM Microphone System, will be revised to allow the !

Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) microphones to be installed i for testing and/or monitoring as required. The CRDM microphones and cables between junction boxes 2JNBX0207 & 2JNBX0208 and the reactor vessel head will removed and stored, available for future use.

L Exempt Changes !

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Evaluation ' '

This Minor Modification will.not create a_ revision to the margin of safety as stated in the basis to the Tech. Specs. nor will it create any Tech. Specs, or FSAR changes. For the reasons stated above, an Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation is not ;

applicable.

Exempt Change CE-4757 t Description The changes proposed in the mod are basically material changes.

The piping reroutes ace 'or ease of installation and will require less materials than th, axisting routes. The replacement piping -

and valves will be stainless steel. The only portion of this mod which is safety related is the 1E" RY header section to valves ;

1RY20 & 21. This piping is OA Condition 3. The installation of j this mod will not degrade the fire protection system except when the tie-in to mod CE-4665 is made. This portion of the mod will ;

be installed while fire pump A is out of service for CE-4665.

Fire protection requirements of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9 :

will still be met.

Evaluation The proposed modification will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. The change in ,

piping will not create the possibility of an accident of a f different type than any evaluated in the FSAR since no safety ;

systems or equipment important to safety are affected in a manner ,

different than previously evaluated. There are no USQ requirements due to this change nor any Tech. Specs. changes.

Exempt Change CE-4821 Description ,

Hydrogen mitigation system transformers 1XFMR0013 and 1XrNR0014 provide 120 VAC power to groups of ignitor boxes that contain the l glow plugs for hydrogen burn off. Current measurements were made during troubleshooting of wire termination problems and showed that the transformers are loaded beyond their nameplate rating when all glow plugs are on. The loading (48 amps) is within the overload capability cited by the transformer manufacturer but the i

transformers are being replaced with larger units to bring within Duke de-rating guidelines.

Exempt Changes Page 24 l I

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i Evaluation i This_ evaluation concludes no Unreviewed-Safety Questions are created by this change. FSAR Table 8-6_will require revision as !

a result of this1 modification and a red-marked' copy has been ;

prepared. No Technical Specification changes are required.

Exempt Change CE-4822 i t

Description Hydrogen mitigation system transformers 2XFMR0013 and 2XFMR3014 provide 120 VAC power to groups of ignitor boxes that contain the !

glow plugs.for hydrogen burn off. Current measurement were made -

during troubleshooting of wire termination problems and showed j that the transformers are loaded beyond their nameplate rating [

when all glow plugs are on. The loading (48 amps) is within the :

i overload. capability cited by the transformer manufacturer but the transformers are being replaced with larger units to bring within l Duke de-rating guidelines. !

Evaluation I This evaluation concludes no Unreviewed Safety Questions are created by this change. FSAR Table 8-6 will require revision as ,

a result of this modification and a red-marked copy has been }

- prepared. No Te':hnical Specification are required. i Exempt Change CE-4897 ;

i Description The referenced modification will remove the sight glass on the i Unit Vent Stack and install 1" caps on the remaining piping. The intent of the sight glass, as originally installed, was to ;

monitor water level in the Unit Vent Stack. However, subsequent evaluations have shown that water is primarily entering the stack i from ZJ (Condensate Steam Air Ejectors) steam ejected into stack j ductwork from turbine. The 7.J steam condenses and runs down the ;

~

sidt of the stack and drains into VE (Annulus Ventilation) ducting. Elbows have been placed over this duct such that water ;

no loager goes into VE ducting. Additionally, the WL (Waste ;

Liquid) drain lines at the bottom of the stack were modified to be easily cleaned in order to allow for proper stack drainage. ,

Since the original problem has been solved, it was decided to remove rather than repair the sight glass. In order to remove ,

the sight glass assembly, the upper piping is removed from the 1" threaded union and the lower piping from the elbow fitting. This ;

includes the elbow and union fittings. The remaining piping will i be capped off the maintain the ductwork integrity.

Exempt Changes :

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i Evaluation Since no safety releted equipment is adversely affected there is '

no creation of the possibility for an accident or malfunction other than those described in the FSAR. No safety parameters or design limits have been adversely affected and no margin of l safetyEdefined in the Technical Specifications is reduced.

Consequently, there are no unreviewed safety questions associated with this modification.

Exempt Change CE-4899 ,

Description Minor Mod CE-4899 will replace ICAPG5030 with an Ashcroft 1279S pressure gauge. The current model for ICAPG5030 is a Marsh PG-73 ccJe1 which has been found out of tolerance quite often. It is believe that the main reason for the out of tolerance is due to l ;the high ambient temperature. The Ashcroft model can withstand a higher ambient temperature and industry experience has found the Ashcroft model to be more reliable. The catalog number shown on

the I&C list for ICAPG5020, 5130 and 5140 is incorrect. The ,

correct catalog number is PG-73, Type 100, and Type 100 ,

respectively. This minor mod will also incorporate these changes to the CA System I&C List.

?

Evaluation A USQ evaluation is not applicable to this activity. No ;

technical specification or FSAR changes are required.

Exempt Change CE-4956 I Description 4 A minor modification is issued to replace a corroded junction box 1TBOX0015. This is a passive electrical device which is part of the Safety Injection (NI) system described in the FSAR. The ,

replacement of this box during plant "no-mode" conditions will i not affect the ability of the system to fulfill its safety function during normal plant modes. ,

Evaluation An Unreviewed Safety Question evaluation has been performed, and no Unreviewed Safety Questions will result from this minor ,

modification. No changes to the FSAR or the technical specifications are required. 1 i

Exempt Changes Page 26

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Exempt Change CE-4983 Description This minor modification will install independent 120VAC fuses in i existing power distribution circuits for each set of 48/15VDC .

power supplies in Unit 1 Train A Solid State Protection System ;

cabinets. This modification does not add or delete any power [

loads. It will not adversely affect the original design j function. The modification will provide protection for the concerns related to electrical faults in some non-safety related class 1E signals to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) addressed in NRC Information 95-10.

I Evaluation' t Accordingly, this activity does not change the facility as described in the FSAR. This modification will not change procedures, methods of operation, or alter a test as described in '

the FSAR. This change does not require inclusion in the FSAR. ,

- This activity does not adversely affect any system or component i necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR. This !

modification does not perform a test or experiment that is not l addressed in the FSAR. Therefore, no further evaluation is {

necessary beyond this screening for Unreviewed Safety Question i applicability. l dxempt Change CE-4984 Description This minor modification will install independent 120VAC fuses in existing power distribution circuits for each set of 48/15VDC ,

power supplies in Unit 1 Train B Solid State Protection System i cabinets. This modification does not add or delete any power !

loads. It will not adversely affect the original design ,

function. The modification will provide protection for the !

concerns related to electrical faults in some non-safety related !

class 1E signals to the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) i

- addressed in NRC Information 95-10. j i

Evaluation l' Accordingly, this activity does not change the facility as described in the FSAR. This modification will not change procedures, methods of operation, or alter a test as described in >

the FSAR. This change does not require inclusion in the FSAR. .

This activity does not adversely affect any system or component !

necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR. This modification does not perform a test or experiment that is not addressed in the FSAR. Therefore, no further evaluation is l

Exempt Changes ;

Page 27 l l

I necessary beyond this screening for Unreviewed Safety Question }

applicability. 4 i-Exempt Change CE-5017 Description Minor Modification CE-5017 increases the SNSW Pond normal elevation from 571.0 to .572.0 by installing a k inch stainless steel plate across the SNSW Pond Outlet Discharge Pipe Headwall.

The increase in normal SNSW Pond level provides a larger volume of water and a larger pond surface area to aid in dissipation of waste heat during LOCA plus unit shutdown events. Minor Modification CE-5017 also increases the existing Intercept Basin weir invert elevation from 572.58 to 573.09. This increase in t weir height will reduce the potential that the SNSW Pond will backup into Secondary Containment Sump #3 via Intercept Basin #7.

-Evaluation .

No USQs are created by Minor Modification CE-5017. No Technical Specification changes are required. FSAR Section 2.4.8 and 9.2.5 changes are required and are attached. l; Exempt Change CE-5045 Description (Item Number This Minor Modification will replace valve 2NC037.

09J-543) with new Item Number DMV-1021. Presently this valve is a k" Y-Type Globe valve. 2NC037 will be replaced with a 1 inch Y-Type Bellows Sealed Globe valve. All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves component replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be .n enhanced system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an eccident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the NC system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the SAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is Exempt Changes Page 28

i determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-5045.

i Exempt Change CE-5064 i Description This FCN describes the steps necessary to modify DPU 05 software l for the Loss of Feedwater pump ASFCS upgrade. It also contains a -

test procedure and tables to verify the modification.

Evaluation The subjtet modification affects only control grade equipment in ,

the Digital Feedwater Control System Cabinets. The modification does not change any of the protection grade channels. The control and protection interaction requirements of IEEE-279-1971 continues to be met. In addition, the existing protection grade isolation between control and protection signals is unchanged.

As such, the subject modification will enhance the ADFCS and a high steam generator water level feedwater isolation, with a resultant reactor trip, will be less likely to occur. Pending successful completion of the acceptance testing, implementation of the subject FCNs does not represent an unreviewed safety '

question as defined in 10CFR50.59(a) (2) . Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in based to any technical specifications will not be reduced. Nor will there be any changes in the FSAR.

4 Exempt Change CE-5071 Description Minor mod CE-5071 will change the transformer taps on the 1&2 ATE t transformers which feed cooling tower loads and aux boiler. The purpose is to lower voltage on the 13.8kv power system to reduce short current in the event of an electrical fault (ref C94-1293). ,

The lowered voltage will not affect the operation of the loads nor of the plant in general. The mod will not impact equipment ,

important to safety.

, Evaluation There are no unreviewed safety questions. Tech specs will not be affected. The FSAR will be revised since At references the turns ratios on these transformers.

Exempt Change CE-5151 Description This Minor Modification will replace valves 1CA069 and 1CA071 (Item Numbers 02H-207*) with new Item Number 06H-214. Presently these valves are 4" globe valves with a history of seat leakage.

4 Exempt Changes Page 29 .

l

?

Once mini-flow is established for CA Pump Testing, these valves ;

are opened'to allow. flow =to the UST. There have been repeated incidence of seat leakage and poor human performance in closing these valves which prevented adequate min-flow indication during testing. In addition, the present valves have a poor pressure t seal design which has resulted in external leakage.in the past. ;

2 This.results in a flooding concern in the CA Pump Pits. Exact

replacements.are no longer available. ICA069 and 1CA071 will be [

replaced with new 4 inch flex wedge gate valves with gear box !

actuators which are available. The gate valve with. gear box design will provide tighter isolation capabilities and easier !

operation. All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this ;

new information.

Evaluation l In. summary, the margin of safety as defined in the based to the 4

Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement ,

of these valves. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not !

j include these valves in any design basis, therefore the increased [

probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement (

of these valves. All answers to the Screening for USQ Evaluation Applicability are "no", therefore the new valves will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and i safety. It is determined that no USQs will arise as a result of -

CE-5151. ;

Exempt Change CE-7001 i Description :

This Minor Modification will replace valve 1HS203 (Item Number ,

06J-601) with new Item Number CMV-653. Presently this valve is a j

, 1" Y-Type Globe valves used in a vent application. The j replacement valve is a 1" bellows sealed gate valve which is an i acceptable design for this type of application. All sffected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

I Evaluation {

This Minor Modification involves component replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced ;

system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated-in :

the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore ;

the increased probability of an accident will not occur due.to l the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same l function as'the old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the HC system and will not create any l Exempt Changes Page 30

~. . ~ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _

i i

new types af accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the SAR.

In f summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the ;

, Technical _ Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement !

l of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation I are "no", therefore,.the new valve will continue to provide all !

requirements necessary for plant operation _and safety. It is l determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a !

- result of CE-7001.- i l

Exempt Change CE-7013 l

Description ;

The purpose of this evaluation is to document plant issues in

order to allow for replacement of the Reactor Coolant Letdown Filter-with smaller micron rated filters. This evaluation will l l- document no changes to the limits and precautions of the_ Reactor {

Coolant Letdown Filter for this replacement. Finally, this !

! evaluation will determine whether there are any unreviewed safety l questions (USQ) associated with this modification.

Evaluation In summary, this modification involves change to an existing I component. No additional components are added, deleted, or .

i replaced. No alterations are made to existing pipes or l i structures. The Reactor Coolant Letdown filter will continue to i meet'and exceed design parameters as specified in the FSAR l

requirements. The margin of safety to any Tech. Specs. will not be decreased as a result of the change. Therefore, there is no USQ associated with this modification. i Exempt Change CE-7040 Description j This-mod is a "like for like" replacement of the existing i regulator installed as 2GB6. The existing regulator is a Fishers model 1301F high pressure regulator that does not provide an adequately stable downstream pressure. The Tescom model 44-3461S24 is an extremely accurate and stable high pressure regulator.

Evaluation The modification is a like component replacement. This

modification does not involve procedures, tests, or experiments described _in the SAR. Operation of the GB system with respect to j 4

-2GB6 is' unaffected except for the reduced makeup capacity as i

! discussed above. This mod will-not change the operation of the j GB system. The GB system is not safety related and is not ;

_ discussed in great detail in the SAR. -The GB system is not l

L Exempt Changes f Page 31 !

l I

e m . . .. _., . . _ _

. . _ . - . - - - .. - . - . .. . = _ . - _ --. .-

n <

[

.r safety related and doe not perform a safety function. The new j

, regulator.will not provide a reliable output ant ure for varying l inlet . (bottle) . pressures. This mod is not not as it involve a i f

test or experiment, Exempt Change CE-7080 i Description' l Minor. Modification CNCE-7080 adds equalization lines from the bonnet of' valves INI1848 and 1NI185A to the downstream side of ;

the valves. These valves are flex-wedge gate valves and have the potential to trap high pressure water and air between the discs.

The trapped water and air are postulated under certain conditions

, to cause the discs to seat so tightly that the valve operator would be unable to open the valve when necessary. This is referred to as a pressure locked condition. The equalization (

line consists of a 4 inch schedule 80 pipe welded into the valve !

4 body and welded to a 4 inch Class B packless (bellows sealed) i valve (1NI487 for valve 1NI184B and valve 1NI488 for 1NI185A) ;

which is fully qualified for the service conditions of this !

application. Downstream of the new b inch valve, H inch schedule j 80 piping will.be welded into the ND process piping. i Equalization valves lIN487 and 1NI488 will be normally open and l

~

indicated as " Locked Open" on the flow diagram. These manual valves are globe valves manufactured by KSB. The installation is !

such that they maintain the same pressure in the valve's bonnet -

as exists in the ND process piping. The equalization line is

i. thus configured to maintain the pressure in the bonnet as exists in the ND process piping. The equalization line is thus ,

configured to maintain the pressure in the bonnet at the pressure 1 not to exceed the operating pressure in the ND/NS pump suction

! piping and should limit the pressure to the ND System pressure j when the system is in its normal operating alignment. ,

Evaluation ;

No Unreviewed Safety Questions or Technical Specification changes .

have been identified related to modification CNCE-7080. FSAR !

changes are required to the flow diagram Figure 6-131 to show the ;

new piping and added valve. !

Exempt Change CE-7082 Description f Minor-Modification CNCE-7082 adds equalization lines from the bonnet of valves 2NI1848 and 2NI185A to the downstream side of

. the valves. These valves are flex-wedge gate valves and have the l potential to trap high pressure water and air between the discs.

s The trapped water and air are postulated under certain conditions j to cause the discs to seat so tightly that the valve operator

would be: unable to'open the. valve when necessary. This is ;

Exempt Changes !

Page 32 e

,.n. - ...<, . . . - . . - . . -

i i

t referred to as a pressure locked condition. The equalization -

line consists of a b inch schedule 80 pipe welded into the valve ,

body and welded to a H inch Class B packless (bellows sealed) valve (2NI487 for valve 2NI184B and valve 2NI488 for 2NI185A) l which is fully qualified for the service conditions of this !

application. Downstream of the new inch valve, H inch schedule 80 piping will be welded into the ND process piping.

Equalization valves 2IN487 and 2NI488 will be normally open and ,

j indicated as " Locked Open" on the flow diagram. These manual i valves are globe valves manufactured by KSB. The installation is i

such that-they maintain the same pressure in the valve's bonnet as exists in the ND process piping. The equalization line is '

thus configured to maintain the pressure in the bonnet as exists in the ND process piping. The equalization line is thus configured to maintain the pressure in the bonnet at the pressure not to exceed the operating pressure in the ND/NS pump suction

. piping and should limit the pressure to the ND System pressure when the system is in its normal operating alignment. ;

i Evaluation 3

No Unreviewed Safety Questions or Technical Specification changes have been identified related to modification CNCE-7080. No Technical Specification changes are required since the added valve is not a containment isolation valve. FSAR changes were required to flow diagram, Figure 6-131, for the analogous Unit 1 modification to show the new valve and equalization piping i connected to the bonnet of the sump isolation valves. Since '

there are no Unit 2 flow diagrams, no FSAR changes will be made.

DBD changes will be made to the associated NI DBD and are ,

~

. attached to the Minor Mod package. $

b Exempt Change CE-7087 !

1 Description This Minor Modification will replace valve 2NS050 (Item Numbers 09J-550) with new Item Numbers DMV-1021. Presently this valve is a 4" Y-Type Globe valve with leakage problems. It will be replaced with a 1 inch Y-Type Bellows Sealed Globe valve. All ;

. affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation -

This Minor Modification involves component placement / improvement.

The overall gain should be in enhanced system operability and !

availability. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include ;

this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased i

probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement ,

of this valve. the new valve will serve the same function as the :

Exempt Changes i Page 33 .

t

P i

- old. valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this ;

minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis ;

of the HC system and will'not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the SAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications j i

will not be reduced by the replacement of this valva. All

' answers'to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "Ic",

therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all j

- requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is .

determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-7087. ,

i Exempt Change CE-7088 Description ,

This Minor Modification will replace valve 2ND020, 2ND021, 2ND069

. and 2ND076 (Item Numbers 09J-550) with new Item Numbers DMV-1021.

Presently this valve is a h" Y-Type Globe valve with leakage .

problems. It will be replaced with a 1 inch Y-Type Bellows Sealed Globe valves and reducing inserts. All affected drawings ;

will be revised to reflect this new information. l l

. Evaluation l This Minor Modification involves component !

replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced f system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in [

the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore !

the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to

. the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same .

function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the I

previous design basis of the JC system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the SAR. In ;

summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the i Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all '

requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is i determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-7088.

Exempt Change CE-7126 Description This Minor Modification will replace valve 1SP129 (Item Numbers 06J-601) with new Item Numbers CMV-653. Presently this valve is ,

a 1" Y-Type Globe valves used in a vent application. The :

Exempt Changes Page 34 r

i a

?

i replacement valve is.a 1 inch'Y-Type bellows sealed gate valve l which is an acceptable design for.this type of application. All [

affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new l information.

Evaluation f This Minor Modificationfinvolves component !

replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system operabil.ity and availability. The accidents evaluated in ;

the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore l the increased probability of an accident.will not occur due to i i

the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased [

consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The i

. design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the !

previous design basis of the SP system and will not create.any

~

l new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the SAR. In l

, summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the .

Technical Specifiustions will not be reduced by the replacement i of.this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation !

are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a -

result of CE-7126. !

i Exempt Change CE-7169 ;

Description j This Minor Modification will replace valve 1HW245 (Item Numbers 06J-601) with new Item Numbers CMV-653. Presently this valve is a 1" Y-Type Globe valve used in a drain application. The j replacement valve is a 1 inch Y-Type bellows sealed gate valve. l All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation

'This Minor Modification involves component replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced ;

system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in !

the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore !

the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to i I

the replacement of this valve. che new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, thcrefore there will be no increased ;

consequences of an accident or. equipment malfunctions. The :

design basis of this~ minor modification is consistent with the l

~

previous design basis of the HW system and will not create any ;

'new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the SAR. In Exempt Changes Page 35 [

I i

~'

+

summary, the. margin of safety as defined in the bases to the !

Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation ,

are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all :

requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a i

result of CE-7169.

. Exempt Change CE-7200 Description '

This Minor Modification involves component replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in ,

the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same

?2 unction as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The ;

design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the CM system and will not create any-new types of accidents cr malfunctions evaluated in the SAR. In i summary, the margin of sefety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all requirements necessary fcr plant operation and safety. It is ,

determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-7200.

Evaluation

- This Minor Modification will replace valve 1CM309 (Item Numbers 06J-601) with new Item Numbers CMV-653. Presently this valve is '

a 1" Y-Type Globe valve used in a drain application. The replacement valve is a 1" inch bellows sealed gate valve. All ;

affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Exempt Change CE-7215 Description ,

Minor Modification CNCE-7215 adds a vent valve to the BB pump 1A and 1B seal water cooler inlets, eliminates threaded fittings and provides tailpipes to allow safety venting hot fluid and air from the BB pumps. The purpose of this minor mod is to provide a means tr adequately vent the BB pump discharge to prevent air 4

Exempt Changes l Page 36

i entrapment in the seal in order to increase reliability of the mechanical seal and sealwater piping. The BB pump seals and

-mechanical joints on the seal supply piping have been unreliable. '

This modification is expected ;o increase the reliability of the mechanical seal and seal piping. This arrangement is recommended by current API standards. The vent. valve and piping specified ,

meet the design requirements for pressure and temperature and l will be installed per applicable standards. t i

Evaluation The BB pump is a class G component. The pump is located in the :

building basement and is not in the vicinity of any equipment vital to the safe shutdown of the reactor. The function of the BB system is to maintain proper S/G shell side water chemistry and the only safety related function of BB pump is to Isolate on Containment Phase A isolation or on CA auto-start. The BB pump ,

-does not exist in the safety related function of the BB system.

Section 10.4.8 of the FSAR only describes the function of the BB pump and this Minor Modification does not change that function. ,

The S/B Blowdown procedures are not described in detail in the SAR. This minor mod is expected to increase the reliability of the pump mechanical seal. Since the BB pump does not perform any d

safety related functions and it in not located in the vicin y of any components that provide safety related functions, this mod will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. This modification will not create the i possibility or increase the consequences of a malfunction of ;

equipment important to safety evaluated in FSAR. This {

modification will not create the possibility for malfunction of t equipment of equipment of a different type that evaluated in the .

FSAR and will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the ;

basis of any technical specifications.

i

Exempt Change CE-7218 Description ,

This modification will change the frequency of Turbine Stop/

Control / Intercept valve testing as currently required in selected Licensee Commitment 16.7-5. Catawba N.S. presently test the Turbine Stop and Intercept valves on a weekly basis. The Turbine !

Control valves are tested on a monthly basis. Catawba N.S. has received " updated" missile probability calculations from GE based on changing the Turbine Stop and Intercept valves periodic test to monthly and the Control valve test to quarterly. The probabilities. The probabilities have gone up slightly as :

compared to the weekly / monthly test probabilities but are still Exempt Changes Page 37 ,

i

1 i

within the NRC limits established for rotor missile l probabilities. This modification will also change the recommended test interval for the "Off-line" test of the mechanical overspeed trip device on the main turbine. GE has reviewed the operating experience of the mechanical overspeed ,

trip device on nuclear steam turbines and has concluded that the intervals between tests can be extended to 18 to 24 months per ,

reference 7, GE TIL #1165-3. This will also align the GE i recommendation with the insurance requirement of "once per fuel cycle".

Evaluation [

Catawba N.S. requested the removal of prior Technical Specification 3/4.3.4, " Turbine Overspeed Protection" and bases, ;

from the Technical Specifications to the Selected Licensee ,

Commitments (SLC) manual which is Chapter 16 of the FSAR. The :

relocation of'these requirements was granted. The SER ;

acknowledged that the turbine overspeed control is not part of an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the :

integrity of a fission product barrier. Placing the surveillance requirements in the SLC which is part of the FSAR, will allow optimization of testing and inspection frequencies without prior !

NRC approval as no Tech Spec change will be required. The SER !

acknowledged that Catawba planned on making changes to inspection frequencies via SLC changes utilizing the 50.59 regulation which is done under this modification. Selected Licensee Commitment '

16.7-5~can be changed as described above per Minor Modification :

CE-7218. This change does not involve any Unreviewed Safety l Questions. No Technical Specification changes are required. ;

FSAR changes are requires to sections 3.5.1.3 and 10.2.3.6 text, i Table 3-13, and Table 3-14. These are attached to the Minor Modification package.

Exempt Change CE-7245 ,

Description Minor Modification CNCE-7245 adds a vent valve to the BB pump 2A and 2B seal water cooler inlets, eliminates threaded fittings and ,

provides tailpipes to allow safety venting hot fluid and air from the BB pumps. The purpose of this minor mod is to provide a means to adequately vent the BB pump discharge to prevent air entrapment in the seal in order to increase reliability of the ,

mechanical seal and sealwater piping. The BB pump seals and mechanical joints on the seal supply piping have been unreliable. i' This modification is expected to increase the reliability of the

' mechanical seal and seal piping. This arrangement is recommended Exempt Changes Page 38 l

, -. - - .- - . - - - . -.- . . . - .. - - -~ . - -

t r

by~ current API. standards. The vent valve and piping specified f meet.the design requirements for pressure and temperature and !

. will be installed per applicable standards. .

Evaluation !

i The BB pump is a class G component. The pump is located in the building basement and is.not in the vicinity of any equipment ,

vital to the safe shutdown of the reactor. The function of the !

BB. system is to maintain proper S/G shell side water chemistry and-the only safety related function of BB' pump.is to Isolate on ,

Containment Phase A isolation or on CA auto-start. The BB pump r does not exist in the safety related function of the BB system. .

Section 10.4.8 of the FSAR only describes the function of the BB !

pump and this Minor Modification does not change that function.

The S/B Blowdown procedures are not described in detail'in the i SAR.. This minor mod is expected to. increase the reliability of

the pump mechanical seal. Since the BB pump does not perform any

. safety related functions and it in not located in the vicinity of l any components that provide safety related functions, this mod l will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident ;

evaluated in the FSAR. This modification will not create the !

possibility or increase the consequences of a malfunction of ;

equipment important to safety evaluated in FSAR. This modification.will not create the possibility for malfunction of !

equipment of equipment of a different type that evaluated in the ;

FSAR and will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the ;

basis of any technical specifications. !

i Exempt Change CE-7256 {

Description

This Minor Modification will add high point vent valve 1KF174 on :

the suction piping to KF Pump 1B, between valves 1KF15 and 1KF17.

The addition of the new valve and piping will allow an easy and ;

reliable method for venting the suction pipe. Valve 1KF174 is a j 1 inch stainless steel, bellows sealed globe valve, item number ,

DMV-1021. All of the affected drawings will be revised to l reficct the addition of this valve.

Evaluation The CNS Tech Spe , are not affected by this modification. The only affect to 1 e FSAR is a drawing change to show the addition of valve 1KF174 and the associated vent piping. The attached Valve Replacement Evaluation Form documents that the applicable design inputs, such as codes, standards, seismic, flow, '

compatibility, and function as described in ANSI 45.2.11 have been addressed. Based on the stress analysis and operational

. evaluation by Engineering, and'FSAR requirements, it is Exempt Changes Page 39 v w < p < .-- , n - .,

l determined that no USQs'will arise as a result of this ;

modification.

' Exempt-Change CE-7273 Description This Corrective Minor Mod deletes the Final Feedwater hydraz'ine ;

analyzer from the CT System and replaces it with a sodium ~

analyzer. .The previously used sodium anal yzer was sh ared between several sample points which have higher sodium concentrations. ;

Since the feedwater sodium concentration is extremely low, the analyzer'could not provide an accurate analysis of the actual concentration. Therefore, the final feedwater sample needed to .

be placed on.a separate analyzer. The hydrazine analysis will:be performed using.a different: analyzer.

Evaluation

-This change neither increased the probability of an accidente increase the consequences of any accident nor create the ,

possibility of a different accident as addressed in the FSAR.

The-sample point in question is not associated with any addressed ,

accident. The monitoring of sodium and hydrazine in the CT System does not affect any equipment that is important safety as .

addressed in the FSAR. There is no increased possibility oi!

malfunction of any equipment due to the sampling change as described above. The. sampling of final feedwater is not i addressed in Tech Specs. Therefore, no reduced margin of safety ;

as defined in Tech Specs is reduced due to this mod.

i Exempt Change CE-7274 !

Description t This Corrective' Minor Mod deletes the Final Feedwater hydrazine analyzer from the CT System and replaces it with a sodium l analyzer. The previously used sodium analyzer was shared between i several sample points which have higher sodium concentrations.

Since the feedwater sodium concentration is extremely low, the analyzer could not provide an accurate analysis of the actual concentration. Therefore, the final feedwater sample needed to be placed on a separate analyzer. The hydrazine analysis will be performed using a different analyzer. l Evaluation l This change neither increased the probability of an accident, increase the consequences of any accident nor create the !

possibility of a different' accident as addressed in the FSAR. l The' sample point in question is not associated with any addressed Exempt Changes l Page 40 )

l

Y f

accident. .The monitoring.of sodium and hydrazine in the CT f System does not affect any equipment that is important safety as ;

addressed in the FSAR. There is no increased possibility of t malfunction of any equipment due to the sampling change as described above. The sampling of final feedwater is not j addressed in Tech Specs. Therefore, no reduced margin of safety >

as defined in Tech Specs is reduced due to this mod.

Exempt Change CE-7321 Description l The purpose ~of this evaluation is to document plant issues in order to allow for replacement of the Chemical and Volume Control (NV) Seal Water Injection Filters with a smaller micron rated filter. This evaluation will document no changes to the limits and precautions of the Seal Water Filters for this replacement. t Finally, this evaluation will determine whether there are any unreviewed safety questions (USQ) associated with this ,

,. modification. !

Evaluation In summary, this modification involves change to an existing component. No additional components are added, deleted, or replaced. No alterations are made to existing pipes or structures. The Seal Water Injection Filters will continue to satisfy, meet and exceed design parameters as specified in the FSAR requirements. The margin of safety to any Tech. Specs. will l not be decreased as a result of the change. Therefore, there is no USQ associated with this modification.

Exempt Change CE-7342 [

Description I The purpose of this evaluation is to document plant issues in order to allow for replacement of the Recycle Evaporation Feed Filter with smaller micron rated filters. This evaluation will ,

document no changes to the limits and precautions of the Recycle ;

Evaporation Feed Filters for this replacement. Finally, this evaluation will determine whether there are any unreviewed safety questions (USO) associated with this modification.

Evaluation In summary, this modification involves change to an existing component. No additional components are added, deleted, or replaced. No alterations are made to existing pipes or structures. The Recycle Evaporation Feed filters will continue to meet and_ exceed design parameters as specified in the FSAR requirements. The margin of safety to any Tech. Specs. will not Exempt Changes Page 41

~- _ _.

be. decreased as a result of the change. Therefore, there is no USQ associated with'this modification.

Exempt Change CE-7384 Description This minor mod will revise the digital turbine control system logic to ensure that DO/L's (digital outputs to the loop) will produce OIU alarms even when the signals.are present for a very

-short duration. This'will be accomplished by adding a time delay block which will ensure the signal to the DO/L remains active for 2 seconds. This is long enough to ensure the OIU senses the alarm condition. Making these logic changes does not effect'any of the control logic for the turbine. It only effects the DO/L's that cause the OIU alarms.

Evaluation

.This minor mod will not have any effect on Tech Specs or the SLCs. This minor mod will not increased the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. The possibility of an accident which is not evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The probability or consequences of a malfunction of equ'oment important to safety will not be increased as a. ret t of this minor mod. An USQ is not created by this minor mod.

Exempt Change CE-7416 Description This minor modification will update the RP-86A technical manual to include revision 4.0 of the operating software. The RP-86A is the digital output module that is used for all the radiation monitors except the containment and unit vent high range monitors, and the monitors in the waste monitor tank building, the annulus, and the reactor coolant filter pits. This version of the software will allow the monitors to communicate with the interface for the new Operator Aid Computer (OAC).

Evaluation A USQ Evaluation is not applicable to this modification. No changes to the FSAR or any technical specifications are required.

Exempt Change CE-7429 Description This Minor Modification will replace valve 1RN279 & 1RN299 (Item Numbers 06J-501) with new Item Numbers 02D-701. Presently this valve are 1" Y-Type Globe valve with leakage problems. They will Exempt Changes Page 42

h !

'l be replaced with a 1 inch Ball valves which will continue to j serve the same function. All affected drawings will be revised 't to reflect this new information. l Evaluation This Minor Modification involves a one-for-one component replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced ,

system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in i' the FSAR do not include'this valve in any design basis, therefore

.the increased. probability of an accident will not. occur due to 7 the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve.the same t function as'the old valve, therefore there will be no increased ,

consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The !

design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the RN system and will not create any ,

new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the SAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the l Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement }

of.this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question' Evaluation are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is ,

determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result-of CE-7429.

Exempt Change CE-7474 ;

Description This Minor Modification will replace valve ICF130 (Item Numbers i 06J-601) with new Item Numbers CMV-653. Presently this valve is !

a 1" Y-Type Globe valve used in a drain application. The replacement valve is a 1" inch bellows sealed gate valve. All !

affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves component replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased ,

consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The l design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the !

l previous design basis of the CF system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement Exempt Changes Page 43 l

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l

. I of this valve. .All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all ;

requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is !

determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result'of CE-7474.

Exempt Change CE-7475 Description This Minor Modification will replace valve ICM446 (Item Numbers 06J-602) with new Item Numbers CMV-654. Presently this valve is a 2" Y-Type Globe valve used in a drain application. The replacement valve is a 2" inch bellows sealed gate valve. All '

affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information, t Evaluation This Minor Modification involves component placement / improvement.

, The overall gain should be in enhanced system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include ,

this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased 8 probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement .

4 of this valve. the new valve will serve the same function as the

old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis ,

of the CM system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of ;

safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no",

2 therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-7475.

Exempt Changa CE-7476 Description l This Minor Modification will replace valve 1CM435 (Item Numbers l 06J-602) with new Item Numbers CMV-654. Presently this valve is i a 2" Y-Type Globe valve used in a drain application. The j s replacement valve is a 2" inch bellows sealed gate valve which is an acceptable design for this type of application. All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

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Exempt Changes Page 44 ,

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i

-Evaluation- .

This Minor Modification involves component !

replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced ,

system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in the'FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to l the replacement of this valve. the new. valve'will serve the same >

function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased ,

consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the ;

previous design basis of the CM system and will not create any

).

new types of-accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement '

of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all ;

requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is

. determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a

. result of CE-7476. :

i Exempt Change CE-7477 Description This Minor Modification will replace valve IND034 (Item Numbers 09J-550) with new Item Numbers DMV-1021. Presently this valve is a h" Y-Type Globe' valve with a history of seat leakage. IND034 will be replaced with a 1 inch Y-Type Bellows Sealed Globe valve.

All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves a component replacement / '

improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the ,

increased probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased 5 4

consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the ND system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR.

In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the i Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. -All anpwers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are<"no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all Exempt Changes Page 45

i requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is-determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a

, result of CE-7477.

Exempt Change CE-7480 Description This Minor Modification.will replace valve IRC104 (Item-Numbers 06J-602) with new Item Numbers CMV-654. Presently this valve is a 2" Y-Type Globe valve _used in a-drain application. The replacement valve is a 2" inch bellows sealed gate valve which is an acceptable design for this type of application. .All affected !

drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This. Minor Modification involves component replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced ,

system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not-occur due to the replacement of this valve. the.new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased j consequences of an accident or equipment Malfunctions. The t

-design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the RC system and will not create any i new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement ]

of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all )

requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is !

determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-7480.

Exempt Change CE-7491 Description This Minor Modification will replace valve 1RL159 (Item Numbers 06J-601) with new Item Numbers CMV-653. Presently this valve is a 1" Y-Type Globe valve used in a vent application. The replacement valve is a 1" inch bellows sealed gate valve. All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves component replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR-do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to Exempt Changes Page 46

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the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same

function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased ,

consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this_ minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the RL system and will not create any l new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the ,

Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation '

are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to orovide all

- requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a :

~

result of CE-7481. l i

Exempt Change CE-7482 Description

. This Minor Modification will replace valve IND066 (Item Numbers 09J-550) with new Item Numbers DMV-1021. Presently this valve is ,

a " Y-Type Globe valve with a history of seat leakage. IND066 l will be replaced with a 1 inch Y-Type Bellows Sealed Globe valve. 3 All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

J l

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves a_ component replacement / !

improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system J operability and availability. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the m increased probability of an accident will not occur due to the i

replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The !

design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the ,

previous design basis of the ND system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a ,

result of CE-7482.

- Exempt Changes ,

Page 47

Exempt Change CE-7483 Description

~

This Minor Modification will' replace valve IVG013 & IVG014 ' (Item ;

' Numbers 06J-501) with new Item Numbers,02D-701. Presently this valve are 1" Y-Type Globe valve.with leakage problems. They will -

be replaced with a 1 inch Ball valves which will continue to serve-the same function. All affected drawings will be revised i to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves'a one-for-one component

-replacement / improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced i system operability and availability. .The accidents evaluated-in the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to-the replacement of this valve. the new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis.of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the VG system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the l Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation !

are "no", therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all !

s requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-7483.

Exempt Change CE-7521 l Description This minor modification will revise the digital turbine control !

system logic to allow a higher TARGET value to be selected.

Since T-HOT reduction a higher valve reference is required to >

reach 100% load. This valve reference, when in OPEN loop, is ,

calculated by the TARGET that is selected. The highest TARGET l that can now be selected is 1280 Mwatts. This was an arbitrary ,

select limit that was adequate prior to the implementation of T- r HOT reduction. This Minor Modification will allow a TARGET of 1340 Mwatts to be selected. This MM will not effect the controlling function of the turbine, it only changes the logic to allow a higher TARGET to be selected. This Minor Mod. will not effect turbine trip or valve closure time (overspeed protection) i in any way.

Evaluation This minor mod is not changing the function of the turbine controlfsystem. Accordingly, it will not change the facility Exempt Changes Page 48 {

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~ _ _ _

described in the FSAR. It does not change procedures or i experiments described in the FSAR; nor is it significant enough l to require inclusion in the FSAR. This change will not adversely affect any SSC necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR. This minor mod does not perform a test or experiment which is not described in the FSAR. This change will have no effect on either Tech Specs or the SLC. Therefore, further 10CFR50.59 evaluation is not required.

Exempt Change CE-7529 !

Description This minor modification revises the drawings to reflect the AS-BUILT condition of the plant. The chart recorders on 1MC2 are driven from the OAC. The operator can select which OAC point is trended using the TREND GROUP program. The chart recorders function correctly the way they are wired, the drawings need to be updated to reflect this plant configuration.

Evaluation This change does not change the facility, or methods of operation, as described in the FSAR. This change does not perform a test or experiment. This change will not affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR. This change is not significant and does not need to be included in the FSAR. There were no Tech Specs or USQ changes required. -

Exempt Change CE-7562 !

Description Revise NW flow diagram CN-2569-1.0 to correct errors and reflect current plant configuration per the attached sketches.

Evaluation [

This modification does not require inclusion in the FSAR. Nor l does it require any changes to Tech Specs. There are no USQs evaluations required.

Exempt Change CE-7567 Description >

A leak has developed on a flex hose connecting the KC piping to the 1A. Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Cooler. The leaking flex hose, .

Mark No._CN-1KC-H-2 will be replaced with a spare flex hose Mark

No. MG-lKC-H-8. The spare hose was located at McGuire and was i ordered and specified for the same application as the leaking ,

hose at CNS.

Exempt Changes '

Page 49

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t i

Evaluation t This minor mod will not alter the ability of the KC system nor .

I the Reactor Coolant pump to perform their designed function.

There are no changes to'the FSAR or the Tech Specs. The I

structural integrity of the system and component identified in I

this mod will not be degraded. A USQ is not applicable.

Exempt Change CE-7578 Description i This modification replaces valve 12NW69B (existing Item No. 04D-239*) with a new Item No.04D-245*. The current valve design.is obsolete and frequently has operational problems. The new valve ;

design has eligiloy springs and vernier reed switches which is a i more reliable design.

Evaluation :

No changes were made in Tech Specs or FSAR due to this modification. A safety review has been performed and there are-no USO involved with this modification.

Exempt Change'CE-7622 f Description This modification replaces valve 2NW46A (existing Item No. 04D- l 239*) with a new Item No.04D-245*. The current valve design is obsolete and frequently has operational problems. The new valve design has eligiloy springs and vernier reed switches which is a more reliable design.

Evaluation ;

No changes were made in Tech Specs or FSAR due to this !

modification. A safety review has been performed and there are no USQ involved with this modification. [

r Exempt Change CE-7693 !

Description !

A Boron Recycle (NB) System gas educator (ejector) was used to ;

remove hydrogen and fission gases from the Recycle Holdup Tanks ;

(RHTs) and the Waste Drain Tank (WDT). This ejector was removed from the system for cleaning and was subsequently lost. A replacement ejector could not be located or manufactured. Minor Modification CNCE-7693 will provide piping modifications to the !

RHT/WDT purge line to facilitate hydrogen and fission gas removal l from the tanks via a temporarily installed vacuum pump. The pump !

will transfer the gases to the WG compressors, the missing i j

Exempt Changes {

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ejector will be replaced with a pipe tee. The run of the tee

' leading to compressor discharge will be blanked. In addition, a ;

blank flange will be installed at the standing end of the piping ;

which originates at the compressor discharge. Also, tubing at valves 1NB479 and INB480 will be extended to allow connection of the pump. Finally, existing vacuum gage ONBPG5090, located in the tank purge line, will be replaced with_a compound gage to provide improved tank pressure information to system operators. ;

Evaluation Minor modification CNCE-7693 has no Unresolved Safety Questions.

No Tech Spec Changes'are required. A minor revision to FSAR

section 9.3.5.2.1.12 is required to update a reference to the Recycle Holdup Tank Vent Ejector. :

Exempt Change CE-7712 Description A partial replacement of the piping in the WT system, from the ,

aeration blowers to the Aquaculture Pond and the (4) Aeration ;

' Lagoons distribution header including the agua tubing prior to i lEOC-9. The replacement pining will be 3" polyethylene, the original material, polybut,leae, is no longer available. This partial piping replacement will prevent any impact on the refueling outage to discharge water. The larger PE will allow more air to be delivered to the WT ponds for any future !

requirements. L i

Evaluation I No unreviewed safety question is associated with this modification. No changes are required in the FShR or Technical ,

, Specifications. A State notification is not required by this modification. i Exempt Change CE-7849 !

Description i

a Teledyne Brown Engineering Analytical Instruments has issued an addendum to CNM-1210.09-0195 recommended spare parts list to ,

identify suitable pump replacement parts as well as a suitable ;

replacement pump assembly. No immediate action to replace j original equipment is recommended therefore the original l

. components will be replaced on an 'as-fail-basis'. ,

l Evaluation i The replacement components and pump assemble is identical in i form, fit and function. The VY system operation remains l unchanged. The pump / component model is not addressed in the FSAR !

Exempt Changes l Page 51 l 1

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or Technical Specifications. Accordingly, this activity does not change the facility as described in the FSAR. This modification will not change procedures, methods of operation, or alter a test as described in the FSAR. This change does'not required inclusion in the FSAR. This activity does not adversely affect any system or component necessary to opernte the plant in accordance with the FSAR. This modification does not perform a test or experiment that is not addressed in the FSAR. Therefore, no;further evaluation is necessary beyond this screening for Unreviewed. Safety Question applicability.

Exempt Change CE-7930 Description Editorial Minor Modification, CNCE-7930, will revise the Component Cooling (KC) System Design Bases Document (DBD) and the FSAR to reflect the correct flow rates and heat loads as found in calculation CNC-1223.23-00-0022, Component Cooling Heat Load and Flow Requirements. Over the year, this calculation has been revised several times, however the DBD and the FSAR were not updated in conjunction with this new information. This discrepancy was found by the SITA audit, SA-95-21. The changes are Editorial and will not require field work.

Evaluation There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with this modification. Also, no Technical Specification changes will be required. The FSAR will need to revised, however this revision will only reflect correct Design Basis information.

Exempt Change CE-7938 Description This modification concerns specifically corrective actions in restoring corroded tubesheet and interior channel surfaces of KC (Component Cooling) Heat Exchanger (HX) 1B by application of a protective coating designed for under water surface conditions.

Unprotected original carbon steel tubesheets and channels of the KC HXs have corrosion damage due to exposure to rsw lake water used for cooling. Corrosion damage has the future potential to be severe if not corrected. Design Spec CNS 1201.06-00-0002 provides generic KC HX coating requirements applicable to the severe under service environment to assure qualification of prospective coating suppliers.

Evaluation This modification does not craate an unreviewed safety question.

No FSAR or Tech Spec changes are necessary or needed.

Exempt Changes Page 52

Exempt Change CE-7977 Description The purpose of this evaluation.is to document plant issues in.

order-to allow for usage of a similar filter to that of the present 0.1' micron Chemical and Volume Control (NV) Seal Water Injection Filter. This evaluation will document no change to the limits and precautions of the Seal Water Filters.

Evaluation The Margin of safety to any Technical Specifications will not be decreased as a result of the change. Therefore, there will be no reduction in any safety margins. In summary, this modification involves change to an existing component. No additional components are added, deleted or replaced. No alterations are made to existing pipes or structures. The new 0.1 Seal Water Injection filter is nearly identical to the present 0.1 micron filter (See Attachment 1). This filter will continue to satisfy, ,

meet and exceed design parameters as specified in the FSAR requirements. Therefore, there is no USQ associated with this modification. ,

i Exempt Change CE-7983 Description This Minor Modification will replace valves 1CF125 and 1CF137 (Iten Number 06J-601) with new Item Number 06J-243. Presently these valves are 1" Y-Type Globe valves used in vent applications. The replacement valves are a k" globe valves. A reducing insert will be used in the 1" half coupling. All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves a component replacement / ,

improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system operability as the new valves will provide better service. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include ICF125 and ICF137 in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement of this valve.

the new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the CF system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications .

will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All Exempt Changes Page 53

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i l

answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no",

therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all ,

requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is }

determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a j result of CE-7983. !

i I

Exempt Change CE-7998 ;

Description [

Modification CNCE-7998 changes the EHM documentation to reflect (

the fact that the hydrogen ignitor'part number has changed from i 7G to 12G. This modification could not increase the probability ;

of an accident evaluated in the FSAR, because the Hydrogen -

Mitigation (EHM) System is not an accident initiator. It is l designed for accident mitigation. The modification will not !

. increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. !

Since the form, fit, function and material have not changed, the !

EHM system will be capable as ever of mitigating the consequences {

of hydrogen accumulation in containment. This modification will l not create the possibility for an accident of a different type !

than any evaluated in the FSAR, because the design parameters of l the hydrogen ignitors have not changed. It will not increase the i probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety i evaluated in the FSAR. Since the form, fit, function and j material are the same, all the test conducted and documented in the Red Book are still applicable, and the probability of failure !

is no greater. Redundancy will still be present in the hydrogen >

ignitors, and the modification does not make either ignitor !

covering the same region more likely to fail. !

i Evaluation l The Red Book is considered the design basis for the EHM system. l The Safety Evaluation Report was based on the submittal of the l Red Book. This modification change does not reduce the margin of j safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification. j No changes are needed to the FSAR. {

i Exempt Change CE-8025 , j Description l Minor Mod CE-8025 will replace chart recorder 1SMCR5370 with a l Westronics Series 3200 chart recorder. The existing chart i recorder is obsolete and replacement parts are difficult to I obtain. l i

Exempt Changes l Page 54 !

3 Evaluation A Unreviewed Safety Question is not applicable to this modification. No technical specifications or FSAR changes are required.

Exempt Change CE-8040 Description This Minor Modification will replace valve 1RL318 Item Number 06J-601) with new Item Number CMV-653. Presently this valve is a 1" Y-Type Globe valve used in vent application. The replacement 1" valve is a bellows sealed valve. All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves a component replacement /

improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system

. operability as the new valves will provide better service. The accidents evaluated in the FSAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement of this valve. The new valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the RL system and will not create any new types of accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no",

therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-8040.

Exempt Change CE-8072 Description The criteria of 10CFR50.59(a)2 will be applied to make this determination per the requirements of NSD-209 (ref.9). Minor Modification CNCE-8072 will revise Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water (KD) system Test Acceptance Criteria (TAC) sheets to reflect current tube plugging requirements. Safety related heat exchangers cooled by the RN system (KC,KD,NS,etc) are tested periodically to insure sufficient heat transfer capacity.

Parameters affecting heat transfer capacity include hot fluid flow, cold fluid flow, heat transfer surface area, cleanliness of the heat transfer surface area, and the temperature difference

. between the' hot and cold fluid. The required heat transfer Exempt Changes Page 55

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I capacity is defined as the amount of heat rejected to the KD ;

system by the D/Gs during actual performance testing. (Reference !

Engineering calculation CNC-1223.59-01-0005). Temperature of the

cold fluid (RN) is defined as the peak temperature of the Standby !

Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP). Current CNS Test Acceptance i Criteria for components cooled by RN are based on maximum SNSWP- [

> temperature of 100 degrees F. Temperature of the hot fluid (KD) is based on the cooling requirements of the D/G engine as i documented on manufacturer's drawing CNM-1301.00-0237-001.

Current analysis is based on KD inlet temperature of 190

F. !

. Requirements for hot fluid flowrate, cold fluid flowrate, heat i transfer surface area, and surface the fouling are determined in ,

CNC-1223.59-01-0005. These parameters must combine to provide :

the required heat capacity given the KD and RN temperatures given j above. !

Evaluation ,

The responses to all seven questions were negative, therefore l there are no unreviewed safety questions associated with Minor !

Modification CNCE-8072. No FSAR or Tech Spec changes are required.

Exempt Change CE-8116 i Description Minor Modification CNCE-8116 blocks three small water flow paths ,

through pipe sleeves just above elevation 552 in the crane wall j in the Unit 2 lower containment. Blockage of these paths !

prevents passage of particles of insulation that could l potentially lead to partial blockage of the containment recirculation sump screen. Such particles are dense enough to quickly pass to the bottom of the volume of water collecting j inside the crane wall under postulated accident conditions. t There is a large margin in the volume of water to provide a l source for ECCS circulation which will pass through openings at a l l

higher elevation. The minor modification was initiated as a result of a problem identified in a Problem Investigation j Progress Report.

Evaluation !

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There are no USQs created by Minor Modification CNCE-8119. No i Technical Specification changes are required. A minor change to l FSAR Section 6.3.4.1 is required.

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Exempt Changes I Page 56 l l

Exempt Change CE-8126 Description Modification CE-8126 will drill a 1/8 inch hole in the upstream disc of valve 2ND053 in order to provide a relief path for pressure locking / thermal binding considerations. Valve 2ND053 is normally locked open, passive,. manual valve that is not required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Drilling the upstream disc will change the valve from having bi-directional scaling capability to only uni-directional sealing capability.

The requirement of the valve to seal in only one direction of flow has been evaluated and determined to be acceptable.

Performing modification CE-8126 does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Evaluation Based on the results of the above USQ evaluation, it is concluded that drilling the upstream disc in valve 2ND053 does not involve an unreviewed safety question. No changes to the technical specifications or the FSAR are required.

Exempt Change CE-8127 Description Replace existing ITT Barton model 752 transmitters with Rosemount model 1151DP3 transmitters. This affects 1NVET5120, 5130, 5140,

& 5150. The modification is necessary because the Bartons lose calibration upon being overranged and an accurate assessment of RCP seal leakage flow rate is necessary to start the pumps without causing undue wear to the seals.

Evaluation This activity does not change the facility as described in the FSAR. Th '. n modification will not change procedures, methods of operation, or alter a test as described in the FSAR. This change does not require addition into the FSAR. This activity does not adversely affect any system or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR. This modification does not perform a test or experiment that is not addressed in the FSAR.

Therefore, no USQ or further evaluation is necessary beyond this screening. .

4 Exempt Change CE-8132 Description j The Minor Modification will not revise the facility as described i

in the FSAR because no change is being made to the Rod Control

. System's function. No other changes will be made other than adding the new Duke replacement Firing Circuit Card P/N to the ;

Exempt Changes Page 57 I

i

appropriate design documents to allow card replacement as ;

required. CE-8132 does not change procedures, methods of j operation, or alter a test or experiment as described in the FSAR. This Minor Modification is not significant enough to require inclusion in the 6AR because the system's function or operation is not being changed as described in the FSAR. CE-8132 could'not adversely affect any system, structure, or component.

necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR because no automatic action or safety related functions are affected.

Evaluation In summary, it is concluded that the new replacement Firing Circuit Card, does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

The new replacement Firing Card does not represent a change to the plant's licensing basis, and there is not change to the Technical Specifications. Because the change does not adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate in the plant in accordance with the FSAR, the original licensing basis continues to be met. For the stated above, an Unreviewed Safety Question is not created.

Exempt Change CE-8133 Description The Minor Modification will not revise the facility as described in.the FSAR because no change is being made to the Rod Control System's function. No other changes will be made other than adding the new Duke replacement Firing Circuit Card P/N to the appropriate design documents to allow card replacement as required. CE-8133 does not change procedures, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as described in the FSAR. This Minor Modification is not significant enough to require inclusion in the FSAR because the system's function or operation is not being changed as described in the FSAR. CE-8133 could not adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR because no automatic action or safety related functions are affected.

Evaluation In summary, it is concluded that the new replacement Firing Circuit Card, does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

The new replacement Firing Card does not represent a change to the plant's licensing basis, and there is not change to the Technical Specifications. Because the change does not adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate in the plant in accordance with the FSAR, the original licensing Exempt Changes Page 58

/

basis continues to be met. For the stated above, an Unreviewed

' Safety. Question is not created.

Exempt Change CE-8139 Description Minor Modification CNCE-8139 blocks three small water flow paths ,

through pipe sleeves just above elevation 552 in the crane wall in the Unit 2 lower containment. Blockage of.these paths prevents passage of particles of insulation that could ,

potentially lead to partial blockage of the containment recirculation sump screen. Such particles are dense enough to quickly pass to the bottom of the volume of water collecting ;

-inside the crane wall under postulated accident conditions.

There is still a large margin in the volume of water to provide a source for ECCS circulation which will pass through openings at a :

higher elevation. The minor modification was initiated as a l

. result of a problem identified in a Problem' Investigation Process !

Report.

Evaluation There are no USQs created by Minor Modification CNCE-8139.

No l Technical Specification changes are required. A minor change to FSAR Section 6.3.4.1 is required.

Exempt Change CE-8143 Dameription This Minor !bdi f t;ation will replace valve IRC071 (Item Number ,

02D-202) with new Item Number CMV-520. Presently this valve is a

- 3"' Gate valve used in vent application. The replacement valve is

. a 3" ball valve which is an acceptable design for this type of application. All affected drawings will be revised to reflect this new information.

Evaluation This Minor Modification involves a component replacement /

improvement. The overall gain should be in enhanced system operability as the new valves will provide better service. The accidents evaluated in the SAR do not include this valve in any design basis, therefore the increased probability of an accident will not occur due to the replacement of this valve. The new >

s' valve will serve the same function as the old valve, therefore

'there will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. The design basis of this minor modification is consistent with the previous design basis of the ,

RC-system and will not create any new types of accidents or ,

malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR. In summary, the margin of j safety as defined in the bases to the Technical Specifications Exempt Changes t Page 59 !

i I

)

will not be reduced by the replacement of this valve. All t answers to the Unreviewed Question Evaluation are "no", !

therefore, the new valve will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-8143.

~

Exempt Change CE-8182 l Description [

After returning Unit 2 to power, the 2D reactor coolant pump !

" Mount Horizontal" vibration' channel caused numerous alarms. !

! Evaluation of the situation has shown that the mean value of the [

vibration level on this channel is close the alarm level of 3.0 Mils, and periodically values would exceed the alarm limit. The !

channel would stay in alarm.very briefly, with the vibration r level returning to the average level below the alarm limit. l Based on the steady behavior of the mean value of this vibration l

. channel and evaluation of the other vibration channels on this !

machine, Engineering recommends that the pump can be operated l

> without concern over the condition of the machine of reduced I safety of the Unit. In order to make the alarm meaningful to l Operations personnel, it is further recommended that the alarm

, level setpoint for motor mount be raised to 3.4 Mils. A ,

statement is inserted into the pump manual for the purpose of clean configuration control describing the alarm set-point change.

, t Evaluation The alarm set-point change does r.ot create a possibility of an accident or malfunction different from those evaluated in the i FSAR. And the margin of safety associated with all technical specifications and their basis us unchanged.

Exempt Change CE-8184 Description This minor modification will provide control of valve lYM461 from j 0YMPT5430. Minor Mod CE-8184 will revise drawings to permanently install TSM 93058956. This change is necessary because the flow i paths of the YM system have been modified due to the addition of a Reverse Osmosis unit. CE-8184 will allow control of recirculation water flow to the YM Supply Pumps, control of water flow to the Reverse Osmosis unit, and will reduce water hammer on the YM system piping.

Evaluation No USQs are created by this minor mod. FSAR changes will be required due to YM system flow diagrams (Figures 9.44 and 9.47)

Exempt Changes Page 60

being revised. No Tech. Spec changes are required due to this l modification. l Exempt Change CE-8185 Description Minor Modification No. CNCE-8185 will allow the replacement 011 ;

Heater Thermostats supplied by the vendor for the Control Room '

Area Chilled Water System Chillers to be used.

Evaluation An unreviewed safety queocion evaluation has been performed, and no unreviewed safety questions were identified. Station Technical Specification will not be affected. No changes to the ,

FSAR or Tech Specs are required. ,

Exempt Change CE-8207 ,

Description This modification replaces valve 2NW217B (exiting Item No. 04D- l 240*)with a new Item No. 04D-245*, The current valve design has !

eligiloy springs and vernier reed switches which is a more i

reliable design.

Evaluation A safety review has been performed and there are no USQs involved with this modification. A markup of the applicable FSAR change is attached which are Tables 3-104, P.70.

Exempt Change CE-8208 !

Description This minor mod is written to add a note to the ESF cabinet '

drawing specifying the material to be used in making the top cover plates. The material is not listed on any drawing. The .

remainder of the cabinet has been determined to be carbon steel, ,

and a note will be added which specifies the cover plates to be made of carbon steel A/SA36 or equivalent. The Cabinets are !

designed for both top and bottom cable entry. These cover plates are the top cable entry areas, which are not used at Catawba. !

The plates are 1/8" thick, and provide no structural support to

. the ESF cabinet. They are attached to the cabinet by the use of 4, #6 pan head slotted machine screws. Their only function is to prevent dust, etc. from getting into the cabinets through the top cable entry areas. As these plates provide no structural or i environmental qualification functions, they are not considered to be QA part. A note will be added which specifies these plates as Exempt Changes f Page 61 l i

. - . . . . . - - - - ~. -. - - -

i i

being non-QA. This has been discussed with John Richards (Civil- i Group /GO) and he is in agreement. J

]

Evaluation )

The margin of safety defined in the basis for any tech spec will >

not be reduced as a result of this modification. As the only ;

function of these plates is to cover an access hole, the l probability and/or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Also, the possibility of an accident different from those evaluated in the FSAR will not be created. l The probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment l important to safety will not be increased. This mod specifies !

the as-built material for fabricating and installing the covers !

i only._ The cabinet function and design will not be changed. This (

mod will not impact any other SSC. This mod will not create the- ;

possibility of a malfunction not described in the FSAR. Based on j this discussion, an unreviewed safety question is not created by !

this modification and further 10CFR50.59 evaluation is not {

required. l l

I Exempt Change CE-8236 i I

Description This modification replaces valve 2NW145B (existing Item No. 04D-239*) with a new Item No. 04D-245*. The current valve design is obsolete and frequently has operational problems. The new valve ,

design has eligiloy springs and vernier reed switches which is a ;

more reliable design. j Evaluation ['

A safety review has been performed and there are no USQs involved with this modification. No changes to the technical specifications or FSAR are required.

Exempt Change CE-8245 !

Description ;

Tnis evaluation has been performed to determine if an Unreviewed Safety Question existed due to the Operable but Degrade Condition ;

f of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Standby Makeup Pump (SMP). The SMP sizing calculation contains errors which do not account for elevated spent fuel pool temperatures and higher SMP flow rates, ,

both of which could lead to inadequate available suction head for !

the pump. In order to consider the SMP and the Standby Shutdown System (SSS) as operable, the following conditions must be met:

1. Spent fuel pool temperatures need to be maintained at or below ;

i Exempt Changes !

Page 62 i

?

. - - - c

i 125 degrees F. as read on control room gauge 1(2)KFP5130. '2. The !

fuel pool level needs to be kept at or below 596 ft. elevation.

3. The suction damper charge pressure needs to be kept between 5 and 10 psig relative to a 70 degrees F. charge temperature.

These conditionn are met based on adherence to current procedures and Technical Specifications.

Evaluation There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions asscciated with this ,

Operable but Degraded evaluation. Also, no F?AR changes will be {

required. The SMP and SSS are technically operable from an ,

equipment / system standpoint, but considered to be operable but Degraded due to the unconservative borated water volume stated in i Tech Spec 4.7.13.3 (a) (2) . A Tech Spec change to correct this non-conservative value is needed. -

Exempt Change CE-8250 Description This Minor Modification will allow a leak repair option for INV271. This valve presently has body to bonnet leakage which

'will be repaired by use of sealant material being injected above ,

the pressure seal area in the body of the body of the valve.

Evaluation l This Minor Modification will not change the facility as described

]' in the FSAR. There will be no increased consequences of an accident or equipment malfunctions. All answers to the Unreviewed Safety Question Evaluation Screening are "no",

therefore the leak repair on INV271 will continue to provide all requirements necessary for plant operation and safety. It is

=

determined that no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of CE-8250.

Exempt Change CE-8261 Description An editorial revision to Section 10.4.8.2 was necessary to reflect a modification which changed BB pump mechanical seals to .

shaft packing. This revision has been prepared for inclusion in the 1996 update.

Evaluation !

No unreviewed safety questions are involved, and the original safety analysis remains valid. No change to the Tech Specs are required with this revision. However changes were made to the FSAR Section 10.4.8.2, Figure No. 10-31. ,

Exempt Changes Page 63 >

l Exempt Change CE-8400 '

Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if an USQ is involved with-a procedure change to OP/2/A/6100/02, Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown. Since there is no issue requiring l the unit to go to cold maintenance temperature less than 40'F, it is desirable to maintain the plant Mode 5 (180'F<T<200'F) . rather :

than proceed- to 160*F. Advantages for remaining at a temperature I greater than the current limitation of 160*F include the desire to minimize the temperature transient on the Reactor Coolant System (NC)and connected systems, thereby decreasing the potential for cyclic - related' stresses and potential for valve and flange leaks, and to minimize the potential for NC pressurizer Power Company Operator Relief Valve (PORV) challenges .

by avoiding water solid operation.

i ' Evaluation The. margins present in the Heatup and Cooldown Curves (Ref.2, L j Figure 3.4-3) are not affected by the Procedure Change.

Additionally, the Pressurizer Delta T is unaffected. The fission .

product barriers of the pellet, clad, NC pressure boundary and containment are not adversely affected as a result.of this procedure change. No Technical Specification or Unreviewed i Safety Questions were required. This evaluation is applicable to both Unit 1 and 2. ,

Exempt Change CE-8282 Description i This MM allows the installation of a qualified jumper to be installed on a temporary basis to provide adequate flow to the RF system Reactor Building header. The fire hose and/or RN drain piping used for this jumper is adequate to handle RF system flows, pressures, and temperatures.

Evaluation !

No USQs are created by the MM described in this package. No Tech !

I Specs or FSAR changes are required.

Exempt Change CE-8309 Description FWST Immersion Heater located in the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) nozzle G1 has had a minor leak (<1oz./ day). The leak has ;

apparently existed for a long time as slow seepage at the i electrical heater and its w'alded connection to the blind flange.

The heater terminals have uorroded and several have become non-functional, so this minor modification has been developed to i remove the electrical power and instrumentation cables from this Exempt Changes Page 64

heater element and allow sealing'the leaking connection.

Remaining heater capacity has been shown to be sufficient to !

maintain the FWST between its non-safety control system setpoints, and FWST integrity is assured by the method of '

encapsulation-of the leaking heater with ASME Section III Materials.

Evaluation No Tech Specs changes were required and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were 1dentified. No changes to the FSAR were required, i

Exempt Change CE-8322 Description

This minor modification will install 3 new vent valves in the 4" ND corridor portion of the RF system. They are needed to vent the system and to facilitate wet tap installation during the RF piping cleaning / replacement modification. The item number for this 3/4" bronze gate valves is CMV-091. The outline drawing is CNM 1205.00-643. All piping and other affected drawings will be ;

updated.

Evaluation Installing valves 1RFA-121, 122, and -123 will not affect the facility as described in the SAR. No procedures, tests, methods of operation, or experiments will be affected. This modification is a maintenance activity to improve the RF system's venting ability, and is not significant enough to require inclusion in

+ the FSAR. Since the system will then be more reliable, no system or component important to safety will be adversely affected, Finally, this activity will not perform a test or experiment that j is not currently included in the FSAR. Based on this discussion, ,

then, no Unreviewed Safety Questions will arise as a result of t

this modification, and not further evaluation is required beyond this screening.

Exempt' Change CE-8410

- Description i Minor Modification CNCE-8410 revises the configuration of support 1-R-SM-1645 to relocate the attachment point on the pipe. The pipe attachment is moved to provide he clearance required for the ;

installment of a leak repair device on the adjacent elbow. ;

i Evaluation AS detailed in this discussion, a USQ evaluation is not applicable to Minor Modification CNCE-8410. No SSCs are adversely affected by this modification, as the function of the

, support is not affected. No technical specification or FSAR changes are required.

Exempt changes .

Page 65 l

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Exempt' Change CE-60054 Description

-The Security barrier around the FWST was not designed to indicate if an intrusion has taken place following an intrusion alarm.

This requires the responding officer.to physically access the area inside the FWST missile wall. This creates a hazardous-situation since there is no means to access the perimeter of the FWST.

' Evaluation Per this evaluation, there is no USQs associated with Minor Modification CE-60054. This mod does not require any Tech Spec changes or changes to the FSAR.

Exempt Change CE-60055 Description The Security barrier around the FWST was not designed to indicate if an intrusion has taken place following an intrusion alarm.

This requires the responding officer to physically access the area inside the FWST missile wall. This creates a hazardous situation since there is no means to access the perimeter of the FWST.

Evaluation Per this evaluation, there is no USQs associated with Minor Modification CE-60055. This mod does not require any Tech Spec changes or changes to the FSAR.

Exempt Change CE-60150 Description Minor Modification CE-60150 replaces the Westinghouse type VX252 gages used for 2'ADP 5180 and 2NDP 5190 on 2MC11 with Weschler type BG252 gages. 2NDP 5180 and 2NDP 5190 indicate flow from the ND System to the NC cold legs. The existing gages uses a non-linear scale which has a range of 0 to 4500 GPM, normal operating flow for the ND System is approximately 3000 GPM. Technical Specification Section 3/4.9.8.1 and 3/4.9.8.2 states that the minimum ND flow during refueling is 1000 GPI. Due to the non-linear scale, it is difficult for the operators to determine the flow rate near the Tech. Spec. value. The Weschler gage will be !

equipped with a square root extractor so that a linear scale can be utilized. The Weschler gages has both digital indication and j

~

a LED barograph. The digital indication and barograph will provide accurate indications at both the normal and low flow rates for ND. The receiver gages are not safety related.

Weschler Instruments states in a letter from Gary Hauze, Vice Exempt Changes Page 66

i l

President of Sale for Weschler, to Michael Broome that the !

i accuracy of the BG252 gage is .5%. the accuracy of the VX252 is 1.5%, therefore, the'BG252 will provide more. accurate indication for ND flow. The mounting dimensions for the BG252 is the same !

as the VX252. CNM-1399.03-0333 documents the seismic qualification of the BG252. This revision to main control 2MC11 ,

is documented on Main Control Board Seismic Review Form, EDP- ;

10.17.2 and the Control Room Change Request form.

Evaluation

! This modification will not change any control functions for the ;

. ND System. The replacement receiver gage will provide the same ;

function as the existing gage. The effectiveness of ND in any

- design basis accident will not be degraded due the increased .

accuracy of the gage and the fact that no control functions are l' being modified. This modification will not require a revision to the FSAR. An USQ will not be created by this modification.

l

. Exempt Change CE-60189 i

Description Flow gauges 2BWPG5000/5010 and 2BWPG5020/5030 are located in the !

bottom of the exterior and interior doghouses, respectively, and !

are difficult to access. These gauges are used to verify flow through the BW recirculation pumps during pump start per OP/2/A/6250/03A. The gauges must also be checked for proper flow [

once per shift when the pumps are in operation per OPS round '

sheets. The location of the gauges results in an inordinate

- amount of time being spent to check them and increases the risk j of injury due to climbing over equipment to reach the gauges. )

i Station Problem Report CNPR-01405 was generated to address this :

problem and requested relocation of these gauges to an more j accessible location. This modification will relocate the gauges ;

. to elevation 599+00. Since entry to both doghouses is at j elevation 594+00, this mounting will allow quick and easy access l to the gauges. The recirculation pumps take suction from the S/G l through the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) nozzles located at elev. i 643+08. Since this is above the proposed location of the gauges, l the gauges are assured of operating with a positives static head. 1 Relocating the gauges to a higher elevation based on differential pressure, the measurement will not be affected. The instrument will be seismically mounted using standard mounting brackets in accordance with Instrument Standard ICS-A-20, Section 5.1.1.

Since the instruments will be at a higher elevation than the instrument taps, the instrument tubing will initially be routed above the gauges before sloping downward to the gauge input. A vent will be installed at the high point of the tubing. This Exempt Changes Page 67

5 f

will allow venting of any entrained gases, thus assuring the instrument tubing remains necessary.

Evaluation The flow gauges are not discussed in the FSAR or Technical

. Specifications. They do not serve a safety-related function and have not QA Condition assigned. Since they are located in the !

interior and exterior doghouses which are Seismic Category I structures, they are mounted using QA Condition 4 mounting

~

l brackets which prevents interaction with any other safety-related equipment during a seismic event. The seismic mounting eliminates any failure modes for the instrument which could i result in an adverse impact on safety. Based on the above discussion, no system, structures, or components audressed in the FSAR will be affected and therefore no USQ evaluation is deemed r necessary.

Exempt Change CE-60198 Description CE-60198 will make several changes to lighting and communications equipment located in the Operational Support Center (OSC)/ cable spreading area, to effect an as-built condition per the applicable drawing changes. The changes include removing and adding lighting fixtures, adding cables from the telephone ,

cabinet to the new poles and phone jacks, and removing an l unnecessary support brace (ref.3). !

Evaluation No Unreviewed Safety Questions Evaluation is required. No FSAR or Tech. Specs changes are required.

i

Exempt Change CE-60212 Description After implementation of minor modification CE-60129 safety concerns still existed with the configuration of the CAPT speed control circuit. The controls are not single failure proof since they are associated with 1E Train A only. Failure modes which could result in unacceptable CA System performance are possible. l Temporary Station Modification (TSM) WO 94003676 01 was designed to provide temporary correction of the problem by opening the ,

control circuit for Unit 1 solenoid valve 1SASV5020. The changes l of this TSM will be made permanent in function with the !

implementation of minor modification CE-60212. MM CE-60212 deletes Unit 1 CAPT speed control capabilities by removing the j non-safety speed control devices. Specifically, Electric- i Pneumatic (E/P) Converter 1SAEP5020, Solenoid 1SASV5020, and ;

Exempt Changes Page 68 9

associated contacts, potentiometers, push-buttons, wiring, and tubing. Additionally, administrative control changes that were made per CE-60129 to procedures OP/1/A/6250/02 Enclosure 4.1 and PT/1/A/4600/03A, to ensure the CAPT speed control is not used during normal operation, are to.be deleted along with any other references to Unit 1 CAPT speed control circuit.

Evaluation Neither any setpoint, design limit, or operating parameter is changed with this modification. The ability of the CA System to remove heat from the NC System (the pressure boundary of which is a fission product barrier) is not degraded. No other fission product barrier is affected. Therefore, the modification will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. A change to Table 10-18 of the FSAR will be required. No USQs exists.

Exempt Change CE-60223 Description This minor modification will provide renovation space in the Service Building for the Machine Shop Office areas. The space was previously as a personnel office are for both personnel working in the Machine Shop and Mechanical Technical Support personnel. This modification will require removal of some existing walls, and modification will be made to the HVAC Service Building Ventilation (VW) system. There will also be changes to electrical in the following areas; lighting, public address system, telephone, breaker panels, and electrical power. These changes are to take place on elevation 594 in the Service Building area. The purpose of this minor modification is to relocate some of the machine shop personnel and improve the working area for these personnel.

Evaluation Based on this discussion, no unreviewed safety questions are created by involved with the minor modification. No changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications are required.

Exempt Change CE-60225 Description' The Nuclear Sampling System (NM) provides a means of obtaining [

the more frequently taken samples during normal plant operation i from the station's nuclear safety related systems. The system ,

also provides a means of sampling the reactor coolant and ;

containment atmosphere following a LOCA to monitor the reactor t and determine the degree of core damage. ' Currently there is the i potential for cross-contamination of samples due to unreliable isolation and check valves. The sample lines are the ND System, ;

Exempt Changes l Page 69 .

I

letdown Hx outlet, mixed bed demin outlet, cation bed outlet and sealwater injection filter outlet. Cross-contaminat.on would produce suspect results. The purpose of this modification is to remove the existing check valve / isolation valve combinations for the mixed bed demin outlet and' cation bed demin outlet and replace with more reliable valves. The sealwater injection filter outlet purge line will be cut and capped. Tie-ins will be added to the Pzr, NC,'ND, and NV letdown Hx Outlet sample lines for future tie-in to the NM Automation Panel.

Evaluation This modification will not create any unreviewed safety questions evaluated in the FSAR. It will not affect any procedures addressed in the FSAR or Tech Specs. It will require a revision to CNS operating procedure OP/0/A/6200/11 to delete steps for internal purge for sample from Seal Water Injection Filter Outlet.

Exempt Change CE-60229 Description The Nuclear Sampling System-(NM) provides a means of obtaining the more frequently taken samples during normal plant operation from the station's nuclear safety related systems. The system also provides a means of sampling the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere following a LOCA to monitor the reactor ,

and determine the degree of core damage. The Reactor Makeup i Water Storage Tank (RNWST) provides flush water to each one of l the sample lines (NC system, pressurizer, ND system, S/Gs) !

through a check valve and isolation valve combination. Reverse ;

' flow through the check and isolation valves has led to unreliable {

samples including cases of false indication of S/G tube leakage. ,

The purpose of this modification is to remove the check l valve / isolation valve combinations for each of the sample lines. i Tie-in downstream of INM4 with an isolation valve and quick :

connect. Remove unused portions of the RMWST flush tubing / piping i including check valves and isolation valves. Also provide isolation valves and quick connects at each of the original flush )

line tie-ins to the' sample lines. Flushes will be performed by connecting a flex hose from the flush line supply via tha new isolation valve and quick connect to the sample line quick j connect. The sample line quick connects will also be useful as '

injection points for chemical treatments such a Peroxide and i Sulfuric Acid.

Evaluation This modification will not create any unreviewed safety questions evaluated in the FSAR. It will not affect any procedures addressed in the FSAR or Tech Specs. It will rege4 - an ;

Exempt Changes Page 70 :

l l

l

l enclosure be added to CNS operating' procedure OP/2/A/6200/11 for the use of-the flex hose for flushing. A USQ evaluation is not ,

required.

Exempt Change CE-60230 l Description :

The Nuclear Sampling System-(NM) provides a means of' obtaining l the more frequently taken samples during normal plant operation i from the station's nuclear safety related systems. The system ,

also provides a means of sampling the reactor coolant and ccntainment atmosphere following a LOCA to monitor the reactor j and determine the degree of core damage. The Reactor Makeup

-Water Storage Tank (RNWST) provides flush water to each one of :

the sample lines (NC system, pressurizer, ND system, S/Gs) I through a check valve and isolation valve combination. Reverse f flow through_the check and isolation valves has led to unreliable i samples including cases of false indication of S/G tube leakage. !

The purpose of this modification is to remove the check valve / isolation valve combinations for each of the sample lines.

Tie-in downstream of 2NM4 with an isolation valve and quick ;

connect. Remove unused portions of the RMWST flush tubing / piping :

including check valves and isolation valves. Also provide !

isolation valves and quick connects at each of the original flush :

line tie-ins to the sample lines. Flushes will be performed by ,

connecting a flex hose from the flush line supply via the new i isolation valve and quick connect to the sample line quick ,

k connect. The sample line quick connects will also be useful as injection points for chemical treatments such a Peroxide and ;

Sulfuric Acid.

I Evaluation This modification will not create any unreviewed safety questions i evaluated in the FSAR. It will not affect any procedures l

addressed in the FSAR or Tech Specs. It will require an ,

enclosure be added to CNS operating procedure OP/2/A/6200/11 for ;

the use of the flex hose for flushing. A USQ evaluation is not j required. l Exempt Change CE-60238 Description l The Nuclear Sampling System (NM) provides a means of obtaining ;

the more frequently taken samples during normal plant operation [

from the station's nuclear safety related systems. The system -

also provides a means of sampling the reactor coolant and ;

containment atmosphere following a LOCA to monitor the reactor l and determine. Currently there is the potential for cross- j contamination of samples due to unreliable isolation and check Exempt Changes Page 71

l k

-valves. These samples lines are the VCT Outlet,-Boric-Acid f Blender. Outlet, RMWST Outlet, Spent Fuel Pool, Fuel Pool Cooling Post Filter, and the RWST. Cross-contamination would produce .,

suspect' result. The purpose of this modification is to remove the ;

' existing check valve / isolation valve combinations for the above i mentioned sample lines and replace with more reliable valves.

Evaluation This modification will not create any unreviewed safety questions !

evaluated in the FSAR. 'It will not affect any procedures :

addressed in, nor will it required revisions to the FSAR or Tech Specs.

i Exempt Change CE-60239 .

-Description The Nuclear Sampling System (NM) provides a means of obtaining.

the more frequently taken samples during normal plant operation ,

~from the station's nuclear safety related systems. The system also provides a means of sampling the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere following a LOCA to monitor the reactor and determine. Currently there is the potential for cross-contamination of samples due to unreliable isolation and check valves. These samples lines are the VCT Outlet, Boric Acid Blender Outlet, RMWST Outlet, Spent Fuel Pool, Fuel Pool Cooling Post Filter, and the RWST. Cross-contamination would produce _

suspect result. The purpose of this modification is to remove the :

existing check valve / isolation valve combinations for the above l mentioned sample lines and replace with more reliable valves. !

Evaluation This modification will not create any unreviewed safety questions evaluated in the FSAR. It will not affect any procedures ,

addressed in, nor will it required revisions to the FSAR or Tech Specs.

Exempt Change CE-60244 Description The Condensate System (CM) is designed such that at or above 56%

power (turbine load), if one feedwater pump trips the standby <

Hotwell Pump and Condenstate Booster Dump will automatically start to provide maximum suction pressure to the Condensate Booster Pumps. Additionally, if power is above 56% and a' load ,

rejection occurs, the above control actions'will be initiated as !

well as a trip of the 2C Heater Drain ranks pumps. The pump trip j is anticipatory of the falling level due to decreased extraction Exempt Changes !

Page 72 f

n . . _- . - _ . - - - _ . . -

i

-stream flow to the tanks. This design is illustrated in the logic diagram in Attachment 1. Due to the design of the circuits ,

which implement the above-logic, the actual operation is that of '

the' logic diagram in Attachment 2. This shows that an additional !

scal-in-path is present such that if one feedwater pump is ,

tripped and a load rejection is present, the signal to initiate !

the above actions is sealed-in. With this signal sealed-in, the :

third Hotwell Pump and Condensate Booster Pump canect be returned >

to standby without. automatically starting. The preferred method of resetting the auto-start signals for the pumps is through a turbine load reduction below 56% combined with valve 2CM83 being closed; however, with'this seal-in, resetting the signal involves ;

either a reset or trip of both feedwater pumps since the load t rejection signal cannot be manually reset. This is not an acceptable method of breaking the seal-in. This Minor Mod will modify the circuit in Attachment 2 to operate as shown in

. Attachment 1. This will involve adding a relay to cabinet 2CFPTPA and some wiring changes in 2CFPTPA and 2HWCP. No other l work is involved. !

Evaluation Removal of the seal-in circuit will not affect the function of [

the load rejection circuit as designed and as evaluated in the ,

FSAR. Consequently, this modification does not increased the ,

probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of !

equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. Since no new failure modes are created by removal of the seal-in circuit, ,

j the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated in the '

FSAR will not be created. The seal-in circuit does not affect any setpoints and so the margin of safety as defined in the basis i for any Tech Specs will not be reduced. Consequently, no USQ is ;

created by this modification.

Exempt Change CE-60246 Description The ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) uses pressure-switches 2LPPS5141/5142/5143 and 2LPPS5151/5152/5153 to determine when a pump trip occurs for Feedwater Pumps (FDW) A and B, respectively. The AMSAC circuitry combines the individual switch indications to form a 2/3 logic scheme to determine pump trip. A test circuit is provided in order to isolate individual ,

pressure switches for maintenance and to determine post !

maintenance operability of the switch. The test circuit consists of a three position selector switch and an indicating light, one ;

for each pump. Selecting a particular pressure switch will i remove it from the 2/3 logic and add it to the light circuit such

-that a switch indicating a low pressure will cause the light to Exempt Changes ;

Page 73 l

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elluminate. However, Technical Specification 3/4.3.2, Table 3.3-3,1 Item S.f places certain operability requirements on the CA ;

auto. start. function of AMSAC. Per the Technical Specification ;

Interpretations Manual, this feature of AMSAC requires that any l' inoperate channel be placed in the tripped condition within one -

hour. Since the test switch places the pressure switch input l (channel) in the non-tripped condition, it can only be used for :

one hour before-a Technical Specification violation occurs, thus l making.the switch virtually useless as a maintenance tool.

Additionally, use of the switch to quickly determine if a switch- :

is indicating a low pressure presents. difficulties. Whenever a i pump is tripped, all three' pressure switches indicate low l

. pressure. Cycling the switch between the three positions can !

cause a relay race problem due to the switch contacts not being completely independent (i.e., instead of break before make, j switch problem can actually cause the switch to operate as a make i before break type). If two channels are taken out of service

simultaneously, the AMSAC logic sees a reset CF pump. When one ,

of the channels returns to the tripped condition, the logic will then see a tripped CF pump which can cause a CA auto start. This i problem could be theoretically solved with a perfect break before !

make switch. However, experience with two different types of :

switches has shown this difficult to achieve. This modification !

will delete the test circuit and add individual press-to-test ;

indicating lights on the front of the AMSAC panel for each j pressure switch. The lights will be illuminated when the ;

pressure switches indicate high pressure corresponding to a CF pump reset condition. A dark light will indicate a low pressure l condition or damaged light bulb. During Operations rounds, the :

indicating lights will provide quick inoication of the condition of each pressure switch. If a switch is indicating a condition !

not consistent with the status of the CF pump (i.e., OFF when the pump is reset or ON when the pump is tripped), a WO can be i generated to repair it. The press-to-test feature allows quick identification of a burned out bulb. The AMSAC system, not being j nuclear safety-related, is designed to fe'.1 to the "not actuated" !

state upon loss of power. However, in doing so, there is !

presently no way to determine when a loss of power has occurred. !

In order to detect this condition, this modification will add a ,

control room annunciator to provide indication of loss of power. l This modification will also move several internal jumpers in the AMSAC panel (2ELCPLO323) such that the power to various circuits ;

is' connected to.one side of a sliding link while all circuitry is i connected to the other side. In the manner, individual circuits !

can be de-energized without affecting other circuits by simply I opening the appropriate sliding link. l Exempt Changes f Page 74

P Evaluation' ,

Inadvertent actuation of the1AMSAC system would initiate a !

. Turbine, Trip accident as described in FSAR Section 15.2.3.- This !

modification'will-not' increased the probability 1of-an' inadvertent' ;

AMSAC actuation and failure-of the equipment affected by this -

modification is not evaluated in the SAR; therefore, the .

i probability of an accident or malfunction of equipment important ;

to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased, j While-the.AMSAC system is used to mitigate the consequences of an !

ATWS event, this modification will not affect the ability.of this system:to do so nor will it affect any initial conditions assumed.

in any accident analyses; therefore, the consequences of an ,

accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. There :

are no new failure modes created; therefore, the possibility of l an accident'or malfunction of equipment important to safety !

different than any previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be 7 created. The are no Limiting Safety System Setpoints altered as La result of this modification. Consequently, the margin of ,

safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications will not be reduced. Based on the above analyses, no USQs are i created by this modification or any FSAR changes. !

Exempt Change CE-60248 Description-Valve 2CM83 provides a flow path from the discharge of the l

Hotwell Pumps (HWP), around the Condensate Polishing :

Demineralizers and the G and F stage feedwater heaters, directly j to'the suction of the Condensate Booster Pumps (CBP). By !

circumventing the pressure drops associated with the i domineralizers and heaters, a greater suction pressure can be +

maintained at the CPBs. This in turn decreases the probability ,

of a CPB trip on low suction pressure, thereby decreasing probability of a Feedwater Pump trip low suction pressure. Valve 2CM83 is designed to modulate open as necessary to maintain CBP suction pressure and will fail open upon receiving a generator j i

load rejection bypass signal to assure maximum bypass flow / suction pressure is available. The valve uses a piston '

actuator With a pneumatic positioner to control movement of the piston. Due to the design of the positioner, the valve response ,

time is unacceptably slow. A previous modification added a ,

volume booster to the instrument signal used to stroke the piston 3 closed (cylinder bottom pressure). However, this did not improve !

the' response time in the open direction. This modification will ,

add.a volume booster to the instrument signal used to stroke the !

. valve open. This configuration has been temporarily installed in the past and significantly increased the valve response time. In ,

Exempt Changes Page 75 i i

-i. f I

i L. . . -

- I

. . . . - ~ .- - .- -.- . . - . -

t addition, the setpoint for controller 2CM83_open signal and the CBP trip at 50 psig.

Evaluation The-only analyzed accident which 2CM83'could affect is the Loss j of Normal Feedwater Flow,_Section 15.2.7. Adding the volume _ t booster will result in a reduction of the-probability of this ;

accident since the probability of a CBP trip and subsequent FWP- !

trip will be reduced due to the increased response time of the j valve. A malfunction of the valve 2CM83 is not contained in-any i analyses. Therefore, the probability of an accident or !

malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated [

in the FSAR will not be increased. Valve 2CM83 is not used to l i mitigate any accidents nor can it affect any accident mitigate :

equipment, and does not affect any initial conditions assumed in any analyses, therefore, the consequences of an accident or r malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in'the FSAR will not be increased. There are no new failure .!

j ' modes created, therefore, the possibility of an accident or ;

malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any l 1 previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be created. The !

setpoint change for the controller is not a Limiting Safety i System Setpoint. Consequently, the margin of safety as defined l l

in the basis for any Technical Specifications will not be !

reduced. Based on the above analyses, no USQs are created by -

this modification or any FSAR changes. l l

t Exempt Change CE-60251 l 4 Description ;

A determination was made to employ standpipe vent holes as a i means of performing a more efficient calibration and functional 1 of level switches 0WLLS5060, 0WLLS5080, 1WLLS5860, 1WLLS5880, )

1WLLS5900, and 1WLLS5910. By applying a vacuum via the standpipe ,

vent hole to a partially filled sump, water is drawn up the i standpipe actuating the level switch to perform its designed ,

function. However, the standpipe vent holes proved inaccessible !

due to being located approximately 7" below floor grating. l Station Problem Report CNPR06622 was initiated, in part, to l address this situation and provide new standpipe vent holes while i sealing the existing ones. Minor Modification CE-60251 will seal )

standpipe vent holes below grating and provide new vent holes j with a 1/4" fitting approximately 2" above grating to allow test equipment hookup so that the level switches can be both calibrated and functional in place without disassembly from Ltandpipes. Level switches OWLLS5060, 0WLLS5080, 1WLLS5860, 1WLLS5880, 1WLLS5900, and 1WLLS5910 are safety-related instrumentation and controls of the Liquid Radwaste System, and Exempt Changes Page 76 ,

l 4

i I

l have been' assigned QA Condition 1. The level instruments for the !

motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump sumps automatically start l their associated sump pump on a high sump level and stop the pump i at a predetermined low sump level. The level instruments for the i turbine-driven. auxiliary feedwater pump and the containment spray i and residual'~ heat removal pump sump start the lead pump on high l sump level, and the backup pump on high-high sump level. When j

- the sump has been pumped down to a predetermined low level, the i level instrumentation stops both pumps. .l Evaluation Sealing the' vent holes below grating and drilling new vent holes i above grating will not affect the seismic integrity of the j standpipes, nor adversely affect the pressure equalization :

function served by the vent holes. Consequently, the ability of l the level switches or any other safety-related SSC to perform its

. design function will not be affected. Additionally, the failure '

mode of the vent holes is not affected; therefore, no new failure i

modes are created. Providing new vent holes above grating ensures easier access to perform calibration and functional of level switches, thereby, enhanc ng the system's reliability and reducing the possibility of malfunction and challenges to safety i systems. Minor Mod CE-60251 wi?1 not degrade the level switches l ability to monitor sump levels and control the sump pumps in j containment spray residual heat removal (RHR) pump room sump and ;

in the auxiliary feedwater pump pit sumps to protect essential !

equipment from flooding. Therefore, the probability of accidents l or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously i evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. Since no new failures !

are introduced, no accidents or malfunctions of equipment to j safety different than any evaluated in the FSAR are created. In l the event of a high sump level, the vent holes enable water to i rise up the standpipes to actuate the level switches. The new l vent holes above the grating will continue to achieve this !

function. Thus, mod CE-60251 will not degrade the performance of i the vent holes or level switches with respect to this criterion. I Therefore, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. No safety l limits, setpoints or limiting safety system settings are affected l

by Minor Mod CE-60251. Therefore, the margin of safety defined l l 'in the Tech. Specs. (3/4.7.1.2) is not reduced. No USQ !

evaluations are required for this modification. Also, no Tech !

Specs or FSAR increases are made due to this change. j t

4 Exempt Changes ,

Page 77 i i

i

i f

' Exempt Change CE-60252 Description A determination was made to employ _ standpipe vent holes as a i means of performing a more efficient calibration and functional l of level switches 2WLLS5860, 2WLLS5880,-2WLLS5900, and 2WLLS5910. l By applying a vacuum via the standpipe vent hole to a partially j filled sump, water'is drawn up the standpipe actuating the level: l switch to perform its' designed function. However, the standpipe j

j. . vent holes proved inaccessible due to being located approximately '

7" below floor grating. Station Problem Report CNPR06622 was i initiated,-in part,.to address this situation and provide new. j

standpipe vent holes while sealing the existing ones. Minor l Modification CE-60251 will seal standpipe vent holes below j grating and provide new vent holes with a 1/4" fitting l approximately 2" above grating to allow test equipment hookup so !

- that the level switches can be both calibrated and functional in :

i place without disassembly from standpipes. Level switches 2WLLS5860, 2WLLS5880, 2WLLS5900, and 2WLLS5910 are safety-related .

instrumentation and controls of the Liquid Radwaste System, and !

have been assigned QA Condition 1. The level instruments for the- [

motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump sumps automatically start j their associated sump pump on a high sump level and stop the pump !

at a' predetermined low sump level. The level instruments for the l turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the containment spray ;

and residual heat removal pump sump start the lead pump on high sump level, and the backup pump on high-high sump level. When l the sump has been pumped down to a predetermined low level, the ;

level instrumentation stops both pumps, j 4

i Evaluation l Sealing the vent holes below grating and drilling new vent holes i above grating will not affect the seismic integrity of the j standpipes, nor adversely affect the pressure equalization i function served by the vent holes. Consequently, the ability of the level switches or any other safety-related SSC to perform its i design function will not be affected. Additionally, the failure {

mode of the vent holes is not affected; therefore, no new failure l modes are created. Providing new vent holes above grating !

ensures easier access to perform calibration and functional of l level switches, thereby, enhancing the system's reliability and l reducing the possibility of malfunction and challenges to safety i systems. Minor Mod CE-60252 will not degrade the level switches j ability to monitor sump levels and control the sump pumps in I containment spray residual heat removal (RHR) pump room sump and I in the auxiliary feedwater pump pit sumps to protect essential )

equipment from flooding. Therefore, the ' probability of accidents j or malfunction-of equipment important to safety previously ;

evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. Since no new failures ]

Exempt Changes j Page 78 I

are introduced, no accidents or malfunctions of equipment to safety different than any evaluated in the FSAR are created. In the event of a high sump level, the vent holes enable water to rise up the standpipes to actuate the level switches. The new vent holes above the grating will continue to achieve this function. Thus, mod CE-60252 will not degrade the performance of the vent holes or level switches with respect to this criterion.

Therefore, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. No safety limits, setpoints or limiting safety system settings are affected by Minor Mod CE-60252. Therefore, the margin of safety defined in the Tech. Specs. (3/4.7.1.2) is not reduced. No USQ evaluations are required for this modification. Also, no Tech Specs or FSAR changes are made due to this change.

Exempt Change CE-60255 Description The discharge structure of the WT Effluent Polishing Basin supports a Parshall Flume / Bubbler Flow Meter type recording instrumentation to record discharge flow to the RL discharge cove. The present recording instrumentation is temporarily installed, and permanent installation of this device is required.

Also, the existing Parshall Flume has a 2" throat which is too wide, in relation to discharge flow rate, to achieve accurate discharge flow recordings. Station Problem Report CNPR06627 was initiated to address this situation and provide permanently installed recording instrumentation. Minor Modification CE-60255 will replace temporary recording instrumentation at WT discharge with a permanently installed 1" throat Parshall Flume /ISCO 3230 Bubbler Flow Meter combination recording device. Also, a 4'x4' concrete pad will be constructed as a permanent location for WT discharge Sampler, along with the installation of 3" diameter PVC piping along stairway and ground to RL Cove. This PVC piping will house tubing from Sampler to RL Cove. The temporary recording instrumentation will be kept as a backup device.

Evaluation The Parshall Flumo/ Bubbler Flow Meter combination recording device is not discussed in the FSAR or Technical Specifications. ;

It does not serve a safety-related function and has no assigned i OA condition. The implementation of Minor Modification CE-60255 l will not increased the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR. Nor will the implementation of CE-60255 increased the probability or consequences of an equipment malfunction previously evaluated, or different than any already evaluated in the FSAR. The margin of safety defined in the basis of the Exempt Changes Page 79

Technical Specifications is unaffected and no unreviewed safety question exist.-

Exempt Change'CE-60277 Description Section 11.2.2.7.4 (Loss of Coolant Accident) of the Catawba FSAR requires that an alternate flow path ~ exist with the capability to pump radwaste into the containment via the WL system sump pumps.

The designed flow path which used the Floor Drain Sump A and B Discharge Header to route liquids back to Containment Via EMF-52

~

and the Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank Inlet header on-Unit 2, was blocked by a check valve which.was installed as part of NSM CN-21304. CE-60277 will recreate the flow path. The following alternative flow path, created by this minor mod, will allow liquid radwaste to be returned to Containment. A flow path from Floor Drain Sump B to Containment Floor and Equipment Sump 2A will be created. Valve IWLil (located on Floor Diagram CN-

.1565-1.0) will be maintained closed during normal system operation to prevent inadvertent diversion of flow path between Floor Drain Sump B and the Containment sump is required. To prevent diversion of flow from Floor Drain Sump B to the ND/NS sumps while utilizing the reverse flow path to Containment Floor and Equipment Sump 2A, 2WLE30 (locked open during normal system operation) will be closed when the emergency flow path between Floor Drain Sump B and the containment sump is required. To bypass the segment of the reverse flow path which was blocked by NSM CN-21304, a length of piping will be installed connecting the upstreas section of plug valve 2WLA84 and the downstream section of check valve 2WL850. The additional piping upstream of 2WLA84 will be capped off. (Refer to flow diagram CN2565-2.2). This valve will be maintained closed during normal system operation to prevent inadvertent diversion of flow to the Containment sump and opened only when the emergency flow path between Floor Drain Sump B and Containment Floor and Equipment Sump 2A is required.

Evaluation Based on the above discussion, Minor Modification CE-60277 will not create any USQs; it neither increases the probability or consequences of any accidents or equipment malfunctions evaluated in the FSAR, creates the possibility of a different accident or equipment malfunction, nor reduces the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specifications. A capability to pump radwaste from the Auxiliary Building (which was inadvertently pumped outside Containment following a LOCA) back into Containment via the WL System sump pumps (specified in FSAR Sectopm 11.2.2.7.4) has been recreated. No FSAR changes are requiled. No Technical Specification changes are required.

Exempt Changes Page 80

Exempt Change CE-60280 Description !

The Conventional Low Pressure Service Water (RL) System is '

designed to supply lake water for various makeup and cooling functions'of the secondary side of the plant. The RL system does ,

not perform any safety function and is not required for maintenance of plant _ safety in the event of an accident. This ,

modification'affects non-safety Class G RL system components ,

located at the RL Pump-Intake Structure. As discussed above, ;

this variation will revise the RL Pump 'C' Pump Thrust Support Assembly which is non-safety related Class G. The Thrust Support ;

Assembly will continue to perform it's design function. The function or design of the RL system will not be affected. There are no seismic concerns in this area of the plant.

. Evaluation

. A USQ evaluation is not applicable to this modification.

Technical Specification or FSAR changes are not required.

4 Exempt Change CE-60294 Description Minor Modification CE-60294 will install 2" lines on the RN inlet and outlet piping of the Unit 1 NS Hxs. Lines on the inlet piping will contain an isolation valve, a check valve, and a quick disconnect. Lines on the outlet will contain an isolation valve, a. flow restricting orifice, and a quick disconnect. This >

modification will facilitate the wet lay-up chemical treatment of the shell side of the Unit 1 NS Hxs to reduce the corrosion rate from the raw water environment. An USQ Evaluation has been performed as part of the design of this modification. Piping added by this modification will meet Class C seismic requirements consistent with the RN system. The operation of the installed ,

lines for chemical treatment of the NS Hxs will not result in the diversion of RN flow from the Hxs in the event of an accident, i nor will it result in flooding of the Aux Bldg beyond analyzed limits. ;

Evaluation This modification involves no Unreviewed Safety Questions. No changes to Technical Specifications or revisions to the FSAR are required.

Exempt Change CE-61008 Description CNCE-61008 will. add four baseplates to the operating deck for the '

SGRlP support trestle. The baseplates are compatible with Exempt Changes Page 81

I existing structures. No degradation of the operating deck's ;

ability to prevent. Ice Condenser bypass leakage will occur, and the baseplates will not create an interference with the manipulator crane.

Evaluation No unreviewed safety questions are created as a result of this !

modification. No FSAR changes or Technical Specification changes l result because of this modification. [

Exempt Change CE-61027 i p.seristion '

l The electrical controls for Auxiliary Building Supply air l' handling units ABSU-1A and ABSU-1B will be revised to prevent the shutdown of.these units by a low supply air temperature. Each supply unit has a low temperature thermostat (" freeze stat")

located at the inlet of the fan. The " freeze stat" provides a i permissive in the electrical control circuit necessary for the l supply unit to operate. This minor modification will install an l electrical jumper to bypass this " freeze stat". This will !

prevent the " freeze stat" from shutting down the air handling !

unit.

Evaluation This modification does not create any USQ's or safety concerns. ;

l No Technical Specification or FSAR changes are required as a result of modifications made to the electrical controls for the Auxiliary Building Supply Units (ABSU-1A and ABSU-1B).

Exempt Change CE-61028 Description The electrical controls for Auxiliary Building Supply air handling units ABSU-2A and ABSU-2B will be revised to prevent the shutdown of these units by a low supply air temperature. Each supply unit has a low temperature thermostat (" freeze stat")

located at the inlet of the fan. The " freeze stat" provides a permissive in the electrical control circuit necessary for the supply unit to operate. This minor modification will install an electrical jumper to bypass this " freeze stat". This will prevent the " freeze stat" from shutting down the air handling unit.

Evaluation This modification does not create any USQ's or safety concerns.

No Technical Specification or FSAR changes are required as a result of modifications made to the electrical controls for the Auxiliary Building Supply Units (ABSU-2A and ABSU-2B).

Exempt Changes Page 82 1 l

Exempt Change CE-61036 ;

Description MM, CE-61036 will add a 1/2" SS QAl isolation valve with a tube ,

cap to the test tee for each of the NS and VQ containment

~

pressure transmitters to provide a " double barrier" to ensure ;

containment integrity is maintained after a transmitter tested. :

There are fifteen transmitters fed off of four impulse lines l within the.560' and 577' Electrical Penetration Rooms (two impulse lines per room). This " double" barrier'will be administratively controlled. This means that the " double barrier" which consists of an isolation valve with tube cap will >

be IV'd to assure the " double barrier" final position is closed (both the isolation valve and tube cap installed). This instruction will be covered within the applicable I&E procedures for the NS(CPCS,PAM,& 7300) and VQ pressure transmitters. This

" double barrier" will be exempt from Type B and C leak rate testing per ANSI 56.8 - 1994. These pressure transmitters are affected: 2NSPT 5040,5050,5070,5160,5170,5180,5190,5240,5250,5260,5270,5370,5380, 2VQPT5040. !

i Evaluation This modification will add in a QAl isolation valve / tube cap to the test tee for each of the NS and VQ containment pressure transmitters. No USQs will be involved and Tech Specs will not be affected. No FSAR revisions are required.

Exempt Change CE-61106 Description '

This modification provides a new washing machine for the RP 1 Laundry Area. This includes associated piping and power supply connections and minor structural changes. ,

Evaluation This. modification affects non-safety related piping and equipment in a non-safety related non-seismic area of the Auxiliary Service i Building. The function or design of any system important to safety is not affected. A safety review has been performed and there are no USQs involved with this modification. No changes to l the Tech Specs are required. FSAR Figure No. 11-3 needs to be ;

revised.

Exempt Change CE-61115 !

Description i The purpose of this minor modification is to remove the actua". ors of the Unit 2 Diesel Building Ventilation System normal outside air dampers and leave the dampers welded in the open position.

Exempt Changes Page 83

I The normal outside air dampers are identified as 2DBF-D-1 and 2DBF-D-2.

t Evaluation !

This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or safety concern. No Technical Specification are required. ;

-Revisions to FSAR Section 9.4.4.2, Fig. 9-128, and Section 16.9-3 as noted in the Safety Review are required.

t Exempt Change CE-61116 ,

Description The purpose of this minor modification is to remove the actuators of the Unit 1 Diesel Building Ventilation System normal outside air dampers and leave the dampers welded in the open position.

The normal outside air dampers are identified as 1DBF-D-1 and '

1DBF-D-2.

Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question ,

or safety concern. No Technical Specification are required.

Revisions to FSAR Section 9.4.4.2, Fig. 9-123, and Section 16.9-3 as noted in the Safety Review are required.

Exempt Change CE-61117 ,

Description TSMs 95001650-01 and 95001651-01 were used to align the VA System -

in the filter mode and ensure that no failure could cause the

, system to re-align to the bypass mode. This was achieved by removing the instrument air supply to the dampers that are used ,

to align the VA System. Minor Modification CE-61117 will revise '

the VA System design to prevent the Aux. Bldg. filter units (ABFU-1A and ABFU-1B) from allowing filtered exhaust air to bypass the filter units by permanently aligning VA to the filter mode. the implementation of MM CE-61117 will allow the above ;

mentioned TSMs to be closed out. !

Evaluation Per this evaluation, there are no unreviewed safety questions associated with minor modification CE-61117. There are no revision changes to the Tech Specs or the FSAR.

Exempt Change CE-61119 Description While these TSMs are installed it is requested that LJ (Condenser

Steam Air Ejector) System be aligned to the Unit Vent. This not ,

a condition of operability but is done to protect the filter carbon beds from high moisture levels. The alignment of the ZJ Exempt Changes Page 84

- - . . - - ~- .. . - -- --

System (CSAE) to the Unit Vent is the accident (non filtered) mode alignment'for the ZJ System. However, this alignment always initiates annuniciator 1AD08.04.01. Annunciator 1AD08.04.01 is the CSAE-Exhaust Bypassed to Stack annunciator located on IMC6.

TSM 95017621-01 was created and implemented to disable annunciator 1AD08.04.01 to prevent a continuous alarm with ZJ routed to the Unit Vent. Minor Modification CE-61119 will revise the ZJ routed to the Unit Vent Stack. This will require the deletion of annuciator 1AD08.04.01. The implementation of MM CE-61119 will allow TSM 95017621-01 to be closed out.

Evaluation Per this evaluation, there are no unreviewed safety questions >

associated-with minor modification CE-61119. There are no .

revision changes to the Tech Specs or the FSAR.

Exempt Change CE-61120 *

. Description

' While these TSMs are installed it is requested that ZJ (Condenser Steam Air Ejector) System be aligned to the Unit Vent. This not a condition of operability but is done to protect the filter ,

carbon beds from high moisture levels. The alignment of the ZJ c System (CSAE) to the Unit Vent is the accident (non filtered) mode alignment for the ZJ System. However, this alignment always initiates annuniciator 2AD08.01.01. Annunciator 2AD08.04.01 is the CSAE Exhaust Bypassed to Stack annunciator located on 2MC6.

TSM 95017623-01 was created and implemented to disable annunciator 2AD08.04.01 to prevent a continuous alarm with ZJ routed to the Unit Vent. Minor Modification CE-61120 will revise ,

the ZJ routed to the Unit Vent Stack. This will require the 4

deletion of annuciator 2AD08.04.01. The implementation of MM CE-61120 will allow TSM 95017623-01 to be closed out.

Evaluation Per this evaluation, there are no unreviewed safety questions associated with minor modification CE-61120. There are no revision changes to the Tech Specs or the FSAR.

Exempt Change CE-61121 Description ,

This modification will install a Morse Watchman's KeyWatcher cabinet in the SAS-Control Room. The cabinet will be bolted to the back of the SAS Console on the wedge frame located between SAS 13 and SAS 14. The cabinet will be mounted on the back of the control panel, the control panel along with all other equipment in the SAS are non-QA, non-seismic and non safety related. The DSAR does not describe the SAS layout / equipment so the installation of this cabinet does not change the FSAR nor is Exempt Changes Page 85

i the installation significant enough to be included in the.FSAR. l No. procedures, tests or methods of operation described in the FSAR are changed or affected in any way by this installation.

This installation does not perform a test or experiment not- l addressed'in the FSAR. . Other than bolting to the control panel and plugging this equipment'into a standard outlet, this. ,

installation will not affect any plant equipment safety or non :

safety related. l l

< Evaluation '

Because of the minimum interface with any existing plant equipment either safety or non safety related, along with no i changes being required to any plant documentation including !

technical specifications and the FSAR, this installation does not j require a USQ Evaluation.

Exempt Change CE-61123 !

Description !

Minor Modification CNCE-61123 installs a pneumatic discharge ;

delay timer in the CO2 portion of the RF System protecting the CA i pump rooms. Also, CO2 driven sirens are installed to ensure that a pre-discharge warning is provided for personnel evacuation. l These change are added to the RF System to ensure that there is a ;

warning period to allow personnel evacuation from the area before .

CO2 is discharged. The pneumatic discharge delay timers provide an additional time delay to the existing electrical time delay l for opening the " selector valve". The selector valves control j the discharge of CO2 to the area in which the fire is sensed. l The pressure operated sirens are actuated after the pre-discharge electrical time-delay, and will alarm during the pneumatic time delay. The pneumatic sirens will continue operation until the discharge is complete. The electrical time delay that terminates l CO2 discharge is increased to account for the added pneumatic timer. The NFPA standard applicable to CO2 fire suppression !

4 systems does not specify the length of the pre-discharge time delay, but does require that the CO2 discharge reaches its required concentration with 60 seconds. This modification is in response to PIP #1-C95-2065 and is a personnel safety issue. l l

Evaluation l This modification involves no USQ's. No changes to the Technical Specifications or FSAR are required. Design Basis Specification CNS-1599.RF-00-0001, Section 30.2.2.2.2, High Pressure CO2 Fire Suppression System, will require revision. l l

l Exempt Chang 9s ]

Page 86

Exempt Change CE-611.48 Description Power Delivery System Planning is.taking steps to raise the Duke 230kv System voltage. This requires that the CNS Main Step Up (MSU) transformers have the tap settings changed.

Evaluation I

This minor modification raises the Main Step-up (MSU) transformers' voltage tap 2.5% and does not physically change the :

facility as described in the FSAR. The transformer tap setting procedure is not described in the FSAR. Raising the MSU transformers' tap setting 2.5% does not appear to be significant ;

enough for inclusion in Catawba's FSAR. Raising the_MSU i transformers' tap setting 2.5% will not adversely affect any SSC necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR.

Changing the MSU transformers' tap setting is not described in ,

the FSAR. There are no USQ evaluations require. No 7 ' ch Specs ;

or FSAR revision are required. !

Exempt Change CE-61162 l Description J Minor Mod CE-61162 is an elective modification, editorial in !

nature, which will allow-the installation of block ice cable t i

suspension system parts as a basis for loading large diameter block ice. No physical work will be performed under this Minor !

Mod. This Mod only creates an additional option as to the parts ;

that can be installed in ice baskets under outage work requests. l FSAR changes, based on WCAP-14624, are included as part of this ;

mod and copies will be forwarded to Compliance for inclusion into the next revision. Design Basis Document, CNS-1558.NF-00-0001, ,

"The Ice Condenser System" has been marked up and is included in t this Mod package for revision. Specification CNS 1201.17-00-0005 ;

has been issued to ensure that the block ice cable suspension j system parts are fabricated to meet our requirements. Drawing CNM 1201.17-30 documents the Westinghouse qualification of the block ice cable suspension system parts for use at CNS. Drawing CNM 1201.17-30 sheet 22 through 29 describe the block ice cable !

suspension system parts. Although not included in this package, Duke Power Calculation DPC-1201.17-00-0001, " Block Ice Basket :

Cable Suspension System Component Qualification", originated by .

Nuclear Engineering Services for the GO, fully described all physical parts testing performed to verify design performance. !

Standardized Maintenance Procedure SM/0/A/8510/007 has been ;

written to control the installation of block cable documented on ;

the basket configuration control drawings, CNM 1201.17-30 sheet '

18 (Unit 1) and sheet 19 (Unit 2) as the installation is l performed. ,

Exempt Changes Page 87 i i

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E Exempt Change CE-61214 ,

Description ;

It is desired to modify the non-safety related DFCS CFPT circuit from the current design which has two contacts in series for each .

redundant train parallel to each other, to a design which has all four contacts (one per main and bypass breaker per train) in i series. The current design was installed per NSMs CN-10729/0 and CN-10664/0 (ref 4). This design minimizes the likelihood of secondary side verpressurization and subsequent relief valve lifting due to the inevitable CF Isolation which occurs following a reactor trip and Lo-Tavg conditions (Tech Spec Table 3.3-3).

The circuit runs back the CFPT while also opening the CF i recirculation valves CF-6 and CF-13 to the condenser. These two :

actions initialize the CF system between the CF pump discharge and isolation valves such that a relief path (condenser) is provided and the reduced CF pump speed does not overpressurize the piping / heaters downstream of the CF pumps. The current ,

design provides this non-safety related protection even if one train of the reactor trip system fails due to the parallel i circuit design. This design, however, is not conducive to reliable plant operation as documented above, should spurious conditions occur in the circuit. The original plant was not licensed with this protection. The decision to modify it now, !

recognizes the continuing need for over pressurization i

protection, but not the operational penalty associated with spurious occurrences in the circuit.

i Evaluation The modifications do not create an Unreviewed Safety Question.

No Technical Specification changes are required. No FSAR changes are required.

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Exempt Change CE-61234 {

Description I A minor mod has been proposed to lower the 2C CLA low level alarm ,

setpoint, in order to reduce 2C CLA makeup frequency and i associated dose due to sampling of the 2C CLA. This is the CLA ;

for which a procedure has been developed for obtaining Cold Leg Accumulator samples through an alternate flow path inside !

containment because the normal NM sample flowpath is not 5

- available (Ref Procedure IP/2/A/3222/018E and associated 10CFR50.59 Evaluation). All Technical Specifications are being met and the new 2C CLA low level setpoint contains adequate !

margin'for instrument uncertainly and operator action.

Therefore, the 2C CLA will perform as designed in the event of an Exempt Changes Page 88

i accident and dose terms are unaffected by the different-level alarm setpoint.

Evaluation

No Tech Spec changes were required and no Unreviewed Safety ,

Questions were identified. No changes to the FSAR were required.

Exempt Change CE-61236 f Description Vital Systems, Structures, and Components (SSC's) must be !

protected from the blast effects imposed by the design basis >

vehicle as outlined in Regulatory Guide 5.68. In order to

. accomplish this, a Vehicle Barrier System has been installed to ,

establish the minimum safe standoff distance. Currently buildings 7721 and 7723 serve as part of the Vehicle Barrier '

System. After demolition of these buildings, the barriers installed by this mod will serve this purpose.

Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or safety concern. No technical specification changes are ;

required. The FSAR is not being directly revised, but the !

Physical Security Plan, which is described in the FSAR, will be updated to reflect this modification.

l Exempt Change CE-61240 l Description !

Minor modifications CNCE-61239 (Unit 1) and CNCE-61240 (Unit 2) ;

each install two check valves in the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA)

System of Unit 1 and 2. The new valves, 1(2)CA291 and 1(2)CA292, ,

provide train separation between the motor-driven CA pumps when !

the Nuclear Service Water (RN) System is supplying the CA pumps -

yet still allows flow to the turbine-driven CA pump from either !

train. Also, vent valve 1CA293 will be added to aid in the '

system piping refill and post-modification testing. These modifications are required due to the condition described in PIP 0-C96-3241 and its operability Evaluation. The CA System is relied upon to remove primary coolant stored energy and residual core energy, and to prevent over pressurization of the Reactor ;

Coolant System. In accident requiring extremely high CA flow ;

rates due to steam generator depressurization, all three CA pumps I

-may fail if they are being supplied by only one RN train and single failure renders the other RN train inoperable. The new i valves have been evaluated to be met or exceed the CA system j design conditions of Duke Class C, 165 psia, 160*F, and carbon i steel. Also, the. valves' flow coefficients and weights have been l evaluated as acceptable with respect to CA's required flow :

requirements and seismic analysis. These valves will not ;

Exempt Changes i Page 89 l

interfere with the capability of the turbine-driven pump because both RN trains are still able to supply the pump with no additional-action required. Also, the turbine-driven purp La still able to fulfill its SSF event duties.

Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

UFSAR Figure 10-33 will be revised to show the addition of ICA291, ICA292, and 1CA293. No Technical Specification changes are required.

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CATAMBA NUCLEAR STATION SUlefARY OF FSAR CHANGES-RELATED ,

10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS t

FSAR Section 7.2.2.2.3, section 10.b. " Check of Logic Matrices ;

Description '

Section 7.2.2.2.3, subsection 10, of the FSAR describes the Capability for Testing the Reactor Trip System. The section which describes the Solid State Protection System (SSPS)

Testing, item b. Check of Logic Matrices, includes the statement "At the completion of the logic matrix tests, one bistable in each channel of process instrumentation or nuclear instrumentation is tripped to check closure of the ;

input error inhibit switch contacts. "This should be l changed to state " At the completion of the logic matrix tests one input in each channel shall be tripped to check closure of the input error inhibit switch contacts." This allows alternate methods to tripping bistables which are more expeditious.

Evaluation The proposed change does not create a USQ. This change will l result in no decrease in safety, and will redu :e the amount l of time that the SSPS will be removed from service for ;

testing.

l FSAR Section 11.5.1.2.5 (1995 revision)

Description The change being evaluated deals with the description of the calibration of the process radiation monitors. In addition to the currently described factory calibration, a description of in situ calibration is being added.

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Evaluation Performing an in situ primary calibration of the monitors does not increase the probability of an accident evaluated in the SAR. It has no affect on any accident evaluated in the SAR as radiation monitors can not initiate or mitigate an accident. It does not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR, because it will not change the radiological consequences of any accident evaluated in the SAR. It will not create the possibility for an accident for a different type than any evaluated in the SAR, because it will create any new failure modes or operating FSAR Changes Page 1

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' characteristics. It'could not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment, or increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment, important to safety evaluated in the SAR, because the new calibration will be perform on ;

radiation monitors that are not important to safety. It could not create the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any. evaluated in the SAR because the proposed changes in calibration methodology could not create-any new failure modes. . It could not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical ,

specification. Technical Specification state that the ,

monitors have to be calibratea, but do not specify a method. ;

Review'the references listed specify only that radiation monitors be calibrated with radioactive sources traceable to :

the National Bureau of Standards (now the NIST). With the !

new methodology, NIST traceable sources will be still be ;

used; the only difference is that in addition to primary calibrations performed by the manufacturer and transfer ;

calibrations performed in situ, primary calibrations can also be performed in situ. For these reasons stated above, i an USQ does not exist. No'FSAR nor Technical Specification {

j changes or any other changes are needed, except for FSAR ,

I Section 11.5.1.2.5. l

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4 FSAR, Chapter 11, Section 11.5.1.2.2 l Description i During NRC Inspection (2/26/96), subject section was received and questioned by the Inspector as to the use of silver zeolite cartridges for " continuous air samplers". In actual use, silver zeolite cartridges have never been used for this specific purpose. Therefore, the NRC cited a 4

Violation (96-02-07) for " Failure to revise FSAR to reflect use of activated charcoal instead of silver zeolite to l sample gaseous effluent". This change request corrects the section of FSAR as it applies to routine use of activated charcoal cartridges within the airborne monitors (EMF sample packages). A study was performed by the General Office Radiation Protection Group comparing the collection efficiency of silver zeolite and activated charcoal cartridges. Overall, use of the activated charcoal cartridges for routine air monitoring is acceptable and if noble gas atmospheres are above normal, the cartridges would continue to be acceptable. Purging cartridges with " clean" air can provide adequate reduction of' noble gas and still maintain effic3ent iodine adsorption with the charcoal.

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Evaluation This change will have no affect on safety related systems or components. The function of the airborne monitors are not affected. Due to the fact that activated charcoal cartridges have been used for iodine characterization since plant start-up, no changes will result in procedures or ;

documents other than FSAR, Section 11.5.1.2.2.

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Evaluation for Deletion of the FSAR section 9.5.4 l requirement to allow the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks to settle 24 hrs following recirculation and filing.

Description 7 This evaluation covers the deletion of the 24 hrs settling i FSAR requirement for the D/G fuel oil storage tanks following recirculation and filling. Data from the monthly fuel oil sampling shows that the level of particulate contamination is being maintained at an almost negligible level. This data proves that the recirculation filtration system is operating as designed. Also, the lack of sludge build up in the tanks further indicates that the stored fuel oil is being maintained in a clean state. Based on the above discussion, the 24 hrs settling time requirement ;

following tank recirculation and tank filling can be deleted without affecting the ability of the D/G Fuel Oil System from performing its safety related design basis function of providing seven days of continuous fuel oil to the emergency diesel generators.

Evaluation This evaluation determines that there are no unreviewed safety questions with the deletion of the Diesel Generator fuel oil storage tank 24 hrs settling time requirement following tank recirculation and filling. Therefore, the changes can be made per 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

Chapter 9.1 Spent Fuel Pool Description This 50.59 evaluation includes revisions of several discussions contained in Chapter 9.1 of the FSAR. No physical changes are being made to the facility, and no operational changes are being made to any SSC described in the FSAR. The refueling practice in Section 9.1.4.2.2 is being revised to clearly show that total core unloading is routinely performed during refueling outages at Catawba FSAR Changes Page 3

Nuclear Station. The existing description does not prohibit this practice, but also does not clearly describe the sequence until the core is completely unloaded into the !

Spent Fuel Pool. Additionally, the valves of nominal and j maximum decay 1. eat loads in the Spent Fuel Pool are being i revised to reflect different heat loads from the fuel enrichment upgrade, approved by the NRC Staff, due to changes in initial fuel' enrichment and increased fuel ,

burnup. Section 9.1.3.1.3 is being revised to reflect the ;

fact that the Standby Shutdown System pump takes suction :

from the fuel transfer the tube, and to state that in the 4 event of a break of the suction piping at this location, ,

adequate time exists to isolate the break from the Spent Fuel Pool. Several other editorial revisions are being made j to the FSAR in Sections 9.1.3.1.1, 9.1.3.1.2, 9.1.3.3.1, 9.1.4.2.2, 9.1.4.2.3, 9.1.4.3.4. It has been determined ,

that these description revisions do not involve an USQ. !

Evaluation The responses to all of the questions posed by 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (2) are negative. These FSAR revisions do not create any unreviewed safety questions. These FSAR revisions do not necessitate any Technical Specifications amendments.

FSAR 6.4.4.2 Control Room Chlorine Analysis, (verifying acceptability of VC Sys. to satisfy RG 1.95 requirements Description PIP 0-C95-1158 was written because FSAR Chapter 6.4 and Table 6-100 indicate that Catawba complies with Reg Guide 1.95 while certain requirements of the Reg Guide seem unresolved. Through an NRC questionnaire it was discovered that Catawba was not meeting the requirements of Reg Guide 1.95 with respect to response time and single failure as stated in the FSAR. Upon a further detailed review it was determined that the Control Room Ventilation System is capable of maintaining control room habitability following receipt of a chlorine detection alarm without the use of the .

current breathing apparatus. Chapter 6 of the CNS FSAR will l be changed to reflect the deletion of the current breathing I apparatus. Table 6-100 of the FSAR will also be changed to reflect that Catawba is taking exception to paragraphs C.4.c l and C.4.d of Reg Guide 1.95. l Evaluation No Unreviewed Safety Questions are created by this FSAR l Change. No Technical Specification changes are required. I i

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FSAR Table 6-74, " Potential Bypass Leak Paths Through Containment Isolation Valves"/ NSM CN-10911/00 & NSM CN-20300/00 Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the presence or absence of any unreviewed safety question (USQ) associated with Nuclear Station Modifications (NSMs) CN-10911/00 and CN-20300/00. The criteria of 10CFR50.59a (2) will be used to make the determination. Since the presence or absence of a USQ is to be determined, the evaluation is classified as QA Condition 1. The recently completed Containment Integrity Review revealed that a change to Technical Specification Table 3.6-1 should have been processed before the implementation of the above modifications, but the Final Scope Document for secondary containment bypass leakage pathway. An Operability Evaluation was done for this issue under PIP 0-C95-2337 that the required Tech Spec change has been added to their list of backlogged changes. The attached FSAR change should be l processed in conjunction with this Tech Spec revision. In i the conversion to standard tech specs supersedes the need j for this tech spec change, the FSAR change should still be j processed. I Evaluation No Unreviewed Safety Question is associated with either NSM CN-10911/00 or NSM CN-20300/00.

AR 9 .1. 2 , 15.7.4 - Revisions to FSAR Sections 9.1.2 and 15.7.4 for Inclusion in the 1996 Update to the FSAR l Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if an unreviewed safety question (USQ) is associated with the revision to Section 15.7.4 of the Catawba Nuclear Station FSAR, prepared for the 1996 Updated FSAR (UFSAR). The criteria of 10CFR 50.59 a (2) will be used to make this determination. This evaluation is prepared pursuant to the requirements of NSD-209 and the Qualified Reviewer Program.

Evaluation Revisions to Sections 9.12 and 15.7.4 have been prepared for inclusion in the 1996 update to the Catawba Nuclear Station FSAR. These revisions constitute a report of the analyses ;

of consequences of the postulated drop of the weir gate into '

the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). The results of the analyses of ;

the postulated drop of a weir gate into the SFP are as FSAR Changes ,

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i follows: offsite doses remain within the guideline values ;

of 10CFR 100 and Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 15.7.4. l' Radiation doses to the operators in the Control Room remain within the guideline values of 10CFR50, Appendix A, General ;

Design Criterion 19 and SRP Section 6.4. It has been shown ,

that ken s 0.95 everywhere in the SFP following a postulated {

weir gate drop. The SFP itself is not adversely affected by i a drop oi 1 weir gate onto its liner plate. In addition, '

these ana).yses in particular and movement of the weir gate over the SFP in general are consistent with the applicable guidelines of NUREG-0612 (Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants). No unreviewed safety question is associated with the above changes to Sections 9.12 and 15.7.4 of the Catawba FSAR. In addition, no changes to the Technical Specifications are required as a result of these revisions.

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CATAWBA EUCLEAR STATION SUMULRY OF NUCLEAR MISC. CHANGES RELATED 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS Software upgrade to SNACORE 3.1 Description This modification will replace version 3.0 of SNACORE 3.1, on workstations: desnal, mnsnal, mnsna2, ensnal, and ensna2.

This modification does not directly affect any other structures, systems, or components.

Evaluation This modification involves no USQs. No changes to the FSAR or any technical specifications are required.

CNC-1435.00-00-0014, CA Pump Room Fire Resistive Cable Tray Enclosure Description The reclassification of the CA Pump Room HEMYC fire resistive cable tray enclosure from a one hour fire rated >

barrier to a radiant energy heat shield is a change to the approved Catawba Nuclear Station Fire Protection Program.

The approved fire protection program is detailed in the Catawba Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Report including supplements 2, 3, 4, and 5. The CA Pump Room HEMYC fire resistive cable tray enclosure is specifically discussed in Safety Evaluation Report Supplements 3 (Page 9-16) and 5 i (Page 9-1). Changes that do not degrade the approved fire l protection program can be made per Catawba Facility Operating License Conditions #8 for NPF-35 and #6 for NPF-

52. Based on the following factors it is considered that the approved Catawba Nuclear Station Fire Protection Program has not been degraded.

The existing cable tray enclosure will not be modified.

The procedures for installation, inspection, maintenance and repair will not be revised.

Calculation CNC-1435.00-00-014 concludes that the reclassification provides an adequate level of fire protection to ensure the ability of the SSS related j cables to perform their Post Fire Safe Shutdown I function during a fire in the ;

CA Pump Room. l l

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i I- i Evaluation Reclassification of the CA Pump Room HEMYC fire resistive cable tray enclosure will not degrade the effectiveness of any Structure, System or Component important to safety in any design basis accident or event. The existing arrangement will not be modified. Inspection, maintenance, repair and installation procedures will not be revised.

l This reclassification of the CA Pump Room HEMYC fire resistive cable tray enclosure has been screened not to be applicable for USQ Evaluation for the reasons stated above. ;

There are no Tech Spec changes required or any FSAR changes.

4 Simulate Version 4 50.59 Evaluation (Keyword: Fuel)

Description ;

The purpose of this file will be to document the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of the SIMULATE Version 4 Methodology for the Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations. The SIMULATE Version 3 Methodology has been approved by the NRC for use in Safety-Related reload design calculations as described in ,

topical report DPC-NE-1004A. Calculations have been

, performed using Version 4 to demonstrate the applicability of the conclusions of that report. Specifically, the benchmarking and uncertainly calculations performed with Version 3 to support the topical report have been repeated with similar or better results using Version 4.

, Evaluation The upgrade from Version 3 to Version 4 of the CASMO- -

3/ SIMULATE-3P methodology (including changing from 12 to 18 i axial levels) does into involve any unreviewed safety ,

4 questions. No changes to the FSAR or Technical l Specifications are required. The calculations performed to support this change demonstrate similar comparisons of predicted and measured reactivity parameters to those provided in reference 1. Explicit calculations demonstrate that the application of the uncertainties provided in the !

reference 1 topical report remain conservative.

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i CATANBA NUCLEAR STATION SUMGLRY OF THE NUCLEAR STATION MODIFICATIONS-REIJLTED f 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS l

NSM CE-4148 Description This modification involves the Nuclear Service Water (RN) System, the Conventional Wastewater (WC) System, and the Refueling Weter (FW) System. It replaces the existing non-safety related Conduit Manhole (CMH) sump pumps and the associated level switches with new sump pumps and level switches. This modification also removes the seismically mounted (QA-4) remote starters associated

. with the existing pumps. The manholes contain electrical equipment and the sump pumps are provided to remove water from the manholes. Currently, the pumps do not perform as designed because of the failure of the level switches that operate the pumps. Over time, the Gems level switches mounted in the CMH sumps become saturated with debris from the yard water that enters the pits, thereby disabling the pumps. In order to )

prevent this problem the replacement level switch is a i mechanical, floater-type switch that plugs into a 120V l receptacle. This switch will be tethered to the discharge leg of the pump (or near it), and it provides automatic control of the sump pump. The existing one-half horsepower Goulds sump pump is no longer available, but the upgrade of this model will be installed. The existing pump is wired to a Sylvania starter.

However, the replacement pump has built-in thermal overload protection with automatic reset and it will plug into a 120V .

receptacle (reference 7). I Evaluation )

Minor Modification CE-4148 replaces the sump pumps and level switches in the Conduit Manholes for the RN System, the FW System, and the WC System. No Unreviewed Safety Questions are involved, and no Technical Specification changes are required. '

However, one FSAR figure (Figure 9-25) is revised.

NSM CN-11196 Rev.0 Unit 1 ,

Description This NSM will add three-way valves in addition to flow sight glasses currently used to (visually) identify drain leakage from NV System filters, pumps, and heat exchangers. The three-way valves will allow the normal (drain) flow path to the redirected as necessary to measure unidentified leakage. Use of these valves will be eliminate frequent and time consuming disassemble j l

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-t of the flow sight glasses in order to measure leakage from the

.various NV System components. ;

Evaluation ,

Since no safety parameters or design limits have been adversely affected, no margin of safety as defined in the based to any i Technical Specification is reduced. There are no unreviewed safety questions associated'with these NSMs.

$ l NSM CN-11226 Rev.0 Unit 1 i

Description This NSM covers the' installation of a removable overhead monorail '

and a permanently mounted pump stand which will enable the safe movement of the ND Pump 1B. Presently, the removal of the ND Pump lb is done using unsafe practices to maneuver the pump beneath the hatch on Elev._543'+0". This mod is designed to j reduce the hazards of moving the ND pump beneath the hatch. The i

. pump is required to be moved during maintenance due to dose. rates ;

and work' area limits within the room. The addition of a t removable monorail directly below the Elev. 543'+0" floor slab _ ,

will allow the pump to be lifted and moved to the center of the hatch. From here it can be transferred to an existing monorail )

for the lift through the hatch and placement on the floor above.

j The new monorail must be removable to allow the pump to be lifted j through the existing hatch. The trolley must be geared to help j in moving it along the rail. Stops must be included to lock the ,

trolley to the rail. A permanent pump stand must be provided under the existing hatch for a safe transfer from the removable monorail to the existing monorail.

Evaluation-

, No unreviewed safety questions are created as a result of these NSMs.

4 No FSAR or Tech. Spec. changes are required.

NSM CN-11322 Rev.0 Unit 1 Description

, NSM CN-11322/0 will delete the Rod Cluster Control (RCC) mast from the reactor building manipulator crane. The RCC mast has never been used and is not needed in the future. The structural qualification of the crane is maintained QA-4 to assure no seismic failures and eliminate concerns over seismic l interactions. All electrical (including interfacing interlocks between the fuel and RCC masts) and pneumatic supporting !

components (gripper functioning) associated with the operation i and controls of the RCC mast are being eliminated or abandoned in place.

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Evaluation No changes to operation or controls of the remaining fuel mast will occur as a result of 'his NSM. FSAR changes are required to section 9.1.4 and Figures 9-14 and 9-18 and are included in the I i

Final Scope Document. No Technical Specification changes are l required.

NSM CE-4382 Unit 1 >

Dgseription

.inor mod is written to replace the existing dual coil Tnis Electrical Trip Solenoid Valve (ETSV) with the new single coil -

ETSV which has been developed by GE. Experience over the past.10 years has shown the old type ETSV has been known to fail on an average of 6 times a year. The main mode of failure has been the -

coils either opening or shorting, which is due primarily to the i high operating temperature. ,

Evaluation l The new ETSV is a finned single coil design. Its !

characteristics, both electrically and mechanically, are equivalent to the old ETSV. The finned single coil design ,

operates at lower temperatures, reducing the problem associated ,

with heat. The new single coil design has eliminated the ;

mechanical weakness where the common electrical lead joined the two coils on the old solenoid. The new ETSV is designed to mount in the exact location as the old model. This mod will require .

swapping the ETSV's a few wiring changes and changes to the programming in the ETSI control system. A thorough post modification test will be performed to verify the new ETSV works I

properly.

The function of the ETSV is not changing. We are just improving i the reliability of it. Therefore, the probability or consequences of an accident are not increased. Also, the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased. This mod will not reduce the margin of safety of any of the tech specs. Therefore, an unreviewed safety question does not exist and further 10CFR50.59 evaluation is not required.

NSM CN-11344 Rev.0 Unit 1 Description This NSM will install an Electrochemical Potential (ECP)

Monitoring System in the Conventional Sampling (CT) System. This System will interface with the Condensate (CM) and Feedwater (CF)

-Systems. The tie-ins that interface with the CF and CM Systems were installed under a separate modification (Minor Mod CE-60293 and VN CC-4215). This System will enable better chemical monitoring of the feedwater and indicate when substandard '

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t i i r feedwater conditions exists. This NSM will enable the Chemistry

. organization to provide a more suitable supply of feedwater to >

the Steam. Generators (S/Gs). This will help minimize S/G corrosion / cracking due to the' existence of containments and i improve overall S/G' integrity.

Evaluation No Unreviewed Safety Questions are created as a result of this ;

NSM. No Technical Specification changes are required. FSAR J changes are required to section 9.3.2 and these changes are attached to the Final Scope Document. ;

NSW CN-11347 Rev.0 Unit 1 I Description i CN-ll347 replaces Main Steam PORV Block Valves 1SV25B, ISV26B, ;

ISV27A, and 1SV28A. (Future associated modifications will l replace the other S/G PORV block valves. CN-21347 replaces

--2SV25B and 2SV26B. CN-21348 replaces 2SV27A and 2SV28A). The l existing valves have caused operational and maintenance problems i and have been selected for replacement as resolved in PIPS 0-C93-

, 0675 and 2-C94-0941. In addition to replacing the block valves, a 3/4" bypass / equalization line is being integrated in the new !

block valve's body. This bypass will allow pre-heating of the ;

piping between the PORV and its block valve. Currently, the block valves are manually (via handwheel) cracked off the seat to warm the downstream. Placing the electric motor operator in manual with the valve closed has damaged torque switches.

Evaluation This Modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question ;

or safety concern. No Technical Specification changes are 7 required. This modification results in a change to FSAR Figure 10-5 to show the new bypass valves around the block valves.

NSM CN-11352 Rev.0 Unit 1 l Description CN-ll352/00 installs an interface between the Radiation Monitoring (EMF) system and the new operator Aid Computer (OAC) being installed by modification CN-ll392/00. This modification will allow the EMF output modules to communicate with the OAC in order to record EMF data such as loss of sample flow, setpoints, operate status and alarm status. In addition, a scanner will ;

replace EMF 41's (Auxiliary Building Ventilation Monitor) ;

multipoint chart recorder.- The 12 EMF 41 sample valves are controlled form the multipoint chart recorder which when set to

" indicate" mode locks EMF 41 on one sample point. The current OAC ;

has only one computer point for EMF 41 which means not all twelve Modifications Page 4 ;

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sampling locations can be constantly trended. The new scanner allows the sampling of all the points and each sample point will have a separate computer point on the new OAC for trending. :

Also, the N-16 monitor (1 EMF 71, 1 EMF 72, 1 EMF 73 and 1 EMF 74) l readouts will change from CPM to GPD at Operations' request to make the displayed units consistent with the units they are

tracking. ;

Fvaluation ,

This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

FSAR Table 11-22 will be revised to show the 1 EMF 71, 1 EMF 72, ;

1 EMF 73, and 1 EMF 74 module readouts in GPD. No Tech Specs changes >

are required.

NSM CN-11354 Rev.0 Unit 1 ,

Description NSM CN-11354 replaces the reactor coolant letdown isolation ,

valves 1NC14, 1NV1A and 1NV2A due to the excessive maintenance required for these valves in a High Radiation Area. 1NC14 is a 3" manually-operated globe valve serving as the Reactor Coolant ,

(NC) System to Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System boundary and will be replaced with a 3" Manually-operated gate valve.

There is not pipe class change at the boundary. The first class change off the NC System is at valve 1NV2A where a Class A to B interface occurs at the valve exit. 1NV1A and 1NV2A are 3" :

pneumatic-operated gate valves serving as the NC System letdown ;

to regenerative heat exchanger isolation and will be replaced with the same. The pneumatic actuators will go from piston / .

cylinder actuators to diaphragm actuators.

Evaluation This modification involves no unreviewed safety questions or

. safety concerns. No Technical Specification changes are i

required. FSAR Figure 5-1 is being revised to show 1NCl4 changing from a globe valve to a gate valve.

NSM CN-11355 Rev.0 Unit 1 Description NSMs CN-11355 and 21355 replaces the Containment Valve Injection Water System (NW) solenoid-operated globe valves, furnished with 17-7ph springs and standard reed switches, with solencid-operated gate valves which have eligiloy springs and vernier reed switches. The current valve design is obsolete and has been problematic in the areas of hydrogen embrittlement (springs),

general operating difficulties, and position indication. The '

valves being replaced are NW-002, -008A, -011, -013A, -020A, -

046A, -057, -061B, -064, -068B, -069B (Unit 2 only), -110B, -

Modifications Page 5 p - - - - . -- - --

--m a - - .,

f i

145B, -175A, -180A, -185A, -190A, -195A, -200A, -217B, -222B, -

227B, -232B, -237B, and -2428. All these valves are 1/2" and 1" valves to standardize to a single size and the associated ,

benefits of reduced spare parts inventory, training and procedure requirements. NW-008A and NW-061B are receiving 2" valves ;

because of valve availability and not because of a system need to j have larger valves. 1NW-069B is not being replaced by this NSM }

because it was previously replaced by minor mod CE-4953.

Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

NO Technical Specification changes are required. FSAR Table 3-104 will be revised to show the increased sizes for some of the ;

valves. !

NSM CN-11360 Rev.0 Unit 1 !

Description f CN-11360 replaces the battery chargers (1DGCA and 1DGCB) in the i 125VDC Diesel Essential Auxiliary Control Power System (EPQ). ,

These chargers have a poor reliability history and a poor !

response to room temperature changes. This less than adequate performance has lead to placing the respective units in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Technical Specification action statement. To compensate for the

chargers' poor performance, Operations, IAE, and Engineering i monitor and adjust the chargers to keep them properly i functioning. Replacing these chargers improves Diesel Generator !

system reliability and reduces the manpower required to monitor l

these chargers. Also, replacing these chargers required that their mounting pad be enlarged to accept the new chargers. In addition to the charger replacements, several EPQ system cables will be uprated, rerouted or have fuse protection added as a result of being identified as undersized by Duke's Self-Initiated Technical Audit (SITA). The amperage rating of these cables could be exceeded before the protective devices in each circuit tripped if challenged. The cables involved are the main battery cables, DG engine fuel oil booster pump cable, diesel engine control panel cable and battery ground detector /undervoltage relay cable.

Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

FSAR Figure 8-26 and Table 3-105 will be revised to show the cable rerouting and new equipment supplier. No Tech Specs j changes are required. 1 Modifications Page 6 1

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NSM CN-11364 Rev.0 Unit 1 i Description ,

CN-11364. deletes containment isolation valves 1RN429A and 1RN432B !

and modifies the penetration (M308) to leave it as'a spare for future use. As part of deleting these isolation valves, associated vent / drain' valves, piping and hangers will be j abandoned or deleted. Also, appropriate electrical cables and control room indication will be abandoned or deleted. These ;

valves were the Nuclear Service Water (RN) returned from the l Upper Containment Vent Units (UCVUs) until NSM CN-11248 changed the normal cooling supply from RN to Containment Chilled Water (YV) and routed the return through the Lower Containment Vent Units (LCVUs) return header. Hence, these containment isolation ;

valves are now essentially abandoned. Given that there is no benefit having these valves (through which no process fluid j passes) they are an unnecessary challenge to containment 1 isolation.

Evaluation The scope of this modification excluding the Technical Specification (table revision) change scope does not involve an unreviewed safety question. FSAR Tables 3-104, 6-74, 6-77, & 6-96 and Figure 3-264 will be revised to show the removal of 1RN429A and 1RN432B and the new spare status of Penetration M308.

Also, FSAR Chapter 16, Selected License Commitments (SLC) Table 16.8-1A, Unit 1 Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices, will be revised to delete reference to 1RN429A.

NSM CN-11370 Rev.0 Unit 1 Description CN-11370 replaces Nuclear Service Water System (RN) valves 1RN250A and 1RN310B which serve as the boundary isolation between I the safety-related, non-condensate quality, assured source of auxiliary feedwater (CA) and the normal non-safety-related, condensate quality supple for the CA system. The current 6-inch, solid wedge, motor-operated gate valves have experienced seat leakage, have marginally adequate motor operators and are l susceptible to pressure locking due to adjacent steam lines heating the valves' bonnets. The new valves will have flexible wedge _ discs, larger electric actuators, and bonnet pressure !

equalization lines which will relieve back to the RN side of the ;

valves. The bonnet pressure equalization lines are 1/2-inch lines integral to the valves and each contain a 1/2-inch manual ,

globe valve (1RNE89 and 1RNE90, respectively). '

Modifications Page 7 i

,. mm = --

r-

~ Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

No Technical Specification changes are required. FSAR Figure 9-27 and 9-31 will be revised to show the addition of the valve bonnet relief paths.

NSM CN-11372 Rev.O Unit 1 Description Certain flow alarm setpoints associated with the Component Cooling (KC) System will be changed with NSM's CN-ll372 and CN-21372. The alarm setpoints for one and two pump runout will be increased while the alarm setpoint for low flow to the Reactor Coolant (NC) Pump Upper Bearing Oil Coolers will be decreased.

The purpose of the modifications is to allow the operation of the KC System with one pump in service. The response of the CC System to all design basis events and design events remains unaffected with the modifications. The availability of the CC

. pumps to run is not adversely affected with the modifications.

The capacity to remove heat from the NC Pump Upper Bearing Coolers is not degraded. There is no discernible increase in the probability of loss of the KC System. The response of the system and the plant to loss of instrument air is not degraded with the modification.

Evaluation There is no unreviewed safety questions associated with any of these modifications. Changes to FSAR Section 9.2.2.2, Table 9-6, and Table 9-8 will be required with the modifications. No amendments to the Technical Specifications are required.

NSM CN-11371 Rev.0 Unit 1 Description This NSM will delete the CA Flow optimization circuitry and CA Pump runout protection circuitry associated with the CA System.

Accordingly, the close signals to valves 1CA46B and 1CA58A will be eliminated. The NSM will be implemented along with the Replacement Steam Generator (RSG) Project for Catawba Unit 1.

These changes, including all associated analysis, will not be applied and are not valid prior to the start of Unit 1, Cycle 10.

This NSM aligns the turbines driven CA pump to all four S/Gs which differ from the current design by additionally aligning the A and D S/Gs. Flow optimization and runout protection will be provided in a " passive" way by positioning travel stops on the flow control valves. This simultaneously providing adequate flow resistance via the CA system piping and components to avoid runout concerns. SSS controls are being modified to allow for the S/G A and D CATDP control valves to go open on an SSF swap.

Modifications Page 8

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The valves are ICA-64 & 1CA-36. Isolation valves 1CA66B & 1CA38A ,

will be open or automatically open. Also, the ESF Bypass l Indication (Reg Guide 1.47 Bypass Panel) for valves 1CA38A and !

ICA66B will be changed consistent with this NSM. Accordingly, I a

emergency lighting will be provided in the doghouse areas to l provide illumination for manual operation of valves 1CA38A and l ICA66B. This NSM makes the CA System more passive, less complex, !

and more reliable while providing adequate flow for those FSAR- l evaluated events which credit the CA System. This includes j chapter 15 events. SSF scenarios (72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months security events & fire j events), Aux Shutdown Panel events (non-fire loss of Control ;

Room), and Blackout scenarios (4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months period assuming loss of all :

AC). The reliability analysis of the CA System as evaluated in !

4 the SER section 10.4.9 and presented in FSAR section 1.8.1.24 is {

not invalidated by this NSM. However, an enhancement revision i i to section 1.8.1.24 will be made to describe this NSM. Figures l' 4 (flow diagram CN-1592-1.0) and 10-34 (flow diagram CN-1592- >

1 1.1) will be revised to reflect associated instrument deletions j and normal valve positions respectively. FSAR chapter 15 i revisions are also necessary and will be handled as part of the ,

j replacement steam generator (RSG) project. l l

Evaluation ]

No unreviewed safety questions are created as a result of this j modification. No Tech Spec changes are required for this NSM beyond what has already been requested related to the steam i generator replacement project. FSAR changes are required to section 10.4.9 and are attached to the Final Scope Document.

. NSM CN-11375 Rev.0 Unit 1 l' Description NSM CN-11375/0 will change the design temperature for portions of

, the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) System piping located between the i Steam Generator (S/G) isolation check valves and the CA pumps'

flow control valves. The design temperature will increase from l 160'F to 2500*F. These lines include two paths for each of two motor driven CA pumps and four paths for the Turbine Driven CA pumps for a total of eight lines. These lines are shown on flow diagram CN-1592-1.1, FSAR Figure 10-34. The issues related to

leaking check valves are documented in PIP-1C96-0120. They

include piping thermal stress analysis, piping thermal

support / restraint loadings, and the potential for water hammer

loads upon CA pump start. Additionally, the valves contained in the lines having their design temperature increased, have been verified to be qualified for the new design temperature. The S/G l check valves includes valves 1CA-37, 41, 45, 49, 53, 57, 61, and E

65. Additional valves subjected to increased temperature include CA flow control valves 1CA36, 40, 44, 48, 52, 56, 60, and 64.

Modifications Page 9 ;

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I The bonnet vent valves 1CA-201 thru 1CA-208 are also qualified for the increased design conditions of 2000/1800 psig and 250 'F..

Existing thermocouples are installed upstream of all eight S/G

~

check and provide OAC input to monitor the temperature of the 1 piping upstream of the S/G check valves. Three of these thermocouples,-ICATE5650,.5670, and 5680 will be relocated, as.

required to preclude operability concerns, a maximum of six feet ,

from the S/G check valve. Alarm setpoints exist for the OAC as a '

function of the number of CA pumps running. This NSM will add local pressure indication (1 high range gauge per pump) in the affected lines at a location thatLis upstream of the S/G check valves and downstream of the pump discharge check valves 1CA20, 27,.and 32. These pressure gauges, ICAPG5770,5780, and 5790, are Use Code 81 approved for use in QA-1 systems but not nuclear safety related as they perform no active safety function. These pressure gauges will' provide assurance that when certain temperature conditions exist due to check valve back leakage, the means exist to determine if saturated /subcooled conditions are present. The presence of the existing thermocouples, the alarm response procedure, and the new pressure gauges will provide, in essence, a subcooling margin monitor. This capability will provide increased assurance that steam voids will not exist in the piping. This is important to avoid water hammer conditions which could occur if steam voids were present in the piping system and a CA auto start occurred. Provisions will be made to assess conditions in the CA' System should a " Loss of OAC" occur.

Evaluation No unreviewed safety questions are created as a result of this modification. No Tech Spec changes are requires for this NSM.

FSAR Figures 10-28, 10-33, and 10-34 will be revised to show the design temperature increasing from 160'F to 250*F. Also, the new pressure gauges will be shown.

i

NSM CN-20344 Rev.0 Unit 2 Description The Loose Parts Monitor in each unit is being replaced with an upgraded system by NSMs CN-10951/00 and CN-20344/00 for units 1/2 respectively. The existing system does not work'well and spare parts are not readily available. Additionally, the existing system has an inadequate array of sensors, no transient capture device and no analysis capabilities on site. The LPMS is non-safety related. The control room located equipment is seimically-mounted. The number of sensors _is being increased from 12 to 22.

None of the sensors degrade the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary.

Modifications Page 10

. Evaluation I

No Unreviewed Safety Questions are created. FSAR changes are.

required to section 7.8.8 and are attached to the Final Scope ,

Document.. No Technical Specification changes are required. j NSM CN-20396 Rev.2 Unit 2 l Description j

The surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.7.8 l for snubbers installed on QA-1 and 4 piping require a substantial l i number of workhours. Additional workhours and radiological !

exposure results from maintenance of degraded snubbers. New technology in piping analysis has made possible a reduction in ;

snubber populations and attending workhours and radiological !

exposure. NSM CN-20396/02 will use new technology to allow the j removal, modification, or replacement of snubbers identified !

through review and/or re-analysis. !

- Evaluation ,

No redundancy or separation criteria are violated by this NSM so i there is no increase in the consequences of accidents or i malfunctions of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. There are no unreviewed safety questions j associated with this NSM.

l NSM CN-20671 Rev.0 Unit 2 Description j Monitors 1(2) EMF 48 will be replaced with " adjacent-to-line" i monitors. Each monitor will be placed next to its NM sample line to measure exposure dose rates from the sample line activity.

The replacement monitors use Geiger-Mueller gamma counters to continuously measure dose rates. Additional changes will be made. The signal comparison circuits associated with Instrument Loops 1(2)NM5030 and 1(2)NM5110 will be removed. The instrument air (VI) interfaces with these loops'will be removed. In

. particular, Instrument Loops 1(2)NM5110 will be converted from a pneumatic loop to an electric loop. In addition, associated Flow Transmitters, 1(2)NMFT5110 will be connected to low flow annunciators in the control room. Instrument Loop 1(2)NM5030 4 will be removed completely. The low flow alarm from Pressure Switches 1(2)NMPS5160 to the Operator Aid Computer (OAC) will be disconnected. Hand operated valves (1 (2) NM28 6) will be removed.

Flush and backflush capabilities for 1(2) EMF 48 will be added.

Thus, new interfaces with Liquid Radwaste (WL) and Demineralized Water (YM) Systems will be added.

Modifications Page 11

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i v

i Evaluation :

No unreviewed' safety questions is associated with either NSM CN- j 11278/00 or NSM CN-20671/00. No changes.to the technical 4 specifications are required. Changes to the FSAR (Section ,

11.5.1.2; Table 11-19; Figures 9-49, 9-78, and 9-80) are l required. Table 11-22 is to added to the FSAR. j NRM CN-20603 Rev.0 Unit 2 h Description Each of these modifications includes several tasks. A brief j synopsis of these tasks is stated. The high temperature ;

" cutouts" associated with the filter preheaters will be deleted.

These cutouts, provided to de-energize the preheaters upon l indications of high temperature, have the potential to de-energize a preheater prematurely (Ref 7,10). Removal of the j

, cutouts is intended to ensure long service life for the carbon ;

beds. Each preheater will be interlocked to activate on two ,

separate'permissives. One permissive will be given upon indication that the fan motor associated with the preheater is activated. For each of the VA demisters and VF preheaters, the ;

second permissive will be given upon indication that the damper i in the flow path with the fan and preheater is open. For each of l the VC, VE and VP preheaters, the other permissive will be given i upon indication of a differential pressure across the fan !

e associated with the preheater (Ref 10,13). In addition, the controls for the VA demisters will be made simpler by removing the permissives associated with Dampers 1(2)ABF-D-17. These j

~

dampers will be locked open and their actuators will be removed.

The disconnect switches associated with the filter preheaters

, will be removed and replaced with qualified splices. These '

disconnect switches have a history of " shorting out". The backup l contractors for the preheater controls will be disconnected. !

They will be left in place for possible use as spares should the ,

controlling contractors fail. Additional changes to the VP !

filter preheater controls will be made. The master and slave !

controllers will removed. Humidistats 1(2)VPME5690 will be l removed. l Evaluation No unreviewed safety questions is associated with either NSM CN-11288/00 or NSM CN-20683/00. No changes to the FSAR or the :

Technical Specifications are required. l 1

1 1

Modifications !

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NSM'CN-21300 Rev.0- Unit 2 Description _ l

.The. primary design' basis for the Containment Spray Systems (NS) i is to spray cool water into the containment atmosphere when appropriate in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident and thereby ensure that the containment pressure cannot exceed the

. containment shell design pressure of 16.0 psig. The NS_ system 4 consists of two separate trains of equal capacity with each train l independently capable of meeting system requirements each train ,

consists of a residual spray headers with nozzles, valves and i associated piping instrumentation and controls. Corrosive l degradation of the tie rod spacers and other shell side !

components of the NS heat exchangers was reported by PIR 1-C91- l 0197. The nuclear service water system (RN) which flows through the shell side was-identified as the probable cause of the ;

corrosion. These modifications will restore the structural

. integrity of the NS heat exchangers by reinforcing the ,

baffle / support plates. No other changes are included in the scopes of either NSM CN-11300 or NSM CN-21300, j

. . Evaluation l

) No'unreviewed safety questions are associated with either NSM CN-

, 11300 or CN-21300. No changes to the FSAR or the Technical ;

I' Specifications is required. {

i a

NSM CN-21310 Rev.0 Unit 2 ,

Description }

i

. This modification will eliminate the use of Action Pak

thermocouple control relays for emergency diesel generator alarm functions, and will change the normal control of KD and LD heaters to thermocouples installed at the diesel engine KD an LD inlet lines. Dual setpoints will be provided for KD and LD inlet and outlet LOW temperature alarms: a new, lower setpoint will be

active at all times, and the existing low setpoint will be defeated when the diesel general is running without load. The purpose of this modification is to eliminate erroneous temperature alarms and inaccurate heater control. These problems are the result of instrumentation that has a history of setpoint drift and extreme sensitivity to their environment. Dual setpoints for low KD and LD temperature are provided to eliminate alarms that are expected as " routine" during a normal engine startup.

Evaluation ;

No unreviewed safety questions are created by these NSMs. No ;

FSAR or Tech. Spec. changes are required. !

Modifications :

Page 13

r NAM CN-21339 l Description '!

NSMs CN-11339/0 and CN-21339/0.will replace batteries EBA, EBB, 1 EBC, and-EBD with 1495 amp-hr batteries. Also, the-battery racks .i will be grounded. These NSMs will replace the tie cables '

associated with distribution centers EDA & EDC and EDB & EDD.of :

the.EPL System. These tie cables (FSAR Figure 8-24) are used l when a battery is removed from service and the associated i distribution center is energized from the other train related ;

battery. Also, the battery racks associated with the EPL j batteries will be upgraded for the new batteries. Existing batteries EBA and EBC are 1200 and 825 amp-hrs, respectively, and j serve Train A of the EPL System. Existing batteries EBB and EBD are 825 and 1200 amp-hrs, respectively, and serve Train B of the ;

EPL System. These NSMs will provide increased margin for the 125 !

VDC Vital & C System (EPL) batteries. This will improve plant j

' flexibility with respect to scheduling maintenance and i surveillance activities. Also, this modification will improve ,

the capability of the EPL System to accommodate any new loads l that might be added in the future. Additionally, as a result of these NSMs and associated calculations performed in support of the replacement batteries, an existing License commitment associated with Tech Spec Interpretation 3.0.2.1 will be !

modified. This change will allow for the full 10 day time period allowed for a tied alignment via action (d) when two channels are relying on battery EBB or EBC versus the current 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time ;

period associated with action (e) of Tech Spec 3.8.2.1. Compared to when the commitment was established, the following 1 observations are make relative to the uncertainty which has been removed which necessitated the License commitment: new batteries '

are installed of higher capacity rating and all 4 channels are the same size battery, a new tie cable is installed between associated channels of the same train offering less voltage drop, calculations have been performed to quantify delivered voltage to all applicable components under various alignments, testing of components has been performed tor those components that do not receive manufacturer's specified minimum voltage to assure that these devices would perform at their delivered voltage.

Evaluation These NSMs does not involve any Unreviewed Safety Questions. No Tech Spec changes are required. These NSMs and the discussion documented in this 50.59 evaluation justify modification of the Interpretation associated with Tech Spec 3.8.2.1 as shown on ATTACHMENT 6. FSAR changes are required to Table 3-106, Figure 8-25, sections 8.1 and 8.3 and are attached to the Final Scope Document.

Modifications I Page 14

NSW CN-21341 Rev.'0- Unit 2 Description NSM CN-21341; replaces some piping and valves, that eupply the -

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (KF) System and Containment Seal Water ,

Injection (NW) System assured makeup from the Nuclear Service i Water (RN) System, with stainless steel components. This is an attempt to_ remedy problems with these lines becoming corroded as-evidenced by the flushing frequency increasing from quarterly to i monthly. The components being added are functionally equivalent i from a performance perspective and should be an improvement with i respect to corrosion.

Evaluation No Unreviewed Safety Questions are created by this NSM. No -

Technical Specification changes are required. No FSAR changes :

are required. ,

NSM CN-21343 Rev.0 Unit 2 Description .

NSM CN-21343 replaces Unit 2's Reactor Coolant System's letdown j orifices (2NVFE5970 and 2NVFE5950) with a " low vibration" design to prevent socket-weld failures. Along with the orifices, ,

downstream piping and fittings that were subjected to high vibration will be replaced with SD and 3D pipe bends and butt-welded fittings. In addition, relief valve 2NV-14 will be moved approximately 24 inches from a vertical to a horizontal run of pipe to prevent sporadic lifting. The new orifices will provide .

the same letdown capabilities while creating less vibration.

Removing the socket-weld joints will prevent the change of weld failures due to vibration. <

Evaluation ,

This modification involves no unreviewed safety questions. No technical specification changes are required. Because of the same modification on Unit 1 (CN-11343) FSAR Figure 9-89 is being revised to show the new orifices' diameter sizes.

NSM CN-21356 Rev.0 Unit 2 ,

Description CN-21356 (originally a partial tube replacement) replaces all the l tubes in the Component Cooling (KC) System's 2B heat exchanger with stainless steel tubes. The current inhibited admiralty i brass tubes are experiencing corrosion pitting on the inside '

surfaces which are exposed to the Nuclear Service Water System (RN).

Modifications Page 15 I

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- Evaluation l This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or safety concern. . No technical specification changes are required. This NSM results in a change to the FSAR. FSAR Table :

9-8 will be updated to show the heat exchanger's new tube l material and UA value. During implementation of this NSM in the EOC7 outage, it was decided to replace all the tubes and cancel -

I the follow-up NSM (CN-21357). Due to schedule constraints and the need for special tools, the outer perimeter tubes (172) could i not be replaced. It has been decided that the tube replacement will be deemed complete and these perimeter tubes will not be replaced. The conclusion of the original 10CFR50.59 evaluation is unaffected and FSAR Table 9-8 will be updated at the t 4 corpletion of this NSM as opposed to waiting for the completion

of the now canceled CN-21357. ,

NSM CN-21367 Rev.0 Unit 2 Description .

CN-21367 will reduce the full power operatina temperature of Unit }

- 2's' Reactor Coolant System hot leg temperature (T hot) by 3.0*F. )

This temperature reduction will extend the life of the steam {

generators' Inconel-600 alloy tubes by slowing the rate of primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). This modification does not require any physical changes to the plant.

Tnis change is to how the existing plant is operated; therefore, Operations and IAE procedures will reflect the temperature reduction. Equipment operating sequences will not be affected and no Control Room Instrumentation changes are'needed.

Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question i' or safety concern. Other than the changes to the k6 penalty coefficient definition submitted on September 13, 1995, no additional Technical Specification changes are required. FSAR Tables 4-1, 4-17, 5-1, and 5-5, and Figure 4-72 will be updated to reflect the new primary system operating temperatures.

NSM CN-21372 Rev.0 Unit 2 Description Certain flow alarm setpoints associated with the Component Cooling (KC) System will be changed with NSM's CN-ll372 and CN-21372. The alarm setroints for one and two pump runout will be increased while the alurm setpoint for low flow to the Reactor Coolant (NC) Pump Upper Bearing Oil Coolers will be decreased.

The purpose of the modifications is to allow the operation of the KC System with one pump in service. The response of the KC System to all design basis events and design events remains

. Modifications Page 16

unaffected with the modifications. The availability of the KC !

pumps to run is not adversely affected with the modifications.

The capacity to remove heat from the NC Pump Upper Bearing !

Coolers;is not degraded.

i Evaluation ,

There_is-no discernible increase in the probability of loss of

.the KC System. The response of the system and the plant to loss of instrument air is not degraded with the modification. There in no unreviewed safety questions associated with any of these modifications. Changes to FSAR Section 9.2.2.2, Table 9-6, and i Table 9-8 will be required with the modifications. No amendments to the Technical Specifications are required.

i NSM CN-50413 Rev.O Unit 0 Description This modification provided for the " reverse engineering" of Crane-Deming WN sump pumps by Johnson Pumps. Johnson Pumps, using a spare Crane-Deming pumps reverse engineered all parts of ;

these pumps, providing Duke Power Co. with a complete set of documentation. This documentation included cross-sectional 1 outline drawings, bill of material drawings, and seismic reports.

The scope of this modification did no (ultimately) require the procurement of any spare (Johnson Pumps) parts or an entire pump.

However, the Mechanical and Civil Equipment Section purchased one l pump, to be installed only when needed. Thus, this modification !

does not have an implementation phase and therefore does not l require a Functional Description. However, when a part or an entire WN sump pump is replaced it will be considered a direct ]

replacement handled under the Acceptable Substitutes program.

i i Evaluation Based on the guidance given in NSD-209, section 209.10.4 -

Screening for USQ Evaluation Applicability, this NSM does not require a USQ Fvaluation. No FSAR or Tech. Spec. changes are required.

NSM CE 50416 Rev.0 Unit O Description This modification provided for the " reverse engineering" of Crane-Deming WL sump pumps by Johnson Pumps. Johnson Pumps, using 2 spare Crane-Deming pumps reverse engineered all parts of these pumps, providing Duke Power Co. with a complete set of documentation. This documentation included cross-sectional outline drawings, bill of material drawings, and seismic reports.

l The scope of this modification did no (ultimately) require the procurement of any spare (Johnson Pumps) parts or an entire pump.

However, the Mechanical and Civil Equipment Section purchased one Modifications Page 17 l

pump, to be installed only when needed. Thus, this modification l does not have an implementation phase and therefore does not y require a Functional Description. However, when a part or an entire WL sump pump is replaced it will be considered a direct ;

replacement handled under the Acceptable Substitutes program. l J

Evaluation Based on the guidance given in NSD-209, section 209.10.4 - 1 Screening for USQ Evaluation Applicability,.this NSM does not require a USQ Evaluation. No FSAR or Tech. Spec changes are required. ,

NSM CN-50431 Rev. 0 Unit 0 p.scription This mod will modify the Instrument Air System to make it more ,

reliable and improve performance. It replaces reciprocating compressors A, B, and C with 2 centrifugal compressors E and F.

Also refrigerant dryers A, B, C, and D will be replaccd with two desiccant dryers. ,

i Evaluation l No Unreviewed Safety Questions are created by this NSM. No Tech !

Spec changes are required._ FSAR changes are required to Table 1-1, Table 1-4, Table 8-6, Section 9.3.1.2, Table 9-3, Table 9-17, Figure 8-21, Figure 8-1.

NSM CN-50431 Rev.3 Unit 0 Description This NSM (CN-50431/03) will electricall'y abandon (spare the load 2

center breaker) breaker ILXH-5A which previously supplied the power for VI compressor B, and is no longer used. This also includes the removal of associated power and control cables.

Currently, administrative controls maintain breaker ILXH is part of the 600VAC Blackout Auxiliary Power System (ETC - ref6).

Evaluation No Unreviewed Safety Questions are created by this NSM. No Technical Specification changes are required. FSAR changes are required to Figures 8-1 and 8-21 for this NSM. These changes are attached to the Final Scope Document (Ref 3). No other FSAR changes are required.

NSM CN-50438 Rev. 00 Description Water purity in the Main Steam Supply System (secondary side) and in the steam generators is controlled by the Conventional Chemical Addition System (YA). the YA System maintains and water Modifications Page 18 i

l l t 1

purity _within specified limits to minimize corrosion and fouling l of the steam generator heat transfer surfaces. All volatile ,

treatment (AVT)is provided by the chemical addition of hydrazine j for oxygen scavenging and ammonia / morpholine for maintain pH. !

(Ref.2). -The use of morpholine for maintaining pH has been- ,

discontinued. Ethanolamine, also known as monoethanolamine or i ETA, one of the derivatives of morpholine is now being used to control / maintain pH. (Ref. 6,7). Bulk chemicals (hydrazine, i ammonium hydroxide, and ETA) now located in the basement of the l Service Building will be removed from the vicinity of the air 4

compressor intakes, particularly the (VB) Breathing Air .

Compressor. These chemicals will be. relocated to the Unit 2 Turbine Building Mezzanine floor adjacent to the opening between floors at columns 26 and 27, 2L and 2M. Containment curbing (3 !

i

! sides) and absorbent material (1 side) will be installed to

. prevent spills from spreading. Three stainless steel lines will J

be run from the floor opening into the basement to the YA Day l 4

l Tank area. One line will connect to existing valve lYA103 on the ;

Hydrazine Volume Control Receiver Tank. One line will tee and l connect to the Condensate (CM) Ammonium Hydroxide Tanks for both l l

Unit 1 and Unit 2. The remaining line tee and connect to the Steam Generator Ammonium Hydroxide Tanks for both Unit 1 and Unit

2. These lines will be clearly labeled at the Mezzanine level connections.

Evaluation A USQ Evaluation is not applicable to this modification (Ref. 3).

Revision of the Technical Specification or FSAR is not reg.' red (Ref. 7).

NSM CN-50441 Rev. O Unit 1 & 2 Description Replace ITT Hydromotors on values lYC26, 58, 100, 150, 196, 203, 208, 214, 264, 270, 274, and 281 with manual valve actuators.

Evaluation No USQs are created by this NSM. No Tech. Spec. changes are l required. FSAR changes are required to the active valve list (FSAR Table 3-104 pgs 43 & 44 of 88) and are attached to the final scope document.

i NSM CN-50443 Rev.0 Unit 0 l Description l

This modification replaces carbon steel pipe and valves in the RN Strainer Backwash lines with stainless steel piping and valves.

The modification adds a flow orifice and a local gauge to assist in RN flow determinations and balancing. A set of bolted flanges Modifications J

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.is added for removing a section of pipe for accessibility to Backwash Strainer internals.for periodic cleaning. Valves 1/2RNE39 and 1/2RNE47 are being added by this modification. The modification changes 1/2" flanges and approximately 6" long nipples from the-High & Low pressure connections I & C at the l backwash Strainer to stainless steel. ;

Evaluation l This modification does involve a Structure, System, or Component !

(SSC) that is evaluated in the FSAR or a smaller SSC that is part of an SSC evaluated in the FSAR, and does more that replace components with equivalent components. No Tech Spec changes or ;

FSAR revisions are required. No USQ evaluation are applicable. !

t NSM CN-50450 Rev.0 Unit 0 Description :

CN-50450 replaces the tubes in Component Cooling (KC) System's lA heat exchanger. The current inhibited admiralty brass tubes are experiencing corrosion pitting on their inside surfaces which are exposed to the Nuclear Service Water System (RN). All tubes will be replaced with stainless steel tubes for increased corrosion resistance. In addition to the degradation, the tube sheets have experienced metal loss around the tubes. To prevent further corrosion of the carbon steel tubesheets, a protective coating will be applied to the tubesheets and channel sections.

Evaluation -

This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or safety concern. No technical specification changes are required. This NSM and its Unit 2 counterparts, CN-21356 and CN- ,

21357, result in a change to the FSAR. FSAR Section 9.2.2 and j Table 9-8 will be updated to show the heat exchangers' new tube J material and UA value. !

l NSM CN-50457 Rev.0 Unit 0 l Description l CN-50457 installs a plant perimeter barrier to resist entry by a i vehicle loaded with explosives. The Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) has been designed and will be installed per Regulatory Guide 5.68 I and NUREG/CR-6190. l Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety questions or safety concern. No technical specification changes are required. The'FSAP. is not being directly revised, but the i Modifications Page 20

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Physical Security Plan, which is described in the FSAR, will be updated to reflect this modification. i

NSW CN-50470 Rev.0 Unit 0 l Description As per NSM CN-50470, the Pump Lube' Oil' Injection (PLI) Subsystem ,

~

of the Nuclear Service Water (RN), System will be downgraded from Duke Class C (safety related) to Duke Class F (non safety related j but seismic). The Duke Class C valves at the new Class C/F l' boundaries will be maintained closed with the exception that one of the two isolation valves at the intake of the PLI System may be opened to fight a fire in the RN Pumphouse. All active components associated with the RN PLI System will either be isolated or retain their current classification. -

Evaluation It has been determined that the ability of the RN System to perform the safety function associated with any event within its design basis is not degraded with the modification. No unreviewed safety question is associated with this modification.

No changes to the Technical Specification are required. Changes 3 to (at least) the following FSAR Sections are required: Table 3- l 4, Sections 9.2.1.2.3 and 9.2.1.3, Tables 9-4 and 9-5, and Figures 9-22 & 9-24.

NSM# CN-50474 Rev.0 Unit 0 Description This. NSM will modify the Standby Shutdown System (SSS). This j NSM will provide some portable equipment to reinstate RC's ability to provide 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of condensate suction to the Turbine l Driven CA pump following a Security event involving a RC induced l Turbine Building Flood requiring use of the SSF. The portable ,

l equipment consists of a cart, an electric submersible pump, power cable, and hosing for each unit. In a security event with manning of the SSF, if RC piping inside either or both Unit's ,

Turbine Buildings has been breached, the submersible pump (s) I powered from the SSF will be installed in the affected Turbine )

Building's RC pit with discharge hose routed to a manway on one j of the RC waterboxes. 1 Evaluation This NSM involves no Unreviewed Safety Question. No Technical Specification changes are required. FSAR 10.4.9, Auxiliary Feedwater System, will be revised to reflect this NSM. The changes are included in the Final Scope Document. No other FSAR changes are required. Technical Specification Interpretation for Modifications Page 21 6

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1 3/4.7.13 will be revised to identify the. additional equipment 4 (e.g. ~ submersible pumps) required for SSS operability. These j changes are not part of this modification /50 evaluation. They will be processed'in the same time frame as the procedures for !

surveillance-testing of the pumps. J NSM CX-19135 Rev.0 Unit 0

< Description

This work package provides temporary services inside Containment during the S/G Replacement Outage. These services include j welding, cutting gases, compressed air, HVAC, and communications.

These services will be provided by a temporary service supply center located outside containment along the Unit 1 Fuel Building wall. The supply center will'contain three welding (MO) units and one six pack dual grid unit, three diesel air compressors, ;

.one electric air compressor and welding gas bottles (Argon, Argon / Helium, Argon-CO2, Oxygen, and Acetylene). Piping for Argon / Helium and compressed air will be run along and attached to !

the fuel building wall. Service lines and cabled for Upper :

Containment will be pulled under the dance floor and through the equipment hatch. Service lines for Lower Containment will be pulled through the boot seal and through containment penetration manifolds. Supply lines for compressed air and welding gases will then run to manifolds.in upper and lower containment. An evaluation of the need for temporary ventilation services was !

conducted. With the welding and painting activities during the 4 S/G replacement outage, adequate ventilation will be needed to maintain air quality in containment. It was determined that the VP and VV systems would be used for this purpose. The VP and VV systems will remain in operation for the duration of the replacement outage. These systems will provide general area ventilation.and filtered exhaust during th'a outage. If necessary, the VP and VV filters will be changed out. Temporary telephone services will be set-up inside containment and in the temporary service area outside of the equipment hatch. Phone 1 3

lines will be hooked into the outside connection box at the Unit 1 Temporary Power Pad. Lines runhing into containment will be routed along with other temporary services. ;

Evaluation No unreviewed safety questions are created as a result of this work activity. No Technical Specification or FSAR changes are associated with this work activity.

NSM CX-19265 Rev. O Unit 1 i

' Description This package provides for unloading the steam generators when they arrive at the onsite manufacturing facility, placing them in l Modifications !

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l the appropriate location for onsite manufacturing, and disassembly of the schnabel car for return travel.

- Evaluation ;

A USQ. Evaluation is not applicable for CX-19265.. There are no

. Technical Specification or FSAR change required. .

i NSM CE-61223 Rev. N/A Unit Shared Description j The activity associated with this evaluation is Minor +

Modification CE-61223. This modification provides a sound i isolation phone booth in the RN System Pump Structure at Elevation 600 + 0. The high noise. levels in the pump structure l interfere with telephone communications during testing and other ;

i activities. A Sound Isolation Telephone Booth will be provided'in the A Train Side of the RN Pump Structure which will result in ;

enhanced-telephone communications. '

4 ' Evaluation The activity associated with this evaluation is Minor

Modification CE-61223. This modification provides a sound ;

isolation phone booth in the RN System Pump Structure at

Elevation 600 + 0. The high noise levels in the pump structure j interfere with telephone communications during testing and other activities. A Sound Isolation Telephone Booth will be provided 1 in the A Train Side of RN Pump Structure which will result in enhanced telephone communications. The mounting of the booth and the routing of the telephone cable both meet the QA Condition 4 criteria for seismic interaction. A safety review has been ,

performed and there are no USQs involved with this modification. j i

SAR Document sections which need revision are: 3.8.4.1.

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CATANBA NUCLEAR STATION

SUMMARY

OF OPERABLE BUT DEGRADED 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATION t

PIP 2-C97-0157 Residual Heat Removal (ND) System and ECCS Operable but Degraded ND Discharge Header Pressurization with Cold Leg Accumulator Leakage with Regular Depressurizations to Preclude Nitrogen Buildup Description Unit 2 ND System downstream of ND pump discharge check l valves pressurizes to approximately 350 psig due to NC l pressure boundary valve leakage. ND suction pressure remains at FWST static pressure, indicating that ND pump )

discharge checks and miniflow valves are holding tight. ND l pressurization appears to be closely related to frequent NI pump runs that occurred on 1/17 - 18/97. Operable but degraded status of the ND system was established on 1/20/97 using a conservation approach that had been developed on 12/14/96 (PIP 2C97-3250). The purpose of this evaluation is to determine Operability more concisely for the current situation and if there is any Unreviewed Safety Question associated with the subject PIP 2-C97-0157.

Evaluation )

The 2B ND pump has been shown to be Operable through !

successful IWP results. This " Operable but Degraded" l condition imposes certain precautions to assure that N2 )

concentration will not increase such that it will adversely I impact ND pump operation. The potential for limited i accumulation of N2 has been evaluated and shown to not adversely affect the mitigation of the design basis events.

The worst-case effect of ECCS delay in ND water reaching the ,

NC System due to nitrogen accumulation in the (inaccessible) high points inside containment has been evaluated and shown to be bounded by the ND pump response time limit of 27 i seconds in Tech Spec Table 3.3-5.

No Tech Spec changes were required and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were identified. No changes to the UFSAR were required.

1 Operable but Degraded Page 1

I PIP 2-C96-3250 Residual Heat Removal (ND) System and ECCS Operable but Degraded ND Discharge Header Pressurization with Cold Leg Accumulator Leakage with Regular Depressurizations to Preclude Nitrogen Buildup Description Unit 2 ND System downstream of ND pump discharge check valves pressurizes to over 600 psig due to NC pressure boundary valve leakage. ND suction pressure remains at FWST static pressure, indicating that ND pump discharge checks and miniflow valves are holding tight. ND pressurization appears to be closely related to frequent makeup's to CLA 2D and to a lesser extent, CLA 2C. The purpose of this evaluation is to determine Operability and if there is any Unreviewed Safety Question associated with the subject PIP.

New concerns identified through the performance of the regularly scheduled 2B pump IWP test on 12/12/96 point to the need for regular depressurization of the ND System to prevent unwanted migration of Nitrogen (N2) form CLA 2D leakage. The effects of such a difference in nitrogen solubility limits caused flow fluctuations with the 2B ND pump in miniflow alignment.

Evaluation The 2B ND pump has been shown to be Operab'e l through successful IWP test results. This " Operable but Degraded" condition imposes certain precautions to assure that N2 concentration will not increase such that it will adversely impact ND pump operation. The potential for limited accumulation of N2 has been evaluated and shown to not adversely affect the mitigation of the design basis events.

The worst-case effect of the ECCS delay in ND water reaching the NC System due to nitrogen accumulation in the (inaccessible) high points inside containment has been evaluated and shown to be bounded by the ND pump response time limit of 27 seconds in Tech Spec Table 3.3-5.

No Tech Spec changes were required and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were identified. No changes to the UFSAR were required.

1 Operable but Degraded Page 2

PIP 0-C96-1824 Operable but Degraded Evaluation of the Unit 1 and 2 Standby Makeup Pump Description PIP 0-C96-1824 has identified errors in Calculation CNC-1223.04-00-0009, Standby Makeup Pump Sizing. Because of these errors, operability of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Standby Makeup Pump (SMP) is in question. This 50.59 Evaluation will discuss the operability concerns associated with the Unit 1 and 2 SMP and the Standby Shutdown System (SSS).

Evaluation This evaluation has been performed to determine if an Unreviewed Safety Question existed due to the Operable but Degraded condition of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Standby Makeup Pump (SMP). The SMP sizing calculation contains errors which do not account for elevated spent fuel pool temperatures and higher SMP flow rates, both of which could lead to inadequate available suction head for the pump. In order to consider the SMP and the Standby Shutdown System (SSS) as operable, the following conditions must be met: 1.

Spent fuel pool temperatures need to be maintained at or below 125'F as read on control room gauge 1(2)KFP5130. 2.

The fuel pool level needs to be kept at or above the 596 ft, elevation. 3. The suction damper charge pressure needs to be kept between 5 and 10 psig relative to a 70 F charge temperature. These conditions are met based on adherence to current procedures and Technical Specifications. There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with this Operable but Degraded evaluation. Also, no FSAR changes will be required. The SMP and SSS are technically operable from an equipment / system standpoint, but are considered to be Operable but Degraded due to the unconservative borated water volume stated in Tech Spec 4.7.13.3 (a) (2) . A Tech Spec change to correct this non-conservative value is needed.

PIP 0-C96-3241 (Step 1)

Operable but Degraded Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if unreviewed safety questions are involved with the continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of CNS Unit 1 and 2 under Technical Specification 3/4.7.1.2. The CA Turbine Driven pumps have been declared INOPERABLE with 1(2)CA85B closed and power removed. This evaluation reviews the operability determination of the two motor driven pumps with 1(2)CA85B closed and power removed. The criteria of 100FR50.59(a)2 Operable but Degraded Page 3

will'be applied to make this determination per the requirements of NSD-209.

Evaluation There are no changes to any design limit or setpoint that have not been evaluated. No fission product barrier is affected. No control, instrument function, or performance of any structure, system, or component is degraded.

Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any Techncial Specification has not been reduced.

No FSAR changes needed.

PIP 0-C96-3241 (Step 2)

Operable but Degraded Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if unreviewed '

safety questions are involved with the unrestricted operation of CNS Units 1 and 2 with valves 1(2)RN250A and 1 (2)RN310B open with power removed. The criteria of 10CFR50.59(a)2 will be applied to make this determination i per the requirements of NSD-209. ,

I Evaluation l There are no changes to any design limit or setpoint that have not been evaluated. No fission product barrier is !

affected. No control, instrument function, or performance of any structure, system, or component is degraded.

Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any Technical Specification has not been reduced.

No FSAR change needed.

PIP 0-C96-3241 (Step 3)

Operable but Degraded Description Due to the design of the RN to CA transfer circuitry and piping, the potential exists for one RN-to-CA header (A or B) to be aligned to supply all three CA pumps as a result in )

insufficient NPSH for all three CA pumps for certain accidents resulting in extremely high CA flow rates due to S/G depressurization, potentially resulting in the failure of the CA pumps. The resulting Operability Evaluation has concluded that the CA System is " Operable But Degraded" based on the elimination of the possibility of on RN-to-CA header supplying three CA pumps. This requires that the single. failures which could result-in this alignment be eliminated.

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i This evaluation will determine the absence or presence of an ;

Unreviewed Safety Question associated with the Operability ;

Evaluation of " Operable But. Degraded" on the CA System along with the associated, required Compensatory Actions.

i Evaluation ;

No Unreviewed Safety Questions are associated with this Operability Evaluation and associated, required Compensatory ,

Actions.

T With the Compensatory Actions in place, the three CA pumps on both units, as well as the CA and RN systems, are _

maintained operable. These Compensatory Actions will remain -

in place until the CA pumns are returned to unconditionally ,

operable status by evaluation or modification. This time is !

not to exceed 2EOC8 for Unit 2 and lEOC10 for Unit 1.

The required Compensatory Actions result in a " Operable But Degraded" condition on the CA System of each unit. This ,

Operability Evaluation has been approved by the PORC, and !

associated Compensatory Actions implemented by Operations. l The CA System on each unit is considered " Operable But ;

Degraded".

PIP 0-C96-3266 l Operable but Degraded Description [

The CA flow rates, RN essential header pressures, and design l basis event scenarios assumed in some RN and CA design I calculations have been determined to be invalid. The resulting Operability Evaluation has concluded that the CA System is " Operable But Degraded" based on the revised calculation assumptions and the results of the most recently completed CA Flow Balance procedures (PT/l(2)/A/4250/03E) and RN Flow Balance procedures (PT/0/A/4400/08A/(B)) which ,

are more restrictive.than the allowable Test Acceptance Criteria for these procedures.

This evaluation will determine the absence or presence of an Unreviewed Safety Question associated with the Operability Evaluation of " Operable But Degraded" on the CA System. -

Evaluation No Unreviewed Safety Questions are associated with this Operability Evaluation.

The CA System is determined to be Operable But Degraded based on the revised calculation assumptions and actual RN i header pressures and CA flow rates. These conditions for

, operability will remain in place until the CA Flow Balance Operable but Degraded Page 5 d

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procedures (PT/1(2)/A/4250/03E) and RN Flow Balance procedures (PT/0/A/4400/08A/(B)) have been revised to reflect the limits used for this determination. This time is not to exceed 2EOC8 for Unit 2 and 1EOC10'for Unit 1. No Compensatory Actions are required by this evaluation. This Operability Evaluation has been approved by the PORC. The CA System on each unit is considered " Operable But Degraded".

No FSAR changes needed.

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CATANBA NUCLEAR STATION

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OF NUCLEAR OPERABILITY CHANGES REIJLTED 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS !

10/5/93 1 NB6 SYSTEM NV (LETDOWN DIVERSION VALVE)

Description ;

At the end of core life, additional make-up and letdown are required for reactivity control in the Reactor Coolant (NC) system. Normally, the additional letdown is relieved to the WEFT through valve INB6 via 3-way valve 1NV172A. In order to support repair work on valve 1NB6, additional letdown flow will be diverted to the VCT. To prevent the VCT from exceeding it safety level of operation, it will be drained through valves 1NV177 and INV179 into the WEFT.

Evaluation There are no unreviewed safety questions associated with this evolution. Also, there are not Tech Specs or FSAR changes required.

10/26/93 REACTOR BUILDING PENETRATION REVISION 3 Description During Modes 5, 6, and No Mode the Reactor Building wall between the Auxiliary Building and the Annulus becomes a Tornado Pressure Boundary for the operating unit. This '

occurs because of the following reasons:

1.The boot seal, on the shutdown unit, is removed exposing the annulus to tvinado inducad nacative pressures.

2. The equipment hatch shield door is rolled back thus removing tornado missile protection for the containment vessel, and in particular the equipment hatch, for the shutdown unit.

3. Typically, the airlock doors on the shutdown unit are maintained open to minimize wear on the door seals.

If at any time this boundary is breached during the outage then the compensatory actions discussed in this compensatory action are required to protect structures and components in the Auxiliary Building which support the operating unit and shutdown safety functions on the shutdown unit. This Compensatory Action accomplished this by ensuring that the pressure in the annulus does not drop low enough to created a differential pressure across any structure in the Auxiliary Building large enough to cause its failure (approximately 0.4 psid). Pressure in the Annulus is Operability Evaluations Page 1

maintained by minimizing the number and size of the airflow paths from the annulus to the environment. The argest of these flow paths are the two airlocks which this compensatory actions requires to closed within the customary one hour of tornado watch or warning conditions in York County. Other flowpaths of significant concern are the spare flanged penetrations which would allow for a direct air flow path from the annulus to the containment atmosphere. This compensatory action requires these to be !

closed while the reactor building penetrations are open. l Miscellaneous penetrations which may be aligned for Type C ,

testing are not of concern due to the high flow restrictions ;

the vents and drains provide.

Evaluation The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by disassembling :

these penetrations. The probability'of an accident or a }

malfunction of equipment important to safety will not be I increased because Tornado Pressure Protection will be !

restored by this compensatory action. The possibility or ;

consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to :

safety different than already evaluated in the FSAR will not be created. The margin of safety to any Technical i specification Bases are not decreased by this action because this compensatory action does not directly affect any ,

Technical Specification. i 2/15/94 50.59 EVALUATION TO ADDRESS THE CONDITIONALLY !

OPERABLE CONTROL COMPONENT RCCA R-30 L Description An operability evaluation was performed on RCCA #R-30 as ,

part of PIP 1-C94-0133. The operability evaluation was deemed necessary because during the course of Catawba 1 >

cycle 7, RCCA R-30 was potentially mis-positioned to the incorrect axial park position. The actual park positions used during this cycle are not known for certain. In the evaluation, it was determined that in a worst case scenario ;

all 53 RCCA were operated at the 225, 228, and 230 SWD park positions. All three of these park positions were intended to be avoided. The document that provided this guidance was cNEI-0400-17. The operability evaluation considered the worst case additional wear that each RCCA could have :

received at these park positions and arrived at the ,

conclusion that only one of the RCCAs did not meet the [

Nuclear Engineering acceptance criteria. Worst case wear i projections for R-30 indicated a wear defect approximately 34.82 mils deep. This violated the acceptance criteria of 7.4 mil wall thickness remaining (31.3 mil deep). The operability evaluation concluded that the worse case wear Operability Evaluations ;

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scar assumed on R-30 would not lead to a structural failure during normal operating conditions. This determination was made based on input from both Nuclear Engineering and Westinghouse and assumed no further wear would occur at that location. The RCCA was therefore declared conditionally operable based on the requirement that it be positioned axially to avoid the 227, 228, or 229 SWD park positions.

Evaluation This operability evaluation involves no USQs. No changes to the FSAR or any Technical Specifications is required.

2/18/94 50.59 EVALUATION TO ADDRESS THE CONDITIONALLY OPERABLE CONTROL COMPONENT RCCA R-24 Description An operability evaluation was performed on RCCA #R-24 as part of PIP l-C94-0215. The operability evaluation was

deemed necessary because during the course of Catawba 1 cycle 7, RCCA R-24 was potentially mis-positioned to the incorrect axial park position. The actual park positions used during this cycle are not known for certain. In the evaluation, it was determined that in a worst case scenario all 53 RCCA were operated at the 225, 228, and 230 SWD park positions. All three of these park positions were intended to be avoided. The document that provided this guidance was a CNEI-0400-17. The operability evaluation considered the worst case additional wear that each RCCA could have received at these park positions and arrived at the conclusion that only two of the RCCAs, R-30, and R-24, did not meet the Nuclear Engineering acceptance criteria.

Operability and USQs evaluations for RCCA # R-30 are addressed in PIP # C94 0133. Worst case wear projections for R-24 indicated a wear defect approximately 33.5 mils deep.

This violated the acceptance criteria of 7.4 mil wall thickness remaining (31.3 mil deep). The operability evaluation concluded that the worse case wear scar assumed on R-24 would not lead to a structural failure during normal operating conditions. This determination was made based on input from both Nuclear Engineering and Westinghouse and assumed no further wear would occur at that location. The RCCA was therefore declared conditionally operable based on the requirement that it be positioned axially to avoid the 224, 225, or 226 SWD park positions.

Evaluation This operability evaluation involves no USQs. No changes to the FSAR or any Technical Specifications is required.

Operability Evaluations Page 3

l 2/23/94 CNC - 1435.00-00-0014, CA PUMP ROOM FIRE RESISTIVE CABLE TRAY ENCLOSURE Description The reclassification of the CA Pump Room HEMYC fire resistive cable tray enclosure form a one hour fire rated barrier to a radiant energy heat shield is a change to the approved Catawba Nuclear Station Fire Protection Program.

The approved fire protection program is detailed in the Catawba Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Report including supplements 2, 3, 4, and 5. The CA Pump Room HEMYC fire resistive cable tray enclosure is specifically discussed in (Page 9-1). Changes that do not degrade the approved fire protection program can be made per Catawba Facility Operating License Conditions #8 for NPF-35 AND #6 for NPF-52.

Evaluation Per this discussion, the reclassification of the CA Pump Room HEMYC fire resistive cable tray enclosure discussed in calculation CNC - 1435.00-00-0014 will not adversely effect any structure, system or component important to the safe operation of Catawba Nuclear Station and will not degrade the approved Catawba Nuclear Station Fire Protection Program. There are no Tech Specs or FSAR Change required.

3/2/94 LATCH COIL FOR RELAY KC615 SYSTEM VQ Description The latch coil for relay KC615 is inoperable. This relay closes valve IVQ2A (the inside containment isolation valve for the VQ penetration) and ensures that is stays closed after receipt of a Phase A isolation signal or a Safety Injection signal. With this latch coil inoperable, valve IVQ2A will go closed upon receipt of a phase A isolation signal or a Safety Injection signal, but as soon as the signal clears the valve will be able to manually opened from the control room. The compensatory action was written so the operations could perform a containment release in order to avoid a shutdown of Unit 1 due to high containment pressure. The compensatory action has instructions in it instructing operations personnel to ensure that valve IVQ2A closes upon receipt of a Phase A isolation signal or a Safety injection signal and then to remove power to the i valve thus ensuring that the valve stays closed. This compensatory action guards against the inadvertent operation of IVQ2A following an accident.

Evaluation The probability or consequences of an accident, whether or not previ>usly evaluated in the FSAR, will not be increased Operability Evaluations Page 4

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by the performance of this compensatory action because the l operation of a valve IVQ2A is not an accident initiator as ;

described in the FSAR. Also the valve will operate in the r

. manner it was designed to operated in - it will closed upon

- receipt'of the appropriate signal and it will remain closed ,

(because power will be removed). If there were a failure of' i IVQ2A to go closed, the VQ penetration would be isolated by valve IVQ3B (the outside containment isolation valve). The probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety, whether or not previously evaluated in .

the FSAR, will not be increased by this compensatory action !

because IVQ2A does not serve an equipment support function -

in any way nor does its operation in this manner affect the ,

operation of any other equipment. It is assumed that valve ,

IVQ2A will go closed when it receives the appropriate signal i and this compensatory action removes power from the valve 7

. thus ensuring that it will remain closed (this is cane to guard against the inadvertent operation of valve IVQ2A during the accident). The margin of aafety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specifications will not be affected by this compensatory action. IVQ2A will operate as l 3.

it normally would. This compensatory action only removes

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power to the valve that it stays closed during an accident. j 3/2/94 1BB19A !

Description .

Thia justification verifies the method.used follows sound Engineering Evaluation practices, provides a method to ensure proper testing is continued, and that the safety of the system, structure, and/or components have not been {

reduced in any way. This alternate method of ensuring

IBB19A is cycled closed with in its required 10 second criteria. Although the standard method of verifying in the J valve thoroughly cycled from open to closed is not

- available, this test performed ensures the cycle time, ;

- current seating valve (amps), and the isolation of flow provide a method to verify the testing is met with equal i

conservatism.

I Evaluation This method does not effect the procedures as described in the FSAR in any significant manner. This method does not ;

require inclusion in the FSAR. Additionally, the safety l function of the valve, the penetration, the BB system, and :

1 the containment structure have not been jeopardized in any ;

manner. The possibility, consequences of an accident and potential for a malfunction have not been affected in any i

, way. <

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3/7/94 COWTROL ROOM AREA CBILLER A & B STATION / UNIT 1 & 2 Description During a review of flow balance data obtained during RN flow balancing it was observed that the measured chiller condenser pressure drop was less than that specified by Carrier design data and less than that reported in the Chiller Test Report. This indicated that flows had to be less than the 1400 gpm specified by Carrier for operation at 420 tons with 95'F Nuclear Service Water to the condenser.

An operability evaluation was performed on 11/1/93 using data from TT/A/9100/59 - Control Room Area Chiller Cooling Load (2CRA C-1). This evaluation listed a set of conditions ,

that.had to be met in order to consider the YC chillers !

operable. Since then two performance tests !

(PT/0/A/4450/008E) have been performed on'each chiller. (

Results from these test indicated that the chiller i

condensers would need to be cleaned approximately once a month. This current operability evaluation (Rev. 1) uses reduced Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond temperatures t along with data from first A Train performance test (A Train had approximately 9 weeks of fouling at the time of the test) to justify lowering the acceptance criteria in the YC !

PT (the chiller performance test). This will allow a longer ,

interval between condenser cleanings. :

Evaluation The probability or consequences of an accident whether or not previously evaluated in the FSAR, will not be increased by.this evaluation because the YC System is not considered an accident initiator. The action does not affect the YC Chillers function. This evaluation lists a set of I conditions that must be met before the YC Chillers can be !

declared operable. With the conditions of this evaluation met, the YC Chillers will be fully capable of performing l their function of removing heat from the Control Room and l Control Room Area. This evaluation will not increase the l probability or consequences of a malfunction of a piece of equipment important to safety, whether or not previcusly -

evaluated in the FSAR, because it lists a set of conditions ;

that must be met in order to consider the YC Chillers operable. Therefore if the terms of this evaluation are I followed the YC Chillers will be fully capable of performing :

their function. This evaluation ensures that the YC Chillers can perform their function during an accident (keeping the Control Room < 90*F), therefore the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not i reduced.

Operability Evaluations Page 6 i

'3/25/94 CONTROL ROON AREA CHILLERS OPERABILITY EVALUATION

- REV. 2 Description During a review of flow balance data obtained during RN flow balancing it was observed that the measured chiller condenser pressure drop was less than that specified by Carrier design data and less than that reported in the Chiller Test Report. This indicated that flows had to be less than the 1400 gpm specified by Carrier for operation at 420 tons with 95*F Nuclear Service Water to the condenser.

An operability evaluation was performed on 11/1/93 using data from TT/A/9100/59 - Control Room Area Chiller Cooling Load (2CRA-C-1). This evaluation listed a set of conditions that had to be met in order to consider the YC chillers operable. Additional testing indicated that the chiller condensers would need to be cleaned approximately once a month. Revision 1 to the operability evaluation used reduced Standby Nuclear Serve Water Pond (SNSWP) temperatures along with data from the first A Train performance tests (A Train had approximately 9 weeks of fouling at the time of the test) to justify lowering the acceptance criteria in the YC PT (the chiller performance test). This will allow a longer interval between condenser cleanings. Revision 1 to the operability evaluation used a RN flowrate of 700 gpm and SNSWP temperature of 65*F in the condenser analysis. With current SNSWP temperatures approaching 65*F, Revision 2 to the operability evaluation was written to increase the allowable SNSWP temperature.

Revision 2 to the operability evaluation used increased RN supply and return piping to the YC chillers that was performed in January (A Train) and March (B Train).

Although the pipe cleanings did increase the RN flow to the chiller condensers, the flowrate is still not high enough for the currently postulated accident heat load and allowing for an estimated condenser cleaning frequency of 2 - 3 months. This cleaning frequency is based on the condenser fouling rate monitored in the. fall of 1993. There is also some allowance for additional pipe fouling which would result in lower flows to the condensers than was obtained immediately after the pipe cleaning. During the upcoming Unit 2 outage additional testing will be performed to determine what the maximum actual heat load on the chillers should be. Through this testing it is believed that the chillers can be returned to fully operable condition.

Evaluation The probability or consequences of an accident whether or not previously evaluated in the FSAR, will not be increased by this evaluation because the YC System is not considered an accident initiator. The action does not affect the YC Operability Evaluations Page 7

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I Chillers function. This evaluation lists a set of !

conditions that must be met before the YC Chillers can be l declared operable. With the conditions of this evaluation met, the YC Chillers will be fully capable of performing ,

their function of removing heat from the Control Room and ,

Control Room Area. This evaluation will not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of a piece of equipment important to safety, whether or not previously evaluated in the FSAR, because it lists a set of conditions that'must be met in order to consider the YC Chillers ,

operable. Therefore if the terms of this evaluation are ;

followed the YC Chillers will be fully capable of performing )

their function. This' evaluation ensures that the YC Chillers can perform their function during an accident :

(keeping the Control Room < 90*F), therefore the margin of '

safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is not l reduced.

3/31/94 OPERATOR AID COMPUTER, SYSTEM WL Description This Compensatory Action provides Operations personnel '

instructions on how to use the systems outlined in Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 as indicators of leakage inside i containment when the OAC is Out of Service.

Evaluation This instruction do not increase the probability or '

consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR. They do not create the possibility of an accident different from that already evaluated in the FSAR. They do i not increase probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety already evaluated in the FSAR. ,

Nor do they create the possibility of a malfunction of ;

equipment different than already evaluated in the FSAR. ,

These instructions do not decrease the margin of safety as l defined in any Technical Specification Bases, rather they allow compliance with the Technical Specification Bases if the Operator Aid Computer is Out of Service.

4/27/94 2 NI 165, 167, 169, 171 SYSTEM NI Description Because of leakage of NC system fluid past the Unit 2 NI Cold Leg discharge check valve (s) (2NI 165, 167, 169, 171),

it is necessary to bleed off pressure trapped between these check valves and the NI pump discharge check valves (2NI 116 and 2NI 148) to prevent challenging the NI discharge header relief valves (2NI 119 and 2NI 151).

Operability Evaluations Page 8

r Evaluation The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the l FSAR will not be increased by this Compensatory Action j because this Compensatory Action does not affect any of the j accident initiators as. described in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.

The possibility of an accident different that already ;

evaluated in the FSAR will not be created by this i Compensatory Action because no new failure modes for !

equipment important to safety are created. The consequences :

of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be l significantly affected. Control Room Operator does are most !

limiting in this case and they remain below GDC19 limits ;

with this Compensatory Action in effect. The impact on the i ECCs analysis is insignificant. This configuration will actually decreased the probability of malfunction of i equipment important to safety by preventing the unnecessary l challenge to the NI discharge header relief valves. As i discussed above, the proper operation of plant systems is ;

i not impaired, so the consequences of any equipment malfunction will not be increased. The margin of safety as discussed in the Bases of Technical Specifications are not i reduced. Operator doses remain below GDC19 limits as discussed in the bases and the ECCS analysis is not j significantly affected. Therefore, based on the above i evaluation, no Unreviewed Safety questions are involved with l this Compensatory Action. j i

6/10/94 KC PUMP 2A1, SYSTEM KC f Description !

On June 7, 1994, oil sample results on the 2A1 KC pump j indicated a large increase in the iron content of the pump -

bearing oil. Discussions were held and it was decided that this condition warranted maintenance of the pump even though operating parameters were still well within normal operating l limits. Due to the outage schedule, work on the 2A1 pump j needs to begin while B Train ESF testing is in progress. ;

This requires that A Train of ND be in service. The Unit 2 1 conditions expected when the 2Al KC pumps functional. This i Compensatory Action justifies only needing one A Train KC .

pump in service to maintain ND A Train operable. !

Evaluation !

Based on the discussions above, the conditions imposed by !

this Compensatory Action will ensure that A Train ND is (

operable with only one A Train KC pump in service. The KC i system will be in its accident alignment (A Train cross over i valves closed), therefore, a system alignment other than the l

one verified by the attached flow balance enclosures will i not occur due to any unexpected safety signals. The KC !

system will be operated in a manner such that equipment on f l

Operability Evaluations Page 9 (

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l I the AC system, and those systems it supplied, will not be at f risk of failure or damage. l j Evaluation !

The probability / consequences of an accident or equipment malfunction previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be ;

increased due to this Compensatory Action. The 2A2 KC pump j will be run within its operating limits and will supply the j required flows to all the equipment needed for this ,

particular mode of operation. Therefore, the possibility of {

an accident or safety related equipment malfunction l different from those previously identified in the FSAR will not be created. None of the operating parameters nor design limits for the KC system or the systems it supplies will be i affected by performing this Compensatory Action. Therefore, I the margin of safety defined in the bases of the Technical i Specifications will not be reduced. In conclusion, it is l determined that an Unreviewed Safety Question does not exist ;

for this 10CFR50.59 evaluation. ,

6/21/94 2 RFFS 6090 SYSTEM RF ;

Description The maintenance work on 2RFFS6090 will not modify or alter )

the operation of the Unit 2 Annulus fire protection ,

sprinkler system. The system will be able to continue to i perform it's fire protection function after the maintenance l work has been completed. The Selected Licensee Commitments l (SLC) Section 16.9-2, " Remedial Action", requires that backup fire suppression equipment be provided within hour ;

after the Unit 2 Annulus fire protection sprinkler system I has been removed from service. A review of the fire hazards l associated with the Unit 2 Annulus identified the Unit 2 l Standby Makeup Pump and the concentration of cable !

penetrations at the 560 and 577 Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Rooms. Based on these requirements were determined to be as follows.

1. Provide an additional 300 feet of fire hose at Fire Hose Station 1RF485. This fire hose will provide backup fire suppression capability for fighting fires at the concentrations.

2. Provide an additional 150 feet of fire hose at Fire f Hose Station 1RF233. There are no significant fire i hazards located in the upper portions of the Unit 2 !

Annulus. This fire hose will provide general fire suppression capability within the Unit 2 Annulus.

i The additional fire hose will be dedicated for fighting ;

fires inside the Unit 2 Annulus. The Fire Brigade Incident i Operability Evaluations Page 10 i

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Commander has the option to request additional fire hose if l needed. The Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Section '

16.9-2, " Remedial Action", requires that a continuous fire watch be established within hour after the Unit 2 Annulus fire protection sprinkler system is removed from service. l This fire watch will be established at the Unit 2 Annulus -j Fire Detection Control Panel. Upon receipt of an alarm or j trouble signal on the Unit 2 Annulus Fire Detection Control i Panel, the fire watch will immediately call the Control Room. The Control Room also has the capability to monitor ,

the status of the Unit 2 Annulus Fire Detection Control 4

Panel. The decision to establish the continuous fire watch at the Unit 2 Annulus Fire Detection Control Panel as i opposed to inside the Unit 2 Annulus was based on ALARA l principles and the consideration that the continuous fire ,

watch at the Unit'2 Annulus Fire Detection Control Panel is !

equivalent to a continuous fire watch inside the Unit 2 Annulus.

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Evaluation !

Per this discussion, it is considered that the Unit 2 Annulus fire protection compensatory actions will not ;

adversely effect any structure, system or component j important to the safe operation of Catawba Nuclear Station. ;

- These fire protection compensatory measures will not :

increase the probability or consequences of any accidents i evaluated in the FSAR.

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6/28/94 2 NI 165, 167, 169, 171 SYSTEM NI Description Because of leakage of NC system fluid past the Unit 2 NI Cold Leg discharge check valve (s) (2NI 165, 167, 169, 171),

it is necessary to bleed off pressure trapped between these check. valves and the NI pump discharge check valves (2NI 116 and 2NI 148) to prevent challenging the NI discharge header relief valves (2NI 119 and 2NI 151).

Evaluation The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased by this Compensatory Action because this Compensatory Action does not affect any of the

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accident initiators as described in Chapter 15 of the FSAR.

The possibility of an accident different that already evaluated in the FSAR will not be created by this Compensatory Action because no new failure modes for equipment important to safety are created. The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be significantly affecced. Control Room Operator does are most limiting in this case and they remain below GDC19 limits j Operability Evaluations Page 11

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1 with this Compensatory Action in effect. The impact on the ECCs analysis is insignificant. This configuration will actually decreased the probability cf malfunction of equipment important to safety by preventing the unnecessary l challenge to the NI discharge header relief valves. As discussed above, the proper operation of plant systems is not impaired, so the consequences of any equipment malfunction will not be increased. The margin of safety as discussed in the Bases of Technical Specifications are not reduced. Operator doses remain below GDC19 limits as discussed in the bases and the ECCS analysis is not significantly affected. Therefore, based on the above !

evaluation, no Unreviewed Safety questions are involved with ,

this Compensatory Action. 4 6/29/94 1RF209 SYSTEM RF Description !

The maintenance work on 1RF209 will not modify or alter the operation of the Unit 2 Annulus or Unit 2 Containment Pipe Chase fire protection sprinkler systems. The systems will be able to continue to perform there fire protection ,

function after the maintenance work has been completed. .

The Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Section 16.9-2,

" Remedial Action", requires that backup fire suppression equipment be provided within hour after the Unit 2 Annulus and Unit 2 Containment Pipe Chase fire protection sprinkler system has been removed from service.

Fvaluation '

Per this discussion, it is considered that the Unit 2 ,

Reactor Building fire protection compensatory actions used !

during maintenance on 1RF209 will not adversely effect any I

structure, system or component important to the safe operation of Catawba Nuclear Station. These fire protection compensatory measures will not increase the probability or consequences of any accidents evaluated in the FSAR.

6/30/94 ASSURED MAKEUP LINES TO V2 KC FROM RN SYSTEM KC/RN i Description In response to CNS RN SITA item 16, radiographs of the RN assured makeup to KC surge tank lines were performed 5/8/94.

These radiographs indicate that a significant number of clams exist in the RN portion of the makeup lines to KC surge tanks 2A and 2B. These clams present two potential problems:

1.If the clams fill the 4" pipe cross section, chances _are that these lines are not capable of supplying any significant makeup to the KC surge !

Operability Evaluations Page 12

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tanks. These clams will grow until they are packed into the pipe so tight that they cannot be dislodge !

with normal RN system pressure. i

2. If the- clams are flushed into the KC system, there l would appear to be the potential for blocked flow and component damage. i RN makeup to the KC surge tanks required operator action per i AP/1(2) /A/5500/21 " Loss of Component Cooling". It is i preferred to make up to the KC surge tanks from the YM l system, but in the case of blackout RN may be the only )

available pressurized source. Because the assured RN makeup :

lines may not be capable of supplying makeup to the KC surge l+

tanks 2A and 2B, compensatory actions are provided. PIR 1-C88-0108 reviewed the impact of clams being flushed'into the j

KC_ system from-the RN assured makeup lines and determined ;

the impact to be negligible. l Evaluation i These lines are listed in the FSAR as part of the RN system. l The function of these lines is not described in reference to !

any accident evaluated in the FSAR. The function of these j lines is not described in reference to any malfunction of equipment important to safety in the FSAR. The blockage of !

these lines is not an initiator of either an accident or .

component malfunction. Therefore, an USQ evaluation is not !

required to address the presence of clams in these lines.

7/1/94 1RF859 SYSTEN RF i Description i A review of the Unit 1 Containment Pipe Chase fire protection j sprinkler system identified that this system is a normally .

manual system with dry piping located within containment.

Indications of a fire inside containment would have to be recognized by Control Room operators prior to opening valve )

1RF 447B and charging the containment RF header with water. ;

Based on this review the following compensatory actions are considered to be adequate: ,

1. Utilize the following EFA Zones, which are located 5 within the Unit 1 Containment Pipe Chase Area to satisfy the continuous fire watch requirement. In any of these EFA Zones become inoperable, SLC Section 16.9-6 Remedial Action for inoperable l detection zones within containment will be initiated l

~ (EFA Zone 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137. l

2. The fire hose stations located wi thin the Unit 1 ]

Reactor Building will not be impaired by the RF l isolation required to-perform maintenance on 1RF :

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l 859. These fire hose stations will serve as backup fire suppression equipment.

Evaluation Per this discussion, it is considered that the Unit 1 Reactor Building fire protection compensatory actions used during maintenance on 1RF 859 will adversely effect any structure, system or component important to the safe operation of Catawba Nuclear Station. These fire protection compensatory measures will not increase the probability or consequences of any accidents evaluated in the FSAR.

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SECTION 7.O 1

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CATANBA NUCLEAR STATION SUMARY OF PROCEDURE-RELATED 10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS ,

HP/0/B/1003/22 Change O Approved 11/30/95 Inservice Portable Instrument Source Check '

Description This change is being made to bring into compliance INPO guidance that recommends that 100 ccpm be used to release limit for items leaving the RCA. All three Duke Power, nuclear sites are changing from 150 ccpm to 100 ccpm. The effective date of this change will be 12-1-95.

Evaluation Activities covered in this procedure concern an approved method of performing source check on RP portable instruments. These activities will no increase the probability of an accident as ,

stated in Section 15 of the FSAR, or create any situation that could cause an accident that has not already been evaluated in the FSAR. These activities are also found to be in compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 12 and Section 17 (in

' reference to 10CFR50, Appendix B) of the FSAR. In addition, '

activities covered in this procedure are not addressed in Section 16 of the FSAR or Section 6 in the CNS Technical Specifications.

The margin of safety, as defined in the above basis, will not be reduced.

OP/0/A/6100/06 Change 34 Approved 10/5/95 i Reactivity Balance Calculation Description The Reactivity Balance Calculation procedure is being changed to account for a boron concentration requirement which, when added to the boron concentration outlined in the Reactor Operation Data Manual to maintain 1.3% shutdown margin, will ensure that the requirement of Technical Specification 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2 are met (1.3% SDM). This change will require an additional value of 50 ppma to be added to the required boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant System to account for the affects of a postulated event wherein a potentially dilute pressurizer water inventory instantaneously mixes with the remainder of the Reactor Coolant System, causing a slight decrease in the boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant System. This change only applies to the EOC Unit 2 shutdown due to leaking pressurizer sample valves causing <

dilution of the pressurizer boron concentration samples.

Representative samples cannot be obtained from the pressurizer; Procedures i Page 1

hence, the pressurizer sample will be isolated during this unit shutdown.

Evaluation The calculation will account for the potential affects of unavailability of this sample by ensuring that, even in the unlikely event of mixing of the pressurizer with the remainder of the Reactor Coolant System, compliance with Technical Specifications will be ensured. This change does not affect the ,

capability to maintain adequate mixing of the pressurizer '

inventory during the unit shutdown. Pressurizer spray and heater will be available during the shutdown evolution. There are no unreviewed safety questions associated with this change. No FSAR {

change is required as a result of this procedure change. 1 OP/1/A/6200/11 Change 13 Rev.11 Approved 11/21/95 Operating Procedure for the Primary Sampling System (NM) j I

Description The purpose of this procedure is to describe the proper operation of the Primary Sampling (NM). (The Primary Sampling System is j also known as the Nuclear Sampling System).

Evaluation These changes do not involve any unreviewed safety questions, or questions not already addressed in previously approved 50.59 evaluations. There no changes to the FSAR. l 1

OP/2/A/6150/01 Change 34 Approved 11/22/95 Filling and Venting the Reactor Coolant System Description An evaluation was performed to document plant conditions required in order to allow repair of one or more Conoseal (C.E.) flange (s) with steam generator tubes remaining filled, instead of intentionally draining SG tubes and performing this work at reduced inventory. This was an outage risk reduction effort to ensure greater reactor coolant inventory available in the event of a postulated Loss of RHR. This evaluation also documented the limits, precautions and recovery actions associated with this evolution.

Evaluation No unreviewed safety questions (USQ) were associated with this evolution. No changes to the FSAR are required as a result of this procedure / evolution.

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PT/2/A/4200/12 Chaage 10 Approved 10/26/95 ,

NI/NV Check Valve Test Description l

The purpose of PT/2/A/4200/13H, NI and NV Check Valve Test is to comply with Catawba IWV testing program requirements for !

operability (full stroke exercise) for those valves listed in the procedure. During performance of this test, Safety Injection 1 (NI) pumps A and B and Chemical and Volume Control (NV) centrifugal charging pumps A and B are operated in Hot Leg and Cold Leg Injection with suction provided by Residual Heat Removal (ND) pumps A and B. The reactor vessel is open with fuel inside of the core during performance of this test. NI and NV pumps discharge into the reactor vessel and water is allowed to l overflow into the reactor vessel cavity.

l Evaluation There are no Technical Specification change or an Unreviewed Safety Questions. Also, no changes are made in the FSAR.

PT/2/A/4200/01N Change 31 Approved 11/19/95 l Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Valve Leak Rate Test Description While performing the Pressure Boundary Valve leak test, valve 2NI-169 failed the acceptance criteria. It is desired to start NI pump 2B and establish flow through the valve in order to flush any debris that may have collected on the seat preventing the I valve for seating properly. NI Pump 2B will be started so as to )

establish flow through 2NI-169 AND with a flow path open to the )

NI test header sample hood. Thus, when NI Pump 2B is secured, l the pressure in the NC system will assist the valve in returning I to its closed position. Also, an open flow path to the NI test header sample hood will create a larger differential pressure across 2NI-169 when NI Pump 2B is secured.

Evaluation There is no FSAR or Unreviewed Safety Questions changes. The margin of safety for ECCS operation is not reduced.

PT/2/A/4200/13H Change 10 Permanent Approved 10/26/95 NI/NV Check Valve Test Description The purpose of PT/2/A/4200/13H, NI and NV Check Valve Test is to comply with Catawba IWV testing program requirements for operability (full stroke exercise) for those valves listed in the procedure. During performance of this test, Safety Injection (NI) pumps A, B, Chemical and Volume Control (NV) centrifugal charging pumps A and B operated in Hot Leg and Cold Leg Injection Procedures Page 3

with suction provided by Residual Heat Removal (ND) pumps A and B. The reactor vessel is open with no fuel inside of the core during' performance of this test. NI and NV pumps discharge into the reactor vessel and water is allowed to overflow into the reactor vessel cavity. Performance of this test provides assurance that adequate ECCS flows will be delivered to the Reactor Coolant System in the event of a LOCA. In addition, this test allows'for DP testing of various ECCS valves.

Evaluation 10CFR5059 allows the conduct of procedures which affect structures described in the FSAR in a significant manner without prior NRC approval unless the test involves a Technical Specification change or an Unreviewed Safety Question. This procedure change can be determined to involve no unreviewed safety questions if the answer for all the following questions is

, "No".

PT/2/A/4350/02E Change 47 Approved 11/2/95 )

CA,CF and Turbine Interlocks Periodic Test l Description l The changes to enclosure 13.15 are being make to reflect the as l built condition of the AMSAC circuitry as revised by CE-60246. 1 In addition, changes are being made to simulate the Turbine trip on AMSAC actuation by verifying the External trip Non train j status changes form reset to trip without actually tripping the turbine. The turbine is tripped through the External trip non train DFCS logic relay in enclosure 13.10, therefore, it is not necessary actually to trip the turbine two more times during this enclosure since both inputs are through the same logic relay.

Evaluation This testing takes place in modes 4,5,6, or no Mode when the tested functions are not required. For this reason these changes will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident l evaluated in the FSAR. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of Tech Spec is not being changed since all required functions are being tested in accordance with it.

PT/2/A/4400/01 Change 22 Approved 10/30/95 ECCS Flow Procedure Description-This restricted change allow the Safety Injection Cold Leg Balance for NI Pump 2A to be performed. This change replaces Section 12.2.4 of Enclosure 13.2 with a revised Section 12.2.4.

This change is necessary so the NI Pump 2A balance can be l

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l performed without performing NI Pump 2B Cold Leg Injection flow balance. ,

P Evaluation NI Pump 2B Cold Leg Balance has been performed (10/30/95) in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.5.5.h, therefore, this activity does involve an Unreviewed safety question. The FSAR will not be increase do to this procedure.

PT/2/A/4350/12B Change O Approved 11/14/95 Diesel Generator 2B Governor and Voltage Regulator Test Description This evaluation is applicable to PT/2/A/4350/12B, Diesel Generator 2B Governor and Voltage Regulator Test. The purpose of the test is to demonstrate acceptable response of the governor and voltage regulator to load changes after either device has l

undergone maintenance. The test is identical to section 12.1 of PT/2/A/4350/12 except that additional loads have been added to i the procedure. The NS, ND, and KF pumps have been added as ;

additional loads. Neither the probability nor the consequences I of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR will increased by I this test. The D/G will be run to verify acceptable performance after maintenance, the D/G will already be considered inoperate.

D/G 2A will be unaffected by this test and will be able to supply emergency power if needed.

PT/2/A/4450/03C change 13 Retype 4 Approved 11/13/95 Annulus Ventilation System Performance Test Description The Subject procedure was rewritten to provide new single train alignments for testing the annulus pressure boundary (referred to as vacuum decay testing) with the Unit in any mode. New single train alignments were developed to individually test system ductwork components and verify annulus integrity during any mode of plant operation. The procedure previously was designed to test these components and verify annulus integrity using both VE System trains simultaneously after each refueling outage and was performed prior to Unit Startup Mode 4. In an effort to reduce outage duration's, the testing alignments were redesigned to allow testing during any mode of operation. Testing of the annulus pressure boundary integrity will continue to be performed l after each refueling outage. One new common train alignment was j added to verify annulus integrity after refueling outages without !

any system damper modifications. Additional extensive testing of !

system individual pressure boundary components previously performed prior to Unit Startup Mode 4 will continue to be i

Procedures j Page 5 '

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performed. This additional testing will now be performed during normal operational modes using compensatory actions. This procedure rewrite also incorporated changes due to NSM CN-21303 and deleted the minimum 8700 cfm airflow requirement for the Control-Room Compensatory Action. The subject modification replaced the VE System Unit Vent isolation dampers 2AVS-D-5 and 2AVS-D-10 along with their associated ITT Hydramotors with backdraft dampers. The 8700 cfm referenced in the subject steps was previously an input to Reference 10 to ensure control room operator doses remained acceptable during implementation of the Control Room Pressure Boundary Compensatory Action (Ref.11). The 4 ' subject compensatory action.was also revised to eliminate the requirement that the VE System airflow rates be greater than 8700 cfm.

Evaluation See Reference 11 for additional safety review information. Other editorial changes occurred as a result of the entire procedure being. restructured. This change was evaluated for its impact upon Unit operation and ability to migitate the consequences of a design basis LOCA. No significant concerns were identified which i would adversely impact station operation. No FSAR changes were required.

PT/2/A/4450/03C Change 15 Approved 12/19/95 Annulus Ventilation System Performance Test Description During Post Maintenance Testing Activities associated with work performed on 2AVS-D-6 difficulties were encountered in meeting the target vacuum decay time of 91 seconds specified in step 11.5 (Reference PIP 2-C95-4211). The vacuum decay time is a measure of the leak tightness of the reactor building, and is obtained by measuring the length of time it takes air for the vacuum generated in the annulus, by operation of the Annulus Ventilation fans, to decay from 3.45 inwc. With this type of test a larger vacuum decay time is indicative of an annulus with better leakage characteristics. The Procedure as it is currently written, does not declare the system inoperable if this vacuum decay time is not met, rather it instructs the test coordinator to notify the Operation Shift Manager and the Responsible Mechanical Systems and requires that a work request be generated to repair the defective component. Investigation into the source of the target value in the procedure has revealed that the value actually used in the dose analysis is based on a 84 second decay time.

Procedure change 15 to PT/2/A/4450/03C has been prepared to change the vacuum decay time value in step 11.5 from 91 seconds to 84 seconds.

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I Evaluation The purpose of the vacuum decay test is to quantify the reactor building inleakage which is an input into the dose analysis. The

Vacuum decay test is not discussed in the Catawba Technical Specifications, either as a Limiting Condition for Operation or a Surveillance. FSAR section 6.2.6.5, Special Testing requirements

. discusses that reactor building inleakage will be checked preoperationally, and periodically as required by Tech. Specs. No other section in the FSAR discussed reactor building inleakage or surveillance requirement to verify it. Annulus Ventilation System Performance Test does not involves an unreviewed safety '

question.

PT/2/A/4700/14 Change O Approved 10/8/95 :

Auxiliary Shutdown Panel 2B (2ASPB) Function Test Description l The need to restrict primary to secondary leak rate (PSLR) in the steam generators beyond the limits of TS 3/4.4.6.2 has been documented in PIP 0-C95-1537. The Reactor Coolant System has been found to be " operable but degraded". Restrictions on PSLR have been identified and evaluated. Radiological consequences of accidents have been re-analyzed with the reduced PSLR and have been found to remain within guideline values. The margin to catastrophic failure of one or more tubes has been increased.

Evaluation The ability of any piece of equipment important to safety to perform its design function (s) in any event sequence including a

, safe shutdown earthquake will not be degraded by the activity.

The activity has neither any temporary not any permanent adverse effect on the piping in which the freeze seal will be installed.

No unreviewed safety question is associated with this activity.

No changes to either the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) nor the Technical Specification are required.

TN/1/A/1346/00/01E Original 0 Approved 11/27/95 Procedure for the Implementation of NSM CN-11346 Rev.0, Work Unit 21 Description The A-train portion of NM C-11346 replaces ILDPT5142 and 2LDPT5143 with 1LDPS5143 and 1LDPSS144 which are safety related pressure switches and will add a seal-in to the Lo-Lo Lube Oil trip logic to seal in the trip signal until the diesel emergency start signal from the load sequencer is reset. Replacing the two pressure transmitters with pressure switches will eliminate the !

Procedures Page 7

i possibility of a power failure to the transmitters from causes a 2/3 logic trip. Adding the seal-in from the load sequencer will stop the diesel engine from being restarted on a lo-lo lube oil pressure trip until the load sequencer is reset. These changes are being made to make the diesel engine lube oil trip logic operate in the way which it should have been operating and was thought to be operating.

Evaluation This modification involves no unreviewed safety questions or safety concerns. No tech spec changes are required. FSAR section 7.6.18.1 will be revised to show one pressure transmitter and two pressure switches providing the 2/3 logic for low low lube oil pressure trip.

AM/0/B/5100/008 Rev 00 Approved 7/4/96 Installation of RC Recovery Submersible Pump (s)

Description This procedure is required as a result of NSM CN 5047/0 (SSf Portable Pump for Condenser Circulating Water (RC) Pipe Break ,

Recovery) to provide some portable equipment to reinstate the RC I System's ability to provide a water supply to the TD CA Pump j following a Security event involving an RC System induce Turbine )

Building Flood requiring use of the SSF. The portable equipment !

consists of a cart, and electric submersible pump, power cable, and hosing for each unit. The procedure will be used by Maintenance to install the portable equipment when directed by Operations, assist Operations with any problems during equipment operation, and remove the equipment when directed by Operations.

Evaluation The procedure involved no Unreviewed Safety Question. No Technical Specification or FSAR changes are required. Technical Specification Interpretstion for 3/4.7.13 will be revised to identify the additional equipment required for SSS operability.

AM/1/A/5100/05 Change O Retype 0 Approved 9/23/96 Install Jumper to Open or Close IVQ-13, 1VQ-15B, or IVQ-16A Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if any Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) exists for the new subject procedure. The I subject procedure establishes a method of SPOC personnel to open or close VQ System valves upon loss of the Control Room. Valves l VQ-15B and VQ-16A are safety related power opeisted containment i isolation valves which are closed during normal unit operation. ;

If containment pressure drops below 0 psig during normal plant i operations, these valves along with non safety related VQ-13 are i

Procedures Page 8 i

opened from the control room to repressurize the containment. ,

Upon loss of the control room, the method of opening these valves i per this new procedure will involve installation of a jumper to bypass the respective valve's motor open switch contacts.- Valves ;

VQ-15B and VQ-16A are designed to automatically close upon receipt of any containment ventilation isolation signal. The ability for these valves to close and satisfy their containment isolation design basis function will not be adversely affected by placing these jumpers to open them.

Evaluation Valves VQ15B and VQ16A are provided as safety related redundant containment isolation trains to mitigate the consequences of a design basic LOCA. The placement of jumpers for opening or closing VQ-15B or VQ-16A as described above will not adversely affect the ability of either of these valves to maintain their containment isolation design basis function. Therefore, plementation of this procedure will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evalus+ed in the SAR. Since implementation of this procedure wil) ot defeat any containment isolation functions, the possibility tur an accident of a different type than any evaluated in tl.e SAR will not be created.

The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR will not be increased. Based on the above, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to l safety evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased and the l possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any ) '

evaluated in the FSAR will not be created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification will not be reduced. No USQ will exist due to implementation of this new procedure. There are no changes made to FSAR.

AM/2/A/5100/05 Change O Retype O Approved 9/23/96 1 stall Jumper to Open or Close 2VQ-13, 2VQ-15B, or 2VQ-16A Dascription The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if any Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) exists for the new subject procedure. The subject procedure establishes a method of SPOC personnel to open or close VQ System valves upon loss of the Control Room. Valves VQ-15B and VQ-16A are safety related power operated containment isolation valves which are closed during normal unit operation.

If containment pressure drops below 0 psig during normal plant operations, these valves along with non safety related VQ-13 are opened from the control room to repressurize the containment.

Upon loss of the control room, the method of opening these valves per this new procedure will involve installation of a jumper to bypass the respective valve's motor open switch contacts. Valves VQ-15B and VQ-16A are designed to automatically close upon Procedures Page 9

~ . .__ _

I receipt of any containment ventilation isolation signal. The

.bility for these valves to close and satisfy their containment isolation design basis function will not be adversely affected by placing these jumpers to open them.

Evaluation ,

Valves VQ15B and VQ16A are provided as safety related redundant containment isolation trains to~ mitigate the consequences of a design basis LOCA. The placement of jumpers for opening or closing VQ-15B or VQ-16A as described above will not adversely affect.the ability of either of these valves to maintain their ,

containment isolation design basis function. Therefore, '

plementation of this procedure will not increase the probability ,

or consequences of an accident evaluated in the FSAR. Since implementation of this procedure will not defeat any containment isolation functions, the possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the FSAR will not be created. The probability of a malfunction of equipment important ,

to safety evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. Based on !

the above, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment l i

important to safety evaluated in the SAR will not be increased and the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than j any evaluated in the SAR will not be created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification will not be educed. No USQ will exist due to implementation of this new procedure. There are no changes made to FSAR.

AM/1/A/5100/07 Change O Retype O Approved 8/20/96 l Changing Positioner Action to Operate IVQ-10 '

Description The VQ System is utilized to maintain containment pressure

. between the limits specified in the Catawba Technical Specifications. Normally non safety related valve IVQ10 )

automatically closes when containment air pressure decreases to 0 !

psig or the valve receive a high radiation signal from the unit i vent radiation monitors 1 EMF-35, 36, or 37. Because power would not be available to the solenoid IVOSV0100 during a LOOP, the automatic closing functions for IVQ10 would not be available.

Radiation Protection would monitor containment radioactivity and Operations would monitor containment pressure when the containment isolation valves are open in accordance with Reference 1. The VQ System containment isolation valves are safety related and close of a containment ventilation isolation signal.

Evaluation No USQ exists for this procedure. There no Tech Specs changes or !

FSAR changes due to this procedure.

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AM/2/A/5100/07 Change O Retype O Approved 8/20/96 Changing Positioner Action to Operate IVQ-10 Description The VQ System is utilized to maintain containment pressure between the limits specified in the Catawba Technical Specifications. Normally non safety related valve 2VQ10 automatically closes when containment air pressure decreases to 0 psig or the valve receive a high radiation signal from the unit vent radiation monitors 2 EMF-35, 36, or 37. Because power would not.be available to the solenoid 2VQSV0100 during a LOOP, the ,

automatic closing functions for 2VQ10 would not be available.

Radiation Protection would monitor containment radioactivity and Operations would monitor containment pressure when the containment isolation valves are open in accordance with Reference 1. The VQ System containment isolation valves are safety related and close of a containment ventilation isolation signal.

Evaluation No USQ exists for this procedure. There no Tech Specs changes or FSAR changes due to this procedure.

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AP/0/5500/39 Change 0 Retype O Approved 7/3/96 1 Control Room High Temperature !

Description Periodically one train of the combined VC/YC System is unavailable to provide cooling to the control room. This could be due to periodic maintenance on the VC/YC System or on the RN System which provides cooling to the YC Chiller. During these times the station could encounter temperature related problems if there was a failure of the operating train of VC/YC that prevented it from cooling the control room. Without control room cooling, there could be failures of equipment located within the l control room. This could lead to events such as a spurious safety injection or reactor trip. Therefore, abnormal operating procedure AP/0/A/5500/39 was written to mitigate the consequences of a total loss of control room cooling. Basically, this procedure uses the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (VA) to pull air from the Service Building through the control room. The two " front" doors of the control room leading to the Service Building (doors S400 and S406) will be opened as well as the "back" doors leading to the Auxiliary Building (doors AX657H and AX657 F) . In this configuration air will be drawn from the l Service Building through doors S400 and S406, past the protection cabinets, and then out into the Auxiliary Building through doors AX657H and AX657F. It should be noted that if a total loss of control room cooling event where to occur, both CNS units would Procedures l Page 11 1

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enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 and would commence a shutdown if one train could not be restored to an operable status within the allowable time frame. Opening the control room doors under these circumstances will aid in keeping control room equipment with acceptable operating temperature limits.

Evaluation There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with this procedure. No Technical Specification changes or FSAR changes are required.

CP/0/B/8100/55 Chemistry Procedure for the Determination of Organic Phosphorus Concentration in Water Description This procedure has been converted into Lab method LM-C-E-027. The System Chemistry Manual Section 5.11 states that if a procedure is not required per the Technical Specification, FSAR or any technical document, the procedure can converted into a Lab method. The only other change is the removal of a section on sample analysis with high florides and high iron. This section is not needed anymore. (Delete this _ Procedure) .

Evaluation This revision will not require a change to the FSAR or the Tech Specs. This procedure deletion will not:

e change any activities in this facility as described in the SAR.

e change any procedure, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as describe in the SAR.

be required as an inclusion in the SAR.

e adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance.

be an activity or test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

CP/0/B/8100/81 Description This procedure was converted into a lab method and then deleted.

There is additional information in the Reagent section on the shelf life, storage code and warehouse number. (Delete this procedure).

Evaluation This procedure revision will not require a change to the SAR or l the Technical Spacifications. This procedure revision will not:

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e change any activities in this facility as described in the SAR.

. change any procedure, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as describe in the SAR.

be required as an inclusion in the SAR.

e adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance.

be an activity or test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

CP/0/B/8150/01 Change O Approved 11/26/96 -

Chemistry Procedure for the Determination of pH, Auto Analyzer Description CP/0/B/8150/01, Chemistry for the Determination of ph, Auto Analyzer, is being deleted. This procedure was converted to Lab Method LM-G-G-010. The criteria listed in 5.1.1 of Use and ,

Control of Laboratory Methods have been reviewed and it has been determined that this procedure meets the criteria for converting ;

it to a Lab Method. The procedure describes how perform an analysis and is not discussed in these station's . Technical Specifications, Final Safety Analysis Report, licensed commitments, Safety Evaluation Report or facility operating license. Question #2 of the 50.59 screening asks "Does the activity change procedures, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as described in the SAR?' Section 209.10.2 of NSD l 209 points out that procedures which are simply listed are not considered " described". Therefore, as long as a parameter is simply listed as being required for analysis, the specific procedure describing the analytical methodology would be exempt from a 50.59 screening and a Laboratory Method may be used instead of a Station Procedure. The exception to this when specific methods of analysis are listed for a particular parameter. For example, Section 4.8.1.1.2(e) of CNS Technical Specifications, specific ASTM methods for analyzing fuel oil are prescribed. If methods other than these are considered to perform the same analysis, then a 50.59 screening would be necessary which would lead to the completion of an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Evaluation. j Evaluation For the above reasons this procedure change does not: !

change the facility as described in the FSAR.

change any procedure, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as describe in the FSAR.

appear significant enough as to required inclusion in the FSAR.

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e adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance with the FSAR. l

perform test or experiments not addressed in the FSAR.

l' CP/0/B/8200/04 Change 11 Rev.6 Approved 7/29/96 Chemistry Procedure for the Preparation of Gamma Isotopic Activities Samples Description This procedure is being revised in order to make a more generic statement concerning exceptions to the dead-time limits. The names of demineralizers are being deleted and the phrase," or any demineralizer effluent" will replace them. This procedure describes the preparation of solid, liquid, and gaseous samples which will be delivered to Radiation Protection for gamma isotopic analysis.

Evaluation This change in noway makes the procedure less conservative and has no impact on plant safety. This procedure does no affect the FSAR. '

CP/0/B/8500/12 Change O Approved 8/1/96 Chemistry Procedure for the Determination of Temperature Description This procedure is converted into a lab method. This will allow for easier changes without the need for a 10 CFR50.59. There are also two changes to the procedure. The first is to the Standard Methods reference which was changed from 1985 to 1992. The second change was to step 1.6.4 which is the requirement for technicians while analysis NPDES samples to verify lab thermometer against a calibrated thermometer. This check was changed from weekly to just a few hours prior to analysis.

Evaluation This procedure will not require a change to the SAR or the Technical Specifications. This procedure will not:

e change any activities in this facility as described in the SAR.

change any procedure, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as describe in the SAR.

e be required as an inclusion in the SAR.

e adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance.

Procedures Page 14

be an activity or test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

CP/0/B/8500/14 Change 0 Approved 6-20-96 Chemistry Procedure for the Determination of Ammonia in Wastewater Description This procedure CP/0/B/8500/14 is be deleted. It is no longer i being used on site.

Evaluation This procedure will not require a change to the FSAR or the Technical Specifications. This procedure will not:

e change any activities in this facility as described in the .

SAR. I

change any pr%cedure, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment av describe in the SAR.

be required as an inclusion in the SAR.

adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance, e be an activity or test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

CP/0/B/8500/16 Change 7 Approved ?/31/96 Chemistry Procedure for the Determination of Nitrite in Wastewater and Water Description This procedure CP/0/B/8500/16 is being changed as part of a PIP.

This procedure was audited in March. During the audit there were two comments on the word " fresh" in the procedure. Both of these comments have been resolved. Step 1.6.1 delete the word " fresh" from that sentence. Step 3.1 delete the last sentence from that paragraph. Step 3.1 Add this sentence after that paragraph "This solution is stable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ." This procedure change is needed to resolve PIP 0-C-96-0798.

Evaluation This procedure will not require a change to the FSAR or the ,

Technical Specifications. This procedure will not: I e change any activities in this facility as described in the SAR.

change any procedure, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as describe in the SAR.

be required as an inclusion in the SAR.

e adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance.

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be an activity or test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

CP/0/B/8500/18 Change O Approved 11/21/96 Chemistry Procedure for the Preliminary Digestion for Total Metal Analysis Description This procedure is being converted into a lab method. This procedure conforms to the guidelines set in the System Chemistry Manual, Section 5.11 for converting a procedure to a lab method.

This procedure is not mentioned or reference in the Technical Specifications, FSAR or any other technical document.

Evaluation This procedure will not require a change to the FSAR or the Technical Specifications. This procedure will not:

change any activities in this facility as described in the SAR.

change any procedure, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as describe in the SAR.

be required as an inclusion in the SAR.

+ adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance.

be an activity or test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

CP/0/B/8500/19 Change O Approved 11/21/96 Description This procedure is being converted into a lab method. This procedure conforms to the guidelines set in the System Chemistry Manual, Section 5.11 for converting a procedure to a lab method.

This procedure is not mentioned or reference in the Technical Specifications, FSAR or any other technical document. The only other change is the removal of a section on titrating with a 0.8 M cartridge. This section was not being used anymore.

Evaluation This procedure will not require a change to the FSAR or the Technical Specifications. This procedure deletion will not:

change any activities in this facility as described in the SAR.

change any procedure, methods of operation, or alter a test or experiment as describe in the SAR.

be required as an inclusion in the SAR.

adversely affect any system, structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in accordance.

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be an activity or test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

CP/0/B/8500/30 Change 3 Approved 6/18/96 Description This procedure is being deleted since the CT-1 Clam-Trol in no longer being used on site. Therefore this analytical procedure is no longer needed.

Evaluation !

This procedure will not require a change to the FSAR or the l Technical Specifications. This procedure deletion will not:

change any-activities in this facility as described in i the SAR.

change any procedure, methods of operation, or alter a i test or experiment as describe in the SAR. !

be required as an inclusion in the SAR.

e adversely affect any system, structure, or component ,

necessary to operate the plant in accordance. i

be an activity or test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

EN/0/A/5200/01 Change O Retype O Approved 7/24/96 Troubleshooting cause for Improper Operation of VC/YC System Description Emergency maintenance procedure EM/0/A/5200/01 establishes a safe and ctrrect method for SPOC Maintenance personnel to troubleshoot the cause for improper operation the Control Room Area Ventilation System and the Control Room Area Chilled Water (VC/YC) until VC/YC trained personnel are available to lead an investigation. This procedure will be used on a system that has already malfunctioned and it will not further degrade the system, therefore, an USQ does not exist.

Evaluation This procedure will be used to troubleshoot the VC/YC System in the event that the system is not operating properly. Although the VC/YC System could be an accident initiator (causing a l spurious safety injection due to overheating in the control room) this procedure will attempt to restart a train of VC/YC and will not cause loss of a train of VC/YC. Performance of this procedure will not degrade the VC/YC System in any way. This procedure will be used to troubleshoot the cause for improper !

system operation and will attempt to restore the system to a l functional state. This procedure will be used only in the event of a malfunction of one of the two trains of the VC/YC System. ;

This procedure will attempt to restore the system to a functional !

Procedures Page 17

1 state. This procedure will only be use to attempt to restart a piece of equipment that has already malfunctioned. Performance of this procedure will not further degrade the system. An Unreviewed Safety Question doe not exit for Emergency Maintenance Procedure EM/0/A/5200/01 - Troubleshooting cause for Improper Operation of VC/YC System. There are no changes required to the FSAR or any Technical Specifications. .

EN/2/A/5200/02 Change O Retype O Approved 7/24/96 Troubleshooting Cause for VE System HI/LO Pressure Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if any Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) exists for the new subject procedure. The subject procedure establishes a method for SPOC personnel to troubleshoot problems with the Annulus Ventilation System pressure control function. In effect, this new procedure will provide guidance in determining a root cause for inadequate annulus pressure control. Actual system operation and instrument calibrations will be controlled / performed via existing plant procedures.

Evaluation Two 100 percent capacity and safety-related redundant trains of l the VE System are provided to Mitigate the consequences of a '

design LOCA. Actions implemented during the troubleshooting process will not affect the fission product barriers and therefore not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR. Since no physical changes will be made in the plant, the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR will not be created.

Troubleshooting or calibrating the annulus pressure instrumentation and other system components will not increase the probability of malfunction or consequences of malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR. Based on the above, none of the planned troubleshooting activities in the subject will reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification. No USQ will exist due to implementation of this new procedure.

HP/0/B/1000/38 Change O Approved 1/31/96 j Duties of Radiation Protection Support Personnel '

Description To describe the major duties and responsibilities of the Radiation Protection (RP) Support personnel to complete routine activities as outlined. Previously submitted change to FSAR Section 12.5.2.1.4 Instrument-Calibration and Operational Changed Procedures Page 18

requirement for daily operational check to weekly operational check as applicable to personnel monitors.

Evaluation Activities covered in this procedure describe the responsibilities of the Radiation Protection Support personnel to complete routine activities as outlined. These activities will not increase the probability of an accident as stated in Section 15 of the FSAR, or create any situation that could cause an accident that has not already been evaluated in the FSAR. These activities are also found to be in compliance with all applicable ,

requirements of Section 12 and Section 17 (in reference to '

10CFR50, Appendix B) of the FSAR. In addition, activities l covered are not addressed in Section 16 of the FSAR or Section 6 l in the CNS Technical Specification. The nargin of safety as defined in the basis will not be reduced due to this change.

HP/0/B/1003/44 Change O Approved 1/31/96 Operation and Calibration: Aptec Concept 7M Hand and Foot Description To describe the proper method of operation and calibration for the Aptec Concept 7M and Foot Monitor. Section 4.2 revised to require functional check to be performed Weekly instead of daily.

Section 4.3 revised to require Alarm response check to performed Weekly instead of daily. Enclosure 5.2 replaced with new enclosure. Previously submitted change to FSAR Section 12.5.2.1.4 Instrument Calibration and operational Changed requirement for daily operational check to weekly operational I I

check as applicable to personnel monitors.

Evaluation Activities covered in this procedure describe the responsibilities of the Radiation Protection Support personnel to complete routine activities as outlined. These activities will not increase the probability of an accident as stated in Section 15 of the FSAR, or create any situation that could cause an accident that has not already been evaluated in the FSAR. These activities are also found to be in compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 12 and Section 17 (in reference to 10CFR50, Appendix B) of the FSAR. In adoition, activities covered are not addressed in Section 16 of the FSAR or Section 6 in the CNS Technical Specification. The margin of safety as defined in the basis will not be reduced due to this change.

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HP/0/3/1003/50 Change O Approved 1/31/96 Operation and Calibration: Eberline Model PCM-1B Whole Body Frisker Description ;

To describe the proper method of operation and calibration for the Eberline Model PCM-1B Whole Body Frisker. Section 4.9 revised to require functional check to be performed Weekly insteaa of daily. Section 5.8 switched order of enclosure 5.8 and 5.9. Enclosure 5.9 replaced with new enclosure. Previously submitted change to FSAR Section 12.5.2.1.4 Instrument Calibration and Operational Changed requirement for daily operational check to weekly operational check as applicable to personnel monitors.

Evaluation Activities covered in this procedure describe the responsibilities of the Radiation Protection Support personnel to complete routine activities as outlined. These activities will r not increase the probability of an accident as stated in Section 15 of the FSAR, or create any situation that could cause an accident that has not already been evaluated in the FSAR. These 1

activities are also found to be in compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 12 and Section 17 (in reference to 10CFR50, Appendix B) of the FSAR. In addition, activities cover- I are not addressed in Section 16 of the FSAR or Section 6 in the CNS Technical Specification. The margin of safety as defined in the basis will not be reduced due to this change.

HP/0/B/1003/61 Change 0 Approved 1/31/96 Operation and Calibration: NNC Gamma-40 and Gamma-60 Portal Monitor Description The procedure describes the proper method of operation and calibration for the National Nuclear Corporation Gamma-40 and Gamma-60 Portal Monitor. Section 4.1 revised to require source response checks to be performed Weekly instead of daily. .3 revised to reflect Weekly instead of Daily source response checks and to reflect new standard enclosure.

Evaluation Activities covered in this procedure describe the responsibilities of the Radiation Protection Support personnel to complete routine activities as outlined. These activities will not increase the probability of an accident as stated in Section 15 of the FSAR, or create any situation that could cause an accident that has not already been evaluated in the FSAR. These activities are also found to be in compliance with all applicable Procedures Page 20

requirements of Section 12.and Section 17 (in reference to-10CFR50, Appendix B) of the FSAR. In addition, activities covered are not' addressed in Section 16 of the FSAR or Section 6 in the CNS Technical Specification. The margin of-safety as defined in the basis will not be reduced due to this change.

HP/0/3/1003/62 Change O Approved 1/31/96 Calibration of the NE America SAM-9 Small Articles Monitor (SAM)

Description This procedure describes the proper method to calibrate the NE America SAM-9 Small Articles Monitor (SAM). This the new procedure for new equipment. Previously submitted change to FSAR Section 12.5.2.1.4 Instrument Calibration and Operational Changed requirement for daily operational check to weekly operational check as applicable to personnel monitors.

Evaluation Activities covered in this procedure describe the responsibilities of the Radiation Protection Support personnel to complete routine activities as outlined. These activities will not increase the probability of an accident as stated in Section 15 of the FSAR, or create any situation that could cause an accident that has not already been evaluated in the FSAR. These activities are also found to be in compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 12 and Section 17 (in reference to 10CFR50, Appendix B) of the FSAR. In addition, activities covered are not addressed in Section 16 of the FSAR or Section 6 in the CNS Technical Specification. The margin of safety as defined in the basis will not be reduced due to this change.

IP/2/B/3044/01A Change 5 Approved 3/20/96 Calibration Procedure for Feedwater Pump Turbine 2A Lubricating 011 System (LF) Pressure Switches Description Event recorder point 2ER550 is being changed to 2ER555. The incorrect event recorder point was listed in this procedure.

Typographical error and to clarify information concerning Monitor Point Function. Delete, Remove, and Replace following page. 1.1.12, Page 2 of 2.

Evaluation A USO evaluation is not applicable to this activity. No Technical Specification changes or FSAR changes are required Procedures Page 21

IP/1/B/3130/0 Change 11 Permanent Approved 7/31/96 Calibration Procedure for 30f System PAI.SS II+

Description Changed the.100% Calibration values for INMLP5660 instruments.

Test equipment required has been restricted to a maximum of 190 PSIA.

Evaluation A USQ evaluation is not applicable to this activity. No Technical Specification changes or FSAR changes are required.

IP/1/3/3130/001 Change 12 Permanent Approved 8/1/96 Calibration Procedure for IOi System PALSS II+

Description Thf.s change corrects the accuracy for INMFT5430 and also corrects the 0% desired output for INMP5620.

itvaluation A USQ evaluation is not applicable to this activity. No Technical Specification changes or FSAR changes are required.

IP/0/A/3200/12 Change 3 Permanent Approved 7/3/96 Procedure for blocking P-14 and/or placing both trains of SSPS in test Description Resolve corrective action associated with PIP 2-C96-0377. Add a new step 10.3.1 and renumber remaining steps in Section 10.3.

10.3.1 verify that no outlet relays are latched prior to placing SSPs trains in test. If any are latched, notify Ops and re-establish required blocks and/or resets per IP/1(2) /A/3200/02 (B) .

Evaluation A USQ evaluation is_not applicable to this activity. No Technical Specification changes or FSAR changes are required.

IP/0/B/3220/39 Change 1 Permanent Approved 3/26/96 Rod Control System (IRE) Control Board Step Counter Maintenance and Verification Testing Description Add instructions to include internal jumper configuration for replacement of new step counter. Add Step 4.6 to read: If step counter is being replaced, ensure that "JP1" jumper is installed in New step counter before installing the counter. This will ensure the correct operation of new counters that are being installed.

Procedures Page 22

Evaluation A USQ evaluation is not applicable to this activity. No Technical Specification changes or FSAR changes are required.

IP/1A/3222/0768 Rev.64 Change O Approved 10/7/96 Calibration Procedure for ^T/T(avg) Protection Channel II Description Delete, Remove, and Replace Enclosures 11.1.4, Pages 1,2,& 3 of 5 and 11.2.9, Page 1 of 2 with new enclosures pages. Changes incorporated to adjust Delta T values in a conservative direction l for CERN Engineering evaluation. The change to the DTo value ;

only affects the gain in an electronic module in the Channel II and Channel IV 7300 protection system. The change in the DTo !

gain values make the indicated DT greater in %fp for a given Dr i in degrees F. Therefore, the OPDT and OTDT trip setpoints will !

i be compared to a larger trip parameter, making the trip oce,ur earlier. An early trip is conservative and will not increase the !

consequences of any accident evaluated in the SAR. No change to I physical plant is being made with the exception of the potentiometer of settings in two electronics modules. This activity will not create the possibility of a new type of accident.

Evaluation The change will make the OPDT and OTDT trips occur sooner. This is not a malfunction, but an adjustment in the conservative direction. No other changes are being made. The current Delta T values are based on the average of 1 minute data taken via the OAC from 22:00 to 23:00 on 10/6/96 (OAC points CIA 0675, CIA 0681, CIA 0687, and CIA 0690). In the two loops that are changing, the "B" and "D" loops, the proposed DTo values in %fp are higher.

This means that the OPDT and OTDT trips will occur sooner than they currently would. Therefore, the margin of safety is increased, not decreased. There are not changes made in the FAR.

IP/2/A/3222/018E Rev. O Approved 7/13/96 Collecting Chemistry Samples From Cold Leg Accumulator Level, Loops Description A procedure has been developed for obtaining Cold Leg Accumulator samples through an alternate flow path when the normal NM sample flowpath is not available. This procedure has been written to establish a safe and correct method for collecting Chemistry samples from the CLA Level Instrumentation Loops. The instrument channel selected is removed from service and logged inoperable.

Following test rig attachment and instrument manifold valve manipulation to establish a sample path, the test rig throttling Procedures Page 23

valve is slowly opened to bleed a conservative purge volume into a container. The effect of the weight of this test rig on the ,

seismic integrity of the instrument loops has been evaluated.

Evaluation No Tech Spec changes were required and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were identified. No changes to the FSAR were required. :

IP/1/A/3222/076D Rev 62 Approved 10/7/96 l Calibration Procedure for ^T/T (avg) Protection Channel IV !

Description i Delete, remove, and replace Enclosures 11.1.4, pages 1,2&3 of 5 and 11.2.*, page 1 of 2 with new enclosure pages. Changes .

incorporated to adjust Delta T values in a conservative direction per CERN Engineering evaluation.

Evaluation The change to the DTo value only affects the gain in an electronic module in the Channe.' II and Channel IV 7300 protection system. The change in the DTo gain values makes the indicated DT greater in %fp for a given DT in degrees F. ,

Therefore, the OTDT trip setpoints will be compared to a larger !

trip parameter, making the trip occur earlier. An early trip is I conservative and will not increase the consequences of any accident evaluated in the SAR. No change to the physical plant is make with the exception of the potentiometer settings in two electronics modules. This activity will not create the possibility of a new type of accident. This activity will not increase the possibility of malfunction of any equipment. The gain change will make the OPDT and OTDT trips occur sooner. This l 1s not a malfunction, but an adjustment in the conservative direction. No other changes are being made. Since the equipment function is unchanged, the possibility of a new malfunction is not created. The current and proposed values of Delta T are shown below. The current Delta T values are based on the average of 1 minute data taken via the OAC from 22:00 to 23:00 on 10/6/96 (OAC points CIA 0675, CIA 0681, CIA 0687, and C1A0690). In the two loops that are changing, the "B" and "D" loops, the proposed Dto values in %fp are higher. Therefore, the margin of safety is increased, not decreased. There are no changes to the FSAR.

MP/0/A/7450/82 Rev 0 Approved 10/15/96 Safety Related and Non Safety Related Duct Removal Description Maintenance procedure MP/0/A/7450/082 was generated to provide CNS with a station document that provides guidance for removing and re-stalling safety and no safety HVAC ductwork. This work Procedures ;

Page 24 l 1

_____a

I i

was previously done by an HVAC contractor using the contractor's own procedures and QA inspectors. This new procedure does not l allow the station to do any work that was previously allowed, it j only changes who can do the work and under what program (CNS's or a vendor's) the work can be done.

Evaluation ,

There.are no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with maintenance procedure MP/0/A/7450/082. There are also no FSAR or l Technical Specification changes required as a result of this l procedure.

MP/0/A/7650/057 Change 3 Retype 10 Approved 6/5/96 Polar Crane Operation and Upper Containsment Load Paths Description Section 1.0 (Purpose) of MP/0/A/7650/57 was changed. The changed ,

version is shown below with actual change underlined: To outline safe operation of the Polar Crane main and Auxiliary hoist, and shall apply to all personnel involved in moving any load using either the polar crane or auxiliary hoist. To cover safe ,

handling of loads associated with Steam Generator Replacement Project during 1 EOC9 as listed in Enclosure 13.4. Other changes were also made. The new Duke Power Company Lifting program Manual was listed in Section 2.0 (Reference). Note "3" was added i in Section 5.0 (Unit Status) as follows: Note:3 All Steam )

l Generator Replacement Project (SGRP) lifts will be done in "No Mode" with fuel removed from Reaction vessel. Notes "4" and "5" were added in Section 11.0 (Procedure) as follows: Note:4 NUREG-0612 requirements do NOT apply to Polar Crane during No Mode.

Therefore, ALL loads shall be treated as non-heavy loads when Unit is in "No Mode". Note:S For non-heavy loads, movement over Reactor Vessel should be avoided as much as practical. Also add 3.4 (Steam Generator Replacement Project) in Section 13.0 (Enclosures).

Evaluation There is no unreviewed safety question associated with Retype 10 of MP/0/A/7650/57. No change to either FSAR or the Technical Specification is required.

MP/0/A/7650/107 Change O Retype 4 Approved 5/28/96 Retubing KC Heat Exchanger Description This Safety evaluation is for a revision to procedure MP/0/A/7650/107, Retype #4, that concerns specific maintenance criteria applicable to only the KC (Component Cooling) Heat Exchanger (HX). The basis for revision of this existing Procedures Page 25

f I

_ procedure was a work execution change in the retubing scheme. <

Specifically, the previous procedure method did not. allow access j to the Hx.shell through any temporary shell cut openings to address a variety of possible retube problems, such as; stuck tubes that would not pull free of tube joint, tight. tool clearance of perimeter tubes to water box, inadvertent loss of j tube guides,-crossed tube lanes, and clean-up of shell from tube :

extraction debris-tubeside mud, metal shavings from tubes j cutting, loosened she11 side deposits, etc. The previous i procedure _did have guidance in methods to avoid loss of tube guides and crossed tube lanes, but inadequate procedure adherence during retube of KC Hx 2B resulted in occurrence of these i specific problems without a means of timely 'ield correction. I The previous procedure, also, had steps available to address i she11' flushing to minimize the level of she11 side debris if warranted. However, no accurate assurance of the cleanness level +

of the shell could be determined. In the particular case after i retube of KC Hx 2B high particulate solids were soon detected ~in !

the KC system with eventual failure (external leakage) of KC Pump j mechanical seals. This procedure revision focuses on a retube ;

plan that will allow tow phases of de-tubing, which essentially provides an open shell interior that through temporarily cut manway access holes in the shell, corrective attention can be applied to the above noted retube problems. The new retube plan ,

specifies at least six equally spaced manway access' holes to be l cut along the Hx shell length so as to allow access to all !

support plate elevations where retube problems could occur, i Cutting and replacing of the shell port holes will be controlled through station welding procedures in accordance with ASME Sec i III, Subsec ND, Duke Class C, and treated as repairs to a pressure vessel under ASME Sec XI. ,

i Evaluation l This revision is related to installation of modification (mod),

NSM CN-50450, to change tubing material in KC Hx 1A from brass to stainless steel (SSG) in a fully retype problems. The previously reviewed and approved safety evaluation for the mods to change i the tube material (CN-50450 and CN-21356) documents references to '

design basis specifications and calculations that justify the heat transfer evaluation and the structural integrity applicable

to installation of the new SSG tube material in a partial and fully retubed bundle condition. This Safety evaluation, however,

.is for the maintenance procedure (MP) aspect that will in effect implement the modification requirements to install the new stainless steel tubes as did the previous MP. The MP changes incorporated in this revision, also, stemmed from retype problems experienced in the previous retype job of KC Hx 2B (NSM CN-21356) and were documented as corrective actions in PIP 2-C96-0217.

Procedures ,

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, . ._, _ _ , _ , _ _ _ - ._ _ _. .h

Dimensional criteria from previous revision was essentially unchanged. Based on the above considerations, an unreviewed safety question evaluation does not appear to apply with proposed ,

revision of the stated MP. -No changes were made to the FSAR or l the Technical Specification.

MP/1/A/7150/042 Change 11 Rev.23 Retype 12 Approved 6/14/96 Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Replacement Description This procedure change incorporates information from the Dominion Engineering Reactor Vessel Bolting Evaluations for Rotterdam Dockyard Vessels (CNM-12 01. 01.102 9 ) to allow the vessel head.

torque values to be increased, reducing the number of passes in the torque sequence. This reduces the critical path time needed to remove and replace the Rx head. The will be possible by using a higher capacity Biach pump than the one previously used at CNS.

This pump has been successfully used at MNS. Also changed in the procedure, is the " soak" time for the studs prior to ,

tensioning, from 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . It has been demonstrated during past outages from temperature measurements that this is sufficient time for the studs temperatures to reach equilibrium ,

with the vessel and head. l i

Evaluation l These changes do not change the facility as described in the SAR l or change procedures as addressed in the SAR. The Rx head !

tensioning sequence is not addressed, nor are the " soak" times !

for the studs. These activities doe not appear significant l enough to require inclusion in the FSAR. These activities are performed on the Rx vessel head during each refueling outage, and have created no problems that could affect the capability to operate the plant in accordance with the SAR. This is not a test or experiment, and the tensioning pressures and sequences have I been proven effective at other plants and utilities. The design and safety considerations in NSD 209, Table 209-2 have been considered as appropriate.

OP/1/A/6100/02 Change 92 Approved 12/18/96 Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if an Unreviewed Safety Question is involved with a procedure change to OP/2/A/6100/02,- Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown. Since there is no issue :equiring the unit to go to cold maintenance temperature less tnan 140*F, it is desirable to maintain the plant at' Mode 5 (18 0

F<T<2 00

F) rather than proceed to 160*F.

Advantages for remaining at a temperature greater than the current limitation of 160 degF include the desire to minimize the Procedures Page 27 I

temperature transient on the Reactor Coolant System (NC) and connected systems, thereby decreasing the potential for cyclic -

related stresses and potential for valve and flange leaks, and to minimize the potential for NC pressurizer Power Operator Relief Valve (PORV) challenges by avoiding water solid operation.

i Evaluation The margins present in the Heatup and Cooldown Curves (Ref 2, Figure 3.4-3) are not affected by the Procedure Change. l Additionally, the Pre =surizer Delta T is unaffected. The fission product barriers of the pellet, clad, NC pressure boundary and containment are not adversely affected as a result of this .

procedure change. No Tech Spec changes were required and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were identified. This evaluation is applicable to both Units 1 and 2.

OP/2/A/6100/02 Change 80- Approved 12/17/96 Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if an Unreviewed Safety Question is involved with a procedure change to OP/2/A/6100/02, Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown. Since there is no issue requiring the unit to go to cold maintenance temperature less than 140*F, it is desirable to maintain the plant at Mode 5 (18 0

F<T<2 00

F) rather than proceed to 160 F.

Advantages for remaining at a temperature greater than the current limitation of 160 degF include the desire to minimize the temperature transient on the Reactor Coolant System (NC) and connected systems, thereby decreasing the potential for cyclic -

related stresses and potential for valve and flange leaks, and to minimite the potential for NC pressurizer Power Operator Relief Valve (FORV) challenges by avoiding water solid operation.

Evaluation l The margins present in the Heatup and Cooldown Curves (Ref 2, Figure 3.4-3) are not affected by the Procedure Change.

Additionally, the Pressurizer Delta T is unaffected. The fission

, product barriers of the pellet, clad, NC pressure boundary and containment are not adversely affected as a result of this procedure change. No Tech Spec changes were required and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were identified. This evaluation is applicable to both Units 1 and 2.

Procedures Page 28

OP/1/B/6100/10G ' Change 34 Approved 6/14/96 l Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-6 Description Reactor Coolant Pump 1A shaft vibration increased to levels around 16 to 18 Mils on 6/13/96, after the Reactor has been shut down. The increase in vibration was fairly gradual taking place steadily from around 10 to 15 Mils over a period of about 12 to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months . Analysis of the vibration indicates that the response of the pump is basically the same as the previously understood steady-state condition, only now higher. Westinghouse has stated in previous discussions concerning coolant pump vibration that stated shutdown limits might be revisited, provided an understanding of the situation was had and that the condition was stable with understood tendencies. The assessment of the situation of coolant pump 1A meets this criteria. Westinghouse was contacted and replied with written approval for limited operation of the pump with up to 30 Mils shaft vibration. Moto mount vibration limits will not be relaxed and remain at 5 Mils shutdown value.

Evaluation Restricted procedure changes to allow the operation of the 1A Reactor Coolant Pump with shaft vibration above the traditional ,

limit of 20 Mils, but not above 30 Mils will neither increase the probability of any accident evaluated in the SAR, or increase the I probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as )

evaluated in the SAR. No safety margins defined in the basis of any technical specifications will be reduced or any FSAR changes. l 1

OP/1/A/6150/02A Change 29 Approved 6/14/96 Reactor Coolant Pump Operation Description Reactor Coolant Pump 1A shaft vibration increased to levels around 16 to 18 Mils on 3/13/96, after the Reactor has been shut down. The increase in vibration was fairly gradual taking place steadily from around 10 to 15 Mils over a period of about 12 to

, 16 hours1.851852e-4 days 0.00444 hours 2.645503e-5 weeks 6.088e-6 months . Analysis of the vibration indicates that the response i of the pump is basically the same as the previously understood I steady-state condition, only now higher. Westinghouse has stated 3

in previous discussions concerning coolant pump vibration that stated shutdown limits might be revisited, provided an understanding of the situation was had and that the condition was l stable with understood tendencies. The assessment of the situation of coolant pump 1A meets this criteria. Westinghouse was contacted and replied with written approval for limited operation of the pump with up to 30 Mils shaft vibration. Moto mount vibration limits will not be relaxed and remain at 5 Mils shutdown value.

Procc res {

Page 25 l l

Evaluation Restricted procedure changes to allow the operation of the 1A Reactor Coolant Pump with shaft vibration above the traditional >

limit of 20 Mils, but not above 30 .'!11s will neither increase the probability of any accident evaluated in the SAR,. or increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as -

evaluated in the SAR. No safety margins defined in the basis of any technical specifications will be reduced or any FSAR changes. !

OP/1/A/6150/02A Change 31 Restricted Approved 12/7/96 Reactor Coolant Pump Operation s Description The purpose of this evaluation is to determine if this procedure to OP/1/A/6150/02A (Reactor Coolant Pump Operation) involve any '

unreviewed safety questions (US0) using criteria of 10CFR50.59.

Reactor Coolant (NC) Pump 1D #1 Seal Return Line has experienced a leak. This procedure change establishes the system line up to necessitate the repair effort. Concerns are:

1. Impact on other NC pumps in operations.

2. NC pumps seal integrity. 1

3. Affect of a #1 seal failure. ;

4. Boric acid impact on carbon steel component in area of class l B piping removed for repair.

i Evaluation l Since all Technical Specifications will be adhered to there would l be no reduction in margin as defined by Tech Spec basis. )

Operation of the NC system as outlined in FSAR Section 5.1 and j the analysis of Chapter 15 will not be compromised. In fact the margin of safety will be enhanced because once the leak is repaired the ability to have early detection of additional leakage is enhanced. The conclusion is that there are no Unreviewed Safety Questions involved or created by this procedure change.

OP/1/A/6200/01 Change 76 Approved G/13/96 i Chemical and Volume Control System Description A restricted procedure change was processed to allow the use of the variable orifice flow control valve 1NV849 to increase letdown flow for crud cleanup during cooldown for refueling outage lEOC9. A Maximum NC pressure of 385 psig was specified to conservatively bound the maximum flow rate so that flashing conditions would not occur. Use of NV849 for continuous letdown under NC limited pressure conditions has been evaluated ar.d it is concluded that the' consequences of any postulated break in the Procedures Page 30 i

t letdown line under specified shutdown conditions remain bounded by the Chapter 15 analysis.

Evaluation I No Technical Specification changes were required, and no Unreviewed Questions were identified. No changes to the FSAR ,

were required as a result of this restricted procedure change.

i OP/1/A/6200/09 Change 47 Approved 6/18/96 !

Cold Leg Accumulator Operation ;

Description A procedure enange was processed to require an operat?r to close -

NI96B in the infrequent event that the NI System is in alignment for cold leg accumulator (CLA) makeup and a blackout or LOCA occurs. This is a proceduralized compensatory action designed to prevent ECCS flow diversion in the event of a B train related i failure, in which NI pump flow was recognized to bypass through the containment check relief valve NI471 to non-safety, non-seismic piping the CLA makeup header, Evaluation No Technicrl Specification changes were required, and no Unreviewed Questions were identified. No changes to the FSAR were required as a result of this restricted procedure change.

OP/1/A/6200/09 Change 36 Approved 6/18/96 Cold Leg Accumulator Operation Description A procedure change was processed to require an operator to close NI120B and NI96B in the infrequent event that the NI System is in alignment for cold leg act anulator (CLA) makeup and a blackout or LOCA occurs. This is a proceduralized compensatory action designed to prevent ECCS flow diversion in the event of a B train related failure, in which NI pump flow was recognized to bypass through the containment check relief valve NI471 to non-safety, non-seismic piping the CLA makeup header.

Evaluation No Technical Specification changes were required, and no Unreviewed Questions were identified. No changes to the FSAR were required as a result of this restricted procedure change.

Procedures Page 31

l OP/1/A/6200/11. Change O to 15 Rev.14 Approved 12/4/96 Operating Procedure for the Primary Sampling System (NM)

Description This procedure is being revised due to several changes that make the procedure more user friendly and correct typos. These i changes are also to address plant reactivity concerns per PIP.#

0587. Cautions have been placed in those enclosures identified as having the potential to affect reactivity have been changed to require Level III prejob briefings for reactivity control.

Evaluation The change made in this procedure revision are being made as a ?

result of increased station emphasis on improving reactivity control and mgmt oversight. These changes will enhance the communication and interface between operations and chsmistry by procedurally identifying areas where potential reactivity concerns existed and by requiring a higher level of attention be given to these procedure sections. Therefore these changes does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR. It does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR. This change does not increase the probability or i consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety ,

evaluated in the SAR. It does not reduce the margin of safety as '

defined in the basis for any technical specification.

OP/2/A/6200/11 Change O to 11 Rev.12 Approved 12/4/96 Operating Procedure for the Primary Sampling System (NM)

Description This procedure is being revised due to several changes that make the procedure more user friendly and correct typos. These changes are also to address plant reactivity concerns per PIP #

0587. Cautions have been placed in those enclosures identified as having the potential to affect reactivity have been changed to require Level III prejob briefings for reactivity control. l l

Evaluation The change made in this procedure revision are being made as a result of increased station emphasis on improving reactivity l control and mgmt oversight. These changes will enhance the communication and interface between operations and chemistry by l procedurally identifying areas where potential reactivity j concerns existed and by requiring a higher level of attent.on be '

given to these procedure sections. Therefore these changes does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR. It does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in l Procedures Page 32

1 the SAR. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equip ment important to safety evaluated in the SAR. It does not reduce the margin of safety as !

defined in the basis for any technical specification. i i

OP/1/A/6200/28 Change 8 Approved 8/29/96 l Operating Procedure for the Addition of Chemicals to the Reactor Coolant System (NC)

Description Replacement of CNS Unit 1 Westinghouse Model "D" type preheat i steam generators with feeding steam generators designed by ]

Babcock & Wilcox International. Have resulted in a NC System i' volume change because the new generators have approximately 2000 more tubes of a slightly smaller diameter and a tube bundle that 4 is about 8 ft. taller. !

Evaluation There are no changes to the FSAR or Tech. Specs. required. No unreviewed safety questions were required.

OP/1/B/6200/22 Change O Rev. 1 Approved 7/31/96 Unit 1 Operating Procedure for Composite Crud Sampling Description This procedure is being revised in order to insert a statement to notify Radwaste Chemistry of our intention to for composite crud.

This will allow them to more effectively track inputs to their systems and thus reduce their time spent looking for unidentified inputs. Also, steps are being added to direct technicians to flush sample sink by operating the YM supply valves. This will provide more consistency in our sampling routines.

1 Evaluation i This change in noway make the procedure less conservative and has i no impact on plant safety. This procedure does not affect the FSAR.

OP/0/A/6200/26 Rev. 6 Change 2 Approved 12/18/96 Operating Procedure for the EMF Troubleshooting Description i This procedure is being revised in order to delete enclosures 4.1 I and 4.2 which pertain to the flushing of EMF's on both units. A different type of EMFS, which do not utilize a crud trap are i being used. Also, the note pertaining to temperature was changed to read less than 140*F to make it consistent with other Chemistry procedures. This change in nowsy makes the procedure less conservative and has not impact on plant safety.

Procedures l Page 33 l

Evaluation This procedure does not affect the FSAR because:

1) The activities do not change the facility as described in the SAR, i

2) The activities do not change the procedures, method of operation, or alter a test or experiment as described in ;

(

the SAR.

3) The activities do not appear significant enough to require inclusion in the SAR, ,

4) The activities do not adversely affect an, system, '

structure, or component necessary to operate the plant in !

accordance with the SAR, and

5) The activities do not perform a test or experiment that is not described in the SAR.

OP/0/A/6200/26 Change 2 Rev. 5 Approved 4/24/96 Operating Procedure for the EMF Troubleshooting Description This procedure is being revised to incorporate a change that will allow it to also be used to clear high flow and pressure problems. This will be accomplished by the addition of steps 2.9 cnd'2.10. The steps are renumbered to give Chemistry the flexibility to use the enclosures in problems pertaining to high or low flows or pressures. The change does not impact plant safety or make the procedure less conservative.

Evaluation These changes do not involve any unreviewed safety questions, or questions not already addressed in previously approved 50.59 evaluations. There are not any changes required in the FSAR or any Technical Specification changes.

OP/2/6200/27 Change 14 Rev. 10 Approved 10/23/96 Operating Procedure for Sampling Local Primary Sample Points Description This 50.59 addresses a procedure revision that incorporates PIP 2-C96-0700 corrective action to notify operations when placing the BAT recirc pump or discharge pump in service for extended periods. The purpose of this change was to ensure operations was made aware of a potential BAT high temperature alarm on pt 112 (NV12) may annunciate. Additional changes were made to this procedure as a result of operational experience with the PRT sample. This section was changed to clarify chemistry and operations roles during PRT sample alignment. There were also changes made to the PRT valve alignment enclosure to clarify prerequisite conditions for sample alignment and collection.

Changes were also added to indicate the use of analytical methods Procedures Page 34

e i

for laboratory analysis. The BAT sample enclosure - - wra changed to include a 3 line volume purge of 4 galloc 'bl.s was ;

added to ensure a representative sample was collecte dless of BAT level. These changes improve sample collection : ability and representation. These changes included in this revision in no way impacts the safe operation of the plant.

Evaluation These changes do not involve any unreviewed safety questions, or ,

questions not already addressed in previously approved 50.59 evaluations. There are not any changes required in the FSAR or ,

any Technical Specification changes.

OP/0/A/6200/27 Change 12 Rev. 9 Approved 7/12/96 i Operating Procedure for Sampling Local Primary Sample Points, Description This revision to OP/2/A/6200/27 was made to add alternate saniple r points for the NI Cold Leg accumulators, as a result of 2NM-78B failure. FSAR 6.3.2.2 and 9.3.2.2.1 do not specify a particular sample point. The failure of 2NM-78B requires that the outside containment isolation valve 2NM-82A be closed for containment integrity, in an accident scenario. The isolation of 2NM-82A prevents sampling of the Cold Leg accumulators via the normal method. Enclosures 4.20 thru 4.23 provide alternate sample points for accumulators 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D via containment at the )

Ni instrumentation. These enclosures initiate the sample activity to be performed by I&E or I&E spoc per I&E Procedure IP/2/A/3222/01E - Collecting Chemistry Samples From Cold Leg ;

Accumulator Level Loops. System configuration and control removal and restoration will be administered with the I&E 1 procedure. This procedure ensures that the sample activity is tracked and controlled from start to finish, while making the necessary notifications to on site management.

Evaluation These changwa do not involve any unreviewed safety questions, or questions not already addressed in previously approved 50.59 evaluations. There are not any changes required in the FSAR or any Technical Specification changes.

OP/1/A/6200/27 Change 11 Rev.9 Approved 10/23/96 Operating Procedure for Sampling Local Primary Sample Points Description This 50.59 addresses a procedure revision that incorporates PIP 2-C96-0700 corrective action to notify operations when placing the BAT recirc pump or discharge pump in service for extended periods. The purpose of this change was to ensure operations was Procedures Page 35

-made aware of a potential BAT high temperature alarm on pt 112 ,

(NV12) may annunciate. ' Additional changes were made to this l procedure as a result of operational ~ experience with the PRT j sample. This section was-changed to clarify chemistry and !

operations roles during PRT sample alignment. There were also

. changes made to the PRT valve alignment enclosure to clarify l prerequisite conditions for sample alignment and collection. '

' Changes were also added to indicate the use of analytical methods ;

for laboratory analysis. The BAT sample enclosure 4.4 was i changed to include a 3 line volume purge of 4 gallons. This was I added to ensure a representative sample was collected regardless i of BAT level. These changes improve sample collection capability l and representation. These changes included in this revision in .

no way impacts the safe operation of the plant. j Evaluation r These changes do not involve any unreviewed safety questions, or !

questions not already addressed in previously approved 50.59 l evaluations. There are not any changes required in the FSAR or !

any Technical Specification changes.

OP/1/A/6200/28 Change 8 Rev.3 Approved 9/14/96 !

Operating Procedure for the Addition of Chemicals to the Reactor i Coolant System (NC)

Description i This procedure is being revised in order to allow for multiple ;

chemical additions and to provide a mechanism for the suspension of the procedure at a certain point thus to facilitate the I addition of chemical to the chemical mixing tank at one time and the injection of chemicals to the NC System at a later time. I Steps 2.6-2.19 are being repeated and additional signoffs are being added as needed. These changes apply to enclosure 3.4.

Evaluation l These changes in noway makes the procedure less conservative and has no impact on plant safety. There are no changes to the FSAR or the Technical Specifications.

OP/1/A/6200/28 Change O to 8 Rev. 4 Approved 12/4/96 Operating Procedure for the Addition of Chemicals to the Reactor l Coolant System (NC)

Description OP/1/A/6200/2 Operating Procedure for the Addition of Chemicals to the Reactor Coolant System (NC). These changes are also to ;

address plant reactivity concerns per PIP # 0587. Chemical additions to the NC system are flushed in using RMWST water, which is a positive reactivity concern if not properly controlled Procedures Page 36

i I

l l

and communicated. Warnings have been placed in those enclosures identified as having the potential to affect reactivity. In I

addition the enclosures identified as having the potential to affect reactivity have been changed to require Level III prejob ,

' briefings for reactivity control. Requirements are being placed in the limits and precautions and initial condition sections, requiring a level 3 pre-job brief prior to adding chemicals to ,

the NC system. :

Evaluation The change made in this procedure revision are being as a result of increased station emphasis on improving reactivity control and mgmt oversight. These changes will enhance the communication and interface between operations and chemistry by procedurally identifying areas where potential reactivity concerns existed and requiring a higher level of attention be given to these procedure sections. Therefore these changes does not increase the :

probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR.

It does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction ,

of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the SAR. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification.

OP/2/A/6200/28 Change 6 Rev.3 Approved 9/14/96 l Operating Procedure for the Addition of Chemicals to the Reactor Coolant System (NL)

Description This procedure is being revised in order to allow for multiple chemical additions and to provide a mechanism of the suspension of the procedure at a certain point thus to facilitate the addition of chemical to the chemical mixing tank at one time and the injection of chemicals to the NC System at a later time.

Steps 2.6-2.19 are being repeated and additional signoffs are being added as needed. These changes apply to enclosure 3.4.

Evaluation l These changes in noway makes the procedure less conservative and has no impact on plant safety. There are no changes to the FSAR ,

or the Technical Specifications.

Procedures :

Page 37 I

i 1

OP/2/A/6200/28 Change 6 Approved 2/8/96 Operating Procedure for the Addition of % micals to the Reactor Coolant System (NC) l Description i l

This change adds a note to inform the operator that he/she can obtain the most accurate information on projected boron concentrations by contacting the Reactor Engineer. The result of this procedure change will be that a more accurate lithium addition can be achieved, since the amount of lithium needed is a l function of the predicted boron concentration. Since the result ,

of this procedure change will be that a more accuracy in the additions to the reactor coolant system, the change to this procedure is unrelated to any accident scenarios.

Evaluation It does not increase the probability nor consequences of an ;

accident. It does not create the possibility of a new accident.

It does not increase the probability nor consequences of malfunction of safety equipment nor does it create a new malfunction. Being unrelated to safety functions, it does not reduce the margin of safety. Therefore, there are no changes to the FSAR.

OP/2/A/6200/28 Change 0 to 6 Rev. 4 Approved 12/4/96 Operating Procedure for the Addition of Chemicals to the Reactor '

Coolant System (NC)

Description OP/2/A/6200/28 Operating Procedure for the Addition of Chemicals to the Reactor Coolant System (NC). These changes are also to address plant reactivity concerns per PIP # 0587. Chemical additions to the NC system are flushed in using RMWST water, which is a positive reactivity concern if not properly controlled and communicated. Warnings have been placed in those enclosures identified as having the potential to affect reactivity. In addition the enclosures identified as having the potential to affect reactivity have been changed to require Level III prejob briefings for reactivity control. Requirements are being placed in the limits and precautions and initial condition sections, requiring a level 3 pre-job brief prior to adding chemicals to the NC system.

Evaluation The change made in this procedure revision are being as a result of increased station emphasis on improving reactivity control and mgmt oversight. These changes will enhance the communication and interface between operations and chemistry by procedurally identifying areas where potential reactivity concerns existed and Procedures Page 38

}

requiring a higher level of attention be given to these procedure sections. Therefore these changes does not increase ths

- probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR.

It does not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different' type than any evaluated in the SAR. This change does not increase the probability or consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety-evaluated in the SAR. It does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the l basis for any technical specification.

OP/0/A/6200/30 Change 4 Rev.4 Approved 6/11/96 Operating Procedure for the Preparation and Transfer of Boric Acid Description This procedure revision was made as a result changes made to the station NRC Committed Fire Boundary program. The Boric Acid Batching Tank access hatch and chemical addition plug are no .

' longer a committed notification of the ops shift supervisor prior l to opening the removing the BABT plug. The Implementation and completion of minor mod CE-60123 made these changes possible. ,

The drawing for the BABT area access hatch (CN-1105-9.2) was a changed during the implementation of minor mod CE-60123. ,

However, the BABT plug was still shown as OA -3 on detail drawing CN-1105-9.7. This issue was resolved with the implementation of !

CE-7343, which changed the drawing (CN-1105-9.7) for the BABT l plug to non QA -3. -

Evaluation l These changes do not involve any unreviewed safety questions, or ;

questions not already addressed in previously approved 50.59 evaluations. There are not any changes required in the FSAR or ,

any Technical Specification changes. .

OP/0/A/6200/30 Change 4 Rev.5 Approved 9/12/96 Operating Procedure for the Preparation and Transfer of Boric Acid Description !

This procedure is being revised as part of a resolution to PIP 2- l C-96-0700. A step is being added to the procedure that directs Chemistry to inform Operations that point 112(NV12) may alarm i during extended run times of the Boric Acid Transfer Pump.

Evaluation This change in noway makes the procedure less conservative and has no impact on plant safety. These changes do not involve any Procedures Page 39 i

unreviewed safety questions. There are not any changes required in the FSAR or any Technical Specification changes.

OP/2/A/6200/32 Change 2 Rev.2 Approved 9/26/96 Operating Procedure for Primary Sampling Using a Rheodyne Model 7010 Valve i Description This procedure is being revised in order to provide more concise !

directions pertaining to operation of valves in certain steps.

Also, some steps are being re-arranged in the order in which they ,

are performed. The changes are being made to enhance the flow of ;

the procedure and to help prevent the accidental pressurization i

of the sample line which would prevent the reconnection of the normal sample line via the quick disconnect. The changes are input provided from a job observation.

Evaluation This change in noway makes the procedure less conservative and l has no impact on plant safety. These changes do not involve any j unreviewed safety questions. There are not any changes required in the FSAR or any Technical Specification changes.

OP/2/B/6200/33 Change 4 Rev. 4 Approved 7/29/96 Operating Procedure for the Determination of Hydrogen by In-Line

. Analyser Description This procedure is being revised in order to correct some numbers i that are referred to in certain steps in enclosure 5.2. In the last revision some steps were added and some were deleted, thus causing the steps to be renumbered. An example of this occurs in step 2.24. The last part of the step states to proceed to step 2.30 if condition is met. This should state, "go to 2.28".

Steps 2.24 - 2.27 and steps 2.21 and 2.30 are being corrected to refer the performer to the correct step. Step 2.4 of enclosure 1 5.4 references enclosure 5.9. The reference to 5.9 is to be deleted, j i

Evaluation ?

This change in noway makes the procedure less conservative and has no impact on plant safety. These changes do not involve any unreviewed safety questions. There are not any changes required ,

in the FSAR or any Technical Specification changes. !

i Procedures Page 40 i

i OP/2/3/6200/33 Change 4 Rev. 3 Approved 7/9/96 Operating Procedure for the Determination of Hydrogen by In-Line Analyser Description i This procedure is being revised in order to make changes to several of the enclosures. Steps are being added in enclosures 5.1 - 5.5, instructing technicians to verify hoods operability.

The addition of this step makes our procedures more consistent. ,

Enclosures 5.9 and 5.0 are being deleted. Former enclosure 5.11 is being renumbered to 5.9. Steps pertaining to the opening and ,

closing of 2NV-176 have been added to enclosure 5.9. Steps 2.2 and 2.3 of enclosure 5.2 have been deleted from 5.2 and inserted

into 5.3. In enclosure 5.2, step 2.25, a duration of approximately 5 minutes has been added. Also, if pulling the NC via the NV/BIX in enclosure 5.4, notify operations of your intention.to do this. This change in noway make the procedure less conservative and has no impact on plant safety.

Evaluation This change in noway makes the procedure less conservative and !

has no impact on plant safety. These changes do not involve any unreviewed safety questions. There are not any changes required in the FSAR or any Technical Specification changes.

OP/1/A/6250/02 Change 75 Restricted Approved 12/12/96 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Description This evaluation finds that there are no un-reviewed safety questions involved with the proposed procedure change to allow 1(2)CA-6, CA pumps Suction from CACST, to be closed and 1(2)CA194 to be throttled open to provide a bleed path to remove sodium and ,

other raw water contaminants that my leak by through RN to CA ,

isolation valves while 1(2)RN250A and 1(2)RN310B are being opened. 1(2)RN250A and 1(2)RN310B are being opened to maintain the operability of the CA pumps and the opening of these valves is being considered under a separate evaluation.

Evaluation The responses to all seven questions were negative. Given the conditions of the Operability evaluation, the CA pumps and RN system are operable. There are not unreviewed safety questions associated with maintaining the RN and CA systems in service under the restrictions of the stated conditions for operability.

There are no FSAR revision or Tech Spec changes required.

Procedures Page 41 f

E

OP/2/A/6250/02 Change 67 Restricted Approved 12/12/96 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Description New Enclosures 4.17 (CA Pump Assured Section alignment) and 4.18 (CA System Bleed Termination on Auto Pump Start) were added to this procedure to ensure that insufficient NPSH for all three CA pumps does not occur due to failure of 2RN-250A or 2RN-3108.

This is a restricted change and will be place until this problem can be placed until this problem can be corrected by future NSM that will prevent the possibility on insufficient NPSH due to failure of RN-250A or 310B.

l Evaluation This evaluation finds that there are no un-reviewed safety questions involved with the proposed procedure change to allow 1(2)CA-6, CA pumps Suction from CACST, to be closed and 1(2)CA194 l to be throttled open to provide a bleed path to remove sodium and I other raw water contaminants that my leak by through RN to CA isolation valves while 1(2)RN250A and 1(2)RN310B are being opened.1(2)RN250A and 1(2)RN310B are being opened to maintain I the operability of the CA pumps and the opening of these valves is being considered under a separate evaluation. There are no FSAR revision or Tech Spec changes required.

OP/0/B/6500/34 Rev. 8 Approved 7/59/96 Operating Procedure for Liquid Waste Recycle System Laundry and Hot Shower l Description This revision to OP/0/B/6500/34 is to delete requirements of placing the LHST in Recirc prior to processing to a Monitor tank.

The requirement of the LHST being in Recirc has been evaluated ,

and determined that the intent of moving water from the LHST to a Monitor tank can be accomplished without the extra steps of placing the LHST in Recirc.

1 Evaluation I This change has been reviewed for 10CFR50.59 applicability. The following section of the FSAR was reviewed: 11.2 Liquid Radwaste System, and 15.0 Accident Analysis. Section 16.11-4 of the Selected Licensee Commitments was also reviewed. This change does not warrant further review of the FSAR for an unreviewed safety question. The change does not affect structures, systems, components, or procedures addressed in the FSAR in a significant manner.

Procedures ,

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OP/1/A/6550/14 Change 2 Permanent Approved 6/14/96 Draining and Filling of Spent Fuel Transfer Canal and Cask Area Jescription The purpose of this procedure is to define the proper methods to be used during draining and filling of the Spent Fuel Pool transfer canal and draining and filling of the Spent Fuel Pool cask area.

Evaluation No unreviewed safety questions is associated with Change 2 to OP/1/A/6550/014. No changes to either the FSAR or the Technical '

Specification are required as a result of this activity.

OP/0/A/6550/015 Rev. 16 Approved 12/19/96 Receipt, Inspection and Storage of New Fuel j Description j This procedure, Inspection and Storage of New Fuel Assemblies and ;

Inserts, was revised to change "B&W" fuel to Framatome Cogema {

Fuel or "FCF". Also Enclosure 4.8 was divided into two separate tables, one for Westinghouse fuel and one for FCF fuel. The wet weights for FCF inserts were determined by lifting an insert with the given number of rods and plugs, and recording the weight difference between the empty tool and the tool plus insert in the fuel pool. Also, added to the procedure was a new enclosure for receipt of new BPRAs/RCCAs that come in containers without fuel assemblies. There are no Technical Specifications which deal specifically with Receipt, Inspection and Storage of New Fuel and Inserts, except the restricted storage criteria for high enrichment fuel per Tech Spec 3.9.14. The fuel pool storage locations would be specified by OP/0/A/6550/011, to comply with the spec.

Evaluation The changes made to OP/0/A/6550/011 do not increase the probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR, ;

as no changes were made to any equipment important to safety as l addressed in the SAR. The changes made to the procedure were mostly editorial in nature, and will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR. l These changes will not increase the probability or consequences l of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as addressed or not addressed in the SAR. The changes will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Tech Spec. The Design and Safety Considerations of NSD 209, Table 209-2 have been considered as appropriate. No reactivity management concerns will be created by the changes to OP/0/A/6550/015.

Procedures I Page 43 I

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OP/1/A/6700/01 Change 229 Approved 4/4/96 Unit 1 Reactor Operating Data Manual Description This change will change various setpoints associated with the '

Boric Acid Tank levels IRef. Unit 1 Data Book Curve 7.35). The setpoint changes are as follows: ;

Present Change High Level Alarm 89.5% 94.1%

Lo Level Alarm 56.6% 39.5%

Lo-Lo Level Alarm 54.5% 13.8%

Empty -5.9% 10.5%

The above setpoints will be changed to comply with CNM 1201.00-0039 001 (Precautions, Limitations and Setpoints for Nuclear Steam Supply Systems) and the Unit 1 I&C List. These values are backed up by calculation CNC-1223.04-00-0038. These values provided for lo and lo-lo level setpoints serve to inform the '

operators of the need for BAT makeup so that the minimum volumes specified in Tech Spec bases for modes 1-4 (lo level) and modes 5 and 6 (Lo-lo level) can be observed. The high level alarm informs the operator that BAT overflow is imminent, and the Empty alarm indicates that pump suction is inadequate.

Evaluation In summary, this change will.not impact the ability of the Boric Acid tank to perform its function to provide a source of borated water. Therefore, there is no USQ associated with this change.

J The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FAR '

will not be increased. Technical Specifications minimum limits will be affected by this change.

OP/2/A/6700/01 Change 157 Permanent Approved 11/16/96 Unit Two Data Book i Description I The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the presence or I absence of an unreviewed safety question due to NSM CN-21367. '

l CN-21367 will reduce the full power operating temperature of Unit 2's Reactor Coolant System hot leg temperature (T-hot) by 3.0 F. ,

This temperature reduction will extend the life of the steam j generators' Inconel-600 alloy tubes by slowing the rate of primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). This modification does not require any physical changes to the plant.

This change is to how the existing plant is operated; therefore, Operations and IAE procedures will reflect the temperature Procedures Page 44

reduction. Equipment operating sequences will not be affected and no Control Room instrumentation changes are needed. This determination will apply the criteria of 10CFR50.59(a)2 and is performed under the Qualified Reviewer program as required by NSD-209. This evaluation concentrates on the issues outside of

FSAR Chapter 6 (Engineered Safety Features) and Chapter 15 (Accident Analysis). The Chapter 6 and 15 accidents and events are reviewed under a separate 10CFR50.59 evaluation performed by Safety Analysis in the General Office. A Technical Specification change has been identified and is discussed below. This evaluation will address all of the remaining scope. The Technical Specification change approval is required prior'to unit startup (Modes 1 and 2) under the changes described herein.

Evaluation This modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or safety concern. Other than the changes to the K6 penalty coefficient definition submitted or September 13, 1995, no addition Tech. Specs. changes are required. FSAR Tables 4-1, 4-17, 5-1, and 5-5, and Figure 4-72 will be updated to reflect the new primary system operating temperatures.

OP/0/A/6700/06 Approved 6/10/96 Site Directive 3.1.30, Revision 6, Unit Shutdown Configuration Control (MODE 5, 6, or NO MODE)

Description An evaluation was performed to justify a deviation from internal station requirements for PAL closure during "High decay heat, l I

Loops not Filled" portion of 1EOC9. This deviation was justified based on the large number of workers involved in Steam Generator Replacement activities inside containment. Activities include removal of insulation of scaffolding and shielding. Maintaining )

the PAL open provides improved access and egress for personnel l and avoids the accumulation of materials both inside and outside containment. A qualified PAL door operator, using an existing procedure, is provided as a Compensatory Action (vs. a normally closed or operable PAL) to ensure an orderly containment evacuation and closure of the inner door, considering the thermal margin time each day of the outage. This evaluation also documented the safety system operability requirements and recovery actions associated with this activity.

Evaluation No FSAR or Tech Spec Changes or unreviewed safety questions (USQs) were associated with this activity. ;

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l PT/1(2) /A/4150/01C Change O Retype 2 Approved 9/27/96 NC System Controlled Leakage Verification Description PT/1(2)/A/4150/01C was revised to demonstrate that seal line flow does not exceed 40 gpm with the modulating valve in the supply l line fully open at a nominal Reactor Coolant Pressure of 2235 i psig. This surveillance ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the safety injection flow will not be less than assumed in the safety analyses.

Evaluation No Tech Spec changes were required, and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were identified. No changes to the FSAR were required as a result of this procedure change.

PT/1/A/4150/01C Change O Retype 3 Approved 9/27/96 NC System Controlled Leakage Verification Lascription PT/1(2) /A/4150/01C was revised to demonstrate that seal line flow does not exceed 40 gpm with the modulating valve in the supply line fully open at a nominal Reactor Coolant Pressure of 2235 psig. This surveillance ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the safety injection flow will not be less than assumed in the safety analyses.

Evaluation No Tech Spec changes were required, and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were identified. No changes to the FSAR were required as a result of this procedure change.

PT/1/A/4150/01B Change (Initial) Approved 9/29/96 Manual NC Leakage Calculation Description i i

This PT is used to perform a manual calculation of the NC system leakage in the event that the OAC is not available. The procedure substitutes for the function of PT/1/A/4150/01D, NC System Leakage Calculation. That PT is the normal 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months NC leakage surveillance PT. To calculate leakage without the OAC, the normal valve checklist is performed. Then, initial data is obtained by taking process instrumentation voltages and Control Room indicator readings. After at lease 60 minutes delay, a trend of NC T-Avg and PZR level is monitored to select a time when these parameters are close as possible to the initial values. Then, the final data is obtained. The data is used to calculate the various leakage rates which are then compared to l l

the Tech Spec limits, Procedures !

Page 46 l l

l 1

Evaluation This procedure allow for the calculation of NC System Leakage (total, identified and unidentified) to performed manually in cases where the OAC is not available. This procedure has been evaluated to not have an Unreviewed Safety Question associated with it. Additionally, no Tech Spec or FSAR changes are required.

PT/0/A/4150/12B Change 3 Permanent Approved 3/16/96 Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity Measurement (EOL)

Description Changes have been make to PT/0/A/4150/12B to ensure that the measurement of EOL moderator temperature coefficient may be completed without causing the turbine control valves to be fully open and thereby losing turbine control system responsiveness.

These changes also reduce the probability of reactor power being greater than allowance values. Requirements have been implemented which ensure that the reacter power is greater than ;

90% and the valve reference is less than 90%. Steps have been :

added to stop boric acid addition and place the turbine control i in"MW Out" if control valve #4 reaches 50% open. All initial conditions assumed in the Chapter 15 accident analysis for all accidents remain enveloping.

Evaluation No USQ is associated with these changes. No changes are required to either the FSAR, Selected Licensee Commitments, or Tech Spec.

PT/1/B/4150/13C Rev. Initial Issue Approved 11/14/96 Steam Generator Moisture Carryover Determination Description The MCO is accomplished by injecting a chemical tracer (Potassium, K, in the form of Potassium Chloride, KCI) into the condensate downstream of the Condensate Polishing Demineralizers.

During this time, both the S/G Blowdown (BB) System will be taken out of service as well as the condensate polishers in order to preserve the chemical tracer for the duration of the test.

Injection will be accomplished using vendor supplied infection equipment that will be connected to the Condensate System at drain valve 1CM-404 which ties into the main Condensate System piping upstream of 1CM44. Sufficient time is allowed for the KC1 solution to accumulate at the steam-water interface in the stream generators. A total of eleven samples will be taken from standard secondary chemistry sample points in the turbine building. Once the required samples are taken, the BB System will be returned to service as will be condensate polishers Procedures Page 47

i l

completion of the test. The samples obtained during the test i' will be. shipped to NWT for analysis. The three primary activities which affect unit operation are: 1) Isolation of S/G ,

blowdown, 2) Bypassing the condensate polishers and 3) Injection of the chemical tracer into the condensate system. The first two i

]

evolutions will be carried out by means of pre-existing l procedures which have already been evaluated for unresolved ,

safety questions. They are OP/1/A/6250/08 (Steam Generator l Blowdown) and OP/0/B/6250/09. The third primary activity involves the injection of potassium chloride into the condensate system. This chemical is a concern due to its ability, in sufficiently high concentrations, to degrade S/G tube material.

An EPRI industry document (PWR Secondary Water Chemistry Guidelines) forms the basis for Catawba's site chemistry procedures and manuals. These guidelines are to ensure that secondary side containment's either do not exceed predefined levels, or if these levels are exceeded, provide a timetable for being back in spec. It has been determined that the maximum tracer concentration in the generators will peak well below the maximum concentrations outlined in the EPRI guideline for the least urgent corrective action. It should be noted that continued full power operation is permitted for up to a week while operating outside the action level 1 guidelines, before power reduction is called for. Peak concentration of the tracer should only last for about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . Once the blowdown system and polishers are placed back in service, nominal chemical conditions existing prior to the test will be quickly restored. Also, some j additional mass is being added to the CM inventory but only at a rate of 110mL/ minute. Total water mass added will only be about 1 liter. This amount is extremely insignificant given the !

relative vastness of the secondary side volume and the fact that l it is not water solid. l Evaluation l No Tech Spec changes were required, and no Unreviewed Safety Questions were identified. No changes to the FSAR were required as a result of this procedure change.

PT/1/A/4200/07E Change O Approved 9/4/96 Reactor Makeup Pump Flow Balance Description Each Reactor Makeup Water (RMW) Pump is designed to have j sufficient capacity to cool the content of the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) from 200^F to ambient in approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months following a pressurizer safety valve discharge. This requires a flow of 150 gpm at.a total head sufficient to overcome the pressurizer relief tank internal pressure (50 psig when safety valve is discharging), plus a 10.7 drop across the pressurizer Procedures Page 48

relief tank spray nozzles, in addition to line losses and valve losses. Although, FSAR 9.3.5.2.1.11 required 150 gpm, this procedure requires a flow rate of 165 gpm. The 15 gpm margin if for instrument uncertainty. The PRT is considered "non-safety '

related".

Evaluation This procedure was developed to comply with FSAR section 9.3.5.2.1.11. Technical Specifications 3/4.9.2 and 3/4.3.3.11 were reviewed and a flow rate of less than 70 gpm is assured by isolating the NV system from the NC system. Based on this and the above discussion, it is determined that this test does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR are not increased.

PT/1/A/4200/07F Change 1 Approved 9/4/96 Standby Makeup Pump Flow Verification Test Description This revision to the Standby Makeup Pump Test procedure involves operation of the pump within normal design limits to gather data for analysis. The test is performed during Modes 5,6, or no Mode when SSF is not required operable. Impact on plant operation systems have adequately considered and procedural steps are provided to ensure no design limits are exceeded.

Evaluation There is no FSAR changes and no Unreviewed Safety Questions have been identified.

PT/1/A/4200/01N Change 39 Approved 9/24/96 Reactor Coolant System Pressure poundary Valve Leak Rate Test Description This revision to the Reactor Cociant Pressure Boundary Valve Leak Rate Test procedure involves the addition of new enclosures to allow for testing the boundary valves in groups. During he performance of these new enclosures and all other enclosures, this procedure ensures 1) a valid test flow path exist, 2) each valve under test is pressurized, 3) no direct flow path for the NC system to the auxiliary building exit. Impact on plant operation systems have been adequately considered and procedural steps are provided to ensure no design limits are exceeded.

Evaluation There is no FSAR change and no USQ have been identified.

Procedures Page 49

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I PT/1/A/4200/23A -Change 14 Retype 7 Approved 7/17/96 l MC Valve Inservice Test (CS) ,

Description During the Unit 2 EOC 7 Refueling Outage PZR PORV valve 2NC-34A !

did not meet the failed air IWV stroke time test requirement of 3 seconds. This occurred during the retest of the valve following l the packing replacement during the outrage when all three PORV's (2NC-23B,2NC-34A, and 2NC-36B) were repacked. All three valves did meet the open stroke time requirement of 3 seconds, including 2NC-34A. To resolve the immediate problem, 2NC-34A was i disassembled and repacked on 11/13/95. A broken lantern ring was discovered, which may or may not have contributed to the slow ,

closure time, the valve subsequently passed the <3 second closure requirement on spring alone. This event initiated PIP 2-C95-2142 :

which requested that the stroke time acceptance criteria be reviewed. Currently the acceptance criteria in PT/A/4200/023A, NC Valve Inservice Test (CS!, cpecifies the maximum stroke time is 3 seconds to open and 3 seconds to close. But the procedure ;

is written to measure the closure time with air assist, i.e.

spring force alone. The is the PORV operator is sized to fail {

closed in 3 seconds on loss of air but is designed to close with air assist within 3 seconds. Thus it is highly probable that _

future failures of the IWV stroke time testing of these PORVs will take place using the current acceptance criteria and translate into possible outage delays.

Evaluation The purpose of this safety evaluation is to determine whether a change to the testing method (close with air assist) in PT/A/4200/023A constitutes an unreviewed safety question. The l conclusion is that there are no Unreviewed Safety Questions l involved or created by changing the PZR PORV fail-safe closure j acceptance criteria from 3 to 15 seconds. Based on this ;

evaluation the proposal for the PZR PORV stroke times are found !

acceptable: closed-to-open:53 seconds with air, open-to-close:53 seconds with air, open-to-close (fail-safe):515 seconds without air (i.e. spring alone). This does not impact the probability of its inadvertent opening as evaluated in FSAR. j PT/2/A/4200/01L Change 8 Retype 4 Approved 7/17/96 Controlling Procedure for Type B & C Leak Rate l Description This procedure updates the method of totaling the total leakage and secondary containment bypass leakage that are currently calculated by the containment leakage software.

a) Modified procedure to match Operations format. .

Procedures Page 50

b) Converted procedure to WORD.

c) Replaced Lotus 1-2-3 memo to file reference with new updated reference to SDQA document for new excel spreadsheet. i d) Deleted old Limit and Precaution, not used with Excel, e) Updated section 9 to match Spreadsheet.

f) Section 12 New procedure for new Excel spreadsheet. Manual addition of penetrations removed because software has been updated.

Evaluation This procedure provides manual addition of containment leakage ,

paths previously not included in the summation of total and l bypass leakage by the containment leakage software. This manual l addition is more conservative than the presently approved 1 practices. There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions. A FSAR change will accomplished at a later date by Engineering. l PT/1/A/4200/01L Change 19 Retype 2 Approved 7/16/96 Controlling Procedure for Type B & C Leak Rate Description This procedure updates the method of totaling the total leakage and secondary containment bypass leakage that are currently ,

calculated by the containment leakage software:

a) Modified procedure to match Operations format.

b) Converted procedure to WORD.

c) Replaced Lotus 1-2-3 memo to file reference with new updated reference to SDQA document for new excel spreadsheet.

d) Deleted old Limit and Precaution, not used with Excel.

e) Updated section 9 to match Spreadsheet.

f) Section 12 1

New procedure for new Excel spreadsheet. Manual addition of l penetrations removed because software has been updated.

PT/1/A/4250/02B Change 13-15 Retype 11 Approved 2/8/96 Monthly Main Turbine Valve Movement Description This modification will change the frequency of Turbine Stop/ Control / Intercept valve testing as currently required in Selected Licensee Commitment 16.7-5. Catawba N.S. presently tests the Turbine Stop and Intercept valves on a weekly basis.

The Turbine Control valves are tested on a monthly basis.

Catawba N.S. has received " updated" missile probability calculations from GE based on changing the Turbine Stop and Procedures Page 51

Intercept valves periodic test to monthly and the Control valve test to quarterly. The probabilities have gone up slightly as compared to the weekly / monthly test probabilities but are still within the NRC limits established for rotor missile probabilities. This modification will also change the recoramended test interval for the "off-line" test of the mechanical-overspeed trip device on the main turbine. GE has reviewed the operating experience of the mechanical overspeed trip device on nuclear steam turbines and has concluded that the intervals between tests can be extended to 18 to 24 months per reference 7, GE TIL #1165-3. This will also align the GE recommendation with the insurance requirement of "once per fuel cycle. Catawba N.S. requested the removal of Prior Technical Specification 3/4.3.4, " Turbine Overspeed Protection" and bases, from the Technical Spec. to the Selected Licensee Commitments (SAC) manual which is Chapter 16 of the relocation of these requirements was granted.

' Evaluation Selected Licensee Commitment 16.7.5 can be changed as described I above per Minor Modification CE-7218. This change does not !

involve any Unreviewed Safety Questions. No Technical Specification changes are required. FSAR changes are required to sections 3.5.1.3 and 10.2.3.6 text, Table 3-13, and Table 3-14.

These are attached to the Minor Modification Package.

PT/1/A/4250/03E REV. 0-19 Approved 9/26/96 CA System Discharge Control Valve throttling Procedure Description Change #19 to PT/1/A/4250/03E (CA System Discharge Control Valve Throttling Procedure) is a procedure " rewrite". Changes were made to the procedure to: Incorporate previously approved changes, convert the computer file to Microsoft Word, correct typographical errors, incorporate various miscellaneous editorial and format changes, and reflect changes to station group / position designations. Reflect the revised S/G Hi-Hi and Lo-Lo level setpoints resulting from the replacement of the S/G's. Provide direction to return the system to its "as found" condition if the test cannot be successfully completed. Ensure that adequate shutdown margin exits for the performance of the test. Inform Operations that NC System Tave may decrease during the performance of the procedure, and that the P-12 Lo-Lo Tave Interlock setpoint may be reached. N/A steps that do not need to l' be performed id no adjustments are made to the CA Flow Control Valve travel stop positions. Record the operation of the P-12 Interlock. Require a stroke time of a CA Flow Control Valve if the travel stop was adjusted in the "open" direction any amount.

Procedures !

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Delete steps that required updating the Catawba Valve Position Throttle program if a CA Flow. Control Valve position as was ,

adjusted. Incorporate required changes resulting from modification NM C--11371/00, "CA Flow Optimization Deletion". :

This mainly consisted of combining two old sections into one new section. As a result of NM 11371/00, CA Pump #1 will now be aligned to supply all four S/G's and therefore the flows to all' ;

four S/G's are required to be balanced to verify operable flow ;

paths.

Evaluation No unreviewed safety questions created as a result of change

19 to PT/1/A/4250/03E. No Toc, jec or FSAR changes are required for the procedure changes.

PT/2/A/4400/01 Change 23 Approved 11/23/96 ECCS Flow Balance [

Description !

The ECCS Flow Balance Test is normally performed in "No Mode" ,

with the reactor vessel head removed and water allowed to overflow into the reactor cavity. This restricted procedure change to the existing procedure will provide the necessary guidance to perform the NI Cold Leg portion of the ficw balance ;

in Mode 5 with the reactor vessel head installed. Therefore, this change is the scope of the USQ evaluation.

Evaluation Chapter 15 of the FSAR addresses dilution accidents in Mode 5 and recognizes that by having proper operation of the Boron Dilution Mitigation System there is adequate time for termination of the dilution source and injection of borated water to ensure that shutdown margin is maintained. This procedure change ensures that shutdown margin is maintained by ensuring proper boron ,

concentration in the FWST which is the injection source. FWST temperature is also verified to be above 70^F to ensure shutdown margin is not compromised by the injection of this source of water. It also ensures that BDMS system is operable or the conditions of Tech Spec 3.3.3.11 are being met. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased. Since equipment required to terminate this event will be available, the consequences of an accident is previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.

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PT/1/A/4400/01 Change 35 Approved 8/23/96 !

ECCS Flow Balance Description This procedure change makes enhancements to the existing procedure that allow testing to be performed in an easier manner.

The changes made to the procedure do not significantly affect the r test procedure not the data / results obtained from the test. The i procedure changes made to PT/1/A/4400/01 have no adverse impact on plant safety. This test is performed with no fuel in the core. The original purpose of the test is still applicable and the intent of the test in not compromised in any way result of these procedure change. The ECCS equipment will be operated within specified design limits and criteria.

Evaluation l Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that the proposed procedure changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Therefore, the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than any evaluated in the FSAR will not be created.

l

, PT/2/A/4400/09 Change 18 Approved 7/24/96 "

Cooling Water Flow Monitoring for Asiatic Class and Mussels Quarterly Test Description The performance of systems supported by RN will not be degraded by this change. The change will not impact the RN flow balance and is not considered to impact the performance of the KC heat exchanger. No other equipment used for any phase of either power generation or conversion or transmission, normal shutdown ;

cooling, fuel handling, or radwaste treatment is affected. Thus, the probability of an accident evaluated in the SAR is not affected. Likewise, the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR is not created. j Evaluation There are changes to any design limit or setpoint. No fission I product barrier is affected. This modification will change the flow, temperature, or pressure of cooling water supplied to any component. No control, instrument function, or performance of any structure, system, or component is degraded. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the bases to any Technical Specification has not been reduced. The responses to all seven questions were negative, therefore there are no ut. reviewed safety questions. Also, no FSAR or Tech Spec changes are required.

Procedures Page 54

l PT/0/A/4450/Olc Change 10 Approved 7/30/96 Auxiliary Building Filtered Exhaust Filter Train Performance Test Desociption This procedure change will reduce the maximum allowable normal r air flow rate through one VA filter unit from 32,000 cfm. The ,

maximum allowable air flow rate has been reduced because of concerns associated with a single failure that would shut down one of the trains of VA filtered exhaust and the resulting potential high air flow rate through the operating filter unit ,

could cause the carbon residence time to be less that the minimum allowable carbon residence time of 0.25 seconds. PIP 0-C94-1539 i alone addresses the potential concerns associated with a single failure of one VA filtered exhaust fan. Other changes made to !

this procedure provide guidance for measurement of the differential pressure across Unit 1 and Unit 2 VA filter units.

In addition, guidance is provided for measurement of filtered exhaust fan (s) voltage and current.

Evaluation No FSAR or Tech Spec Changes or unreviewed safety questions (USQs) were associated with this activity.

PT/1/A/4450/03C change 29 Approved 9/19/96 Annulus Ventilation System Performance Test i Description The subject procedure was rewritten to provide new single train alignments for testing the annulus pressure boundary (referred to as vacuum decay testing) with the Unit in any mode. New single l train alignments were developed to individually test system ductwork components and verify annulus integrity during any mode of plant operation. The procedure previously was designed to test these components and verify annulus integrity using both VE System trains simultaneously after each refueling outage and was performed prior to Unit Startup Mode 4. In an effort to reduce outage duration's, the testing alignments were redesigned to allow testing during any mode of operation. Testing of the a nulus pressure boundary integrity will continue to be performed atter fueling outage. One new common train alignment was added to verify annulus integrity after refueling outages without any system damper modifications. Additional extensive testing of system individual pressure boundary components previously i performed prior to Unit Startup Mode 4 will continue to be l performed. Vacuum Decay testing after any corrective maintenance on the annulus pressure boundary will be performed during normal l operational modes using compensatory actions. These compensatory 'l actions ensure the annulus boundary is restored in the unlikely l Procedures Page 55 1

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event of a safety injection or test failure to ensure the radiological consequences remain acceptable. This procedure change was evaluated for its impact upon Unit operation and ability to mitigate the consequences of a design basis LOCA. No significant concerns were identified which would adversely impact station operation.

Evaluation No USQ exits for this evolution. There are not changes to the Tech Specs. or any changes to the FSAR.

i l PT/0/A/4450/04A Change 34 Approved 1/25/96 Aux Blds Ventilation System Performance Test Description 1 Restricted procedure change #34 was written to revise procedure I for testing of the Unit 1 VA total air flow rate. This revision is proposed to improve the accuracy of the air flow measurement.

The air flow measurement improvement is brought about by using a pitot traverse ideally located for air flow measurement. In addition testing using the pitot traverse will remove a potential inaccuracy within the air flow monitor (1VAFE5280) cause by a partial blockage of a component in the monitor. This procedure change will add new Enclosures 13.9, and 13.Q.1 Enclosure 13.2 as well the main portion of the test report will also be revised to allow for testing of the pitot traverse in place of testing with air flow monitor (VA). i Evaluation There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with this j procedure change. No Technical Specification or FSAR changes are I required. I l

PT/0/A/4450/008E Change 31 Approved 1/16/96 Control Room Area Chillers Performance Test I Description I Procedure change #31 to the Control Room Area Chillers Performance Test changes the method for calculating the RN flow to the YC Condensers. This procedure change takes credit for the 4 friction factor of the condenser tubes changes. Prior to this change the assumption was made that the friction factor was constant and this resulted in very conservative results in the winter (when the RN inlet temperature is very low). The new method for calculating the RN flow will result in more accurate calculations.

Procedures Page 56

i Evaluation This procedure change does not involve an Unreviewed Safety

' Question. No Tech. Specs or FSAR changes are required. !

1 PT/0/A/4450/008E Change 32 Approved 5/1/96 )

Control Room Area Chillers Performance Test J Description J The purpose of this test is to ensure the operational readiness j of the Control Room Area Chillers (YC System) by verifying the RN l System flow rate to the condensers is sufficient and the l condenser coils are sufficiently clean to adequately reject the '

)

evaporator cooling and compressor motor loads. This test also collects data to trend the fouling rate of the RN supply piping to the YC Chillers. The chiller that is being tested will be considered inoperable but will remain available during the !

performance of the test.

Evaluation No Unreviewed Safety Questions are created by this procedure. No Technical Specification changes or FSAR changes are required.

PT/0/A/4450/008E Change 35 Approved 9/12/96 Control Room Area Chillers Performance Test Description Restricted procedure change #35 will delete step 12.9.2.1 and move the caution statement immediately prior to step 12.9.2 to j immediately prior to step 12.9.3. This is being done to allow valve 1RN291 to be failed open while in the " Temperature Mode" of 1 operation. This procedure change is restricted to 9/12/96 - I 9/14/96 during which time Unit 1 will be mode 6 and the KC system on Unit 1 will be in parallel operations with both trains in

" Temperature Mode". Although failing open 1RN291 will cause a slight cooldown of the KC System, the system temperature will not decrease below 80^F. This is above the currently analyzed lower temperature of 40^F. Therefore, this cooldown will have no adverse effects on any equipment that is cooled by the KS System.

Evaluation This procedure change does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. No Tech. Specs. or FSAR changes are required.

PT/0/A/4450/008E Change 36 Approved 9/18/96 Control Room Area Chillers Performance Test Description-Restricted procedure change #36 will delete step 12.9.2.1 and move the caution statement immediately prior to step 12.9.2 to immediately prior to step 12.9.3. This is being done to allow Procedures Page 57

I valve 1RN351 to be failed open while in the " Temperature Mode" of operation. This procedure change is restricted to 9/18/96 -

- 9/19/96 during which time Unit 1 will be mode 5 and the KC system on Unit I will be in parallel operations with both trains in

" Temperature Mode". Although failing open 1RN351 will cause a

slight cooldown of the KC System, the system temperature will not decrease below 78^F.. This is above the currently analyzed lower temperature of 40^F. Therefore, this cooldown will have no adverse effects on any equipment that is cooled by the KS System.

Evaluation This procedure change does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. No Tech. Specs. or FSAR changes are required.

PT/1/A/4600/02A Change 115 Approved 10/31/96

- Mode 1 Periodic Surveillance Items Description The purpose of this safety evaluation is to justify changing the normal pre-accident operation temperature limits utilized in the subject mode periodic surveillance procedure. Calculation CNC-

> 1210.01-00-0054, Rev.2 determined new, normal pre-accident total loop uncertainties for the upper and lower containment temperature detectors. The total loop uncertainties are then used to calculate a reduced error depending upon the number of operating air handling units and available temperature (rtd) loops in service. The RTDs and their associated alarms Are utilized by the operators to verify and maintain the bulk average containment air temperature below Technical Specification 3.6.1.5 limits. These Containment temperature loops are non safety related, however, they are utilized to verify the containment temperature parameter associated with Catawba's Safety Analyses.

Evaluation No USQ was identified for these procedure changes. Also, there are changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications.

PT/2/B/4700/42 Change 0 Rev.0 Approved 10/31/96 Corrosion Product Sampling of Unit 2 Steam Generator A Blowdown Description Chemistry Procedure PT/2/B/4700/42 (Corrosion Product Sampling of Unit 2 Steam Generator A) was written in order to allow the sampling and measurement of iron, copper, and lead corrosion products in steam generator blowdown. The measurements will be taken to determine the effects of dimethylamine additions in the secondary cycle.

4 Procedures Page 58

t Evalua tion No USQs are involved and no changes to the FSAR or Technical

-Specifications are required.

PT/1/B/4700/82 Change O Rev.0 Approved 12/16/96 Local Sampling of Unit 1 Final Feedwater Description This modification provides sample connections to Main Feedwater (CF) System and Condensate (CM) System piping for the non-safety-related Electrochemical Potential (ECP) monitor which is to be installed by NSM CN-11344. The CF and CM System design or function is not affected. A safety review has been performed and there are no USQs involved with this modification.

Evaluation

-This modification involves no USQs. No changes to the technical specifications are required. FSAR changes are required to

. Figures 10-24 and 10-27 (flow diagrams CN-1590-1.6 and CN-1591-l1.0).

PT/1/A/4700/13 Change 1 Approved 6/19/96 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel LA Functional Test Description I This 10CFR50.59 evaluates PT/1/A/4700/13 which functionally tests the 1A Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (1ASPA). All devices on the panel (pushbuttons, switches, manual loaders, etc.) will be operated while control is transferred, or simulated to be transferred, to the panel. Process instrumentation will not be checked per this procedure since it is verified to work correctly under existing periodic surveillance procedures. All equipment which positions automatically upon transfer will be verified.

Evaluation Based upon the evaluation performed, this procedure does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. There are no Tech. Specs.

or FSAR changes required.

PT/1/A/4700/14 Change O Approved 7/11/96 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel 1B Functional Test Description This 10CFR50.59 evaluates PT/1/A/4700/14 which functionally tests the 18 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (1ASPB). All devices on the panel (pushbuttons, switches, manual loaders, etc.) will be operated while control is transferred, or simulated to be transferred, to.the panel. Process instrumentation will not be checked per this procedure since it is verified to work correctly Procedares Page 59 i l

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under existing periodic surveillance procedures. All equipment which positions automatically upon transfer will be verified.

Evaluation Based upon the evaluation performed, this procedure does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. There are no_ Tech. Specs.

or FSAR changes required.

PT/1/A/4700/14 Change 5 Appro-ed s/21/96 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel 1B Functional Test Description I This evaluation allows performance of enclosure 13.19 cf PT/1/A/4700/14, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Functional Test, to be performed in Mode 6. Pt/1/A/4700/14, enclosure 13.9 de-energizes u relays AD and AE in 1ASPB to verify that the CF Isolation valves will close as designed during a transfer to the ASP. The relays l AD and AE also affect the indications and controls on ICA46B, CA ;

Pump 1B Discharge to S/G 1C, IND1B, ND Pump 1A Suction from Loop '

B, and 1ND36B, ND Pump 1B Suction from Loop C. The evaluation i finds that refueling containment integrity and core cooling are I affected by allowing the enclosure to be performed during core alts or Mode 6.

Evaluation There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions. Also, no Tech. Specs. l or FSAR changes are required.

PT/1/A/4150/OlI Approved 9/9/96 Manual NC Leakage Calculation Description This PT is used to perform a manual calculation of the NC system leakage in the event that the OAC is not available. The procedure substitutes for the function of PT/1/A/4150/01D, NC System Leakage Calculation. That PT is the normal 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months NC leakage surveillance PT. To calculate leakage without the OAC, the normal valve checklist is performed. Then, initial data is ;

obtained by taking process instrumentation voltages and Control !

Room indicator readings. After at least 60 minutes delay, a !

trend of NC T-Avg and PZR level is monitored to selected a time when these parameters are as close as possible to the initial values. Then, the final data is obtained. The data is used to calculate the various leakage rates which are then compared to the Tech Spec limits.

Evaluation No USQs are created by the use of this procedure. No Tech Spec of FSAR changes are required.

Procedures Page 60

I PT/1/A/4700/13 Change #8 Approved 9/13/96 !

Auxiliary Shutdown Panel 1A' Test Description This change allows enclosure 13.19 to be performed in Mode 6 at any NC level as well as in the previously specified conditions of Mode 5 Mode 6 > 23 feet and No Mode as specified in the Required Unit status section in stop 7.19.1.

I Evaluation This evaluation allows performance of enclosure 13.19 of PT/1/A/4700/13, Auxiliary Shutdown Panel-Functional Test, to be performed in Mode 6 at any level. PT/1/A/4700/13, enclosure 13.9 de-energizes relay AD in 1ASPA to verify that the CF Isolation valves will close as designed during a transfer to the ASP. The l' evaluation finds that refueling containment integrity and core cooling are not affected by allowing the enclosure to be performed during core alts or Mode 6 at any NC level since the

. Refueling integrity and Containment closure PT's control whether the valves manipulated in this enclosure may be opened to allow ,

testing. <

PT/1/B/4973/007 Change O Approved 6/12/96 Rod Control System (IRE) Control Rod Drop Timing Test Description This procedure will not revise the facility as described in the !

SAR because no change is being made to the DRPI System function. i No other changes will be made other than pacing the DRPI System

.in half accuracy after Mode 3 boron concentration has been verified, removing only one data channel for duration of the test evolution, and holding the Feedwater Isolation Reset switches in RESET while operating the Reactor Trip Breakare. PT/1/B/4973/007 does not change, methods of operation, or alter a test or .

experiment as described in the SAR. This procedural test method I is not significant enough to require inclusion in the SAR because l the system's function or operation is not being changed as j described in the SAR. PT/1/B/4973/007 could not adversely affect !

spy system, structure, or component necessary to operate the I plan' in accordance with the SAR because no Mode 3 automatic l

. action or safety related functions are affected. l Evaluation As a result, the probability and/or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR will not increased, or will any accident or malfunction of equipment different than that evaluated in the SAR be created. The probability and/or consequences of a malfunction to equipment important to safety as evaluated in the SAR will not be increased by the performance of Procedures Page 61 I

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this procedure. This procedure will not create a revision to the margin of safety as stated in the basis to the Tech. Specs. nor will it created any Tech. Specs. changes. No Unreviewed Safety Question is created.

PT/2/B/9200/081 Change O Rev.0 Approved 6/30/96 Direct Sampling of Unit 2 Final Feedwater Descrijtion To provide directions for the 'nstallation and removal of piping and related equipment in ordec to supply a direct (near to source) sample of unit two final feedwater to in-analyzers. j Evaluation No USQs are involved and no changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications are required.

l PT/2/B/9200/081 Change O Rev.1 Approved 7/2/96 1 Direct Sampling of Unit 2 Final Feedwater Description !

To provide directions for the installation and removal of piping I and related equipment in order to supply a direct (near to source) sample of unit two final feedwater to in-analyzers.

Evaluation No USQs are involved and no changes to the FSAR or Technical Specifications are required. !

RP/0/A/5000/15 Change 1 Retype 3 Approved 3/13/96

, Core Damage Assessment Description Upon determination of fuel pin cladding failure, operations i should be requested to terminate operation of the Auxiliary Building Groundwater Drainage (WZ) System sump pumps. Data on all of the suggest isotopes may not be available due to the time required to degas a sample from PALS. In the absence of data of each of the suggested isotopes, other isotopes may be chosen at the discretion of the test coordinator.

Evaluation The existence of the requirement to terminate operation of the WZ System sump pumps in this procedure does not affect the margin of i safety, as fission product barriers will have already breached in the event that this action is taken. This procedure change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. There are no changes to the FSAR.

Procedures Page 62

TN/0/A/0251/MM/081 Original 0 Approved 3/21/96 Procedure for the Implementation of MW CE-60251, Work Unit 08 Description

.MM CE-60251, WUO8 removes from service level switch OWLLS5090 in order to seal existing vent holes below grating, or metal plate, and provide new vent holes to support field supplied 1/4" fittings 2" i 1" above grating, or metal plate, on the associated standpipe. This will allow test equipment hookup so that the level switch can be both calibrated and fuctionaled in place without disassembly from the standpipe.

Evaluation There is no Unreviewed Safety Questions. The margin of safety

. defined in the basis of Tech. Specs. or the FSAR is unaffected.

TN/0/A/0251/MM/071 Original 0 Approved 3/21/96 Procedure for the Implementation of MM CE-60251, work 07 Description-MM CE-60251, WUO7 removes from service level switch OWLLS5070 in order to seal existing vent holes below grating, or metal plate, and provide new vent holes to support field supplied 1/4" -

fittings 2" i 1" above grating, or metal plate, on the associated standpipe. This will allow test equipment hookup so that the level switch can be both calibrated and functional in place without disassembly from the standpipe.

Evaluation There is no Unreviewed Safety Questions. The margin of safety defined in the basis of Tech. Specs. or the FSAR is unaffected.

TN/1/A/1239/MM/01M Rev. Original Approved 12/18/96 IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE FOR MINOR MODIFICATION CNCE-61239 WORK UNIT 01 D,escription The following procedures implement minor modification CNCE-61239 (Unit 1):

.

TN/1/A/1239/MM/01M CNCE-61239 Install 1CA291

TN/1/A/1239/MM/02M CNCE-61239 Install 1CA292 and 1CA293 Each of these Minor Modifications install two check valves in the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) System. The new valves, ICA291 and ICA292, provide train separation between the motor-driven CA pumps when the Nuclear Service Water (RN) System is supplying the CA pumps yet still allows flow to the turbine-driven CA pump from Procedures Page 63 l

'either train. Also, a vent valve, ICA293 will be added to aid in the system piping refill and post-modification testing.- In order to install 1CA292 and ICA293, the turbine-driven pump will be made inoperable for all events. Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Action a) will apply. Valves 1CA7A, ICA19, ICA85B, ICA116A, and 1CA174 will be tagged closed to allow draining of the piping. In this configuration, the CA System with motor-driven CA pumps will .

be able to fulfill its design basis function. Where applicable, l design basis analyses assume the worst case loss of a CA pump, whether it be the turbine-driven or a motor-driven pump. To ,

install ICA291, the A train motor-driven pump will be made inoperable for all event. Again, Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Action a) will apply. Valves 1RN250A, ICA15A, and 1CA116A will be tagged closed to allow draining of the piping. The B train .

motor-driven pump and the turbine-driven pump are available to ,

fulfill CA's required design basis response. Refill of all the

. drained piping is performed by opening 1CA15A. This refill does not affect the operability of any other pump. At no time during any of these activities will any two CA pumps be rendered inoperable.

Evaluation l These activities doe not involve an unreviewed safety question. ;

No FSAR documents require revision. No Technical Specification j changes are required.

TN/1/A/1239/MM/02M Rev. Original Approved 12/18/96 IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURE FOR MINOR MODIFICATION CNCE-61239 WORK UNIT 02 Description l The following procedures implement minor modification CNCE-61239 (Unit 1):

1 TN/1/A/1239/MM/01M CNCE-61239 Install 1CA291 i TN/1/A/1239/MM/02M CNCE-61239 Install 1CA292 and 1CA293 l Each of these Minor Modifications install two check valves in the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) System. The new valves, 1CA291 and ;

4 1CA292, provide train separation between the motor-driven CA pumps when the Nuclear Service Water (RN) System is supplying the CA pumps yet still allows flow to the turbine-driven CA pump from either train. Also, a vent valve, ICA293 will be added to aid in the system piping refill and post-modification testing. In order ;

to install 1CA292 and ICA293, the turbine-driven pump will be made inoperable for all events. Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Action a) will apply. Valves 1CA7A, ICA19, ICA85B, ICA116A, and 1CA174 will be tagged closed to allow draining of the piping. In this configuration, the CA System with motor-driven CA pumps will Procedures Page 64

be able to fulfill its design basis function. Where applicable, design basis analyses assume the worst case loss of a CA pump, whether it be the turbine-driven or a motor-driven pump. To install 1CA291, the A train motor-driven pump wil] be made inoperable for all event. Again, Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Action a) will apply. ' Valves 1RN250A, ICA15A, and 1CA116A will be tagged closed to allow draining of the piping. The B train motor-driven pump and the turbine-driven pump are available to fulfill CA's required design basis response. Refill of all the drained piping is performed by opening ICA15A. This refill does not affect the operability of any other pump. At no time during any of these activities will any two CA pumps be rendered inoperable.

Evaluation These activities doe not involve an unreviewed safety question.

No FSAR documents require revision. No Technical Specification changes are required.

TN/1/A/9310/00/M Rev. Original 0 Approved 7/13/96 Reactor Coolant Level Reduction for NM C-19310 Description .

This procedure provides the ability to remove reactor coolant I from the Hot Leg of NC system while the Unit is in a drained No Mode condition. This draining will facilitate the installation of FME control debris dams and pipe end decontamination. Two method for this draining are addressed by the procedure. The first method call for the attachment of Tygon tubing and a small capacity vacuum pump to the RVLIS connecting and draining the NC system until water has been removed from the NC Hot Leg. The second method involves the insertion of Flex Tubing into the NC System piping following the removal of the first steam generator.

(Ref 3)

Evaluation No unreviewed safety question is associated with revision 0 to procedure TN/1/A/9310/00/M. No change to the Technical Specifications is required. No changes to the FSAR will be required.

TN/5/A/0450/00/01M original 0 Approved 6/3/96 Implementation Procedure for NM C-50450, REV.0 Work Unit 01 Description NM C-50450 replaces KC HX 1A's existing admiralty brass tubes, which have corrosion problems form exposure to the RN System, with stainless steel. In addition, a protective epoxy coating Procedures Page 65

i will be applied to the HX's tubesheets and channel sections.to l prevent further corrosion from the RN System. Temporary station' ,

procedure TN/5/0450/00/01M has been written to coordinate the l activities required to perform this work. Implementation of this !

procedure will occur during 1EOC09 with KC HX 1A out of service and be completed with the HX fully restored prior to returning the HX to service. l Evaluation ,

Implementation of this procedure does not involve an unreviewed safety question or safety concern. No technical specification changes or changes to the FSAR are required, TT/0/A/9100/67 Change O Approved 6/20/96 :

Control Room Pressure Data With All VA Exhaust Operating Description.

Per chapter 6 of the FSAR, one of the design bases of the habitability system for the control room is the capability to i

detect and limit the introduction of airborne radioactive contamination into the control room such that exposure to [

personnel will not exceed the limits specified in DCG 19. This is accomplished in part by maintaining the control room at a i positive pressure with respect to all adjacent areas. Since the i control room at CNS is located within the Auxiliary Building, the VA System can adversely affect the ability of the VC System to pressurize the control room. When the VA System goes into an abnormal alignment (for example a Supply Unit trips), Operations

. personnel are required by the VC/VA Compensatory Action to check i 4

control room pressure. If the pressure is not acceptable then they are instructed to secure VA exhaust fans until the pressure is greater than the Technical Specification minimum.

Evaluation There are no Unreviewed Safety Questions for TT/0/A/9100/67. No FSAR or Technical Specification changes are required.

TT/0/A/9200/91 Change O Approved 7/31/96 Verification of Flow Path Established by CE-60236 Description The purpose of TT/0/A/9200/91 is to verify the flow path established'by Minor. Mod CE-60236. The modification was implemented to provide a flow path from the Auxiliary Building to Unit 1' containment as specified in Section 11.2.2.7.4 of the FSAR. To accomplish the test, two flow paths will be developed.

First, RF system water will be added to Floor Drain Sump C, to obtain sump pump actuation. Water will be pumped from the sump, through the piping installed per CE-602366 to the Unit i VUCDT.

Procedures Page 66

A Also, RF water will be added to Floor Drain Sump D and pumped to the ND and NS Rooms Sump. 1WL869B, an inside containment isolation valve, will be closed for a short period during the performance of the test. Closing 1WL869B renders the Unit i VUCDT inoperable with respect to Reactor Coolant System leakage detection per Tech Spec 3/4.4.6 in Modes 1 through 4.

Evaluation TT/0/A/9200/91 has no Unreviewed Safety Questions. No Spec or FSAR changes are required.

TT/1/A/9200/17 Change O Approved 9/12/96 1 Values 1NV1A and 1NV2A Interlock Test l Description This procedure was developed to provide guidance for Post modification testing. Values 1NV-1A and 1NV-2A are cross-interlocked with letdown orifice values 1NV-10A, 1NV-11A, and INV-13A, which must all be closed in order to open either 1NV-1A ;

or 1NV-2A. Once opened, valves 1NV-1A and 1NV-2A can not be closed if any of the letdown orifice isolation valves are open, unless they automatically close upon receipt of a low Pressurizer lever signal. Also values 1NV-10A, 1NV-11A and 1NV-13A, cannot be opened unless values 1NV-1A and 1NV-2A are both opened.

Evaluation There are no unreviewed safety questions since this is performed with letdown isolated from the system. No FSAR or Tech Spec changes are required.

TT/1/A/9200/86 Initial 0 Approved 9/29/96 Unit Load Transient Test for NM C-19815 Description Procedure for Unit Operations. The OAC's Transient Monitor will be frozen to obtain trend data of required plant parameters during the load swing. Following plant re-stabilization the Transient Monitor will be restarted and the plant allowed to resume a power increase in accordance to fuel maneuvering limits to the original level before the transient.

Evaluation This transient test to verify proper operation of the modifications performed various control systems for NM C-19815, RSG Instrumentation and Control, has been evaluated to not have an Unreviewed Safety Question associated with it. Additionally, ,

no Technical Specification or FSAR changes. l Procedures Page 67 l

TT/1/A/9200/88 Original 0 Approved 4/24/96 KC System One Pump Flow Verification for C-11372 Description In order to obtain flow data to evaluate whether or not one KC pump can supply the necessary flows to all the normal operational loads, a test is being performed per TT/1/A/9200/88. This TT will have the KC System in its' normal operational alignment (trains cross connected, one train supplying all essential and non essential headers, and both the A and B train ND Hx's isolated). Only one KC pump will be running during the test while flow rates through all affected components are verified and adjusted as necessary. Should valve adjustments be necessary, sufficient precautions are addressed in the procedure to preclude degrading any system or component. The normal operation of the KC system, or any system which interfaces with KC, will not be affected by the performance of this test.

Evaluation There are Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with this test procedure. Also, no FSAR or Technical Specification changes will be required.

TT/2/A/9200/88 Original 0 Approved 4/24/96 KC System One Pump Flow Verification for C-21273 Description In order to obtain flow data to evaluate whether or not one KC pump can supply the necessary flows to all the normal operational loads, a test is being performed per TT/2/A/9200/88.

This TT will have the KC System in its' normal operational alignment (trains cross connected, one train supplying all essential and non essential headers, and both the A and B train ND Hx's isolated). Only one KC pump will be running during the test while flow rates through all affected components are verified and adjusted as necessary. Should valve adjustments be necessary, sufficient precautions are addressed in the procedure to preclude degrading any system or component. The normal operation of the KC system, or any system which interfaces with KC, will not be affected by the performance of this test.

Evaluation There are Unreviewed Safety Questions associated with this test procedure. Also, no FSAR or Technical Specification changes will be required.

Procedures Page 68

i TT/2/9200/91 Initial 0 Approved 11/14/96 I Unit Load Transient Test for NM C-21367 Description This activity will be performed in Mode 1, at 75% RTP following completion of flux mapping. (The procedure allows power lever to be between 40% and 80%, but the 75% RAP is the most ideal point j to perform this test). The procedure initially begins with the r unit in a stable condition at the specified power level. Then a I step lead decrease of 10% is performed via the Turbine generator l controller. Operations will initiate a runback of 10% (120 Mv) ,

by placing the turbine control in manual. The runback will be i generated by lowering the control valves through the FAST / LOWER response on the Operator Panel to the Target set by the Test Coordinator. Operations will recover from the 10% runback according to OP/2/A/6100/03, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operations. The OAC's Transient Monitor will be frozen to obtain :

trend data of required plant parameters during the load swing.

Following plant re-stabilization the Transient Monitor will be restarted and the plant allowed to resume a power increase in accordance to fuel maneuvering limits to the original level before the transient. ;

Evaluation l Based upon this evaluation, no Unreviewed Safety Question exit l for this procedure. Since plant configuration will be maintained in normal alignment per Tech Specs, the margin of safety as defined in Tech Specs or FSAR will not be required.

f TT/2/A/9200/101 Rev. O Approved 12/30/96 Performance Verification Test for 2B Reactor Makeup Water Pump Installed per CNCE-8440 Description The purpose of TT/2/A/9200/101 is to verify the performance of the 2B Reactor Makeup Water (RMW) pump that was installed per Minor mod CNCE-8440. The test is comprised of four sections.

Each section either establishes or records for evaluation, l predetermined performance criteria for the 2B pump or both the 2A l and 2B pump. Most of the system alignments for the TT are '

performed via existing OP enclosures. Temporary calibrated test gages are installed at the test connections at the 2A and 2B pump discharge pressure gages to facilitate accurate readings.

Evaluation TT/2/A/9200/101 has no unreviewed safety questions. No FSAR or Tech Spec changes are required. 1 Procedures Page 69 l

j

TT/1/B/9300/012 Rev. O Approved 7/24/96 Operator AID Computer Post MOD Testing, OAC and RP-86A Cosmaunications Toat Description.

This procedure is a test procedure designed to provide a portion of the post modification testing for C-11352/00. The procedure provides instructions for verification of correct communication between the radiation monitor output modules, the Operator Aid Computer (OAC) Interface and the OAC. It covers all the

-radiation monitors that are being modified by C-11352. The procedure is designed to be run without making any of the radiation monitors inoperable, and the work is being controlled by TN/1/B/1352/03E. The procedure will verify that the OAC is displaying the true status of all radiation monitors affected by the modification. It will use monitors that are-not required by Technical Specifications to verify receiving reactor power from the OAC. It will use monitors that are not required by Technical Specifications to verify that the Trip 2 (high radiation) setpoint cannot be changed without the proper security, and that with the-proper security both the Trip 1 (alert) and Trip 2 setpoints can be changed, and that checksource and counter tests can be initiated from the OAC.

Evaluation Because neither the radiation monitors nor the OAC are accident initiators, an Unreviewed Safety Question is not present. Also, there will be no changes to the FSAR or technical specification.

TT/1/A/9300/021 Change O Approved 9/12/96 Containment Purge (VP) System Operation for Steam Generator Replacement Description The steam generators were replaced during the Unit 1 End of Cycle 9 Refueling Outage (U1EOC9 RFO). Generation of decomposition gases from the new steam generator insulation as well as various coatings and fluids associated with maintenance activities are expected to occur during the heatup. Because personnel access to the containment is necessary to enable numerous piping, pipe support, and normal plant startup inspections, operation of the VP System during Modes 3 and 4 is necessary to supply fresh air to the containment and exhaust any decomposition gases generated during the plant heatup. The operation of the VP System during this evolution will enhance personnel habitability for these inspections.

Procedures Page 70

Evaluation The radiological consequences associated with the operation of

-the Vp System in modes 3 and.4 were evaluated in References 11 through 13 and deemed acceptable in Reference 10. The ability of the Vp System Containment isolation valves to close under conditions associated with a design basis LOCA was evaluated in References 10 and 11 and is not evaluated here. The concerns includa maintaining (1) containment pressure within Technical Specification 3.6.5.3, (2) the ice condenser doors closed in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.5.3, (3) degradation of the ability to detect a small break LOCA (SBLOCA), and (4) other considerations. No Unreviewed Safety Question was identified for this evolution. There were no changes to FSAR.

TSM/960ll40201 Approved 2/7/96 Description The VQ System is utilized to maintain containment pressure ,

between the limits specified in the Catawba Technical ;

Specifications. Normally valve 2VQ10 automatically closes when l i

containment air pressure decreases to O psig or the valve receives a high radiation signal from the unit vent radiation monitors 2 EMF-35, 36, or 37. Because power is not currently !

available to the solenoid 2VQSV0100, the automatic closing functions for 2VQ10 will not be available. Radiation Protection l will monitor containment radioactivity and Operations will monitor containment pressure when the containment isolation valves are open in accordance with references 1 and 6. The VQ :

System containment isolation valves are safety related and close of a containment ventilation isolation signal.

Evaluation No USQ exists for this TSM. There are no changes required into FSAR due to this TSM. j TSM/96016097 Approved 5/29/96 Description During UlEOC9 RFO corrective maintenance was performed on various VP System containment isolation valves (civs). The Maintenance activities involved replacing the T-Ring Seals in these butterfly valves. In order to operate the VP System while these seals were replaced, blank flanges were installed in places where the HVAC duct was removed for access to the interior of the valves. Only one penetration was worked at once. The blank flange was j installed for the subject penetration being worked. The blank l flange was removed and the HVAC duct reinstalled once the work associated with the penetration was complete. The blank flanges were not installed during Mode 6 activities.

Procedures Page 71 l j

7 . _ ._.

8 Evaluation No USQ exists for this TSM. There are no changes required in the '

FSAR due to this TSM.

TSM/96023671 Approved 6/26/96 Description A temporary modification to the Containment Purge Ventilation System humidistat will be made to bypass the Train B Relative Humidity system trip signal. Previous changes to the station Technical Specification has eliminated the need for the humidistats, however, the humidistats have not been removed from the system at the present time.

Evaluation A temporary modification does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. No changes to the FSAR or the technical specifications are required.

TSM/96025037-01 Approved 4/30/96 Description TSM.96025037-01 installs a temporary sump pump and hoses in the Unit 1 CA Pump Room to allow implementation of Minor Modification j CE-60237. This allows Floor Drain Sump D to be available by providing an alternate means for removing into the sump.

Evaluation This Temporary Modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question or safety concern. No Technical Specification or FSAR changes are required.

TSM/96036486 Approved 5/1/96 Description j This TSM will restore the automatic calculation function of j unidentified NC system leakage to the OAC based upon Containment 1 Floor and Equipment Sump level. The OAC and 1WLP5740 will be fed I via level transmitter 1WLLT5740. This TSM is necessary due to OAC indication being lost as a result of 1WLLT6870 failing.

Evaluation No USQs are created by this TSM. No Tech. Spec or FSAR changes are required.

TSM/96043561 Approved 6/17/96 Description Temporary Station Modification (TSM) 96043561, 96046236, ;

96046237, and 96046238 will temporarily remove existing flanges I and crifice plates in BB system piping in Turbine Building.

Procedures Page 72 i

I

_~ ~ . - - -. -. -

After flanges and orifice plates are removed, a temporary flange will be installed in BB piping. The temporary flange ~will enable >

the Steam Generator Replacement Project to more efficiently drain the existing steam generators via the BB system piping. Hoses will be installed on the temporary flange and then connected to a pump which will drain the steam generators into Turbine Building Sump. After existing steam generators are drained and new steam generators are installed, operations will utilize this temporary modification to flush CA and CF piping. After draining of CA and CF piping, the existing flanges and orifice plates will be installed back in BB piping. A mechanical functional will be performed to ensure no leaks at system temperature and pressure.

Evaluation e TSM will be implemented during'No-Mode, Mode 5 and Mode 6 only.

This TSM does change the facility as described in the SAR.

However, no safety issues, USQ's, changes to Technical Specifications, FSAR or SAR documents are required due to -

implementation of this temporary station modification. ;

TSM/96046236 Approved 6/17/96 ,

Description Temporary Station Modification (TSM) 96043561, 96046236, 96046237, and 96046238 will temporarily remove' existing flanges and orifice plates in BB system piping in Turbine Building.

After flanges and orifice plates are removed, a temporary flange will be installed in BB piping. The temporary flange will enable the Steam Generator Replacement Project to more efficie7tly drain the existing steam generators via the BB system piping. Hoses !

will be installed on the temporary flange and then connected to a pump which will drain the steam generators into Turbine Building Sump. After existing steam generators are drained and new steam i generators are installed, operations will utilize this temporary modification to flush CA and CF piping. After draining of CA and CF piping, the existing flanges and orifice plates will be installed back in BB piping. A mechanical functional will be performed to ensure no leaks at system temperature and pressure.

Evaluation TSM will be implemented during No-Mode, Mode 5 and Mode 6 only. j This TSM does change the facility as described in the SAR. 1 However, no safety issues, USQ's, changes to Technical Specifications, FSAR or SAR documents are required due to implementation of this temporary station modification. j I

1 Procedures Page 73

TSM/96046237 Approved 6/17/96 i Description Temporary Station Modification (TSM) 96043561, 96046236, 96046237, and 96046238 will temporarily remove existing flanges and orifice plates in BB system piping in Turbine Building.

After flanges and orifice plates are removed, a temporary flange 7 will be installed in BB piping. The temporary flange will enable the Steam Generator Replacement Project to more efficiently drain ,

the existing steam generators via the BB system piping. Hoses l will be installed on the temporary flange and then connected to a >

pump which will-drain the steam generators into Turbine Building Sump. After existing steam generators are drained and new steam generators are installed, operations will utilize this temporary modification to flush CA and CF piping. After draining of CA and l CF piping, the existing flanges and orifice plates will be j installed back in BB piping. A mechanical functional wil] be performed to ensure no leaks at system temperature and pressure.

Evaluation TSM will be implemented during No-Mode, Mode 5 and Mode 6 only.

This TSM does change the facility as described in the SAR.

However, no safety issues, USQ's, changes to Technical Specifications, FSAR or SAR documents are required due to ;

implementation of this temporary station modification.

TSM/96046238 Approved 6/17/96 Description Temporary Station Modification (TSM) 96043561, 96046236, 96046237, and 96046238 will temporarily remove existing flanges ,

and orifice plates in BB system piping in Turbine Building. l

' After flanges and orifice plates are removed, a temporary flange will be installed in BB piping. The temporary flange will enable the Steam Generator Replacement Project to more efficiently drain the existing steam generators via the BB system piping. Hoses will be installed on the temporary flange and then connect'ed to a pump which will drain the steam generators into Turbine Building Sump. After existing steam generators are drained and new steam s generators are installed, operations will utilize this temporary modification to flush CA and CF piping. After draining of CA and ;

CF piping, the existing flanges and orifice plates will be !

installed back in BB piping. A mechanical functional will be l performed to ensure no leaks at system temperature and pressure. )

Evaluation TSM will be implemented during No-Mode, Mode 5 and Mode 6 only.

This-TSM does change the facility as described in the SAR.

However, no safety issues, USQ's, changes to Technical Procedures Page 74 i 5

m -

l l

Specifications, FSAR or SAR documents are required due to !

implementation of this temporary station modification.

TEN /96050075 Approved 9/24/96 Description I The plant computer input from the Auxiliary Building Supply Units l will be wired to two Control Room annunciators to alert the j Control Room of a fan trip during the plant computer replacement !

modification. This change is necessary to ensure Control Room pressure is maintained per Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 limits. An evaluation has been performed and no Unreviewed ;

Safety Questions will result from the temporary modification. l Evaluation This temporary modification does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. No changes to the FSAR or the technical specifications are required.

TsM/96089186-01 Description This modification will install an alternate source of instrument air (VI) to the manifold supplying instruments 2CMSS6261, 2CMSS6540, 2CMSS6470, 2CMSS6400, 2CMSS6330, 2CMSS6260 (located in cabinet 2CMPDCP). Currently, the instrument air supply for the above instruments taps off of the VI supply header at valve 2VIK043. From here, it,is routed in instrument tubing to an area just above cabinet 2CMPDCP, at which point a tee splits it into two separate supplies. One supply is routed inside cabinet 2CMPDCP to supply the above instruments while the other is routed over to an instrument panel at column 2M-17. The instrument panel contains only instrument 2 CMP 6820. The tubing route from the cabinet to the instrument panel-containing 2 CMP 6820 needs to be deleted in order to implement NSM CN-21374/00; however, with no isolation valves beyond the tee, the entire header must be isolated for the deletion process. This requires an alternate source of instrument air for 2CMSS6261, 2CMSS6540, 2CMSS6470, 2CMSS6400, 2CMSS6330, 2CMSS6260 while the original header is isolated. Refer to Sketch 1 of Attachment 5 for a diagram illustrating the configuration of the current source of instrument air. The alternate source of instrument air will tap off of the VI header at valve 2VIK040, downstream of the attached filter regulator. Tygon tubing will be used to route the air source over to and inside of cabinet 2CMPDCP. Inside this cabinet, the tubing will connect to a second filter regulator set for 20 psig, which will itself be connected to a spare valve on the instrument air manifold. Reference Attachment 5, Sketch 1 for an illustration of the instrument air manifold and the method of connecting the secondary air supply to this manifold. All Procedures Page 75

fittings and components are I&C Classification 7 except the Tygon tubing. However, the tubing has a pressure rating of 350 psig at room temperature and since the maximum VI system pressure is 110 psig, the tubing will be sufficient for this particular application. The installation of the alternate air supply will also isolate the existing air supply at the isolation valve j directly upstream of the manifold (valve #1 and #2 on Sketch 1 of i ). A separate work order will perform the desired '

work on the original instrument air header. Removal of this TSM will isolate and remove the alternate air supply and restore the original instrument air supply to cabinet 2CMPDCP.

Evaluation Installing an alternate source of instrument air for controllers 2CMSS6261, 2CMSS6540, 2CMSS6470, 2CMSS6400, 2CMSS6330, 2CMSS6260 does not require a USQ Evaluation as defined by 10CFR50.59.

There are no FSAR revisions or Tech Specs changes required.

I t

J Procedures Page 76

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