ML20086G458

Intervenor Exhibit I-MOSBA-101,consisting of Response to Hobby/Mosbaugh 2.206 Petition,Section III.3

ML20086G458
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/17/1995
From:	AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
References
2.206, OLA-3-I-MOSB101, NUDOCS 9507140376
Download: ML20086G458 (12)

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00CKETED RESPONSE TO BOBBY /MOSBAUGH E 2.206 PETITIONgy9gCTION III.3 I. Petitioners' Allecations. 95 JN -6 P4 :06 The petitioners assert that GPC, through the SONOPCO Project, submitted known, f alse stateme 0EEltb 0fhES80cTAilhtended to

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mislead the NRC about the reliability of)00tGE TNytleEmii46fgency diesel generators. As basis, the petitionersBallede that on April 10, 1990 Mr. M

" diesel air quality"psbaugh informed statements the made inGeneral Managerofthat a Confirmation the Action response letter were false and that on April 19, 1990 Georgia Power submitted a Licensee Event Report ("LER") after Mr. Mosbaugh advised the Senior Vice President, a corporate officer located in Birmingham, that the information contained in the LER was incorrect. The petitioners further allege that the Company " intentionally delayed" revising the LER until after a June 8, 1990 presentation to the Commissioner, drafted multiple transmittal letters for the revised LER which contained " false explanations" in an attempt to " cover up" errors in the original LER, and retaliated against Mr. Mosbaugh for identifying the i alleged false information submitted to the NRC.

II. GPC ResDonse to Petitioners' Allecations.

A. Diesel Generator Pneumatic System Air Quality.

The petitioners' allegation that the Confirmation of Action response letter, dated April 9, 1990 (the "COAR"), was false and Os the implication that Mr. Mosbaugh informed the General Manager of the inaccurate statements in the letter prior to its transmittal to thy NRC are without merit. First, the COAR was dated April 9, 1990. Mr. Mosbaugh's memorand.um to the Vogtle Gener%1 Manager which addresses " air quality" (Exhibit 1) is dated April 10, I

Diesel air quality refers to the dryness of the air in the j pneumatic control system of the diesel engines. l 2

The COAR states, in part, the following:

In addition, the following actions have been or are being implemented to ensure a high state of diesel reliability . . . . GPC has reviewed air quality of the D/G air system including dew point control and has concluded that air quality is satisfactory. Initial reports of higher than expected dew points were later attributed to faulty instrumentation. This was confirmed by internal inspection of one air receiver on April 6, 1990, the periodic replacement of the control air filters last done in March, 1990 which showed no indication of corrosion {,] and daily air receiver blowdowns with no significant water discharge.

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NUCLEAR REGULATCF:Y COMMISSION p.y29-cLA-5 Docket No. W- 42W A-1 OMic:a: Exh.fa 1 d . Ic(

In the matter of 6 04 0+ al Staft ENTIFIED Apphcant RECElVED -

laterrenor V REJECTED ConfD OM'r Contractor DATE O 9 -I 7- 9 I Other Witness 6 e nu ( A4d Reporter C . // .W <--

1990. Thus, Mr. Mosbaugh's alleged notification to the General Manager that the " diesel air quality statements made in the letter were false" would have occurred after the letter was transmitted to'the NRC. Second, the memorandum of Mr. Mosbaugh e (Exhibit 1) does not mention the COAR nor state that the air quality at that time was not satisfactory. Rather, the memorandum identifies three types of historic problems.

Third, the basis of Mr. Mosbaugh's memo is believed to be a document, consistir.g of five pages (Exhibit 2), also dated April 10, 1990. This memorandum also discusses historic maintenance of the diesel air dryers and suggests that dew point measurement practices needed to be investigated to ensure reliable results. The memorandum does not, however, conclude that the then current air quality was deficient.

Fourth, the COAR acknowledges initial concern associated with air quality (i.e., " initial reports of higher than expected >

dew points") and deficient measurement of dew point (i.e.,

" attributed to faulty instrumentation"). Mr. Mosbaugh, it appears, was focused on historic air quality issues based on maintenance history, and was unaware of GPC efforts relative to better instrumentation and measurement. These efforts included obtaining instrumentation from another pl97t.

Fifth, the COAR lists some of the activities which form the basis for the conclusion that the air quality was satisfactory i (April 6, 1990 internal inspection, replacement of control air filters and daily air receiver blowdowns). In addition,

Mr. Mosbaugh apparently was unaware of other technical

! considerations, including the views of knowledgeable engineers j that the air quality of the pneumatic system was satisfactory.

Finally, the NRC Staff, thought to include Mr. Pete Taylor, reviewed the issue of the possible contribution of moisture in l the diesel engine's pneumatic control system to the March 20,

, 1990 event. The NRC Staff, then, is more aware of the 1

verification of adequate diesel engine air quality based on I

personal, review than Mr. Mosbaugh, who bases his conclusion on dated information.

i B. Diesel Generator Start Information.

l L Petitioners' allegation that the April 9, 1000 COAR r.od a 4

Licensee Event Report ("LER") (90-006) dated April if, 3390

contained known false statements intended to mislead tne NRC about the reliability of the VEGP diesel generators is without

. merit.

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! The COAR states, in part, that the "A" Unit 1 diesel generator had been started 18 times, and the "B" diesel generator had been started 19 times and that no failures or problems had

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! occurred during any of these starts. The LER refers to both j

! diesel generators as "having been started at least 18 times each .

i and no failures or problems have occurred during any of these j l starts." As can be confirmed in statements in the custody of the  ;

j NRC's Operational Safety Inspection team which reviewed this i matter in August, 1990, unit control logs and shift supervisor i j logs were the source of the data used in developing the numbers l j "18" and "19" found in the COAR and the original LER. The  !

i numbers originally were included in a transparency developed by Vogtle plant personnel; this transparency was included in i

handouts at an April 9, 1990 meeting with the NRC in Atlanta,  !

) Georgia. The COAR, written the same day as the meeting with NRC ,

representatives in Atlanta, adopted the "18" and "19" numbers. l

! The LER, written later, also was predicated upon the "18" and i

"19" start count. Statements in the custody of the Operational i Safety Inspection team confirm that both documents basically used .

i the information developed for the April 9 transparency.

4 In addition, successive draft revisions of the LER have been

} reviewed by GPC. A version of the LER prepared by the site, '

dated April 17, 1990, identified "several starts" rather than  !

specifying a. number of starts (Exhibit 3, p. 6 of draft LER). An  !

attendee at the Plant Review Board stated that a specific number j

should be used and the next draft version of the LER stated that  ;

! the number was "more than 20 times" (Exhibit 4, p. 6). The "more I 4 than 20 times" phraseology was provided to corporate i representatives in Birminghar. (Exhibit 5). These O

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{ represeruatives,. with knowledge of the 18 and 19 numbers used in the transparency on April 9, questioned the "more than 20 times  !

each" language provided by the site. More specifically, Mr. Hairston, the Senior Vice President, requested the corporate i LER coordinator to " verify >20 starts." Retained copies of the  ;

LER drafts confirm other efforts by corporate representstives to i verify other information and assure the accuracy of the LER i

(Exhibit 6).  !

4 Additional diesel generator starts had occurred subsequent

, to April 9, 1990 (the date of the GPC meeting in Atlanta with NRC representatives), and the final April 19th LER werding stated  !

that egchGPC diesel engine had been started "at least 18 times was aware that NRC inspectors had followed the l

l each.' l Company's efforts to troubleshoot and test the operability of the

- diesel generators and believed that the NRC had all relevant information on the diesel generators' operability and I reliability. Nevertheless, either before or concurrent with the l 1

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The wording was reviewed by corporate and site

, representatives in a telephone conference call late on April 19, l 1990. Although Mr. Hairston was not a participant in that call, l he had every reason to believe the final draft LER presented to j him after the call was accurate and complete.

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-x F1 transmittal of the LER to the NRC, the Senior Vice President instructed'Mr. C. Ken McCoy, the Vice President for Vogtle, to call the NRC's Mr. Ken Brockman and to discuss the fact that the <

number of starts' indicated in the LER differed from.the number on the April 9 transparency. A phone call from Mr. McCoy was placed to Mr. Brockman on April 19, in the afternoon.

Mr. Mosbaugh and employees who reported to him controlled  !

the development of the original LER. To the extent Mr. Mosbaugh actually had concerns about the substance of this document, he '

had direct and immediate ability to change the information contained in it. His own actions relative to the LER establish  !

this fact. Indeed, as reflected in the PRB comment review sheet

! for its meeting No. 90-59, held on April 18, 1990 (Exhibit 4),

l Mr. Mosbaugh directed three changes to the draft LER, two of I which he directed as " mandatory" word changes. He, therefore, r L had an opportunity to require any other correction. Similarly, l' 1 on April 19, 1990 in a telephone conversation between the site I representatives and Corporate Office representatives,.he had the i opportunity to suggest corrective language but, apparently,

failed to do so.- Not until April 30, 1990 does it appear that l- Mr. Mosbaugh articulated for the benefit of his management that

the diesel engine start count data contained in that LER was

] inaccurate. At that time, he was assigned, in writing, to

l. correct the NRC documentation (Exhibit 7). He, therefore, was

tasked with correcting the inaccuracy which his Technical Support j group had created by supplying "more than 20 times" wording to j the Corp? ate Office.

! In Sy ' ;amber or October, 1990, in the presence of Mr. Brian '

i Bonser, an NRC Resident Inspector, Mr. John Aufdenkampe (the i former Technical Support Manager under Mr. Mosbaugh responsible

{ for LER development in April, 1990), stated his opinion that the

LER used the numbers in the transparencies developed for the

April 9, 1990 meeting with the NRC in Atlanta and that his group j had merely added additional starts from and after April 9 to e reach the conclusion that "more than 20" successful starts had j occurred during the relevant time frame.

l In addition to directing changes in documents as required, on April 30, 1990 the General Manager also verbally notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the erroneous data, as he testified to

the Operational Safety Inspection team. Further, Mr. Hairston j called Mr. Stewart Ebneter, the NRC Regional Administrator, on l

May 14 and May 24, 1990. He believes that in the longer call on l May 24 he informed Mr. Ebneter that the count of successful

!' starts in the LER vas in error. He further recalls that ha

! conveyad the then-current " correct" numbers at that time to Mr.

Ebneter and informed him that revisions to the LER would be forthcoming. Mr. McCoy recalls calling the NRC's Mr. Ken i- Brockman about the same time and informing him of the error; i telephone billing reports reflect several telephone calls from LO o

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Mr. McCoy to Mr. Brockman on May 24. The petitioners' allegation

'N that an intentional delay in revising the LER until after a June 8, 1990 NRC meeting is founded, then, on the false premise that the revised LER was the mechanism by which the NRC first learned of the inaccuracy of the LER. Such was not the case.

On or about May 9, 1990, Mr. Mosbaugh provided a revised draft of the LER language which addressed diesel generator starts. The revised language proposed by Mr. Mosbaugh (Exhibit

8) conveys the same substantive message as the language in the April 9th COAR and the original April 19th LER. All three state that each engine had been started successfully, and none indicated failures or problems indicative of an unreliable diesel engine. Mr. Mosbaugh's proposed revision, in pertinent part, states " including the under-voltage test each engine has been successfully started eleven times with no start failures." If, as he now alleges, Mr. Mosbaugh truly had concerns related to the original LER, his inaction on April 18 (at the PRB), in the April 19 telephone conference, and his April 30 assignment from his General Manager to provide revised LER language provided him with numerous opportunities to direct revision or to revise the alleged " false statements." This he failed to do.

The allegation that GPC officers would attempt to mislead the NRC with incorrect information is, in a word, absurd. As Appendix B to NUREG-1410 indicates, from March 26, 1990 through April 17, 1990 numerous interviews and meetings were held

, concerning the event at Vogtle, including transcribed diesel generator meetings between the NRC and GPC. The Incident Investigation Team (IIT) reviewed voluminous plant records, including records associated with historic diesel generator operations and maintenance. Numerous informal discussions concerning diesel operability also occurred, including discucsions concerning operability of the diesel generators between the General Manager and the NRC's Mr. Allen Chaffee.

Extensive telephone discussions were also held between NRC and GPC after the March 20 event, including 25 calls to IIT l representatives in Bethesda between April 6 and May 11, 1990 concerning the diesel generators' sensors. Many of these calls lasted for over an hour and typically involved several IIT team members. Given the widespread and extensive discussions between GPC and NRC representatives at various functional levels, the suggestion that GPC officers or upper level managers, who were

aware of these efforts, would knowingly provide false information j

is ludicrous. The converse is the truth; their staffs were tasked to verify the information provided from the site group

, which was under Mr. Mosbaugh's direction and control. And, when it became appare..c that information provided to the NRC was inaccurate, various GPC representatives informed the NRC of the fact.

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l Finally, the Petition fails to point out that Mr. Mosbaugh  ;

was removed from the PRB on May 11, 1990 as a consequence of the O permanent Assistant General Manager - Support reassuming his position after completion.of SRO training, not as a consequence l

l of identifying an inaccuracy in the LER or COAR.

C. The Revised LER.

• A revision to the original LER to correct the diesel generator start count was contemplated as early as April 30,  ;

1990, as reflected by the General Manager's memo of that date +

(Exhibit 7). Due to the several sources of inaccuracy, as  !

j identified in GPC's August 30, 1990 letter to the NRC, a consensus on the " correct" count was not reached for some time.  !

In addition, examination and testing of diesel engine sensors was  ;

being pursued (representatives of the IIT readily can verify the l extensive, almost daily discussions with GPC representatives {

concerning these efforts). A draft of Revision 1 of LER 1-90-6  !

was approved by the PRB in PRB meeting No. 90-66 on May 8, 1990 j and by the Vogtle General Manager on May 14, 1990. Mr. Mosbaugh, as Acting PRB Chairman, signed the approval sheet on this i revision draft on or about May 8. Exhibit 9 reflects this l approval, as well as the Technical Support Manager's May 4th  :

approval of this draft revision, which was telecopied to the t Corporate Office on May 14, 1990. j A comparison of this site-approved draft revision and the O prior draft prepared just a few days before (Exhibit 10) reveals changes in diesel generator starts. As stated previously, on l May 24 the Senior Vice President celled Mr. Stewart Ebneter, the {'

Region II Administrator. The Senior Vice President recalls that he supplied the Regional Administrator the then-current " correct" numbers which were "14" and "15." This recollection is confirmed  :

by the May 14, 1990 draft of Revision 1. He also recalls j informing the Regional Administrator that two revisions to the LER were then contemplated, one to correct the diesel generator start data and the other to document the results of the sensor test program.

l The draft revised LER was further modified over time.

{ Exhibit 11 is a June 11, 1990 corporate edition of the revision i draft which reflects "15" and "14" starts. Exhibit 12, a site

version of the revision updated to include starts through l June 11, shows "14" and "11." The Senior Vice President noted about this time that the diesel generator start count data was

! different than previous data. Irritated at the data variation

i. and without a satisfactory explanation of why the data was different, the Senior Vice President tasked the Safety Analysis and Engineering Review ("SAER") quality assurance group at the j

plant with the verification of the " correct" numbers for the LER j

! revision.

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i As of June 11, 1990 the then-current draft revision of the j LER identified "14 valid tests of DG1 (sic) with no valid

failures" and "11 valid tests of DG1B with one valid failure"  ;

(Exhibit 12). On June 14 the Senior Vice President called the j Regional Administrator again. The Senior Vice President informed l 4

the Regional Adalnistrator that the " count" data had changed once I i again and was different than the information previously provided j to the Regional Ada.inistrator on May 24. He also informed him i

that the SAER group had been assigned to conduct an audit on the )

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numbers. The conversation reflected upper management's commitment to obtain and supply accurate information. The Senior i

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j Vice President also instructed that the NRC's Mr. Brockman or l

Mr. Hardt be contacted and informed about the change in " count" i j data; Mr. William Shipman, the General Manager - Supporf did so, l it either on June 14 or June 15, based upon telephone billing l

[ reports. i

! l l By June 15, 1990 information related to the testing of the I j jacket water temperature sensors had been sufficiently developed l for inclusion in the revised LER (Exhibit 13).

j By June 23, 1990, the Manager of Technical Support, the PRB,

and the General Manager at the plant had approved a draft i

Revision 1 to LER 1-90-6 (Exhibit 14). Concurrently, the SAER

group was conducting-its. comprehensive review of available diesel generator start data. As of June 28, 1990, the SAER group had

! reviewed diesel generator start data available and prepared a number of spread sheets comparing various data sources. These spread sheets eventually were attached to the group's report 4

(Exhibit 15). Again, this report was developed at the request of l the Senior Vice President, who instructed that a copy of the l report be provided to the Resident Inspector at Vogtle.

As demonstrated by the foregoing, the delay in submittal of

! a revised LER was principally a function of assuring an accurate i document and providing additional information concerning the l temperature sensor testing. Numerous informal notifications to

! the NRC preceded the formal revision as well as the IIT

! presentation to the Commission. The various draft revisions

! unequivocally demonstrate an on-going evolution of LER draft j revisions and the significant variation which led, appropriately, j to the Senior Vice President's request for independent

_ verification by the SAER group prior to submission of the revised LER.

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D. Transmittal Letter for Revision 1 of LER 1-90-006.

() Mr. Hairston instructed his staff to prepare a transmittal letter to the NRC for the revised LER which explained the differences in the count numbers between the original and revised LERs. The transmittal letter informs even the most casual reader that the revision was necessary "to correct the LER" and borrows heavily from the SAER report (Exhibit 15). The third sentence of the transmittal letter comes from the "results" section of the SAER report, page 3. The revision's shift to " valid diesel generator tests in accordance with Reg. Guide 1.108 rather than the number of successful starts since the event" is stated '

clearly. One key phrase is "since the event," which connotes to the knowledgeable reader a shift in the time frame for the counts from (1) after the March 20 event until April 19 (the date of the original LER) to (2) after completion of the test program (as defined in the June 29 letter) through April 19 ("10" and "12" set forth in the transmittal letter) or through June 7, 1990

("12" and "16" set forth in LER 90-006-1, p. 6 of 9).

The petitioners ascribe nefarious intent to the fact that various drafts of the June 29, 1990 transmittal letter wer%

prepared. The fact that several transmittal letters were prepared merely evidences the difficulty inherent in dealing with the subject matter (i.e., " tests," " valid failures," " valid tests" and " successful starts"). Further, the drafts were just that: preliminary documents which were subject to further verification and approval. None of them were the document O forwarded to the NRC. Nonetheless, a review of the drafts in their full text demonstrates the on-going effort of GPC to improve the accuracy of the transmittal letter in spite of the petitioners' selective paraphrasing of their contents on page 1?

of their Petition under " Explanation Contained in Draft."

First, the June 28, 1990 draft of 0751 AM Central Time (Exhibit 16) states that "only valid failures were considered in the conclusion that no problems or failures occurred" and that the number of tests was determined by counting tests regardless of whether or not the test constituted a " valid test" under regulatory definition. These would have been inaccurate statements of fact since, as established by interviews of the osI in August, 1990, " tests" and " valid failures" were not counted by

, involved personnel.

i The June 28, 1990 0855 draft (Exhibit 17) appears identical j to the earlier draft of 0751 except that the revised draft

appropriately deletes reference to "valii t failures" and changes the key word " tests" to " starts": "the number of starts was determined by counting Diesel Generator starts...." These modifications increase the accuracy of the draft by correctly j identifying, using a lay term, the things that were, indeed, j counted.

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1 The June 29, 1990 0755 (Exhibit 18) draft and 1142 draft 4

1 O (Exhibit 19) of the same date are each longer than the preceding draft, accurately describe the substance of the April 9, 1990 letter and focus on the wording " subsequent to the test program" i in the original LER. In both instances, the draft transmittal letter explains that if the report had stated " subsequent to the

event," rather than " subsequent to the test program," the LER would have been consistent with the April 9 COAR and the "18" and "19" numbers included in the transparencies provided by GPC to j the NRC on April 9. This is a correct statement of fact. '

The 1142 draft (Exhibit 19) includes the additional sentence: "The statement made in the LER and in the April 9 letter did not consider troubleshooting problems associated with the restarting of Diesel Generator 1B, which was out of service for maintenance at the time of the event." This, also, is a j correct statement -- made with hindsight -- because the SAER l

! report identified " successful" starts associated with non-valid i i

tests where post-maintenance problems were identified (e.g., fuel priming) and these problems were not counted.

With each iteration additional information was added to the prior draft to provide a more complete explanation of the " count" in the original LER and April 9 letter. This is indicative of i the Company's attempt to assure accurate and useful information to the NRC Staff -- a revision to the original LER, standing i alone, would have resulted in a " correct" count and would have satisfied notification requirements but would not have explained why the revision was appropriate.

The June 29, 1990 1311 draft is essentially the same as the transmittal letter forwarded to the NRC, with one exception. The word " discrepancy" in the last sentence of the first paragraph i

.! (Exhibit 20) was modified to " difference" in the final version.

This final wording more clearly connotes a contrast between the

" count" in the transmittal letter and the " count" in the original j LER. 1 The final LER Rev. 1 transmittal letter, then, draws on statements and conclusions made by the SAER group in its report of June 29, 1990. This makes sense, since the Senior Vice President had commissioned this effort by the croup and would execute the transmittal letter. And, as can ha observed by reviewing prior draf ts and comparing them to che final version of the transmittal letter, the final version not only reconciles the original LER and the April 9 letter with the facts known as of June 29, 1990, but also identifies the causes of the error (e.g.,

recordkeeping practices and the lack of definition of the time frame of the " count" due to the vagaries associated with the original " test program" wording).

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} The August 30, 1990 letter (Attachment 11 to GPC's j September 28, 1990 response to the Petition) from GPC to the NRC j further expounded upon the differences in the " counts." The j attachments to the August 30, 1990 letter contain tables which

list the starts using more extensive information than used as the

basis for the April 9 transparency and letter and designates

starts considered " successes" under a definition which is spelled

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out in the text of the August 30 letter. The letter also 1 acknowledges error on the part of the Vogtle SRO who originally l compiled the " counts" in his review of operations logs.

1 j In light of the revised LER, the information supplied to the

OSI, the independent review of diesel generator start data j conducted by the OSI, the August 30, 1990 letter submitted prior i to the Petition, and the further information provided in this a response, the lack of merit of the allegation that GPC attempted i to mislead the NRC has been demonstrated exhaustively.

l l Relevant and controlling facts, including interviews l;

conducted by the OSI, the text of draft documents provided in this response, and the informal notification of the " count" error j in the original LER were either unknown or not provided by the

petitioners. On these bases, each standing alone, the allegation j is demonstrated to be without merit.

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E. Request for NRC Review of Diesel Generator Performance.

The petitioners, on page 12 of the Petition, request a

! review of the performance records of the diesel generators. Such

{ a review, according to the Petition, will show unreliability j based upon (1) the initiation of three different design changes, t (2) additional " failures" after the original LER was submitted to

} the NRC, and (3) the unreliability of the components, apparently l

the temperature sensors, which are alleged to have been known to j be unreliable for years. The review requested by the petitioners l has been fulfilled. First, GPC understands that several NRC j representatives have reviewed the performance records of the i diesel engines. Mr. Allen Chaffee, Mr. Pete Taylor, and Mr. Milt l Hunt are believed to have professional opinions as to the j reliability of the diesel engines. Second, while GPC cannot j divine the "three" specific design changes referred to by the petitioners, the NRC Staff is intimately familiar with the

! performance of and design change associated with the temperature l sensors of the emergency diesel generators (see, for example, NRC

! Staff comments filed January 11, 1991 in ASLBP No.90-617 } OLA). Third, revised LER 90-06 and other Special Reports to the j NRC subsequent to the original LER have formally notified the NRC l cf additional problems, including " invalid" and " valid" i " failures." Fourth, the petitioners' allegation that the

! reliability of "the components" was "known to be unreliable for

] years" is supported by no articulated fact. A documented fact is i that the NRC has examined, in the context of potential I 10 lO 1

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Exhibit IOl,pageO of enforcement action resulting from the March 20, 1990 avant, whether information available to GPC should have been identified O as precursors of that event, including the failures of the temperature sensors (333 Confirmation of Meeting letter dated August 22, 1990 (at page 2) and October 1, 1990 Enforcement Conference Summary letter from Mr. Luis A. Reyes (NRC) to Mr. W. G. Hairston, III (GPC)). GPC's knowledge of the components' historic reliability, therefore; has already been I considered by the NRC Staff. Further review is simply not l appropriate on the basis of a bald, conclusory allegation.

F. Alleged Retaliation.  ;

The retaliation alleged by Mr. Mosbaugh is the subject matter of ongoing Department of Labor proceedings, as explained in the Enclosure to this submittal. By lettor dated January 10, )

1991, GPC provided the NRC with an explanation of the basis for j the employment action taken with regard to Mr. Mosbaugh.

The Petition is not the appropriate vehicle for resolution of Mr. Mosbaugh's private cause of action, if any, and the requested relief is inappropriate for this employment-related matter.

III. Conclusion.

Based on the foregoing, the company concludes that the petitioners' allegations are without merit.

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