IR 05000424/2009006

IR 05000424-09-006, 05000425-09-006, on 02/09/2009 - 02/27/2009, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2, Biennial Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML090860653
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/27/2009
From:	Vias S J Reactor Projects Branch 7
To:	Tynan T E Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-09-006
Download: ML090860653 (18)

Text

March 27, 2009

Mr. Tom Vice President - Vogtle Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant 7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2009006 AND 05000425/2009006

Dear Mr. Tynan:

On February 27, 2009, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on February 27, 2009, with you and members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of plant equipment and activities, and interviews with personnel.

On the basis of the samples selected for review, there were no findings of significance identified during this inspection. The team concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem identification and resolution (PI&R) program. However, the team identified examples of minor problems, including closing of a corrective action prior to completion and closing of a corrective action without clear documentation of what was performed.

SNC, Inc. 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Steven J. Vias, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000424/2009006 and 05000425/2009006

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information

cc w/encl. (See next page)

_________________________ X G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE SJV OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE See email; RCT1 See email; See email; SMS SJV NAME SAtwater RTaylor TChandler TLighty SShaeffer SVias DATE 03/25/2009 03/25/2009 03/25/2009 03/25/2009 03/25/2009 03/26/2009 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO SNC, Inc. 3 cc w/encl: Angela Thornhill Managing Attorney and Compliance Officer Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution N. J. Stringfellow Manager Licensing Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Jeffrey T. Gasser Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

L. Mike Stinson Vice President Fleet Operations Support Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Michael A. MacFarlane Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. 40 Inverness Center Parkway P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 David H. Jones Vice President Engineering Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Bob Masse Resident Manager Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Oglethorpe Power Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Moanica Caston Vice President and General Counsel Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Laurence Bergen Oglethorpe Power Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. N. Holcomb Commissioner Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Dr. Carol Couch Director Environmental Protection Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Cynthia Sanders Program Manager Radioactive Materials Program Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Jim Sommerville (Acting) Chief Environmental Protection Division Department of Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Steven M. Jackson Senior Engineer - Power Supply Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Reece McAlister Executive Secretary Georgia Public Service Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Office of the Attorney General Electronic Mail Distribution

Office of the County Commissioner Burke County Commission Electronic Mail Distribution Arthur H. Domby, Esq. Troutman Sanders Electronic Mail Distribution

SNC, Inc. 4 Director Consumers' Utility Counsel Division Govenor's Office of Consumer Affairs 2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive Plaza Level East; Suite 356 Atlanta, GA 30334-4600 Senior Resident Inspector Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant U.S. NRC 7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 Susan E. Jenkins Director, Division of Waste Management Bureau of Land and Waste Management S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution

SNC, Inc. 5 Letter to Tom from Steven J. Vias dated March 27, 2009

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2009006 AND 05000425/2009006

Distribution w/encl:

C. Evans, RII EICS L. Slack, RII EICS OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC R. Martin, NRR D. Wright, NRR

Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Report Nos.: 05000424/2009006 and 05000425/2009006 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830

Dates: February 09 - 13, 2009 February 23 - 27, 2009

Inspectors: S. Atwater, Senior Project Inspector, Team Leader R. Taylor, Senior Project Inspector T. Chandler, Resident Inspector, Vogtle T. Lighty, Project Engineer

Accompanied By: C. Smith-Standberry, Construction Inspector Trainee Approved by: Steven J. Vias, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

OF ISSUES

IR 05000424/2009006, 05000425/2009006; 02/09/2009 - 02/27/2009; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; biennial inspection of the identification and resolution of problems.

The inspection was conducted by two senior project inspectors, a resident inspector, a project engineer, and a construction inspector trainee. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

Identification and Resolution of Problems The team concluded that, in general, problems were identified, evaluated, prioritized, and corrected. The licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution, as evidenced by the relatively few deficiencies identified by external organizations (including the NRC) that had not been previously identified by the licensee, during the review period. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, formal root cause evaluations for significant problems were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner. However, the team identified examples of minor problems, including closing of a corrective action prior to completion and closing of a corrective action without clear documentation of what was performed.

The team determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. Operating experience usage was found to be generally acceptable and integrated into the licensee's processes for performing and managing work, and plant operations.

Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.

A. NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (1) Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of condition reports (CRs). To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the inspectors reviewed CRs that had been issued between January 2007 and December 2008, including a detailed review of selected CRs associated with the Main Steam System, Standby Power System, Reactor Coolant System, 125 VDC System, and 480 VAC System

. Where possible, the inspectors independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The inspectors also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the team selected a representative number of CRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including operations, maintenance, engineering, health physics, chemistry, and security. These CRs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed selected CRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where CRs were screened for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.

The inspectors reviewed CRs, Action Items (AI), work orders, and health reports for the systems selected. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period of time; however, in accordance with the inspection procedure, a five-year review was performed for selected systems for age-dependent issues.

The team conducted a detailed review of selected CRs to assess the adequacy of the root cause and apparent cause evaluations of the problems identified. The inspectors assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and had adequately addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

The team reviewed selected industry operating experience items, including NRC generic communications, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.

4 Enclosure The team reviewed site trend reports, to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.

The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process. These included the Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCO) meetings, Management Review Meetings (MRM), Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) meetings and Plant Review Board (PRB) meetings.

The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment Identification of Issues The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. There was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP as evidenced by a CR generation rate of approximately 1,000 per month. The management expectation was for employees to initiate CRs for all deficiencies. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance and the team did not identify any deficiencies not previously entered into the CAP. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.

Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues Based on the review of CRs, work orders, and health reports for the systems selected and audits conducted by the licensee, the team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's CAP procedures. Each CR was assigned a severity level, the type of cause determination, and a responsible department by the Corrective Action Program Coordinators (CAPCOs). Management reviewed the CAPCO decisions at the Management Review Meeting (MRM). Management reviews were thorough, and adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk. The team determined that the station had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensee's CAP procedures, and the assigned cause determinations were appropriate considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. The following causal-analysis techniques were used depending on the type and complexity of the issue:

• Event and Causal Factors Chart

• "Why" Staircase Analysis

• Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT Analysis)

• Kepner Tregoe

5 Enclosure The team determined that generally, the licensee had performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. The licensee has substantially improved the quality of their root cause analyses since the last PI&R inspection.

The team further determined that operability, reportability, and degraded or non-conforming condition determinations had been completed consistent with the CAP program procedures.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the team determined that overall, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected and non-recurring. A review of performance indicators, all CRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and were effective.

However, the team identified the following two examples in which corrective actions had been closed improperly. The first corrective action had been closed prior to completion and the second corrective action had been closed without proper documentation.

• CR 2008102153, "Clearance & Tagging Errors" The root cause evaluation identified ineffective management oversight and inadequate use of Human Error Tools as root causes for this event. AI 2008205802 was generated to enhance management oversight through bi-monthly observations in the area of clearance development and review.

As of the first week of inspection, the team determined that the management observations had not yet been established and AI 2008205802 had been closed. When notified of this condition, the licensee immediately generated CR 2009101479 to investigate. The licensee revised procedure 10000-C to formally establish a management observation policy and generated an action item to establish a recurring task. At the close of the inspection, management had conducted their first observation.

Previous clearance and tagging CRs along with misposition CRs were reviewed to determine if a common caused existed. The team determined that an adverse trend existed in which similar root causes were identified in previous analysis reports associated with clearance and tagging deficiencies. The licensee has not yet completed all of the programmatic corrective actions to address the clearance and tagging issues.

• CR 2007101757, "Engineering Qualifications Not Valid" AI 2007201138 was an effectiveness review that found the actions taken to address the root causes to be ineffective. AI 2007201138 had been closed with no follow-up action identified. Investigation under CR 2009101505 found the questionable qualifications were based on an incorrect qualification 6 Enclosure standard. Once the correct standard was referenced, the qualifications were valid. This was an error in documentation only, in that the original effectiveness review was not corrected prior to closure.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

(1) Inspection Scope The team examined licensee programs for reviewing industry operating experience, reviewed the licensee's operating experience database, and interviewed the OE Coordinator, to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience data was handled at the plant. In addition, the team selected operating experience documents (e.g., INPO OE, NRC Regulatory Information Summaries (RIS), Information Notices (IN), Generic Letters, Part 21 vendor notifications , licensee event reports, and plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since January 1, 2007, to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the Vogtle plant, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP. Procedure NMP-GM-008, "Operating Experience Program," was reviewed to verify that the requirements delineated in the program were being implemented at the station.

(2) Assessment Based on interviews with the OE coordinator, a sample of relevant OE, and a review of documentation related to the review of operating experience issues, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was evaluated at either the corporate or plant level depending on the source and type of document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the applicable department for further action or informational purposes. OE issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure.

The inspectors determined that significant operating experience such as INPO Significant Event Notifications (SEN) and Significant Operating Experience Reports (SOER), NRC Generic letters (GL), Regulatory Information Summaries (RIS), and Information Notices (IN), and Part 21 vendor notifications was regularly used to prevent events from occurring and to address events or near-misses. OE was regularly included in System Health Reports and in CRs associated with station events as part of the causal investigations and corrective action development.

However, the team identified one significant OE that had not been entered into the CAP, as required by procedure. RIS 2008-22 contained safeguards information and was therefore correctly processed through security protocols, rather than through the corrective action process. This was a minor issue in that the OE procedure did not address handling of safeguards information. The licensee generated CR 2009101910 to address the procedure gap.

7 Enclosure c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits (1) Inspection Scope The team reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution.

(2) Assessment The team determined that the scope of assessments and audits was adequate. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by observations consistent with the team's independent review. CRs were created to document a summary of the results and associated recommendations from the final reports. The team verified that all recommendations from self-assessments reviewed had been entered into the CAP, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations. Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate. The team concluded that the self-assessments and audits were an effective tool to identify adverse trends.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope The team randomly interviewed 20 on-site workers regarding their knowledge of the corrective action program at Vogtle and their willingness to write CRs or to raise safety concerns. During technical discussions with members of the plant staff, the inspectors conducted interviews to develop a general perspective of the safety-conscious work environment at the site. The interviews were also conducted to determine if any conditions existed that would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and interviewed the Concerns Coordinator. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of completed ECP reports to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed, and identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.

(2) Assessment Based on the interviews conducted and the CRs reviewed, the team determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees. Based on discussions conducted with a sample of plant employees from various departments, the inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP 8 Enclosure for resolution. The inspectors did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.

The investigations conducted by the ECP were thorough and complete, and recommended corrective actions were appropriately focused to address actions needed to resolve individual concerns. The team noted one exception in which the licensee failed to formally enter a concern into the concerns resolution process due to lapses in ECP staffing caused by illness and turnover. However, the licensee had taken actions to acknowledge and address the employee concern.

(3) Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On February 27, 2009, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom Tynan and members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

J. Agcaoilli, Engineering

M. Agcaoilli, 125 VDC System Engineer

R. Brigdon, Nuclear Operation Training Supervisor

C. Buck, Chemistry Manager

W. Copeland, Performance Improvement Supervisor

R. Dedrickson, Plant Manager

K. Dyer, Security Manager

J. Ealick, Fleet Oversight Supervisor

M. Hickox, Principal Licensing Engineer

D. Hill, Root Cause Analyst

D. Holt, Performance Improvement Engineer

P. Hurst, Concerns Program Manager

M. Johnson, Health Physics Support Supervisor

N. Johnson, Standby Power System Engineer

I. Kochney, Health Physics

D. Lambert, Site Design Manager

L. Mansfield, Engineering Support Manager

J. Martin, 480 VAC System Engineer

D. McCary, Maintenance Manager

T. Morgan, Human Resources Business Consultant

T. Parton, Operations Support Superintendent

S. Phillips, Maintenance Superintendent

T. Reeves III, Health Physics Specialist

A. Rivera, Main Steam System Engineer

J. Robinson, Technical Services Manager

M. Sharma, Nuclear Specialist

R. Shepherd, Performance Improvement Nuclear Specialist

E. Sweat, RCS System Engineer

T. Tynan, Site Vice President

R. Vaught, Outage and Scheduling Manager

D. Vineyard, Operations Manager

A. Whaley, Corrective Action Program Supervisor

J. Williams, Site Support Manager

D. Wilson, Human Resource Business Partner

M. Wilson, Fleet Oversight

T. Youngblood, Engineering Director

NRC

S. Vias, Branch Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 7

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

Concerns Program Procedure, Rev 9.0

NMP-AD-012 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Version 6

NMP-AD-012-F01 Prompt Determination of Operability, Version 1

NMP-AD-012-GL01 Prompt Determination of Operability Guideline, Version 1

NMP-ES-001 Equipment Reliability Process Description, Version 7

NMP-ES-001-GL01 Equipment Reliability Event Free Clock Reset Criteria, Version 2

NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Rev 7

NMP-GM-002-001, Corrective Action Program Instructions, Rev 11

NMP-GM-002-002, Effectiveness Review Instructions, Rev 1

NMP-GM-002-GL03, Cause Determination Guidelines, Rev 12

NMP-GM-002-GL05, Data Configuration Guideline, Rev 14

NMP-GM-002-GL09, CAP Training and Qualification Plan, Rev 1

NMP-GM-013, Integrated Performance Assessment, Rev 1

NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program Version 6

NMP-MA-006, Rework Program, Version 2.0

50028-C, AI SSC Classification/Monthly Status Report, Rev 15.1 14986-C, Security Diesel Generator Load Test, Rev 17

Condition Reports

2000001929

2003001597

2003002176

2003002197

2003002389

2004000184

2004001501

2004001978

2004002504

2004002989

2004003621

2004151063

2004151123

2005100835

2005101787

2005104478

2005107369

2005110364

2005111257

2006102359

2006102721

2006103594

2006109712

2006109952

2006109953

2006111712

2006112084

2006112783

2007100039

2007100078

2007100188

2007100096

2007100237

2007100259

2007100262

2007100491

2007101109

2007101311

2007101355

2007101666

2007101748

2007101757

2007101900

2007102014

2007102161

2007102211

2007102400

2007102428

2007102520

2007102522

2007102638

2007102919

2007102989

2007103387

2007103546

2007103580

2007103718

2007103840

2007103883

2007103925

2007104053

2007104084

2007104186

2007104260

2007104602

2007104604

2007104694

2007105019

2007105288

2007105452

2007105476

2007105584

2007105619

2007105689

2007105693

2007105809

2007105890

2007105979

2007106228

2007107600

2007107713

2007108319

2007108415

2007108560

Attachment Condition Reports (cont.)

2007108614

2007108615

2007108616

2007108618

2007108619

2007108621

2007108715

2007108962

2007109053

2007109839

2007110110

2007110792

2007111591

2007111799

2007111805 2007111974

2007112543

2007112446

2007112728

2007112742

2007112760

2007112890 2007113060

2008100087

2008100319

2008100556

2008101609

2008101772

2008101975

2008102153

2008102330

2008102873

2008102874

2008102875

2008102904

2008103103

2008103330

2008103509

2008103734

2008104000

2008104207

2008104821

2008104834

2008104931

2008104991

2008105088

2008105207

2008105645

2008105652

2008105969

2008106118

2008106265

2008106692

2008106726

2008106729

2008106920

2008107201

2008107256

2008107362

2008107375

2008107505

2008107540

2008107796

2008107825

2008107854

2008108003

2008108021

2008108178

2008108190

2008108357

2008108893

2008109022

2008109091

2008109267

2008109383

2008109859

2008110052

2008110104

2008110119

2008110440

2008110488

2008110791

2008110805

2008110848

2008110870

2008110907

2008110947

2008110969

2008110970

2008110971

2008110973

2008111359

2008111485

2008112064

2008112092

2008112392

2008112654

2008112988

2008113428

2009101073

2009100074

2009100352

2009100769

2009100970

2009101000

2009101166

2009101474

2009101478

2009101479

2009100487

2009101505

2009101726

2009101752

2009101765

2009101861

2009101862

2009101910

Action Items

2004200405

2004200408

2005204639

2006201122

2006202343

2006202512

2006204734

2006205103

2006205303

2006205313

2007200298

2007200745

2007200901

2007200902

2007200903

2007201008

2007201139

2007201336

2007201709

2007201712

2007201731

2007201820

2007201821

2007202419

2007202875

2007202877

2007204121

2007204141

2007204143

2007204152

2007204215

2007205176

2008109269

2008200840

2008200841

2008202144

2008203171

2008203288

2008203908

2008204801

2008204836

2008204937

2008204938

2008205252

2008205735

2008205778

2008206528

2008206534

2008206798

2008206800

2008206802

Work Orders

1053871504

1062237701

1070278101

1070566001

1070886401

1080449101

1081133901

1081159701

1081263101

1081306201

1081746201

1081859301

2040257501

2070050401

2070386101

2070503501

2070714801

2070793001

2070840501

2071336601

2071527101

2072151201

2080714101

2080721201

2080751601

2081218401

2081511401

2081570101

2081638501

2081689901

2081690501

2081697001

2081701201

2081853601

Self Assessments Fleet Oversight Quarterly Self Assessment Report, 3rd Quarter 2008 Fleet Oversight Quarterly Self Assessment Report, 4rd Quarter 2008 V-CAP-2008-1, QA Audit of the Corrective Action Program (CAP), March 2008

V-ENG-2007, QA Audit of Engineering Activities (ENG), August 2007 SNC Fleet Assessment, Foreign Material Exclusion Programs, Spring 2007 Nuclear Safety Culture Self Assessment, December 2007

Attachment Other Documents:

Operability Determinations OD 1-07-002 NSCW PSVs OD 1-07-005 Sequencer Termination Units OD 1-07-003 Rev 0 ECCS Sump Suction Valves

OD 2-07-002 TDAFW OD 2-07-003 MSIV 3016B

OD 2-07-004 Sequencer Termination Units OD 2-07-005 Press Code Safety restraints OD 2-07-008 DG2A water in Oil

OD 2-07-009 SGBD Sample Pipe Hanger System Health Reports from the 2nd Quarter of 2007 through the 4th Quarter of 2008, and Current Maintenance Rule a(1) Action Plans for the: Standby Power System 125 VDC System 480 VAC System

NCVs

NCV 2007202 (Sept 07). "Potential Security Vulnerability"

CR 2007109656 AI 2007205044

AI 2007205191

AI 2007205910

AI 2008203119

NCV 2007401 (June 07)

"Security Manual Search Process"

CR 2007106645

AI 2007202705

AI 2007203116

NCV 2008003 (April 08) "White Residue Inside Containment"

CR 2008104461

AI 2008203461

AI 2008203462

AI 2008203463

AI 2008203464

AI 2008203465

AI 2008203466

AI 2008203467

AI 2008203468

AI 2008203469

AI 2008203470

AI 2008203471

AI 2008203472

AI 2008203473

AI 2008203474

AI 2008203475

AI 2008203476

AI 2008203477

AI 2008203478

AI 2008203479

AI 2008203485

AI 2008203486

AI 2008203487

AI 2008206773

NCV 2007006-01 "Material Condition of EDG MCCs"

CR 2007108171

AI 2007205393

AI 2007205394

AI 2007205395

AI 2008203117

LER

1-2008-001 (June 08) "Group A PZR Heaters Inoperable During Mode Change"

CR 2008104834

AI 2008203404

AI 2008203405

AI 2008203406

AI 2008203407

AI 2008203408

AI 2008203409

AI 2008203410

AI 2008203411

AI 2008203412

AI 2008203413

AI 2008203414

AI 2008203415

AI 2008203416

AI 2008203417

AI 2008203418

AI 2008203419

AI 2008203420

AI 2008203422

AI 2008203423

AI 2008203424

AI 2008203425

AI 2008203426

AI 2008203579

Attachment NRC Generic Communications

GL2008-01 Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems

GL2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients.

IN2008-13 Main Feedwater System Issues and Related 2007 Reactor Trip Data

IN2008-04 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants

IN2008-21 Impact of Non-Safety Electrical Support System Vulnerabilities On Safety Systems

RIS2008-02 Actions to Increase the Security of High Activity Radioactive Sources

RIS2008-22 Notification of Licensees Regarding Aircraft Threats

Part 21 Vendor Notifications

2008-16-00 - Part 21 Replacement Diaphragm Failures Due Inadequate Cure and Operation Over Maximum Pressure

2008-27-00 - Tyco Electronics - Part 21 Transfer of Information;

CII-012 Relays