ML19323A162

TMI-Plus One:Toward a Safer Nuclear Power Program.

ML19323A162
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee, Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, Perkins, Cherokee
Issue date:	03/26/1980
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8004170327
Download: ML19323A162 (13)

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THREE MILE ISLAND - PLUS ONE '

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DUKE POWER COMPANY  !

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The year since the Three Mile Island accident has been a watershed period not only for nuclear power, but for all energy in the United States. A series of dramatic events has demonstrated-how fragile our energy supply system - and thus our. economy'and basic way of life - really_is.

Duke Power Company, along with the electric energy industry, believes that there are five overriding lessons to be learned from the past 12 months.

1. Three Mile Island was a serious -- but not a dangerous --

accident. Official reports since then'have shown that many of the fears at the time ~were based largely on misinformation. The unmatched public safety record of.

nuclear power after more than 25 years of commercial experience and almost 450 cumulative years of power reactor operation remains intact.

2. The United States. electric-power industry responded quickly and effectively to the accident, revising .-

procedures and-training in nuclear power plants,-making indicated equipment changes,-establishing major new organizations, and developing consumer protection measures. As a result, nuclear power plants today.are' even safer and more reliable than they were a year ago.

3. Other energy developments during-the past year -- long gas lines, substantially higher prices'for oil and gas-oline and the ominous turmoil in the Middle East --

have demonstrated the serious" dangers. tied to our heavy dependence on imported oil.and the importance;of fully developing nuclear power along with~other sources.

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4. Several major new energy policy studies -- by such expert organizations as the National Academy of Sciences and Resources for the Future, NAACP, and others -- have emphasized the pressing need to move ahead with our only logical energy strategy: conserving energy and developing all existing US resources, meaning largely coal and nuclear power.

5. The national energy direction has taken us further away from domestic energy adequacy rather than closer to it. We must remove the roadblocks to the develop-ment of domestic energy supply.

It is imperative that we recognize the urgent need to develop ,

all US energy sources, including nuclear power, to reduce our danger-ous dependence on imported oil. Such a commitment will require leadership from the highest levels of government, as well as coop-eration from the public and the many special interest groups that are involved in energy policy decisions. Because of the long lead times related to the development of any large-scale energy source, a further delay in such a commitment is to gamble with the very stability and security of the United States in the years ahead. As we have seen demonstrated dramatically in the past year, the greatest ,

risk related to nuclear power is the risk of facing the future with-out it.

DUKE POWER' COMPANY RESPONSE Duke Power personnel played a significant role in the recovery efforts at the Three Mile Island Nuclear plant. The-com-pany'also has been active in the nuclear industry nationally since '

the March accident near Harrisburg, Pa.

Duke Power was immediately requested to assist in the recovery operations at Three Mile Island. The company sent about 30 persons who spent 500 man-days at TMI within the first month.

Duke Power President Bill Lee spent eight days at the sf e organiz-ing recovery efforts. This kind of direct participation gave Duke personnel an unusual opportunity to learn first hand what happened.

OCONEE STATION REVIEW '

Within days of the Three Mile Island accident, Duke Power engineers began a review of the Oconee Nuclear Station design and operation using insight and information from Duke Power personnel on site at TMI.

The initial review indicated that the Oconee Plant was being operated safely and systems were performing as designed. Al-though the initial study of the Oconee Station-turned up no reasons for discontinuing operations, some changes in equipment and operating i

procedures were made to increase backup protection systems. The main triggering event of the accident at TMI was a loss of feed-water to the steam generators. Without feedwater, and with valves shut on the available backup system, the steam generators at TMI were unable to remove residual heat that built up rapidly in the '

i reactor. This, along with a pressure drop due to a stuck-open F

relief valve and improper operator action, allowed water to be boiled away which resulted in exposing a portion of the reactor core, causing damage to the fuel rods.

Duke Power and the NRC determined that certain controls systems, equipment and procedures should be modified to provide t

additional backups for emergency feedwater when needed. Two I additional motor-driven emergency feedwater pumps were installed i on each of the three Oconee units.. Another change provided for an immediate additional automatic reactor shutdown should there be a loss of main feedwater supply or a turbine / generator shutdown.

• l Nuclear power plants are designed and equipped to control hydrogen buildup should it occur following an accident. However, due to the partic'11ar circumstance of the TMI accident, a.small.

hydrogen reaction did indeed occur in the containment building.

1 While the containment building is designed to contain this with.

i j no significant effects, additional _ emphasis is being placed on-i hydrogen control. At Oconee, hydrogen removal systems have been

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added. Duke Power had included this feature in the original designs I

of its other nuclear, plants under. construction.

l The release of radioactivity from the TMI station was small

! compared with the significance of the accident, but the containment.

! building and the backup systems could have been better: utilized to control practically all releases. Although the Oconee' systems are

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! operated differently from TMI, this concern caused Duke Power to.re-examine the Oconee containment building, systems, and procedures.

f This thorough review reassured Duke Power that radioactive materials-- 1 i

could be safely-contained in the event of an. emergency.  ;

OPERATOR ACTION '

Other actions initiated by' Duke Power included retraining of- f

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l operators on procedural.and equipment changes that were made as a .

I result of the evaluation at TMI. All nuclear operators ati Oconeel -

were sent to the Babcock & Wilcox training facility at Lynchburg, Va,

1 where they received simulator training that covered TMI events.

Operators soon will be able to receive simulator training at the site without having to travel to remote locations; Duke Power's own simulator identical to the Oconee control room is expected to be operational in 1981.

Emergency core cooling systems for nuclear reactors are available to automatically supply cooling water to the reactor in the event of either a major pipe rupture or small pipe breaks.

The effect of a small pipe break or leak can be the same as a large break -- exposure of the fuel core if water is not replaced in the system. These automatic cooling systems worked well at TMI.

However, the actions of plant operators after the safety valve hung open has indicated that operator procedures apparently did not give adequate priority tu keeping the core covered.- Duke Power  :

reviewed the various types of small breaks that could occur and revised our operating procedures to emphasize appropriate actions to assure that the reactor core would be protected at all times.

Communications between TMI officials and the NRC during the rapidly changing accident were confusing. As a result, direct t telephone links have now been made between the Oconee station and the NRC. This allows the Duke station personnel and the resident Oconee NRC inspector to be in immediate contact with the NRC if needed.

EMERGENCY PLAN UNDER REVISION Duke Power examined its Oconee emergency plan in the early days after the TMI accident and concluded that the plan, as then i

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prepared, could be effectively implemented. The Pennsylvania accident clearly demonstrated that a more comprehensive program is required for dealing with an emergency at a nuclear station. The Duke Power emergency preparedness plan has undergone a complete 4

reivew and upgrading to include the lessons learned from the TMI experience. The emergency planning area has been expanded to include that area within a 10-mile radius of our nuclear stations, and coordination between Duke and federal, state, and local emergency agencies has been improved.

IN-DEPTH STUDY UNDERTAKEN Concurrent with these changes and reviews, the Nuclear Station Review Team (NSRT), an internal task force appointed by Duke Power, was involved in an in-depth study of the nuclear systems used by Duke Power. The team examined the design of systems, equip-ment, controls, and procedures. One group made a review of the Oconee Nuclear Station and the nuclear system that was manufactured by Babcock & Wilcox. A second group was named to review the McGuire i and Catawba nuclear stations including the nuclear systems manu-i factured by Westinghouse Electric Corp., and a third group was named to review the Cherokee and Perkins stations designs and their nuclear systems being supplied by Combustion Engineering Inc. A final group reviewed information specific to the TMI accident and channeled appropriate data to the first-three groups. The Duke Power team was comprised of personnel with experience and technical training in design, operation, and radiological control with technical. support from each of the reactor system manufacturers.

The Nuclear Station Review Team concluded that the current Duke Power designs and operations assure public safety. The de-tailed review generally supports the initial review made earlier that an adequate factor of safety had been designed into the facilities. However, the review revealed some items that merited re-evaluation. The team developed specific recommendations for management. Many of the recommendations parallelled items recently recommended by a " Lessons Learned Task Force," conducted by the NRC, by the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile l

l Island (Kemeny Commission), and the Special Inquiry Group of the NRC (Rogovin Report).

The NRC " Lessons Learned Task Force" was very similar to Duke Power's Nuclear Station Review Team. The " Lessons Learned Task Force" report proposed a series of actions that utilities were.to implement by specific dates. Duko Power already met the_ require-ments for emergency power supply for certain safety relief and block valves and pressurizer level indicators as recommended by the NRC. Indicators for additional key valve positions in the control room of each nuclear unit have been installed. New'in-strumentation has been installed that will give operators another means of determining the adequacy of core cooling. Additional i

radiation monitoring equipment at all plants will provide a better analysis of radioactivity at the site and in the immediate area' in the event of an emergency. A. technical advisor has been placed on each shift at Duke Power's nuclear stations. This additional technical advisor, who is a' licensed senior reactor operator, adds

to the analytical capability on each shift and provides another person experienced in plant operation to assist in abnormal situations.

INDUSTRY RESPONSE Immediately following the accident at Three Mile Island,

, the Edison Electric Institute (representing almost 200 investor-owned utilities), the American Public Power Association (representing more than 1400 publicly owned electric systems), and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (representing about 900 electric cooperatives) formed the TMI Ad Hoc Nuclear Oversight Committee to coordinate and oversee the electric utility response to the accident.

The Atomic Industrial Forum (an international organization with 600 members involved in the peaceful use of nuclear energy) cooperated in this effort.

The Nuclear Oversight Committee moved quickly to organize the industry to solve the problems reflected at TMI. Their efforts resulted in three new independent organizations:

- the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) for detailed safety asses _,reat

- the Institutt of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) for improved operations and training

- the Nuclear Electric Insurance-Limited-(NEIL) for financial protection due to extended plant outages The committee also served as the industry's liaison with the White House, the Congress, the U. S. Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (Kemeny Commission), and the Special Inquiry

. Group of the NRC (Rogovin Report).

NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSIS CENTER The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) was established in May 1979, and is located at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto. NSAC was established to provide a detailed technical study of what happened at TMI, the contributing factors, and the implications in terms of generic safety issues and remedies. NSAC and the state of Pennsylvania also co-sponsored studies of possible health and mental effects resulting from the accident.

Currently, NSAC has a staff of 50 people with expertise in various nuclear-related areas, and it is budgeted at about $8 million.

Many of the people have hands-on operating experience, and they come from various utilities, including Duke Power, national labs, reactor.

manufacturers, etc.

One of the first jobs was to issue a draft report in June 'of what happened at TMI. The report relies heavily on instrument charts and computer data, which taken together serve the same purpose-as a flight recorder on an airplane. 'his analysis, the result of 65 man-months, was presented on request to the Kemeny Commission.

The prime objective of NSAC is to provide the utility industry with the best possible technical information on questions of nuclear safety. A program is now in effect to analyze all non-normal events which occur at any reactor and disseminate information from such analyses to all operators of~ nuclear reactors. If a clearinghouse for technical information like NSAC had'been in operation before TMI, the accident could well have been avoided.

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A number of follow-up reports are being developed. They.

include reports on fuel core damage assessment, hydrogen behavior and burning, radiation pathways, equipment design and its application, ,

and the answers to many "what if" questions.

INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS The NRC Special Inquiry Group pointed out that the defects in nuclear safety "are not hardware problems, they are management problems." Despite the excellent safety record of nuclear power, it is clear that everyone from the chief executive officer to the mainte-nance man atthe plant must be totally committed to nuclear safety.

This philosophy is the cornerstone of the industry's most ambitious response to TMI -- the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, (INPO) .

Concern for operations quality has led INPO to establish bench-marks of excellence for nuclear power station operations. INPO will have a staff of some 200 and will be budgeted at about $11 million annually. W. S. Lee, Duke Power's president, is serving as chairman of the board of directors and Eugene (Dennis) Wilkinson, retired admiral and first skipper of the atomic sub Nautilus, as the president.

INPO is located in Atlanta, Ga.

This industry-sponsored institute will provide utilities with the means to improve their own operations. For example, independent-l and periodic evaluations of operating practices at nuclear plants are performed by INPO in order to assist the utilities to meet the established benchmarks.

I INPO, in close operation with NSAC,.will review nuclear power ,

operating experience for analysis and feedback to the utility industry.

Lessons learned will be incorporated into training programs available f to electric utilities.

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INPO is performing studies and analyses in order to support the development of operating criteria for personnel training and for human factors design considerations. Education and training objectives are being established by INPO for reactor operations and maintenance personnel. Screening and performance measurement systems are under development. The best'available teaching techniques will be utilized.

INPO will accredit existing training programs, and instructors will be certified.

NSAC/INPO ACTION On Feb 26, 1980, a shutdown at the Crystal River Nuclear Station in Florida resulted in prompt action and review by a team from NSAC and INPO. By the morning of February 27 this team was at the station and their detailed analysis of the incident and evaluation of operator actions was released to the industry and NRC on March 13, 1980.

NUCLEAR ELECTRIC INSURANCE LIMITED The third national program, Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL), will provide consumer cost protection for replacement power when a nuclear facility is out of service because of an accident.

The utilities currently have insurance to protect plant equipment and property and also to cover off-site damage. NEIL provides additional insurance so that the utility-industry and its customers will be protected against the increased cost of electricity during any large-scale nuclear accident.

SUMMARY

The accident at Three Mile Island caused the electric utility P

and nuclear industries to re-examine the institutional performance l of the nuclear' industry and the respective-roles of government agencies, the manufacturers and the utility operators. The utilities must ensure ,

the reliable and safe operation of nuclear power stations. Duke Power -

3 as well as the entire electric utility industry - accepts that responsibility.

Reliability and' safety cannot be established solely by the regulatory process -- they require dedication, motivation, and implementation by.the plant owner. Duke is committed to excellence in the design, construction, and operation of is nuclear power plants..

The full utilization of nuclear power, the use of coal and aggressive conservation,are vital to assure a reliable supply of electricity for the future of the Piedmont Carolinas and our nation.

3-26-80

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