ML17251A238

Responds to NRC 880727 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $50,000,per Insp Rept 50-244/88-10.Corrective Actions:Check Valves Have Been Exercised Monthly as Part of Test Procedure.Penalty Paid

ML17251A238
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/26/1988
From:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
References
EA-88-154, NUDOCS 8809010097
Download: ML17251A238 (26)

Text

ACCESSION NBR:8809010097 DOC.DATE: 88/08/26 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 AUTH.~ NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION

%ECREDY,R.C.~

~ Rochester Gas 6 Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME

~ RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Ofc of Enforcement (Post 870413)

SUBJECT:

Responds to NRC 880727 ltr re violations noted in Insp Rept 50-244/88-10.Corrective actions:check valves exercised.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE14D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR / ENCL TITLE: Enforcement Action Non-2.790-Licensee Response L SIZE: /DL NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR.ENCL PD1-3 LA 1 1 PD1-3 PD 1 1 STAHLEiC 1 1 INTERNAL: AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/EPB 10 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB12 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 OE 01 1 1 OE LIEBERMANgJ 1 1 G FIL 02 1 RGN1 FILE 03 1 1 RGN2/DRSS/EPRPB 1 1 ERNAL: LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1

@ gory/Fd TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 18 ENCL 18

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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001 abaci August 26, 1988 J c c c D te Q H c cocle v ia 5 46 2 700 Director, Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Inspection Report 50-244/88-10 Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty Enforcement Action EA 88-154 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation's (RG&E) response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty dated July 27, 1988. The first enclosure is RG&E's Reply to Notice of Violation filed in accordance with 10CFR2.201. The Reply admits the violations and, documents the corrective actions taken. Also enclosed is a check for $ 50,000, the amount of the civil penalty.

The second enclosure is RG&E's Answer to the Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, filed in accordance with 10CFR2.205. Although RG&E has chosen not to contest the proposed civil penalty, we have included information for the record describing reasons why the NRC could have mitigated the proposed penalty. These reasons include our excellent enforcement record at Ginna, prior good performance in the general area of concern, and alternative operation and maintenance practices.

Very truly yours, 8809010097 880826 PDR ADOCK 05000244 G PNU Robert C. Me edy General Manage Nuclear Production Enclosures xc: Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

ENCLOSURE 1 Re 1 to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report 88-10 stated:

"During an NRC inspection conducted. on May 16-20, 1988, viola-tions of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and. Procedure for NRC Enforce-ment Action," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:

Technical Specification 4.2 requires that inservice testing (IST) of pumps and valves be performed in accordance with Section ZI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and.

applicable Addenda, as required by 10 CFR 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(6)(1).

Article IWV-1100 of the ASME Code, Section ZI, 1977 edition, which is applicable in this situation, requires, in part, periodic testing for those valves which are required to perform a specific function in shutting down a reactor to the cold shutdown condition, or in mitigating the consequences of an accident.

Contrary to the above, as of May 20, 1988, the IST test program for pumps and valves did not include periodic testing of the following safety related check valves that are used to mitigate the consequence of an accident:

a. Check valves Nos. 3504B and 3505B in the main steam supply lines for the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine; and

b. -Main feedwater check valves Nos. 3992 and 3993.

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2. .-'-Puticle IWV-3522 of ASME Code, Section ZI, 1977

-edition, which is applicable in this situation, requires, in part, that the testing required by Article IWV-1100 be performed by exercising the check valves to the position required to plant operation. Further, fulfill if their function during only limited operation. of a check valve is practical during plant operation, the check valve shall be full stroke exercised during. cold shutdowns.

Contrary to the above, as of May 20, 1988, the following check valves which are used to mitigate the consequences of an accident, had not been full-stroke exercised to the position required to functions:

fulfill their

a. Nos. 9627A and B in the 1C and 1D standby auxiliary feedwater pump service water suction lines;

b. Nos. 862A and B in the 1A and 1B containment spray pump discharge lines:

c. Nos. 710A and B in the 1A and 1B residual heat removal (RHR) pump discharge;

d. Nos. 853A and B in the core deluge check;

e. No. 854 in the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to RHR pump suction check;

f. Nos. 842A and B in the loop A and B accumulator dump line check; and

g. Nos. 867A and B in the loop A and B accumulator dump and safety injection (SI) to cold leg."

I The following responses are provided.

Admission or denial of the alle ed violation 1.

Rochester Gas and Electric admits to Violation 1. The Inservice

'Test Program delineated in Appendix C of the Ginna Station Quality Assurance Manual did not include check valves 3504B, 3505B, 3992 and 3993.

(1) Check Valves 3504B and 3505B (a) lanation and reasons for the violation These valves were installed as part of a 1981 system modification, subsequent to the establishment of the current IST program. RG&E's controls for reviewing the impact of modifications on the IST program scope were less formal in 1981 than our present practice.

"'The 6 point modification improvement established in 1985 has resulted in more through review of modifica-tions relative to the impact on the IST Program.

(b) Corrective ste s that have been taken and. the results achieved.

The check valves have been exercised monthly as part of the PT-16, Auxiliary Feedwater System, test procedure to demonstrate operation of the turbine driven AFW pump. Each valve has been sequentially tested since May 1988 to assure proper opening, backseating and return to the post test normally closed position.

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(c) Corrective ste s that will be taken to avoid further violations and when full com liance will be achieved.

Steps to preclude further violations include formaliza-tion of the testing of these valves in accordance with IST commitments by the end of this year. Further, RG&E modification control procedures have been modified to specifically require that the effect of all modifica-tions will be reviewed to identify any required IST Program changes. Additional actions being taken to ensure adequacy of the IST Program are described later in this reply.

(2) Check Valves 3992 and 3993 (a) Ex lanation and reasons for the violation Lack of comprehensive selection criteria at the time -of RG&E's IST Program establishment contributed to feedwater check valves 3992 and 3993 not being included in the program. Original program selections considered safeguards systems actuated to mitigate the conse-quences of an accident or to provide safe shutdown, but did not specifically include valves forming the boundary to interfacing systems. RG&E is completing its review of systems and has found very few potential omissions. These potential omissions are being evaluated for inclusion and for significance at this time. An additional contributing cause was that an independent assessment of the IST program for scope and adequacy was not conducted at the time of its develop-ment.

(b) Corrective ste s that have been taken and the results achieved.

As a result of RG&E's review of SOER 86-03, these valves were disassembled in 1986 and 1987. It was determined that the valves were capable of performing their intended functions.

As further assurance of the capability of these valves to perform this isolation function, during each plant startup when the AFW pumps are in operation a large pressure differential exists across these valves maintaining them closed.

(c) Corrective ste s that will be taken to avoid further violations and when full com liance will be achieved.

Actions taken to preclude further violations include formalization of the testing of these valves during cold shutdown, beginning with the 1989 refueling outage, in accordance with IST commitments, and plans to include these valves in the next IST Program submittal scheduled for 1989. Additional actions being taken to ensure adequacy of the IST program are described later in this response.

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Admission or denial of the alle ed violation 2.

In response to Violation 2, Rochester Gas and Electric admits, with one exception, that the governing test procedures did not provide for full stroke exercising without a corresponding relief request from Article IWV-3522 of ASME code,Section XI, 1977 edition. Consistent with page 9 paragraph 4 of the inspection report, SI Accumulator Discharge check valves 842 A and B are tested. in accordance with a partial stroking relief request submitted to the NRC with program revision 3A on June 20, 1983.

(a) Ex lanation and. reasons for the violation.

Ten years ago, when. the existing program was established, comprehensive detailed test specifications were not developed, which could have been used as input to the procedures used to perform testing. Additionally the check valve test procedures that were established to comply with IVV-3521 used "observation of substantially free flow" as an indicator that the valve disk moved promptly away from the seat Internal audits of the program did not identify part-stroke testing of the valves as deficient due to our inter-pretation of "substantially free flow" as being "demons-trated partial flow".

(b) Corrective ste s that have been taken and the results achieved.

Engineering dispositions have been provided for each valve, for which full flow testing has not been performed and relief has not been requested. These measures will ensure future valve testing meets our current commitments Valves Di sition 9627A & B Quarterly Partial stroke testing will be augmented, hy disassembly of one valve each refueling shutdown.

is inoperable, the other If that valve valve will he disassembled.

Note: Relief request is being prepared..

862A & B Test Procedure PT-3,'ontainment Spray System, is heing revised to require a mechanical exerciser to move the disc.

The force required to initiate movement will he measured, and subsequent movement will be demonstrated to the position required to fulfillits function.

Note: The reference value will be es-tablished and subsequent testing will demonstrate a breakaway force within 50% from the established reference value.

Valves Dis sition 710A & B PT-2.10.2 will be revised to verify 853A & B the minimum safeguards flow of 1560 854 in each flow path during refueling cavity fill.

Note: A relief request for the deferral of quarterly to the refueling frequency to be prepared.

842A & B For the 1989 outage, either of the following two options for 842A & B 867A & B and 867A & B will be implemented to supplement the existing partial stroke testing.

~tion A Discharge each accumulatcr and measure the pressure and level drop vs. time. Evaluate these parameters against the required system performance to demonstrate check valve operability .

~tice B - Disassemble and inspect either 867A or 867B and either 842A or 842B for operability verification, using a maintenance procedure. Should the inspected. valve require corrective maintenance, the other check valve of similar number will also be inspected.

Note: Relief requests are being prepared.

(c) Corrective ste s that will he taken to avoid further violations and when full com liance will he achieved,.

The short term and long term actions heing taken for both violations will ensure adequacy of the IST Program and avoid similar violations are:

Short Term Actions:

These short,.term actions will ensure that ASME Section XI requirements.. are heing met by the IST Program and. are heing properly. implemented by procedures.

a0 Comprehensive selection criteria have been developed and are heing used to guide an in-depth review of the current program. This review will identify program pump and valve additions or deletions and test category changes for both the current IST program and for the third 10-year interval program, scheduled to be submitted next year. These selection criteria will identify all valves required to be tested, in accordance with the RG&E Section XI IST program, including interfacing system boundary valves.

b. An indepth review has been completed of the IST implementing procedures to identify any other potential discrepancies from current program commitments.

Corrective actions are being taken to resolve any deficiencies as they are identified in accordance with applicable procedures. These actions include procedure changes, additional testing, generation of relief requests and cold shutdown justifications. Justifica-tions for continued operation are being formulated as appropriate.

c Existing valves are also being evaluated to the recently established test category guidelines to ascertain need for revised testing requirements relative to the 19S6 edition of ASME Section XI. These evaluations are being performed, concurrently with the reviews described in item (a) for identifying valve additions or deletions. The attached milestone schedule identifies the dates for evaluation completion and issuance of interim program changes. Engineering will be involved in this effort and will be defining the safety function parameters relative to each valve (for example full flow rates). This information will be provided to the personnel performing and, reviewing test results.

d. Plans for an independent assessment of the program revisions have been formulated and will be implemented in early September.'est

e. procedures are being revised to implement the interim program changes. The December completion is identified on the attached-schedule.

ir Selected personnel involved in our program assessment have visited three other utilities to discuss their programs and have reviewed current IST programs made

.=available from other nuclear plants.

gi Audits of the IST program activities are being enhanced 6o include technical expertise in pump and valve testing and other Section XI requirements.

Lon Term Actions:

These long term actions will ensure that the IST Program will receive the necessary engineering support to be maintained and monitored adequately to prove continued operability of Ginna pumps and valves.

a ~ Responsibility for program control will be shifted from the Quality Assurance group to another group prior to the end of 1988. This change will facilitate the communication of industry pump and valve issues to a group more directly involved with technical issues.

This change will also provide separation between the groups with program respon-sibility and audit responsibility.

b. Actions are being taken to ensure that notifications of industry experience, vendor bulletins and NRC issuances involving the program are reviewed by cognizant IST test and program personnel.

In summary, the efforts which began after the NRC inspection to

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.establish definitive IST selection guidelines and test require-ment guidelines are providing a documented. basis for not only identifying the changes and. additions to the current program and implementing test procedures but are also providing a basis upon which responses to regulatory review inquiries can be facilitated and. for which future changes can be adequately considered.

Attached is a milestone schedule of the. actions being taken which, when completed, will provide full compliance to testing commitments.

MILESTONE SCHEDULE Action TCD Review IST implementing procedures to identify Completed potential discrepancies from current program commitments Initiate proposed interim actions and proposed Completed resolution to differences noted in 1 Finalize selection criteria for which valves Completed and pumps will be added to the program Evaluate relevant PGIDs to new criteria for 10/07/88 potential addition to program Finalize test category selection guidance Completed requirements Revise Mod control procedures to ensure modifi- Completed cation impact on IST program is considered Evaluate new and existing program valves to 10/15/88 new selection criteria delineated in 5 above and establish related test recpxirements and corresponding test acceptance criteria for each valve Begin independent assessment. of program 09/01/88 development Augment and revise procedures consistent with 12/15/88 proposed. program revisions

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ENCLOSURE 2 ANSWER TO PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Although Rochester Gas and Electric has chosen not to contest the proposed civil penalty, RG&E believes that mitigation could have been granted. The reasons for our position are (1) the superior enforcement history of the Ginna facility and prior good performance in the area of concern, (2) the level of safety significance of the violations, (3) the prompt and extensive corrective actions taken, and (4) our response to prior notice of related events.

The Staff stated in the Notice of Violation (at 2):

"A basis exists for 50% mitigation of the base penalty in view of your prior good enforcement history in the area of surveillance testing, as evidenced by a Category I SALP rating in this area during. the last three rating periods.

Full 100'%itigation based on this factor is inappropriate since the root cause of the violation was inadequate engineering support, which received a Category II SALP rating during the last rating period, which was the first period that engineering support was evaluated as a separate area.

Furthermore, ,a basis exists for 50%

escalation of the civil penalty in light of your prior notice, via NRC Information Notice 86-01 and INPO SOER 86-03, of the need to adequately test operation of check valves. Therefore, on balance, no adjustment to the civil penalty amount is

,"appropriate."

For the following reasons, RG&E believes that the Staff should have considered granting mitigation.

1. Past Performance During the 18 years of operating the Ginna facility, RG&E has an excellent record relative to enforcement action.,

As this record shows, RG&E places the highest priority on compliance with NRC requirements and maintaining a cooperative working relationship with the NRC Staff.

RG&E's commitment in the area of concern is reflected in

the Category I SALP rating for surveillance testing during the last three rating periods. From a policy standpoint, such exemplary past performance should be rewarded. The NRC's Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, allows for up to 100% mitigation for prior good performance.

The Staff, however, concluded that 100% mitigation was not appropriate given the Category II SALP rating for engineering support during the last rating period. RG&E respectfully submits that a Category II SALP rating (which basically means "satisfactory performance") should not be cited in this manner as essentially an escalation factor. Such a satisfactory rating should not adversely affect other mitigation or escalation conclusions.

Level of Safet Si ificance Although RG&E admits that the valves in question were not tested in accordance with ASME Section XI criteria, we have also determined by analysis that the lack of testing did not result in the violation of any Ginna safety limits. RG&E recognizes that all these valves

,should have been included in the IST program, and that relief requests should have been submitted to permit less than full flow testing of the valves as necessary.

However, RG&E does believe that the partial testing, operation, and maintenance practices on the valves provided reasonable assurance of their capability to perform the required functions. Most of these valves will be addressed in relief requests, currently being prepared for submittal to the Staff, to permit alternatives to full flow testing (the SI accumulator discharge check valves were the subject of a relief request filed in 1983 but not yet acted on by the Staff).

These relief requests have already been discussed with the NRC Staff as the basis for continued operation.

Pr t. and Extensive Corrective Actions RG&E'.s- prompt and extensive corrective actions are detailed in the Reply provided in Enclosure 1 to this lettei. In brief terms, RG&E has not only aggressively pursued resolution of the specific violations, also adopted comprehensive short-term and long-term it has measures which will result in a substantially improved IST program. RG&E has not narrowly focused its actions on the cited deficiencies, but rather has taken broad initiatives to resolve any programmatic weaknesses.

These unusually extensive corrective actions warrant mitigation under the NRC's Enforcement Policy (See 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, V.B.2).

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4. Res nse to Prior Notice The NOV concluded that a basis exists for 50% escalation as a result of prior notification in Information Notice 86-01 and INPO SOER 86-03. It should be noted that RG&E did perform extensive maintenance in response to these issuances, and performed maintenance of valves 3992 and 3993 as a direct result of our review of SOER 86-03.

Since RG&E did consider these issuances, and performed a number of actions as a result of these documents, we do not believe that we should be cited for escalation of enforcement action.