ML18139B817

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Submits nine-month Response to NRC 801222 Ltr Re NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. Also Forwards Bechtel Nine-Month Response to NRC Ltr Dtd 801222 on Control of Heavy Loads for VEPCO North Anna Units 1 & 2.
ML18139B817
Person / Time
Site: Surry, North Anna, 05000000
Issue date: 03/22/1982
From: Leasburg R
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18139B818 List:
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR 171, NUDOCS 8203260142
Download: ML18139B817 (32)
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Text

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMP.

RICHMOND.., VIRGINIA 23261 R.H. LEA.SBURG March 22, 1982 VICE PJ<ESIDENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Serial No. 171 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ---~-;,-...,.,. PSE&C/WSM: j dm Attn: Mr. D. G. Eisenhut, Director

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Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

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~/7lTf('<A NUREG-0612 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 In accordance with letters 388 and 388A, Vepco to Harold R. Denton, dated July 1, 1981 and September 30, 1981 respectively, Vepco is providing the nine month response to -.the NRC letter dated December 22, 1980 on NUREG-0612 "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 and Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation is in the process of performing a reactor vessel head drop analysis for North Anna Units 1 and 2 and Surry Units 1 and 2. The results of this analysis will be submitted at a later date.

As stated in our six month responses, Vepco has requested a proposal from Westinghouse Electric Corporation to verify conformance of the reactor vessel head lifting rigs, reactor vessel internals lifting rigs, load cells, and reactor coolant pump motor lifting rigs at Surry Units 1 and 2 and North Anna Units 1 and 2 with ANSI Nl4.6-1978 as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.(4). The results of these analyses will be submitted at a later date.

The new fuel container lifting rig at Surry Power Station is currently under review for compliance with NUREG-0612. The results of this analysis will be submitted upon completion.

As stated in our letter 688, dated December 22, 1981, the six month response for Surry Power Station requires final editing. The safe load path sketches are currently being redrafted and will be forwarded to you upon completion.

8203260142 820322 PDR ADOC~ 05000280 p PDR

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  • VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY TO
  • Should you have any questions, please advise.

Enclosures cc: Mr. J.P. O'Reilly - NRC Region II Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing i-

DOCKET NO. 50-280/281 ... VEPCO.~SURRY 1 and 2 NINE MONTH REPORT NUREG-0612 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS Rec'd w/ltr 3/22/82 ... 8203260142 NOTICE THE ATTACHED FILES ARE OfFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIVISION OF DOCUMENT CONTROL. THEY HAVE 8EEN CHARGED. TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RECORDS

  • FACILITY BRANCH 016.. PLEASE DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTS

'CHARGED OUT THROUGH THE MAIL. REMOVAL OF ANY PAGE(S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION. MUST

  • BE REFERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL.

DEADLINE RETURN DATE

, RECORDS FACILITY BRANCH

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

  • SECTION TITLE Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PAGE 1

2.2 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling .......... 1 Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools 2.3 Specific Requirements of Overhead Handling ............ 3 Systems Operating in the Containment 2.4 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling ........... 4 Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Cooling 2.1.3f Supplemental Information to Vepco's Six Month ........ 5

  • Report - Verification of Crane Design APPENDICES A. TABLES Table I - Load/Impact Area Data

Page 1 of 9 INTRODUCTION In accordance with letters 388 and 388A, Vepco to Harold R. Denton, dated July 1, 1981 and September 30, 1981 respectively, Vepco is providing the nine month report on NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear.

Power Plants" for Surry Power Station - Units 1 & 2.

This nine month report is structured in direct response to the information requested in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 of Enclosure 3 of the NRC letter, dated December 22, 1980, concerning control of heavy loads. Also included in this report is supplemental information to Section 2.1.3f of Vepco's Six Month Report previously submitted.

The following sections are numbered to correspond to the information as requested in Enclosure 3 of the NRC letter dated December 22, 1980.

2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF FUEL STORAGE POOLS 2.2.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool.

RESPONSE Name: Fuel Building Trolley Type: Electric Overhead Top Running Trolley Capacity: 125 Tons & 10 Tons Equipment Designation: 1-CR-15 Name: Motor Driven Platform & Hoists Type: Single Girder Electric Traveling Gantry Capacity: 2 - 2 Tons (each)

Equipment Designation: 1-FH-13 2.2.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that for any failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel-storage po61.

RESPONSE The new fuel crane (1-CR-20, 1-CR-23, & 1-CR-24) is excluded since this crane is not capable of moving its hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the spent fuel pool boundary. The new fuel crane has three equipment I.D. numbers due to its particular design.

Page 2 of 9

  • 2.2.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load d!OP extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSE The fuel building trolley and the motor driven platform and hoists are not single failure proof cranes.

2.2.4 For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance.

RESPONSE Alternative 4 of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2 has been selected for discussion of the cranes list in Section 2.2.1 above.

The fuel building trolley (1-CR-15) does not carry any heavy loads, including the spent fuel cask, over any stored spent fuel. The fuel building trolley moves only in a north-south direction over an area at one end of the fuel pit; A built-up pad of energy absorbing material is located over the base of the fuel pit in the area w~ere the spent fuel cask is loaded. This built-up pad was designed to reduce the consequences of a spent fuel cask drop, such that structural damage to the reinforced concrete fuel pit structure, including cracking, will not occur. Therefore, significant leakage of fuel pit water through the concrete structure will not occur. The consequences of a dropped fuel cask into the fuel pool was addressed in the Surry Final Safety Analysis Report as part of the original plant design and licensing. However, Surry Technical Specification 3.10 prohibits movement of a spent fuel cask into the Fuel Building until such time as the NRC has reviewed and approved the spent fuel cask drop evaluation.

Upon resolution of this issue, compliance with NUREG 0612 shall be determined.

The motor driven platform and hoists (1-FH-13) does not carry any heavy loads, including the transfer canal door, over any stored spent fuel. The motor driven platform spans the spent fuel pit and may be maneuvered over any part of the fuel building area. However, Surry Technical Specification 3.10 prohibits the movement of heavy loads exceeding 110 percent of the weight of a fuel assembly (not including fuel handling tool) over spent fuel.

Page 3 of 9

  • 2.2.4 RESPONSE-(cont'd.)

The only "heavy load" handled by the motor driven platform and hoists are the transfer canal doors. The movement of the tranfer canal doors are administratively controlled through Surry Technical Specification 3.10 and Surry Operating Procedure 4.18. Through the use of these adminstrative controls, the consequences of a load drop are within the acceptance criteria of NUREG 0612.

2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE CONTAINMENT 2.3.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel.

RESPONSE: Name: Reactor Containment Polar Cranes Type: Electric Overhead Circular Traveling Top Running Double Girder Crane Capacity: Trolley No. 1 main hook 125 tons aux. hook 15 tons Trolley No. 2 main hook 125 tons Equipment Designator: 1-CR-1 (Unit 1) & 2-CR-1 (Unit 2)

  • 2.3.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling-system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel.

RESPONSE The reactor cavity manipulator cranes (l-CR-5 and 2-CR-5) are excluded in this area since the maximum loads lifted by these cranes are not classified as "heavy loads".

The neutron detector carriages (1-CR-16 and 2-CR-16) do not have the load handling capability to lift a "heavy load" and therefore excluded.

The reactor containment annulus monorails (1-CR-19 and 2-CR-19) and the reactor containment jib cranes (one per unit) are excluded since they are incapable of carrying heavy loads either directly over the reactor vessel or to a location where in the event of any load-handling-system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel .

  • Page 4 of 9 2.3.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features_ to make the likelihood of a load drop e~tremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-systems (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSE The reacto_r containment polar cranes are not single failure proof cranes.

2.3.4 For cranes identified in 2.3-1, above, not categorized according to 2.3-3, demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NlJREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation_

in the containment and your determination of compliance.

RESPONSE The reactor containment polar cranes are of the polar configuration and are supported on the circular crane walls. The polar cranes main hooks have access to the entire area within the crane walls. The polar cranes auxiliary hooks have access ta the area inside and outside the crane walls.

The movement of the polar cranes are not restricted by mechanical stops or electrical interlocks. However, the operations of the cranes are adminstratively controlled by Technical Specification 3.10 to prevent handling heavy loads over the reactor vessel when there is fuel in the vessel, unless the load lift is specifically required for refueling operations.

The effects of load drops on the reactor vessel shall be performed by Westinghouse. Results of these analyses shall be submitted at a later date. Load drops which are not on or into the reactor vessel have no radiological consequences as outlined in evaluation criteria I through III.

Therefore for load drops which do not impact the reactor vessel, criteria I through III are satisfied.

2.4 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS*

CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN, CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL COOLING 2.4.1 Identify any cranes in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e. , complete compliance with NUREG 061"2, Section 5. 1. 6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional des1gn features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment

1. .
  • RESPONSE None of the cranes identified in 2.1-1 are single failure proof cranes .

Page S of 9

  • 2.4.2

RESPONSE

For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided.

See attached Table I, "Load/Impact Area Data".

All load drops postulated inside the reactor containment buildings are postulated to occur at "hot standby" plant conditions .or lower. Cranes within the reactor buildings are not normally used during power generating plant conditions.

Credit for the operability of the Chemical and Volume Control System is taken for any postulated load drops within the reactor containment. Technical Specification 3.2 requires that when fuel is in a reactor, there shall be at least one flow path to the core for boric acid injection. The minimum capability shall be equivalent to that supplied from the refueling water storage tank.

The effects of postulated load drops onto the reactor vessel shall be submitted at a later date. Vepco has contacted Westinghouse to perform a reactor vessel head drop analysis.

2.1.3.f Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of

  • CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.

RESPONSE: CMAA Specification 70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 apply to the reactor containment polar cranes (1/2-CR-1), fuel building trolley (l-CR-15) and the new fuel crane (1-CR-20, 1-CR-23, & 1-CR-24).

These cranes were designed and fabricated, prior to the issuance of the above referenced standards, in accordance with Electric Overhead Crane Institute, Inc. - Specification #61. The differ-ences between these two specifications are addressed below with respect to these cranes.

1. Impact Allowance CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.1.3 requires that crane design calcu-lations include an impact allowance of 0.5% of the load per foot per minute of hoisting speed but not less than 15%. EOCI-61 specifies only a minimum allowance of 15%. Therefore, for cranes with hoist speeds in excess of 30 feet per minute, it is possible that the impact allowance applied under EOCI-61 will be less than that required by CMAA-70. All of the above cranes have hoist speeds below 30 fpm with the exception of the auxiliary hoist for the reactor containment polar crane, which has a hoist speed of 42 fpm. However, the impact allowance criteria is only applicable to the design of the girders themselves, for which the main hoist is the governing factor for impact allowance.

Page 6 of 9

2. Torsional Forces CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3 requires that twisting moments due to over-hanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the.distance between the center of gravity of the load or force center line, and the girder shear center measured normal to the force vector. EOCI-61 states that such moments are to be calculated with reference to the girder center of gravity. For girder sections symmetrical about each principal central axis, such as box sections or I-beam girders, used in these cranes, the shear center coincides with the centroid of the girder section and there is no difference between the two requirements.

These cranes use symmetrical box section girders in their construction, thereby complying with the above article.

3. Bending Stress CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.2 requires that bending stress calculations include a wind load of 5 pounds per square foot in design stress calculations based on the sum of dead and live loads. The reactor containment polar crane and the fuel building trolley were both designed to be operated in 35 mph winds and to withstand 90 mph winds when not in use. The new fuel crane has been designed for outdoor duty and storage, in accordance with EOCI-61 requirements for wind loading, which specifies a design wind load force of 10 pounds per square foot of projected crane area. Also, in the area where a load
  • 4.

drop could result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal, the new fuel crane is not subject to wind loading.

Longitudinal Stiffeners CMAA- 70, Article 3. 3. 3. 1 specifies (1) the maximum allowable web depth/

thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location and minimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners. EOCI-61 allows the use oi longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance. Longitudinal stiffeners have been supplied on the only applicable box girder, that for the reactor containment polar crane, as indicated below, complying with all requirements of CMAA-70:

No. of Stf. by No. Stf.

h/t C(K+1) / 17

  • 6/ fc M CMMA-70 Provided 197 324 376 1 2 Note that the most conservative approach has been used for a symmetrical girder, which is the case where the maximum stresses are assumed to equal the basic allowable stresses, Using this approach the C(K+l) ./17.6/fc equation governing the longitudinal web plate stiffeners reduces to 2C, which is the smallest possible value for this equation.

Page 7 of 9

  • 5. Allowable Compressive Stress CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 identifies allowable compressive stresses to be approximately 50% of yield strength of the recommended structural material (A-36) for girders, where the ratio of the distance between web plates to the thickness of the top cover plate (b/c ratio) is less than or equal to 38. On the reactor containment polar crane box girder, the b/c ratio equals 17, complying with the CMAA-70 Article.
6. Fatigue Considerations CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowable stress ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated loads. EOCI-61 does not address fatigure failure. However, these cranes will perform only a limited number of lifts (much less than 20,000) throughout the life of the plant; therefore fatigue failure is unlikely.
7. Hoist Rope Requirements CMAA-70, Article 4.2.1 requires that the capacity load plus the bottom block, divided by the number of parts of rope, not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. EOCI-61 requires that the rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. The fuel building trolley and the main hoists of the reactor containment polar crane meet the require-ments of this CMAA-70 article. The auxiliary hoist on the polar crane
  • and the new fuel crane hoist were designed in accordance with EOCI-61 .
8. Drum Design CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads. EOCI-61 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum load bending and crushing loads with no stipulation that these loads be combined. The drum designs of the cranes were based upon the combination of crushing and bending loads thereby complying with the requirements of CMAA-70.
9. Drum Groove Design CMAA-70, Article 4.4.3 provides recommended drum groove depth and pitch.

These cranes were designed in accordance with EOCI-61. The CMAA-70 article represents a codification of the same good engineering practice that would have been used in the cranes buil~-to EOCI-61 specifications.

10. Gear Design .

CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower ratings be based on certain American Gear Manufacturers Association (AGMA) standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower. EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. However, the gear horsepower ratings of and design allowable horsepower for these cranes were based upon the AGMA standards referenced in the CMAA-70 article .

  • Page 8 of 9
11. Bridge Brake Design CMAA-70, Article 4.7.2.2 requires that bridge brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab on the trolley, be rated at least 75% of bridge m~tor torque. EOCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of bridge motor torque for similar configurations. The control station arrangement with the cab located on the trolley was not provided for the following cranes as indicated below:

Control Station Locations Fuel Building Trolley Cab on trolley - no bridge is provided Reactor Cont. Polar Cranes Cab mounted on bridge New Fuel Crane Bridge motion controlled from a pendant pushbutton station

12. Hoist Brake Design CMAA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist holding brakes, when used with a method of control braking other than mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor torque. EOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque without regard to the type of control brake employed. The reactor containment polar crane and the fuel building trolley have three
  • 13.

hoist holding brakes, an eddy current brake and 2 double shoe load brakes, with a minimum torque rating of 150% of the hoist motor torque.

The new fuel crane was designed in accordance with EOCI-61, and was furnished with mechanical load brakes and electric motor brakes.

Bumpers and Stops CMAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for cranes which operate near the ends of bridge and trolley travel. This guidance is not provided in EOCI-61. However, bumpers are provided for the bridge and trolley of the following cranes as indicated below:

Bridge Bumpers - Trolley Bumpers Polar Crane None provided, crane Spring operates on circular runway Fuel Bldg. N/A Spring Trolley New Fuel Crane Rubber Polyurethane

  • Page 9 of 9
14. Static Control Systems CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantial guidance for the use of static control systems. EOCI-61 provides guidance for magnetic control systems only. These cranes are equipped with magnetic type motor controls, so this article is not applicable.

15 Restart Protection CMAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires that cranes not equipped with spring-return controllers or momentary contact push buttons be provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power failure and will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle is brought to the "OFF" position. Since all these cranes were designed with motor controllers of the "dead-man" type with spring returns to the "OFF" position, this article is not applicable.

16. Material Requirement CMAA-70, Article 3.1 requires ASTM A36 structural steel. All of these cranes were designed with this material.

The reactor containment annulus monorails (1/2-CR-19), the 6 and 10 ton monorail systems (l-CR-8 & 1-CR-8A), the decontamination building crane (1-CR-25 & 1-CR-22), new fuel crane (1-CR-20, 1-CR-23 & 1-CR-24),

and the motor driven platform and hoists (l-FH-13) were designed in accordance with EOCI-61. These cranes and monorials meet the require-ments of ANSI B30.11 and ANSI B30.16.

Page 1 of 18 T

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA IDENTIFICATION: Reactor Containment Polar Crane (l-CR-1)

LOCATION: Unit 1 Reactor Containment, El. 103' - 1 1/2" (Top of bridge)

LOAD *HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP ( SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Reactor Vessel Head 122.5 Reactor Vessel Containment Note 6 with Lifting Rig Refueling Cavity Structure (See 13930.12-MSK-5) Note 2 & 7 Reactor Upper Internals 52.0 Reactor Vessel Containment Note 6 with Lifting Rig Refueling Cavity Structure (See 13930.12-MSK-5) Note 2 & 7 Reactor Cavity Inner 12.2 Reactor Vessel Containment Note 6 Seal Ring Refueling Cavity Structure (See 13930.12-MSK-5) Note 2 & 7 CRDM Missile Shield 36.5 Reactor Vessel Containment Note 6 Refueling Cavity Structure . (See 13936.12-MSK-5) Note 2 & 7 Stud Carriers (Full) 3.6 Refueling Cavity Structure Containment Note 2 & 7 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (See 13930.12-MSK-5) Note 2 & 7 Reactor Coolant Pump 41.0 Reactor Coolant Pressure Containment Note 2 & 7 Motor with Sling Boundary (See 13930.12-MSK-5,6,&7)

Operating Floor 13.0 Reactor Coolant Pressure Containment Note 2 & 7 Removable Plugs (Max) Boundary (See 13930.12-MSK-5)

Octagonal Floor 31.5 No identified safe shutdown Containment Note 3 Plug or decay heat removal (See 13930.12-MSK-6) equipment below load path

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  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA IDENTIFICATION: Reactor Containment Polar Crane (l-CR-1)

LOCATION: Unit 1 Reactor Containment, El. 103' - 1 1/2" (Top of bridge)

LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Polar Crane - 2.4 No safe shutdown or decay heat Containment Note 3 & 8 Bottom Block & Hook removal equipment below limit switch testing location Containment Recirc. 23.7 Recirc. Spray & Component cooling Containment Note 2 Spray Cooler piping (See 13930.12-MSK-5 thru 8)

Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Note 2 & 7 Regenerative Heat 2.4 Chemical & Volume Control Piping Containment Note 2 & 7 Exchanger (See 13930 .12-MSK-7)

Residual Heat Removal 12.8 RHR and Component Cooling Piping Containment Note 2 Exchanger (See 13930 .12-MSK-7)

Residual Heat Removal 2.4 RHR and Component Cooling Piping Containment Note 2 Pump Motor (See 13930. 12-MSK-7)

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 3 of 18 ~

IDENTIFICATION: Reactor Containment Polar Crane (2-CR-1)

LOCATION: Unit 2 Reactor Containment, El. 103' - 1 1/2" (Top of bridge)

LOAD *HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Reactor Vessel Head 122.5 Reactor Vessel Containment Note 6 with Lifting Rig Refueling Cavity Structure (See 13930.12-MSK-l) Note 2 & 7 Reactor Upper Internals 52.0 Reactor Vessel Containment Note 6 with Lifting Rig Refueling Cavity Structure (See 13930.12-MSK-l) Note 2 & 7 Reactor Cavity Inner 12.2 Reactor Vessel Containment Note 6 Seal Ring Refueling Cavity Structure (See 13930.12-MSK-1&3) Note 2 & 7 RHR Heat Exchanger Note 2 CRDM Missile Shield 36.5 Reactor Vessel Containment Note 6 Refueling Cavity Structure (See 13930.12-MSK-l) Note 2 & 7 Stud Carriers (Full) 3.6 Refueling Cavity Structure Containment Note 2 & 7 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (See 13930.12-MSK-1) Note 2 & 7 Reactor Coolant Pump 41.0 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Containment Note 2 & 7 Motor with Sling (See 13930.12-MSK-1)

Operating Floor 13.0 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Containment Note 2 & 7 Removable Plugs (Max) RHR System Boundary (See 13930.12-MSK-1&3) Note 2 Octagonal Floor 31.5 RHR System Boundary Containment Note 2 Plug Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (See 13930.12-MSK-1&3) Note 2 & 7

TAaLE I (cont'd.)

Page 4 of 18 tt LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA IDENTIFICATION: Reactor Containment Polar Crane (2-CR-1)

LOCATION: Unit 2 Reactor Containment, El. 103' - 1 1/2" (Top of bridge)

LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Polar Crane - 2.4 No safe shutdown or decay heat removal Containment Note 8 Bottom Block & Hook equipment below limit switch testing location Containment Recirc. 23.7 Recirc. Spray & Component Piping Containment Note 2 Spray Cooler Piping (See 13930.12-MSK-2 thru 4)

Chemical & Volume Control Piping Note 2 Safety Injection Piping Note 2 Regenerative Heat 2.4 Chemical & Volume Control Piping Containment Note 2 Exchanger (See 13930.12-MSK-3)

Residual Heat Removal 12.8 RHR Component Cooling Piping Containment Note 2 Exchanger (See 13930.12-MSK-3)

Residual Heat Removal 2.4 RHR and Component Cooling Piping Containment Note 2 Pump Motor (See 13930.12-MSK-3)

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 5 of 18 IDENTIFICATION: Reactor Containment Annulus Monorail (l-CR-19 & 2-CR-19)

LOCATION: Unit 1 & Unit 2 Reactor Containments, El. 78'-10" LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Undefined 5.0 Safe shutdown and decay heat removal Containment Note 2 (Max.) equipment in annulus area (See 13930.12-MSK-1&5)

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 6 of 18

  • IDENTIFICATION: Reactor Containment Jib Cranes LOCATION: Unit 1 & Unit 2 Reactor Containments, El. 86 1 -0 11 LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Undefined* 8.0 Reactor Coolant Pressure Containment Note 2 & 7.

(Max.) Boundary (See 13930.12-MSK-1&5)

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 7 of 18

  • IDENTIFICATION: New Fuel Crane (l-CR-20, l-CR-23, l-CR-24)

LOCATION: Fuel Building & Yard, El. 44 1 -8 11 LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

New Fuel 3.3 Spent Fuel Pit Pumps Motor Fuel Bldg. Note 3 & 9 Container (Full) Control Centers (See 13930.12-MSK-9&10)

Spent Fuel Pit Pump Note 2,3 & 9 Fuel Pit Cooler Note 2,3 & 9 Removable Slabs 1.0 Spent Fuel Pit Pumps Motor Fuel Bldg Note 3 & 9 Control Center (See 13930.12-MSK-9)

Page 8 of 1 8 ~

'i'Al3LE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA IDENTIFICATION: Motor Driven Platform & Hoists (l-FH-13)

LOCATION: Fuel Building & Yard, El. 47' -9 1/2" LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Fuel Pool Gate 1.8 Spent Fuel Pool Fuel Bldg. Note 3 & 10 (See 13930.12-MSK-10)

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 9 of 18 IDENTIFICATION: Fuel Building Trolley (1-CR-15)

LOCATION: Fuel Building, Decontamination Building, and Yard, El. 81' -4" LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Spent Fud 125.0 Spent Fuel fool Fuel Bldg. Note 11 Shipping Cask (Max.) (See 13930.l2-MSK-10)

Fuel Pit Cooling System Piping Note 3 & 9 Fuel Building -Z. 4 No safe shutdown or decay Fuel Bldg. Note 8 Trolley - Bottom heat removal equipment below (See 13930.12-MSK-10)

Block & Hook limit switch testing location Spent Resin Shipping 3.7 No s:;ife shutdown or decay heat Decou. Bldg. Note 3 Container & Cask removal equipment under load path (See 13930.12-MSK-11)

Irradiated Specimen 11.3 Spent Fuel Pool Fuel Bldg. Note 11 Shipping Cask (See 13930.12-MSK-10)

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 10 of 18 IDENTIFICATION: Decontamination Building Crane, (1-CR-25, 1-CR-22)

LOCATION: Decontamination Building, El. 43' -4" LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION

  • ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Undefined 5.0 No safe shutdown or decay heat removal Decon. Bldg. Note 3 (Max.) equipment under load path (See 13930.12-MSK-11)

Spent Fuel Shipping Container Note 12

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 11 of 1 IDENTIFICATION: 10 Ton Monorail Sytem (1-CR-84)

LOCATION: Auxiliary Building, El. 40'-7 3/4" LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Removable Slabs 8.5 Seal Water Heat Exchangers Aux. Bldg. Note 3 & 13 (Max.) and Non-Regen. Heat Exchangers (See 13930.12-MSK-12)

Chemical & Volume Control Note 2 Piping Chilled Component Cooling Note 2 Exchanger & Piping Undefined Loads 8.5 Same as removable slabs above Aux. Bldg. Note 2, 3, 13, 14 (Max.) (See 13930.12-MSK-12)

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 12 of 1 8 .

IDENTIFICATION: 6 Ton Monorail Sytem (l-CR-8)

LOCATION: Auxiliary Building, El. 22'-1" LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP ( SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Component Cooling 2.7 Component C60liilg Piping Aux. Bldg. Note 2 Water Pump (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

Component Cooling 3.2 Component Cooling Piping Aux. Bldg. Note 2 Water Pump-Motor (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

Charging Pump 1.3 Chemical & Vol. Control Piping Aux. Bldg. Note 2

& Comp. Cooling Piping (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

Charging Pump-Motor 2.1 Chemical & Vol. Control Piping Aux. Bldg. Note 2

& Comp. Cooling Piping (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

Removable Slabs 4.5 Unit 1 Charging Pump Discharge Aux. Bldg. Note 2 (Max.) Heads Piping - 4"-CH-89-1503 El. 2'-0"

& 4"-CH-80-1503 Unit 1 Safety Injection Piping - Aux. Bldg. Note 2 10"-SI-6-153, 8"-SI-14-153, El. 2'-0"

& 8"-SI-92-153 Unit 2 Charging Pump Discharge Aux. Bldg. Note 2 Headel's Piping - 4"-CH-389-1503 El. 2' -0" 4"-CH-380-1503 Unit 2 Safety Injection Piping Aux. Bldg. Note 2 10"-SI-206-153, 8"-SI-214-153, El. 2' -0"

& 8"-SI-292-153

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 13 of 1 IDENTIFICATION: 6 Ton Monorail Sytem (l-CR-8)

LOCATION: Auxiliary Building, El. 22'-l" LOAD* HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Removable Slabs 4.5 Charging Pump Seal Cooler Surge Aux. Bldg. Note 2 (Max.) Tank (l-CC-TK-3 or 2-CC-TK-3) El. 2' -0" Service water piping to charging Aux. Bldg. Note 2,5 & 14 pump intermediate seal coolers El. 2' -0" (2-WS-71-136, 2-WS-73-136, 2-WS-173-136, 2-WS-171-136)

Component Cooling Piping to Fuel Pit Aux. Bldg. Note 2,5 & 14 Coolers (lO"-CC-67-121 & 10"-CC..70-121) El. 2' -0" Undefined Loads 4.5 Same as removable slabs above Aux. Bldg. Note 2,5 & 14 (Max.) El. 2' -0"

  • Page 14 of 18 (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA IDENTIFICATION: Unit #1 Switchgear Room Monorail LOCATION: Service Building, El. 53'-6" LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Motor-Generator 2.0 Misc. Cables & Conduits Service Bldg. Note 2 Set-Motor (Max.) (See 13930.12-MSK-14)

Control Room Roof Note 5 & 15

15 18.

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page of IDENTIFICATION: Filter Cartridge Removal Monorail LOCATION: Auxiliary Building, El. 23'-0" LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Undefined 2.0 Reactor coolant pump seal Aux. Bldg. Note 2,3 & 13 (Max.) water injection filter and (See 13930.12-MSK-13) associated piping

  • TABLE I (cont'd)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 16 of* 18 IDENTIFICATION: Emergency Diesel Generator Room Monorails LOCATION: Service Building, El. 27' -0"

. LOAD HAZARD WEIGHT LOCATION ELIMINATION CATEGORY LOAD (TONS). EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP (SEE NOTE 17) (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17)

Diesel-Generator 10 Emergency Diesel Generator Service. Bldg. Note 2 & 16 Parts (Max.) El. 27 1 -0 11

  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 17 of 1 NOTES: HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORIES EXPLANATIONS

1) Crane travel for this area/load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops~
2) System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safe shutdown.

or decay heat removal function following this load drop in this area.

3) Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load/equipment combination.
4) Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e. section 5. 1. 6 NUREG 0612 satisfied).
5) Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

equipment.

6) Results of analysis to be supplied later. Vepco has requested Westinghouse to analyze load drops onto the reactor vessel. Postulated load drops into the reactor vessel shall not be addressed. Westinghouse has never performed any previous .analyses of heavy load drops into the reactor vessel.
7) Load drops which damage the refueling cavity structure or reactor coolant pressure boundary do not prevent qecay heat removal by alternate systems available for operation if required, i.e. RHR system, Safety Injection System or Chemical & Volume Control System.
8) The crane limit switch testing location shall be administratively controlled.
9) The spent fuel storage rack configuration is designed to remain subcritical under unborated water conditions.

Temporary make-up to the spent fuel pool using unborated water, while repairs are made to damaged equipment, will maintain spent fuel cooling and shielding.

10) Surry Technical Specification 3.10 and Surry Operating Procedure 4.18 provide adminstrative controls to ensure safe movement of the spent fuel pool gates.
  • TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Page 18 of 1 NOTES: HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORIES EXPLANATIONS - (cont'd.)

11) Surry Technical Specification 3.10 prohibits movement of a spent fuel cask into the Fuel Building
  • until such time as the NRC has reviewed and approved the spent fuel cask drop evaluation. Upon resolution of this issue, compliance with NUREG 0612 shall be determined. Resolution of the spent fuel cask drop evaluation shall also be applicable for the irradiated speciment shipping cask.
12) A postulated load drop from the Decou. Bldg. Crane may impact and strike a spent fuel shipping container due to load swing. The spent fuel shipping container is closed prior to its movement into the Decou. Building so that any possible spillage of its contents is a remote possibility.
13) As addressed in FSAR Section 9.1.3.5, a postulated loss of all seal water injection flow does not affect the operability of reactor coolant pumps if component cooling water is available. Since a postulated load drop does not affect the component cooling system, the consequences of a load drop are acceptable per NUREG 0612.
14) Load carrying height restrictions shall be adminstratively controlled. A one foot maximum load carry height restriction shall be imposed on all lifting operations in the Auxiliary Building on elevations 27'-6" and 13 I -:0 11 *
15) The control room roof is designed to withstand a tornado generated missile. The kinetic energy developed from a postulated load drop is significantly less than the kinetic energy developed by a tornado generated missile. Therefore, the postulated load drop is within the acceptance criteria of NUREG 0612.
16) Two 5 ton capacity monorails are located in each Emergency Diesel Generator Room for maintenance purposes.

No permanently attached hoist or trolley is mounted on either monorail under normal conditions. A postulated load drop would impact the diesel generator under repair. Redundant diesel generators, located in separate rooms are available to perform their functions.

17) Sketches referenced were provided in Vepco's Six Month Report concerning "Control of Heavy Loads."
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