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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORYORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYS9(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBRt8003240381DOC~DATE;80/03/17NOTARIZED!NODOCKETFACIL;50204RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantiUnitliRochesterG05000244AUTH,NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONWHITE,L,D,RochesterGas8ElectricCorp.RECIPNNAME.RECIPIENTAFFILIATIONZIEMANNiD~L,OperatingReactorsBranch2
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY ORMATIONDISTRIBUTION SYS9(RIDS)ACCESSION NBRt8003240381 DOC~DATE;80/03/17NOTARIZED!
NODOCKETFACIL;50204RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantiUnitliRochester G05000244AUTH,NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION WHITE,L,D, Rochester Gas8ElectricCorp.RECIPNNAME.RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ZIEMANNiD
~L,Operating ReactorsBranch2


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
RespondstoNRC'00211ltrreaddiinfo,oncontainmentpurge8ventsysExistingsysbeingmodifiedperNUREG0578to.requireindividua'1resettingofanyconta,inmentisolatiop-valverequiredtoIopenwheninitiatingsignalpresents1DISTRISUTIONCODE:ASSESCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRlENCL-4SIZEI-~----TITLE:SEPTopicsNOTES:JQ~+Ag+J1E~''R.+AC~--'ECIPIENTCOPIESRECIPIENT~COPIESIDCODE/NAMELTTRENCLIDCODE/NAMELTTRENCL'CTION:19BCOg8INTERNAL:REGR10TA/EDO-13ENGRBR15PLANTSYSBR17EFFTTRT"SYSEXTERNAL:03LPDR23ACRS11602NRCPDR08ISEilCOREPERFBR14REACSFTYBR-16EEBSTSGROUPLEADR07NSIC1211'11MARS51980TOTALNUMBEROF-COPIESREQUIRED:LTTR~ENCL P~'
RespondstoNRC'00211 ltrreaddiinfo,oncontainment purge8ventsysExisting sysbeingmodifiedperNUREG0578to.requireindividua'1 resetting ofanyconta,inment isolatiop
ZiZZZiZS/////I/I///gal////IIXI/I//E//Il/II//////SZuROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONJ''"'gwIIAtto,89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,N.Y.14649LEOND.WHITE,JR.VICEPRESIDENTTELEPHONEARE*CDDETIE546.2700March17,1980DirectorofNuclearReactorRegulationAttention:Mr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefOperatingReactorsBranchNo.2U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555
-valverequiredtoIopenwheninitiating signalpresents1DISTRISUTION CODE:ASSESCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR lENCL-4SIZEI-~----TITLE:SEPTopicsNOTES:JQ~+Ag+J1E~''R.+AC~--'ECIPIENT COPIESRECIPIENT
~COPIESIDCODE/NAME LTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME LTTRENCL'CTION:
19BCOg8INTERNAL:
REGR10TA/EDO-13ENGRBR15PLANTSYSBR17EFFTTRT"SYSEXTERNAL:
03LPDR23ACRS11602NRCPDR08ISEilCOREPERFBR14REACSFTYBR-16EEBSTSGROUPLEADR07NSIC1211'11MARS51980TOTALNUMBEROF-COPIESREQUIRED:
LTTR~ENCL P~'
ZiZZZiZS/////I/I///gal//
//IIXI/I//E
//Il/II//////
SZuROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION J''"'gwIIAtto,89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649LEOND.WHITE,JR.VICEPRESIDENT TELEPHONE ARE*CDDETIE546.2700March17,1980DirectorofNuclearReactorRegulation Attention:
Mr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefOperating ReactorsBranchNo.2U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
SEPTopicVI-4,ContainmentIsolationSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244
SEPTopicVI-4,Containment Isolation SystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244


==DearMr.Ziemann:==
==DearMr.Ziemann:==
ThisletterisinresponsetoyourFebruaryll,1980letter,whichrequestedthefollowingadditionalinformationconcerningtheGinnacontainmentpurgeandventsystems.1.Theoverridingofonetypeofsafetyactuationsignalshouldnotcausetheblockingofanyothertypeofsafetyactuationsignaltotheisolationvalves.TheGinnaplantengineeredsafetyfeaturesapparentlyhaveseveraloverridesthatblockevenmanualactuation.Response:Asstatedinourlettertoyouonthesubjectsystem,datedDecember14,1979,thecontainmentpurgesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovidepurgingcapabilityfollowingaLOCA,whenhighcontainmentradiationandSIsignalsmaybepresent,tolimitpotentialhydrogenconcentrationsincontainmentduringthepostaccidentperiod.Inordertoperformthissafetyfunction,theresetsystemisdesignedtooverrideallcontainmentisolationinitiatingsignalsaslongasanyactuatingsignalispresent.TheexistingresetwithSection2.1.4requireindividualvalvewhichmaybesignalispresent.actions,includingsystemisbeingmodifiedinaccordanceandAppendixA2.1.4ofNUREG0578,toresettingofanycontainmentisolationrequiredtoopenwhileaC.I.initiatingAtleastthreedeliberateoperatoroperationofthecontainmentisolation80032408'I JlROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,-ChiefSHEETNO.keyswitch,mustbeperformedbytheoperatorbeforeanytworedundantisolationvalves(potentialreleasepath)areopened(e.g.,purgeexhaust).Thisvirtuallyprecludesinadvertentviolationofcontainment,isolation.Proceduresrequireextensivereviewofplantconditionsbeforeinitiatinganyactionwhichwouldrequiretheopeningofanisolationvalveafteraneventwhichhascausedcontainmentisolation.Ifitweredecidedtoperformacontainmentpurgeduringaccidentconditions,greatcarewouldbetakenduringthisoperation.Thepersonnelperformingthissafetyfunctionwouldbeawareofthesignificanceoftheaction,andwouldbepreparedtoclosethevalvesifnecessaryforanyreason.Re-establishingcontainmentisolationwouldbeaquick,simpleprocess(closingtheappropriatevalveswitches).Itisnotconsideredthat.thisprocessrequiresanyfurthersimplification(suchashavingasystem-levelmanualisolationswitch).AnothersetofcircumstanceswhereinthecontainmentventilationisolationvalvesareblockedfromclosinguponreceiptofasafetyactuationsignalisdescribedinourDecember14,1979letteronthissubject.Intheeventthesevalvesareopen,andhighactivity(butnoSIsignal)ispresent,administrativeproceduresensurethattheresetwillnotbeuseduntilthehighactivityalarmhasbeencleared.TheSIsignalwillthusnolongerbeblocked,andbecapableofeffectingvalveclosure.2.Thesystemlevelannunciationoftheoverriddenstatusshouldbeprovidedforeverysafetysystemimpactedwhenanoverrideisactive.TheGinnaplantapparentlydoesnothavethiscapability.Response:Asnotedinourresponsetoitem(1)above,theresetpanelmatrixclearlydisplaysanyisolationvalvewhichisinaresetstatus.TherequirementreferredtoforsystemlevelannunciationofoverriddenstatusofsafetysystemsiscontainedinRegulatoryGuide1.47,BassedandInoerableStatusIndicationforNuclearPowerPlantSafetSstemswhichwasz.ssuedznMay1973.Theextenttowhichplants,suchasR.E.Ginna,whichweredesignedandconstructedpriortotheissuanceofthisRegulatoryGuide,arerequiredtoimplementitsrequirementsiscurrentlythesubjectofgenericreviewundertheSEPprogramandTMIrelatedNRCstaffprograms.Itisourpositionthatstatusmonitoringmodificationsshouldonlybemadeonanintegratedbasisforallsafetysystemsinaccordance'withcarefulconsiderationoftheman-machineinterface.  
ThisletterisinresponsetoyourFebruaryll,1980letter,whichrequested thefollowing additional information concerning theGinnacontainment purgeandventsystems.1.Theoverriding ofonetypeofsafetyactuation signalshouldnotcausetheblockingofanyothertypeofsafetyactuation signaltotheisolation valves.TheGinnaplantengineered safetyfeaturesapparently haveseveraloverrides thatblockevenmanualactuation.


T,ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefSHEETNO.Treatingindividualsystems,suchascontainmentisolation,withoutregardtomaintainingaconsistent=statusmonitoringapproachtoallsafetysystemscouldleadtooperatorconfusionanderror.3.Theinstrumentationandcontrolsystemsprovidedtoinitiateengineeredsafetyfeaturesshouldbedesignedandqualifiedassafetygradeequipment.Discussthequalificationoftheisolationchannelandradiationchannelequipment.inthisregard.Response:Thecontainmentisolationsystem,includingtheactuatingchannels,wasdesignedandconstructedasaClassIEsystem.QualificationofelectricalandISCequipmenthasbeendescribedinourreporttoA.Schwencer,datedFebruary24,1978,onthesubject."EnvironmentalQualificationofElectricalEquipment,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUnitNo.1".ThistopiciscurrentlybeingreviewedgenericallyundertheSEPprogram.4.TheoverridingorresettingoftheisolationactuationsignalshouldnotcausetheautomaticmotionofanyEngineeredSafetyFeaturevalve.YourletterofOctober17,1979andNovember19,1979indicatethatamodificationisplannedfortheupcomingMarchrefuelingoutage.Describehowthemodificationwillpreventautomaticvalvepositionchangesonresettingofisolationlogic,includingschematicdiagramsorsketchesasnecessary.Response:ThedetaileddesignofthecontainmentisolationmodificationwhichrequiresindividualresetforeachisolationvalveisbeingreviewedaspartoftheShort-TermLessonsLearnedProgram.Verytrulyyours,L.D.Whie,Jr.LDW:np}}
===Response===
Asstatedinourlettertoyouonthesubjectsystem,datedDecember14,1979,thecontainment purgesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovidepurgingcapability following aLOCA,whenhighcontainment radiation andSIsignalsmaybepresent,tolimitpotential hydrogenconcentrations incontainment duringthepostaccidentperiod.Inordertoperformthissafetyfunction, theresetsystemisdesignedtooverrideallcontainment isolation initiating signalsaslongasanyactuating signalispresent.TheexistingresetwithSection2.1.4requireindividual valvewhichmaybesignalispresent.actions,including systemisbeingmodifiedinaccordance andAppendixA2.1.4ofNUREG0578,toresetting ofanycontainment isolation requiredtoopenwhileaC.I.initiating Atleastthreedeliberate operatoroperation ofthecontainment isolation 80032408'I JlROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,-
ChiefSHEETNO.keyswitch,mustbeperformed bytheoperatorbeforeanytworedundant isolation valves(potential releasepath)areopened(e.g.,purgeexhaust).
Thisvirtually precludes inadvertent violation ofcontainment, isolation.
Procedures requireextensive reviewofplantconditions beforeinitiating anyactionwhichwouldrequiretheopeningofanisolation valveafteraneventwhichhascausedcontainment isolation.
Ifitweredecidedtoperformacontainment purgeduringaccidentconditions, greatcarewouldbetakenduringthisoperation.
Thepersonnel performing thissafetyfunctionwouldbeawareofthesignificance oftheaction,andwouldbepreparedtoclosethevalvesifnecessary foranyreason.Re-establishing containment isolation wouldbeaquick,simpleprocess(closingtheappropriate valveswitches).
Itisnotconsidered that.thisprocessrequiresanyfurthersimplification (suchashavingasystem-levelmanualisolation switch).Anothersetofcircumstances whereinthecontainment ventilation isolation valvesareblockedfromclosinguponreceiptofasafetyactuation signalisdescribed inourDecember14,1979letteronthissubject.Intheeventthesevalvesareopen,andhighactivity(butnoSIsignal)ispresent,administrative procedures ensurethattheresetwillnotbeuseduntilthehighactivityalarmhasbeencleared.TheSIsignalwillthusnolongerbeblocked,andbecapableofeffecting valveclosure.2.Thesystemlevelannunciation oftheoverridden statusshouldbeprovidedforeverysafetysystemimpactedwhenanoverrideisactive.TheGinnaplantapparently doesnothavethiscapability.
 
===Response===
Asnotedinourresponsetoitem(1)above,theresetpanelmatrixclearlydisplaysanyisolation valvewhichisinaresetstatus.Therequirement referredtoforsystemlevelannunciation ofoverridden statusofsafetysystemsiscontained inRegulatory Guide1.47,BassedandInoerableStatusIndication forNuclearPowerPlantSafetSstemswhichwasz.ssuedznMay1973.Theextenttowhichplants,suchasR.E.Ginna,whichweredesignedandconstructed priortotheissuanceofthisRegulatory Guide,arerequiredtoimplement itsrequirements iscurrently thesubjectofgenericreviewundertheSEPprogramandTMIrelatedNRCstaffprograms.
Itisourpositionthatstatusmonitoring modifications shouldonlybemadeonanintegrated basisforallsafetysystemsinaccordance
'withcarefulconsideration oftheman-machine interface.
 
T,ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefSHEETNO.Treatingindividual systems,suchascontainment isolation, withoutregardtomaintaining aconsistent=
statusmonitoring approachtoallsafetysystemscouldleadtooperatorconfusion anderror.3.Theinstrumentation andcontrolsystemsprovidedtoinitiateengineered safetyfeaturesshouldbedesignedandqualified assafetygradeequipment.
Discussthequalification oftheisolation channelandradiation channelequipment.
inthisregard.Response:
Thecontainment isolation system,including theactuating
: channels, wasdesignedandconstructed asaClassIEsystem.Qualification ofelectrical andISCequipment hasbeendescribed inourreporttoA.Schwencer, datedFebruary24,1978,onthesubject."Environmental Qualification ofElectrical Equipment, R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUnitNo.1".Thistopiciscurrently beingreviewedgenerically undertheSEPprogram.4.Theoverriding orresetting oftheisolation actuation signalshouldnotcausetheautomatic motionofanyEngineered SafetyFeaturevalve.YourletterofOctober17,1979andNovember19,1979indicatethatamodification isplannedfortheupcomingMarchrefueling outage.Describehowthemodification willpreventautomatic valvepositionchangesonresetting ofisolation logic,including schematic diagramsorsketchesasnecessary.
 
===Response===
Thedetaileddesignofthecontainment isolation modification whichrequiresindividual resetforeachisolation valveisbeingreviewedaspartoftheShort-Term LessonsLearnedProgram.Verytrulyyours,L.D.Whie,Jr.LDW:np}}

Revision as of 14:53, 29 June 2018

Responds to NRC 800211 Ltr Re Addl Info on Containment Purge & Vent Sys.Existing Sys Being Modified Per NUREG-0578 to Require Individual Resetting of Any Containment Isolation Valve Required to Open When Initiating Signal Present
ML17249A779
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/17/1980
From: WHITE L D
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: ZIEMANN D L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0578, RTR-NUREG-578, TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8003240381
Download: ML17249A779 (6)


Text

REGULATORY ORMATIONDISTRIBUTION SYS9(RIDS)ACCESSION NBRt8003240381 DOC~DATE;80/03/17NOTARIZED!

NODOCKETFACIL;50204RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantiUnitliRochester G05000244AUTH,NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION WHITE,L,D, Rochester Gas8ElectricCorp.RECIPNNAME.RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ZIEMANNiD

~L,Operating ReactorsBranch2

SUBJECT:

RespondstoNRC'00211 ltrreaddiinfo,oncontainment purge8ventsysExisting sysbeingmodifiedperNUREG0578to.requireindividua'1 resetting ofanyconta,inment isolatiop

-valverequiredtoIopenwheninitiating signalpresents1DISTRISUTION CODE:ASSESCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR lENCL-4SIZEI-~----TITLE:SEPTopicsNOTES:JQ~+Ag+J1E~R.+AC~--'ECIPIENT COPIESRECIPIENT

~COPIESIDCODE/NAME LTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME LTTRENCL'CTION:

19BCOg8INTERNAL:

REGR10TA/EDO-13ENGRBR15PLANTSYSBR17EFFTTRT"SYSEXTERNAL:

03LPDR23ACRS11602NRCPDR08ISEilCOREPERFBR14REACSFTYBR-16EEBSTSGROUPLEADR07NSIC1211'11MARS51980TOTALNUMBEROF-COPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR~ENCL P~'

ZiZZZiZS/////I/I///gal//

//IIXI/I//E

//Il/II//////

SZuROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION J"'gwIIAtto,89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649LEOND.WHITE,JR.VICEPRESIDENT TELEPHONE ARE*CDDETIE546.2700March17,1980DirectorofNuclearReactorRegulation Attention:

Mr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefOperating ReactorsBranchNo.2U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

SEPTopicVI-4,Containment Isolation SystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Ziemann:

ThisletterisinresponsetoyourFebruaryll,1980letter,whichrequested thefollowing additional information concerning theGinnacontainment purgeandventsystems.1.Theoverriding ofonetypeofsafetyactuation signalshouldnotcausetheblockingofanyothertypeofsafetyactuation signaltotheisolation valves.TheGinnaplantengineered safetyfeaturesapparently haveseveraloverrides thatblockevenmanualactuation.

Response

Asstatedinourlettertoyouonthesubjectsystem,datedDecember14,1979,thecontainment purgesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovidepurgingcapability following aLOCA,whenhighcontainment radiation andSIsignalsmaybepresent,tolimitpotential hydrogenconcentrations incontainment duringthepostaccidentperiod.Inordertoperformthissafetyfunction, theresetsystemisdesignedtooverrideallcontainment isolation initiating signalsaslongasanyactuating signalispresent.TheexistingresetwithSection2.1.4requireindividual valvewhichmaybesignalispresent.actions,including systemisbeingmodifiedinaccordance andAppendixA2.1.4ofNUREG0578,toresetting ofanycontainment isolation requiredtoopenwhileaC.I.initiating Atleastthreedeliberate operatoroperation ofthecontainment isolation 80032408'I JlROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,-

ChiefSHEETNO.keyswitch,mustbeperformed bytheoperatorbeforeanytworedundant isolation valves(potential releasepath)areopened(e.g.,purgeexhaust).

Thisvirtually precludes inadvertent violation ofcontainment, isolation.

Procedures requireextensive reviewofplantconditions beforeinitiating anyactionwhichwouldrequiretheopeningofanisolation valveafteraneventwhichhascausedcontainment isolation.

Ifitweredecidedtoperformacontainment purgeduringaccidentconditions, greatcarewouldbetakenduringthisoperation.

Thepersonnel performing thissafetyfunctionwouldbeawareofthesignificance oftheaction,andwouldbepreparedtoclosethevalvesifnecessary foranyreason.Re-establishing containment isolation wouldbeaquick,simpleprocess(closingtheappropriate valveswitches).

Itisnotconsidered that.thisprocessrequiresanyfurthersimplification (suchashavingasystem-levelmanualisolation switch).Anothersetofcircumstances whereinthecontainment ventilation isolation valvesareblockedfromclosinguponreceiptofasafetyactuation signalisdescribed inourDecember14,1979letteronthissubject.Intheeventthesevalvesareopen,andhighactivity(butnoSIsignal)ispresent,administrative procedures ensurethattheresetwillnotbeuseduntilthehighactivityalarmhasbeencleared.TheSIsignalwillthusnolongerbeblocked,andbecapableofeffecting valveclosure.2.Thesystemlevelannunciation oftheoverridden statusshouldbeprovidedforeverysafetysystemimpactedwhenanoverrideisactive.TheGinnaplantapparently doesnothavethiscapability.

Response

Asnotedinourresponsetoitem(1)above,theresetpanelmatrixclearlydisplaysanyisolation valvewhichisinaresetstatus.Therequirement referredtoforsystemlevelannunciation ofoverridden statusofsafetysystemsiscontained inRegulatory Guide1.47,BassedandInoerableStatusIndication forNuclearPowerPlantSafetSstemswhichwasz.ssuedznMay1973.Theextenttowhichplants,suchasR.E.Ginna,whichweredesignedandconstructed priortotheissuanceofthisRegulatory Guide,arerequiredtoimplement itsrequirements iscurrently thesubjectofgenericreviewundertheSEPprogramandTMIrelatedNRCstaffprograms.

Itisourpositionthatstatusmonitoring modifications shouldonlybemadeonanintegrated basisforallsafetysystemsinaccordance

'withcarefulconsideration oftheman-machine interface.

T,ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefSHEETNO.Treatingindividual systems,suchascontainment isolation, withoutregardtomaintaining aconsistent=

statusmonitoring approachtoallsafetysystemscouldleadtooperatorconfusion anderror.3.Theinstrumentation andcontrolsystemsprovidedtoinitiateengineered safetyfeaturesshouldbedesignedandqualified assafetygradeequipment.

Discussthequalification oftheisolation channelandradiation channelequipment.

inthisregard.Response:

Thecontainment isolation system,including theactuating

channels, wasdesignedandconstructed asaClassIEsystem.Qualification ofelectrical andISCequipment hasbeendescribed inourreporttoA.Schwencer, datedFebruary24,1978,onthesubject."Environmental Qualification ofElectrical Equipment, R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUnitNo.1".Thistopiciscurrently beingreviewedgenerically undertheSEPprogram.4.Theoverriding orresetting oftheisolation actuation signalshouldnotcausetheautomatic motionofanyEngineered SafetyFeaturevalve.YourletterofOctober17,1979andNovember19,1979indicatethatamodification isplannedfortheupcomingMarchrefueling outage.Describehowthemodification willpreventautomatic valvepositionchangesonresetting ofisolation logic,including schematic diagramsorsketchesasnecessary.

Response

Thedetaileddesignofthecontainment isolation modification whichrequiresindividual resetforeachisolation valveisbeingreviewedaspartoftheShort-Term LessonsLearnedProgram.Verytrulyyours,L.D.Whie,Jr.LDW:np