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ThisletterisinresponsetoyourFebruaryll,1980letter,whichrequestedthefollowingadditionalinformationconcerningtheGinnacontainmentpurgeandventsystems.1.Theoverridingofonetypeofsafetyactuationsignalshouldnotcausetheblockingofanyothertypeofsafetyactuationsignaltotheisolationvalves.TheGinnaplantengineeredsafetyfeaturesapparentlyhaveseveraloverridesthatblockevenmanualactuation.Response:Asstatedinourlettertoyouonthesubjectsystem,datedDecember14,1979,thecontainmentpurgesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovidepurgingcapabilityfollowingaLOCA,whenhighcontainmentradiationandSIsignalsmaybepresent,tolimitpotentialhydrogenconcentrationsincontainmentduringthepostaccidentperiod.Inordertoperformthissafetyfunction,theresetsystemisdesignedtooverrideallcontainmentisolationinitiatingsignalsaslongasanyactuatingsignalispresent.TheexistingresetwithSection2.1.4requireindividualvalvewhichmaybesignalispresent.actions,includingsystemisbeingmodifiedinaccordanceandAppendixA2.1.4ofNUREG0578,toresettingofanycontainmentisolationrequiredtoopenwhileaC.I.initiatingAtleastthreedeliberateoperatoroperationofthecontainmentisolation80032408'I JlROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,-ChiefSHEETNO.keyswitch,mustbeperformedbytheoperatorbeforeanytworedundantisolationvalves(potentialreleasepath)areopened(e.g.,purgeexhaust).Thisvirtuallyprecludesinadvertentviolationofcontainment,isolation.Proceduresrequireextensivereviewofplantconditionsbeforeinitiatinganyactionwhichwouldrequiretheopeningofanisolationvalveafteraneventwhichhascausedcontainmentisolation.Ifitweredecidedtoperformacontainmentpurgeduringaccidentconditions,greatcarewouldbetakenduringthisoperation.Thepersonnelperformingthissafetyfunctionwouldbeawareofthesignificanceoftheaction,andwouldbepreparedtoclosethevalvesifnecessaryforanyreason.Re-establishingcontainmentisolationwouldbeaquick,simpleprocess(closingtheappropriatevalveswitches).Itisnotconsideredthat.thisprocessrequiresanyfurthersimplification(suchashavingasystem-levelmanualisolationswitch).AnothersetofcircumstanceswhereinthecontainmentventilationisolationvalvesareblockedfromclosinguponreceiptofasafetyactuationsignalisdescribedinourDecember14,1979letteronthissubject.Intheeventthesevalvesareopen,andhighactivity(butnoSIsignal)ispresent,administrativeproceduresensurethattheresetwillnotbeuseduntilthehighactivityalarmhasbeencleared.TheSIsignalwillthusnolongerbeblocked,andbecapableofeffectingvalveclosure.2.Thesystemlevelannunciationoftheoverriddenstatusshouldbeprovidedforeverysafetysystemimpactedwhenanoverrideisactive.TheGinnaplantapparentlydoesnothavethiscapability.Response:Asnotedinourresponsetoitem(1)above,theresetpanelmatrixclearlydisplaysanyisolationvalvewhichisinaresetstatus.TherequirementreferredtoforsystemlevelannunciationofoverriddenstatusofsafetysystemsiscontainedinRegulatoryGuide1.47,BassedandInoerableStatusIndicationforNuclearPowerPlantSafetSstemswhichwasz.ssuedznMay1973.Theextenttowhichplants,suchasR.E.Ginna,whichweredesignedandconstructedpriortotheissuanceofthisRegulatoryGuide,arerequiredtoimplementitsrequirementsiscurrentlythesubjectofgenericreviewundertheSEPprogramandTMIrelatedNRCstaffprograms.Itisourpositionthatstatusmonitoringmodificationsshouldonlybemadeonanintegratedbasisforallsafetysystemsinaccordance'withcarefulconsiderationoftheman-machineinterface. | ThisletterisinresponsetoyourFebruaryll,1980letter,whichrequestedthefollowingadditionalinformationconcerningtheGinnacontainmentpurgeandventsystems.1.Theoverridingofonetypeofsafetyactuationsignalshouldnotcausetheblockingofanyothertypeofsafetyactuationsignaltotheisolationvalves.TheGinnaplantengineeredsafetyfeaturesapparentlyhaveseveraloverridesthatblockevenmanualactuation.Response:Asstatedinourlettertoyouonthesubjectsystem,datedDecember14,1979,thecontainmentpurgesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovidepurgingcapabilityfollowingaLOCA,whenhighcontainmentradiationandSIsignalsmaybepresent,tolimitpotentialhydrogenconcentrationsincontainmentduringthepostaccidentperiod.Inordertoperformthissafetyfunction,theresetsystemisdesignedtooverrideallcontainmentisolationinitiatingsignalsaslongasanyactuatingsignalispresent.TheexistingresetwithSection2.1.4requireindividualvalvewhichmaybesignalispresent.actions,includingsystemisbeingmodifiedinaccordanceandAppendixA2.1.4ofNUREG0578,toresettingofanycontainmentisolationrequiredtoopenwhileaC.I.initiatingAtleastthreedeliberateoperatoroperationofthecontainmentisolation80032408'I JlROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,-ChiefSHEETNO.keyswitch,mustbeperformedbytheoperatorbeforeanytworedundantisolationvalves(potentialreleasepath)areopened(e.g.,purgeexhaust).Thisvirtuallyprecludesinadvertentviolationofcontainment,isolation.Proceduresrequireextensivereviewofplantconditionsbeforeinitiatinganyactionwhichwouldrequiretheopeningofanisolationvalveafteraneventwhichhascausedcontainmentisolation.Ifitweredecidedtoperformacontainmentpurgeduringaccidentconditions,greatcarewouldbetakenduringthisoperation.Thepersonnelperformingthissafetyfunctionwouldbeawareofthesignificanceoftheaction,andwouldbepreparedtoclosethevalvesifnecessaryforanyreason.Re-establishingcontainmentisolationwouldbeaquick,simpleprocess(closingtheappropriatevalveswitches).Itisnotconsideredthat.thisprocessrequiresanyfurthersimplification(suchashavingasystem-levelmanualisolationswitch).AnothersetofcircumstanceswhereinthecontainmentventilationisolationvalvesareblockedfromclosinguponreceiptofasafetyactuationsignalisdescribedinourDecember14,1979letteronthissubject.Intheeventthesevalvesareopen,andhighactivity(butnoSIsignal)ispresent,administrativeproceduresensurethattheresetwillnotbeuseduntilthehighactivityalarmhasbeencleared.TheSIsignalwillthusnolongerbeblocked,andbecapableofeffectingvalveclosure.2.Thesystemlevelannunciationoftheoverriddenstatusshouldbeprovidedforeverysafetysystemimpactedwhenanoverrideisactive.TheGinnaplantapparentlydoesnothavethiscapability.Response:Asnotedinourresponsetoitem(1)above,theresetpanelmatrixclearlydisplaysanyisolationvalvewhichisinaresetstatus.TherequirementreferredtoforsystemlevelannunciationofoverriddenstatusofsafetysystemsiscontainedinRegulatoryGuide1.47,BassedandInoerableStatusIndicationforNuclearPowerPlantSafetSstemswhichwasz.ssuedznMay1973.Theextenttowhichplants,suchasR.E.Ginna,whichweredesignedandconstructedpriortotheissuanceofthisRegulatoryGuide,arerequiredtoimplementitsrequirementsiscurrentlythesubjectofgenericreviewundertheSEPprogramandTMIrelatedNRCstaffprograms.Itisourpositionthatstatusmonitoringmodificationsshouldonlybemadeonanintegratedbasisforallsafetysystemsinaccordance'withcarefulconsiderationoftheman-machineinterface. | ||
T,ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefSHEETNO.Treatingindividualsystems,suchascontainmentisolation,withoutregardtomaintainingaconsistent=statusmonitoringapproachtoallsafetysystemscouldleadtooperatorconfusionanderror.3.Theinstrumentationandcontrolsystemsprovidedtoinitiateengineeredsafetyfeaturesshouldbedesignedandqualifiedassafetygradeequipment.Discussthequalificationoftheisolationchannelandradiationchannelequipment.inthisregard.Response:Thecontainmentisolationsystem,includingtheactuatingchannels,wasdesignedandconstructedasaClassIEsystem.QualificationofelectricalandISCequipmenthasbeendescribedinourreporttoA.Schwencer,datedFebruary24,1978,onthesubject."EnvironmentalQualificationofElectricalEquipment,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUnitNo.1".ThistopiciscurrentlybeingreviewedgenericallyundertheSEPprogram.4.TheoverridingorresettingoftheisolationactuationsignalshouldnotcausetheautomaticmotionofanyEngineeredSafetyFeaturevalve.YourletterofOctober17,1979andNovember19,1979indicatethatamodificationisplannedfortheupcomingMarchrefuelingoutage.Describehowthemodificationwillpreventautomaticvalvepositionchangesonresettingofisolationlogic,includingschematicdiagramsorsketchesasnecessary.Response:ThedetaileddesignofthecontainmentisolationmodificationwhichrequiresindividualresetforeachisolationvalveisbeingreviewedaspartoftheShort-TermLessonsLearnedProgram.Verytrulyyours,L.D.Whie,Jr.LDW:np | T,ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefSHEETNO.Treatingindividualsystems,suchascontainmentisolation,withoutregardtomaintainingaconsistent=statusmonitoringapproachtoallsafetysystemscouldleadtooperatorconfusionanderror.3.Theinstrumentationandcontrolsystemsprovidedtoinitiateengineeredsafetyfeaturesshouldbedesignedandqualifiedassafetygradeequipment.Discussthequalificationoftheisolationchannelandradiationchannelequipment.inthisregard.Response:Thecontainmentisolationsystem,includingtheactuatingchannels,wasdesignedandconstructedasaClassIEsystem.QualificationofelectricalandISCequipmenthasbeendescribedinourreporttoA.Schwencer,datedFebruary24,1978,onthesubject."EnvironmentalQualificationofElectricalEquipment,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUnitNo.1".ThistopiciscurrentlybeingreviewedgenericallyundertheSEPprogram.4.TheoverridingorresettingoftheisolationactuationsignalshouldnotcausetheautomaticmotionofanyEngineeredSafetyFeaturevalve.YourletterofOctober17,1979andNovember19,1979indicatethatamodificationisplannedfortheupcomingMarchrefuelingoutage.Describehowthemodificationwillpreventautomaticvalvepositionchangesonresettingofisolationlogic,includingschematicdiagramsorsketchesasnecessary.Response:ThedetaileddesignofthecontainmentisolationmodificationwhichrequiresindividualresetforeachisolationvalveisbeingreviewedaspartoftheShort-TermLessonsLearnedProgram.Verytrulyyours,L.D.Whie,Jr.LDW:np}} | ||
}} |
Revision as of 14:25, 18 May 2018
ML17249A779 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Ginna |
Issue date: | 03/17/1980 |
From: | WHITE L D ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
To: | ZIEMANN D L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
RTR-NUREG-0578, RTR-NUREG-578, TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8003240381 | |
Download: ML17249A779 (6) | |
Text
REGULATORYORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYS9(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBRt8003240381DOC~DATE;80/03/17NOTARIZED!NODOCKETFACIL;50204RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantiUnitliRochesterG05000244AUTH,NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONWHITE,L,D,RochesterGas8ElectricCorp.RECIPNNAME.RECIPIENTAFFILIATIONZIEMANNiD~L,OperatingReactorsBranch2
SUBJECT:
RespondstoNRC'00211ltrreaddiinfo,oncontainmentpurge8ventsysExistingsysbeingmodifiedperNUREG0578to.requireindividua'1resettingofanyconta,inmentisolatiop-valverequiredtoIopenwheninitiatingsignalpresents1DISTRISUTIONCODE:ASSESCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRlENCL-4SIZEI-~----TITLE:SEPTopicsNOTES:JQ~+Ag+J1E~R.+AC~--'ECIPIENTCOPIESRECIPIENT~COPIESIDCODE/NAMELTTRENCLIDCODE/NAMELTTRENCL'CTION:19BCOg8INTERNAL:REGR10TA/EDO-13ENGRBR15PLANTSYSBR17EFFTTRT"SYSEXTERNAL:03LPDR23ACRS11602NRCPDR08ISEilCOREPERFBR14REACSFTYBR-16EEBSTSGROUPLEADR07NSIC1211'11MARS51980TOTALNUMBEROF-COPIESREQUIRED:LTTR~ENCL P~'
ZiZZZiZS/////I/I///gal////IIXI/I//E//Il/II//////SZuROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONJ"'gwIIAtto,89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,N.Y.14649LEOND.WHITE,JR.VICEPRESIDENTTELEPHONEARE*CDDETIE546.2700March17,1980DirectorofNuclearReactorRegulationAttention:Mr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefOperatingReactorsBranchNo.2U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555
Subject:
SEPTopicVI-4,ContainmentIsolationSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244
DearMr.Ziemann:
ThisletterisinresponsetoyourFebruaryll,1980letter,whichrequestedthefollowingadditionalinformationconcerningtheGinnacontainmentpurgeandventsystems.1.Theoverridingofonetypeofsafetyactuationsignalshouldnotcausetheblockingofanyothertypeofsafetyactuationsignaltotheisolationvalves.TheGinnaplantengineeredsafetyfeaturesapparentlyhaveseveraloverridesthatblockevenmanualactuation.Response:Asstatedinourlettertoyouonthesubjectsystem,datedDecember14,1979,thecontainmentpurgesystemhasbeendesignedtoprovidepurgingcapabilityfollowingaLOCA,whenhighcontainmentradiationandSIsignalsmaybepresent,tolimitpotentialhydrogenconcentrationsincontainmentduringthepostaccidentperiod.Inordertoperformthissafetyfunction,theresetsystemisdesignedtooverrideallcontainmentisolationinitiatingsignalsaslongasanyactuatingsignalispresent.TheexistingresetwithSection2.1.4requireindividualvalvewhichmaybesignalispresent.actions,includingsystemisbeingmodifiedinaccordanceandAppendixA2.1.4ofNUREG0578,toresettingofanycontainmentisolationrequiredtoopenwhileaC.I.initiatingAtleastthreedeliberateoperatoroperationofthecontainmentisolation80032408'I JlROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,-ChiefSHEETNO.keyswitch,mustbeperformedbytheoperatorbeforeanytworedundantisolationvalves(potentialreleasepath)areopened(e.g.,purgeexhaust).Thisvirtuallyprecludesinadvertentviolationofcontainment,isolation.Proceduresrequireextensivereviewofplantconditionsbeforeinitiatinganyactionwhichwouldrequiretheopeningofanisolationvalveafteraneventwhichhascausedcontainmentisolation.Ifitweredecidedtoperformacontainmentpurgeduringaccidentconditions,greatcarewouldbetakenduringthisoperation.Thepersonnelperformingthissafetyfunctionwouldbeawareofthesignificanceoftheaction,andwouldbepreparedtoclosethevalvesifnecessaryforanyreason.Re-establishingcontainmentisolationwouldbeaquick,simpleprocess(closingtheappropriatevalveswitches).Itisnotconsideredthat.thisprocessrequiresanyfurthersimplification(suchashavingasystem-levelmanualisolationswitch).AnothersetofcircumstanceswhereinthecontainmentventilationisolationvalvesareblockedfromclosinguponreceiptofasafetyactuationsignalisdescribedinourDecember14,1979letteronthissubject.Intheeventthesevalvesareopen,andhighactivity(butnoSIsignal)ispresent,administrativeproceduresensurethattheresetwillnotbeuseduntilthehighactivityalarmhasbeencleared.TheSIsignalwillthusnolongerbeblocked,andbecapableofeffectingvalveclosure.2.Thesystemlevelannunciationoftheoverriddenstatusshouldbeprovidedforeverysafetysystemimpactedwhenanoverrideisactive.TheGinnaplantapparentlydoesnothavethiscapability.Response:Asnotedinourresponsetoitem(1)above,theresetpanelmatrixclearlydisplaysanyisolationvalvewhichisinaresetstatus.TherequirementreferredtoforsystemlevelannunciationofoverriddenstatusofsafetysystemsiscontainedinRegulatoryGuide1.47,BassedandInoerableStatusIndicationforNuclearPowerPlantSafetSstemswhichwasz.ssuedznMay1973.Theextenttowhichplants,suchasR.E.Ginna,whichweredesignedandconstructedpriortotheissuanceofthisRegulatoryGuide,arerequiredtoimplementitsrequirementsiscurrentlythesubjectofgenericreviewundertheSEPprogramandTMIrelatedNRCstaffprograms.Itisourpositionthatstatusmonitoringmodificationsshouldonlybemadeonanintegratedbasisforallsafetysystemsinaccordance'withcarefulconsiderationoftheman-machineinterface.
T,ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCP.DATEMarch17,1980ToMr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefSHEETNO.Treatingindividualsystems,suchascontainmentisolation,withoutregardtomaintainingaconsistent=statusmonitoringapproachtoallsafetysystemscouldleadtooperatorconfusionanderror.3.Theinstrumentationandcontrolsystemsprovidedtoinitiateengineeredsafetyfeaturesshouldbedesignedandqualifiedassafetygradeequipment.Discussthequalificationoftheisolationchannelandradiationchannelequipment.inthisregard.Response:Thecontainmentisolationsystem,includingtheactuatingchannels,wasdesignedandconstructedasaClassIEsystem.QualificationofelectricalandISCequipmenthasbeendescribedinourreporttoA.Schwencer,datedFebruary24,1978,onthesubject."EnvironmentalQualificationofElectricalEquipment,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUnitNo.1".ThistopiciscurrentlybeingreviewedgenericallyundertheSEPprogram.4.TheoverridingorresettingoftheisolationactuationsignalshouldnotcausetheautomaticmotionofanyEngineeredSafetyFeaturevalve.YourletterofOctober17,1979andNovember19,1979indicatethatamodificationisplannedfortheupcomingMarchrefuelingoutage.Describehowthemodificationwillpreventautomaticvalvepositionchangesonresettingofisolationlogic,includingschematicdiagramsorsketchesasnecessary.Response:ThedetaileddesignofthecontainmentisolationmodificationwhichrequiresindividualresetforeachisolationvalveisbeingreviewedaspartoftheShort-TermLessonsLearnedProgram.Verytrulyyours,L.D.Whie,Jr.LDW:np