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DEVIATIONREQUESTNO.11PAGENO.1APPENDIXRDEVIATIONREUESTHVACPENETRATIONSREACTORBUILDINGFIREWALLSDEVIATIONREVEST:Werequestapprovalofthefollowing:Fireratedwallsbetweenfireareaswhichhaveacombustibleload(in-situandtransient)onbothsidesofthewallofonehourorlessareacceptableasFireAreaBoundarieswithoutfiredampersinstalledinthehorizontalventilationductsthatpenetratethewalls.FIREAREASAFFECTED:Thisdeviationappliestoanyfirewallwherethefireloading[in-situandtransient]oneachsideofthewallislessthan1-hour.REASONFORDEVIATIONREUEST:NRCguidanceto10CFR50AppendixRSectionIII.G.2requiresthatfireareasshallhavethreehourbarriers,andsuchbarriersshallhavefirerateddampersinstalledatductpenetrations.VariousfirewallswithintheUnit1andUnit2ReactorBuildinghaveventilationsystem(HVAC)ductpenetrationswithoutfiredampersthusrenderingtheratingofthebarrierlessthanthreehours.EXISTINGCONDITIONS:Themaximumcombustibleloading[in-situandtransient]islessthan1-hour.JUSTIFICATION:TheNationalFireProtectionAssociation"FireProtectionHandbook"(14thedition,page7-64)states:"Inthegaugescommonlyused,somesheetmetalductsmayprotectanopeninginabuildingconstructionassemblyforupto1-hour,ifproperlyhungandadequatelyfirestopped.Therefore,ductspassingthroughfirebarriershavingaratingofupto1-hourfireresistancecanbeassumedtopresentnoextraordinaryhazard.Ifthewall,partition,ceilingorfloorisrequiredtohaveafireresistanceratingofmorethan1-hour,afiredamperisrequired  
DEVIATIONREQUESTNO.11PAGENO.1APPENDIXRDEVIATIONREUESTHVACPENETRATIONSREACTORBUILDINGFIREWALLSDEVIATIONREVEST:Werequestapprovalofthefollowing:Fireratedwallsbetweenfireareaswhichhaveacombustibleload(in-situandtransient)onbothsidesofthewallofonehourorlessareacceptableasFireAreaBoundarieswithoutfiredampersinstalledinthehorizontalventilationductsthatpenetratethewalls.FIREAREASAFFECTED:Thisdeviationappliestoanyfirewallwherethefireloading[in-situandtransient]oneachsideofthewallislessthan1-hour.REASONFORDEVIATIONREUEST:NRCguidanceto10CFR50AppendixRSectionIII.G.2requiresthatfireareasshallhavethreehourbarriers,andsuchbarriersshallhavefirerateddampersinstalledatductpenetrations.VariousfirewallswithintheUnit1andUnit2ReactorBuildinghaveventilationsystem(HVAC)ductpenetrationswithoutfiredampersthusrenderingtheratingofthebarrierlessthanthreehours.EXISTINGCONDITIONS:Themaximumcombustibleloading[in-situandtransient]islessthan1-hour.JUSTIFICATION:TheNationalFireProtectionAssociation"FireProtectionHandbook"(14thedition,page7-64)states:"Inthegaugescommonlyused,somesheetmetalductsmayprotectanopeninginabuildingconstructionassemblyforupto1-hour,ifproperlyhungandadequatelyfirestopped.Therefore,ductspassingthroughfirebarriershavingaratingofupto1-hourfireresistancecanbeassumedtopresentnoextraordinaryhazard.Ifthewall,partition,ceilingorfloorisrequiredtohaveafireresistanceratingofmorethan1-hour,afiredamperisrequired  
<<gfffP,nVN, DEVIATIONREQUESTNO.11PAGENO.2The18-gaugeminimumductsusedatSusquehannaareheavierthanthecommonlyusedgaugesreferredtobytheNFPAStatement.Theductsareseismicallyhungandadequatelyfirestopped.A1-hourfiretestofhorizontalsteelductswithoutafiredamperatthefirewallpenetrationswasconductedbyUnderwritersLaboratoriesusingASTHE-119criteria.Thetestconfirmsthevalidity,oftheNFPAstatement.ThetestreportisAttachmentNumber1tothisrequest.www/rpk20224li I,a~I\ji1P~,(I,Klll')*  
<<gfffP,nVN, DEVIATIONREQUESTNO.11PAGENO.2The18-gaugeminimumductsusedatSusquehannaareheavierthanthecommonlyusedgaugesreferredtobytheNFPAStatement.Theductsareseismicallyhungandadequatelyfirestopped.A1-hourfiretestofhorizontalsteelductswithoutafiredamperatthefirewallpenetrationswasconductedbyUnderwritersLaboratoriesusingASTHE-119criteria.Thetestconfirmsthevalidity,oftheNFPAstatement.ThetestreportisAttachmentNumber1tothisrequest.www/rpk20224li I,a~I\ji1P~,(I,Klll')*}}
}}

Revision as of 00:33, 18 May 2018

Forwards Response to NRC Concerns Re Plant Fire Protection Program,Including Criteria for Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Sys within Fire Zone Not Complying W/Requirements of Section Iii.G & Analysis of Associated Circuits
ML18040A795
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/18/1985
From: KEISER H W
PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: ADENSAM E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18040A797 List:
References
PLA-2566, NUDOCS 8512230165
Download: ML18040A795 (24)


Text

REGULATORY.FORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR;8512230165DOC~DATE+85/12/18NOTARIZED:NODOCKETFACIL:50387Susquehanna.SteamElectricStationsUnit1-,Pennsylva0500038750-388SusquehannaSteamElectricStationpUnit2'gPennsylva05000388AUTH~NAME.AUTHORAFFILIATIONKEISERrH.WEPennsy)vaniaPowerLLightCo,RECIP,NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONADENSAMgE,BWRProjectDirectorate3sc~p+

SUBJECT:

ForwardsresponsetoNRCconcernsre,plantfireprotectionprogram~includingcriteriaforfire'rotectionofsafe'hutdown;syswithinfirezonenotcomplyingw/requirementsofSectionIII,G8analysisofassociatedcircuits.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A002DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRg'NCLf.'IZE;:I>~17%TITLE:ORSubmittal:InadequateCoreCooling(ItemII~F.2)GL8?<<28NOTES:1cyNMSS/FCAF/PM.LPDR2cysTranscripts.QL:07/17/82'cyNMSS/FCAF/PM'PDR2cysTranscripts",OLe03/23/840500038705000388RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEBWRPD3PDCAMPAGNONECOPIESLTTRENCL1122RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEBWRPD3LACOPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL;ACRS'RRBWRDIRNRRPWRADIRNRRSHEA,JNRRODIR1710101111012211OQ11ADM/LFMBNRRBWRPD1NRRPWRBDIRNRR/DHFTDIRNRR/ORAS08RGN107101111~1111EXTERNAL:24XNRCPDRNOTES:02-111133LPDRNSIC03062211TOTALSNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR30'NCL33 PennsylvaniaPower8LightCompanyTwoNorthNinthStreet~Allentown,PA18101~215/770.5151HaroldW.KeiserVicePresident-NuclearOperations215/770-7502DEC181985DirectorofNuclearReactorRegulationAttention:Ms.E.Adensam,ProjectDirectorBWRProjectDirectorateNo.3DivisionofLicensingU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,DC20555SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATIONRESOLUTIONOFFIREPROTECTIONPROGRAMCONCERNSER100450FILE841-2,143PLA-2566DocketNo.50-38750-388

DearMs.Adensam:

Thisletterisprovidedinresponse'totheNRCstaff'sconcernsregardingtheFireProtectionProgramatSusquehannaSES.Specifically,itaddressestheconcernsregardingthecriteriaforfireprotectionofsafeshutdownsystemswithinafirezonewhichdoesnotcomplywiththerequirementsofSectionIIIGandanalysisofassociatedcircuitswithinfirezonesoutsidethecontrolroom.Summaryreportsaddressingeachoftheseconcernsareattached.PP&LhasinitiatedthedevelopmentofacomputerizedAppendixRsafeshutdownanalysisprogram.Wewillcomparetheresultsfromthisprogramwiththeworkwhichwehavecompletedtodate.Thisprogram,inadditiontogivingusafirmandauditableanalysisbyshutdownpath,wouldalsoenhanceourabilitytomaintainourAppendixRcommitmentsandallowustoexpeditiouslyevaluatetheeffectsofplantchangeswithrespecttothesecommitments.Wedonotanticipatesignificantchangesintheinformationpreviouslysubmittedtoyou.WeexpectthiscomparisontobecompletedbytheFourthQuarter1986ortheFirstQuarter1987.Ifanyplantmodificationsshouldbeidentifiedinthiscomparisonprocess,wewilldiscusstheirimplementationschedulewithyou.Wewillmaintainourpreviouslycommittedscheduleforcompletingthealreadyidentifiedplantmodifications.Verytrulyyours,H.W.KeiserVicePresident-NuclearOperationscc:M.J.Campagnone-NRCR.H.Jacobs-NRC SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATIONUNITS1&2FIREPROTECTIONPROGRAMAPPENDIXRSUGARYREPORTFORCONCERN$/2'CRITERIAFORFIREPROTECTIONOFSAFESHUTDOWNSYSTEMSWITHINAFIREZONEWHICHDONOTCOMPLYWITHTHEREQUIREMENTS,OFSECTION,III.GDOCKETNOS.50-38750-388851223016) gggp~~gg\r3,~gpggggag~ggt'ggggg'~g SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATION-UNITS1&2FIREPROTECTIONPROGRAM-CONCERN82DOCKETNOS.50-38750-388SUMMARYREPORTINDEXPAGESECTION

1.0INTRODUCTION

........................................1SECTION2.0METHODOLOGYUTILIZED................................1SECTION3.0ASSUMPTIONS&NRCGUIDANCE..........................2SECTION4.0LISTINGOFDEVIATIONS...............................2SECTION5.0RESULTS.............................................3SECTION6.0IDENTIFICATIONOFMODIFICATIONS.....................5SECTION7.0SCHEDULE............................................5SECTION8.0COMPENSATORYMEASURES...............................6SECTION

9.0CONCLUSION

..........................................6APPENDIXAAPPENDIXBDEVIATIONREQUESTSTABLE:FIREAREASVSDEVIATIONREQUESTS 4II44eee~4~4~4~e4I~~~4n4~,~4I~~

SUSQUEHANNASTEAMELECTRICSTATION-UNITS1&2FIREPROTECTIONPROGRAMDOCKETNOS.50-38750-388SUMMARYREPORTCONCERN82:CRITERIAFORFIREPROTECTIONOFSAFESHUTDOWNSYSTEMSWITHINAFIREZONEWHICHDONOTCOMPLYWITHTHEREUIREMENTSOFSECTIONIII.G(DeviationRequestResponse)

1.0INTRODUCTION

Asaresultofauditsperformedinthefirstquarterof1985ontheFireProtectionProgramatSusquehannaSteamElectricStation(SSES),theNRC,inaletterdatedApril18,1985,issuedastatementoftheirconcernsrelatedtotheSSESFireProtectionProgram.Subsequently,PP&LissuedaletternumberedPLA-2482datedJune11,1985,whichdescribedeachoftheNRCconcernsanddelineatedthedescriptionoftheconcern,adescriptionofPP&L'smethodofresolutionoftheNRCconcernandadescriptionofPP&L'sdeliverablestotheNRC.AlloftheseitemswerediscussedwithandagreedtobytheNRCstaff.TheintentofthisreportistoprovidearesolutiontoConcern82,CriteriaforFireProtectionofSafeShutdownSystemsWithinaFireZoneWhichDoNotComplyWiththeRequirementsofSectionIII.G,byidentifyingallapplicabledeviationrequests.Justificationisprovidedtoshowthatacommensuratelevelofprotectionhasbeenprovidedtoassuresafetyisachievedanddeviationsfrom10CFR50,AppendixR,SectionIII.Gareacceptable.2.0METHODOLOGYUTILIZEDPP&L,hasreviewedeachFireAreaidentifiedintheFireBarrierAnalysisandappliedthemethodologyasdescribedbelow:a)Eachspecificrequirementof10CFR50,AppendixR,SectionIII.Gwasidentified.b)SpecificguidanceandinformationfromGenericLetters83-33,and85-01andInformationNotice84-09waslistedwiththeappropriateAppendixRrequirement.c)Fireprotectionfeaturesforeachfireareawhichcontainessentialsafeshutdownraceways,werecomparedtoeachAppendixRrequirementandrelatedguidanceinordertodeterminecompliance.

II'4r d)WhenaFireAreawasfoundtobeincompliance,themethodsofcomplianceweredocumented.e)DeviationsfromrequirementswereidentifiedanddatatodescribetheFireAreaandsupportthejustificationforthedeviationwascollected.f)Deviationsrequestswerewritten.ORg)Additionalanalysiswasperformedorcorrectiveactionwasidentifiedasanalternativetopreparingdeviationrequests.3.0ASSUMPTIONSANDNRCGUIDANCE3.1ThisresponsewasbasedonthefollowingNRCdocuments.a)b)c)d)10CFR50,AppendixR,SectionIII.GNRCGenericLetter83-33IEInformationNotice84-09NRCGenericLetter85-013.2Thefollowingassumptionswereusedinformulatingthisresponse.3.2.1FireAreasasidentifiedinPPGLresponsetoConcernf/1UnratedFireBarrierAnalysis(PLA-2529,September4,1985)areacceptable.Changestothosefireareasmaychangetheseexemptionrequests.3.2.2Itwasassumedthattherequirementforfiresuppressionin10CFR50,AppendixRIII.G.3appliestobothIII.G.3aandIII.G.3b.3.2.3ItwasassumeddeviationsfromNFPAcodeswhichconcernthedetectionsystemmonitoringfunctionsandcontrolroomresponsedonotrequireadeviationrequest.ThesedeviationshavealreadybeenidentifiedinSection3.2,Item95oftheFireProtectionReviewReportRevision1and2.3.2.4Itwasassumedthatallexistingfireratedbarriers(1.5,2,and3hrs.)whichwereapprovedbyNRCinSERRev.0areacceptableasfireareaboundaries.4.0LISTINGOFDEVIATIONS4.1Previousdeviationrequestnumbers1through7weresubmittedonSeptember4,1985(PLA-2529)asPP&L'sresponsetoNRCConcern//1and4b.

5~k,'IIIrL'wW,~l'4,~p'1f 4.2TheNRChaspreviouslyapprovedtwoexemptionrequests.Wehaveassignedtherequestfor"One-HourWrapWithoutSprinklersforFireZones1-2D,0-2Band0-28H",datedFebruary9,1982,(PLA-1013),asRequest88.Therequest.for"SpacingCloserthan20feetWithouta1-HourWrapforEquipmentinFireZone2-5A"datedDecember13,1983(PLA-1985)asRequest89.ThesewereapprovedbytheNRCinSERSupplements734and/36,respectively.H4.3Request/310concernsafutureplantmodificationrelatedtothefifthdieselgeneratorinstallationwhichwillbetransmittedseparatefromthisresponse.4.4AppendixAtothis'reportcontainstheremainderofPP&L'sdeviationrequests.5.0RESULTS5.1AsdescribedinSection4.0,DeviationRequests11-23containedinAppendixAtothisreportandpreviousrequests1through9,comprisePP&L'sresponsetoNRCConcern//2,CriteriaForFireProtectionofSafeShutdownSystemsWithinaFireZoneWhichDoNotComplyWiththeRequirementsofSectionIII.G.5.2Thefollowingconditionswereidentifiedthroughouranalysis.Thespecificactionstobringeachconditionintocompliancearegivenbelow:A)Condition:FireZones0-26Mand0-26Rcontainedessentialsafeshutdownraceway.TheracewayseparationsatisfytherequirementsofRegulatoryGuide1.75.Thephysicalarrangementofthecablechasesprecludedtransientcombustibles.FixedC02firesuppressionwasprovided.Thisconfigurationwaspreviously.usedasajustificationfornotprotectingtheessentialsafeshutdownracewayswithaonehourfireratedbarrier.Action:ThesezonesarenowpartofFireAreaCS-9(ControlRoom)whichusesalternateshutdownpaths.FireZone0-26Mand0-26RwerereanalyzedtoassurethatcablesinthesezonesdidnotpreventsafeshutdownusingAlternateShutdownPathsasanalyzedfortheControlRoomAnalysis.AsaresultofthisanalysissupportingConcernNo.4badeviationrequestisnotrequired.Thefollowingracewayinfirezone0-26Rwillbewrappedwitha1-hourbarrier:B2K006 hghytflcf B)Condition:FireZones2-5A,1-3Aand1-4Acontainedsomeracewaysnotwrappedfrom"walltowall"andtheseracewaysarenotencompassedbyDeviationRequestt/13.Action:TheracewaysinFireZone2-5Awerereanalyzedandprotectionisnotrequiredforthefollowingraceways:E2PK43E2PK44E2P373F2P375F2P773F2P774F2P803Thefollowingracewayswhicharenotcompletelywrappedwithafireratedbarrierbetweenfirezoneboundarieswillbeprovidedwithafireratedwrapfromwalltowall:1-3A-'Hourrequiredbecausetherearenosprinklers.F1M4341W300F1KL12131415FlKH121314151-4AF1K017C)Condition:FireZones1-5Band2-5BcontainedbothDivisionIandDivisionIICoreSprayValvesandCable.Thesefirezonescontainedlowcombustibleloadinganda6-footseparationwasconsideredjustified.Action:SincethisconditionanditsjustificationdoesnotsupporttheconclusionsdrawnforthesefirezonesintheFireBarrierAnalysis,wehavedecidednottosubmitadeviationrequest.Thesezoneshavebeenreanalyzedtodemonstrateothersafeshutdownpathsareavailable.ThiswillresultinachangetothedescriptionsofFireZone1-5B(RCICpathtobeadded)and2-5B(HPCIPathtobeadded)intheFireBarrierAnalysisReport.

4VV~44ff~IIIIf,I4'IVfII4II\44VfV'M~IYVII81I4f~III444'rl~f'41yyf~

ThefollowingadditionalracewaywillbewrappedtoassuretheavailabilityoftheHPCIPathforZone2-5BandtheRCICPathforFireZone1-5B.'Zone1-5BJB1253E1K053E1K489Zone2-5BE2KK24E2KK25E2KK26E2KK27E2K1C8D2P006D)Condition:FireAreaCS-7containsaminorityessentialraceway.Thelowcombustibleloading,separationofracewaysinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.75,limitedspacefortransientcombustibles,andfixedCOfiresuppressionwasthepreviousjustificationfornotprovidinga1-hourfireratedbarrier.ThelossoftheminorityracewaywouldresultinthelossoftheDivisionISwitchgearCoolingFancontrolcircuit.Action:ThisfancanbestartedremotelyusingtheinterimproceduresprovidedasaresultofControlRoomFireAnalysiswhichwasourresponsetoNRCConcern84b.Therefore,adeviationrequestwillnotbesubmitted,andthepermanentmodificationforthefancircuitsasoutlinedintheControlRoomAnalysisConcerni4bwillbe'mplementedtoalsocorrectthisproblem.6.0MODIFICATIONSTheonlymodificationsidentifiedaretheracewayswhichrequireadditionalwrappingandwereidentifiedinSection5.2.7.0SCHEDULEAnymodificationscommittedtointhisreportwillbeaccomplishedinaccordancewiththescheduleprovidedbelow.Thecommitmentdateistiedtotheendofoutagereferenced.Actualdatesprovidedareforoutagetimeframereferenceonly.ThisisthesamescheduleidentifiedinourresponsetoNRCConcerns1and4b(PLA-2529,9/4/85).

uewtI' UNITModificationinUnitPl&CommonModificationinUnit82COMPLETEDBYEndofUnit//13rdRefuelingOutageEndofUnitf/22ndRefuelingOutageREFERENCEDATEOctober23,1987April29,19888.0COMPENSATORYMEASURESCompensatorymeasurescurrentlyinplacewillremaininplaceuntilallidentifiedmodificationsarecompleted.

9.0CONCLUSION

Uponcompletionoftheidentifiedmodificationsandwiththeacceptanceofalldeviationrequestsidentifiedherein,theNRC'sconcernsrelatedtoConcernF2,CriteriaForFireProtection'ofSafeShutdownSystemsWithinAFireZoneWhichDoNotComplyWiththeRequirementsofSectionIII.G,willberesolved.dk/g075a:krp II~~'li)IggI8~N('I'f'~I(I(I~4('Ig$)~~""IVIIgI,I(o.P SUSQUERQHHR'S~ELECTRZCSTATZCHUNZTS1&2PZREPROTECT+Paar+-CONCERNS2DOCKETSNOi50-38750-388APPENDXXADEVXATZONREQUESTS

DEVIATIONREQUESTNO.11PAGENO.1APPENDIXRDEVIATIONREUESTHVACPENETRATIONSREACTORBUILDINGFIREWALLSDEVIATIONREVEST:Werequestapprovalofthefollowing:Fireratedwallsbetweenfireareaswhichhaveacombustibleload(in-situandtransient)onbothsidesofthewallofonehourorlessareacceptableasFireAreaBoundarieswithoutfiredampersinstalledinthehorizontalventilationductsthatpenetratethewalls.FIREAREASAFFECTED:Thisdeviationappliestoanyfirewallwherethefireloading[in-situandtransient]oneachsideofthewallislessthan1-hour.REASONFORDEVIATIONREUEST:NRCguidanceto10CFR50AppendixRSectionIII.G.2requiresthatfireareasshallhavethreehourbarriers,andsuchbarriersshallhavefirerateddampersinstalledatductpenetrations.VariousfirewallswithintheUnit1andUnit2ReactorBuildinghaveventilationsystem(HVAC)ductpenetrationswithoutfiredampersthusrenderingtheratingofthebarrierlessthanthreehours.EXISTINGCONDITIONS:Themaximumcombustibleloading[in-situandtransient]islessthan1-hour.JUSTIFICATION:TheNationalFireProtectionAssociation"FireProtectionHandbook"(14thedition,page7-64)states:"Inthegaugescommonlyused,somesheetmetalductsmayprotectanopeninginabuildingconstructionassemblyforupto1-hour,ifproperlyhungandadequatelyfirestopped.Therefore,ductspassingthroughfirebarriershavingaratingofupto1-hourfireresistancecanbeassumedtopresentnoextraordinaryhazard.Ifthewall,partition,ceilingorfloorisrequiredtohaveafireresistanceratingofmorethan1-hour,afiredamperisrequired

<<gfffP,nVN, DEVIATIONREQUESTNO.11PAGENO.2The18-gaugeminimumductsusedatSusquehannaareheavierthanthecommonlyusedgaugesreferredtobytheNFPAStatement.Theductsareseismicallyhungandadequatelyfirestopped.A1-hourfiretestofhorizontalsteelductswithoutafiredamperatthefirewallpenetrationswasconductedbyUnderwritersLaboratoriesusingASTHE-119criteria.Thetestconfirmsthevalidity,oftheNFPAstatement.ThetestreportisAttachmentNumber1tothisrequest.www/rpk20224li I,a~I\ji1P~,(I,Klll')*