ML18040B129
| ML18040B129 | |
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| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1985 |
| From: | UNDERWRITERS LABORATORY, INC. |
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Text
File NC505-12 Project 84NK29824 April 17, 1985 FACT-FINDING REPORT on AIR DUCT PENETRATIONS THROUGH ONE HOUR FIRE RESISTIVE WALL ASSEMBLY s
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333 PflNCSTEN ROAD NORTNBBOOK, ILLINOls60063 an independent, not-for-profit organizatt'on testing for pubHc safety File NC505-12 Project 84NK29824 April 17, 1985 FACT-FINDING REPORT on AIR DUCT PENETRATIONS THROUGH ONE HOUR FIRE RESISTIVE WALL ASSEMBLY American Iron and Steel Institute Washington, D.C.
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Copyright C 1985 Underwriters Laboratories Inc.
Underwriters Laboratories Inc. authorizes the above named company to reproduce this Report provided in its entirety.
it is reproduced Fact,-Finding Investigations are undertaken to develop facts and issue a Report for use by the Applicant in seeking amendments in nationally recognized installation codes and standards. The issuance of this Report in no way implies Listing, Classification, or other Recognition by UL and does not authorize the use of UL Listing or Classification Marks or any other reference to Underwriters Laboratories Inc. on or in connection with the product.
Underwriters Laboratories Inc., its employees, or its agents shall not be responsible to anyone for the use or nonuse of the information contained in this Report, and shall not incur any obligation or liability for damages, including consequential damages, arising out of or in connection with the use of, or inability to use the information contained in this Report.
Look For The Listing or Classification Mark On The Product lthoho: (01D 0724800 Zotoh: 72~ C1OIO: VLINC NOtthbrooO. IL Ihthttthllhhol YOIOh NO.: 1330I10
Pile NC505-12 Issued: 4-17-85 TABLE OF CONTENTS Pacae List of Illustrations 11 Introduction I1 Description o Test Assembly Test Record Summary S1 Appendix A - Tabular Test Data A1 Appendix B Photographs of Test Assembly Bl
o, File NC505-12 Issued: 4-17-85 LI STQF ILLUSTRATIONS Descri tion ILL. No.
Construction Drawings 1,1AglB Appearance o'f Exposed Surface of Assembly Before Test Furnace Time-Temperature Curve Plot of Furnace Pressure Thermocouple Locations on Unexposed Sur face o f Wall Assembly Thermocouple Locations on Air Duct Assemblies
,Plot of Average and Maximum Individual Unexposed Surface Temperatures Plot of Temperatures 3 In. from Unexposed Wall Surface and Within Duct Assemblies Plot of Temperatures 6 Ft from Unexposed Wall Surface and Within Duct Assemblies Plot of Temperatures 9 Ft, 3 In. from Unexposed 10 Wall Surface and Within Duct. Assemblies Plot of Temperatures on the Top Surface of Duct.
Assemblies 3 In. from Unexposed Wall Surface Plot o f Temperatures on the Top Surface o f Duct. 12 Assemblies 6 Ft from Unexposed Wall Surface Plot of.'emperatures on the Top Surface of Duct 13 Assemblies 9 Ft, 3 In. from Unexposed Wall Surface Appearance of Exposed Surface of Assembly after Test 14 Appearance of Unexposed Suiface of Assembly after Test 15
1 File NC505-12 Issued: 4-17-85 INTRODUCTION This Fact-Finding Report describes the performance of air duct penetrations through a 1 hr rated fire resistive wall assembly when the wall assembly was subjected to a fire test conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Standard for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, UL 263 (ASTM E119).
The air duct assemblies which penetrated the wall assembly consisted of two square 10 in. by 10 in. inside dimension galvanized steel ducts and one square 10 in; by 10 in. inside dimension Class I rigid fiberglass duct. The outside surface of one galvanized steel air duct was covered with foil-scrim-kraft faced fiberglass duct insulation on the fire and non-fire side of the wall assembly. All the air duct assemblies had open duct drops on both sides of the wall assembly. None of the air duct assemblies contained fire dampers. The fire resistive wall assembly consisted of 5/8 in. thick gypsum wallboard screw-attached to steel studs which were spaced 24 in. on center.
This investigation was undertaken at the request of the American Iron & Steel Institute (AISI) to develop test data relative to the 'fire performance of insulated steel air ducts, uninsulated steel air ducts, and Class I rigid fiberglass air ducts, without dampers, penetrating a 1 hr fire resistive wall.
The following objectives were associated with the conduct of this test:
(1) develop fire performance data on the ability of insulated steel, uninsulated steel, and rigid fiberglass air duct systems to remain secure within the wall opening without developing through openings allowing the passage of flame and hot gases through, the wall and duct assemblies, (2) develop data on the influence of the air ducts on the transmission of heat to the unexposed surfaces of the wall and duct assemblies and (3) the radiation of heat from the surfaces of the duct assemblies to adjacent surfaces.
File NC505-12 Page I2 Issued: 4-17-85 For this investigation, the measurement o f temperatures on the unexposed surface of the wall utilized thermocouples that were covered with 6 by 6 in. ceramic pads as described in Standard UL 263. The thermocouples used to measure the temperatures on the top surface of the duct assemblies were attached with tape and were not covered with ceramic pads so as not to interfere with the measurement of radiant heat from the surface of the duct assemblies to adjacent untreated wood surfaces.
Information developed in this investigation is to be used for submittal by the sponsor to the Air Conditioning Committee of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in connection with the development of the Standard for Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilation Systems, NFPA 90A, which specifies the use of fire dampers in openings in partitions requiring fire resistive ratings of 2 hr or more and does not now contain provisions for the protection of openings in walls and partitions requiring fire resistance ratings of less than 2 hr.
The fire performance included temperatures measured and recorded at various locations within, top surface of, to the side of and above the.air duct assemblies, the structural'integrity of air duct assemblies, the passage of flames through the air duct assemblies, and the passage of flames through the wall assembly.
Because of the furnace design and the characteristic of rising hot gases, the value of the pressure differential between the furnace chamber and the surrounding laboratory volume changes as the distance from the test frame sill changes. During the fire test, a plane of zero pressure differential between the laboratory and the furnace existed in the furnace chamber. Above this plane, the pressure within the furnace was greater than the.-
laboratory and below this plane, the pressure within the furnace was less than the laboratory. The location of the zero pressure plane was maintained at approximately 36 in. above the test frame sill.
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~ I I File NC505-12 . Page 1 Issued: 4-17-85 DESCRIPT ION OFTEST ASSEMBLY MATERIALS:
The following is a description of the materials used in the test assembly.
Floor/Ceilin Tracks The floor/ceiling tracks were fabricated from 0.025 in. thick galvanized steel. The channel shaped tracks were 3-5/8 in. deep with 1 in. long legs.
Steel Studs - The steel studs were fabricated from 0.025 in.
N thick galvanized steel. The channel shaped studs were 3-5/8 in.
deep with 1-1/4 in. long legs and 5/16 in. long stiffeners.
Gv sum Wallboard The gypsum wallboard was 5/8 in. thick and bore UL's Classification Marking for Fire Resistance Classification.
Steel Sleeves The steel sleeves were 12 in. long,'0 by 10 in. (O.D.) and fabricated from 0.059 in. thick galvanized steel.
Framin An les The framing angles used in mounting the steel sleeves in the wall assemblies had 1-1/2 in. long legs and were fabricated from 0.079 in. thick galvanized'teel.
Galvanized Steel, Air Duct Insulation - The glass fiber insulation was supplied in rolls, 48 in. wide by 48 in. long.
The nominal density of the fiberglass insulation was approximately 1 lb/ft~. The outside face of the fiberglass insulation was covered with 7 mil thick aluminum foil-scrim-kraft facing.
Galvanized Steel Air Duct Assemblies - The two steel aa.r duct assemblies were fabricated from 0.022 galvanized in. thick material and each duct assembly had a 10 by 10 in. inside dimension.
Ri id Fiber lass Air Duct - The rigid fiberglass air duct material was fabricatedAssembl from 4 ft wide by 8 ft long by 1 in. thick boards. The density of the boards was approximately 4 lb/ft~. The air duct material bore the UL for use in fabrication of a Class I air duct Classification Mark per the requirement.
of the Standard for Factory-Made Air Ducts and Connectors, UL 181.
Fasteners - All fasteners used in the assembly were steel.
The floor tracks were secured to the No. 8-32 by 3/4 in. long bolts spaced sill of the test frame with approximately 16 in. OC.
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~ I k Pile NC505-12 Page 2 Issued: 4-17-85 The steel studs and the floor/ceiling tracks were secured together with Type S-12 by 1/2 in. long pan head screws.
The gypsum wallboard was secured to the steel studs with Type S by 1 in. long bugle head screws. The fasteners were spaced 8 in. OC along the wallboard joints in the field.
WALL ASSEMBLY:
The wall assembly was nominally 15 ft wide by 10 ft high and consisted of 3-5/8 in. deep, 0.025 in. thick, steel studs spaced 24 in. OC. Additional studs were added to accommodate the penetration framing. The studs were covered on the exposed and unexposed sides with a single layer of 5/8 in. thick gypsum wallboard which was screw-attached to each stud.
AIR DUCT ASSEMBLIES:
Three air duct assembl'es were included in the test .
assembly. The air duct assemblies included two galvanized steel air ducts and one rigid fiberglass air duct. The galvanized air.
ducts were fabricated from 0.022 in. thick steel. The inside dimension of the ducts was 10 by 10 in. A,steel sleeve was
~ utilized for each air duct assembly where
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it penetrated through the wall. One galvanized steel air duct assembly was covered
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with glass fiber duct insulation on the fire and non-fire side of
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the wall assembly. The other galvanized steel duct assembly was uninsulated. The horizontal center line of the galvanized steel
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air duct penetrations, with and without insulation, was 96 in.
above the test frame sill. The remaining air duct assembly was fabricated from 1 in. thick rigid fiberglass air duct material with an aluminum foil-scrim-kraft facing. The inside dimensions of the rigid fiberglass air duct assembly was 10 by 10 in. The horizontal center line of the rigid fiberglass air duct penetration was 78 in. above the test frame sill. None of the air duct assemblies contained fire dampers.
Galvanized Steel Air Duct Assemblies - The two galvanized E
steel duct assemblies were fabricated from 0.022 in. thick material. The duct assemblies were fabricated from several sections to form L-shaped units. Each duct assembly contained a 6 in. square drop outlet which was centered 10 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surface cf the wall assembly and a 6 in. square drop
'outlet which was centered 12 in. from the end of the duct trunk on the exposed side of the assembly. The ends of each duct assembly were closed and the duct drop outlets were open.
File NC505-12 page 3 Issued: 4-17-85 One of the two galvanized steel duct assemblies was wrapped with glass fiber insulation.
Class I Ri id Fiber lass Duct Air Assembl - The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct assembly was fabricated from 4 ft wide by 8 ft long by 1 in. thick boards. The density of the boards was approximately 4 -lb/ft~. One surface of the boards was covered with an 0.008 in. thick aluminum foil-scrim-kraft facing.
The 4 ft long edges of the board were cut with kerf edges to provide shiplap construction when joining adjacent pieces. The air duct material bore the UL Classification Mark as Class I material per the requirements of the Standard. for Factory-Made Air Ducts and Connectors, UL 181.
The boards were cut to form a 10 in. by 10 in. (I.D.)
L-shaped .unit. Longitudinal joints and adjacent, 4 ft long sections of duct were joined together with staples and pressure sensitive tape in accordance with instructions provided with the rigid fiberglass air duct board material. The duct assembly contained a 6 in. by 6 in. by 6 in. deep drop outlet which was centered 10 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall assembly and .a 6 in. square drop outlet which was centered 21 in. from the end of the duct trunk on the exposed side of the wall assemblg. The ends of the duct assembly were closed and the duct drop outlets were opened.
Duct Su ort S stem On the exposed side of the test assembly, each air duct was supported by means of a trapeze support system. The supports for the air duct systems were spaced 24 in. OC. Each support consisted of two 1/4 in. diameter threaded steel rods spaced a nominal 12 in. OC. The galvanized steel ducts, with and without insulation, were supported by 14 in. long, 1 by 1 by 1/8 in. thick steel angles. The rigid fiberglass duct was supported by 14 in. long, 2 by 2 by 1/8 in.
thick steel angles.
On the unexposed side of the test assembly, the air ducts were supported by temporary steel framing.
CONSTRUCTION OF TEST ASSEMBLY:
The test assembly was constructed in a manner similar to that shown on ILLS. 1, 1A and 1B.
File NC505-12 . page 4 Issued: 4-17-85 The floor/ceiling tracks were secured to the test frame.
The steel studs were secured to the floor/ceiling tracks at, a spacing of 24 in. OC. The vertical edges of a frame to support, the air duct penetration was formed from the studs placed toe-to-toe. The horizontal edges of the frame were formed from 36 in. lengths of floor/ceiling tracks folded into U-shapes as shown on ILLS. 1 and 1A.
A single layer of gypsum wallboard was fastened to the steel framing membrane forming the frames for the air duct penetrations as shown in ILL. l.
A steel sleeve was inserted through each steel frame.
Rockwool batt material was installed between the steel sleeve and the wallboard lining of the frame to seal any openings between the sleeve and the wallboard. The framing angles were fastened to the sleeve and to the steel studs to secure the sleeves in place as shown on ILLS. 1 and lA.
On the exposed surface of the assemblies, the trapeze air duct supports were hung from the lintel of the test frame.
supports were spaced 24 in. OC. The air duct assemblies The'uct were installed with the ends sealed and open 6 in. square outlets. One end of'ach duct assembly contained a 90'lbow which was connected to the steel sleeve as shown on ILL. 1A. The horizontal center line of the galvanized steel air duct assemblies was located 96 in. above the test frame sill. The horizontal center line of the rigid'iberglass duct assembly was located 78 in. above the test frame sill. Glass fiber insulation was wrapped around the galvanized steel air duct located on the north side of the assembly. The insulation extended approximately 4 in. beyond the closed end and was folded over and stapled to itself. A 6 in. overlap was provided along the horizontal and longitudinal joints and were taped with a pressure sensitive tape.
On the unexposed surface, one end,of the air duct assembly was connected to the steel sleeve and the remaining end was sealed. A 6 in. square air outlet was provided in each duct assembly. The center of each air outlet was located 10 ft, 3 in.
from the unexposed -surface of the wall assembly as shown on ILL. 1B. The same procedure of wrapping the north galvanized steel air duct with glass fiber insulation on the exposed side of the assembly was repeated on the unexposed side.
File NC505-12 Page 5 issued: 4-17-95 Photographs depicting various stages of the construction process are contained in Appendix B. The appearance of the exposed surface of the assembly prior to the fire test, is shown in ILL. 2.
File NC505-12 Page 6 Issued: 4-17-85 TE ST RECORD FIRE ENDURANCE TEST:
The fire test was conducted in accordance with the Standard of Underwriters Laboratories Inc. for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, UL 263 (ASTM E119, 11FPA No. 251) .
DESCRIPTION OF TEST ASSEMBLY The test assembly was constructed as described in the Section of the Report entitled "Construction of Test Assembly" and as shown on ILLS. 1, 1A and 1B.
METHOD The standard test equipment of Underwriters Laboratories Inc. for wall and partition assemblies was used for the fire endurance test.
The test assembly was placed in front of the vertical furnace and exposed to flames of controlled .extent and severity in accordance with the Standard Time-Temperature Curve. The furnace temperatures were measured with 12 thermocouples positioned 6 in. from the exposed face of the assembly and located in the furnace chamber as shown on ILL. 3.
The pressure differential between the furnaces chamber and the laboratory was measured at 3 locations. The location of the zero. pressure plane was 36 in. above the test frame sill. Above this plane, the pressure within the furnace was greater than the laboratory and below this plane, the pressure within the furnace was less than the laboratory. The two remaining pressure differential locations were 78 in. and 96 in. above the test frame sill. All three air duct penetrations were located above the zero pressure plane.. A plot of the pressure magnitudes measured during the test are shown on ILL. 4.
The unexposed surface temperatures of the wall assembly were measured with thermocouples located as shown in ILL. 5. Each thermocouple was covered with a 6 in. by 6 in. dry ceramic fiber pad e
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NC505-12 Page 7 Issued: 4-17-85 Thermocouples used to measure the temperatures within, on top of, above, and to the side of the each air duct assembly were located as shown in ILL. 6. These thermocouples were attached with tape and were not covered with ceramic fiber pads.
Thermocouples used to measure the surface temperature of the wood blocks adjacent to the duct surfaces were secured against the wood surface with staples. Staples were care'fully applied in order to avoid causing a 'short in the thermocouple. The thermocouples were not covered with ceramic pads.
RESULTS Character and Distribution of the Fire The furnace fire was luminous and well distributed during the test and the temperatures recorded in the furnace chamber followed the Standard Time-Temperature Curve as defined in the Standard for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, UL 263 and as shown on ILL. 3.
Observations of Ex osed Surface Durin Test The were made of the exposed surface during the fire following'bservations test. ~ All references to dimensions are approximate.
Time
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min: s
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Observations
- 30 The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct had ignited.
- 45 The insulated galvanized steel air duct had ignited.
1:00 Heavy flames were issuing from the rigid fiberglass air duct. The insulated galvanized steel air ducts'uter layer of the foil wrap was delaminating. Pieces 1 in.~ to 4 in.~ were falling into the furnace chamber.
1:15 Flames were issuing from the insulation on the insulated galvanized steel duct.
2:00 Both the Class I rigid fiberglass and the glass fiber insulated galvanized steel air duct assemblies were emitting heavy flames. The wall surface was a light gray color.
3:00 Sections of glass fiber insulation located on the bottom surface of the galvanized steel duct had fallen off, leaving exposed 75 percent of the bottom surface of the steel duct.
File NC505-12 page 8 Issued: '-17-85 3:15 The paper surface of the wallboard had ignited.
4 00 The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct had deflected 1 to 1-1/2 in. downward.
4:15 The majority of the rigid fiberglass air duct was consumed.
4:30 A small section of the Class I rigid fiberglass air duct, 6 to 8 in. long remained attached to the wall assembly. The rest of the duct assembly had been consumed or had fallen into the furnace chamber.
4'45 The wall surface was black in color and the paper was peeling and falling away.
5 00 The glass fiber insulation that was wrapped around the north galvanized steel air duct was consumed or had fallen into the furnace chamber.
5 50 All flaming had stopped.
15.00 All charred paper surfacing on the wallboard had
.fallen.
20:00 The joint tape on the wallboard had begun to delaminate from the wallboard.
40:00 All of the joint tape had delaminated.
53:00 The wallboard joints had opened 3/16 in.
60:00 Test terminated.
Observations of the Unex osed Surface Durin the Test The following observations were made of the unexposed surface during the fire test. All references to dimension" are approximate.
Time min: s Observations
- 15 A light amount of smoke was issuing from the north glass fiber insulated galvanized steel air duct.
- 30 Light smoke was issuing from all three air duct assemblies.
2:00 Heavy smoke was issuing from the Class I rigid fiberglass air duct.
I File NC505-12 page 9 Issued: 4-17-85 6:00 Smoke was fiberglass till issuing from the Class I rigid air duct. Light smoke was issuing from the glass fiber insulated galvanized steel air duct. Light smoke/steam was issuing from the top surface of the south galvanized steel a'r duct 6 ft from the wall surface.
12:00 Light smoke was issuing from 'the north glass fiber insulated galvanized steel air duct 10 t rom the wall surface.
15:00 The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct had begun to collapse inward near the sleeve penetration.
17:00 Heavy smoke was issuing from the horizontal joint of the Class I rigid fiberglass air duct located 4 ft from the wall surface.
17:30 The transverse joint of the Class I rigid fiberglass'ir duct located 4 ft from wall surface and the longitudinal joint began to deteriorate and the duct started to bow downward.
18:00 The transverse joint tape of the Class I rigid fiberglass duct located 4 ft from the wall surface, had delaminated and fallen away from the air duct surface.
18 50 The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct ignited at the horizontal joint, located 4 ft from the wall surface.
19:07 The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct had separated at the transverse joint located 4 from the wall surface. The section of flaming air ft duct beyond the horizontal joint had fallen to the laboratory floor. The 4 ft air duct section extending from the wall surface was burning and collapsed inward.
23:20 Flames had begun to issue from the collapsed Class I rigid fiberglass air duct section extending from the wall surface.
25:00 The remaining section of the Class I rigid iberglass air duct had separated from the sleeve and had fallen to the laboratory floor. Flames were issuing from the unprotected opening left by the collapsed rigid fiberglass air duct.
File NC505-12 page 10 Issued: 4-17-85 25:30 The untreated wood blocks near the Class I rigid fiberglass air duct through-opening ignited.
26:00 The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct through-opening was sealed with sections of gypsum wallboard and ceramic fiber blankets.
26:30 Beginning at the wall surface and extending outward 10 in., the insulation on the bottom of the galvanized steel air duct began to discolor.
The top and side foil surface had begun to blister.
32:00 Light amounts of smoke were issuing from the perimeter of the wall assembly.
34:00 Beginning at the wall surface and extending outward 18 in., the surface of the galvanized steel air duct, without insulation had begun to discolor.
40 00 The top seam of the glass fiber insulation had separated. Sections of the exposed glass fiber insulation were visibly charred.
43:00 The insulation wrap on the galvanized steel air duct glass fiber had appeared to expand outward.
50:00 Slight discoloration was visible on the wall surface adjacent to the glass fiber insulated galvanized steel air duct.
57:00 The wall assembly was giving off some light cracking sounds.
60:00 Test terminated.
eratures on the Unex osed Surface of the Wall Assembl
- The Tem temperatures that developed at various points on the unexposed surface of the wall assembly were recorded by
.Thermoccuples Nos. 1 through 14 located as shown on ILL. 5.
Tables containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min, 30. s intervals throughout the test are contained in Appendix A.
File NC505-12 Page 11 Issued: 4-17-85 Tem eratures of the Duct Assemblies - The temperatures that developed within, top surface of, to the side of, and above the air duct assemblies were recorded by Thermocouple Nos. 15 through
- 68. The location of these thermocouples is shown on ILL. 6.
Tables containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min, 30 s intervals throughout the test are contained in Appendix A.
Plots of the temperatures recorded within the duct assemblies, located 3 in., 6 ft and 9 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall are shown on ILLS. 8, 9 and 10, respectively.
The limited temperature data on the Class I duct occurred because the transverse joint of the rigid fiberglass duct, located 4 ft from the unexposed surface of the wall, opened and separated at 19 min and the portion of the duct assembly beyond the first joint collapsed and fell to the laboratory floor. The remaining duct assembly section extending from the unexposed surface of the wall collapsed at 25 min. To maintain the pressure diffeiential between the furnace chamber and laboratory the through-opening of the wall assembly was plugged with gypsum board and cera-fiber blankets at 26 min.
" The ttted and temperatures within the Class I rigid fiberglass duct, 9 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall were for 17 min, 30 sec and temperatures within the rigid fiberglass duct 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall were plotted for 25 min.
Temperatures measured, within the galvanized steel duct, with and without insulation, were plotted through the The thermocouple location for each duct assembly full 60 min.
is shown on ILL. 6.
Plots of the temperatures measured on the top surface of the duct assemblies, 3 in, 6.ft and 9 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall, are. shown on ILLS. 11, 12 and 13/
respectively.
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the test and remained inoperative throughout the test. These thermocouples were on the top surface of the insulated steel duct and on the top surface of the rigid fiberglass duct, 6 ft from the unexposed surface of the wall.
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File NC505-12 page 12 Issued: 4-17-85 The transverse joint of the Class I rigid fiberglass duct, located 4 ft from the unexposed surface of the wall, opened and separated at 19 min. The portion of the duct assembly beyond this transverse joint collapsed and fell to the laboratory floor.
Consequently, the last accurate temperature recorded on the fiberglass duct beyond the transverse joint was obtained at 17 min, 30 s. This temperature was 136'F.
The remaining portion of the Class I fiberglass duct assembly collapsed at 25 min. Consequently, the final accurate temperature recorded on the fiberglass duct 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall was obtained at 22 min, 30 s. This temperature was 168.7'F.
The temperatures developed from the radiant heat transfer from each duct assembly were measured by thermocouples located 18 in. and 60 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall and 1 in., 2 in. and 4 in. from the top and side surface of each duct assembly. The thermocouples used to measure these temperatures were secured to the surface of the 6 in. long, 2 by 4 in. exposed untreated wood. The thermocouple locations near each duct assembly is shown on ILL. 6.
The temperatures recorded by Thermocouple Nos. 60 through 62 and 66 through 68, located 60 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall, above and to the side of the rigid fiberglass duct assembly, respectively, were accurate for the 30 s first 17 min and of the fire test. This occurred because the transverse joint of the Class I rigid fiberglass duct located 4 ft from the unexposed surface of the wall, opened and separated at 19 min.
and the remaining portion of the duct assembly fell to the laboratory floor. Consequently, the final accurate temperatures for Thermocouple Nos. 60 through 62 and 66 through 63 were recorded at 17 min, 30 s. Within this group of thermocouples, the highest, temperature was 145'F as recorded by Thermocouple No. 6l,at 17 min, 30 s. Thermocouple No. 61 was located 60 in.
from the unexposed surface of the wall and centered 2 in. above the top duct surface. The temperatures recorded by Thermocouple Nos. 57 through 59 and 63 through 65, located 18 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall, above and to the side of the Class I rigid fiberglass duct assembly, respectively, were accurate for the first 22 min, 30 s of the fire test.
Thereafter, the last relevant temperatures for Thermocouple Nos.
57 through 59 and 63 through 65 were recorded at 22 min, 30 s.
Within this group of thermocouples, the highest temperature was 363'F as recorded by Thermocouple No. 64. Thermocouple No. 64 was located 18 in. from the unexposed surface, centered at the mid-height, and 2 in. from the side surface of the duct.
File NC505-12 page 13 Issued: 4-17-85 OBSERVATIONS AFTER TEST:
The appearance of the exposed and unexposed surfaces after the test are shown in ILLS. 14 and 15, respectively.
On the exposed surface, all wallboard remained attached to the studs. The wallboard contained numerous cracks and displayed a maximum joint separation of 5/8 in. The C1ass I rigid.
fiberglass air duct had fallen from its supports and was consumed by the furnace fire. The glass fiber insulation used to insulate the north galvanized steel air duct was also consumed.
Both galvanized steel air ducts remained in place. The galvanized steel ducts without insulation distorted less than the galvanized steel duct with insulation.
On the unexposed side of the wall assembly, the gypsum wallboard remained in place with no joint separation or cracks observed. The Class I rigid fiberglass .air duct collapsed at 19 min, 5 s and dropped to the laboratory floor. Two galvanized steel ducts were intact and remained in place. The glass fiber insulation that was wrapped around the north galvanized steel air duct was charred. through its entire depth for the first 8 ft extending away from the wall surface. the charred depth of the remaining portion was 75 percent of the total thickness. The foil facing had numerous blisters and 1/8 in. wide cracks throughout its surface for the first 4 ft extending from the wall surface. The remaining length of foil facing had numerous blisters. The galvanized steel air ducts, with and without insulation, remained structurally intact. Upon removal of the glass fiber insulation from the north duct assembly, it that the galvanized steel. air duct was discolored along its was noted entire length. The south galvanized steel air duct, without insulation, was discolored approximately 3 ft extending from the surface of the wall assembly.
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NC505-12 Page S1 Issued: 4-17-85' UMMARY In consideration of the fact-finding character of the investigation, the foregoing Report is to be construed as information only and should not be regarded as conveying any conclusion or recommendations on the part of Underwriters Laboratories Inc. regarding the ability of the construction or performance of the product for Recognition by any code or Standard or for any other purpose.
WALL ASSEMBLY FIRE PERFORMANCE:
The fire resistant test was conducted on the wall assembly in accordance with Standard UL 263 (ASTM E119, NFPA 251, ANSI A2.1).. The wall assembly was of gypsum wallboard and steel stud construction containing three types of duct assemblies two galvanized steel ducts and one Class I rigid fiberglass duct.
All three duct assemblies penetrated the wall assembly and had open air drops on each side. The duct assemblies did not coritain fire dampers.
Based on measurements at locations other than at the duct assembly penetrations, the wall assembly complied with the temperature transmission requirements of Standard UL 263 for a 1 hr fire resistance rating.
A plot of the maximum individual and average temperatures recorded on the unexposed surface of the test assembly is shown on ILL. 7.
Temperature measurements of the duct assemblies at various
.locations are described separately.
PRESSURE DIFFERENTIALS:
A.'plane of neutral pressure between the furnace chamber and the surrounding laboratory volume existed within the furnace.
Above this plane, the pressure differential within the furnace was positive with respect to laboratory atmospheric pressure.
Below the neutral pressure plane, the pressure differential was such that the pressure plane within the furnace was negative with respect to the laboratory atmospheric pressure.
The location of the neutral pressure plane was 36 in. above the sill of the assembly. All three air duct assemblies were
.located above the neutral plane, in the positive pressure area of the furnace.
File NC505-12 Page S2 Issued-: 4-17-85 The magnitude of the pressure differentials at the location of each duct assembly during the test are shown on ILL. 4.
TEMPERATURES WITHIN THE AIR DUCT:
The temperatures within each air duct assembly were measured at distances of 3 in., 6 ft and 9 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall. The thermocouple locations on each assembly are shown on ILL. 6. Plots comparing maximum temperatures reached at each location for each duct assembly are shown on ILLS. 8, 9 and 10, respectively.
Through 15 min of the fire exposure period, the temperatures recorded within the insulated galvanized steel air duct were generally higher than the uninsulated and Class I rigid glassfiber air duct assemblies. The lowest temperatures were measured within the uninsulated galvanized steel duct. After 60 min of fire exposure, the temperatures recorded within the uninsulated galvanized steel air duct continued to be lower than the insulated galvanized steel duct. Comparison with the Class I rigid fiberglass air duct assembly was not made beyond the time when joint separation occurred (17 min, 30 s).
Tables containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min, 30 s intervals throughout the test and at each location are contained in Appendix A.
TEMPERATURES ON THE UNEXPOSED SURFACE OF THE AIR DUCTS:
The temperatures on the top surface of each duct assembly were measured at distances of 3 in., 6 ft, and 9 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall. The thermocouple location on each assembly is shown on ILL. 6.
The maximum temperature measured nearest the wall assembly on the top surface of the uninsulated galvanized steel air duct was 499'F at 22 min, 30 sec. The corresponding maximum temperature measured for the insulated galvanized steel air duct was 176'F at 60 min. A maximum temperature of 293'F was recorded on the Class I glass fiber duct at 25 min, just prior to the collapse of the duct at the steel sleeve.
The maximum temperature measured furthest from the wall assembly on the top surface of the uninsulated galvanized steel duct was 175'F at. 47 min, 30 sec. The corresponding maximum temperature measured for the insulated galvanized steel air duct and for the Class I rigid fiberglass duct was 1784F at 2 min, 30 sec and 294'F at 17 min, 30 sec (just prior to collapse of duct portion beyond 4 ft from wall), respectively.
File NC505-12 Page S3 Issued: 4-17-85 Plots comparing maximum temperatures reached at each location on each duct assembly are shown on ILLS'1, 12 and, 13, respectively.
Tables containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min, 30 s intervals throughout the test and at each location are contained in Appendix A.
RADIANT TEMPERATURE OF THE AIR DUCTS:
Temperatures developed from the radiant heat transfer from each duct assembly were measured by thermocouples located 18 in.
and 60 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall and 1 in.,
2 in. and 4 in. from the top and side surface of each duct assembly. The thermocouples were secured to the surface of the 2 by 4 in. untreated wood blocks, 6 in. long. The location of these thermocouples for each duct assembly is shown on ILL. 6.
A comparison of the radiant temperatures for the three duct assemblies indicates that the greatest temperature rise occurred on the untreated wood adjacent to the galvanized steel air duct assembly without insulation. The Class I rigid fiberglass duct assembly produced the least radiant temperature rise prior to the changes in temperatures, affected by the partial or complete collapse of the Class I glass fiber duct assembly.
A comparison of the radiant temperature rise for the galvanized steel duct assemblies, with and without insulation, indicates that the greatest temperature rise occurred with the galvanized steel duct assembly without insulation. The maximum temperatures recorded were 479'F from the uninsulated duct and 251'F from the insulated galvanized steel duct.
File NC505 Page S4 Issued: 4-17-85 Tables containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min 30 s intervals throughout the test and at each location are contained in Appendix A.
Reviewed by:
THOMAS PLENS J. BEYREIS Senior Engineering Assistant Managing Engineer Fire Protection Department Fire Protection Department F~
KENNETH RHODES Engineering Group Leader Fire Protection Department TP/KR:'rr REPT4
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File NC505-12 Page Al Issued: 4-17-85 AP PEND IX A TABULAR TEMPERATURE TEST DATA The following tables contain the temperature data recorded at 2 min, 30 s intervals during the fire test.
ILL. Descri tion A2 Thermocouple Index A3-A5 Temperatures measured on unexposed surface of wall assembly.
A6-A9 Temperatures measured on insulated steel duct.
A10-A13 Temperatures measured on steel duct without, insulation.
A14-A17 Temperatures measured on rigid fiberglass duct.
File NC505-12 Page A2 Issued: 4-17-85 THERMOCOUPLE INDEX UNEXPOSED SURFACE THERI{OCOUPLES 1 "14 Insulated Steel Duct Fiberglass Steel Duct Without Insulation Duct Inside Duct - 3 {n. from wall 15 33 51 Inside Duct - 6 ft from wall 16 34 52 Inside Duct - 9 ft, 3 {n. from wall 17 35 53 Outside Duct, Top Surface, 3 {n. from wall 36 18 Outside Duct, Top Surface, 6 ft from wall 37 19 55 Outside Duct, Top Surface, 9 ft, 3 {n. from wall 38 20 56 Outside Duct, w/wood 1 {n. above top, 18 {n. from wall 21 39 57 Outside Duct, w/wood 2 {n. above top, 18 {n. from wall 22 40 58 Outside Duct, w/wood 4 {n. above top, 18 {n. from wall 23 59 Outside Duct, w/wood 1 {n. above top, 60 {n. from wall 24 42 60 Outside Duct, w/wood 2 {n. above top, 60 {n. from wall 25 43 Outside Duct, w/wood 4 {n. above top, 60 {n. from wall 26 62 Outside Duct, w/wood 1 {n. from side, 18 {n. from wall 27 45 63 Outside Duct, w/wood 2 {n. from side, 18 {n. from wall 28 46 64 Outside Duct, w/wood 4 {n. from side, 18 {n. from wall 29 47 65 Outside Duct, w/wood 1 {n. from s{de, 60 {n. from wall 30 66 Outside Duct; w/wood 2 {n. from side, 60 {n. from wall 31 49 67 Outside Duct, w/wood 4 {n. from side, 60 {n. from wall 32 50 68
FIiE NC505-l2 TK Z . NO. A-3 ISSUED: 4-17-85 FULLY-SCATE TEST 84NK29824/NC505 1-3-85 SUr!2'CI!
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ILL. NO. A-8 ISSUED: 4-17-85 FILE NC505-12 FULL-SCM E TEST 84NK29824/NC505 1-3-85 I'ASULA'"'"9 8",g-~ '>UC A 16 17 CHAH(HGS.)
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- T.C. 37, "located on top surface of insulated steel duct, 6 ft from unexoosed surface of wall, malfunctioned at the start of test and remained inoperable throughout the test.
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FILE NC505-12 ILZ . NO. A-7 ISSUED: 4-17-85 FUZZ-SCME TEST 84NK29824/NC505 1-,3-85 X.'3SUl'.AT~'D, S'l'E~:L UUC, P<<
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- Z-.E NC505-12 JLj. NO. A-11 ISSUED
- 4-17-85 FUl j-SCAT E TEST 84NK29824/NC505 1-3-85 GTE=L UUI"7 4 7x "[OUR "<JS~JLAY. GR
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FILE NC505-12 ILI . NO. A-13 ,
ISSUED: 4-17-85 FULL-SCAT E TEST 84NK29824/NC505'-3-85 STEBL !iU': 'i.HGUT;.;-!SUL~TI0P I
CHAH < tfO"-. ) 0 T iI'iE 0: 0 69.8 68.2 2:~0 80.1 73s8 71.0 5: 0 rJR. 8 BQ.Z 75m 1 7:30 99.9 HG.1 78.5 10: 0 127.8 '100.8 86.0 12:70 15: 0 17:ZO 20: 0 22".30 25: 0 1.28.
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I 4)
FILE iCC505-12 ITZ . ifO. A-15 T.SSUED: 4-17-85
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FILE NC505-12 ZLL. NO. A-17 FULL-SCALE TEST 84NK29824/NC505 l-3-85 e'aaa8 SSS;ivr.-..
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'2 :,"0 177.5 17<<3. 3 190.4. 187.9 JJ 0 aHC.O 189.2 1 <<J8. 7 192.5 37 gp ~
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(5 FILE NC505-12 ILL. NO. A-7 ISSUED: 4-17-85 FULL-SCMZ TEST 84NK29824/NC505 1-3-85 vI I<<
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FILE NC505-12 IIL. NO A-13 ISSUED: 4-17-85 FUII-SCALF TEST 84NK29824/NC505 1-3-85 STP. 'L UUl"T ~ 1THOUT "r(SUL~ T TO>!
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- T.C. 55, located on top surface of fiberglass duct, 6 ft from unexposed surface of wall, malfunctioned at the start of test and remained inoperable through-out the test.
CS FILE NC505-12 ILL ~ NQ. A-15 ISSUED: 4-17-85 FUI L-SCALE TEST 84NK29824/NC505 1-3-85 "i3ER<iLASS DUCT CHAH<HtiS.> 59 60 5/'8.
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File NC505-12 Page Bl Issued: 4-17-85 APPEND IXB TEST RECORD GENERAL PICTORIAL HISTORY
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I ~ ~,I STEEL STUDS AND FRAMING ANGLES STFEL STUDS AND FRAMING ANGLES FOR AIR DUCT PRNETRATZONS FOR AIR DUCT PENETRATIONS
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UNEXPOSED GYPSUM WALLBOARD SURFACE WITH STEEL STUDS AND INNER FACE OF EXPOSED OPENINGS FOR AIR DUCT PENETRATIONS GYPSUM WALLBOARD
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EXVOSrn SURFACE OF TEST ASSEHBLY BEFORE TFST
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CO DISCOLORATION OF GALVANIZED STEEL AIR DlJCT ON li I SCOI.()R.' I i);! l)F I'Al.l. SIIR FACE AND IIF.TI'.R I ORA'I' llN I NSI'I.A I I:.Ii (.Al V.
S'I'I'.I:.I. AIR l)IICT ON IINI:.Xl'ASI'.0 IJNI'.XPOSFD SIDE OF ASSEMBLY ~ TEST TIME 34 >I I N. OF S I III'>I ':!i I "l Ill 'I . I I".1'I 'I' Ml' ) 0 M I H,
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~ LD GALVANIZED STEEL AIR DUCT AFTFR TEST DUCT AFTER TEST
s"g ~ n DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 12 PAGE 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE UEST FIRE BARRIER WITHOUT FIRE DAMPERS IN VERTICAL VENTILATION DUCT PENETRATIONS DEVIATION RE VEST:
We request approval of the following:
Fire dampers are not required to be installed in the following ventilation duct penetrations in fire rated floor/ceiling assemblies between Fire Area R-lA and R-1B or R2A and R-2B.
Penetration Fire Zone/Fire Zone X27-6-17 1-5A-S/1-6A X27-6-18 1-5A-S/1-6A X27-6-50 1-5A-S/1-6A X27-6-51 1-5A-S/1-6A X27-6-83 1-5A-S/1-6A X28-5-66 1-4A-W/1-5A-W X29-5-54 1-4A-W/1-5A-W X29-5-34 1-4A-W/1-5A-S X34-5-4 2-4A-S/2-5A-W FIRE AREAS AFFECTED This deviation request concerns Fire Areas R-1A, R-1B, R-2A, and R-2B.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE UEST:
The requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. requires fire rated barriers between fire areas. The guidance documents provided by the NRC indicate these barriers shall be rated for 3-hours fire resistance and ventilation ducts that penetrate such barriers shall have fire dampers installed. The floor/ceiling assemblies identified to be upgraded in PPSL's September 4, 1985 response (PLA-2529) contain ventilation duct penetrations which do not contain fire dampers.
EXISTING ARRANGEMENT:
The following is a description of the floor/ceiling assemblies penetrated by ventilation ducts:
t 4
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 12 PAGE 2 Zone Without Zone Duct Figure Fire Zone/Fire Zone Penetration Duct Size R-1A to R-1B 1-5A-S/1-6A X-27-6-17 26" Dia. 1-5A-S 1-6A (1A,1B$ 1C) 1-5A-S/1-6A X-27-6-18 32" Dia. 1-5A-S Both 2A, 2B, 1-5A-S/1-6A X-27-6-50 30" x 20" 1>>5A-S 1-5A-S 3A,3B~3C 1-5A-S/1-6A X-27-6-51 30" x 20" 1-5A-S 1-5A-S 3A,3B,3C 1-5A-S/1-6A X-27-6-83 20" x 8" 1-5A-S 1-6A 4 1-4A-W/1-5A X-28-5-66 22" x 22" 1-4A-W Both 5A,5B,5C 1-4A-W/1-5A-S X-29-5-34 36" Dia 1-4A-W Both 6A,6B,6C,6D 1-4A-W/1-5A-S X-29-5-54 22" x 22" 1-4A-W Both 7A, 7B R-2A to R-2B 2-4A-S/2-5A-W X-34-5-4 40" x 28" Both Both 8A,8B$ 8C The maximum combustible loading within either Reactor Building is 45 minutes (In-Situ and transient).
See attached figures for details.
JUSTIFICATION:
The National Fire Protection Association's "Fire Protection Handbook" (14th edition, page 7-69) states:
"In the gauges commonly used, some sheet metal ducts may protect an opening in a building construction assembly for up to l-hour, if properly hung and adequately fire stopped. Therefore, ducts passing through fire barriers having a rating of up to 1-hour fire resistance can be assumed to present no extraordinary hazard. If the wall, partition, ceiling, or floor is required to have a fire resistance rating of more than 1-hour, a fire damper is required .
It is our position that these ducts adequately mitigate the chimney effects and provide at least an equivalent 1-hour five resistance. The basis for this position is as follows:
(1) The minimum duct thickness is 18 gauge and a typical 3-hour fire damper utilizes 24 gauge blades.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 12 PAGE 3 I
(2) The ducts, as a maximum, have an opening on only one side of the floor/ceiling assembly. Figures are attached which depict the lack of openings.
(3) In each case, automatic sprinkler protection is provided on the lower floor elevation.
A 1-hour equivalent rating provides a sufficient fire resistance to contain the expected 45 minute fire. Except for the ventilation duct penetrations, which are the subject of this request, and unprotected structural steel (See Deviation Request No. 6), the floor/ceiling assemblies will be upgraded to a rating of 3-hours.
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e APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE VEST DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 13 PAGE 1 ESSENTIAL REDUNDANT RACEWAY PROTECTION We request approval of the following:
a) Protection of redundant safe shutdown cable in a Fire Zone may be accomplished through the use of one or a combination of methods identified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2a, b, and c.
b) When different shutdown paths are used in different Fire Zones within a Fire Area, the raceways required to ensure availability of a path in a particular Fire Zone need only be protected in that Fire Zone or wrap around area.
c) Fire suppression need only be provided above essential safe shutdown raceway protected by a 1-hour fire rated barrier and the suppression can terminate at a fire zone boundary or if:
- 1) the raceway barrier changes to a fire barrier rated at 3 hours.
- 2) the raceway no longer requires protection. (i.e., the raceway exits in a wrap-around area.)
- 3) The fire suppression is located 50 feet beyond the location of the raceway protected with a 1-hour fire rated wrap.
FIRE AREAS AFFECTED:
This deviation request applies to Fire Areas R-1A, R-1B, R-2A and R-2B in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE VEST:
The requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R allows redundant safe shutdown raceway to be protected by the following methods:
III.G.2 a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier.
III.G.2 b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 13 PAGE 2 addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or III.G.2 c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour rating. In, addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
NRC guidance documents indicate that fire suppression and fire wrapping (barrier) shall be complete inside fire area boundaries. When a combination of the methods listed above are utilized within a fire area (or fire zone),
configurations are created which may conflict with guidance documents.
EXISTING CONDITIONS:
The 3-hour barrier method (III.G.2.a) and the 1-hour barrier .with fire suppression and fire detection method (III.G.2.c) are used to protect redundant (essential) raceways at Susquehanna SES. The choice of methods depends on the availability of fire suppression.
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PPGL's response to the NRC's concern on unrated fire zone boundaries contained two assumptions. First a 50 foot wide wrap-around area will be used to divide fire areas. Both divisions of redundant safe shutdown raceways are protected in a wrap-around area, but only one division would be protected in each horizontally adjacent zone (i.e., 1-4A-W would have Division I and II protected, 1-4A-N would have only Division I protected and 1-4A-S would have only Division II protected.) This is the subject of Deviation Request No. 4.
Second, it was assumed that a fire would only spread to the next adjacent fire zones. Therefore, different safe shutdown paths could be protected in fire zones remote from each other. This is the subject of Deviation Request No. 7.
In both cases fire barrier wrapping and fire suppression would not be provided throughout a fire area.
Automatic sprinkler protection is provided to protect essential redundant safe shutdown raceway wrapped with a 1-hour fire rated barrier and is extended either to the fire zone boundary or a maximum 50 feet beyond the location of the 1-hour fire wrapped raceway (see attached figure).
The attached figures provide additional details.
JUSTIFICATION:
It is our position that since it is acceptable to utilized the protection methodology described in either Appendix R, III G.2.a, b, or c on an individual basis, then utilizing a combination of those methods within a fire area is justifiable.
When a combination of these methods is used throughout a fire zone or fire area it is possible that, the 1-hour or 3-hour rated wraps would not be complete throughout the zone or area.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 13 PAGE 3 Limiting protection as a result of wrap-around area concept is justified, as documented by Deviation Request No. 4.
The limiting of protection as a result of utilizing different safe shutdown paths in different fire zones within the same Fire Area is justified, as documented by Deviation Request No. 7.
Since the maximum fire loading within any fire zone of either reactor building does not exceed 45 minutes, automatic sprinkler protection which extends either to the Fire Zone boundary or for a horizontal distance of 50 feet on either side of the essential minority raceway is adequate to protect essential safety shutdown raceways wrapped with a 1-hour rated fire barrier.
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APPENDIX R DEVIATION REQUEST REQUEST NO. 13 FIGURES
REQUEST NO. 13 FIGURE ¹1 SPRINKLER PROTECTION PROVIDED TO PROTECT ESSENTIAL SAFE SHUTDOWN RACEWAY WRAPPED WITH 1-HOUR FIRE RATED BARRIER Protection Fire Area Fire Zone Within Zone R-lA 1-3 8-W Full 1-38-S Ful 1 1-3A Part 1-4A-S Ful 1 1-4A-W Full 1-5A-S Full R-18 1-28 Full 1-38-N Part 1-38-W Full 1-4A-N Par t 1-4A-W Full R-2A 2-38-S Ful 1 2-38-W Ful l 2-4A-S Part 2-4A-W Full Ful 1 2-5A-W Ful 1 R-28 2-38-N Part 2-38-W Full 2-4A-W Full 2-4A-N Full 2-48 Full 2-5A-W - "c Full 2-5A-N' ii Full NOTE: Part indi cates:
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c) The wrapping changes to a 3-hour fire rated wrap.
or d) The essential raceway leave the "wrap-around" area, and protection is not required.
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FIRE ZONK D FlRK ZONK SO'-0 FIRE ZONE A F'IRE ZONE C I HOUR FIRE @RAP 0N ESSENTIAL RAC EMAY TYPIC RL SPRINKLER PROTECTlON WHEN A i HOUR I=IRE WRAP I S USED, PLAN VIE W lNDlCATES AREA COVERED BY SPRlNKI ER, PROTEG'rlahl REQUEST No. l'3 FIGURE 2
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 14 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE UEST REACTOR BUILDING FIRE ZONES WITHOUT FIRE DETECTION DEVIATION RE UEST:
We request approval of the following:
Fire det'ection need not be provided in Fire Zones which do not,contain safe shutdown racew'ay or'o not 'represent 'an exposure hazard to-safe shutdown equipment even if a fire zone within -the same area "contains 'essential redundant safe shutdown raceway. The provision of automatic sprinkler protection in lieu of fire detection is acceptable in Fire Zones 1-1C and 2-1C.
FIRE AREA AFFECTED:
This deviation applies to Unit /fl and 82 Reactor Buildings, Fire Areas: R-lA, R-1B, R-2A and R-2B.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE UEST:
The requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 require fire detection. The NRC guidance indicates fire detection should be provided throughout a fire area. Fire detection has not been provided in the Reactor Building Fire Zones listed below under Existing Arrangement.
EXISTING ARRANGEMENT:
The following zones do not have fire detection:
Fire Area Fire Zone Reason R-1A 1-2C No electric detection Automatic sprinklers provided 1-4E No safe shutdown cables-very low combustible loadings 0-6H Cask Storage Pit 1-7B No safe shutdown cables-very low combustible loadings 1-6F Spent fuel pool R-1B 1-lI Stairwell-no safe shutdown raceway or combustibles 1-1J Stairwell-no safe shutdown raceway or combustibles 1-6F Spent fuel pool 0-6G No safe shutdown cables-very low combustible loadings R-2A 2-2C Same as 1-2C 2-4E Same as 1-4E 2-lI Same as 1-lI 2-6F Same as 1-6F R-2B 2-1J Same as 1-1J
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 14 PAGE NO. 2 JUSTIFICATION:
Fire zones 1-2C and 2-2C have been provided with automatic sprinkler protection. Detection 'of a fire is provided via the sprinkler flow alarm when heat activates a sprinkler head. The remainder of the fire zones listed above do not contain safe shutdown raceway or equipment. None of the zones listed above represent a fire hazard which impacts on adjacent fire zones.
The NRC requested additional detection for Fire Zones 1-7B and 1-6F in FSAR Question 281.17. There was no additional detection requested for Fire Zones 1-2C, 1-4E or 0-6H. Our response to the staff and our Fire Protection Review Report both indicated that additional smoke detection would be provided in zones which contain or present a fire exposure hazard to safe shutdown equipment. The Fire Zones delineated in this request do not present an exposure fire hazard to safe shutdown equipment.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 15 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION REQUEST CONTROLSTRUCTURE FIRE AREA WITHOUT FIRE SUPPRESSION DEVIATION RE UEST:
We request approval of the following:
Automatic fire suppression is not required for the protection of 1-hour wrapped essential redundant safe shutdown raceway in Fire Areas CS-11 and CS-20.
FIRE AREA AFFECTED:
This deviation applies to Fire Areas CS-11 (Fire Zone 0-28A-I) and CS-20 (Fire Zone 0-28A-II).
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE VEST:
The requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III G.2.C require fire suppression,'f a one-'hour fire rate barrier, for cable is provided. Fire areas CS-ll and CS-20, are- not provided with automatic fire suppression.
EXISTING CONDITIONS:
Fire Areas CS-11 and CS-20 contain essential safe shutdown raceway protected by a one hour barrier. The combustible loading in each area is less than 1 minute. All cables are in conduits. No cable trays which could add to the combustible loading are located in either fire area.
JUSTIFICATION:
Fire Areas CS-11 and CS-20 are identical in function and hazard to Zone 0-28B which was the subject of a request for variance.(PLA-1013, 2-9-82). The NRC concluded in SER Supplement 84 that the approach in question was acceptable for Zone 0-28B.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 16 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE UEST SWITCHGEAR ROOM COOLER FANS INSUFFICIENT SPATIAL SEPARATION We request approval of the following:
The Switchgear Room Cooling Fans, 1V222A (Division I) and 1V222B (Division II) for Unit 1 (Fire Zone 1-4A-S) and 2V222A (Division I) and 2V222B (Division II) for Unit 2 (Fire Zone 2-4A-S) are required safe shutdown equipment.
The Division I and II equipment are located within 6 feet of each other.
Automatic fire detection and suppression equipment are located within each zone above the equipment. Both zones are located on mezzanines 20 feet above the main floor with access only by ladder. Transient combustibles are precluded by the congestion of equipment, ducts, conduits, and pipes in an area with only a 5' 9" height clearance and accessible only by ladder. The combustible loading in the each zone is low.
This combination of protection constitutes an adequate level of safety and is an acceptable deviation from the staff's guidelines.
FIRE AREA AFFECTED:
The Unit 81 fans are located in fire zone 1-4A-S located in Fire Area R-1A.
The identical Unit 2 fans are located in fire zone 2-4A-S located in Fire Area R-2B.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE UEST:
The requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III G.2.b requires redundant safe shutdown equipment to be separated by 20-feet (with no intervening combustibles) and fire suppression and detection must be provided.
Redundant switchgear room cooling fans are located less than 20 feet from each other.
EXISTING ARRANGEMENT:
Switchgear Room Cooling Fans 1V222A (Division I) and 1V222B (Division II) are located in fire zone 1-4A-S on a mezzanine above fire zone 1-4E. Fire Zone 1-4A-S in the area of these fans and 1-4E have low combustible loading. Fire Zone 1-4A-S has automatic sprinkler protection and fire detection above the equipment. The mezzanine is 20-feet above the main floor of Fire Zone 1-4A-S (Elevation 719'1"). Trans'ient combustibl'es in this area are precluded by the congestion of equipment, ducts, conduits, and pipes in area with only 5'9" clear height and accessible only by ladder. See Figures 1 and 2 for details.
Unit 2 conditions are identical.- The fans are 2V222A" (Division I) and 2V222B (Division II). The fire zones are 2-4A-S and 2-4E. See Figures 3 and 4 for details.
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I JUSTIFICATION:
The existing fire suppression, fire detection, and 6 foot spatial separation are adequate measures to protect equipment located in a inaccessible location with low combustible loadings.
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APPENDIX R DEVIATION REQUEST REQUEST NO. 16 FIGURES
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 17 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE UEST KAOWOOL SYSTEM AS AN ACCEPTABLE 1-HOUR FIRE BARRIER WRAP DEVIATION RE VEST We request approval of the following:
A Kaowool fire barrier wrap system along with an automatic suppression system is acceptable for use as a 1-hour fire barrier in plant areas where the installation currently exist.
FIRE AREAS AFFECTED:
Kaowool has been installed in the following 'plant'reas:
Fire Area Fire Zones with Kaowool R-lA 1-3B-S 1-3B-W 1-4A-S, W 1-5A-S R-1B 1-3A 1-3B-N 1-3B-W 1-4A-W 1-4A-N CS-l0 0-27-C CS-3 0-25E REASON FOR DEVIATION RE UEST:
The requirements of 10CFR50, Section II.G.2.C, allows the use of, a 1-hour fire barrier wrap. NRC guidance letter 85-01, Section 3.2.1 indicates that the "Kaowool System", which had been accepted by the NRC, failed to meet the 325'F temperature limit. This system has been installed at Susquehanna SES.
EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS:
All fire zones in which Kaowool has been installed have automatic fire suppression installed a minimum of 50'n either side of the wrapped raceway.
Fire detection is also provided in these fire zones.
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Kaowool was installed as a barrier wrap at Susquehanna SES prior to fuel load on Unit 1 (July, 1982). In Generic Letter 85-01, the staff has stated that conduit and cable tray enclosure materials accepted by the NRC as a 1-hour barrier prior to Appendix R (e.g. some Kaowool and 3M materials) and already installed bg the licensee need not be replaced even though they may not have met the 325 criteria." The existing Kaowool installations at Susquehanna SES were previously approved by the NRC. Each installation is protected by an automatic fire suppression system. While another barrier design may be preferable and has been utilized at Susquehanna SES, Kaowool provides a sufficient level of protection for raceways when fire suppression is provided so as to not warrant its replacement in areas of the plant where it is currently installed.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 18 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE VEST FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS DEVIATIONS FROM NFPA RE UIREMENTS g
We request approval of the following:
The use of small, orifice sprinkler heads in preaction sprinkler systems protecting the essential safe shutdown raceway is acceptable.
FIRE AREAS AFFECTED:
This deviation applies to Fire Areas R-1A, R-lB, R-2A, and R-2B.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE UEST:
Generic Letter 85-01 indicates fire suppression must comply with NFPA requirements in order to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirements. Certain sprinkler systems installed at Susquehanna SES do not comply with NFPA 13, Section 3-16.5.2a.
NFPA 13 (1985) Section 3-16.5.2a states:
"(a) Small orifice sprinklers shall not be used on dry-pipe, preaction or combine dry-pipe and pre-action systems."
EXISTING ARRANGEMENT:
Preaction sprinkler systems in the following fire zones utilize 3/8 inch orifices rather than 1/2 inch standard orifices.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 18 PAGE NO. 2 JUSTIFICATION:
The maximum combustible loading within,reactor building is 45 min. (in situ and transient).
In 1981 and 1982, sprinkler systems were retrofitted to provide protection for essential safe shutdown raceway. These systems utilize a preaction systems to minimize damage to safety related equipment. The systems were designed to provide .15 gpm/sq. ft. over the entire area of application, or 2,500 sq. ft.,
(whichever is smallest). If 1/2 inch orifice heads had been used, large individual head densities would have resulted at areas close to the supply valve. The smaller orifice heads were utilized to minimize the impact on the existing drainage system.
The time delay to evacuate the low pressure supervisory air in the preaction system is minimal.
The use of small orifice sprinkler nozzles does not impact the ability of these preaction systems to properly protect these areas.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 19 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE UEST INCOMPLETE FIRE SUPPRESSION AND FIRE DETECTION IN DIESEL GENERATOR FIRE AREAS We request approval of the following:
Existing fire protection in Fire Areas D-1 and D-3, consisting of automatic suppression and detection in the basement (EL 660' 0") and ground floor (EL677' 0") only, is adequate to protect essential redundant safe shutdown equipment located within the fire areas. Specifically, no automatic suppression or detection is required for the top floor (EL 710' 9").
FIRE AREA AFFECTED:
This deviation covers Diesel Generator Fire Areas D-1 (0-41A) and D-3 (0-41C).
Fire areas D-2 and D-4 do not contain essential redundant safe shutdown raceway and, therefore, are not in deviation.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE VEST:
The requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2 require fire detection, and fire suppression when redundant safe shutdown raceway exist within a fire area. NRC guidance indicates fire detection and suppression should be provided throughout a fire area. Portions of the Diesel Generator Buildings do not satisfy these requirements.
EXISTING ARRANGEMENT Fire Areas D-1 and D-3 contain essential safe shutdown equipment. Automatic suppression and fire detection is provided for the basement (EL 660'0") and the ground floor (El. 677'0") of each Fire Area.. The top floor of each Fire Area (El. 710'9"), neither of which contain essential safe shutdown equipment, are not provided with fire suppression or fire detection.
JUSTIFICATION:
The top floor (El. 710'9") of each Fire Area contains fan equipment only, have minimal combustibles, and do not contain any redundant safe shutdown raceway and consequently do not present a hazard to redundant safe shutdown raceway located in the basement elevations.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 20 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE UEST PENETRATION SEALS CONDUITS We request approval of the following:
It is acceptable to seal new and existing conduits at Susquehanna SES which penetrate fire rated barriers. in the following manner:
A. 'll conduit ends which terminate more than 6 inches from a wall and terminate either as open ends (i.e., cable drops) or into boxes (or cabinets) with ventilation openings are provided with a non-fire rated seal to prevent the passage of air and hot gases.
B. All conduit ends which terminate in enclosed boxes such as junction boxes, are not sealed since the )unction box, etc., would prevent flow of hot gases and air.
FIRE ZONE AFFECTED:
The requirements for fire rated seals (PP&L Specification C1027) and general sealing of conduits (Drawing E-49) are applied throughout the facility, therefore, this deviation applies to all safety related fire area boundaries.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE UEST:
The requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section'II.G.2 require fire areas to have rated fire boundaries. In Generic Letter 85-01,,Section 8.8 the NRC indicated requirements for sealing conduits as they passed through fire rated boundaries. The conduits passing through fire rated barriers at Susquehanna SES are protected in a different, but equivalent manner.
EXISTING ARRANGEMENT:
Conduits at Susquehanna SES are sealed in the following manner: (See attached Figure 1)
A. When both ends of the conduit terminate within 6 inches of the barrier a full fire rated seal is provided in the conduit. Such seals coincide with the fire barrier.
B. All conduit ends which terminate more than 6 inches from a wall and terminate either as open ends (i.e., cable drops) or into boxes (or cabinets) with ventilation openings are provided with a non-fire rated seal to prevent the passage of air and hot gases.
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JUSTIFICATION:
Conduits which terminate within 6 inches on both sides of the fire barrier are adequately filled with a fire rated penetration seal which coincides with the fire barrier. When the conduit extends more than 6 inches, then it is not possible using our existing procedures to place a 9 inch fire rated penetration seal which coincides with the barrier. Protection of the penetration in this situation relies on fire not breaching the conduit for the distance between the non-coincidence fire seal and the fire barrier, and the non-coincidence seal preventing transfer of hot gases and smoke.
As an alternative to a fire rated seal at one end of a conduit, (which extends more than 6 inches from a fire barrier) all conduit ends at Susquehanna SES are treated in a manner which, prevents transfer of hot gases,and smoke through the conduits. The treatment of both ends of al'1 "conduits 'ensures that, when conduits penetrate'ire, barriers, the conduit end not exposed to a fire will prevent passage of hot gases and smoke. Therefore, a fire rated seal at one end is not required.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 21 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION RE UEST CONTROL STRUCTURE FIRE ZONES WITHOUT FIRE DETECTION OR FIRE SUPPRESSION DEVIATION RE UEST:
We request approval of the following:
The fire detection and fire suppression as described herein for Fire Zones 0-21A, 0-22A, 0-22C, 0-23, 0-24A, 0-24B, 0-24C, 0-24D, 0-24E, 0>>24F, 0-24G, 0-25A and 0-25E provide an acceptable level of protection and as such Fire Area CS-3 satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
FIRE AREA AFFECTED:
This exemption covers Fire Area CS-3.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE UEST:
10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, requires fire detection and suppression throughout a fire area. Fire detection and suppression is not provided throughout the Fire Area CS-3 at Susquehanna SES.
EXISTING ARRANGEMENT:
The following list identifies the Fire Zones which comprise Fire Area CS-3 and the protection features provided.
Safety Redundant Related Safe Equipment/ Shutdown Zone ~Racewa Detection Su ression ~Racewa 0-21A No No No No 0-22A No Part Part No 0-22C No No No No 0-23 No Part No No 0-24A No Yes CO No 0-24B No" Yes CO 'Part) No 0-24C No Yes CO No 0-24D Yes Yes C02 Halon No
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 21 PAGE NO. 2 Redundant Safe Safety Shutdown Zone Related Detection Su ression ~Racewa 0-24E Yes Yes C02 Halon No 0-24F No Yes C02 (Part) No 0-24G Yes Yes C02 Halon Yes 0-25A Yes Yes Sprinklers No 0-25E Yes Yes Sprinklers Yes All safety related fire zones are provid'ed with fire detection and fire suppression. In addition, all safety related fire zones have fire rated walls, and except for, exposed support steel in the floor/ceiling assemblies, all safety-related zone have fire rated floors and ceilings.'he essential raceway in this fire area have been provided with a one hour barrier, automatic fire suppression, and fire detection as outlined above.
JUSTIFICATION:
The fire zones which contain essential safe shutdown raceway have been properly protected in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2.C.
The other fire zones within this fire area which have not been provided with either complete fire detection and fire suppression do not contain sufficient combustibles to present a hazard to either safety related equipment or essential safe shutdown raceway.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 22 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION REQUEST CONTROL STRUCTURE FIRE AREA CS-10 PARTIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION DEVIATION We request approval of the following:
Fire protection provided in Fire Area CS-10 is adequate to protect essential safe shutdown raceway in the Fire Area. Specifically, the Fire Area, with the exception of fire Zone 0-27D is provided with fire detection and suppression capability throughout the Fire Area. Fire Zone 0-27D, although not provided with fire suppression capability is separated from the remainder of the Fire Area by barriers with a minimum rating of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and contains a combustible loading of less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
FIRE AREA AFFECTED This deviation request applies to Fire Zone 0-27D in Fire Area CS-10.
REASON FOR DEVIATION RE UEST The requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.G.2. requires fire suppression throughout a fire area. Fire Zone 0-27D, which is part of Fire Area CS-10, has not been provided with fire suppression.
EXISTING ARRANGEMENT Fire Zone 0-27D (Fire Area CS-10), is not provided with fire suppression. The other fire zones within Fire Area CS-10 are provided with fire detection and fire suppression. The walls separating Fire Zone 0-27D and the remainder of Fire Area CS-10 are rated at a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, which is in excess of the combustible loading in Fire Zone 0-27D. No safety related equipment is located in Fire Zone 0-27D.
JUSTIFICATION Safe shutdown raceways within Fire Area CS-10 are adequately protected and passive fire rated construction exists between essential safe shutdown raceway and Fire Zone 0-27D.
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 23 PAGE NO. 1 APPENDIX R DEVIATION REQUEST CONTROL STRUCTURE FIRE AREA CS-9 PARTIAL FIRE SUPPRESSION We request approval of the following:
Fire protection provided in Fire Area CS-9 is adequate to protect the identified hazard. Specifically, the Fire Area is constantly manned by operations personnel who would detect and react to a fire, the area is provided with partial suppression, manual suppression is available, and the capability to achieve safe shutdown through alternative equipment is provided by the remote shutdown panel located outside the fire area.
FIRE AREA AFFECTED This deviation applies to Fire Area CS-9 (Main Control Room).
REASON FOR THE DEVIATION RE VEST Dedicated shutdown capability in accordance with Appendix R,Section III.G.3 has been provided for use in the event of a fire in the control room. The above was provided since separation of redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment within the control room does not satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Complete Fire suppression has not been provided throughout the Control Room (Fire Area CS-9).
EXISTING CONDITIONS The following conditions exist in Fire Zone CS-9:
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DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 23 PAGE NO. 2 SAFETY RELATED ZONE PROTECTION E UIPMENT 0-26A None None 0-26E None None 0-26F None Yes Manual Spurt 0-26G CO under floor Yes (axed Piping)
Manual Spurt 0-26H CO under floor Yes (lixed Piping)
Manual Spurt 0-26I CO under floor Yes (fixed Piping) 0-26'one Yes Automatic 0-26K Sprinkler Yes Protection Automatic 0-26L Sprinkler Yes Protection Manual Spurt 0-26M C02 Yes (Fixed Piping)
Manual Spurt 0-26N C02 Yes (Fixed Piping)
Manual Spurt 0-26P C02 Yes
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Manual Spurt 0-26R C02 Yes (Fixed Piping)
The release of CO is controlled manually to minimize the effects of a CO discharge on planf operation. Manual control stations are provided both inside and outside the fire area. Areas with constant occupancy (0-26G, H, and I) are provided with under floor protection only.
Complete automatic sprinkler protection has been provided for Fire Zones 0-26K and 0-26L.
Fire Zones 0-26F and J are vestibules and contain minimal safety related cables below the raised floor.
Fire Zones 0-26A and 0-26E do not contain safety related equipment.
Portable extinguishers are available for use in the fire area. A hose station is available within the control structure for use in the fire area.
JUSTIFICATION It has been demonstrated, during the performance of .startup and test procedures ST28.1 and ST28.2 that 'full shutdown is achievable without reliance on the Control Room. The existing protection provided in Fire Area CS-9 is adequate to protect the identified cable hazards. It is expected that since the control room is constantly manned by operations personnel, any fire would be detected and 'extinguished prior to activation of a suppression system. The addition of more suppression capability would not enhance, to a significant degree, the protection of safe shutdown functions.
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E-1 20 E-2 20 NOTE: Deviation Request Numbers ll and 17 may apply to all fire areas.
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SUMMARY
REPORT FOR CONCERN 54A Analysis of Associated Circuits Within Fire Zones Outside the Control Room DOCKET NOS. 50-387 50-388
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SUMMARY
REPORT INDEX Section 1.0 Introduction Section 2.0 Methodology Utilized Section 3.0 Assumptions 6 NRC Guidance Section 4.0 Results of the Analysis Section 5.0 Corrective Actions Section 6.0 Schedule Section 7.0 Compensatory Measures Section 8.0 Conclusion Appendix A Sample Documentation
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SUMMARY
REPORT CONCERN ¹4A Analysis of Associated Circuits Within Fire Zones Outside The Control Room
1.0 INTRODUCTION
As a result of audits performed in the first quarter of 1985 on the Fire Protection Program at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), the NRC, in a letter dated April 18, 1985, issued a statement of their concerns related to the SSES Fire Protection Program. Subsequently, PPaL issued PLA-2482 dated June 11, 1985 which provided"a description of each of the NRC concerns, a description of PPaL's method of resolution of the NRC concerns, and a description of PPGL's deliverables to the NRC. All of these items were discussed with and agreed to by the NRC staff.
Concern ¹4A addresses the possibility of a majority division component preventing the operation of a minority division system. For the purposes of this report, the minority division is defined as that division which was chosen to be protected from fire. In response to this concern, PPaL reviewed all safe shutdown systems and all systems that interconnect with safe shutdown systems. It was determined that in several safe shutdown systems operation of the minority division depends upon one majority division component. To resolve Concern ¹4A, PPaL made an investigation to determine if the majority division components had been protected when required. PPGL also reviewed all systems connected to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to determine if the spurious operation of a "majority" component could cause a loss of coolant from the RPV.
2.0 METHODOLOGY UTILIZED II fj Majority'components were investigated by the f'ollowing methodology:
- l. Identified all safe shutdown systems that require components from both divisions for operation.
- 2. Determined the routing of essential cabling required for the operation and control of each majority division component and identified the fire zones through which this essential cabling passes.
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- 3. Identified all fire zones that contain essential cabling for a majority division component that is required for a safe shutdown path* in the zone.
- 4. Determined if the cabling identified in step 3 was protected or, need not be protected due to the existence of an alternate safe shutdown path that does not rely on the particular safe shutdown system.
- 6. Identified all systems that, interconnect with safe shutdown systems and reviewed for potential effects of majority division components.
3.0 ASSUMPTIONS 6 NRC GUIDANCE 3.1 The analysis was performed in accordance with the following NRC guidance:
- a. 10 CFR 50, Appendix R Section III.G.
- b. Generic Letters 83-33 and 85-01.
- c. NRC letter to PPGL dated April 18, 1985 which states:
The licensee's separation criteria is adequate to assure that the "minority" division is not associated electrically with the "majority" division. However, the methodology is not adequate to identify systems interactions that could associate the "majority" division with the "minority" division shutdown capability for the area.
4.0 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
'lt 4.1 Safe Shutdown Systems It was determined that 'the 'only majority division components that can affect the operation of a minority system are containment isolation valves. The results of the analysis for these valves are shown on Table 1 at the end of this section. Both the inboard and ouboard isolation valves were analyzed even though in most cases one valve would be a minority system component.
The results of the anlaysis indicate that there are fire zones in which majority components must be protected if the associated system is required for safe shutdown. Table 1 identifies the raceways that must be protected to insure that the required components will remain operable in the event of fire.
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- Safe Shutdown Paths for each fire zone in both the Unit-1 and Unit-2 Reactor Building are identified in Appendix B of the Summary Report for NRC Concern 01.
4.2 Interconnecting Systems Interconnecting systems can only defeat a safe shutdown system by flow diversion. All potential flow diversion paths for each safe shutdown system were identified and evaluated. It was concluded that flow diversion will not defeat the operation of any safe shutdown system. Potential flow diversion paths that could defeat system operation are either so small that, any flow through them would be insignificant or they are blocked by a check valve or a normally closed manual valve. It can therefore be concluded that spurious operation of a majority division component in an interconnecting system cannot defeat the operation of a minority division safe shutdown system. Appendix A to this report provides sample documentation of flow diversion paths.
4.3 Loss of Coolant From The Reactor Pressure Vessel In an effort unrelated to Concern 54A, PPaL conducted a study of all potential loss of coolant (LOC) paths from the RPV. This study shows that there are no cases where a majority division component can cause a loss of coolant through a minority division system.
5.0 Corrective Actions Those raceways in fire zone 1-4A-S and 1-5A-S identified in Table 1 will be protected. Revision 2 to our response to Concern No. 1 has concluded that. path 4 must be made available in these fire zones. The revision also showed that a safe shutdown path is available in the remaining fire zones identified in table 1.0 without paths 2 or 4.
6.0 SCHEDULE Any modifications committed to in this report will be accomplished in accordance with the schedule listed below. The commitment date is tied to the end of outage referenced. Actual dates provided are for outage time frame reference only.
UNIT COMPLETED BY REFERENCE DATE Modification in End of Unit 51 October 23, 1987 Unit 51 s Common 3rd Refueling Outage Modification in End of Unit 52 April 29, 1988 Unit 52 2nd Refueling Outage 7.0 COMPENSATORY MEASURES Those compensatory measures currently in place will remain in place until all identified modifications are completed.
I P
8.0 CONCLUSION
Upon completion of the identified modifications, the NRC's concerns related to Concern I4A, "Analysis of Associated Circuits within Fire Zones Outside the Control Room", will be resolved.
~
- >' ' ~ * < ~
'I ll1. 4 4 A*
- I ~ A ,,'J' I )I N ~ F
TABLE - (continued)
ID NO. OF ID NO. OF MAJORITY/ SAFE SHUTDOWN FIRE ZONES RACEWAYS & JUNCTION ALTERNATE PATH(S)
MINORITY NORMALLY OPEN/ PATH(S) REQUIRING WHERE PROTECTION BOXES REQUIRING AVAILABLE IN VALVE DESCRIPTION COMPONENT NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE IS REQUIRED PROTECTION FIRE ZONE HV-1F008 UNIT-1. RHR SHUTDOWN N/A N.C. 2,4 NONE N/A COOLING OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE HV-1F009 UNIT-1 RHR SHUTDOWN N/A N.C. 2,4 1-3A EVKH01,05, E1K373,375 COOLING INBOARD 393,EIKJ55,EIKJ55g ISOLATION VALVE E1KF57,58,59,JB0302,0304 1-4A-8 E1PJ07-15, E1KJ09-15, E1K704 3~
1-4D EIPJ34e35 53e54e56t64s
~ 3&4 E1PJ51,ElKJ31-35,37-39 E1KH27 HV-2F008 UNIT-2 RHR SHUTDOWN N/A N C. 2,4 N/A COOLING OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE HV-2F009 UNIT-2 RHR SHUTDOWN N/A N.C. 2,4 2-3A E2KH05 09 ~ 61 E2KG71 COOLING INBOARD 2-4A-S E2KJ08 16e91i92e95i ISOLATION VALVE E2PJ07-16,71 2-4A-W E2KJ17-19 1&3 2-4D E2KJ03-37,E2KH30,E2PJ, 3 34 '5 '1 53 '4~56 '7g64
- PP&L has previously nade a commitment to protect. the raceways necessary to nake the alternate safe shutdown path available in these zones. See Appendix D of the Su@nary Report for NRC Concern $ 1.
gMIIZ - 1 ID NO. OF ID NO. OF MAJORITY/ SAFE SHUTDOWN FIRE ZONES RACEWAYS & JUNCTION ALTERNATE PATH(S)
MINORITY NORMALLY OPEN/ PATH (S) REQUIRING WHERE PROTECTION BOXES REQUIRING AVAILABLE IN VALVE DESCRIPTION COMPONENT NORMALLY CLOSED VALVE ZS REQUZRED PROTECION FIRE ZONE HV-1F007 UNIT-1 RCIC SYSTEM MAJORITY N.O. 1-3B-N F1K937,FlK958,JB3937 STEAM SUPPLY INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE HV-1F008 UNIT-1 RCIC SYSTEM MINORITY N.O. NONE N/A STEAM SUPPLY OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE HV-2F007 UNIT-2 RCIC SYSTEM MAJORITY N.O. 2-4C F2K674,F2K676 & JB4156 1 STEAM SUPPLY INBOARD 2-1E F2K674 1 ZSOLATION VALVE HV-2F008 UNIT-2 RCIC SYSTEM MINORITY N.O. NONE N/A STEAM SUPPLY OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE HV-1F002 UNIT-1 HPCI SYSTEM MAJORITY N.O 1-3A E1K985 3*
STEAM SUPPLY INBOARD 1-4A-S E1K985,E1K990,JB3941 3*
ISOLATION VALVE 1-5A-S E1K990 HV-1F003 UNIT-1 HPCI SYSTEM MINORITY N.O. 1-3A F1KX11 STEAM SUPPLY OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE HV-2F002 UNIT-2 HPCI SYSTEM MAJORITY N.O. . 2-3A E2K1C1 STEAM SUPPIY INBOARD 2-4A-S E2KlCl,E2KK8 & JB4157 ZSOLATION VALVE 2-5C E2KlC8 HV-2F003 UNIT-2 HPCI SYSTEM MINORITY N.O. NONE N/A STEAM SUPPLY OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVE
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 6 2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM - CONCERN 54A DOCKET NOS. 50-387 50-388 APPENDIX A - SAMPLE DOCUMENTATION
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APPENDIX A Description of Sample Documentation This appendix contains examples of the documentation used to evaluate the effects of majority division components on minority division systems. The first example is for the Inboard Containment Isolation Valve on the Steam Supply to the RCIC Turbine. This documentation was developed from electrical schematics, fire protection raceway drawings and safe shutdown paths as reported in Appendix B of the Summary Report for NRC Concern 51. The second example is flow diversion paths for the Unit 1 Core Spray System and Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel. Flow diversion paths are defined as those pipelines that have a potential for diverting coolant flow from its required destination or from the Reactor Pressure Vessel. The documentation of the flow diversion paths for safe shutdown systems was developed by:
- l. Identifying the required flow path on the system PAID.
- 2. All lines connected to the required flow path are traced from the connection point back to a point where or cannot cause flow diversion.
it can be determined that they can The procedure for the RPV was basically the same except that rather than a required flow path all pipe lines connected to the RPV were identified.
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FLOW DIVERSION PATHS CORE SPRAY SYSTEM
Core S ra Sheet Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: S. S. Howze Reviewed By: L. S. Weed Component(s) that Component Potential Prevents W/Potential Flow Path Flow Flow for Flow Description Diversion Diversion Diversion Division References Remarks 16" HBB-104 Suction Line from CST No 1F002A N/A M-152 Locked Closed Manual Valve 1" HBB-104 Suction Relief Line No PSV-1F032A N/A M-152 Relieves Pressure Only No Multiple Failure Considered 1 1/2" GBB-101 Discharge Relief Line No PSV-1F012A N/A H-152 Relieves Pressure Only, Minimal Flow No Hultiple Failures Considered 2" GBB-101 Condensate Transfer No CV-1F030A Fill Line H-152 Double Check Valves in Series CV-1F029A Restrict Flow 1" Lines Vent, Drain, Pump Shaft No See Remarks N/A H-152 Flow in These Lines is Prevented By Seal, Znstrument Tap, Locked Closed Manual Valves, Caps, Test S Equalizing Lines or Excess Flow Check Valves, and therefore is not a problem
She 6 Core S ra Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: S. S. Howre Reviewed By: L. S. Weed Component(s) that Component Potential Prevents W/Potential Flow Flow for Flow Flow Path Description Diversion Diversion Diversion Division References Remarks 16" HBB-104 Suction Line from CST No 1F002B N/A M-152 Locked Closed Manual Valve 3" GBB-102 Condensate Transfer No 1 52-005 N/A M-152 Check Valve Restricts Flow Minimum Flow Fill Line 1" HBB-104 Suction Relief Line No PSV-1F032B N/A H-152 Relieves Pressure With Minimal Flow Multiple Failures Not Considered 1 1/2" GBB-101 Discharge Relief Line No PSV-1F012B N/A M 152 Relieves Pressure With Minimal Flow Multiple Failures Not Considered 2" GBB-101 Condensate Transfer No CV-1F030B N/A M-152 Double Check Valves in Series Filling Line CV-1F029B Restrict Flow 1" Lines Vent, Drain, Pump Shaft No See Remarks N/A M-152 Flow in These Lines Is Prevented by Seal, Instrument Tap, Locked Closed Manual Valves, Caps, Test S Equaliring Lines or Excess Flow Check Valves and Therefore is not a Problem dk/tbd305i
FLOW DIVERSION PATHS UNIT-1 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL
Reactor Vessc Sheet 1 of C.
Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James M. Manoleas Reviewed By: L. S. Weed Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. 'from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks N4D, E, F - Feedwater Supply No 1F010A N/A N/A M-141 3 feedwater branch outlets tie Lines (12" DLA-102 to 24" into a single supply header with DLA-102) a check valve to restrict back-flow from RPV.
N4, A, B, C - Feedwater Supply No 1F010B N/A N/A M-141 3 feedwater branch outlets tie Lines (12" DLA-104 to 24" into a single supply header with DLA-104) a check valve to restrict back-flow from RPV.
N3A - Hain Steam Line 'A'26" Yes N/A PSV-IF013A,C,EgS M-141 Consequences to fuel and vessel G001) (N.C.) (Solenoid valves resulting from multiple valve SV-14113Ag Cg Eg & S, openings have been determined to respectively) be less severe than a main steamline break. See final resolution Task No. 183E1, 2, 3, 4 Control Room Fire Study.
No PSV-1F013G N/A H-141 These components are required to (N.C.) (Solenoid to perform a safety function.
valves SV-14113G1, Refer to ADS System.
G2 No HV-1F022A (N.O.) N/A M-141 These components are required to (Solenoid valves perform a safety function.
SV-14123A1, A2) Refer to MSIVs.
Reactor Vess C.
Sheet 2 of Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James H. Hanoleas Reviewed By: L. S. Weed Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks N3A - Hain Steam Line Yes N/A HV-1F016 (N O.) H-141 The injection rate of available (2"DBA-108 to 'A'ypass HV-1F019 (N.O.) makeup systems is much greater 3" DBA-108) than the maximum possible loss of coolant rate through this line. Valves normally close on a main steam isolation signal.
N3B - Main Steam Line Yes PSV-1F013P (N.C.)
'B'26'OOl)
M-141 Consequences to fuel and vessel (Solenoid valve resulting from multiple valve SV-14113P) openings have been determined to be less severe than a main steamline break. See final resolution Task No. 183E1, 2, 3, 4 Control Room Fire Study.
No PSV-1F013J, H N/A H-141 These components are required to (Solenoid valves perform a safety function.
SV14113J1, J2f Refer to ADS System.
Hl,H2 respectively)
No HV-1F022B (N 0.) N/A M-141 These components are required to (Solenoid valves perform a safety function.
SV-14123B1,B2) Refer to MSIVs.
N38 - Main Steam Line 'B'ypass Yes N/A See Remarks valves as (2" DBA-109 to 3" DBA-108) H-141 Same N3A Main Steam Line 'A'ypass.
Reactor Vess C.
Sheet 3 of Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James H. Hanoleas Reviewed By: L. S. Weed Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks N3B - NPCI Steam Supply Line HV-1F001 (N.C.)
(10" DBA-102) from Main No N/A H-155 This component is required to Steam Line perform a safety function.
'B'3C Refer to HPCI System.
- Main Steam Line 'C'26" Yes N/A PSV-1F013B,R (N.C.) H-141 Consequences to fuel and vessel G001) (Solenoid valves resulting from multiple valve SV-14113Bg R, openings have been determined to respectively) be less severe than a main steamline break. See final resolution Task No. 183El, 2, 3, 4 Control Room Fire Study.
No PSV-1F013L N/A H-141 These components are required to (N.C.) (Solenoid perform a safety function.
valves SV-14113 Refer to ADS System.
Ll,L2)
No HV-1F022C (N.O.) , N/A M-141 These components are required to (Solenoid valves perform a safety function.
SV-14123C1,C2) Refer to HSIVs.
Reactor Vess .C.
Sheet 4 of Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James M. Hanoleas Reviewed By: L. S. ~
Weed Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks N3C - RCIC Steam Supply Line No HV-1F045 (N.C.) N/A M-150 This component is required to (4"DBA-105) from Hain Steam Line perform a safety function.
'C'3C Refer to RCIC System.
- Hain Steam Line Yes N/A See Remarks M-141 valves as -
(2" DBA-110 to Same N3A. Hain Steam
'A'ypass.
'C'ypass 3" DBA-108) Line N3D - Hain Steam Line Yes N/A PSV-lF013D,F, 6001)
'D'26" H-141 Consequences to fuel and vessel H, (N.C.) (Solenoid resulting from multiple valve valves SV-14113Dg F; openings have been determined to 8; respectively) be less severe than a main steamline break. See final resolution Task No. 183E1, 2, 3, 4 Control Room Fire Study.
No PSV-1F013K, N/A M-141 These components are required to N (N.C ) perform a safety function.
(Solenoid valves Refer to ADS System.
SV14113K1,K2; Nli N2, respectively)
No HV-IF022D (N.O.) N/A M-141 These components are required to (Solenoid valves perform a safety function.
SV-14123D1,D2) Refer to MSIVs.
N3D - Hain Steam Line 'D'ypass Yes N/A See Remarks M-141 Same valves as N3A Main Steam (2" DBA-111 to 3" DBA-108) Line 'A'ypass
Reactor Vess sheet 5 of C.
Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James H. Manoleas Reviewed By: L. S. Weed Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks N5A - Core Spray System Injection Line 'A'12" No HV-1FOOSA (N.C.) N/A M-141 & This component is required to DCA-107)
H-152 perform a safety function.
Refer to Core Spray System.
N5B - Core Spray System No MV-1F005B (N.C.) N/A M-141 This component is required to Injection Line 'B'12" M-152 perform a safety function.
DCA-107)
Refer to Core Spray System.
N7 - Reactor Vent to Drywell No HV-1F001 (N.C ~ ) N/A H-141 The injection rate of available Equip. Drain Tank Line See Remarks HV-1F002 (N C.) makeup systems is much greater (2" DBA-112) than the maximum possible loss of coolant rate through this line.
N7 - To Nuclear Boiler No XV-1F041 N/A Instrumentation (2" DBA-112 to N/A M-141 & Excess flow check valve 1" DCA-145) M-142 restricts flow from RPV.
N9 - Capped Connection No Capped 4" Nozzle N/A N/A M-141 No L.O.C. permissible.
N6A - Flanged Connection No 6" Hating Flange N/A N/A H-141 No L.O.C. permissible.
Connection N6B - RHR Reactor Head No 1F019 N/A N/A M-141 & Check valve restricts Spray Line (6" DCA-ill) M-151 Sh.l backflow from RPV.
N13 - RPV Instrument Line No XV-1F009 N/A N/A H"141 Excess flow check valve and (1" DCA-101) 1-41"014 & double locked closed manual 1-41-015 valves restrict flow from RPV.
Sheet 6 of Reactor Vess C.
Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James H. Hanoleas Reviewed By: L. S. Weed d 'L.da Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks N10 Instrument Sensing I inc No XV-1F061 N/A N/A M-142 Excess flow check valve (1" DCA-139) restricts flow from RPV.
N10 - Instrument Sensing Line No XV"1F057 N/A N/A M"142 Excess flow check valve (1" DCA-135) restricts flow from RPV.
N10 - Instrument Sensing Line No XV-1F055 N/A N/A M-142 Excess flow check valve (1" DCA-135) restricts flow from RPV.
N10 - Standby Liquid Control No CY-1F007 N/A N/A M-142 Check valve restricts backflow System Line (1 1/2" DCA-106) M-148 from RPV.
'N12A - Instrument Sensing Line XV-IF043A N/A N/A M-142 Excess flow check valve (1" DBA-118) restricts flow from RPV.
N128 - Instrument Sensing Line No XV-1F043B N/A N/A H-142 Excess flow check valve (1" DBA-118) restricts flow from RPV.
N11A - Instrument Sensing Line No XV-1F047A N/A N/A H-142 Excess flow check valve (1" DCA-138) restricts flow from RPV.
N118 - Instrument Sensing Line No XV-1F0478 N/A N/A H-142 Excess flow check valve (1" DCA-138) restricts flow from RPV.
N16A - Instrument Sensing Line No XV-1F045A N/A N/A M-142 Excess flow check valve (1" DCA-140) restricts flow from RPV.
N168 - Instrument Sensing Line XV-1F045B N/A H-142 Excess flow check valve i>i DCA 140 restricts flow from RPV.
Sheet 7 Reactor Ve .O.C.
Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James M. Manoleas Reviewed By: L. S. Weed 8 J.w Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks N8A- Instrument Sensing Lines No XV-IF053A,B/CgD N/A N/A M-142 Excess flow check valves (3/4" DCA-144) (Typ. 4 lines) XV-1F051C,D restrict flow from RPV.
(3/4" DCA-136) (Typ. 2 lines) XV-1F051AgB (3/4H DCA-136) (Typ. 2 lines)
N8B - Instrument Sensing Line No XV 1F059ApBgCgDg N/A N/A M-142 Excess flow check valves (3/4" DCA-144) (Typ. 15 li.nes) E,F,H,LfMgNfP,Rg restrict flow from RPV ~
(3/4" DCA-144) SgT,U No XV-1F059G N/A N/A M-142 N2A,B,C,D,E - Loop B Recircula- No HV-1FOSOA N/A M-151 Sh.2 Check Valve Restricts Flow tion Discharge Lines (12" G001 & M-143 to 28" G001 to 24" DCA-110) to RHR N2F,G,H,J,K, - Loop A Recircula- No HV-1FOSOB N/A N/A M-151 Sh.l Check Valve Restricts Flow.
tion Discharge Lines (12" G001 & M-143 to 28" G001 to 24" DCA-110) to RHR N1B - Loop B Recirculation No HV-1F009 (N.C.) N/A M-143 & These components are required to Suction Line (28" G001 to 20" HV-1F008 (N.C.) M-151 Sh.2 perform a safety function.
DCA-108) to RHR Refer to RHR system.
4S Sheet 8 Reactor Ve .O.C.
Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James M. Manoleas Reviewed By: L. S. Weed Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks N1B - Loop B Recirculation N/A HV-1F001 (N.O.) M-143 s The injection rate of available Suction Lines (28" G001 to 4" HV-1F004 (N.O.) M-144 makeup systems is much greater DCA-102 to 6" DBA-101) to RWCU than the maximum possible loss of coolant rate through this line.
N1A - Loop.A Recirculation Yes N/A HV-1F001 (N.O.) M-143 s See N1B - Loop B Recirculation Suction Line (28" G001 to 4" HV-1F004 (N.O.) M-144 Suction Line above.
DCA-102 to 6" DBA-101) to RWCU N15 - RWCU Line from RPV (4" Yes N/A HV-1F001 (N.O.) M-144 See N1B - Loop Recirculation DCA-103 to 6" DBA-101) HV-1F004 (N.O.) Suction Line above.
N15 - Instrument Sensing Line No XV-1F046 N/A N/A M-144 Excess flow check valve from RWCU (1" DCA-103) restricts flow from RPV.
CRD (1/2" Exhaust Water Header DCD) (Typ. of 185)
No N/A SV-120 SV-121 (ND) I/II M-147 These valves are typical for (ND) 185 CRDs.
SV-122 (ND)
SV-123 (ND)
Scram Discharge Volume Drain Line (2" No SVlF009 (XV- N/A I/II M-147 Valves close on scram and DCB) 1FOllg FC) prevent L.O.C. inventory.
Refer to CRD System.
Reactor Vess~ C.
Sheet 9 of Flow Diversion Paths (Unit 1) Prepared By: James M. Manoleas Reviewed By: L. S. Weed Component that Component W/Potential Potential Prevents L.O.C. for L.O.C. from Flow Path Description L.O.C. from R.P.V. from R.P.V. R.P.V. Division References Remarks Scram Discharge Volume Vent SV1F009 (XV-1F010; FC)
N/A I/II M-147 Valves close on scram and prevent L.O.C. inventory.
Refer to CRD System.
Scram Inlet Line No 115 N/A N/A M-147 Check valve restricts L.O.C.
(1/2" DCD) flow path.
Drive Water Header No 137 (1/2" DCD)
N/A N/A M-147 Check valve restricts L.O.C.
flow path.
dk/thd364i
4, l
, I
~
I
- jr
ATTACHMENT 1 Underwriter's Laboratories Inc.'act-Finding Report on Air Duct Penetrations Through One Hour Fire Resistive Wall Assembly
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Pi10 NC505 12 Pro)oct 84NK29824 April 17, 1985 PACT PZNDZNQ REPORT on i AZR DUCT PENETRATXQNS THROUGH ONE HOUR PXRE RESXSTZVE WALL ASSEMBLY
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4
File NC505-12 Pxoject 84NK29824 April 17, 1985, FACT-F INDINC REPORT on AZR DUCT PENETRATIONS THROUGH ONE HOUR FZRE. RESISTIVE WALL ASSEMBLY American Iron and Steel Institute Washington, D.C.
Copyright C,.1985 Underwriters Laboratories Znc.
Underwriters Laboratories Inc. authorizes the above to reproduce this Report provided in its entirety.
it is reproduced named'ompany Fact-Finding Investigations're undertaken to develop facts and issue a Report fox use by the Applicant in seeking amendments in nationally recognized installation codes and standards. The issuance of this Report in no way implies Listing, Classification, or other Recognition by UL andMarks does not authorize the use of UL Listing or Classification or any other reference to.'nderwriters Laboratories Inc. on or'n connection with the product. F Underwriters Laborat'eries Znc.', its employees, or its agents shalL not he responsible to anyone for the use or nonuse of the information contained in this Report, and shall not incur any obligation or liability for damages, including consequential damages, arising out of or in connection with the use of, or inability to use the information contained in this Report.
pile NC505 12 Zssueds 4 17 TABLE CONTENTS
~Pa e List of Xllustrations Introduction Description o Test Assembly Test Record Summary Sl Appendix A - Tabular Test Data Appendix B - Photographs oC Test Assembly Bl
pile NC505-12 Issued: 4-17-85 gIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Descri tion XLL. N0 1
Construction Drawings LtlAglB Appearance of Exposed Surface of Assembly Before Test Furnace Time-Temperature Curve Plot of Furnace Pressure Thermocouple Locations on Unexposed Surface of Wall Assembly Thermocouple Locations on Air Duct Assemblies Plot of Average and Maximum Individual Temperatures Unexposed'urface Plot of Temperatures 3 In. Crom Unexposed 8 Mall Surface and Within Duct Assemblies Plot of Temperatures 6 Ft from Surface and Within Duct Assemblies Unexposed'all Plot of Temperatures 9 Ft, 3 In. Crom Unexposed 10 Wall Surface and Within Duct Assemblies Plot of Temperatures on the Top Surface of Duct Assemblies 3 In. from Unexposed Wall Surface Plot of Temperatures on the Top Surface of Duct Assemblies 6 Ft from Unexposed Wall Surface Plot of Temperatures on the Top Surface of Duct Assemblies 9 Ft-<- 3 In. CroNUnexposed Wall Surface
'3 12 Appearance of Exposed Surface of Assembly after. Test 14 Appearance of Unexposed Surface of Assembly after Test 1S
Pile NC505 12 Zl Zssued, 4 17 85 Z N T R 0 D U C' Z 0 N This Pact-Pinding Report describes the performance of air duct penetrations through a 1 hr rated Cire resistive waLL assembly when the wall assembly was sub)ected to a Cire test conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Standard for Pire Tests of Building Construction and Materials, UZ, 2g3 (ASTM E119) .
The air duct assemblies which penetrated the wall assembly consisted of two square 10 in. by 10 in. inside dimension galvanized steel ducts and one square 10 in; by 10 in. inside dimension Class Z rigid fiberglais duct. The outside surface of one galvanized steel air duct was covered with toil-scrim-kraft faced fiberglass duct insulation on the fire and non-fire side of the wall as'sembly. All the air duct assemblies had open duct drops on both sides of the wall assembly; None of the air duct assemblies Oontained fire dampers. The C'ire resistive wall: ..
assembly consisted of 5/8 in. thick gypsum wallboard screw-attached to steel studs which war ~ spaced 21 in. on center.
This" investigation was undertaken at the request oC'he American 'Zron t Steel Znstitute (AZSZ) to develop that data
.relative to the Ci,rh performance of insulated steel air ducts, uninsulated steel air ducts, and Class Z rigid fiberglass air ducts, without dampers, penetrating a 1 hr fire resistive wall..
The following ob)ectives were associated with the conduct nf this tast:
(1) deveLop Cire performance data on the ability of insulated steel, uninsulated steel, and rigid fiberglass air duct systems to remain secure within the wall opening without developing through openings allowing the passage ot flame and hot gases through the wall and duct assemblies, (2%.. develop data on the influence of the air ducts on the transmission of heat to the unexposed surfaces of the nil and duct assemblies and (3) the radiation of heat from the surfaces of the duct assemblies to ad)acent'surfaces.
File NC505 12 Page Z2 Issued: 4-17-8S Foe this investigation~ wallthe measurement of temperatures on the unexyose4 surface of the utilixed thermocouples that were covered with 6 by 6 in. ceramic pads as described in Standard UL 263. The thezmocouples used to measure the temperatures on the top surface of the duct assemblies were attached with tape and were not covered with ceramic pads <o as not to interfere with the measurement of radiant heat surface of the duct ass'emblies to ad)acent untreated wood surfaces.
Information developed in this investigation is to be used foz submittal by the sponsor to the hir Conditioning Committee of National Fire protection Association (Neph) in connection with the development of the Standard for Installation of hir Conditioning and Ventilation Systems, NFPA 90k> which specifies the use of fire dampers in openings in partitions requiring fire resistive ratings of 2 hr or more and does not no@ contain provisions for the protection of openings in walls and paztitions requiring fire resistance ratings of less than 2 hr.
I The fire performance included temperatures measuzed and recorded at various locations within, top surface of, to the side of and above the aiz duct assemblies, the structural integrity of aiz duct assemblies, the passage of flames through the air duct assemblies, and the passage of fLames through the walL assembly.
Because of the furnace. design and the.characteristic of rising hot gases, the value of the pressure differential between the furnace chamber and the surrounding laboratory volume changes as the distance from the test frame sill changes. During the fire test, a plane of xezo pressure differential between the laboratory and the furnace existed in the furnace chamber. Above this plane, the pressure within the furnace was greater than the laboratory and below this plane, the pressure within the furnace was less than the laboratory. The location of the cero pressure plane was maintained at approximately 36 in. above the test frame sill.
File HC505 12 Page 1 Zssuodi 4-17 0
DE5CRZPT TON TEST AS S EMQZ,y MATERZALS!
The following is a description of the materials used i,n age teat assembly.
Floor/Coilin Tracks - The floor/ceiling tracks,wore fabricate rom 0.02 n. thick galvanized steel. The channel shaped tracks wore 3-5/8 in. deep with 1 in. long logs.
iikeeKStool Studs - The steel studs vere fabri.cated Crom 0.025 in.
- i. h *i i i i~
deep with 1-1/4 in. long legs and 5/16 in. long stiffonors.
I i i/ i sum Wallboard - The gypsum wallboard was 5/8 in. thick and bore s aas i.cation Marking for. Pire Resistance Class ification.
Steel Sleeves - The stool sleeves vere 12 in. long, 10 by i i i i Il.iii i iii i i i* i ii i steel.
~l ~
Fred.n
.t An i
les -
. I The framing anglos used i.n mounting the
~
steel s eevos in the wall assemblies had 1-1/2 in. long legs and wore fabricated Crom 0.079 i.n. thick galvanized steel.
Qa1vaniaed Steel Air Duct Znsulation - The glass fiber insulat on vas supp o ro s, 4 n. vide hy 48 in. long.
Tho nominal density of the. fiberglass insulation was approximately 1 Eb/Ct>.- The outsi.de face of the fiberglass i.nsulation vas covered with 7 mil thick aluminum foil-scrim-kraft faci.ng.
. Galvani,led Sheol Air Duct Assemblies - The two galvanized steel a uct ass es were r cat Crom 0.022 in. thick material and each duct assembly had a 10 by 10 in. inside dimensi.on.
Ri id tiber lass Air Duct Assombl -. The rigid fihorglass air duct mater a vas 1 in. thick boards.
r cat rom ft wi.de by 8 it The density of. the hoards was approximately long hy 4 Eb/ft~. The ai.r duct material bore the UZ Classification Mark Cor use i.n fabri. cation of a Class Z air duct per the requirements of the Standard for Factory-Made Air Ducts and Connectors, UL 181 ~
ii iX Fasteners 8-32 by 3/4 k
All fasteners in.
- ii ii used iii ~
long bolts spaced approximately ii in 15 i
in the assembly wore stool.
in.
ii OC.
pile NC505-12 page 2 Issued! g Lg 85 The st~i stud<<nd the floor/ceiling in.
tracks vere socuzed pan head screws.
t<<other with Type S 12 by 1/2 Long The gypsum wal]board vas secured 'to the steel studs with Type S by 1 in. 1ong bugle head sczews. the fasteners wore spaced 8 in. OC along the wallboard ]oints in the field.
WALL ASSEMBLY!
The wall assembly was nominally 15 ft wide by 10 consisted of 3-5/8 in. deep, 0.025 in. thick, steel studs spaced 24 in. OC. Additional studs were added to accommodate the penetration framing. The studs vere covered on the exposed and unexposed sides vith a single layer of 5/8 in. thick gypsum wallboard vhich vas sczev-attachod to each stud.
AIR DUCT ASSEMBLIES!
Three air duct assemblies vore included in the test assembly. The aiz duct assemblies included tvo galvanised steel air ducts and one rigid fibezglass air duct. The galvanized air ducts were fabricated from 0.022 in. thick steel. The inside dimension of the ducts vas 10 by 10 in. A steel sleeve was utilized foz eacii air duct assembly where it penetrated through the vali. One galvani"ed steel air duct assembly vas covered with glass fiber, duct insulation on the fire and non fire side of the vali assembly. The other galvanised steel duct assembly vas uninsulated.. The horizontal center Line of the galvanirod steel air duct penetzitions, vith and vithout insulation, vas 96 in.
above the test frame sill. The remaining air duct assembly was fabzicated'rom 1 in. thick rigid fiberglass air duct material with an aluminum foil-scrim-kraft. facing. The inside dimensions of the rigid fiberglass air duct assembly was 10 by 10 in. The horizontal center line of the rigid fiberglass air duct
'penetration vas 78 in. above the test frame sill. None of the air duct assemblies contained fize dampezs.
Calvanised Steel. Air Duct Assemblies - The, two galvanized steel uct ass os vere r cate rom 0.022 in. thick material The duct assemblies were fabricated from several sections to toaa. L-.shaped units. Each duct, assembly contained a 6 in..square drop outlet which was centered 10 ft> 3 in. from the unexposed surface cf the wall assembly and a 6 in square drop outlet which vas centered 12 in. from the end of the duct trunk on. the exposed side 0 f the assembly e The ends of each duct assembly were closed anl the duct drop outlets were open.
page 3 Zssuedg 4 Pile NCS05-12 On ot the two galvanized steel duct assemblies was with glaaa fiber insulation.
Class I Ri id Fiber lass Duct Air Assembl The Class Z from 4 ft wide rigid erg ass acr uct asse y was r cated hy 8 ft long by 1 in. thick" boards. of
The density the boards was approximately 4 1b/ft3. One surface of the hoards waa covered wf.th an 0.008 in. thick aluminum foil-scrim-kraft facing.
The 4 ft long edges of the hoard were cut with kerf edges to provf.de shiplap construction when )of. ning ad)acent pieces.
air duct material bore the UL Classific'ation Mark aa Class I material per the requirements of the Standard for Pactory-Made Air Ducts and Connectors, UL 181.
The boards were cut to form a 10 in. by 10 in. (I.D.)
L-shaped unf.t. Longitudinal )oints and 'ad)acent 4 ft long sections of duct were )oined together vith staples and pressure sensitive tape in accordance with f.nstructiona provided vith the rigid fiberglass air duct board material. The outlet duct assembly contained a 6 in. by 6 in. by 6 in. deep drop which waa centered 10 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the vali assembly and a 6 in. square drop outlet which waa centered 21 in. from the end of the duct trunk on the exyosed side of t wall assembly. The ends. of the duct assembly were closed and ~
duct dzoy outleta were opened.
Duct Su ort S stem - On the exposed side of the teat asse y, eac a r uct waa supported by means ot a trayese support system. The supports for the air duct systems were spaced 24 in. OC. Each support consf.sted of two 1/4 in. diameter threaded steel'ods spaced a nominal 12 in. OC. The galvanized steel ducts, with and vithout, insulation, vere supported by 14 in. long, I by 1 hy 1/8 in. thick steel angles. The rigid fiberglass duct waa supported by 14 in. long, 2 by 2 by 1/8 in.
thick steel angles.
On the unexyoaed side of the teat assembly, the air ducts vere supported hy temporary steel framing.
CONSTRUCTICN OF TEST ASSEMBLY'he teat assembly waa- constructed in a manner similar to that ahem on ILLS. I, IA and lb.
pile NCSOS 12 page 4 Zssu~dg 4 17 8 e floor/ceiling tracks towere secured to the test frame, The steep studs were secured the floor/ceiling tracks at a spacing of 24 in. OC. The vertical edge's oC a frame to support the air duct Penetration was formed from the studs placed toe-to-toe. The horizontal edges of the frame were formed from 36 in. lengths of 'floor/ceiling tracks folded into U-shapes as shown on ILLS. 1 and 1A.
A single layer of gypsum wallboard was fastened to the framing membrane forming the frames for the air duct penetrations as shown in ZLZ. l.
A steel sleeve was inserted through each steel frame.
Rockwool batt material was installed between the steel sleeve and the wallboard lining of the frame to seal any openings between the sleeve and the wallboard. The framing angles were fastened to the sleeve and to the steel studs to secure the sleeves in place as shown on ZLLS. 1 and 1A.
I On the exposed surface of the assemblies, the trapeze air duct supports were hung from the lintel of the test frame. - The duct supports were spaced 24 in. OC. The air duct assemblies were installed with the ends sealed and open 6 in. square outlets. One end of each duct assembly contained a 90'lbow which was connected to the steel sleeve as shown on ZLL. 1A. The horizontal center line of the galvanized steel air duct assemblies was located 96 in. above the test frame sill. The horizontal center line of the rigid fib'erglass duct assembly was located 78,in. above the test frame sill. Glass fiber insulation was wrapped around the galvanized steel air duct located on the north side of the assembly. The insulation extended approximately 4 in. beyond the closed end and was folded over and stapled to itself. A 6 in. overlap was provided along the hori'zontal and longitudinal )oints and were taped with a pressure sensitive tape.
Oa the unexposed surface, one end of the air duct assembly was connected to the steel sleeve and the remaining end was A 6 in square.air outlet was provided in 'each duct The center oC each, air outlet was located 10 ft, 3 in.
'ealed assemblp.
Crom the unexposed surface of the wa11 assembly as shown on ZLL. 18. The same procedure of wrapping the north galvanized steel air duct with glass fiber insulation on the exposed side of the assembly was repeated on the unexposed side.
pile HC505-12 page 5 Issued; 4~] 7 85 Photeptayha depicting various stages of the construction process ac contained in Appendix B. The appearance of the exposed surf'ace of the assemhlp prior to the fire test is shown in ILL. 2.
page 6 Zssuedt 4-17 85 File NC505-12 TES T RECORD FIRE ENDKUSCE TEST:
The fire test was conducted in accordance with the Standard of Underwriters Laboratories Inc. for Fire Tests of Buii,ding Construction and Materials, UL 263 (ASTM- E119, NFPA No. 251~.
DESCRIPTION OF TEST ASSENSLY The test assembly was constructed as described in the Section of the Report entitled "Construction of Test Assembly" and as shown on. ILLS. 1, 1A and 1B.
NETHOD The standard test equipment of Underwriters Laboratories Inc. for wall and partition assemblies was. used for the fire endurance .test.
The test assembly was placed in front ot the vertical ;
furnace and exposed to flames of controlled extent,and severity in accordance with the Standard Time Temperature Curve. The furnace temperatures were measured with 12 thermocouples positioned 6 in. from the exposed face of'he assembly and located in the furnace chamber as shown on ILL. 3 ~
'I The pressure differential between the furnace chamber and the laboratory was measured at 3 locations. The location of the zero pressure plane was 36 in. above the test frame sill. Above this plane, the pressure within the furnace within the furnace was greater than the laboratory and below this plane, the pressure was less than the laboratory. The two remaining pressure differential locations were 78 in. and 96 in. were above the test frame sill. All three air duct penetrations located above the zero pressure plane.. A plot of the pressure magnitudes
. measured":4uiing the test are shown on ILL.. 4..
'I ~
The unaqeaed surface temperatures of the wall assembly Kth thermocoupleswithlocated as shown in ILL. 5., Each were'easured
'thernocoup?o was covered a 6 in. by 6 in. dry ceramic fiber pad+
pile NC505-12 page 7 Issued>
Thermocouyloa used to measure the temperatures within on top of, above, and to the side-of the each air duct assembly were located as shown in ZLL. 6. These thermocouples were attached with tape and were not covered with ceramic fibex pads.
Thexmocouples used to measure,.the sux'face temperature QC the wood blocks ad)acent to the duct surfaces were secux'ed against the wood surface with staples. Staples were carefully applied in order to avoid causing a short in the thermocouple. The thermocouplea were not covered with ceramic pads.
RESULTS, Character and Distribution of the Fire - The Cuxnace Cire was 1 nous and well d stri ute uxing the test, and the temperatures recorded in the furnace chamber followed the Standard Time-Temperature Curve as defined in the Standaxd for Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials> UL 263 an4 as shown on ILL.'.
Observations< of E osed Surface Durin Test The Collowing observat ons were made o the expose sux ace uring the Cire test. All references to dimensions are approximate.
Time min: s Observations c30 The Class I'igid fiberglass air duct had ignited.
- 45 The insulated galvani,xed steel air duct. had ignited.
1:00 Heavy flames were issuing from the right fiberglass aix duct. 'he insulated galvanized.
steel aix ducts'uter layer of the Coil wxap was delaminating. pieces 1 in.i to 4 ia.~ were Calling into the Curnace chambex.
I!15" PI'ames were issuing froa the insulation on the insulated galvanized steel duct; 2 j00 Both the Class I xigid fibex'glass and the glass fiber insulated galvanized steel air duct assemblies were emitting heavy flames. The wall surface was a light gray color.
3!00 Sections of glass Ciber 'insulation located on the bottom surface of the galvanixed steel duct had fallen off, leaving exposed 75 percent of the bottom surface of the steel duct.
File NC505-12 page 8 Zssuedc 4-17-85 3jLS of the wallboard had 4 00 i id fiberglass air duct deflected 1 to l-l/2 in. downward.
4s15 The majority of the rigid fiberglass air duct was consumed 4!30 A small section of the Class I rigid fiberglass air duct, 6 to 8 in. long remained attached to the wall assembly. The rest of the duct assembly had been consumed or'ad fallen into the furnace chamber.
I!45 The wall surface was bLack in 'color and the paper was peeling and falling away.
5!00 The glass fiber insulation that was wrapped around the north, galvanized steeL air duct was consumed or had fallen into the furnace chamber.
5:50'll flaming had stopped.
15:00 All charred paper surfacing on the wallboard had
. fallen.
20:00 The joint tape on the wallboard had begun to delaminate. from the wallboard.
40:00 All of the foint tape had delaminated.
53:00 The waLLboard joints had opened 3/16 in.
60:00 Test terminated.
Time min'as
'iL5, Obser'vations of the Unex osed Surface Durin the Test - The follow ng servat ons were ma ~ o .,t e unexpose sur ace during the fire teat. ALI;:references to dimensions are approximate.
Observations
.,A'.Light amount oC smoke was issuing from the north gL'ass fiber insulated galvanized steel air duct.
all air
'30 Light smoke wai issuing from three duct assemblies.
2'00 Heavy smoke was issuing frcnn the CLass I rigid fiberglass air duct.
File KC505,-12 Page 9 Issued: 4 17 8 6$ 00 Smoke was still air issuing Crom the Class I rigid duct. Light smoke was issu f fiberglass the glass fiber insulated galvaniqed issu ste 1 duct. Light smoke/steam was su" ace of the south galvanized steel air d 6 ft Crom the wall surface.
12$ 00 Light smoke was issuing fromair 'the north glass insulated galvani-ed steel duct 10 wall surface.
15$ 00 The CLass I rigid fiberglass air duct had begun to collapse inward near the sleeve penetration.
17!00 Heavy smoke was issuing Crom the horizontal joint of the Class I rigid. fiberglass air'uct located 4 ft Crom the wall surface.
17 $ 30 The transverse joint of the Class I rigid i
fiberglass air duct located 4 ft Crom wall surface and the Longitudinal joint began to deteriorate.
and the duct started to how downward.
18$ 00 he transverse joint tape of the Cliss I rigi fiberglass duct located 4 ft from 'the wall surface, had delaminated and fallen away from the air duct surface.
18$ 50 The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct ignited at the horizontal joint, located 4 Ct from the waLL surface.
19 07 The Class I rigid fiberglass air duct had separated at the transverse joint located 4 ft Crom the wall'surface. The section of flaming air duct beyond the horizontal joint had fallen to the Laboratory floor. The 4 ft air duct section extending from the wall surface was burning and collapsed inward.
23820 Flames had begun to issue Crom the collapsed Class I rigid fiberglass air duct section extending Crom the Mals surface.
25 $ 00 The remaining section of the Class I rigid fiberglass air duct had separated Crom theFlames sLeeve and had fallen to the Laboratory floor.
wer>> issuing from the unprotected'pening lef the collapsed rigid fiberglass air duct.
Pile NC505 12 Page 10 Zssued$ 4 17 85 25 030 The. untreated wood blocks near the Class I rf,gid fiber'glass air duct through-opening.ignited.
26$ 00 The Class X rigid fiberglass air duct through-opening was sealed with sections of gyps~
wallboard and ceramic fiber blankets.
,26 $ 30 Beginning at the wall surface and extending outward 10 in., the insulation on the bottom of the galvanized steel air duct began to discolor, The top 'and side foil surface had begun to blister.
32$ 00 Light amounts of smoke were issuing from the perimeter of the wall assembly..
34 $ 00 Beginning at the wall surface and extending outward 18 in., the surface of the galvanized steel air duct, without insu tion had begun to discolor.
40 $ 00 The top seam of the glass fiber insulation had separated. Sections of the exposed glass fiber insulation were visibly charred.
43 $ 00 The insulation wrap on the galvanised steel air duct glass fiber had appeared to expand outward.
50 $ 00 Slight discoloration was visible on the wall surface adjacent to the glass fiber insulated galvanized steel air duct.
57$ 00 The wall assembly was giving off some light cracking sounds.
60:00 Test terminated..
eratures on the Une osed Surface of the .Wall Assembl
- The Tetemperatures that eveloped at var ous po nts on the unexposed turface of the wall asscrmbly were recorded by Thermocouylea Noe. 1 through 14 located aa shown on lLL. 5.
Tables containing the temperatures recorded"at, 2 min, 30 s intervals throughout the test are contained in-Appendix A.
pile NC505-1 page 11 Issueds 4-17-85
~lies Th P e o thermoco p Tables containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min, 30 intervals throughout the test are contained in Appendix A.
Plots of the temperatures recorded with'in the duct assemblies, located 3 in., 6 ft and 9 ft, 3 in from the unexposed surface of the v411 are shown on ILLS 8, 9 and 10
~
respectively.
The limited temperature data on the Class I duct occurred because the transverse )oint of the rigid fiberglass duct, located 4 ft from the unexposed surface of the vali, opened and separated at 19 min and the portion of the duct assembly beyond the first )oint collapsed and fell to the laboratory floor. The remaining duct assembly section extending from the unexposed surface of,the wall collapsed at 25 min.'o maintain the pressure differential between the furnace chamber and laboratory the through-opening of the walI. assembly was plugged with gypsum board and cera-fiber blankets at 26 min.
The temperatures wi.thin the Class I rigid fiberglass duct, 6 ft and 9 ft, 3 in. from the unexposed su face of the vali wer plotted for 17 min, 30 sec and temperatures vithin the rigid fiberglass duct 3 in. from the unexposed surface of the wall were plotted for 25 min.
Temperatures measured within the galvanized steel duct, with and without insulation, vere plotted through the full 60 min.
The thermocouple location for each duct assembly is shovn on ILL. 6 ~
Plots of the temperatures measured on the top surface of the duct assemblies, 3 in> 6.ft and' ft, 3 in. from the unexposed surf ace of the wall, are shown on ILLS. 11, 12. and 13 J respectively.
Theraocouple Nos. 3 and 5 n at the start of the teat auR remained inoperat ve .throughout the teat. These thermocouplea vere on the top surface of the insulated steel duct and on the top surface of the rigid fiberglass duct, 6 ft from the unexposed surface of the vali.,
Pf.le NC505-12 Page 12 Issueds 4-17-85 The transverse joint of the Class I rigid fiberglass duct, located 4 t Crom the unexposed surface of the vali, opened and separated at 19 min. The portion of the duct assembly beyond this transverse joint collapsed and fell to the laboratory floor.
Consequently, the 1ast accurate tempexature recorded on the fiberglass duct beyond the transverse joint was obtained at 17 min, 30 s. This temperature was 136'F.
The remaining portion of the Class I fiberglass duct assembly collapsed at 25 min. Consequently, the final, accurate temperature xecorded on the fibeiglass duct 3 in. from the unexyosed surface of the wall was obtained at 22 min, 30 s. Thf.s temperature was 168.7'P.
The temperatures developed from the i nt heat transfer from each duct assembly vex'e measured hy thermocoup es ocated 18 in. and 60 in. Crom the unexposed surface of the wall and 1 in.> 2 in. and 4 in. from the toy an4 side surface of each duct assembly. The thermocouples uied to measure these temperatures were securdd to the surface of the 6 in. long, 2 hy 4 in. exposed untxeated wood. The thermo ouple locations near each duct .
assembly is shown on I . 6.
The temperatures recorded by Thermocouple Nos. 60 through 62 and 66 thxough 68, 'located 60 in. from the unexyoied surface of the wall, above and to the side of the rigid fiberglass duct assembly, respectively, were accurate for the first 17 min and 30 s of the fire test. This occurxed because th>> transverse joint of the Class I rigid fiberglass duct located 4 Ct, from the unexposed surface of the wall, opened and seyarated at, 19 min.
and the remaining portion oC the duct assembly Cell to the laboratory floor. Consequently, the final accurate temperatures for Thermocouple Nos. 60 through 62 and 66 through 68 were recorded at 17 min, 30 s. Mithin this group of thermocouples,
. the highest temyeratuxe vas 145'P. as recorded by Thermocouple No. 61 at 17 min, 30 s. Thermocouple No. 61 was located 60 in.
from the unexposed surface of the will and centered 2 in. above th'e toy 'duct surface. The -temperatures recorded hy Thermocouple Nos; .57 though 59 and 63 through 65, located 18 in.'rom the unexyose4 surface oC the vali, above and to the side oC the Class X'asid fiberglass duct assembly, respectively, vere accurate for the first 22 min, 30 s of the fire'est.
There'after, the last relevant temperatures for Thermocouple Nos.
57 through 59 and 63 through 65 were recoxded at 22 min, 30 s.
Nithin this group of thermocouples; the highest temperature was 363't as recorded hy Thermocouyle No. 64. Thermocouple No. 64 was locate4 18 in. from the unexposed surface, centered at the mid-height, and 2 in. from the side surface of the duct.
Pile NC505-L2 Page 13 Zssued. 4 OSSERVATXONI AFTER TEST s The appearance of the exposed and unexposed surfaces aftor the test are shown in ILLS. 14 and 15> respectively.
On the exposed surface, all wallboard remained attached to the studs. 'The wallboard contained numerous cracks and disp]+y+d a maximum joint separation of S/8 in. The CXasa I rigid fiberglass air duct had fallen from ita supports and waa cons~ed by the furnace fire. The glass fiber insulation used to insu]ate the north galvanized steel air duct waa also conaume4.
Both galvanized steel aiz ducts remained in place. The galvanized steel ducts without insulation 4iatozte4 less than the galvanized steel duct with insulation.
On the unexposed side oC the wall assembly> the gypsum wallboard gemained in place with no )oint separation or cracks observed. The Class X rigid fiberglass i'uct collapse4. at 19 min, 5 a and dropped to the Laboratory floor. Two galvanised steel ducts were intact and remained in place. The glass fihe insulation that, was wrapped around the north galvanized steel duct was charre4 through ita entize depth Coz the fizst 8 ft extending away Crom the wall surface. %he chazre4 depth of the remaining portion was 75 percent of the total thickness. The foil facing had numerous blisters and 1/8 in. wide cracks throughout its surface for the first 4 ft extending from the wall surface. The remaining length of Coil facing had numerous blisters. The galvanised steel air ducts,.with and without insulation, remained structurally intact. Upon removal of the glass fiber insulation fzom the north duct assembly> it that the galvanized steel air duct was discolored along its waa noted entire length. The south galvani-ed steel air duct, without insulation, was discolored approximately 3 ft extending from the surface of the wall assembly.
Pi10 NC505 12 Page Sl Issued ~ 4 17 85 S QMMA RY In consideration of the fact-finding character of the investigation, the foregoing Report is to be co~~trued as information only and should not be regarded as conveying any conclusion or recommendations on the part of Underwriters Laboratories Inc. regarding the ability of the construction or Performance of the product for Recognition by any code Qr Standard or for any other purpose.
WALL ASSEMBLY FIRE PERFORMANCEt The fire resistant test was conducted on the vali assembly in accordance vith Standard UL 263 (ASTM E119i Neph 251, ANSX A2.1) ~ The wall assembly was of gypsum vallhoard and steel stud construction containing three types ot duct assemblies two galvanized steel ducts and one Class I rigid fiberglass duct.
All three duct assemblies penetrated the wall assembly and. had open air Crops on each side. The duct assemblies did not contain fire dampirs.
Based on measurements at locations other than at the duct assembly penetrations, the wall assembly complied vith the temperature transmission requirements of Standard UL 263 tor a 1 hr fire resistance rating.
A plot of the maximum individual and average temperatures recorded'.on the unexposed surface of the .test assembly is shown on ILL. 7.
Temperature measurements of the duct assemblies at various.
locations are described separately.
PRESSURE DIFFERENTIALS!
A plane of neutral pressure hetveen the furnace chamber and the surrounding laboratory volume existed vithin the furnace.
Above thk,s plane i the pressure differential within the furnace vas positive vith respect to laboratory atmospheric pressure.
Below the neutral pressure plane, the pressure differential vas such that the pressure plane vithin the furnace was negative vith respect to the laboratory atmospheric pressure.
The location of the neutral pressure, plane was 36 in. above the sill of the assembly All three air duct assemblies vere of located above the neutral plane, in the. positive pressure area the furnace ~
File NC505-12 Page S2 7 8 The ~prude of the px'essure differentials at the location of each duct assembly duxing the test axe shown on, ILL. 4.
TEMPERATURES WITHIN THE AIR DUCT!
The temperatures within each aix'uct, assembly were measured at distances of 3 surface of the in" ft wall.
6 The and 9 fthm 3 in. from the unexposed thermocouple locations on each Qssemb]y are shown on ILL. 6. Plots comparing maximum temperatures reached at each location for each duct assembly ax'e shown on ILLS. 8, 9 and 10, respectively.
Thxough 15 min of the fire exposure period~ the temperatuzes recorde4 within the insulated galvanized steal air duct. were generally higher than the uninsulated and Class I rigi4 glassfiher air duct assemblies. The lowest temperatures were measured within the uninsulated galvanized steel duct. After 60 min of fire exposure, the .tempexatures recorded within the unknsulatedi galvanixed steel air duct continued to be lower- than the insulated galvanixed steel duct. Compaxison with the Class I rigid fiberglass aix duct assembly was not made beyond the time when foint separation occurred (17 min, 30 s).
Tables containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min, 30 intervals throughout the test and at each location are contained in Appendix A.
TEMPERATURES ON THE UNEXPOSED SURFACE OF THE AIR DUCTS'he tempeiatures on the top suxface of each duct assembly were measured at distances of 3 in.p 6 fthm and 9 fthm 3 in'rom the unexposed surface of the wall. The thermocouple location on each assembly is shown on ILL. 6.
The maximum temperature measured nearest the wall assembly on the top surface of the uninsulate4 galvanized steel air duct was i99't. at 22 min, 30 sec. The corresponding maximum.
temperature measured for the insulate4 galvanized steel air duct was 174't at 50 min. h maximum temperature of 293'F was recorded on the CTass I glass fiber duct at 25 qua>-=fust prior to the collapse of the duct at the steel sleeve -
- The maximum temperature measured furthest from the wall assembly on the top surface of'he uninsulated galvanized steel duct was 175't at 47 min 30 sec. The'orresponding maximum temperature measured for the insulated galvanized steel air duct and foi the Class I rigid fiberglass duct was:178~t at 2 min, 30 sec and 294'F at 17 min, 30 sec (fust prior* to colla of duct portion beyond 4 ft from wall) respectively.
Pile NC505 12 page S> Zssueds 4-17-85 plots ccayaring maximum temperatures reached at each location oa each duct assembly are shown on ILLS. 11, 12 ad 13 respectively.
Tables containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min, 3Q intervals throughout the tait and at each location are contained in Appendix A.
RADIANT TEMPERATURE OF THE AIR DVCTSj Temperatures developed from the radiant heat, transfer Crom each duct assembly were measured hy thermocouples located 18 in.
and 60 in. Crom the unexposed surface of the wall and 1 in.f 2 in. and 4 in. Crom the top and side surface of each duct assembly. The thermocouples were secured to the surface of the 2 by 4 in. untreated wood blocks, 6 in. long. The location oC these thermocouples for each duct assembly is shown on ZLL. 6.
A comparison of the radiant temperatures Cor the threa. duct aisemblies indicates that the greatest temperature rise occurred on the untreated wood adjacent to the ga].vanised steel air duct assembly without insulation. The Class Z rigid fiberglass duct assembly produced the least radiant temperature rise prior to the changes in temperatures affected by the partial or complete collapse of the Class I glass fiber duct assembly.
A comparison of the radiant temperature rise Cor the galvanised steel duct assemblies, with and without insulation, indicates that the greatest temperature rise occurred with the galvanized steel duct assembly without insulation. The maximum temperatures recorded were 479'F Crom the uninsulated duct and 251'F from the insulated galvanized steel duct.
Page S4 Xssuedc File NC505-12 Tabbies containing the temperatures recorded at 2 min, 30 I intervQg throughout the test and at each Location are contained in Appendix A.
Reviewed by:
THOMAS PLENS J ~ BEYREZS Senior Engineering Assistant Managing Engineer Fire Protection Department Fire Protection Department m
KENNETH RHODES
'ngineering Group Leader Fire Protection Department TP/KRs rr~
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-Apt END ZX A TABULAR TENPERATQRS TEST DATA The following tables contain the temyeratuze data zecozded at 2 min, 30 s f.ntecvals during the N.re test.
ZLT . Deacri tibn Thezmocouyle Zndex Temyeratuzes measured om. unecyosed surface ot wall assembly.
A6 A9 Temyeratures measure4 on insulated steel du A10 A13 Temyeratures measured: on steel duct vithout insulation.
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'P.C. 37, located on toa surface of insulated steel duct, 6 ft from unexoosed surface of wall, malfunctioned at the start of test and remained inoperable throughout the teat.
p'gL~ ÃC505-'-2 NO ~ A-7 4 g4gg29824/NC505 X-S-S5
":izUt ~T"J t.HAIKU (t'ti!:-.'. }
r;:op t}: 6 J.Ii 69. (~ 69.5 ti'3 o 2 I 2 '0 5: 0 1/8. 4 92.0 98.G
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'4 73.1 88.3 73.6 90.0
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' '36 10: 0 109.3 136.6 125.5 159 12:.'0 101.0 189.1 141.8 159.8 136 15: 0 105.0 146.S 161.7 175.Z 310
.t 7:30 104.4 1SO.& 173.9 1&2.7 214 20: 0 121.3 163.8 .175.9 184.5 195 22:30 136.7 178.7 189.3 181.6 17~~
"5: 14n.a 138.8 176.7 166.1 13I:
- j. $ 3."" 1S3.& 187.6 190.7
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10: 0 L44.S 113.1 100.7 89.i 77 LZ:80 l.'iS.i L'D. 1 105.'k 95.3 85 15: 0 156.6 L35.8 113.9 106 ' 91 L7:80 ~
164.4 1'59. 1 118.8 109.9 95
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liQ. A 9 ISSUED t pZ~< gC505-12 pg~-SCAKZ TEST g~ggggaRIINC505 1,-3 85 i OAHI.i'JII r :;I Q::) 70,2 ~ i8 ~ L 'j7.9 P'P /0.2 Iid. 7 G8 ~ 2 S: 0 71.0 Ij9.4 G8 ~ Q 7:30 7y ~ 1 70.4 C)9. 4 10: 0 7b.2 72.7 70.S 12:v0 )'9. 7 PG.S 73.5 15: 0 88.7 82.8 78.2..
17:30 101.2 87.7 82.5 20: 0 87.2 90M 8S'.4 Z2:80 HS iJ 98.2 89.S 2S: 0 '88. G 93.6 7.": 50 l)g ~ Sg I) 91.4
~0 i 'I 91.7
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60: 0 111.1 121.U '05.4
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~-SCARS TEST 8~NK29824/MC505 1-3-85
' a 4a .J'J'v 4
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1 2':s) 1 1 li.'; ~ e (i73.'3
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- 7. 0'2 l.:.'P.. i 10)0 ~ 1 922." i43.0 0 g'\ r'~
r 10: L~i4.8 1143 .9 1.028. 3 32V.3 <</ I r
'242
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921.0 431.3 11 alg 10'L4 907.6 499.4 25: 0,. 1Zz0.9 1051 ~ 4 931.9 483.1 rJ eJ 1243'r 1071 937.4 372.2 Q(\
1'~0. 3 1087 .7 953.Z 448.1 ~r9 1'bl ~ ') 1085 977.2 (Lr>2.7 40
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98.2 86.8 7:JO 0 ili9.2 115.2 89.8 '3l; LG3.1 131." 110.1 115 10: 0 129.9 l22.1 1".:30 128.6 218.5 165.5 141.3 LV 15: 0 l33.3 251.3 TLt6.5 17:30 291.7 187.6'91.5 1/0
':0: 199.2 252.9 153.6 158 0 159.8 T98.8 TSQ.O 22;30 298<<2 197.8 lGG 199.9 ZG9.0 155.2 t67 25: 0 1~a'.: 209.% 162.1 27:30 157.~
298.9 209.1 1GS 308.0 1G1.5 157 30~ 0 bi-:.3 232.8 172.8 3?:.'0 1
150. 1 P5.6 2".2-1 189.5
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- 18.": ~
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- T.C. 55, located on top surface of fihercrlass duct, 6 ft from unexyosed surface of vail, malfunctioned at the start of teat and remained inoperable through-out the teat.
- i (
- 91. () '39. 6 LLJ). i 57:40 91.8 89.4 115. L 18.'3 ~ ~
- 1) 7I..2 $ 9.2 67.9 7:30 J4.2 71.1 b8.5 10: 0 75.7 72.2 69.S 12:30 76.3 73.1 70.2 15: 0 80.0 75.Z 72.2 17:30 110.8 8$ .7 75.8 20: 0 290.0 271:3 271.0 22:ZO 4SS.4 502.~
- 37: 30 %OS.Z 09.9 ~ V ~
- I('(~/X(""..3' 'i J I aC L 4 (<< ~
.i l91. c'. 198 ~ 209.9 I~ 'iI 8 .::.I 202.9 Lir (, ' ~ ~ r 1(;; ~ (( <<AO/P ~ () + (( ~ ~~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ I<<~ ~ ~, i ""C 1.': 7<<<<4 I ~ ( 'i rG.': :I
- "".'. l) 4<< I
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- '0
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- 50 'g.50. 8 'Z.S~. 4 '~40. '.
- ~0 2~9.1 234.4 C~('d. 7 :45. r".
- 0 259 0 256.0 241.8 ~an.'. 24>
~ ~ ~ ~ )0 ~ P.P~ <IJ'- ~ ) ~ )) Q Qa ~ I 'i. ']0 4 ~ ) ) ~ {,( i'0. 64.3 (j$ , g ~ $ jg "~ ji8, p 68..4 sij. Q t0: )3 I I i'. 9 IO)3. t 81.8 81, 'g
- -XLE NCS05-LZ TU,. NO. A-4 FKK -SCARS TEST 84HK29824/NC505 1-3-85
~ 1 'i0: th6.4 tN.O 15$ .8 148.6 I>v.s L58.i 152.'L tfi2. I t f30,4 157.g 156.$ 25: 159.2 'L7: O, cg L6'!i. g I bc...'5 I G3.'JJ ib8.1 LJ~.Z 167.G 161.8- '0: 175,b 175. (j IG9.v IG).5 184.0 17": 174.0 . '7>.g L94.':- S 17 ~.:. 177.0 . I88.'-.'9'7 'I ".Ql ~ I PQ. I86. ~ ~ r') ~ \ ~ )' "i) ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ' ~ ~ V o ~ I ~ 0 ~ <<e Pf ~ J g 0 ~ )o, ~ ~ ~ <<~ ~ ~ ~ + ,0 i ~ ~ ~ O~ r0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ y i)p " I."' 0<<V 'v ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' << ~ 'v~ ) II ~ O ~ <<r 0 ~ v ~ L ) iso r ~ ~ i0 j ~ ~ <<J0 ~ / ~ ~ ) 3r .-'J -'4c. 4 '0 ~ <<J 4 ~ ~ GO: Q C 'z ~ ' 0 0 ~ L49.L <<DQ 'L42. 1 LS>.I i' i%0. A-5 f Tt iSSUQ); 4 84i%(29824/NC505 1-3-85 ~ I Ll L I'. f L.'IE
- j. 2:So t 6.'L IO7.S 105 I49.> 1~9.b 14S.2 Idl.l I46.0 t27.8
wl 69.4 70.~ Ig ~ 70 r'8. 8 78 7 80.8 Ih' 100.'J 9J.9 103.5 12:30 123.5 122.S 125.7 11r 15: 0 140.7 1'40. 4 140.9 '7:i0 lbl.3 151. 7 14S.7 la5 20: 0 lbG." lb7.0 ib4. 8 22:30 158 '3 15'9. 158.2 25' 1GZ.O r'GZ.7 162.0 1G 27: 50,. 165.8 167. Z 1G8.1 17 182.0 -;2'rp I. lr'9.5 190.4 35: 0 r'.'H(: .>.') l89.2 '98.r" JCl 7,7 ~ 50 IJ 1 agIa :?06.5 gl I r I. ~ I ~ ~ rI 'I 1+ ~ Q ~ 'I ~ r 'L ~ oa ~ ~ ~ I<< ~ ~ ~ L "\ QQ << ~ '1 "":I) 4 r~ 4 ()
- p. 65. 3 Gr .tg 7:30 bG. 1 tj G ~ Ij Ii8, p Gi 5: 0 Gg ~
~ 'i'7 Iw ~ << r Io ~ ~ ~ I ~ I C 5sID r'4'J. 4r ~(; ~ ~ r I1 <<J ~ Q c 41.'J 1 GO: O Z4>.l i49. 2 '..'GG. G ILL, NO ~ A-6 ISSUED' FZ~ NC545 12 pgr,r.-SUEZ TEST 84ggg9824/NC505 1-B-85 OV4PIeCV >4'> I.G ;7 I'. iF 0: 0 Ii7.9 67 ~ 8 I~C.l. ) 70 ~ '08I! 5 870. 1 720.1 71.7 Il.
- ) 'r . ~ ', :..';0. 0 2 7 iJ
I2:30 1381.8 l. 197. 8 1076.7 102.6 7: 15: 0 1.58b.0 1216.2 1089.8 108.1 / 17:ZO :SGR.O 121%.5 1098.%'098.1 112.7 / 20: 0 1.GG. 0 1211.5 118.1 / 22:30 1369.7 1212.3 lOS9.6 121.% 7 25: 0 1.316.8 1/.'17.2 110%.3'11G.1 121.8 7 27:30 1400.2 1Z35.7 125.% "0' 1'.) 37. I! 1.0.0 '0 11L'.0. 7 72 ' IJ I) '.4I) 1. 9 1427. <!4n.4 '.430.4 9 li4n.': 1251.7 1)58.5 '254.3 11"5.5 I4 v',') 0 \ 0 % ~ V ~ ~ Ii V 153.>> 148 ~ 4 V% ~ ~: l.4.:3.5 1243. I g /0 V ~ 6 1 ') I' C ~ 1921.'." I ~ 1.I,":: .. IJ7' Q 1u27 2 12".'.i I8 'J 'iO: 'J '3Q ~ ~ 1'><'i. 5 I.Ij7, ~ i5: >246.Q ib9 '.o i468.7 1249. 0 ill=:.0 1/v ~ 7 GO: 0 1472.7 1251.1 1118.1 1/6.3 'T.C. 31. Located on. top surface o~ insulatcH steel duct, 5 t't I'rom unexoased surface o+ wall, Inane,t.'unctioned at the start oC teat and remained inoperable throughout the test. ENSUED; 4 ] 84NK29824/NC505 l-3-S5 i>AH('!ii;~.) 0: V (j'J . (i i~J 6 a7;~.i 69.5 92.0 79.i 73.1 cj9, 2 73.G 7'.3O LOB.9 JV.G 88.3 /, 110.G 9O.O gj 10: o 109.3 176 G 103.6 LOZ.q ;3i LZ: 0 101.0 LZ5 ..5 137.% 15: O '105. 0 189.1 191.8 '.7:30 L't6. 5 , 161'. 7 ih9.8 15'3i 109.9 150.8 175.2 Zai <j Q ~ Q 121.3 173.9 )82.7 Zai ZZ:SQ "136.7 LG3.8 175.9 178. 7 189.5 19! 140.8 189.$ 181.6 1~8.8 17G.7 ~ ~ ~ 1 3.1. 5 '$47 8 '187.6 166.1 17'/t 0 LSO.7 1"7 9 a'38. z LGL.>> 19.'0'? ~vs >.99." :.9~J.3 r f!'.; 7 L7L.S "05.7 I ~1 >~ 'o); jl ~ ~ 1 e, 1I Joi 203.7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '7(9 ~ 'h ~ 'V ~ 'v ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ j i ao> 4 e ~ )gg~ ~ Ck / ~ gi 130. ~ "'~6. /'. ~ ~ atg ~ ' ;1 ' iq. 'j I'\ )') ~ i3 '>~ ~ L a'i.!1 f ( Ig i>>J I ii ~ I ~ ~ .y ~ ,J gl 48 ~ 0 ~ ~ J/ ~ .Ao b .'~ ~ J ~ ~ 1 'J8. r i~V pe ') 0 ~ 4 iaa.w ) Llg ~ O LLG.L '/09. Z ' ~ diL.H / 'i0 ~ 0 4 FZM NC505 lZ l~. NO. A-8 ZSS kg,-SNICK TEST 84gg2g824INC505 1-a-85 '. te ~o J v;1 L s; JJ
- 5. I3 '. 148.1 976.7 892.8 71.3 7I 1?70.0 1077.0 969.6 /9.8 10: 0 13G0.3 116%.% 1055.5 93.9 /.
~ ~ ' ~ T LI'.r 0: 0 70.5 70.3 GER 67.5 6i 2:30
- .'.:.AH (HI!='.:
\ 5: 0 88.3 87.3 73.8 70.3 ~ 100.4 99.1 82.1 lS.G 10: 0 1.4%. 5 113.1 100.7 8J.1 12:30 153.5 124.1 105.% 95.3 8 15: 0 156.6 13S.8 113.9 106.9 9 17:SO 164.4 159.1 118.8 109.9 9 ZO: 0 158.b ib3.8 121.0 108.9 22:~0 158.8 1GS.1 128.8 11G.3 10 25: :157.$ lb'.l 145.J 103.1 ]07.8 " 10 0','7:30 118.5 119.2 ';0 30: 0 '.60. 5 l5l.O 127. 1 125.3 10 l
- 75. 4 73.3 71.0 G8.5 LVC
-'50.'4 ~ 1 lbO.Z 156.3 137.4 135.' .I i ~ .is 1 5'9. 5 ,.140. 3 l~~ 4 14I>. G IL!j~ 4 Sg,.j !GG.4 L a ~ 1 ~ g ~
- i'2: 80 1.5l . 151 0
~ g ~ 1ti0.':: 1 4'.> 'i: ~ ~ L bd.Z ~ ) 1 G7. '. I~ 13 ~ ~ .) I '
- I rlJ
li0. i i'D .'7'.. 4 !GZ.~ I ~ l ~8.0 155.v 179. 'L 17>>. ~ ~ ~ 154.': l84. ~ ~ pJ 0 ~) ~ t il GO: 0 ~ ~IJ
- l. G8. Ii 158.2 16'.4 lb0.
18S. 2 Ldl 1 185.3 e I cI E rU.. ua. A-9 tSSuZnI 4 < pg,-SGQ EST 84gg29824/NC505 1-3-85 i,'IS'iL~ a ~I'i, DAN~.l 7 ~ i3 7Qi2 ~ >'3 ~ L c'.'. -0 i0.2. G8.7'9.4 Ga.2 ) ~ ~ ~ 71.0 138 ~ Q <0 70.4 G'3. 4 LO; 0 7b.2 72.7 70.9 12:30 l9.7 lG.S 73.S LS: 0 I38.7 82.8 78.2 0 01.2 81.7 82.5
- J LOP ~ 7 1G7.2 15G.l 154.G lul..~
'r'.7.'OI 'u.4 91.4 1 91.7 c!9.3 92.1 35~ I c!0. 101.0 95.l "g II ~ ~ Ij i';I'I 9S ~ 0 s.I l~ '.'I'3.i gG.', L:r' ',r ~ ni 77+v ~ r ~ ~ 0 '.I)8. i 'v:. 0 l 'z'J ~ 0 'JO.,'::iL. .") p I. :) ~.s I ~ Lo '1 ~ ~ i emI ~ ~ 7 ~ I ~ Q4 ~ 'g ~ e ~ la ~ I L OS.G L'Qo. ~ ~ I V5.'J ~ 4/ i@ ~ ~ ~ L 08.'J '0 ~ >) ',04.". 60: 0 L 11.1 121.V 1I)S. 4 pZ~ NC505-LZ KZ . NO ~ A-LO iSSUED 4-Y @gal',-SCKK 84~?9824/NC505 L-Z-85 v e f ~ e I~ ~ e vie OVo ~ )1 4 'U ( i..'.;.'(~U.. ~ ~ . ".-.1E r Zr40 I1 (V9 ~ li'.'~ j be 1 ~ ~ H.i(i ~ li/8.'9 1147.d 99i. 105. L r .40 L (.'b'8. 5 I. 860.5 L8/. t) '3'4 LOJPO.L 922. idio.d t ','(I)2 1143.3 '028.3 293. 0 LO!i5;1 32%.3 ~ / LS: t) '10.0 ~Jr'. 2 855.8 C" 7w L7:80 LORS.Z 950.8 LLH.O 33S.S 20: )~> ~ 0 LL87.9 , LOae'.e 'OZQ.L 99$ 821.0 .l 378.6 39 LO i t ALL,.'j LOZQ.Z 931.3 25: 0 ( 1220.9 , 907.6 999.% r 27:40 LOb L. tt 931 9 0; (J LZQ'3.3 LOJ1.1 937.9 98s.l 3; ~ L '60.8 LO87.; 372.2 Q( 4W~ V( 1 "b7.0 35: ) 10 "J5. 3 9SZ.'17. 2 998.'J62. 't v 09.'. () 7 lt( .(~ ~ ~ I( r er 81 F K ~ '5 ~ I ' 1103 ' 9b5.0 ~ ZSO, 390.7 r~ I II ' ~ o >a ~ ev % ~ t)g ~
- 37. 2 '90.G as'.4 z..:..0 85.9 93.2 89.S 25: 0 88.G 'cD 93.G
~ ~ ~ ~ v '1 v) r ~,Q ~ \ ee ~ I ev ~ ~ V r vevr > ~ ~ ~ v Wly e.
- LLO.; ) ~ r
I ) V ~ ~ !)V ~~ :: r) ' >Q ~ o 4 VV) JI) I 4~4 ~ ) ~ 44 ~ '1'tr r ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ v ~ kr 40 (- 'el> (4 I ~ I )' ~ 'r J ~ )V 0 I ~ > JCJ 4/5o ~ ~ ~ iL" .iJO e ~ ~ Vv ~ g v ) L.i "9.0 ~ 4 I' 4V igO: 1338.9 Lii7.i ~ e a/ ('. t ~ LL3%.3 It+ t ~ ~ ~ '78.7 gT~ NC505-12 KT. NO'-ll :SSUED; 4 ~-SCgg TEST 84ggzg8241NC505 1-3-85 ..I'vu f.AT .I" I'I '.HI)H (iH)i '~ r I [I"E i): 0 ')8 8 70 I)9./ I) ~ 'J 4.30 ")9 ~/ 98.2 8G.d 89 8 ') I; 5: 0 164. 2 142.4 115.2 131." 110. 1 1ii 1G3.1 l)Z.Z 122.1 1 "3 10: 0 129.9 218.5 165.5 141.3 t.u4 '? ~ 70 128.6 251.3 187.G 146.5 l. 70 1 15: 0 '33.3 241.7 191.5 153.G 158 17:30 252'.'4 19G.8 154.0 1GC ZO: 0 154.8 248.2 197.6 155.2 22:7JO f49.4 269.0 209.4 1G2.1 16'. 25: 0 148.3 Z48.9 204.1 1G1.5 L5/ 27:30 157.> 308.0 232.8 172.8 15I
- [ VI ~ ~
-i41.0 i 253, 274.0 l 183.7 201.9 li)! '.7 35: 0 1,48.O 37:30 l'C) 2. Ci hb0.4 288.3 206.0 I 71 ~ ~ . )l) , '),"5." v7 ~ v ~ aI ? ~ ~ ,~I J ~ v .",~) .:j V ~ ' I :/0 i I)I / ~ J 8 ~ ~ ~ II v 7: ':) ~ PI 'd ~ ~ Ii ( ~ v ~ ? ~ V 4'I ~ ~ ' ~ ~ i)l ~ "' '/ w/ti ~ 4 ~ 'I I) I ~ ~ 1 ~ C I) iMG.S .Ui. 2 I vvI ~ VI 219 ~ ~ ) J/ ~V ~ : G~J.'J I~OP.d ..r'Z'l.. 60: 0 1)6.9 393.5 330.6 5 QC505 LZ NO. A-L2 I'ZSQED: 84gg29824/NC505 L-3-85 -r l ~ H <<<V<+ tt 4~ <4 ~' o tr IJI e l e<,0 I'I ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ a /l(F)'-'. <e,) r 3 (J 7IJ.vi 2 :50 Hi.'3 /0.1 Ii9.8 Ig"; ~ C' ~ 0 106 d'i.~J'0/. 81.9 /4 ~ 0 I 19.Ci 108.'0 9c'. 0 ~ V 7: 7<l 125.5 /'L7.Z 10 14L.2 .'07.5 L2 :80 139.I. 19I!.0 QGi 15 ldCi. G L83.> 825.0 llt9. 5 1 3'vi II!6.0 139 8 256.j 151 17 CQ llI8.9 1.56. 9 398;8 278.% 20 cGS.J L>8 186.7 287.1 1"8 zz a57.7 ' 25 0 1 '%~<< ~ LL!G.V v 128.8 123.7 '8.2 287 295.7 1 I I!0 44 27 :80 1I!4. 0 1/G. 1 159.8 ip 120.9 386.1 , EE2
- 0
- 0 4'3b. 6 Z~)Z. 1 184.5 Ii; 1~0
- ~:iG.
1"'5. 12~7.5 371-2 I gQ V t<< 0 IGL 9 588.1 vc07. 0 "t ~ <69.'f 1 l3.8 ~99.Z ~ I< C I<< I I '89.2 ll'I ". (J 't ~ ' ' g< a ~ e '15 2 5'C5 ..' ~ I 'll<< e ~ V V '<<< ~" ~ v ~ ./3<< i e V ~ ~ I~ <. O,l 'r r I ~ ~ ~
- '0 127.J 288.7 126 W <e ~
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V ~ f}1 l, ~ ~ ~ sg s") ~ sv ~ ~ ~ 4 vI ~ s .I ~ ~ s) 's}s o ' 's ~ 4 J3 ~, s ~ ~ ~ ~ v v ~ ~ ~ ' ~ v .'! 1 s ss ss'} ~ gg s ) ~ s ~ sv V ~ ~ I4~ ~ ~ 'l7 s I l} V s 'l} ~ )1 ~ e L sJo 'i ~ z J57: Jrp 'J5. 5 Jii. 1 '3!.. 0 GP: 94.9 7 90. 9 1 tile MC545-11 Page bl Zssua4q 0 i-17-85 APPENDIX 8 TEST RECORD QZSERhL PZCTORZAL HZSTORY ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ~ RTRRL RTQDR ANi NMNlNC ANQLRR STERL STllDS AND FRAIIlNC ANCLRR 'Ol All millCT PNSfRITlONS FOR Alt DUCT PRNRTRATlONS ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ Ci C IA UNRXPOSRD CVPSUH MALLROARD SURFACR NfTQ TUDS AND lNNER FACE RTRRL STUD ni'XPOSED OPRNLNCS TOR Alt DUCT PRNRTRATLONS CYPSUII IJALLanARP ibad ~ I ~ lg ~ 'I ~ ~ ~ ~~ ggPOSEP gugFACE OF ESS ASSKHSlV soano ~PCS rf > . + ~ ~ SHOKR lSSlJlNG tRON RlCXD tlIRRGLASS AlR DUCT COLLAPSE OF RKClD FIRRRCL*SS AlR DUCT ON DROt OQTLRT ON QIIRXtOSRI SlDS Ot ISSRNRLV. UNEXPOSED 8 l DR OF ASSRIliLV. TEST T IHR - I 9 II Ill.l TIST Tllli - 2 NlN. J ] ~ ~ nEN r " ~ Ul 1 CI ~ I' CR CR DISCOLORATlON OP CALVANfZRD STRRL All DUI'.T OII ~ g)t~ gif II ll.l. SIIIIFAI R AIIII IIFTI;III 4>I<h'I'tic ""-'-'Y. TeST TIKI - 'l4 HIS. lly INsllhll .: Ill.,lj IIIII ~ or ~ o 1 INSULATED CALVANIZKb STEEL AIR TEST UNKIPOSKD SU/FACE AFTF R DUCT AFTKA TEST ~ y ~ o rs ~ H0 STEEL AIR INSULATED CALVAHIZED CA DUCT AFTER TFST AI.VANIXKD STFFI. A I R DUCT AFTl'.R TF ST SSES-FPRR APPEND1X R DEVIATION'EQUEST NO. 14 REACTOR BUILDING FIRE ZONES WITHOUT FIRE DETECTION DEVIATION REQUEST: be provided in fire zon hi own raceway or 'do not repr s iPment even redundant safe shutdown if fir a >c sprinkler protectio ble in F FIRE AREA/ZONES AFFECTED: This deviation applies to Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Area: R-1A, R-lB, R-2A and R-2B Build'ire ~ REASON FOR DEVIATION REQUEST: The re9uirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 req ire fire detection. The NRC guidance indicates fire detection should be provided throughout a fire area. Fire detection has not been provided in the Reactor Building fire zones listed below under Existing Arrangement. EXISTING ARRANGEMENT: The following fire zones do not have fire detection: Fire Area R-1A Fire 1-2C Zones ~-~ No Reason detection ~/m~4k, a - Automatic spr'inklers provided 1-4E aD o safe s utdown cables-very -low combustible loadings 0-6H Cask Storage Pit - g~ 1>>7B No sa e shutdown cab es-very low combustible loadings 1-6F Spent fuel geol Rev. 3, 6/88 DR14-1 SSES FPRR Fire Area Fire Zones Reason l R-1B 1-1J Stairwell-no safe shutdown raceway or combustibles 1-6F Spent tuel pool- p~ ~Q Vigil 4+g~ g. 0-6H Cask Storage Pit I'~~<o R-2A 2-2C Same as 1-2C 2-4E Same as 1-4E 2-6F Same as 1-6F R-2B 2-1J Same as 1-1J 2-6F Same as 1-6F JUSTIFICATION: Fire Zones 1-2C and 2-2C have been provided with automatic sprinkler protection. Detection of a fire is provided via the sprinkler flow alarm when heat activates a sprinkler head. The remainder of the fire zones listed above do not contain safe shutdown raceway or equipment. None of the zones listed above represent a fire hazard which impacts on adjacent fire zones. The NRC requested additional detection for Fire Zones 1-7B and 1-6F in FSAR Question 281.17. There was no additional detection requested for Fire Zones 1-2C, 1<<4E or 0-6H. Our response to the staff and our Fire Protection Review Report both indicated that additional smoke detection would be provided in zones which contain or present a fire exposure hazard to safe shutdown equipment. The fire zones delineated in this request do not present an exposure fire'azard to safe shutdown equipment. S Rev. 3, 6/88 DR14-2 DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 24 OCTOBER 1987 PAGE I of 3 A endix R DEVIATION RE VEST AUTOMATIC FIRE SUPPRESSION IN Fire Zone 2-5D DEVIATION REQUEST: We request approval of the following: The installation of an automatic fire suppression system in Fire Zone 2-5D in order to comply with Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b would not significantly enhance the fire protection for that zone nor overall plant safety, and therefore is not required. Fire Zone AFFECTED: This deviation request applies only to Fire Zone 2-5D, which is in Fire Area R-2A. REASON FOR DEVIATION RE VEST'0 CFR 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b requires the existence of an automatic fire suppression system, in addition to fire detectors, in those fire areas where separation of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment is greater than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles. Fire Zone 2-5D contains cables for KY-E21-2F005A (Div. I) and power cables from 2D613 and 20653A (Div. I) as well as Valve HV-G33-2F004 (Div. II). Redundant safe shutdown equipment/cables in Fire Zone 2-5D are separated by a horizontal spatial distance of approximately 50 feet with negligible intervening combustibles. No automatic fire suppression system exists in the fire zone. Fire Zone 2-5D is a fire zone in which relief from the automatic fire suppression system requirement of Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b is sought. EXISTING ARRANGEMENT'>> RWCU Outboard Isolation Valve KV-G33-2F004 is normally open during power operation and is required closed to isolate Reactor Coolant letdown to the RWCU System when performing plant shutdown. In the event Valve HV-G33-2F004 is unavailable, the RWCU Inboard Isolation Valve HV-G33-2FOOI may be called upon to close to isolate Reactor Coolant letdown. Valve 2F001 is located inside containment (Fire Zone 2-4F) and 2F004 is located in Fire Zone 2-5D. Fot a fire in Fire Zone 2-5D (physical location of Valve HV-G33-2F004), KV-G33-2F004 (Division II) and its cables may be disabled. The valve and its cables are located in the northwest corner of the fire zone (refer to drawing C-l824).. The cables travel West to Fire Zone 2-5C. No cables for Inboard Isolation Valve HV-G33-2F001 (Division I) are located in Fire Zone 2-5D. Cables for Valve HV-G33-2F001 and its power supply are wrapped in adjacent (i.e., communicating) Fire Zones (2-4A-W and 2-5A-W) (except for 2-4A-S for F'PRE Pooia DEVIATION REquEST NO. 24 OCTOBER 1987 PAGE 2 of 3 c-ivies,sl r, P-( which 3 ~graf,barrier upgrades are provided-between zones). hour Refer to Figures and g for applicable fire zone layouts. M <- s4l, 0 l The total combustible loading in Fire Zone 2-5D is 5910 BTU/sq. trans1ates into an equivalent fire duration of approximate1y 4.4 minutes ft., which assuming all combustibles are fully consumed. The combustibles consist of a tota1 of five (5) gallons of 1ube oi I (five separate one-gallon locations) and cable in cable trays. Division I cable trays E2PK, E2KK, 2PKB and 2KKB a}e located, at the East end of Fire Zone 2-5D and are separated from Valve HV-G33-2F004 (Division II) by a horizontal distance of about 49 feet at the closest point. The effect of combustible oil in the zone was evaluated with respect to Division I cable trays. The five gallons total of lube oil in the fire zone is composed from I gallon in each of the Cleanup System Recirculation Pumps (2P221A and B) and I ga11on in each of three valves (HV-G33-2F042, HV-G33-2F044, and HV-G33-2F104--each are non-safe shutdown valves). The pumps are located in individual cubicles each equipped with a f'loor drain which contains any spilled lube oil within the pump cubicles. The spatial separation between HV-G33-2F004 and the closest pump lube oil is approximately 17 feet and is separated by a pump cubicle wall. The pump cubicles are totally enclosed by concrete and/or masonry walls and communicate only with the Valve HV-G33-2F004 area via a few penetrations in the labyrinth wall arrangement. The three valves and hence the three gallons of lube oil, are separated from Valve HV-G33-2F004 by approximately 35 feet of horizontal spatial separation. Within the 35 feet between the valves exists two floor drains which would preclude a lube oil fire from affecting Valve HV-G33-2F004. The lube oil is the only intervening combustible between HV-G33-2F004 and the redundant safe shutdown equipment cables (refer to C-1824). The above-mentioned cable trays constitute the only other combustibles in Fire Zone 2-5D. However, the large horizontal spatial separation of the cable trays from HV-633-2F004 and the intervening labyrinth wall arrangement make these combustibles inconsequential; Fire Zone 2-SD is equipped with fire detection capability. JUSTIFICATION: A study performed, which included analyzing the combustible loading configuration of Fire Zone 2-5D, determined that a fire occurring in Fire Zone 2-5D is highly improbable based on the negligible level of in situ combustible loading. However, assuming a fire did start in Fire Zone 2-5D, approximately 50 feet horizontal spatial separation exists between redundant safe shutdown equipment/cables. Currently, the only intervening combustibles are five gallons of lube oil which are protected for spillage by pump cubicles hnd floor drains such that any spilled lube oil will not contr ibute to the propagation of a fire. Additionally, the closest lube oil to Valve HV-G33-2F004 is approximately 17 feet separated by an intervening concrete/masonry wall, which provides substantial assurance that a fire will not disable redundant shutdown equipment/cables that are approximately 50 feet apart. FPRR aoolO DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 24 OCTOBER 1987 PAGE 3 of 3 Based on the low probability of a fire in Fire Zone 2-5D, and the insignificant consequences of a fire (due to the configuration of the room) if one were to start, the only possible concerns, therefore, are: 1) a fire may start due to the presence of transient combustibles, and 2) a fire may spread from an adjacent fire zone to Fire Zone 2-5D with the existence of transient combustibles as the fire propagation medium. Both of these concerns are alleviated by controlling the level of transient combustibles in Fire Zone 2-5D and by zone barrier upgrades to prevent such communication between zones where different shutdown paths are specified. The introduction of transient combustibles into Fire Zone 2-50 would be limited due to infrequent access to the room as a result of the. presence of high radioactivity in the fire zone. Additionally, Generic Letter 3.6.2 stipulates that transient combustibles need not be considered 86-10,'ection intervening combustibles. The second concern is further addressed in the communicating fire zone discussion's below. Fire Zone 2-5D,has five communicating fire zones as follows: 2-4A-S, 2-4A-W, 2-5A-S, 2-5A-W and 2-5C. Only Fire Zones 2-4A-S, 2-4A-W and 2-5A-S contain for redundant isolation Valve HV-G33-2F001 or its power supply (2A203) 'ables A study conducted concluded that a fire involving the worst case spatial separation would have to start in Fire Zone 2-4A-S (a fire zone with low in situ combustibles) damaging cables for Valve 2F001 or Power Source 2A203, traverse into Fire Zone 2-5D through the small penetration (3-inch diameter, X-34-5-71), propagate 50 feet horizontally via negligible in situ combustibles in Fire Zone 2-SD, and damage cables for Valve 2F004 or the valve itself. This scenario is highly improbable based on the large spatial separation and low amounts of combustible loading in both fire zones. Hence, operability of RWCU Inboard Isolation Valve HV-G33-2F001 is assur ed for a fire in Fire Zone 2-5D. For a fire in Fire Zone 2-4A-S, HV-G33-2F004 is assured operable. Therefore, based on the existence of: 1) large spatial separation between 'redundant safe shutdown equipment, 2) fire detection, 3) minimal in situ combustibles and 4) negligible intervening combustible loading in Fire Zone 2-5D, the current configuration provides an equivalent degree of safety as that required b~ction III.G.2 of Appendix R. The installation of an automatic fire suppression system in Fire Zone 2-5D to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R,Section III.G.2 would not significantly augment the level of fire protection for that fire zone. Future Appendix R compliance will be assured by: 1) Wrapping safe shutdown raceways that are needed for a fire in Fire Zone 2-5D, 2) installing three-hour fire rated penetration seals for any future penetrations in. the barrier separating Fire Zones 2-5D and 2-4A-S and 3) by controlling the level of transient combustibles in Fire Zone 2-5D. wc/ms j179i (16) N SO 33 I'1 25 'Io / / C' QR 3I 3o 21 Ca 25 $ RtACTOR PLIMAILsl C~TAIAsslt sI T tSOVsIOARQ / 0 V 33 Q ~ ROACTOR ROOOSSR 3SLCS (IIPPROssb / I ~IC V~~ ~H 1 '0" 355 I "eo LtEt t II23 I ~, ITI ~ IV 45 ~ RV Osot 251 I E3L0CIL WALL tooo O 2FOO'L tTt.t5(e d ITI 111 CossCRtTt WALL FtP21I ~ 3 I I ttt 251 ~ ~tot'2OO hs.tt3 tFIOO I P MOTOR OPORATOO OIRt CSRTtCTOR VAlvt FP tP<O (LOCAtsosl APPROss ssott) tooo I I 0 F2R5OO lg I ~ ~ ~ FLOOR ORAlst I ~ ~ ~ ~ s, s ~ ' ~ ~ ov.Cj33 'Fooo +tot 255 I Po ~ ~ ~ Os Pe~tTRATIO< 1PO 14t I tTL~ tSI Chtsht 'TRAY QQMOIC R ~ ~ ~ ~ tPL 252 I 0 IR't 20slt ts0IIFTOARC ~ ~ nso Qttt 111 .- I fo COWC. FIFO OtsL 25514 ~ ~ \ ~ ~ E ~ h 4 ~ ~ 4 ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ 7 v 4 ss ~\ ss ~s 4s I toe( Ot II ~ I ~ I IT RSIS g 5 I Fo g71C FIR\ Zoslt '2.60 SUSOIJLI)ANNA S.E.S. UNITo 2 REACTOR BUILDING PARYIhl I-LCIOR PLATO 'ELSE 149L 2 APPENDIX R-DEVIA.REQ. 24 FIRE ZONE 2-50 EL.749'-I AREh 3t~)tfELEV. Tlt~ISChLE: uooao PCIOIOTLVARIR POSSto O LIOSIT C~ASST OLLtOTOWI ~ sss sss s IK ~ 's s sss C 2 I 3408 ) I I~ ~ C I824 0 FIGURE I 2- S.X 2-5A-9 0< C LC tNlb WLl 1 SCCaNl i LliO 7 Wl ~ '3-0'-5G SL. ~ O~ 783 S.'-bA-5 la+ V G35 gfOOQ 2-ea Or@ Qsoe a~ aw-i) K~%A W fJSOeg loaO Sa% 0'7CCl+) 2-5A-U O~ e! hFOOI= GLAb f'.O.G. e Sl . 788'4're Att4ASf CPCCttS P~S 54'0'-2'0' 28'-8' 5 SAYS 8 27'-0i=j-35'-0' I-7'M pCCPV FIGURE Z I .l' ~ / I l l I 0 2-4F 0<( 0 l 2-4A-9 I I I I +2-4A-V) J. a. 2-48 I 4 ~~ ~ ~ = opplox<~c t'eu+ing rg 0iv. l t:ablcs 28'8'3) PtltCASf au+ ~WfL s gt 5 C~YS a 27'-0'=3.35 33'- 0 SSES-FPRR APPENDIX R DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 27 NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION IN FIRE ZONE 1-5A-S DEVIATION REQUEST: The current arrangement of Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation in Fire Zone 1-SA-S provides an equivalent degree of safety as that required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b based on the present in-situ combustible loading configuration, horizontal separation of redundant safe shutdown ECCS interlock components of 14 feet, horizontal separation of redundant safe shutdown vessel indication components of 6 feet, plant procedure to control transient combustibles, transient combustible fire hazards analysis, and-protection of raceways within 10 feet of required safe shutdown components. FIRE AREAS/ZONES AFFECTED: This deviation request applies only to Fire Zone 1-5A-S, which is in Fire Area R-1A. REASON FOR DEVIATION REQUEST: 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b requires the existence of an automatic fire suppression system, in addition to fire detectors, in those fire areas where separation of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment is greater than 20 feet with no intervening, combustibles. The redundant Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation in Fire Zone 1-5A-S as identified in Table DR27-1 does not meet the separation criteria as required by Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b. The horizontal separation of individual redundant ECCS interlock components .is 14 feet and horizontal separation of the redundant vessel indication components is 6 feet. Automatic fire suppression and detection is provided throughout Fire Zone 1-5A-S. An analysis has demonstrated the following conclusions: The in-situ combustible loading- arrangement will not support a design basis fire that will disable both divisions of nuclear boiler instrumentation.
- l. /j.8 Gj9e 2 G7 9 'i /
DR27-1 SSES-FPRR
- 2. A transient combustible fire will not be of sufficient magnitude to disable both divisions of safe shutdown ECCS interlock components.
- 3. The necessary safe shutdown cables will be protected to insure that a fire will not disable one division's components and the opposite division's cables.
Therefore, the existing arrangement, along with protecting Division I cables in the vicinity of Division II componentsg provides an equivalent degree of safety, as that required by Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b. EXISTING ARRANGEMENT In Fire Zone 1-5A-S, Division II of safe shutdown equipment is assured available for plant shutdown. Both divisions of required nuclear boiler instruments, are located in Fire Zone 1-5A-S. The instruments and terminal boxes on instrument rack 1C004 required for Unit 1 safe shutdown are identified in Table DR27-1. The instruments and terminal boxes on instrument. rack 1C005 required for Unit 1 safe shutdown are also identified on Table DR27-1., The arrangement of the instruments was designed to insure proper RPS input of the "1-out-of-2-taken-twice" logic for a single instrument line failure. The existing arrangement of the nuclear boiler instrument racks and other relative equipment is shown on Drawing C-213437. The combustible loading in the entire Fire Zone 1-5A-S was conservatively calculated to be relatively low. Automatic fire suppression is installed using the guidance of NFPA 13 and fire detection is provided throughout Fire Zone 1-5A-S. Several cable trays traverse East-West in front of and above the nuclear boiler instrument racks in Fire Zone 1-5A-S. Three cable trays are enclosed by sheet metal, while one other is a ladder type tray enclosed on the top. The lowest cable tray is 13-feet above the floor and 7-feet above the instrument racks. All cable is metallically shielded and the insulation meets all requirements of IEEE-383 Flame Test. JUSTIFICATION: To meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b, the following features must exist to ensure that a fire is limited so that one division of redundant components important to safe shutdown is available'. DR27-2 SSES-FPRR a~ fire detection,
- 4. Initiation of the fire suppression system will not disable any required nuclear boiler system.
- b. automatic fire suppression, C ~ no intervening combustibles, and
Requirements a and b are met and a fire hazard analyses has demonstrated that the existing configuration is acceptable even though requirements c and d are not met. Justification is as follows:
- d. greater than 20 feet horizontal separation between redundant safe shutdown equipment/cables.
'I The automatic fire suppression system in Fire Zone 1-5A-S provides suppression capability to immediately suppress a fire in incipient stages. This fire zone has full ceiling and lower level coverage in the area of the reactor building chillers and rack 1C004 and 1C005 using the guidance of NFPA 13.
- 1. Fire Detection 6 Su ression Fire Zone 1-5A-S is fully covered by an automatic fire detection system.
The instruments contain negligible combustibles and are completely encased in metal. enclosures which will contain any internal fire within the housing. Terminal blocks for external cable connections are also completely enclosed in metallic boxes. Therefore, even with very little horizontal spatial separation, any fire on an instrument rack will not be propagated to other racks, equipment, or cable trays. There are four cable trays in the area; three are completely enclosed by sheet metal and one is a ladder type enclosed on top but open on the bottom. The trays completely enclosed are not considered to constitute intervening combustibles, while the open tray does constitute an intervening combustible. The cable tray that is not enclosed is equipped with fire resistant cables that have passed the IEEE-383 flame test. Due to type of materials used, the cables have a low probability for spreading fire. Any fire in the cable trays will not radiate downward to II impact the nuclear boiler instruments. All Division safe shutdown cables in this fire zone have been addressed in the hit resolution process and have been protected if necessary. DR27-3 e SSES-PPRR Other combustibles within the fire zone are various control panels and lube oil from the reactor building-chillers and fuel pool cooling pumps. The control panels contain 'very little combustible materials within enclosed metallic housing, have spatial separation greater than 8 feet, and therefore, have no impact on the required nuclear boiler instrumentation. The lube oil equipment is located in areas where the floor is sloped to local drains. The drainage areas are of sufficient size to contain any oil spill. The areas are equipped with full suppression over the chillers and pumps to mitigate the spread of a resultant fire. Horizontal spatial separation between pumps/chiller and the instruments rack is greater than 20 feet. In addition, the fuel pool cooling pumps are located within the fuel pool cooling room which is surrounded by concrete walls. Transient Combustible Pire Hazard Anal sis Based on limited quantities of transient combustibles and fire suppression systems, any fire caused by transients will be limited in size.'he resultant fire is defined to be a cylindrical area of influence with a radius of 5 feet and a height of 10 feet. Therefore, a transient combustible fire can only disable 3 of the 4 nuclear boiler instrument racks, 1C004, 1C224, and 1C225 or 1C005, 1C225, and 1C224. This will insure that either Rack 1C004 or 1C005 will always be operable and one division of nuclear boiler ECCS interlock components. will be available to insure safe shutdown. However, both divisions of nuclear boiler vessel wide range pressure and level transmitters are located within the cylinder of influence and may be lost. Although availability of this instrumentation is highly desirable, its loss is acceptable because safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained without it. The main concern is a fire that disables one division's components and the opposite division s cables. Since all required Division II safe shutdown raceways will be protected in Fire Zone 1-5A-S, loss of Division I components and Division II cables is not probable. it possible for a fire to disable Division II componentsis and
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Fire Hazard Anal ses The only combustibles located in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear boiler instrumentation are the cable trays, terminal blocks and the instruments themselves.
o Height of 10 feet DR27-4 lj' SSES-FPRR o On the South by the fuel pool cooling room wall, o On the East by a line 14 feet from the East end of Rack 1C005, o On the North by the containment wall, and o On the West by a line 10 feet from the West end of Rack 1C005, have been protected by a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire rated wrap.
- However, Division I cables. Therefore, all Division I safe shutdown raceways in the area around Rack 1C005, which contains the Division II components, defined by:
The actuation of the sprinkler system will not disable any safe shutdown nuclear boiler instrumentation. From the r3 justification above, it can be concluded)that there is no fire (in-situ or transient) in Fire Zone 1-5A-g that will prevent achieving and maintaining cold shutdown. Therefore, it is concluded that the current, configuration provides an III.G.2.b equivalent degree'f safety as that required by Section of Appendix R. DR27-5 Page 1 of 2 SSES-FPRR TABLE DR27-1 UNIT 1 SAFE SHUTDOWN NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTS Safe Instrument Shutdown Fire Required Number Descri tion Area Elev Path Zone Path Rack LIS-821-1N024A Level Indicating 29 749 1-5A-S 3 1C004
- 4) Effects of S rinklers.
- LIS-B21-1N024C Switch for RPS 6 27 749 1-5A-S 3 1C005 RCIC LIS-B21-1N024B Level Indicating 29 749 1-5A-S 3 1C 004 IJ
- LIS-B21-1N024D Switch for RPS & 27 749 1-5A-S 3 1C005 HPCI LIS-B21-1N031A Level Indicating 29 749 1 1-5A-S 1C004
- LIS-B21-1N03ID 27 749 3 1-5A-S 1C005 LIS-B21-1N042A Level Indicating 29 749 1,2 1>>5A-S 1C 004 I
- LIS-821-1N042B Switch for ADS 27 749 2,3 1-SA-S 1C005 LT>>14201A 749 1-5A-S 3 1C225
- LT-14201B 749 1-5A-S 3 1C224 PS-B21-1N021A Pressure Indicating 29 749 1-5A-S 3 1C 004 I
+PS-821-1N023C 27 749 1-5A-S 1C005
- PIS-B21-1N021B Switch for CS 6 27 749 1-5A-S 3 1C005 RHR PS-B21-1N023A Pressure Switch 29 749 1C004 PS-B21-1N023B for RPS 29 749 1-5A-S 1C004
3 1C225 1C224 TB1C004-A1 Terminal Box 29 749'9 1-5A-S 1C004 -A2 Terminal Box 1-5A-S 1C004 -Bl 749'9 Terminal Box 749'9 1-5A-S 1C004 -B2 Terminal Box 1-5A-5 1C004 Page 2 of 2 SSES-FPRR TABLE DR27-1 UNIT 1 SAFE SHUTDOWN NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTS Safe Instrument Shutdown Fire Required Number Descri tion Area Elev Path Zone Path Rack TB1C005-A1 Terminal Box 27 749' 1-5A-S 3 1C005 -A3 Terminal Box 27 749' 1-5A-S 3 1C005 -Bl Terminal Box 27 749' 1>>5A-S 3 1C005 -B2 Terminal Box 27 749' 1-5A-S 3 1C005
- PS-B21-1N023D 27 749 1-5A-S 1C005 PT-14201A APT-14201B Wide Range Reactor Pressure 27 27 749'-5A-S 749 749 1-5A-S 1-5A-S 3
SSES-FPRR APPENDIX R DEVIATION REQUEST NO. 28 NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION IN FIRE ZONE 2-5A-N DEVIATION REQUEST The current arrangement of nuclear boiler instrumentation in Fire Zone 2-5A-N provides an equivalent degree of safety as that required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b, based on the present in-situ combustible loading configuration, horizontal separation of redundant safe shutdown ECCS interlock components of 14 feet, plant procedure to control transient combustibles, transient combustible fire hazards analysis, and protection of raceways within 10 feet of required safe shutdown components. FIRE AREAS/ZONES AFFECTED: This, deviation request applies only to Fire Zone 2-5A-N, which is in Fire Area R-2A. REASON FOR DEVIATION REQUEST: 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b requires the existence of an automatic fire suppression system, in addition to fire detectors, in those fire areas where separation of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment is greater than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles. The redundant nuclear boiler instrumentation in Fire, Zone 2-5A-N as identified in Table 28-1 does not meet the separation criteria as required by Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b. The horizontal separation of individual redundant ECCS interlock components is 14 feet. Automatic fire suppression and detection is provided throughout Fire Zone 2-5A-N. An analysis has demonstrated the following conclusions:
- Denotes the Required Safe Shutdown Components for this Fire Zone
- 1. The. in-situ combustible loading arrangement will not support. a fire that will disable both divisions of nuclear boiler instrumentation.
DR28-1 SSES-FPRR
- 2. A transient combustible fire will not be of sufficient magnitude to disable both divisions of safe shutdown ECCS interlock components.
- 3. The necessary safe shutdown cables will be protected to insure that a fire will not disable one division's components and the opposite division's cables.
Therefore, the existing arrangement, along with protecting Division II cables in the vicinity of Division I components, provides an equivalent degree of safety as that required by Appendix R,Section III.G.2.b. EXISTING ARRANGEMENT: In Fire Zone 2-5A-N, Division I of safe shutdown equipment is assured available for plant shutdown. Both divisions of required nuclear boiler instruments are located in Fire Zone 2-5A-N. The instruments and terminal boxes on instrument rack 2C004 required for Unit 2 safe shutdown are identified on Table DR28-1. The instruments and terminal boxes on instrument rack 2C005 required for Unit 2 safe shutdown are also identified on Table DR28-1. The arrangement of the instruments was designed to insure proper RPS input of the "1-out-of-2-taken-twice" logic for a single instrument line failure. The existing arrangement of the nuclear boiler instrument racks and other relative equipment is shown on Drawing C-213438. The combustible loading in the entire Fire Zone 2-5A-N was conservatively calculated to be relatively low. Automatic fire suppression is installed using the guidelines of NFPA 13 and fire detection is provided throughout Fire Zone 2-5A-N. Three cable trays traverse east-west in front of and above the nuclear boiler instrument racks in Fire Zone 2-5A-N. Two cable trays are enclosed by sheet metal, while the other is enclosed with fireproof insulation. The lowest cable tray is 14 All feet cable above the floor and 8 feet above the instrument racks. is metallically shielded and the insulation meets all requirements of IEEE-383 Flame Test. JUSTIFICATION: To meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.b, the following features must exist to ensure DR28-2 SSES-FPRR that a fire is limited so that one division of redundant components important to safe shutdown is available:
- 4. Initiation of the fire suppression system will not disable any required nuclear boiler system.
- a. Fire detection.
- b. Automatic fire suppression.
- c. No intervening combustibles.
Requirements a and b are met and a fire hazard analyses has demonstrated that the existing configuration is acceptable even though requirements c and d are not met. Justification is as follows: Fire Detection and Su ression Fire Zone 2-5A-N is fully covered by an automatic fire detection system. The automatic fire suppression system in Fire 'Zone 2-5A-N provides suppression capability to immediately suppress a fire in incipient stages. This fire zone has full ceiling and lower level coverage in chillers using the the area of the Reactor Building guidelines of NFPA 13.
- d. Greater than 20 feet horizontal separation between redundant safe shutdown equipment/cables.
- 2. In-Situ Combustible Fire Hazard Anal ses The only combustibles located in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear boiler instrumentation are the cable trays, terminal blocks and the instruments themselves.are The instruments contain negligible combustibles and completely encased in metal enclosures which will contain any internal fire within the housing. Terminal blocks for external cable connections are also, completely enclosed in metallic boxes. Therefore, even with very little horizontal spatial separation, any fire on an instrument rack will not be propagated to
There are three cable trays in the area; two are completely enclosed by sheet metal while the third is wrapped with fireproof insulation. The trays completely enclosed are not considered to constitute DR28-3 SSES-FPRR intervening combustibles. All Division I safe shutdown cables in this fire zone have been addressed in the hit resolution process and have been protected if required. Other combustibles within the fire zone are various control panels and lube oil from the Reactor Building chillers and fuel pool cooling pumps. The control panels contain very little combustible materials within enclosed metallic housing, have spatial separation greater than 8 feet, and therefore, have no impact on the required nuclear boiler instrumentation. The lube oil equipment is located in areas whereareas the floor is are of sloped to local drains. The drainage sufficient size to contain any oil spill. The areas are equipped with full suppression over the chillers and pumps to mitigate the spread of a resultant 'fire. Horizontal spatial separation between pumps/chiller and the instruments rack is greater than 20 feet. In addition, the fuel pool cooling pumps are located within the fuel pool cooling room which is surrounded by concrete'alls. Transient Combustible Fire Hazard Anal sis. Based on limited quantities of transient fire suppression systems, any .fire caused by fire combustibles'nd transients will be limited in size. The resultant is defined to be a cylindrical area of influence with a radius of 5 feet and a height of 10 feet. Therefore, a transient combustible fire will only disable two of the four nuclear boiler instrument racks, 2C004 and 2C224, or 2C225 and 2C005, or 2C225 and 2C004. This will insure that either Rack 2C004 or 2C005 will always be operable and one division of nuclear boiler ECCS interlock components will be available to insure safe shutdown. Also, one division of nuclear boiler vessel wide range pressure and level instrumentation will be available. The main concern is a fire that disables one division's components and the opposite division's cables. Division I safe shutdown raceways will be Since'equired protected in Fire Zone 2-5A-N, loss of Division II components and Division I cables is not probable. However, it is possible for a fire to disable Division I components and Division II cables. Therefore, all Division II safe shutdown raceways in the area around Rack 2C004, which contains the Division I components, defined by: DR28-4 9 0 'E V SSES-FPRR o Height of 10 feet, o On the north by the fuel pool cooling room wall, o On the east by a line 10 feet from the east end of Rack 2C004, o On the south by the containment wall, and o On the west by a line 14 feet from the west end of Rack 2C004, have been protected by a one-hour fire-rated wrap.
- other racks, equipment, or cable trays.
From the justification above, it can be concluded that there is no fire (in-situ or transient) in Fire Zone 2-5A-N that will prevent achieving and maintaining, cold shutdown. Therefore, it; ~ is concluded that the current configuration provides an III.G.2'.b equivalent degree of safety as that required by Section of Appendix R. DR28-5 Page 1 of 2 SSES-FPRR TABLE DR28-1 UNIT 2 SAFE SHUTDOWN NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTS Instrument Shutdown Fire Required Number Descri tion Area Elev. Path Zone Path Rack 1 2-5A-N 2-5A-N 1 1 2C004 2C005
- 4. Effects of S rinklers The actuation of the spri.nkler system will not disable any safe shutdown nuclear boiler instrumentation..
- LIS-B21-2N024B Level Indicating 749'0 2-5A-N 2C004 LIS-B21-2N024D Switch for RPS 2-5A-N 2C005 and HPCI
- L IS-B21-2N031A Level Indicating 33 2-5A-N 2C004 L IS-B21-2N031B CS, HPCI and RHR 30 749'49'49'49' 3 2-5A-N 2C005
- L IS-B21-2N031C 33 1 2-5A-N 2C004 LIS-B21-2N031D 30 3 2-5A-N 2C005 LIS-B21-2N042A Level Indicating 33 2 2C004 LIS-B21-2N042B Switch for ADS 30 2t 3 2-5A-N 2C005
- LT-24201A Wide Range Reactor 30 2-5A-N 2C225 LT-24201B Level 33 3'-5A-N 2-5A-N 2C224
RHC
- PIS-B21-2N021A Pressure Indicating 33 2-5A-N 2C004 PIS-B21-2N021B Switch. for CS and 30 2-5A-N 2C005 749'49'49'49'49'49'49'49'49'49'49'49',
2C004
- PS>>B21-2N023A Pressure Switch 33 2-5A-N ~
- PS-B21-2N023B for RPS 33 2-5A-N 2C004 PS-B21-2N023C 30 2-5A-N 2C005 PS-B21-2N0230 30 2-5A-N 2C005
- PT-24201A Wide Range Reactor 30 l... 2-5A-N 2-5A-N 2C225 2C224 PT-24201B and Pressure 33
Page 2 of 2 SSES-FPRR TABLE DR28-1 UNIT 2 SAFE SHUTDOWN NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTS Instrument Shutdown Fire Required Number Descri tion Area Elev. Path Zone Path Rack TB2C004-A1 Terminal box 33 749'3 2-5A-N 1 2C004 TB2C004-A2 Terminal box 2-5A-N 1 2C004 749'3 TB2C004-B1 TB2C004-B2 Terminal Terminal box box 749'afe 749'3 749'0 2-5A-N 2-5A-N 1 2C004 2C004 TB2C005-A1 Terminal box 749'0 2-5A-N 2C005 TB2C005-A3 Terminal box 749'0 2-5A-N 2C005 TB2C005-B1 Terminal box 749'0 2-5A-N 2C005 TB2C005-B2 Terminal box 2-5A-N 2C005 0 /
- Denotes the Required Safe Shutdown Components for this Fire Zone.