ML20214A596

Affidavit of RM Bellamy Re New Allegations Raised by Georgians Against Nuclear Energy.Notice of Appearance & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20214A596
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	11/14/1986
From:	Bellamy R GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20214A578	List: ML20214A575 ML20214A596
References
IEIN-85-020, IEIN-85-20, IEIN-86-002, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-071, IEIN-86-2, IEIN-86-3, IEIN-86-71, OL, NUDOCS 8611200153
Download: ML20214A596 (39)

Text

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'86 NW 17 A11 :38 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONFlO w -

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )

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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, et al. ) Docket Nos. 50-424 (OL)

) 50-425'(OL)

(Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

County of Burke ss.

State of Georgia AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. BELLAMY I, Robert M. Bellamy, being duly sworn according to law, depose and say as follows:

1. My name is Robert M. Bellamy. I am employed by Georgia Power Company in the position of Plant Support Manager, Plant Vogtle Nuclear Operations. My business address is P.O. Box 1600, Waynesboro, Georgia 30830. A summary of my professional i

qualifications is attached as Exhibit A.

2. The purpose of this affidavit is to address new allega-tions raised in the Georgians Against Nuclear Energy (GANE) i

" Appeal, Brief and Proposed Findings Concerning Licensing Board 8611200153 861114 PDR ADOCK 05000424 l G PDR

Decisions." GANE refers to four I&E Notices as new information pertaining to the environmental qualification of Limitorque motor operators. As discussed below, Applicants have responded to each i

of these I&E Notices and no signficant problem exists. I'have personal knowledge of the matters discussed herein and believe them to be true and correct.

3. GANE refers to I&E Notice 85-20, " Motor-Operated Valve Failures Due to Hammering Effect," (March 12, 1985), attached hereto as I'

Exhibit B. This I&E Notice describes a hammering effect discovered l by Commonwealth Edison Company in motor operated valves (MOVs) from i unidentified suppliers at its Dresden and Quad Cities facilities. t i The hammering effect that was experienced was the result of the

torque switch being repeatedly energized and cycling the valve to mechanical overload. In motor operators, when an energizing signal is received, power is supplied to the valve motor and the valve j

motor moves the valve to its open or closed position. Once the i valve reaches its fully-open or fully-closed position, torque f builds up until a torque switch opens. When the torque switch i

opens, power is cut off. However, the particular motor operators at Dresden were designed such that once the power was cut off, the l valve gearing would relax, and this relaxation would allow the 4 torque switch to reclose. If an energizing signal was still being

! received, the motor would reenergize, and the valve would again i

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r be driven into its seat until the torque switch reopened. This cycling would be constantly repeated.

4. Georgia Power Company has determined that this phenomenon cannot occur in the Limitorque motor operators used at Plant Vogtle. Those motor operators have self locking mechanical linkage. This self locking feature ensures that the valve worm ,

gear does not back off, or relax, after the valve has reached its fully-open or fully-closed position and the torque switch has opened. With the valve gears locked into place, the torque switch cannot reclose, and therefore the re-energization of the 1

motor which causes this hammering effect cannot occur.

5. GANE refers to I&E Notice 86-02, " Failure of Valve Opera-tor Motor During Environmental Qualification Testing" (Jan. 6, 1986), attached hereto as Exhibit C. This notice reported the failure of Reliance Motor Corporation magnesium rotors during environmental qualification testing. The testing was performed by General Electric Company for two BWR nuclear power plants.

The failure was attributed to the corrosion of the magnesium rotor in high temperature steam environments.

6. In order to determine applicability of this potential problem, Georgia Power Company identified all safety-related MOVs installed in a harsh environment at VEGP. Limitorque Cor-poration provided Georgia Power Company with criteria to

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determine which of these MOVs might have magnesium rotors.

'm Through application of these criteria, Georgia Power Company identified 23 MOVs potentially containing magnesium rotors.

The plant location of the 23 MOVs was reviewed, and eight were found to be located in areas where a similar high temperature steam environment could be encountered.

7. The motor identification numbers for these eight MOVs were transmitted to Limitorque Corporation, and Limitorque informed

,, ,' Georgia Power Company that four of the eight used magnesium

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rotors. The design function of the valves was then reviewed.

These four valves act as accumlator isolation valves and have electrical power locked out during plant operation. This de-sign feature prevents the valves from changing position during an accident and ensures that they will remain in their safe configuration. Therefore, the failure of the magnesium rotor cannot compromise plant safety.

8. Additionally, the environmental qualification of these four MOVs was reviewed. These Limitorque motor operated i valves have been environmentally qualified by Westinghouse Corporation for their use at Vogtle. In Westinghouse's I

environmental qualification program, a motor with a magnesium rotor was tested in a steam environment to a peak qualification temperature of 420*F and successfully completed h

this test. The environmental conditions against which this

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x motor was tested by Westinghouse envelops the VEGP plant conditions with margin. :s ,

9. GANE refers to I & E Notice 86-03, " Potential Deficiencies , ,

in Environmental Qualificatio,n of Limitorque Motor Valve ,

Operator Wiring" (Jan. 14, 1986), attached' hereto as Exhibit D. This I & E Notice reported that some Limitorque motoE operators might contain wire]that had not been tested in the Limitorque environmental qualification program.s

10. In response to I & E Notice 86-03, Georgia Power Comp'any x

initiated an inspection of safety-related Limitorque motor operators located in a harsh envircnment. To date, all but i

two MOVs (which were temporarily inaccessible) have been

! inspected, and the two remaining MOVs will be inspected shortly. With respect to the MOVs that have been inspected, all internal wiring was either identified as. properly qualified wire or, if it could not be positively identified, l was replaced with qualified wire.

11. Lastly, GANE referes to I & E Notice 86-71, "Recent ,

Identified Problems with Limitorque Motor Operators" (Aug.

19, 1986), attached hereto as Exhibit E. This I & E Notice relates to two matters: .1 ) burn damage to internal wiring and

2) cracked limit switch rotors. ,

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12. The first matter was one discovered and reported by Georgia Power Company. In November, 1985, Georgia Power Com-pany submitted a preliminary report to the NRC indicating the discovery of burn damage to internal wiring in several Lim-itorque motor operators. The wiring was burned as a result of its close proximity to or contact with an installed limit switch compartment electric heater element.

13. To remedy this problem, Georgia Power Company inspected Limitorque MOVs and replaced any burned wire that was found.

To assure this problem did not recur, design changes were com-pleted. The electric heater element power circuit has been disconnected in all safety-related Limitorque motor operators at Unit 1, and the same change is being made at Unit 2. This heater element was intended for use during storage of the MOVs and is not a necessary or safety-related component.

Consequently, its removal does not affect the operability of the MOVs.

14. The other problems identified by I & E Notice 86-71 involved cracked limit switch rotors. The cracks were found on white melamine limit switch rotors. As a result, Georgia Power Company inspected all but two safety related Limitorque MOVs (which were temporarily inaccessible) at VEGP and identified those which contain a white melamine limit switch.

During this inspection, no cracked limit switch rotors were found. The remaining two MOVs will be inspected shortly.

Georgia Power Company will continue to monitor these MOVs. The maintenance and surveillance program will periodically inspect the motor operators, and if cracking is discovered, the limit switch rotors will be replaced with later-designed brown fibrite limit switch rotors which have not exhibited cracking.

15. In addition to the four I&E Notices, GANE also refers to the NRC's Weekly Information Report--Week Ending January 18, 1985. At enclosure J of that report, (attached hereto as Exhibit F) the Office for Anaylsis and Evaluation of Operational Data discussed completing its evaluation of the valve hammering phenomenon described above. It further concluded that many of the previously reported valve failures, to which GANE refers, may well have been caused by this hammering effect. Since the design of the Limitorque MOVs used at VEGP precludes the occurrence of this hammering effect, the Weekly Information Report has little relevance to Plant Vogtle.

16. For these reasons, the documents which GANE identifies in support of its new allegations raise no unresolved or significant issue. The Limitorque Valve Motor Operators at VEGP are properly qualified.

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Robert' M. Bella Subscribed and sworp to before me this /F day of November, 19F6--- ,

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RESUME NAME: Robert M. (Mike) Bellamy TITLE: Plant Support Manager DEGREE: BSEE DATE OF BIRTH: 3/31/51 DATE EMPLOYED: 09/15/70 WORK EXPERIENCE:

NUCLEAR - GPC Position: Plant Support Manager Dates: September, 1986 to Present Location: Nuclear Operations /VEGP Plant Status Units 1 & 2 Under Construction Job

Description:

Responsibilities are divided into two general areas as follows:

(1) Support of the Operating Unit - responsibilities include Engineering, Materials, Administrative, and Support functions for Unit One. Additional functions include Security and Quality Control.

(2) Test completion on Unit One and Test activities on Unit Two. All responsibilities of previous position (Manager, Test &

Outage) are applicable for completion of the preoperational test program for Unit One and the initiation and completion of the Unit Two program.  ;

Position: Manager, Test & Outage 1 Dates: August, 1984 to September, 1986 Location: ~

Nuclear Operations /VEGP Plant Status: Units 1 & 2 Under Construction  ;

Job

Description:

In addition to previous  !

responsibilities, I assumed i accountabilities for management of the Initial Test Program, receiving work direction from the System

RESUME R. M. BELLAMY PAGE 2 Completion Manager and the General Manager, Nuclear Operations. Accountable for all aspects of the preoperational testing for both units at Plant Vogtle.

Directly responsible for all activities of the Engineering Staff with responsibility for startup related activities of all Nuclear Operations Departments at Plant Vogtle.

Primary' activities under my direction are: (1)

Preparation, review and performance of component tests, preoperational tests, startup tests,.and flushing activities, (2) Control of programs to efficiently manage test activities and maintain compliance with regulatory requirements, (3) Achieving schedule milestones from initial energization through fuel load to support 3/87 Commercial Operation, (4)

Development of long term engineering support for operating phase plant.

• Responsibilities only include the portion related to the Startup of Plant Vogtle.

Position: Superintendent of Plant Engineering and Services, III Dates: 7/24/81 to 8/84 Location: Power Generation / Plant Vogtle Plant Status: Units 1 & 2 Under Construction Job

Description:

In this position, responsibilities were a ,

continuation of the previous l duties with added budgeting 1 accountabilities and increase staffing requirements.

RESUME R. M. BELLAMY PAGE 3 Initiation of the test program activities resulted in demand for contractors to supplement GPC staff. Development of test program control testing procedures was paramount among responsibilities, however, many tasks relating to the development of the. long term operating technical staff were equally prominent.

Position: Plant Engineering Supervisor Dates: 3/3/79 to 7/24/81 Location: Power Generation / Plant Vogtle Plant Status: Units 1 & 2 Under Construction Job

Description:

Responsible for establishing the Engineering Department by developing organizational plans and by selecting applicants to staff the department. The organization grew from 1 to 90 engineers during this period. Tasks related to the development of supervisors and engineers in all areas of expertise were included in my accountabilities. Other departments did not exist during most of this period resulting in a wide array of staff responsibilities.

Examples ares (1) review of plant design for operability considerations, (2) participation in development of project control programs such as Work Planning and l records management, (3) development of plans, procedures, and programs relating to the initial test program.

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RESUME R. M. BELLAMY PAGE 4 Position: Plant Engineering Supervisor Dates: 8/26/78 to 3/3/79 Location: Power Generation / Plant Hatch Plant Status: Both Plants Operational Job

Description:

Primarily respcnsible for:

(1) Establishment of the Balance of Plant Engineering group consisting of 12 to 15 engineers, (2) Technical direction of these engineers in evaluating system performance against applicable Power Generation and design criteria, (3) Review and approval of all design modifications on BOP systems, (4) Total administrative responsibility for the group engineering, (5) Total responsibility to Plant Management on the Balance of Plant Systems on both Nuclear Units (over 150 systems), (6)

Analysis of NRC and QA requirements for implementation of design changes and generation of a method for implementation and (7) Non-license training of group engineers.

Position: Plant Engineer Dates: 02/78 to 06/78 Location: Power Generation / Plant Hatch Plant Status: Unit 1 - Operational -

Unit 2 - Under Construction /

Startup Job

Description:

As Preoperational Test Director, responsibilities included: (1) Total responsibility for 33 Test Engineers in performance and completion of 96 preoperational tests, (2) '

Review and approval of test results against system design ,

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RESUME

. R. M. BELLAMY PAGE 5 criteria, (3) Peview and approval of all design changes to Plant Systems (average of over 100 per month), (4)

Responsibility for receipt, inspection and loading of initial fuel load, (5)

Responsibility for answers to NRC questions on system design and Power Generation criteria, (6) Administrative responsibility for 21 company engineers, (7) Responsibility to the Plant Review Board for all documentation verifying testing activities on all plant systems, and (8)

Assurance that all commitments for fuel loading activities were met.

Position: Associate Engineer Dates: 09/76 to 02/78 Location: Power Generation / Plant Hatch  !

Plant Status: Unit 1 - Operational  ;

Unit 2 - Under Construction / .

Startup Job

Description:

Work assignments involved:

(1) As Preoperational Test Group Leader, coordination of 46 scheduled system tests, (2) Review and approval of test results, (3) Review and approval of system design

changes, (4) Generation of i some system design changes, (5) Analysis of Final Safety Analysis Reports design commitments to ensure qualifications for receipt of license, (6) Direct supervision of twelve Test Engineers, and (7)

Responsibility to Plant Management for all planning / scheduling j activities.

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RESUME

-R. M. BELLAMY PAGE 6 Position: Assistant Plant Test Engineer Dates: 03/75 to 09/76 Location: Power Generation / Plant Hatch Plant Status: Unit 1 - Operational Unit 2 - Under Construction /

Startup Job

Description:

Duties included: (1)

Establishment of a spare parts program including review of all nuclear systems components for parts requirements, (2)

Review of system piping and instrument drawings, and generation of system flushing procedures, and (3) Review of system elementary and wiring drawings and review of system preoperational testing procedures. Generation of Final Safety Analysis Report sections and preoperational test acceptance criteria on certain test from design parameters, (4) Supervision and coordination of component and system testing against design criteria on all plant electrical systems (230 kV, 4160V ac, 600V ac, 480V ac, 120/240V ac, 120/208V ac, i 125/250V de, and 24/48V de).

NUCLEAR (OTHER) None NON-NUCLEAR Position: Cooperative Education Student (GPC) Dates: 09/72 to 09/73 Location: Atlanta Division / Industrial Marketing Job

Description:

As a student engineer assigned to all 5 districts, responsibilities included:

(1) Analysis of industrial customer electrical usage parameters and review of their effective rate schedules, (2)

Lighting analysis at various

RESUME R. M. BELLAMY PAGE 7 plants and offices to determine adequacy, and (3) l Design of new or modified lighting systems for i industrial customers.

Position: Cooperative Education Student Dates: 09/70 to 09/71 Location: Vidalia District / Operations Department Job

Description:

Assumed duties similar to District Engineer in power distribution profession.

Responsibilities included:

(1) Drafting of all additions to or changes to the District distribution system including cost estimation and benefit ratios, (2) Coordination and tracking of the outdoor lighting program, and (3)

Design of small jobs including transformer and wire sizing and protective device coordination.

NON-NUCLEAR Position: Stock Boy, Cashier (OTHER) Dates: 09/67 to 09/69 Location: Leavell's Food Market Position: Vehicle Body Repair Dates: 06/66 to 09/67 Location: Young's Body Shop .

Position: Washing Cars Dates: 06/64 to 06/66 Location: Mack's Used Cars TRAINING:

NUCLEAR Course

Title:

SRO Certification Training Dates: 03/01/83 to 07/01/83 Total Course Hrs: 680 hrs.

RESUME R. M. BELLAMY PAGE 8

Description:

17 weeks of Plant Vogtle specific training on systems and theory, including simulator training.

Course

Title:

PWR Technology Dates: 10/10/80 to 10/17/80 Total Course Hrs: 80 hrs.

Description:

Pressurized Water Reactor technology training Course

Title:

Boiling Water Reactor Technology Course Dates: 1978 Total Course Hrs: 480 hrs.

Description:

12 week course on Plant Hatch systems and theory OTHER Course

Title:

Managerial Problem Solving Dates: 12/6/81 to 12/11/81 Total Course Ers: 40 hrs.

Description:

1 week course on problem solving techniques Course

Title:

P.U.R. Guide Dates: 6/S1 to 8/81 Total Course Hrs: Approx. 320 hrs.

Description:

Economics and regulatory aspects of public utility operation Course

Title:

Foundations of Management Dates: 12/14/80 to 12/19/80 Total Course Hrs: 40 hrs.

Description:

1 week course on Managerial functions Course

Title:

Introduction to Supervision Dates: 2/11/79 to 2/16/79 Total Course Hrs: 40 hrs.

Description:

1 week course on leadership and communications skills development T

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r RESUME

. R. M. BELLAMY PAGE 9 HONORS, AWARDS, ETC.

Title:

Senior Reactor Operator certification Date: March 5, 1984

Description:

NCR Instructor Certified

Title:

Registered Professional Engineer Date: July 13, 1982

Description:

Electrical Engineer a

Title:

Preoperational Testing at Nuclear Power Plants Date: Winter 1981

Description:

Southeastern Electric Exchange presentation

Title:

Preoperational Testing at Hatch Nuclear Plant Date: Winter 1978

Description:

ANS paper - presented at Charlotte Topical Meeting PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS National Society of Professional Engineers Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Georgia Society of Professional Engineers ,

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E%HIBIT "B" SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-20 UNITED STATES '

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT .

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 ,s ' 0 i . -

March I?, 1985

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. -3 IE INFORVATION NOTICE N0. 85-20: MOTOR-0PERATED VALVE FAILURES DUE T0 C HAMMLRING EFFECT 'd.

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A_dd,ressees :

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or con-struction permit (CP).

Purpose:

This information notice is provided to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem pertaining to motor-operated valve failures due to the bamering that may result when a fully closed (opened) valve continues to receive a close (open) signal at the valve operator. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action er written response is required.

Description of Circumstances:

On March 19, 1984, and September 25, 1984, Commonwealth Edison reported

[ licensee event report (LER) 84-003] the failure of a core spray valve to operate from the control room at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2. The immediate cause cf failure was a mechanical failure of the gear housing of the valve, probably caused by mechanical overloading during operation.

The same LER identified the failure of a second core spray valve. In this case, the immediate cause of failure was a cracked bearing race and gear housing. Metallurgical analysis by the licensee indicated that the valve gear housing had failed as a result of a mechanical overload. In addition, the valve thermal overload breaker had tripped.

Further investigation by the licensee showed that these mechanical overloads were the result of the valve being repeatedly hacr.ered closed by the valve cperator. This ham ering would continue as long as the valve operator contin-ued to receive a close demand signal.

8503070477

IN 85-20 March 12, 1985 Page 2 of 3

'N In general, the sequence of events would be:

1.

On receiving a close signal, power would be applied to the valve motor and the valve would begin closing.

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2. Once closed, torque would build up and the torque switch wculd open i removing power from the valve motor. -

3. Vith the power removed, the valve motor would stop and the torque on the valve would relax.

L. With torque removed, the torque switch would reset.

5. Once the torque switch reset, if a close signal was still present at the valve motor operator, power would be re-applied to the valve motor and the valve would be driven further closed.

E. Since the valve was already closed, torque would immediately begin to build up ard the torque switch would open rcmoving power from the valve mctor.

However, the torque The last four steps would then repeat over and over.Thus, the leads would gradu-switch would not stop the motor instantareously. ally build up >

was removed frcm the valve motor centro 11er.

irg" exists if the automatic or manual valve-close demand signal continuesTha after the torquefswitch has been activated open.A similar condition could occur on close limit switch is out of calibration.

valve openirg, if backseating loads are limited by a torque switch.

Reccgnizing this cordition as a possible coneon mode failure nechanism valves with this particular valve motor controller logic, the NRC's Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Cata (AE00)

(AE00 Engineering Evaluation Report No. AECE/E501}.

any events attributed tc hamn.ering, Amongthey these did werefind 47and failure events damagewhich due had sym irdicative cf the hammering problem.to mechanical overloading, overhe cycling ar.d failure cf the starter Frcm contactors, this, AE00thermal conclucedoverloading, that circuit breaker trips, ard valve seat jaccing. licensees have not consistently (This ide valve failures, but rather have only identified the symptom "Following up Symptcmatic Repairs to Assure Resolution of Problem.")

As a part of their corrective action for the valve ir. failure This action will be taken on the valves ir Loth units.

h6mmering effect.the interim, caution cards teve been put on the valves to warn th not to hold cn to the cort r ol switch when closirs the valves.

IN 85-20 March 12, 1985 Page 3 of 3 It is important that any modifications made to the valve's motor controller logic not adversely affect the valve's safety-related functioning. For in-stance, simply locking out a close signal once the torque switch cpens will result in improper valve operation if the valve should experience momentarily high friction loads from either tight packing or high pressure differential across the valve.

LER 84-014 subtritted by Commonwealth Edison on August 14, 1984, described the failure of both low pressure coolant injection valves to open at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 1. In 1980 the motor control logic for these valves was modified to prevent hammering. However, some time later, when the brakes on the valve motors were removed, it became apparent that the modification had not eliminated the problem. This is indicative of the difficulty involved,in perforning this type of modification.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.

.3 r drdan,' Director' Divisio of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical

Contact:

Richard J. Kiessel, IE (301) 492-8119

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices l

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Attachment 1 IN 85-20 March 12, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES 9.,..g 7

Notice No. Sub,j,ec,t. , ,,,, ,,,

Issue ,,,

Is, sued ,to ,,,,

85-19 Alleged Falsification Of 3/11/85 All power reactor i Certifications And Alteraticn facilities holding Of Markings On Piping, Valves an OL or CP Ar.d Fittings S4-18 Failures Of Undervoltage 3/7/85 All power reactor Output Circuit Boards In The facilities holding Westinghouse-Designed Solid an CL or CP State Protection System .

83-70 Vibration-Induced Valve 3/4/85 All power reactor Sup. I Failures facilities holding an OL or CP 85-17 Possible Sticking Of ASCO 3/1/05 All power reactor Solenoid Valves facilities holding an OL or CP 85-10 Time / Current Trip Curve 2/27/85 All power reactor Discrepancy Of ITE/Siemens- facilities holding ,

Allis Molded Case Circuit an OL or CP Brecker CE-15 Ncnconforming Structural 2/22/85 All power reactor Steel For Safety-Relatec facilities holding Use an CL or CP EE-14 Failure Of A Heavy Control 2/22/05 All power reactor Rod (84C) Drive Assembly facilities holding To Insert On A Trip Signal an OL or CP CE-13 Consequences Of Using 2/21/85 All BWR arc PkR Soluble Dams facilities holding an OL or CP 25-12 Recent Fuel Handling Everts 2/11/EE All power reactor ,

facilities hciding an OL or CP EF-Il Licensee Programs For 2/11/P5 All power reactor Inspection Of Electrical facilities hciding Raceway And Cable Installation a CP

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EXHIBIT "C" SSINS Jo.:'6835

. IN 86-02 e

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I,ilNITED' (TATE'$% ; 1E NUCLEAR REGULATQRY' OFFICE OF INSPECTION ND. ENFORCEMENT M. COP 9lISSION ~

WAS,HINGTON, D.C. "20555 January 6, 1986 -

.C IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-02: FAILURE OF VALVE OPERATOR MOTOR DURING ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION TESTING

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l Addressees: ,,

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l All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operatin'g license (OL) or a construction permit (CP).

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Purpose:

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This notice is to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem involv-ing the failure of Reliance Motor Corporation magnesium motors during environ-mental qualification (EQ) testing of Limiterque valve operators for River Bend and Nine Mile Point 2 nuclear power stations. It is expected that recipients l will review this infomation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances:

On August 30, 1985, the General Electric Company (GE) reported to the NRC that

they had experienced test anomalies of the Reliance, class RH, ac motors during EQ testing of a Limitorque fast-acting SMB-3-150 valve motor operator for its Gulf States Utilities (River Bend) and Niagara Mohawk (Nine Mile. Point 2) BWR

customers. These motors have magnesium rotors. Magnesium rotor motors have previously undergone E0 testing by Limitorque (PWR Qualification - Project 600456A) without failures. However, during the current testing, three motors failed during the 100-day design-basis-event (DBE) test. The.first motor had been subjected toc the 40-year qualification series of radiation, thermal, mechanical, and dynamic aging before the loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) i testing. This motor had been exposed for 7 days to a steam environment with

temperatures as high as.355*F when the rotor bar at the interface with the end ring had corroded, causing separation of the end ring from the conducting bars.

A second (unaged) motop-was then substituted into the test; after 14 days in the steam environment,' w.ith a maximum temperature of 245*F, it. experienced the same failure as the fitst motor. ' A third (unaged) motor experienced the sam.e failure following 43 days.with a maximum temperature of 223*F. .

85123'1o46'6 .

fN 86-02  :

January 6, 1986

' Page 2 of 2 >

Discussion:

Limitorque Corporation has used Reliance medium and large (180 frame and larger) ac motors, with magnesium alloy as a standard rotor material, in its operators for many years. Although all specific applications and affected power plants could not be identified, limitorque has concluded that all domestic nuclear

< power facilities, using Limitorque actuators, would have several motors in 180-frame size and larger containing magnesium alloy rotors. The magnesium alloy rotors have been primarily used where high torque, high horsepower, fast-acting motors are required. Reliance Motor Corporation has stated that, while they are reviewing possible design changes to prevent corrosion of the rotor in high temperature steam environments, there are no existing rotors available to replace the magnesium alloy components and retain the same motor characteristics.

General Electric has reviewed the BWR applications and has provided recommended action via Service Information Letter No. 425 (July 17, 1985). In summary; GE recommends that licensees determine the plant-specific applications of magnesi-um motors subject to harsh environment, the adequacy of long-term cooling cculd be evaluated assuming failure of the magnesium rotor MOVs a few days after the DBE. Some systems may allow for the operator to position the valve to its safety position immediately following the DBE instead of waiting for automatic actuation, while other systems may require realignment to a standby mode after initial core cooling. In addition to operator training, it may be prudent to disconnect some 4 of the valve actuation logic following safety positioning to prevent valve realignment without operator initiation. Other corrective actions may be appropriate for specific applications.

PWR owners may wish to review their Limitorque MOV qualification packages in light of this new information. If the review determines that the equipment may not be qualified for its intended use then they may wish to consider taking action, as recommended by GE for BWRs and as described above, to mitigate the potential for long-term core cooling problems caused by motor-operated valve (MOV) failures in the days following a DBE.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

g ward L. Jar an, Director u ivision of mergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical

Contact:

James E. Stewart, IE (301) 492-9061

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices i

l 4

. - Attachment 1 IN 86-02 January 6, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to Failure Of Main Feedwater 1/3/86 All power reactor 86-01 facilities holding Check Valve Causes Loss Of Feedwater System Integrity an OL or CP And Water-Hammer Damage Applicability of 10 CFR 21 12/31/85 All power reactor 85-101 facilities holding To Consulting Firms Providing Training an OL or CP Rosemount Differential 12/31/85 All power reactor 85-100 facilities holding Pressure Transmitter Zero Point Shift an OL or CP 85-99 Cracking In Boiling-Water- 12/31/85 All BWR facilities Reactor Mark I And Mark II having a Mark I or Containments Caused By Failure Mark II containment Of The Inerting System Missing Jumpers From Westing- 12/26/85 All Westinghouse 85-98 designed PWR

- house Reactor Protection facilities holding System Cards For The Over-Power Delta Temperature Trip an OL or CP Function Jail Term For Former 12/26/85 All power reactor 85-97 facilities holding Contractor Employee Who Intentionally Falsified an OL or CP Welding Inspection Records Temporary Strainers Left 12/23/85 All power reactor 85-96 facilities holding Installed In Pump Suction Piping an OL or CP 85-95 Leak Of Reactor Water To 12/23/85 All BWR facilities Reactor Building Caused By holding an OL or CP Scram Solenoid Valve Problem All power reactor 85-94 Potential For Loss Of Minimum 12/13/85 facilities holding Flow Paths Leading To ECCS Pump Damage During A LOCA an OL or CP OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit I

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EXHIBIT "D" f SSINS No.: 6835 l

IN 86-03 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 January 14, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-03: POTENTIAL DEFICIENCIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR VALVE OPERATOR WIRING Addressees:

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a construction permit (CP).

Purpose:

This notice is provided to alert recipients of potential generic problems regarding the environmental qualification of electrical wiring used in Limitorque motor valve operators. It is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances:

~

On September 30, 1985, Commonwealth Edison (Zion Generating Station) reported to the NRC that it had discovered four Limitorque motor. valve operators with jumper wires different from those tested by Limitorque in its environmental qualification program. Subsequently, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) notified the NRC that the manufacturer of the internal control wiring of its Limitorque operators at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant either could not be identified or qualification could not be established where the manufacturer was known.

Similar circumstances have recently been identified at other nuclear plants.

Discussion:

The results of NRC inspections at Limitorque and TVA have determined that even though Limitorque has conducted environmental qualification testing of motor valve operators, the qualification test reports do not specifically address wiring or wiring qualification. Limitorque has installed wires from several different manufacturers in safety-related operators.

8601090679

. TN 86-03 January 14, 1986 Page 2 of 2 s

Limitorque stated that it can provide or reference documentation to support qualification of wires it has installed; however, valve manufacturers, licensees, and/or others may have added additional wires that are not qualified by this data. The NRC physical inspection of Limitorque operators at the Sequoyah plant determined that soe. valve operators contained wires not qualified by the Limitorque tests.

The NRC staff considers the resolution of this issue to be part of the licensee's environmental qualification program to establish and maintain the qualified status of electrical equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49.

Because qualification of Limitorque installed wiring may be based on separate qualification tests of wire, it is important that adequate analyses have been performed and that documentation exists to demonstrate that the separate wire qualification tests encompass the parameters for the valve operator qualification. ,

If additional wiring has been added or replaced after operator shipment from Limitorque, then additional documentation may be appropriate for establishing qualification of the additional wires and subsequently the valve operators for the valve operator specific application.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office, or this office.

~

ard . r nEDirector Division ( Emergency Preparedness and Eng eering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Contact:

G. Hubbard, IE (301) 492-9759

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices i

1 1

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January 14, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES l Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-02 Failure Of Valve Operator 1/6/86 All power reactor Motor During Environmental facilities holding Qualification Testing . an OL or CP 86-01 Failure Of Main Feedwater 1/6/86 All power reactor Check Valve Causes Loss Of facilities holding Feedwater System Integrity an OL or CP And Water-Hammer Damage 85-101 Applicability of 10 CFR 21 12/31/85 All power' reactor To Consulting Firms Providing facilities holding Training an OL or CP 85-100 Rosemount Differential 12/31/85 All power reactor Pressure Transmitter Zero facilities holding Point Shift an OL or CP 85-99 Cracking In Boiling-Water- 12/31/85 All BWR facilities Reactor Mark I And Mark II having a Mark I or Containments Caused By Failure Mark II containment Of The Inerting System 85-98 Missing Jumpers From Westing- 12/26/85 All Westinghouse house Reactor Protection designed PWR System Cards For The Over- facilities holding Power Delta Temperature Trip an OL or CP Function 85-97

• Jail Term For Former 12/26/85 All power reactor Contractor Employee Who facilities holding Intentionally Falsified an OL or CP Welding Inspection Records 85-96 Temporary Strainers Left 12/23/85 All power reactor Installed In Pump Suction facilities holding Piping an OL or CP 85-95 Leak Of Reactor Water To 12/23/85 All BWR facilities Reactor Building Caused By holding an OL or CP Scram Solenoid Valve Problem OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit

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/ EXHIBIT "E" SSINS NO. 6835

/ IN 86-71

?

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONIISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

-' August 19, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-71: RECENT IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS WITH LIMITORQUE MOTOR OPERATORS Addressees:

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a construction permit.

Purpose:

l This notice is provided to alert recipients of two potential problems discovered with Limitorque motor operators. It is expected that recipients will review this I

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate,'to preclude a similar problem from occurring at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Past Related Document _s_:

IE Information Notice 86-03 " Potential Deficiencies in Environmental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring," January 14, 1986.

Description of Circumstances - Burn Damage to Internal Wirina On November 8, 1985 Georgia Power Company submitted a preliminary report to the NRC indicating that it had discovered burn damage to internal wiring.in several Limitorque motor operators installed in their Vogtle Unit 1 Power Plant.

Evidence suggested the burn damage had been caused by electric heater elements installed in the limit switch compartment for storage purposes within certain types of Limitorque motor operators.

l On March 20, 1986 Georgia Power Company submitted a final reportito the NRC which suggested that the burn desage was a generic problem applicable to all

<. Limitorque motor operators. This assumption was based on a sampling inspection of 104 Limitorque motor operators installed in Vogtle Unit 1. Forty-six of the motor operators examined were Limitorque type SMI-000, and six of these were found to have burnt internal wiring. Out of the 58 operators other than type SMI-000 which were inspected, 5 were found to contain wires deemed susceptible to damage because of their close proximity to the heater elements (less than inch).

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IN 86-71 August 19, 1986

, Page 2 of 3 y On May 20, 1986 an NRC inspector, along with Limitorque, Georgia Power, and Bechtel personnel, performed a random inspection on four type SMB-000 operators installed in Vogtle Unit 2. Three of the four operators were found to contain burnt internal wiring. One type SMB-00 operator also was inspected and was found to contain wiring susceptible to damage. x Discussion:

The wiring in question is Limitorque installed internal wiring located in the operator limit switch compartment. The wiring is being burnt as a result of its close proximity to, or contact with, the installed limit switch compartment electric heater element or heater bracket. The wiring is not properly routed and is not restrained from contacting the heater or heater bracket. Although the heater is not a seismically or environmentally qualified part and is intended for use only during storage, its use has been shown to cause serious degradation of environmentally qualified internal wiring.

The burnt wiring has been discovered only in Limitorque type SPE-000 motor operators that contain previously energized heaters, although any Limitorque operator that contains a previously energized heater could possibly exhibit a similar problem.

Description of Circumstances - Cracked Limit Switch Rotors Several licensees have submitted reports to the NRC concerning a problem with cracked limit switch rotors on Limitorque motor operators installed inside and outside of containment. The limit switches are used for control of the motor 4

operator and also provide indication of valve position in the control room.

The cracks have been found on white melamine limit switch rotors. Most of these cracks were found in the area where the limit switch rotors are pinned-to the pinion shafts. Some cracks have been found to ext,and halfway through the melamine rotors, weakening them to the extent that they are easily broken.

I i Discussion:

l In its letter dated February 21, 1984 to the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, t

Electro Mechanical Division, Cheswick, Pennsylvania, Limitorque recommended that any white limit switch components which are found with cracks should be replaced with components manufactured with a later design, brown colored material.

Violations of 10 CFR Part 21 have been issued to Limitorque for failure to report and for failure to evaluate defects discovered in their notcr operators. Licensees are reminded of their responsibility to ensure that procurement documents include a contractual requirement that the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21 apply (when applicable) and that Criterion VII of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B requires that purchased material, equipment, and services conform to the requirements of the procurement documents.

IN 86-71 August 19, 1986 Page 3 of 3 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Admin-istrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.

- / l ,

-y l &

Edward L.

Division . ordan, Emergency Director Preparedness and Eng neering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical

Contact:

Jeffrey Jacobson, IE (301) 492-8845 Att.nhment: List of Recently Issued IE Infonnation Notices e

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Attrchment 1 IN 86-71 August 19, 1986

' . LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES w-Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-70 Spurious System Isolation 8/18/86 All GE BWR facilities Caused By The Panalara Model holding an OL or CP 86 Thermocouple Monitor

86-69 Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve 8/18/86 All BWR facilities (SSPV) Rebuild Kit Problems holding an OL or CP 86-68 Stuck Control Rod 8/15/86 All BWR facilities holding an OL or CP 86-67 Portable Moisture / Density 8/15/86 All NRC licensees Gauges

Recent Incidents And authorized to possess, Common Violations Of Require- use, transport, and l ments For Use, Transportation, store sealed sources i And Storage 4

86-66 Potential For Failure Of 8/15/86 All power reactor Replacement AC Coils Supplied facilities holding By The Westinghouse Electric an OL or CP Corporation For Use In Class 1E Motor Starters And Contractors 86-65 Malfunctions Of ITT Barton 8/14/86 All power reactor Model 580 Series Switches facilities holding During Requalification Testing an OL or CP 86-64 Deficiencies In Upgrade 8/14/86 All power reactor Programs For Plant Emergency facilities holding i

Operating Procedures an OL or CP 86-63 Loss Of Safety Injection 8/6/86 All PWR facilities Capability holding an OL or CP 86-62 Potential Problems In West- 7/31/86 All power reactor inghouse Molded Casa Circuit facilities holding Breakers Equipped With A an OL or CP Shunt Trip l

OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit.

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. . EXHIBIT 'F" r r_ ----.....,......

'85 J.W 25 n! :37 January 24, 1985 For: The Commissioners From: T. A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations, Office of the EDO

Subject:

WEEKLY INFORMATION REPORT - WEEK ENDING JANUARY 18, 1985 A summary of key events is included as a convenience to those Commissioners who may prefer a condensed version of this report.

Contents Enclosure A

Administration .

Nuclear Reactor Regulation 8 Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards C Inspection and Enforcement D Nuclear Regulatory Research E Executive Legal Director F* .

International Programs G State Programs H Resource Management I*

Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data J Small & Disadvantaged Business Utilization & Civil Rights K*

Regional Offices L*

CRGR Monthly Report M*

Executive Director for Operations N*

Items Addressed by the Commission 0 P

Meeting Notices Proprietary or Other Sensitive Information (Not for Q external distribution)

• No input this week. ._

/ x .

T. A. Reh , 1stant for Operafions Office of the Executive Director for Operations

Contact:

T. A. Rehm, EDO 492-7781

OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA

ITEMS OF INTEREST WEEK ENDING JANUARY 18, 1985 Motor Operated Valve Failures

! AE00 has recently completed and issued an engineering evaluation report (AEOD/E501) addressing a problem of motor operated valves failing because of "hamering" effects. Namering is that phenomenon experienced by an MOV when the valve is subjected to repeated closing attempts after the valve has already reached the fully closed position. Based on two events that occurred at Dresden 2 and Quad Cities 1 in 1984, and on a detailed review of the design of a typical M0" control circuit, the report concludes that the hamering i

problem would likely be generically applicable to MOVs that are designed to be torqued closed. The report also concludes that failures of and damage to MOVs due to mechanical overloading, overheating of valve operator motor, repeated cycling and failures of starter contactors, thermal overload trips, etc., could be, at least in part, caused by the hamering problem. A review of operational experience for the period 1983-1984 was performed, and it was concluded that licensees of operating reactors, in their investigation of MOV failures, have not consistently identified the root cause of failure. Further-more, it was concluded that many of the 47 valve failures in 1983 and early 198.4 ascribed to the causes noted above may well have been the result of "hamering."

The report recomends that a revision to IE Information Notice 82-10. "Following Up Symptomatic Repairs to Assure Resolution of Problem," or a new Information Notice be issued addressing the findings and conclusions of this report.

The following AEOD reports have been recently completed and issued:

1. AE00/E418: Feedwater Transients During Startup at Westinghouse Plants l 2. AEOD/E426: Single Failure Vulnerability of Power Operated Relief Valve l Actuation Circuitry for Low Temperature Overpressure Protection

3. AE00/E427: Licensee Event Reports That Address Situations Which Potentially could Result in Overloading Electrical Equipment in the Emergency Power System or Prevent Operation of the Onsite Power System Sequencer

4. AE00/T423: Inoperability of Helium Circulator Overspeed Trip Channels Due to Impedance Variations in Speed Sensing Cables Exposed to Steam Leak

5. AE00/T424: Fire Water Main Leakage Into 4 KV Switchgear Room at San Onofre 1 -

ENCLOSURE J JAN 18 885

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIMg U

% NW 17 All :38 Before the Atomic Safety and L1 Tensing Appeal Board GFFILE t; '

i In the Matter of ) DOCKET!g g ie M<

)

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, et al.

) Docket Noa. 50-424

) 50-425 (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE The undersigned, being an attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of Georgia, the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeal for the District of Columbia, Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, hereby enters his appearance as counsel on behalf of the above identified applicants in proceedings related to the above-captioned matter.

Jo R. Molm '

T OUTMAN, SANDERS, LOCKERMAN

& ASHMORE 1400 Candler Building Atlanta, Georgia 30043 (404) 658-8000 Dated: November 12, 1986

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'86 NOV 17 All :38 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GFfi s NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CKEin.',*, q s,:1 BRANO.

n BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )

)

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, et al. ) Docket Nos. 50-424 (OL)

) 50-425 (OL)

(Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Brief in Opposition to the Appeal of Georgians Against Nuclear Energy,"

dated November 14, 1986, " Affidavit of Robert M. Bellamy" attached thereto, and " Notice of Appearance" of John R. Molm, dated November 12, 1986 were served upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail (postage pre-paid), or where indicated by an asterisk by hand delivery, this 14th day of November, 1986.

David R. Lewis Dated: November 14, 1986

s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )

)

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, - - - -et al.  ? Docket Nos. 50-424

) 50-425 (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) )

SERVICE LIST

• Gary J. Edles , Chairman Bernard M. Bordenick, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Executive Appeal Board Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

• Christine N. Kohl Atomic Safety and Licensing Bradley Jones, Esquire Appeal Board Regional Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100

• Howard A. Wilber Atlanta, GA 30303 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Danny Feig U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1130 Alta Avenue Washington, D.C. 20555 Atlanta, GA 30307 Morton B. Margulies, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Gustave A. Linenberger Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Oscar H. Paris Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Secretary Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 H. Joseph Flynn, Esq. Carol Stangler Assistant General Counsel 425 Euclid Terrace Federal Emergency Management Agency Atlanta, GA 30307 500 C. Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20472