ML20010G081

Interim Deficiency Rept 1 Re Failure of Dikkers Safety Relief Valves to Open within Required Time,Initially Reported on 810807.Deficiency Could Adversely Affect Safety of Plant Operations.Investigation Underway

ML20010G081
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	09/08/1981
From:	Mcgaughy J MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, AECM-81-348, NUDOCS 8109150306
Download: ML20010G081 (5)

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o MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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1. Esi[,5$7.N[ September 8, 1981 Office of Inspection & Enforcement - f U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiesion hgf' f

Region 11 '

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101 Marietta Street, N.W. \\

Suite 3100 ] 'I.' 1.;iog} % 1).

Atlanta, Georgia 3303 !C; v.s. cc eooeie uru m n,2% 3-

,e Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director \ N

SUBJECT:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. N-416/417 File 0260/155.~/15526 PRD-81/33, Int rim Report #1, Dikters Safety Relief Valves AECI-81/348 On August 7, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. F. S.

Cantrell, of your of fice, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGN3) construction site. The deficiency concerns the failure of Dikkers Safety Relief Valves.

We have determined that this deficiency, had it remained uncorrected, could have af fected the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant and is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). We are continuing our investigation to determine reportability under 10CFR21 as well as corrective actions. We expect to vibmit a final report by November 2, 1981.

Attached is our interim report.

Yours truly,

, y.-49 ,

J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr ATTACHMENT cc: See page 2

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Mr. J. P. O'Reilly AECi-81/348 NRC Page 2 cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner Mr. Victor Stello, Director Of fice of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401 l

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bec: Dr. D. C. Gibbs Mr. J. Leatherraan Mr. J. N. Ward Manager of BWR-6 Licensing Mr. J. P. McGaughy, Jr. C3.neral Electric Company Mc. J. D. Heaton 175 Curtner Avenue Mr. R. Trickovic San Jose, Ca. 95125 Mr. J. W. Yelverton Mr. L. F. Dale Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. D. M. Ho'tston Mr. T. H. Cloninger U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. R. A. Ambt.sino Division of Licenaing Mr. A. J. Iosue Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. G. B. Rogers Mr. S. H. Hobbs Mr. L. E. Ruhland Mr. J. Matore Mr. D. L. Hunt U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. A. G. Wagner Division of Licensing Mr. P. A. Taylor Washington, D. C. 20555 PRD File File

Attachment to AECM-81/348 Page 1 of 2 INTERIM REPORT NO. 1 FOR '.!RD-81/33

1. Description of the Deficiency During testing of Dikkers Esfety Relief Valves by Wyle Laboratories, six (6) did not meet the Emergency Operability Acceptance Criteria, i.e., the valves did not open within the required time period when power was applied to the solenoid valves. In addition, another solenoid valve failed the seat leakage test. The failures have been identified to be a result of improper solenoid valve operation.

This deficiency affects the Nuclear Boiler System and the Automatic Depressurization System. At present it is known to apply only to Unit 1.

If two of these defective valves had been installed as Automatic Depres-surization System valves, the single valve failure criteria of FSAR Table 6.3-7 would not be met. This deficiency could adversely af fect the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant and is reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). We are currently investigatir.g its reportability under 10CFR21.

I T. . Approach to Resolution of the Problem The solenoid valve ball disc is bound or stuck to the solenoid valve nozzle. The actual cause has not been determined but it is felt t'nat there is insufficient clearance between the ball disc and the nozzle and/or the presence of a foreign material on the ball disc. (Possibly

" Loctite" which is used during the manufacturing process) Four defec-tive solenald assemblies are being returned to the vendor (Seitz) for analysis. Seven (7) solenoid assemblies have been identified as def t-cient to date.

Corrective action required to prevent recurrence can not be identified until the actual cause of the non-conforming condition has been de te rmined .

Af ter analysis by the vendor and positive determination of the cause, all deficient solenoid valves will be reworked or repaired, as appropriate, and all af fected SRVs will be retested in accordance with Wyle Test procedure No. 1016, Rev. F for Dikkers Safety Relief Valves.

III. Status of Proposed Resolutions, i

It has been determined that this deficiency could adversely affect the r,afety of operations of the nuclear power plant. We expect to be able to determine the cause of the deficiency and to formulate corrective actions by September 25, 1981.

Attachment to AECM-81/343 Page 2 of 2 IV. Reason Why A Final Report Will Be Delayed The vendor has not completed their evaluation and has not formulated corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence.

V. Date When Final Report Will Be Submitted We expect to submit our final report by November 2,1981.

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