ML17324A897

Rev 1 to Procedures Generation Package,Part I,Specific Technical Guidelines for Donald C Cook Nuclear Plant.

ML17324A897
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/01/1986
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17324A896	List: ML17324A895 ML17324A897 ML17324A899 ML17324A900 ML18005A016
References
AEP:NRC:0773Q, AEP:NRC:773Q, PROC-860501, NUDOCS 8605210258
Download: ML17324A897 (126)

Text

ATTACHMENT TO AEP:NRC:0773Q PROCEDURES GENERATION PACKAGE PART I SPECIFIC TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT REVISION 1 MAY 1, 1986 860M10258 860516 PDR ADOCK 05000315 P PDR SSUITtlRY Sot,tlV Fa~ I;III>

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D. C. COOK PLANT SPECIFIC TECHNICAL GUIOELINES ORIGINAL ISSUE JUNE 1984 REVISION 1 APRIL 1986 6924S/042586

D. C. COOK PLANT SPECIFIC TECHNICAL GUIDELINES TABLE OF CONTENTS SUBJECT PAGE

1. INTRODUCTION

2. COMPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS

3. DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS

4. BASIS FOR USING THE GENERIC WESTINGHOUSE ERGs 12

5. METHOD FOR DEVELOPING EOPs FROH ERGs 13

6. CONCLUSION 16 APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS APPENDIX B DETAILED COMPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS 30 APPENDIX C ERGs, REVISION 1 LISTING 40 APPENDIX D EOP BACKGROUND DOCUHENTATION FORH 43 (Revisions made to the original document are indicated by margin bars.)

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1. INTRODUCTION The development of plant-specific technical guidelines is one of the four elements of the Procedures Generation Package, which is required by NUREG-0899 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. For the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1, the generic Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs), Revision 1 will be used as the basis for writing the plant specific Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).

This document describes the method of developing plant specific EOPs from the generic Westinghouse ERGs for the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit l.

Also, plant specific information for the D. C. Cook plant, which highlights differences from the generic Westinghouse ERGs, is included in this document.

i 6924S/042586

2. COHPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS During the development of the generic Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs), a generic reference plant design configuration was assumed, and the technical content included in the ERGs is based upon the reference plant design. The following systems are included in the reference plant:

Reactor Trip Actuation System ESF Actuation System Nuclear Instrumentation System Control Rod Instrumentation System Containment Instrumentation System Reactor Coolant System Chemical & Volume Control System Safety Injection System Residual Heat Removal System Radiation Honitoring System Containment Spray System Containment Atmosphere Control System Component Cooling Water System Service Water System Main Feedwater and Condensate System Hain Steam System Auxiliary Feedwater System Steam Generator Blowdown System Sampling System Spent Fuel Storage and Cooling System Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling System Control Rod Control System Turbine Control System Electric Power System Pneumatic Power System 6924S/042586

Qi

2. COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS (Cont.)

To aid in the development of the plant specific EOPs for the 0. C. Cook plant, a comparison of the above systems from an emer enc o erations 1 1 .. 1 1 1 111 d. 11 comparison will be done in a systematic and complete manner by reviewing all of the above systems. The purpose of the comparison is to identify areas of the 0. C. Cook plant which are different from the reference plant from the stand oint of emer enc s stem o erations, and thus these areas will be explicitly considered and included as appropriate during the development of the D. C. Cook EOPs. The comparison for each system follows. Appendix A was developed to provide a detailed comparison of each system based upon its use in the ERGs. Appendix B provides a more detailed component level comparison relative to the Revision 1 reference plant. Appendices A and B should be referred to during the following comparison of each system.

REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION SYSTEM The function of the Reactor Trip Actuation System (RTAS) is to monitor specified process parameters and equipment status and to actuate reactor trip if conditions exceed specified limits. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the RTAS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant.

ESF ACTUATION SYSTEM The function of the ESF Actuation System (ESFAS) is to monitor specified process parameters and to actuate engineered safety features (ESF) operation if conditions exceed specified limits. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the ESFAS is the same for the D. C: Cook and reference plant.

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2. COHPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS (Cont.)

NUCLEAR INSTRUHENTATION SYSTEH The function of the Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) is to monitor and display the reactivity state of the reactor core. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the NIS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant.

CONTROL ROD INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEH The function of the Control Rod Instrumentation System (GRIS) is to monitor and display the position of the reactor core control rods. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the GRIS is the same for the D. C.

Cook and reference plant.

CONTAINMENT INSTRUHENTATION SYSTEH The function of the Containment Instrumentation System (CIS) is to monitor the environmental condition and isolation status of the containment. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the CIS is the same for the D. C.

Cook and reference plant.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM The function of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is to transfer heat from the reactor core to the main steam system or residual heat removal system to provide a barrier against the release of reactor coolant or radioactive material to the containment environment. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the RCS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant.

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2. COMPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS (Cont.)

CHEMICAL AND VOLUHE CONTROL SYSTEH The function of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) system is to provide coolant to the reactor coolant system and to provide reactivity control for normal operations and any event that does not require engineered safety features operation. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the'VCS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant.

SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEH The function of the Safety Injection System (SIS) is to provide coolant to the reactor coolant system and to introduce negative reactivity or restrict the addition of positive reactivity for events that require engineered safety features operation. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the SIS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant except for Subsystem C as shown in Appendix A.

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEH The function of the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) is to remove residual heat from the reactor coolant system during plant shutdown operations at low reactor coolant system pressures. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the RHRS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant.

RADIATION HONITORING SYSTEH The function of the Radiation Honitoring System (RMS) is to monitor the radiation levels in specified process systems and specified areas internal and external to the plant. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the RHS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant.

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2. COHPARISON OF SYSTEH OESIGNS (Cont.)

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEH The function of the Containment Spray System (CSS) is to provide containment pressure suppression and airborne fission product removal for events that require engineered safety features actuation. The 0. C. Cook design is different from the reference plant as shown in Appendix A and these differences should be incorporated during the writing of the EOPs.

CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL SYSTEH The function of the Containment Atmosphere Control System (CACS) is to provide containment heat removal and combustible gas mixture control.'he

0. C. Cook design is significantly different from the reference plant as shown in Appendix A and these differences should be incorporated, during the writing of the EOPs.

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEH The function of the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) is to provide heat removal from system process and equipment via an intermediate closed-loop system. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the CCWS is the same for the 0. C. Cook and reference plant.

SERVICE WATER SYSTEH The function of the Service Water System (SWS) is to provide heat removal from system processes and equipment to the ultimate heat sink via an open-loop system. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the SWS is the same for the 0. C. Cook and reference plant.

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2. COHPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS (Cont.)

HAIN FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEH The function of the Hain Feedwater and Condensate System (HFCS) is to provide water to the secondary side of the steam generators during plant power operations. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the HFCS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant with the exception of the feedwater flow control bypass valves as shown by Appendix A.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEH The function of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFS) is to provide coolant to the secondary side of the steam generators during plant shutdown operations and for events that require engineered safety features operations. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the AFS is the same for the D. C. Cook and reference plant.

HAIN STEAH SYSTEH The function of the Hain Steam .System (MSS) is to provide controlled heat removal from the reactor coolant system via the steam generators. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the HSS is the same for the D. C.

Cook and reference plant with the exception of the bypass valves as shown by the comparison given in Appendix A.

STEAH GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEH The function of the Steam Generator Blowdown System (SGBS) is to provide letdown from the secondary side of the steam generators. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the D. C. Cook design is the same as the reference plant.

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2. COHPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS (Cont.)

SAHPLING SYSTEH The function of the Sampling System (SS) is to provide a means for sampling process systems. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the D. C. Cook design is the same as the reference plant.

SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND COOLING SYSTEH The function of the Spent Fuel Storage and Cooling System (SFSCS) is to control fuel storage positions to ensure a subcritical geometric configuration and to provide heat removal to maintai'n stored fuel within specified temperature limits. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the D. C. Cook design is the same as the reference plant.

CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING SYSTEH The function of the Control Rod Drive Hechanism Cooling System (CRDHCS) is to provide heat removal from the control rod drive mechanisms. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the D. C. Cook design is the same as the reference plant.

CONTROL ROD CONTROL SYSTEM The function of the Control Rod Control System (CRCS) is to control the position of the control rods in the reactor core. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the D. C. Cook design is the same as the reference plant.

TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEH The function of the Turbine Control System (TCS) is to control the turbine-generator. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the D. C.

Cook design is the same as the reference plant.

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2. COHPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS (Cont.)

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEH The function of the Electrical Power System (EPS) is to provide ac and dc

.electrical power to equipment that require electrical power to accomplish their functions. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the D. C.

Cook design is the same as the reference plant.

PNEUHATIC POWER SYSTEH The function of the Pneumatic Power System (PPS) is to supply pneumatic power (typically control air) to equipment that require pneumatic power to accomplish. their functions. From the standpoint of emergency operations, the D. C. Cook design is the same as the reference plant.

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3. DISCUSSION OF ANALYSIS The 0. C. Cook Plant design has been reviewed with respect to the reference plant analyses which were performed to support the development of the generic ERGs. This review has confirmed that the reference analyses are applicable to the 0. C. Cook Plant and that no additional analysis is required to support the use of the ERGs in developing plant specific procedures for the 0. C. Cook Plant. The reference plant for many of the analyses is a standard 4-loop non-UHI plant, but the analyses are intended to be generic and applicable to all Westinghouse-designed commercial PWR plants to the maximum extent practicable. Since the

0. C. Cook Plant is similar to the reference plant, many of the analyses are directly applicable to D. C. Cook. Although the 0. C. Cook Plant has an ice condenser containment system compared to the dry containment system for the reference plant, this difference does not affect the applicability of the analyses for 0. C. Cook. At the same time, note that these ice condenser design features have been incorporated into the 0. C. Cook EOPs. For those cases where the analysis is not directly applicable to the D. C. Cook Plant, a comparison of the system design and plant parameters demonstrates that the reference analyses are bounding for the

.-

0. C. Cook Plant, and that the conclusions are applicable to the D. C. Cook Plant.

(Analyses performed for a four loop reference plant were considered to be directly applicable to the DCCNP without any additional evaluation.

References analyses performed for a three loop plant required an evaluation of system designs and plant parameters to demonstrate that the analysis results were bounding for DCCNP.)

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4. BASIS FOR USING THE GENERIC WESTINGHOUSE ERGs To the greatest practicable extent, the Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs) have been constructed to be generic and applicable to all Westinghouse-designed commercial PWR plants. It can be seen from the comparison made in Section 2 that the D. C. Cook plant is very similar to the reference plant, which was used as the basis for developing the ERGs.

Also, as noted in the analysis discussion provided in Section 3, the analysis performed to support the generic ERGs is also applicable to the D. C. Cook plant, and no additional analysis is required. Therefore, the D. C. Cook EOPs will be based upon the generic Westinghouse ERGs, HP-Revision 1. When writing the EOPs, modifications to ERG steps must be made to account for the D. C. Cook plant design differences which are delineated in Section 2.

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5. METHOD FOR DEVELOPING EOPs FROM ERGs 5.1 General The generic Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs),

Revision 1 will be used as the basis for writing the EOPs for the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit l. A final list of the Revision 1 ERGs is included as Appendix B.

This section describes the method that will be used to convert the generic guidelines into EOPs.

The EOP writing team will obtain and review the following source documents for D. C. Cook Unit 1:

Westinghouse generic ERGs, Rev. 1 and background documents D. C. Cook Plant Specific Technical Guidelines D. C. Cook Writers Guide for EOPs Technical Specifications Setpoints Engineering Flow Diagrams System Descriptions Existing EOPs (See letter AEP-82-604, 12/14/82)

Calculated Mathematical Values used in EOPs (included in Background Information Manual) 5.3 Hethod The EOP writers will follow the ERGs step by step. The writer will research the source documents and then construct the EOP and an associated EOP Documentation Form (Appendix C). This D. C. Cook Background Documentation Form will list how each generic guideline step is used in the EOP and also list any additional steps added to the EOP with its basis, if applicable. Any difference'etween the 6924S/042586 13

5.3 Method (Cont.)

ERG step and the D. C. Cook step will be explained. This form along with the calculation for mathematical values used in the EOPs will be kept in the Background Information Manual for the D. C. Cook EOPs.

The following additional instructions for writing the EOPs and completing the EOP Documentation Form are provided.

l. If the generic step is compatible with the D. C. Cook plant design, then the step should be copied into the D. C. Cook EOP.

Since the technical basis for the step is explained in the ERG Background Document, there is no need to repeat this on the background documentation form.

2. When an ERG step specifies a numerical value to be calculated, the value will be determined and put into the D. C. Cook EOP.

The documentation form should indicate where the method of derivation is located.

3. When an ERG step requests plant specific details or actions to be added to the procedure, add the information to the procedure.

However, if the operator actions are highly routine or well within the knowledge of the operator, the specific information should not be included. The reason for this should be explained on the documentation form.

4. If the ERG guideline fails to identify or address systems or actions that are unique to D. C. Cook (Refer to Appendix A), then steps should be included to encompass the necessary actions.

These should be explained on the documentation form/

5. If an ERG step spe'cifies an action that cannot be performed at D. C. Cook, the step will be deleted or modified and the reason explained on the documentation form.

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5.3 Hethod (Cont.)

6. If an ERG step is modified such that the intent of the step is changed, then the basis will be explained on the documentation form.

7. Minor modifications to ERGs steps are acceptable without extensive Justification provided that the change does not alter the intent of the guideline. Examples of these types of changes are as follows:

a. Deletions of level of detail (see item g3).

b. Rewording of ERG steps to conform to standard D. C. Cook terminology, abbreviations and acronyms.

c. Rearranging ERG steps to streamline the procedure due to D. C.

Cook control room design and for operator convenience.

• All additions to and deletions from generic guidelines were verified/

validated as part of the EOP verification/validation program. Part of the verification/validation procedure is to check the plant specific procedure against the generic procedure and ensure that; all additions and deletions of information are documented and analyzed and also that the order of steps (if changed) remains within the bounds of the step sequencing table (part of generic background information).

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6. CONCLUSION For the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, the generic Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines {ERGs), Revision 1 will be used as the basis for writing the plant specific Emergency Operating Procedures. This document provides a description of the planned method for developing the D. C. Cook EOPs from the generic Westinghouse guidelines. Also, deviations from the generic guidelines from an emergency operations perspective resulting from differences between the reference plant and

0. C. Cook designs have been identified. It is intended that this document along with 0. C. Cook Writers Guide for EOPs will be used to aid in the preparation of the 0. C. Cook EOPs.

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APPENOIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEH OESIGNS 6924S/042586 17

APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS REACTOR TRIP ACTUATION SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Reactor Tr1p S1gnal Same 0 Turbine Tr1p S1gnal Same ESF ACTUATION SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 SI Actuation and Reset Signals Same 0 Containment Spray Signal (Hi-3) and Reset 0 Feedwater Isolation Signal Reset Same 0 Main Steamline Isolation Signal Same 0 Cont. Isolation Phase A Signal Reset Same 0 Cont. Isolation Phase 8 Signal Reset Same 6924S/042586 i8

APPENDIX A COHPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS NUCLEAR INSTRUHENTATION SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Source Range Startup Rate Same 0 Neutron Flux Recorder Same CONTROL ROD INSTRUHENTATION SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Control Rod Position Same 0 Control Rod Bottom Lights Same CONTAINHENT INSTRUHENTATION SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Containment Pressure Same 0 Containment Temperature Same 0 Containment Recirculation Sump Level Same 6924S/042586 19

APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 4-Loop Same 0 Hot 8 Cold Leg RTD Bypass Same 0 Two PORVs 8 Associated Block Valves Three PORVs and Associated(>) .

Block Valves 0 Three Code Safety Valves Same 0 RV Head Vent to Containment Same 0 RVLIS Same CHEMICAL 5 VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Two Centrifugal Charging Pumps Same which are also used for SI 0 One PD Pump Same 0 Charging & RCP Seal Injection Same using one Charging Pump 0 Letdown-Regenerative HX, Same Letdown HX to VCT 0 4X Boric Acid System l2X,(l) 0 Boric Acid Pumps Supply Charging Same pumps through either normal make-up or Emergency Boration Path 6924S/042586 20

APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Two Charging/SI Pumps take suction Same from RWST or Low-Head SI Pumps 0 Charging/SI Pumps Shutoff Head > RCS Same Design Pressure 0 12K BIT is injected by Charging/SI Same Pumps to all 4 Cold Legs 0 BIT Contents are circulated by 2 Boron B.A. Transfer Injection Recirculation Pumps Pumps(1)

Sub's stem B Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Two High-Head SI Pumps with Shutoff Same Head of - 1600 psig 0 High-Head SI Pumps take suction from Same RWST or Low-Head SI Pumps 0 Suctions of Charging/SI and High-Head Same SI Pumps connected 0 High-Head SI Pumps delivery to 4 Cold Same Legs (thru accumulator lines) and all 4 Hot Legs 6924S/042586

APPENOIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEM OESIGNS Subs stem C Reference Plant 0. C. Cook 0 Two Low-Head SI Pumps Same 0 Low-Head SI Pumps take suction from Same RWST or Containment Sump 0 Low-Head SI Pumps deliver to 4 Cold Same Legs and concurrently feed Charging SI and High-Head SI Pumps (Cold Leg Recirculation Mode) 0 Low-Head SI Pumps deliver to 2 Hot Legs Low-Head SI Pumps and concurrently feed Charging/SI and deliver to 4 Hot High-Head SI Pumps (Hot Leg Legs(2)

Recirculation Mode) 0 Switchover Initiation-Automatic Sump Switchover Valve Opening Initiation(2)

Manually Stopping Low Head SI Pumps Subs stem 0 Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 4 Accumulator Tanks with Nitrogen Cover Same Gas RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM Reference Plant 0. C. Cook 0 Two Low-Head Pumps Same 0 Low-Head Pumps take suction from Two Hot One Hot Leg(1)

Legs and return Flow to Four Cold Legs Suction Connection 6924S/042586 22

0 APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Condenser Air Injector Monitor Same 0 SG Blowdown Monitor Same 0 Containment Atmosphere Monitor Same 0 Auxiliary Building Monitor Same CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Two Low-Head Containment Spray Pumps Same 0 N/A Containment(~)

Spray Heat Exchangers 0 N/A RHR Spray to Containment(4)

CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE CONTROL SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Four Emergency Fan Coolers N/A(

0 N/A Air Recirculation Fans(6)

(Actuated on Hi-2

+ 10 min.)

0 Two Hydrogen Recombiners- Same Manual Actuation 0 N/A Hydrogen Ignitors(>)

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APPENDIX A COHPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Two Hotor Driven Pumps Same 0 One Steam Driven Pump Same 0 Condensate Storage Tank Same 0 Alternate Water Supply Same 0 AFW Control Valves . Same HAIN STEAH SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Steam Generator PORVs Same 0 Steam Generator Safety Valves Same 0 Condenser Steam Dump Valves Same 0 Hain Steamline Isolation Valves Same 0 Hain Steamline Bypass Valves Locally Operated(B)

Hanual Valves 6924S/042586 24

APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 CCW Pumps Same 0 RCP Thermal Barrier Valves Same SERVICE WATER SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Service Water Pumps Same HAIN FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Feedwater Flow Control Valves Same 0 Feedwater Flow Control Bypass Valves N/A(9) 0 Feedwater Isolation Valves Same 6924S/042586

APPENDIX A COHPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS STEAH GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 SG Blowdown Isolation Valves Same SAHPLING SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 SG Blowdown Sample Isolation Valves Same SPENT FUEL STORAGE AND COOLING SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Spent Fuel Pit level Same CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Fans Same 6924S/042586 26

APPENDIX A COHPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS CONTROL ROD CONTROL SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Control Rods Same TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Turbine Runback Same ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEH Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Diesel-generators Same PNEUHATIC POWER SYSTEM Reference Plant D. C. Cook 0 Instrument Air Compressor Same 0 Instrument Air Valves Same 6924S/042586 27

APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS FOOTNOTES:

(1) No impact on the structure of D. C. Cook EOPs.

(2) ES-1.3 and ES-1.4 should be written to include the plant specific transfer to cold and hot leg recirculation procedure, which is included in the D. C. Cook SIS System Description.

(3) The containment spray heat exchangers are utilized, if needed, during the recirculation phase. Therefore, cooling water to the containment spray heat exchangers is required during the recirculation phase of a LOCA when containment spray is required. ES-1.3, ECA-l.l and FR-Z.l should be written to include this design feature.

(4) The D. C. Cook design has spray capability using the RHR pumps. RHR spray should be initiated if the containment pressure exceeds 8 psig following the initial blowdown. Also, RHR spray should not be used until the accident has progressed to the point when the ECCS is in the recirculation phase, or at least 30 minutes after the accident. RHR spray is in'addition to the spray supplied by the containment spray pumps. The addition of RHR spray capability should be included into E-1 and FR-Z.1.

(5) The D. C. Cook plant design does not include safety related containment fan coolers that automatically start on an SI actuation signal.

Therefore, steps in E-O, ECA-0.2, ECA-l.l and FR-Z.l should be modified to delete the emergency fan coolers.

6924S/042586 28

APPENDIX A COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS FOOTNOTES: (Cont.)

(6) The pr1mary function of the a1r rec1rculation/hydrogen skirmer system is to assure containment pressure reduction after blowdown. This is accomplished by continuously circulating air from the upper to the lower compartment immediately after blowdown. The secondary function of this system is to prevent the unlikely accumulation of hydrogen in pocketed areas within the containment resulting from a LOCA. The air recirculation fans are automatically started by a Phase 8 signal after a 10 minute delay. The air recirculation/hydrogen skimer system should be included in E-O, FR-Z.l and ECA-0.2.

(7) The Distributed Ignition System (" hydrogen ignitors") is designed to provide additional hydrogen control capability in the unlikely event of a severe degraded core cooling event involving the generation of substantive amounts of hydrogen. The Distributed Ignition System should be considered for inclusion in E-l, FR-C.l, FR-C.2, FR-Z.1, FR-H.l, FR-I.3, ECA-O.O and ECA-0.2.

(8) Main steamline bypass valve operation outside the control room may be an impact and should be evaluated.

(9) Feedwater flow control bypass valves are not included in the D. C. Cook plant design. Therefore, steps in E-O, FR-H.2 and FR-H.3 should be mod1fied to delete the feedwater flow control bypass valves.

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APPENDIX B DETAILED COMPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS 6924S/042586 30

APPENDIX 8 DETAILED COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS ITEM RE UIREMENTS D. C. COOK c(

Reactor Tri Actuation S stem Reactor Trip Annunciator Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers Reactor Trip Signal Turbine Trip Signal ESF Actuation S stem SI Annunciator (2,3)

SI. Signal X X X SI Signal Reset/Block X X Low Steamline Pressure SI Actuation Signal X X Block Low PRZR Pressure Si Actuation Signal Block X Containment Isolation Phase A Signal X Containment Isolation Phase A Signal Reset X Containment Isolation .Phase 8 Signal Reset X Feedwater Isolation Signal Reset- X Containment Spray Signal X (4,3)

Containment Spray Signal Reset X Main Steamline Isolation Signal X 6924S/042586 31

APPENDIX 8 (Cont.)

DETAILED COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS ITEM RE UIREHENTS 0. C. COOK I(l) C(l)

Nuclear Instrumentation S stem Peer Range Neutron Flux Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Intermediate Range'Startup Rate Source Range Neutron Flux Source Range Startup Rate Neutron Flux Recorder Source Range Detectors (Energize)

Control Rod Instrumentation S stem Control Rod Position Control Rod Bottom Lights Radiation Instrumentation S stem Containment Radiation X SG Blowdown Radiation X Condenser Air Ejector Radiation X Auxiliary Building Radiation X SG Steamline Radiation X 6924S/042586 32

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

DETAILED COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS ITEM RE UIREMENTS D. C. COOK C(')

Containment Instrumentation S stem Containment Pressure Containment Temperature (~)

Containment Recirculation Sump Level Containment Hydrogen Concentration (Sample)

Phase A Containment Isolation Valves Phase 8 Containment Isolation Valves Containment Ventilation Isolation Dampers Reactor Coolant S stem RCS Pressure X PRZR Pressure X RCS Hot Leg Wide Range Temperature X RCS Cold Leg Wide Range Temperature X RCS Average Temperature X Core Exit TC Temperature X PRZR Water Temperature X PRZR Level X Reactor Vessel Liquid Inventory System (RVLIS) X Reactor Coolant Pumps X X PRZR PORVs X X (5,3)

PRZR PORV Blocks Val ves X X PRZR Spray Valves X X Reactor Vessel Vent Valves X X Pressurizer Heaters X X 6924S/042586 33

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

DETAILED COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS ITEM RE UIREMENTS D. C. COOK c(')

Safet In ection S stem Boron In)ection Tank (BIT) Temperature Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Charging/SI Flow ~

X

.High-Head SI Flow High-Head SI Pumps X X X Accumulator Isolation Valves X

'

X Accumulator Vent Valves X X X BIT Inlet Isolation Valves X X X BIT Outlet Isolation Valves X X X Low-Head SI Pump Suction Valves X X X (11,6) from Containment Recirculation Sump Low-Head SI Pump Suction Valves from RWST X High-Head SI Pump Suction Valves from RWST X Low-Head SI Pump Discharge Valve to RCS X (7,6)

Hot Legs Low-Head SI Pump Discharge Valve to RCS X (7,6)

Cold Legs SI Valves Residual Heat Removal S stem Low-Head SI (RHR) Flow Low-Head SI (RHR) Pumps X X Low-Head SI (RHR) Pump Suction Valves X (6,17) from RCS 6924S/042586 34

APPENDIX 8 (Cont.)

DETAILED COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS ITEH RE UIREHENTS D. C. COOK I(1) C(1)

Chemical and Volume Control S stem Boric Acid Tank Temperature X

,Charging Flow X RCP Seal Injection Flow X Letdown Flow X RCP Number 1 Seal Leakoff Flow X RCP Number 1 Seal Differential Pressure X Charging/SI Pumps X X Positive Displacement Charging Pump X X Charging/SI Pump Suction Valves from RWST X X Charging/SI Pump Suction Valves from VCT X X Charging Line Isolation Valves X X Charging Line Flow Control Valve X X Charging Line Hand Control Valve X X Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Valve X X RCP Seal Injection Outside Containment "X (18)

Isolation Valves RCP Seal Return Outside Containment Isolation Valve Letdown Isolation Valves X X Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves X X Low Pressure Letdown Control Valve X X Excess Letdown Isolation Valves X X VCT Hakeup Control System X X (12,3)

VCT Makeup Control System (Hode Selector) X X 6924S/042586 35

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

DETAILED COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS ITEM RE UIREMENTS D. C. COOK I(1) C(1)

Com onent Coolin Water S stem CCW Pumps X RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Return Inside X Containment Isolation Valve RCP Thermal Barrier CCW Return Outside Containment Isolation Valve CCW Valves Service Water S stem Service Water Pumps Service Water Valves Containment S ra S stem Containment Spray Pumps X (8,9)

Containment Spray Valves X Containment Atmos here Control S stem Containment Venti 1 at i on I so 1 ati on Dampers (10)

Containment Fan Coolers Hydrogen Recomb iners X (13,14)

Containment Air Circulation Equipment Containment Filtration Equipment 6924S/042586 36

APPENDIX 8 (Cont.)

DETAILED COHPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS ITEM D. C. COOK (1) C(1)

Hain Steam S stem SG Pressure SG Narrow Range Level SG Wide Range Level SG PORVs Condenser Steam Dump Valves X Hain Steamline Isolation Valves X Main Steamline Isolation Bypass Valves (15)

Steam Supply Valves to. Turbine-Driven X AFW Pump Turbine Stop Valves Hain Feedwater and Condensate S stem FW Flow Control Valves X FW Flow Control Bypass Valves (16)

FW Isolation Valves X Auxi liar Feedwater S stem Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Condensate Storage Tank Level HD AFW Pumps Condensate Storage Tank to Hotwell (18)

Isolation Valves AFW Valves 6924S/042586 37

APPENDIX 8 (Cont.)

DETAILED COHPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS ITEH D. C. COOK (1) C(

Steam Generator Blowdown S stem S6 Blowdown Isolation Valves Sam lin S stem SG Blowdown Sample Isolation Valves S ent Fuel Stora e and Coolin S stem Spent Fuel Pit Level Control Rod Drive Hechanism Coolin S stem Control Rod Drive Mechanism Fans Control Rod Control S stem Control Rods Turbine Control S stem Turbine Runback Electric Power S stem Diesel-Generators 6924S/042586 38

APPENDIX B (Cont.)

DETAILED COHPARISON OF SYSTEH DESIGNS ITEH RE UIREHENTS D. C. COOK

)

C Pneumatic Power S stem Instrument Air Compressor .

Instrument Air Va1ves 6924S/042586 39

APPENDIX 8 COMPARISON OF SYSTEM DESIGNS FOOTNOTES I Instrumentation requ1rements column C Control requirements column An "X" entry indicates an instrumentation or control requ1rement within the scope of the plant A '-" entry 1ndicates no requ1rement (2) SI Status Light (3) No impact on the structure of D. C. Cook EOPs.

(4) H1-2 vs. Hi-3 actuation (5) Three PORVs and assoc1ated block valves.

(6) ES-1.3 and ES-1.4 should be written to include the plant specific transfer to cold and hot leg recirculation procedure, which is 1ncluded in the D. C. Cook System Descript1on.

Low head SI pumps de11ver to 4 hot legs (8) The containment spray heat exchangers are utilized, if needed, during the reci rculat1on phase. Therefore, cooling water to the containment spray heat exchangers is required during the rec1rculat1on phase of a LOCA, when containment spray is required. ES-1.3, ECA-1.1 and FR-Z.l should be written to include this design feature.

The D. C. Cook design has spray capability using the RHR pumps. RHR spray should be initiated if the containment pressure exceeds 8 psig following the initial blowdown. Also, RHR spray should not be used until the accident has progressed to the point when ECCS is 1n the recirculation phase, or at least 30 minutes after the accident. RHR spray is 1n addition to the spray suppl1ed by the containment spray pumps. The add1tion of RHR spray capability should be included into E-1 and FR-Z.l.

(10) The D. C. Cook plant design does not include safety related containment fan coolers that automatically start on an SI actuation signal.

Therefore, steps in E-O, ECA-0.2, ECA-l.l and FR-Z.l should be modified to delete the emergency fan coolers.

Low head SI pump suction valves from the containment rec1rculation sump do not automatically open on low RWST level. Switchover is manually in1tiated after stopping the low head SI pumps..

(12) 12 wt. X bor1c acid is used in the Makeup System.

6502S/040486 40

(13) The primary funct1on of the atr rec1rculation/hydrogen skineer system 1s to assure containment pressure reduction after blowdown. This is accomplished by continuously circulating air from the upper to the lower compartment immediately after blowdown. The secondary function of this system 1s to prevent the unl1kely accumulation of hydrogen in pocketed areas within the containment following a LOCA. The air recirculat1on fans are automatically started by a phase 8 signal after a 10 minute delay. The air recirculation/hydrogen skioeer system should be included in E-O, FR-Z.l and ECA-0.2.

(14) The Distributed Ignition System (hydrogen tgnitors) 1s designed to provide additional, hydrogen control capab111ty in the unlikely event of a severe degraded core cooling event 1nvolving the generation of substantive amounts of hydrogen. The D1stributed Ignition System should be considered for inclusion 1n E-l, FR-C.l, FR-C.2, FR-Z.l, FR-H.l FR-1.3, ECA-O.O and ECA-0.2.

(l5) kain steamline bypass valve operation outside the control room may be an 1mpact and should be evaluated.

(16) Feedwater flow control bypass valves are not included in the D. C. Cook plant design. Therefore, steps in E-O, FR-H.2 and FR-H.3 should be modified to delete the feedwater flow control bypass valves.

(17) RHR suction from one hot leg connection (18) Local valves 6502S/040486

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES, REVISION 1 LISTING 6924S/042586

APPENDIX C EHERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES OPTIHAL RECOVERY GUIDELINES E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection ES-0.0 Rediagnosis ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response ES-0.2 Natural Circulation Cooldown ES-0.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown for Steam Void in Vessel (with RVLIS)

ES-0.4 Natural Circulation Cooldown for Steam Void in Vessel (without RVLIS)

E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant ES-1.1 SI Termination ES-1.2 Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization ES-1.3 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation ES-1.4 Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture ES-3.1 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill ES-3.2 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Blowdown ES-3.3 Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Steam Dump ECA-O.O Loss of All A.C. Power ECA-0.1 Loss of All A.C. Power Recovery Without S. I. Required ECA-0.2 Loss of All A.C. Power Recovery With S. I. Required ECA-l.l Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation ECA-1.2 LOCA Outside Containment ECA-2.1 Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators ECA-3.1 SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant Subcooled Recovery Desired ECA-3.2 SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant Saturated Recovery Desired ECA-3.3 SGTR Without Pressurizer Pressure Control 6924S/042586 43

APPENDIX C EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES FUNCTION RESTORATION GUIDELINES F-0 The Critical Safety Function Status Trees F-o.l Subcriticality F-0.2 Core Cooling F-0.3 Heat Sink F-0.4 Integrity F-0.5 Containment F-0.6 Inventory FR-S.1 Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS FR-S.2 Response to Loss of Core Shutdown FR-C.l Response to Inadequate Core Cooling FR-C.2 Response to Degraded Core Cooling FR-C.3 Response to Saturated Core Cooling Conditions FR-H.l Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink FR-H.2 Response to Steam Generator Overpressure FR-H.3 Response to Steam Generator High level FR-H.4 Response to Loss of Normal Steam Release Capabilities FR-H.5 Response to Steam Generator Low level FR-P.l Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions FR-P.2 Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions FR-Z.l Response to High Containment Pressure FR-Z.2 Response to Containment Flooding FR-Z.3 Response to High Containment Radiation Level FR-I. 1 Response to High Pressurizer Level FR-I. 2 Response to Low Pressurizer Level FR-I. 3 Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel 6924S/042586 44

APPENDIX D D. C. COOK EOP DOCUMENTATION FORM 6924S/042586 45

APPENDIX D Page 1 of D. C. COOK EOP DOCUMENTATION FORH EOP No. Rev.

Ti tie Prepared by: Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OR BASIS FOR DIFFERENCE 6924S/042586 46

D. C. COOK UNIT 1 DOCUMENTATION FORHS FOR EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES BASED ON REVISION 1 OF THE WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP HIGH PRESSURE EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINES 6901S/042486 47

Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP STEP DOCUMENTATION FORM INTRODUCTION The EOP step. documentation form was developed for the purpose of documenting the technical differences between the WOG ERGs and the D. C. Cook EOPs as described in Part 5.3 of the Plant Specific Technical Guidelines. Recorded on these forms are the technical differences, and the explanations or bases for them. The documentation forms are compiled in order of procedure number, and can be used effectively with the following information:

1) When the're are technical differences between a given EOP and its corresponding ERG, the EOP step number will be listed in the left column of the form. The step number of the respective ERG step will be listed in the center column, and the explanation or basis of the difference will be given in the right column.

2) A copy of the ERGs and EOPs must be used in conjunction with step documentation forms as a step text is not presented on the forms.

3) For EOP steps not listed on the forms, there are no technical differences from the ERG steps. Therefore, no explanation or bases are needed.

(Revisions made to the original document are indicated by margin bars) 6901S/042486 48

Page l c 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP NO. Ol-OHP 4023. E-0 Rev.

Title Reactor Tri or Safet In ection

'Prepared by: K. Victor Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 5 A/ZR 5 A/ER ~ Deleted FW flow control bypass valves and added FV pump discharge valves per Cook design

~ Deleted step. No fan coolers in ice condenser containment.

17 13 ~ Reversed intent of high lev'el step to clarify plant specific setpoint requirements. Also, no S/6 stop valve bypass valves in Cook design.

18 a(4 RNO 14 a RNO o Included air recirculation/hydrogen skimmer fans to step due to ice condenser containment.

19 c RNO 19 c RNO ~ No S/G stop valve bypass valves in Cook design.

49

Pag i o:

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DQ"UMENTATION FORM EOP ND. Ol-OHP 4023.ES-O.O Rev.

Rediegnosis Prepared by: J. Reddo Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS NONE 50

Page i c-. 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP NO. 01WHP 4023.ES-0.1 Rev.

.Title Reactor Tri Res Prepared by: R. starz e D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 1c RNO lc RNO ~ No S/G stop valve bypass valves in Cook desig:

8 Note ~ Added note to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541'F to allw the cooldown valves to operate.

51

4 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUM NTATION FORM EOP NO ~ 01-OHP 4023.ES-O. Rev.

Title Natural Circulation Coold PrePared by: C. Nor an Date D. C. COOK ERG I STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 6 Note ~ Added note to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541'F to allow the cooldown valves to operate.

52

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP NO ~ OIWHP 4023.ES-0.3 Rev.

Tjt]e Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel W1 h IS Prepared by: D. Dickehuth D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFrERENCE OR BASIS 1 A/ER, RNO ~ Added step to determine if RVLIS is available per utility request to incorporate in ES-0.4.

53

9. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUH NTA ION FORM EOP No. 01-OHP 4023. ES-0.4 Rev.

Tftje Natural Circulation Cooldown w Steam Void Prepared by: J. Gibbons Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS

~ Added step to determine if RVLIS is available per utility request to incorporate this procedure.

54

Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. 01-OHP 4023.E-1 Rev.

Title Loss of Reactor or Secondar Coolant Prepared by: R. J. Lo iccolo Date 2/27/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 5b 5b o Deleted substep to check power available because operator verified power once per shift.

Also, breaker indication lights and identification are on the control board. Breakers wi 11 not trip on an SI signal.

o Added step to turn on hydrogen ignitors.

16 o Step added due to plant design for RKR spray capability.

17 Note 17 o Added note to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reached 541oF to allow cooldown valves to operate.

19b o This portion of checking circuit breakers is accomplished in 19a because checking status lights verifies valves are closed and breakers are energized (closed).

6488S/04-86

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND OOCUM=NTATION FORM EOP NO ~ Ol-OHP 4023.ES>>l.l T)t1e SZ Termination Prepared by: J. Reddin D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS

~ Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow isolation valves. Also, charging line header valve is used to ensure seal in)ection and protect from CCP runout.

16 16 ~ Reworded high level step because criteria to establish seal return flow are local indications.

17 17 ~ Added not to place steam dump control selector in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541'F tc allow cooldown valves to operate.

29 ~ Added new step to recirculate BIT. This prevents more than one tank from being out of specification due to dilution from BIT.

30 ~ Added step to realign ECCS to give correct status light indication.

Page > c.

D C COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUM NTATION FOP'OP NO ~ 01WHP 4023.ES-1.2 Rev.

Tftle Post Loca Cooldown and De Prepared by: E. F. Tacik Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 7 Note ~ Added note to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541'F to allow cooldown valves to operate.

16 16 ~ Rewozded step because reference plant did not address miniflow isolation valves. Also charging line header valve is used to ensure seal in5ectiori and protect from CCP runout.

23 23 ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always lockec out so the A/ER column was changed to restore power to the isolation valves.

26 26 ~ Reworded high level step because criteria to establish seal return flow are all local indications.

57

Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. 01-OHP 4023.ES-1.3 Rev.

Title Transfer to Cold Le Recirculation Prepared by: A. 3. Sabol Date 2/27/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS General General o The ERG guidance showing typical tasks pertaining to the transfer to cold leg recirculation does not apply to the D. C. Cook design.

The procedure was written according to plant design.

6488S/04-86 58

Page 1 of 1

0. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORH EOP No. Ol-OHP 4023.ES-1.4 Rev. 0 Title Transfer to Hot Le Recirculation Prepared by: A. J. Sabol Date 2/27/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS General General o The ERG Guidance showing typical tasks pertaining to the transfer to hot leg recirculation does not apply to the D. C. Cook design.

The procedure was written according to plant design.

6488S/04-86 59

Page l 0:

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. Ol-OHP 4023.E-2 Rev.

Title Faulted Steam Prepared by: K. Victor Date D. C. COOK ERG

'

STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 1 A/ER l A/ER No S/G stop valve bypass valves in Cook design.

60

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP Ng. O1-OHP 4O23.E-3 Rev.

Title Steam Generator Tube Ru ture Prepared by: R. J. Lopiccolo D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS Sb RNO 3b RNO. ~ No S/G stop valve bypasss valves in Cook design.

Sa ~ Deleted substep to check power available because operator verifies power once per shift.

Also, breaker indication lights and identificat:

are on the control board. Breakers will not trip on an Sl signal.

14 Note 14 Note e Added not to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLACK when Tavg reaches 541'F to allow the cooldown valves to operate.

22 ~ Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves. Also charging line header valve is used to ensure seal in)ection and protect from CCP runout.

34 ~ Reworded high level step because criteria to establish seal return flow are all local indications.

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROVND DOCVMENTATION Fom EOP Na. 01OHP 4023.ES-3,1 Rev.

Tit1e Post - SGTR Cooldown Usin Backfill Prepared by: C. Swenson Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 2b 1b ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out so the A/ER was changed to restoring power to the valves.

5 Note ~ Added note to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541'F to allow the cooldown valves to operate.

62

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP NO. 01-OHP 4023.ES-3.2 Rev.

Tft1e Post - SGTR Cooldown Usin Blowdown Prepared by: J. D. Andrachek Date 2 15 84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BAS'IS 2b 2b ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out so the A/ER column was changed to restoring power to the valves.

5 Note 5 ~ Added nocto place steam dump control 16 Note 16 selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541'F to allow cooldown valves to operate.

63

Page i c'

0. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. Rev ~

Tft]e Post - SGTR Cooldown Usin Steam Du Prepared by: A. J. Sabol Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 2b 2b Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out so the A/ER column was changed to restoring power to the valves.

5 Note 5 ~ Added note to place'team dump control I INo te 11 selectors in BYPASS INTIRLOCK when Tavg 16 Note 16 reaches 541'F to allow cooldown valves to operate.

64

Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. 01-OHP 4023.ECA-O.O Rev. 0 Title Loss of All AC Power Prepared by: J. D. Gibbons 3r. Date 4/18/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS A/ER Deleted "Rod Bottom Lights LIT" 1 A/ER 1 because indicators will not light on loss of all AC. Changed rod position indicators to less than 25 steps because easy to read for reactor trip verification.

21 a Added step for Hydrogen igniters.

6488S/04-86 65

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP NO ~ 01-OHP 402 Rev.

T)tie Loss of All Pow r R Prepared by: J. D Ci n Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS laRNO laRNO Changed 2) RNO to read locally close valves and eliminated the part of the step which said to locally close valves if valves can not be manually closed. Isolation valves outside cnmt are not motor operated. Valves were locally checked closed in step 7 of ECA-O.O.

IbRNO lbRNO ~ No motor operated isolation'valves inside cnmt so part of 2) eliminated.

3d A/ER ~ Deleted containment fan coolers.

4 ~ Reworded step because reference plant did.

not address miniflow valves Also>> chargi line header valve is used to ensure seal g in)ection and prevent from CCP runout.

~ Reworded high level step because criteria to verify seal return flow are all local indicati '

Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORH EOP No. 01-OHP 4023.ECA-0.2 Rev. 0 Title Loss of All AC Power Recover Mith SI Re uired Prepared by: J. Andrachek Date 3/23/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS L

3a RNO 3a RNO Deleted statement to close CCH return isolation valves inside containment because Cook has two valves outside containment and only hand valves inside.

No emergency fan coolers in Cook design.

5b RNO 5b RNO Seal injection valves outside containment are hand valves to RNO column was changed to read locally close valves.

7a RNO Added step for air recirculation/hydrogen skimmer system.

Added step for Hydrogen igniters.

6488S/04-86 67

Page i G.

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM Epp No. Ol-OHP 4023.ECA-l. 1 Rev.

Title Loss of Emer enc Coolant Recirculation Prepared by: C. Swenson Date 5 84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 3 Note 3 ~ Added note to place steam dump control 16 Note 17 selectors in BYPASS ZNTERLOCK when Tavg 17 Note 18 reaches 541'P to allow cooldown valves 20 Note 21 to operate.

22 Note 23 4 ~ Deleted step. No fan coolers in ice condenser containment.

5b Table 6b Table ~ Deleted appropriate columns to accomadate for ice condenser containment.

18 19 ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out so the A/ER column was changed to restoring power to the isolation valves.

68

0 Pap ';

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROOND DOCUMENTA ION FORM EOP No. 01-OHP 4023,ECA-1.2 Rev.

Tjtle LOCA Outside Containment Prepared by: R. Stars Date 3/2/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS NONE 69

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. O1-oHP i Rev.

T<t18 Uncontroll d Prepared by: J. D. Gibbons Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS

~ No S/G stop valve bypass valves in Cooks desig.

e Deleted substep to check power available because operator verifies power once per shift. Also, breaker indication lights and identification are on the control board.

Breakers will not trip on an SI signal.

15 15 ~ Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves. Also, charging line header valve is used to ensure seal in5ection and protect from CCP runout.

27 27 a Reworded high level step because criteria to verify seal return flow are all local indicati 37b 37b ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out. so the A/ER column was changed to restoring power to the isolation valves.

70

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP Ng. 01-OHP 4023.ECA-3. 1 Rev. 0 Tft1e SGTR Pith Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recover Desired Prepared by: R. J. Lo iccolo D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 10 Note 10 ~ Added note to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541'F to allow the cooldown valves tc operate.

20 20 o Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves. Also charging line header valve is used to ensure seal infection and protect from CCR runout.

27 27 ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always lockedout so the A/ER column was changed to restoring power to isolation valves.

31 31 ~ Reworded high level step because criteria to verify seal return flow are all local indications.

71

APPENDIX C Page l of I

9. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. Oi-OHP 4023 ECA-3'2 Rev. 0 Title SGTR With Loss Of Reactor Coolant-Saturated Recovery Desired Prepared by: A 1 6 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO ~ EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 5 Note ~ Added note to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reach 541'F to allow cooldown valves to operate.

~ Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves. Also charging line header is used to ensure seal in)ection and protect from CCP runout.

21 21 ~ Accumulator isolation valve are always lockec'ut so the A/ER column was changed to restor power to isolation valves.

25 25 ~ Reworded high level step because criteria to Verify seal return flow are all local indications.

72

APPENDIX C Page 1 of l D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. Ol-OHP 4023.ECA-3.3 Rcv.

Title SGTR Without Pr r P Prepared by: C. Swenson Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS

.4c 4c ~ Rewarded step because reference plant did not 10 9 address miniflow valves. Also, charging line header valve is used to ensure seal in)ection and protect from CCP runout.

19 18 ~ Reworded high level step because criteria to verify seal return flow are all local indications.

23b 22b ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out so the A/ER column was @hanged to restoring power to the isolation valves.

26 NOTE 25 ~ Added note to place steam dump control 34 NOTE 33 selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541oF to allow cooldown valves to operate.

73

Pag: .": 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. 01WHP 4023.FR-S. 1 Rev. 0 Title Res onse to Nu le Prepared by: C. Morgan Date 3/2/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 2a RNO 2a RNO ~ No S/G stop valve bypass valves in Cook design e Step was changed to infect the BIT as this is the best method for rapid boration.

4d ~ Step 4d became new step 5 since step 4 was changed to infer BIT.

10 ~ No S/G stop valv~ valves in Cook design 74

Page i o; D C COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM FOP No. 01WHP 4023.FR-S.2 Rev. 0 Response to Loss of Core Shutdown Prepared by: J. D. Andrachek Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS NONE 7S

APPENDIX C Page l of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM No.

" - .FR- Rev ~

EOP HP 40 1

~

Q Title R on e T Inade Uate Core Coolin Prepared by: J: Andrachek Date 2 20 84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS

~ Added step to turn on H ignitors, per ice condensor modification.

5 Note ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out so the A/ER column was changed to restoring power to isolation valves.

"

lla 10a ~ Deleted substep to check power available because operator verifies power once per shift. Also, breaker indication lights and identification are on the control board. Breakers will not trip on an SI signal.

12 Note ll ~ Added note to place steam dump control selector.

15 Note 14 in BYPASS INTERLOCK when Tavg reaches 541'F to allow cooldown valves to operate.

76

Pa9e I Q ~ 1 D, C. 'COOK EOP BACKGROUND QOCUME."STATION FORM EOP No, 01-OHP 4023.FR-C.2 -Rev.

Tlt1e RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING Prepared by: J D. ANDRACHEK Date 3/24/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 2 A/ER e Added new step to turn on hydrogen ignitors

~ Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out, so A/ER column was changed to restoring power to isolation valve breakers. Also breakers will not trip on an SI signal.

ll Note ~ Added note to place steam dump control selectors in BYPASS INTERLOCK when tavg 15 Note reaches 541oF, to allow cooldown valves to operate.

77

Pace i G. l D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND 00CUHENTATION FORM EOP No. 01-OHP 4023.FR-C .3 Rev.

RESPONSE TO SATURATED CORE CONDETlONS Prepared by: J. D ANDRACHEK Date 3/3O/84

0. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 3a ~ Deleted step for checking power to PORV block valves because operator checks once per shift and breaker indication lights and identification are on the control board. Also, breaker will not trip on SI signal.

78

APPENDIX C Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. 01-OHP 4023.FR-H;1 Rev.

TitIe Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Prepared by: D. Di k huth II

~384'.

C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP MO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 15 15a ~ Deleted substep to check power available b'ecause operator verifies power once per shift.

Also, breaker indication lights and indicatior.

are on the control board. Breakers will not trip on an SI signal.

25 25 ~ Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves. Also, charging line header valve is used to ensure seal in5ection and prevent from CCP runout.

79

Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. 01-OHP 4023.FR-H.2 Rev. 0 Title Res onse to Steam Generator Over ressure Prepared by: 3. D. Andrachek Date 4/4/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS o No feedwater bypass valves in Cook design.

o No S.G. stop valve bypass valves in Cook design.

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Page 1 of l D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. Ol-OHP 4023.FR-H.3 Rev.

Title Res onse to Steam Generator Hi h Level Prepared by: A. J. Sabol Date 3/27/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS..

o No feedwater bypass valves in Cook design.

o No S/G stop valve bypass valves in Cook design.

e4sss/o4-se 81

Pag i o-.

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP N0. oi-OHP ~O2~.FR-H.I Rev.

Title Res onse to Loss of Normal Steam. Release Ca a Prepared by: J. D. Gibbons Jr. Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS NONE 82

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EPP Na. 01-OHP 4023.FR-H.5 Rev. 0 Tjgle Response to Steam Generator Low Level Prepared by: A. J. Sabol Date 4/16 84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFrERENCE OR BASIS NONE 83

APPENDIX C Page 1 of I D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORM EOP No. 'll-OHP 4023.FR-P:1 Rev.

Title Res onse to Imninent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition Prepared by: E. Tacik Date 3 4 84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS o Deleted substep to check power available becausi operator verifies power once per shift. Also, breaker indication lights and identification hig'ilevel are on the control board.'reakers will not trip on an SI signals substep B was moved to response to follow ERG format.

10 10 ~ Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves. Also, charging line header valve is used to ensure seal in)ection and protect from CCP runout.

14a 14a ~ Accumulator isolation valves are always locked out. so A/ER column was changed to restoring power to isloation valves.

84

Pa"e D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCVH"-NTA ION FORM EOP No. 01OHP 4023.FR-P.2 Rev.

Title Prepared by: A. J. Sabol Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO'. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 1.c. RNO 1.c. RNO ~ No S/G stop valve bypass valves in Cook desigE 85

Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORH EOP No. 01-OHP 4023.FR-Z.l Rev.

Title Res onse to Hi h Containment Pressure Prepared by: A. 3. Sabol Date 4/25/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 3 3 o Step modified for ice condenser containment because spray pumps will already be operating with this procedure in effect.

3d A/ER o Phase 8 isolation valves was made a new step since step 3 was changed to verify containment spray operation.

o Step deleted because no fan coolers in ice condenser containment; o No S/G stop valve bypass valves in Cook design.

o New step for ice condenser modification.

o New step due to plant design for RHR spray capability.

o New step added to turn on Hydrogen ignitors.

o Step deleted because Cook design continuously monitors hydrogen concentration which is initiated in Step 8b.

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Page l c-." I 1

~

• D ~ C ~ COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUH=-llTATION FORM I

IPpi

~

~

EOP No. Ol-OHP 4O23.FR-Z.2 Rev.

Tht1e Res onse to Containment Floodin Prepared by: A. J. Sabol Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO; STEP No. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS NONE

'\ ~

87

Pay i c-.

D. C. COOK EQP BACKGROUND DOCUH="NTATION FORM EOP No. Rev. 0 Tkt1e Res onse to Hf h containm n Prepared by: A. J. Sabol ~ Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 88

Page i c..

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUM""!~iATION FORM EOP No. Ol-OHP 4023.PR-z. 1 Rev.

Tjt)e Response to High Pressurizer Level Prepared by: A. J. Sabol Date 4/10/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO; STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 2cRNO 2cRNO ~ Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves. Also charging line header valve is used to ensure seal in)ection and protect from CCP runout.

~ Reworded high level step because criteria to verify seal return flow are all local indications.

89

Page i c-.

D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUM=tiTATION FORM EOP No. -

Ol-OHp Rev.

Response to Low Pressurizer Level Prepared by: K. J. victor Date D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFrERENCE OR BASIS 2cRNO 2cRNO ~ Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves. Also, charging line header valve is used to ensure seal infection and protect from CCP runout.

90

Page 1 of 1 D. C. COOK EOP BACKGROUND DOCUMENTATION FORH EOP No. Ol-OHP 4023.FR-I.3 Rev. 0 Title Res onse to Voids in Reactor Vessel Prepared by: A. 3. Sabol Date 4/24/84 D. C. COOK ERG STEP NO. STEP NO. EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE OR BASIS 2c RNO 2c RNO o Reworded step because reference plant did not address miniflow valves, Also, charging line header valves is used to ensure seal injection and protect from CCP runout.

17 o Added step for hydrogen igniters.

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