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| | number = ML17202G462 | | | number = ML17202G462 |
| | issue date = 07/21/2017 | | | issue date = 07/21/2017 |
| | title = St. Lucie Plant - NRC Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Report No. 05000335/2017007 and 05000389/2017007 | | | title = NRC Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Report No. 05000335/2017007 and 05000389/2017007 |
| | author name = Bartley J H | | | author name = Bartley J |
| | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 | | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| | addressee name = Nazar M | | | addressee name = Nazar M |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 July 21, 2017 Mr. Mano Nazar President and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Division | | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 21, 2017 |
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| Florida Power & Light Co.
| | ==SUBJECT:== |
| | | ST. LUCIE PLANT - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS REPORT NUMBER 05000335/2017007 AND 05000389/2017007 |
| Mail Stop: EX/JB 700 Universe Blvd. Juno Beach, FL 33408
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| SUBJECT: ST. LUCIE PLANT - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS REPORT NUMBER 05000335/2017007 AND 05000389/2017007
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| ==Dear Mr. Nazar:== | | ==Dear Mr. Nazar:== |
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| The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. | | The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. |
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| This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | | This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. |
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| "
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| Sincerely,/RA/ | | Sincerely, |
| Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 | | /RA/ |
| | | Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16 |
| License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16 | |
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| ===Enclosure:=== | | ===Enclosure:=== |
| Inspection Report 05000335/2017007 and 05000389/2017007, | | Inspection Report 05000335/2017007 and 05000389/2017007, w/Attachment: |
| | Supplemental Information |
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| ===w/Attachment:=== | | REGION II== |
| Supplemental Information
| | Docket Nos.: 050000335, 05000389 License Nos.: DPR-67, NPF-16 Report Nos.: 05000335/2017007, 05000389/2017007 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L) |
| | Facility: St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6501 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Dates: June 5 - June 9, 2017 Inspectors: G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead) |
| | R. Patterson, Reactor Inspector M. Greenleaf, Reactor Inspector S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector (Trainee) |
| | Approved by: Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure |
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| cc: Distribution via ListServ
| | =SUMMARY= |
| | | Inspection Report (IR) 05000335/2017-007, 05000389/2017-007; 06/05/2017 - 06/09/2017; |
| SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRS RIII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRS SIGNATURE VIA EMAIL MCG9 VIA EMAIL RNP1 VIA EMAIL STD1 GKO VIA EMAILLJB4 JHB1 NAME MGreenleaf RPatterson SDowney GOttenberg LSuggs JBartley DATE 7/14/2017 7/16/2017 7/17/2017 7/20/2017 7/18/2017 7/21/2017 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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| REGION II Docket Nos.: 050000335, 05000389
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| License Nos.: DPR-67, NPF-16 Report Nos.: 05000335/2017007, 05000389/2017007 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L)
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| Facility: St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6501 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957
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| Dates: June 5 - June 9, 2017
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| Inspectors: G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead) R. Patterson, Reactor Inspector M. Greenleaf, Reactor Inspector S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector (Trainee)
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| Approved by: Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
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| =SUMMARY=
| | St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2; NRC Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments. |
| Inspection Report (IR) 05000335/2017-007, 05000389/2017-007; 06/05/2017 - 06/09/2017; St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2; NRC Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments.
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| The inspection activities described in this report were performed between June 5 and June 9, 2017, by four Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors from Region II. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process" dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas" dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy dated November 1, 2016. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6. | | The inspection activities described in this report were performed between June 5 and June 9, 2017, by four Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors from Region II. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, |
| | Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated November 1, 2016. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6. |
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| No findings were identified. | | No findings were identified. |
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| ==REACTOR SAFETY== | | ==REACTOR SAFETY== |
| Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity | | Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity {{a|1R17}} |
| {{a|1R17}} | |
| ==1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments== | | ==1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments== |
| {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.17T}} | | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.17T}} |
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| ====a. Inspection Scope==== | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments: The inspectors reviewed six safety evaluations performed pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.59, "Changes, tests, and experiments," to determine if the evaluations were adequate and that prior NRC approval was obtained as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed sixteen screenings and zero applicability determinations where licensee personnel had determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. The inspectors reviewed these documents to determine if: | | Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments: The inspectors reviewed six safety evaluations performed pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.59, Changes, tests, and experiments, to determine if the evaluations were adequate and that prior NRC approval was obtained as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed sixteen screenings and zero applicability determinations where licensee personnel had determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. The inspectors reviewed these documents to determine if: |
| * the changes, tests, or experiments performed were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that sufficient documentation existed to confirm that a license amendment was not required; | | * the changes, tests, or experiments performed were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that sufficient documentation existed to confirm that a license amendment was not required; |
| * the safety issues requiring the changes, tests or experiments were resolved; | | * the safety issues requiring the changes, tests or experiments were resolved; |
| * the licensee conclusions for evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59; and | | * the licensee conclusions for evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59; and |
| * the design and licensing basis documentation used to support the change was updated to reflect the change. | | * the design and licensing basis documentation used to support the change was updated to reflect the change. |
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| The inspectors used, in part, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation," Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," dated November 2000. | | The inspectors used, in part, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, dated November 2000. |
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| This inspection constituted 22 evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determination samples as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.17-05. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | This inspection constituted 22 evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determination samples as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.17-05. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
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| No findings were identified. However, the following unresolved item (URI) was identified. | | No findings were identified. However, the following unresolved item (URI) was identified. |
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| 1. (Opened) Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions
| | (Opened) Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions |
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| =====Introduction:===== | | =====Introduction:===== |
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| =====Description:===== | | =====Description:===== |
| Engineering Change (EC) 284437, "Evaluation of Actions Required to Mitigate Hot Leg Injection Single Failure Vulnerability, revision 0, was created to proceduralize actions needed to mitigate a single failure vulnerability associated with HLI by installing temporary power jumpers to valves in the HLI flow path. The actions in the procedures were generated to provide specific direction to operators and maintenance personnel to install electrical jumper cabling to provide power to un-powered motor operated valves in the HLI flow paths in case one of the electrical power trains was disabled as a result of a postulated single failure. Certain electrical single failures could disable both the primary and alternate methods of aligning coolant injection into the reactor coolant system hot legs, which is needed to preclude boron precipitation, which could interrupt long term core cooling during postulated design basis accidents. The electrical single failures of concern were described in St. Lucie Unit 1 licensee event report 2011-003-01, Long-Term Post-LOCA Hot Leg Injection Single Failure Vulnerability. | | Engineering Change (EC) 284437, Evaluation of Actions Required to Mitigate Hot Leg Injection Single Failure Vulnerability, revision 0, was created to proceduralize actions needed to mitigate a single failure vulnerability associated with HLI by installing temporary power jumpers to valves in the HLI flow path. The actions in the procedures were generated to provide specific direction to operators and maintenance personnel to install electrical jumper cabling to provide power to un-powered motor operated valves in the HLI flow paths in case one of the electrical power trains was disabled as a result of a postulated single failure. Certain electrical single failures could disable both the primary and alternate methods of aligning coolant injection into the reactor coolant system hot legs, which is needed to preclude boron precipitation, which could interrupt long term core cooling during postulated design basis accidents. The electrical single failures of concern were described in St. Lucie Unit 1 licensee event report 2011-003-01, Long-Term Post-LOCA Hot Leg Injection Single Failure Vulnerability. |
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| The inspectors noted that the St. Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR sections 8.3.1.2.1, 8.3.1.2.2, and 8.3.1.2.3, "Redundancy," "Electrical Separation," and "Physical Separation," respectively, did not explicitly account for the installation of electrical jumper cables to provide power between the electrical trains as described in the newly created procedures. The inspectors also noted that the guidance in NEI 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, revision 1, section 4.3.2, "Does the Activity Result in More Than a Minimal Increase in the Likelihood of Occurrence of a Malfunction of an SSC Important to Safety?" considers a reduction in system/equipment redundancy, diversity, separation, or independence, as a more than minimal increase and would require NRC review and approval prior to implementation. The inspectors were unable to locate all relevant licensing basis documents regarding HLI action requirements for redundancy, and electrical and physical separation, or prior NRC approvals of these actions during the inspection. Review of these documents is needed to determine if the licensee's response in Question 2 of the 50.59 evaluation was adequate in its conclusion that a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety previ ously evaluated in the UFSAR did not exist. | | The inspectors noted that the St. Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR sections 8.3.1.2.1, 8.3.1.2.2, and 8.3.1.2.3, Redundancy, Electrical Separation, and Physical Separation, respectively, did not explicitly account for the installation of electrical jumper cables to provide power between the electrical trains as described in the newly created procedures. The inspectors also noted that the guidance in NEI 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, revision 1, section 4.3.2, Does the Activity Result in More Than a Minimal Increase in the Likelihood of Occurrence of a Malfunction of an SSC Important to Safety? considers a reduction in system/equipment redundancy, diversity, separation, or independence, as a more than minimal increase and would require NRC review and approval prior to implementation. The inspectors were unable to locate all relevant licensing basis documents regarding HLI action requirements for redundancy, and electrical and physical separation, or prior NRC approvals of these actions during the inspection. Review of these documents is needed to determine if the licensees response in Question 2 of the 50.59 evaluation was adequate in its conclusion that a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR did not exist. |
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| Additionally, the inspectors noted that the St. Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR Table 15.4.1-11, "LOCA Dose Summary," contained results of consequence analyses, but only provided results for offsite consequences and the control room. At the time of the inspection, it was unclear to inspectors how the dose consequences due to actions outside of the | | Additionally, the inspectors noted that the St. Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR Table 15.4.1-11, LOCA Dose Summary, contained results of consequence analyses, but only provided results for offsite consequences and the control room. At the time of the inspection, it was unclear to inspectors how the dose consequences due to actions outside of the control room had previously been evaluated. Further, the inspectors noted that the St. |
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| control room had previously been evaluated. Further, the inspectors noted that the St. Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR, Table 12.1-11, "Areas Identified in Shielding Review as Requiring Accessibility Following an Accident," did not identify the electrical bus rooms, where the jumpers would be installed, nor the operational support center (OSC) where the jumpers are stored, as requiring occupancy post-accident. The guidance in NEI 96-07, revision 1, section 4.3.4, "Does the Activity Result in More Than a Minimal Increase in the Consequences of a Malfunction?" utilizes the guidance in section 4.3.3 for determining if a more than minimal increase in the consequence of a malfunction existed. The guidance in section 4.3.3 stated, "Activities affecting on-site dose consequences that may require prior NRC approval are those that impede required actions inside or outside the control room to mitigate the consequences of reactor accidents. For changes affecting the dose to operators performing required actions outside the control room, an increase is considered more than minimal if the resultant 'mission dose' exceeds applicable GDC 19 criteria." Review of the licensee's 50.59 evaluation determined that the evaluation only addressed the potential for offsite dose increases and did not address the potential increase in dose resulting from the procedural actions for installation of the jumpers, which are performed outside of the control room. Additional review is needed to determine if onsite dose assessment of the actions was previously addressed by the licensee or considered by the NRC.
| | Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR, Table 12.1-11, Areas Identified in Shielding Review as Requiring Accessibility Following an Accident, did not identify the electrical bus rooms, where the jumpers would be installed, nor the operational support center (OSC) where the jumpers are stored, as requiring occupancy post-accident. The guidance in NEI 96-07, revision 1, section 4.3.4, Does the Activity Result in More Than a Minimal Increase in the Consequences of a Malfunction? utilizes the guidance in section 4.3.3 for determining if a more than minimal increase in the consequence of a malfunction existed. The guidance in section 4.3.3 stated, Activities affecting on-site dose consequences that may require prior NRC approval are those that impede required actions inside or outside the control room to mitigate the consequences of reactor accidents. For changes affecting the dose to operators performing required actions outside the control room, an increase is considered more than minimal if the resultant mission dose exceeds applicable GDC 19 criteria. Review of the licensees 50.59 evaluation determined that the evaluation only addressed the potential for offsite dose increases and did not address the potential increase in dose resulting from the procedural actions for installation of the jumpers, which are performed outside of the control room. Additional review is needed to determine if onsite dose assessment of the actions was previously addressed by the licensee or considered by the NRC. |
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| This issue is a URI pending the determination of whether a performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements exists. (URI 05000335/2017007-01, Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions)
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| | This issue is a URI pending the determination of whether a performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements exists. (URI 05000335/2017007-01, Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions) |
| {{a|4OA6}} | | {{a|4OA6}} |
| ==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit== | | ==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit== |
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| On June 9, 2017, the inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. D. DeBoer and other members of the licensee's staff. On July 20, 2017, a re-exit meeting was conducted via teleconference to present the final inspection results to Mr. D. DeBoer and other members of the licensee's staff. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. | | On June 9, 2017, the inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. D. DeBoer and other members of the licensees staff. On July 20, 2017, a re-exit meeting was conducted via teleconference to present the final inspection results to Mr. D. DeBoer and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report. |
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| ATTACHMENT: | | ATTACHMENT: |
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| =SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= | | =SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= |
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| ===Licensee personnel=== | | ===Licensee personnel=== |
| : [[contact::D. DeBoer]], PSL Site Director | | : [[contact::D. DeBoer]], PSL Site Director |
| : [[contact::D. Cecchett]], Nuclear Licensing Principal | | : [[contact::D. Cecchett]], Nuclear Licensing Principal |
| : [[contact::S. Cornell]], Nuclear Staff Engineer | | : [[contact::S. Cornell]], Nuclear Staff Engineer |
| : [[contact::T. Falkiewicz]], Nuclear Engineer I | | : [[contact::T. Falkiewicz]], Nuclear Engineer I |
| : [[contact::K. Frehafer]], Nuclear Licensing Principal | | : [[contact::K. Frehafer]], Nuclear Licensing Principal |
| : [[contact::W. Laframboise]], Nuclear Engineering Site Manager- Design | | : [[contact::W. Laframboise]], Nuclear Engineering Site Manager- Design |
| : [[contact::R. Raldiris]], Nuclear Engineer Principal | | : [[contact::R. Raldiris]], Nuclear Engineer Principal |
| : [[contact::M. Snyder]], Nuclear Site Licensing Manager | | : [[contact::M. Snyder]], Nuclear Site Licensing Manager |
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| ===NRC personnel=== | | ===NRC personnel=== |
| : [[contact::D. Beaulieu]], Reactor Operations Engineer | | : [[contact::D. Beaulieu]], Reactor Operations Engineer |
| : [[contact::P. Buckberg]], Project Manager | | : [[contact::P. Buckberg]], Project Manager |
| : [[contact::T. Morrissey]], Senior Resident Inspector, St. Lucie Plant | | : [[contact::T. Morrissey]], Senior Resident Inspector, St. Lucie Plant |
| : [[contact::L. Suggs]], Chief, Projects Branch 3 | | : [[contact::L. Suggs]], Chief, Projects Branch 3 |
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| ==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED== | | ==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED== |
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| ===Opened=== | | ===Opened=== |
| : 05000335/2017007-01 URI Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions (Section 1R17.b.1) | | : 05000335/2017007-01 URI Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions (Section 1R17.b.1) |
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| ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | | ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== |
| CFR 50.59 Evaluations
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| : EC 277049, Permanent Removal of St. Lucie Unit 1 RCP 1A1 Whip (Cable), Rev. 0
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| : EC 278372, U2 FHB Vent Stack Rad Monitor Replacement, Rev. 1
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| : EC 279190, Removal of Internals from Check Valve V12174, Rev. 0
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| : EC 282127, Evaluation of Linear Heat Rate Limit Increase in COLR, Rev. 0
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| : EC 284437, Engineering Evaluation
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| : PSL-ENG-SENS-15-001, Evaluation of Actions Required to Mitigate Hot Leg Injection Single Failure Vulnerability, Rev. 0
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| : EC 287794, Connection of Temporary Air Compressors to Support Unit 1 Instrument Air Compressor Replacement, Rev. 0
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| : CFR 50.59 Screenings
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| : EC 235776, Control Room Outside Air Intake (CROAI) Radiation Monitors Firmware Upgrade, Rev. 0
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| : EC 274370, Unit 2 Screen Wash System Strainer Replacement (SOER-07-2), Rev. 0
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| : EC 277356, Documentation Update for New Homewood Energy Services AFW Pump Motor Serial No. 2S-2EM10186, Rev. 2
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| : EC 278595, Agastat DSC Relay Replacement, Rev. 0
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| : EC 278639, PSL 1 & 2 Flex Connections For Non-Qualified Sources, Rev. 3
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| : EC 280780, Check and Vent valves will be added to the Nitrogen Fill Lines for the Unit 1
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| : HCV-08-1A and
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| : HCV-08-1B MSIV Actuators, Rev. 0
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| : EC 280854, RCP 1A2 Replacement Motor Installation Rev. 0
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| : EC 282700, Unit 1 Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Evaluation, Rev. 0
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| : EC 283075, St. Lucie Unit 2 Permanent Reactor Cavity Seal / Shield Ring, Rev. 1
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| : EC 284197, 480 SWGR 2B2 and 2B5 Close and Trip Fuses, Rev. 0
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| : EC 284271, Unit 1 MOV Torque Switch Bypass, Rev. 0
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| : EC 284412, Install New Register in HVAC Duct Above Charging Pumps, Rev. 0
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| : EC 284575, Update Unit 1 UFSAR Containment Boundary Quality Group Designation, Rev. 0
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| : EC 285575, HPSI Pump 1B Motor Replacement, Rev. 0
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| : EC 285611, CS Pump 1B Motor Replacement, Rev. 1
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| : EC 287662, 120V
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| : PP-1A Undervoltage Relay Setting, Rev. 0
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| : CFR 50.59 Applicability Determinations None
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| ===Procedures===
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| : 1-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), Rev. 31 1-EOP-99, Appendix O, Revs. 55 and 56
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| : 1-EOP-99, Appendix U, Local Operation of Unit 1 Atmospheric Dump Valves, Rev. 60
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| : 1-GME-100.03, Installation and Removal of Temporary Power Jumpers, Rev. 5 1-GME-100.03A, Installation and Removal of Temporary Power Jumpers, Rev. 3 1-GMM-04.01, PCTM - ALTERNATE SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING FOR PSL UNIT 1, Rev. 0 1-OSP-12.01, FLOW TEST OF THE UNIT 2 TO UNIT 1 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK
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| : CROSS-TIE, Rev. 11 2-SMI-26.63A, Control Room Outside Air Intake Radiation Monitors Calibration- Channel SA, Revs. 5 & 6
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| : EN-AA-100-1003, Control of Design Interfaces, Rev. 2
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| : EN-AA-203-1201, 10 CFR Applicability and 10
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| : CFR 50.59 Screening Reviews, Rev. 9
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| : EN-AA-203-1202, 10
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| : CFR 50.59 Evaluation, Rev. 1
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| : EN-AA-205-1100, Design Change Packages, Rev. 21
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| : EN-AA-205-1102, Temporary Configuration Changes, Rev. 9
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| : ER-AA-123-1000, NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Program, Rev. 0
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| : LI-AA-101-1003, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Revision, Rev. 5
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| ===Drawings===
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| : 2998-G-080, Sht. 2B, Flow Diagram Feedwater and Condensate Systems, Rev. 39
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| : 2998-G-125, Safety Injection, Rev. 15
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| : 8770-9949, 8" Check Valve I-V-12-174.176 (652), Rev. 3
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| : 8770-9949-EC279190, 8" Check Valve I-V-12-174.176 (652), Rev. 1 8770-B-124, Isometric Valve Drawing
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| : SE-02-3, Rev. 9 8770-B-231, Sht. 29-20, Instrument Installation Detail N2 Backup System MSIV Actuators
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| : HCV-08-1A and
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| : HCV-08-1B, Revs. 0 and 1
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| : 8770-B-327, Shutdown Cooling Drawings, Rev. 3
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| : 8770-G-078, CVCS Drawing, Rev. 25 8770-G-078, Safety Injection System Flow Diagram, Rev. 30
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| : 8770-G-078, Sht. 140, Flow Diagram Fuel Pool System, Rev. 22
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| : 8770-G-079, Sht. 7, Flow Diagram Main Steam, Revs. 13 and 14
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| : 8770-G-080, Sht. 4, Flow Diagram Feedwater and Condensate Systems, Rev. 45
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| : 8770-G-080-SH4- EC279190, Flow Diagram Feedwater and Condensate Systems, Rev. 1 8770-G-083, Sht. 1A, Flow Diagram Component Cooling System, Rev. 62 8770-G-083, Sht. 1B, Flow Diagram Component Cooling System, Rev. 64
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| : 8770-G-083, Sht. 2, Flow Diagram Component Cooling System, Rev. 4
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| : 8770-G-085, Sht. 1A, Flow Diagram Service Air System, Rev. 41
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| : 8770-G-085, Sht. 1B, Flow Diagram Service Air System, Rev. 34
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| : 8770-G-085, Sht. 2A, Flow Diagram Instrument Air System, Rev. 40 8770-G-085, Sht. 2B, Flow Diagram Instrument Air System, Rev. 64 8770-G-085, Sht. 2C, Flow Diagram Instrument Air System, Rev. 48
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| : 8770-G-085, Sht. 3, Flow Diagram Instrument Air System, Rev. 25
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| : 8770-G-085, Sht. 4A, Flow Diagram Instrument Air System, Rev. 43
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| : 8770-G-170, SW Pipe Leak Repair, Rev 0 8770-G-275, One-Line 480V Drawings. Rev. 32 8770-G-794, Reactor Building Equipment Supports, Revs. 2 and 6
| |
| : EC282700-M-001, St. Lucie Plant- Unit No. 1 Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling PI&D- Configuration 1, Rev. 0 EC282700-M-002, St. Lucie Plant- Unit No. 1 Alternate Spent Fuel Pool Cooling PI&D- Configuration 2, Rev. 0
| |
| ===Calculations===
| |
| : CN-MRCDA-09-68, RCP LOCA Cable Restraint Elimination Evaluation for St. Lucie Units 1 and
| |
| : 2, Rev. 1
| |
| : CN-OA-08-40, St. Lucie Unit 1 Post-LOCA Long Term Cooling ECCS Performance Analysis for Extended Power Uprate, Rev. 2
| |
| : NSSS-026, Safety Injection Tank Discharge, Rev 0
| |
| : PSL-2FJF-13-233, St. Lucie Unit 2 Cycle 2 Groundrules and Related Data, Rev 0
| |
| : Corrective Action Documents
| |
| : AR 1692101
| |
| : AR 1803405
| |
| : AR 1916626
| |
| : AR 2126790
| |
| : AR 2192104
| |
| : CR 2008-35069
| |
| : Self-Assessment Reports
| |
| : AR 2072630, St. Lucie Engineering Self-Assessment Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Inspection, May 2017
| |
| ===Miscellaneous Documents===
| |
| : 06-0632-TR-009, Feedwater IST Bases Document, Rev. 0
| |
| : 214-1978, Termination for EBASCO Spec. #1214-1978 St. Lucie II, Jan. 19, 1981
| |
| : 17859-02B, Qualification Test Program on Raychem Nuclear Cable Splices, Okonite Tape Splices, Kerite Tape Splices, Scotch Tape Splices and Butt Splices as Installed on Various Wire Insulations at Commonwealth Edison Company's LaSalle, Dresden, and Quad Cities Generating Stations Volume II of II, Rev. A 2998-3855, RCP Vendor Manual, Rev. 27
| |
| : 2998-A-451-1000, Equipment Qualification Report and Guidebook, Rev. 12
| |
| : 2998-A-451-6.2, Equipment Qualification Document Package 3M Corporation Splices, Rev. 8 2998-A-451-74.1, Equipment Qualification Document Package GE/Schulz and Homewood Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Motors, Rev. 0 54067TR08, Qualification Test Report for Class 1E Safety-Related 600 HP Motor Supplied by Homewood Products Corporation for Use in Nuclear Power Plants, Mar. 21, 2008 AREVA Document No. 77-5069878-004, Replacement Steam Generator Report for Florida Power and Light, St. Lucie Unit 2, Rev. 4 Change Request Notice No. 02019-14763
| |
| : Change Request Notice No. 07127-15145
| |
| : DBD-CVCS-1, Chemical and Volume Control System DBD, Rev. 7
| |
| : DBD-HVAC-2, Safety Related HVAC Systems, Rev. 5
| |
| : DBD-RCS-1, Reactor Coolant System DBD, Rev. 6 E-115-0870, Model
| |
| : RM-80 Microprocessor Software Design Document, Rev. F EC 1-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), Rev. 31
| |
| : EC 1-EOP-04/2114979, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 31
| |
| : EC 1-PSTG-04/2114979, Emergency Operating Procedure 1-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Plant Specific Technical Guideline, Rev. 31
| |
| : EC 205864, Repair damaged NNS Service Water Piping 3-SW-69, Rev. 0
| |
| : EC 280156, Concrete Backfill in Lieu of Class I Fill for I-30"-CW-90, Revs. 0 and 1
| |
| : EC 283094, PSL2 UFSAR Update for OSG/RSG Structural Codes, Rev. 0
| |
| : EC 283720, 2B2 SIT Discharge Header Piping Repair, Revs. 2 and 4
| |
| : EC 285864, Rev. 4
| |
| : EC-277356, Documentation Update for New Homewood Energy Services AFW Pump Motor Serial No. 2S-2EM10186, Rev. 2
| |
| : EC-278327, SBCS DCS Conformance Modification, Rev. 3
| |
| : EC-278372, Unit 2 Fuel Handling Building Vent Stack Radiation Monitor
| |
| : RM-26-12 Replacement, Rev. 7
| |
| : EC-278595, Agastat DSC Relay Replacement, Rev. 0
| |
| : EC-278595, Replace Auxiliary Relay 42X for V3634 Valve 480V MCC 1B6-FF1, Rev. 0
| |
| : EC-282127, St. Lucie Unit 1 Cycle 26 Core Reload, Rev. 4
| |
| : EC-284197, 480 SWGR 2B2 & 2B5 Close and Trip Fuses NRC Commitment - Ref
| |
| : NFFPA-805 LAR, Rev. 0
| |
| : EC-285575, HPSI Pump 1BMotor Replacement, Rev. 0
| |
| : EC-285611, CS Pump 1B Motor Replacement, Rev. 3
| |
| : EC-287662, 120V
| |
| : PP-1A Undervoltage Relay Setting, Rev. 0 Emergency Procedure Guideline E-4, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery Guideline, Rev. 6
| |
| : EN-AA-100-1003-F03, Owner Acceptance review of RSG Report for Florida Power and Light St. Lucie Unit 2, Rev. 4 F-C5022-2, Qualification Tests of Terminal Blocks and Splice-Insulating Assemblies in a Simulated Loss-of-Coolant-Accident Environment - Phase B, Nov. 1978
| |
| : FPL-1, Quality Assurance Topical Report, Rev. 21
| |
| : L-76-27, Letter from R. Uhrig (FPL) to J. Davis (NRC), Re: 10
| |
| : CFR 50.55(e) Interim Report Improper Containment Boundary Quality Group Designation, St. Lucie Unit 1, dated 1/22/76 L-76-61, Letter from R. Uhrig (FPL) to J. Davis (NRC), Re: 10
| |
| : CFR 50.55(e) Final Report Improper Containment Boundary Quality Group Designation, St. Lucie Unit 1, dated 2/19/76 Letter from D. Thompson (NRC) to R. Uhrig (FPL), Improper Quality Group Designation for Containment Isolation Valves and Associated Piping, dated 3/4/76 Letter from H. Thornburg (NRC) to R. Uhrig (FPL), Improper Quality Group Designation for Containment Isolation Valves and Associated Piping, dated 2/10/76 Operations Training Plans for Hot Leg Injection Commitment
| |
| : PC/M 07081, Unit 2 CROAI Radiation Monitor Noise Reduction Firmware Modification, Rev. 0
| |
| : PCR 1692701
| |
| : PCR-2114228, 1/2
| |
| : EOP 10 - Station Blackout SBO, Mar. 1, 2016
| |
| : PSL-ENG-SECS-07-014, Engineering Evaluation for Controlled Low-Strength Material (CLSM) for use as Class I or Lesser Classification Backfill Material, Rev. 0
| |
| : PSL-ENG-SEIS-08-017, Control Room Outside Air (CROAI) Radiation Monitor Actuation Setpoint Basis Document, Rev. 1 Specification for Excavation and Backfill: Seismic Category I and Non-seismic Category, 02/1988
| |
| : STD-C-004, Seismic Response Spectra, St. Lucie Units 1 & 2, Rev. 0
| |
| : STD-C-008, General Civil Design Criteria for St. Lucie Units 1 & 2, Rev. 2 Technical Specifications Amendment 152, St. Lucie Plant Unit 2 - Issuance of Amendment \ Regarding Alternative Source Term (TAC NO. MD6202), Sep. 29, 2008
| |
| : WO 40275887, U1: V12825- Broken Handwheel/ Stem
| |
| : WO 40516072, U2: TS/CROAl'S
| |
| : RIM-26-61/62/65/66 Rad Mon Response Time Test
| |
| : Corrective Action Documents Written as a Result of the Inspection
| |
| : AR 2209110,
| |
| : EC 278372 Trend on Quality of Engineering Review of ECs
| |
| : AR 2209291, 2017
| |
| : NRC 50.59 Inspection- Missing Figures
| |
| : AR 2209295, 2017
| |
| : NRC 50.59 Inspection- Missing Quality Standards
| |
| : AR 2209488, 2017
| |
| : NRC 50.59 Inspection URI- Removal of V12174 Disc
| |
| : AR 2209489, 2017
| |
| : NRC 50.59 Inspection URI- CCW Piping Quality Group
| |
| : AR 2209490, Initial Unit 1 HLI Training Frequency Not Met
| |
| : AR 2209492, 2017
| |
| : NRC 50.59 Inspection- CROAI RM Smoothing Algorithm
| |
| : AR 2209495, Operator/Maintenance Inter-Related Task Training
| |
| : AR 2209501, NRC50.59 Insp Question: EQ Doc-Pac Aging Basis for 3M Tape
| |
| : AR 2211095, U2 CROAI RM Improper Time Response Test Method
| |
| : AR 2211096, EPU Evaluation Error for CROAI RM
| |
| : AR 2213564, 2017
| |
| : NRC 50.59 Inspection URI-
| |
| : EC 239885 (PCM91241)
| |
| : AR 2214470, 2017
| |
| : NRC 50.59 Audit EQ Doc Pac for 3M Tape
| |
| }} | | }} |
|
---|
Category:Inspection Report
MONTHYEARIR 05000335/20230102024-01-26026 January 2024 NRC Quadrennial Focused Engineering Inspection (FEI) Commercial Grade Dedication Report 05000335/2023010 and 05000389/2023010 IR 05000335/20230042024-01-24024 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023004 and 05000389/2023004 IR 05000335/20230032023-11-0606 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023003 and 05000389/2023003 IR 05000335/20233012023-09-20020 September 2023 NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000335/2023301 and 05000389/2023301 IR 05000335/20230022023-08-0707 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023002 and 05000389/2023002 IR 05000335/20234032023-06-29029 June 2023 Security Inspection Report 05000335/2023403 and 05000389/2023403 IR 05000335/20234022023-06-20020 June 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2023402 and 05000389/2023402 IR 05000335/20234012023-05-16016 May 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000335/2023401 and 05000389/2023401 (Cover Letter) IR 05000335/20230012023-05-0909 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023001 and 05000389/2023001 IR 05000335/20234202023-03-21021 March 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2023420 and 05000389/2023420 IR 05000335/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 (Report 05000335/2022006 and 05000389/2022006) IR 05000335/20220042023-02-10010 February 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2022004 and 05000389/2022004 IR 05000335/20220112022-12-27027 December 2022 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000335/2022011 and 05000389/2022011 IR 05000335/20220032022-11-0404 November 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2022003 and 05000389/2022003 ML22208A1762022-08-0404 August 2022 Review of the Fall 2021 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report IR 05000335/20220022022-08-0101 August 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2022002 and 05000389/2022002 ML22210A0782022-07-22022 July 2022 Stl 2022003 Document Request IR 05000335/20220122022-06-29029 June 2022 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000335 2022012 and 05000389 2022012 IR 05000335/20224012022-05-20020 May 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2022401 and 05000389/2022401 IR 05000335/20220012022-05-12012 May 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2022001 and 05000389/2022001 IR 05000335/20220102022-04-27027 April 2022 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000335/2022010 and 05000389/2022010 IR 05000335/20214022022-04-0404 April 2022 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000335/2021402 and 05000389/2021402 - Public IR 05000335/20210062022-03-0202 March 2022 Annual Assessment Letter for St. Lucie, Units 1 & 2 (Report No. 05000335/2021006 and 05000389/2021006) IR 05000335/20210042022-02-14014 February 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2021004 and 05000389/2021004 IR 05000335/20214032021-12-14014 December 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2021403 and 05000389/2021403 IR 05000335/20210102021-12-0707 December 2021 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000335/2021010 and 05000389/2021010 IR 05000335/20210032021-11-0303 November 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2021003 and 05000389/2021003 IR 05000335/20210052021-08-25025 August 2021 Updated Inspection Plan for St. Lucie Plant Units 1 & 2 (Report 05000335/2021005 and 05000389/2021005) IR 05000335/20210022021-08-10010 August 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2021002 and 05000389/2021002 IR 05000335/20214012021-06-23023 June 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2021401 and 05000389/2021401 IR 05000335/20213012021-06-21021 June 2021 NRC Examination Report 05000335/2021301 and 05000389/2021301 IR 05000335/20210012021-05-12012 May 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2021001 and 05000389/2021001 IR 05000335/20200062021-03-0303 March 2021 Annual Assessment Letter for St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Report 05000335/2020006 and 05000389/2020006 IR 05000335/20203012021-02-16016 February 2021 NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000335/2020301 and 05000389/2020301 IR 05000335/20200042021-02-0808 February 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2020004 and 05000389/2020004 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Inspection 07200061/2020002 IR 05000335/20204012021-01-0505 January 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2020401 and 05000389/2020401 IR 05000335/20200112020-12-16016 December 2020 Triennial Inspection of Evaluation of Changes, Tests and Experiments Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2020011 and 05000389/2020011 IR 05000335/20200032020-10-30030 October 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2020003 and 05000389/2020003 ML20296A3732020-10-22022 October 2020 Security Inspection Report IR 05000335/20200052020-08-24024 August 2020 Updated Inspection Plan for St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1 and 2 (Report 05000335/2020005 and 05000389/2020005) IR 05000335/20200022020-07-29029 July 2020 St.Lucie Units 1 & 2 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2020002, 05000389/2020002, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection (Lsfsi) 07200061/2020001 IR 05000335/20200102020-07-16016 July 2020 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000335/2020010 and 05000389/2020010 IR 05000335/20200012020-05-0505 May 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2020001 and 05000389/2020001 and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion IR 05000335/20190062020-03-0303 March 2020 Annual Assessment Letter for St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 NRC Report 05000335/2019006 and 05000389/2019006 IR 05000335/20190032019-11-14014 November 2019 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2019003 and 05000389/2019003 IR 05000335/20193022019-10-18018 October 2019 NRC Examination Report 05000335/2019302 and 05000389/2019302 IR 05000335/20194112019-10-0707 October 2019 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000335/2019411 and 05000389/2019411 IR 05000335/20194012019-09-0909 September 2019 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000335/2019401 and 05000389/2019401 (Public) IR 05000335/20190052019-08-27027 August 2019 Updated Inspection Plan for St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 - (Report 05000335/2019005 and 05000389/2019005) IR 05000335/20190112019-08-20020 August 2019 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000335/2019011 and 05000389/2019011 2024-01-26
[Table view] Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000335/20230102024-01-26026 January 2024 NRC Quadrennial Focused Engineering Inspection (FEI) Commercial Grade Dedication Report 05000335/2023010 and 05000389/2023010 L-2024-010, Point Units 3 and 4, Seabrook, Duane Arnold, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)2024-01-25025 January 2024 Point Units 3 and 4, Seabrook, Duane Arnold, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3) IR 05000335/20230042024-01-24024 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023004 and 05000389/2023004 L-2024-004, Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 10 to 20 Years2024-01-18018 January 2024 Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 10 to 20 Years L-2024-002, Withdrawal of Proposed Alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump2024-01-0808 January 2024 Withdrawal of Proposed Alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump L-2023-173, Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 30 Update2023-12-15015 December 2023 Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 30 Update L-2023-179, Unusual or Important Environmental Event - Turtle Mortality2023-12-14014 December 2023 Unusual or Important Environmental Event - Turtle Mortality L-2023-168, License Amendment Request Supplement to Revision 2 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1432 Revision 52023-12-12012 December 2023 License Amendment Request Supplement to Revision 2 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1432 Revision 5 L-2023-155, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-06542023-11-28028 November 2023 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, ML23332A1772023-11-28028 November 2023 Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-2023-162, Response to 50.69 2nd Round of Rals2023-11-21021 November 2023 Response to 50.69 2nd Round of Rals IR 05000335/20230032023-11-0606 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023003 and 05000389/2023003 ML23270B8882023-10-23023 October 2023 Regulatory Audit Summary Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structure, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors EPID L-2022-LLA-0182 ML23346A1322023-10-0606 October 2023 Communication from C-10 Research & Education Foundation Regarding NextEra Common Emergency Fleet Plan License Amendment Request and Related Documents Subsequently Published ML23275A1102023-10-0202 October 2023 License Amendment Request Revision 2 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1432, Revision 5 L-2023-131, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Second Annual Update2023-09-28028 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Second Annual Update L-2023-136, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2023-09-26026 September 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-2023-122, Corrections to the 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-09-20020 September 2023 Corrections to the 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report IR 05000335/20233012023-09-20020 September 2023 NRC Operator License Examination Report 05000335/2023301 and 05000389/2023301 L-2023-127, Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-09-18018 September 2023 Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-2023-113, Correction to the 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-09-14014 September 2023 Correction to the 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report L-2023-108, Report of 10 CFR 50.59 Plant Changes2023-09-11011 September 2023 Report of 10 CFR 50.59 Plant Changes L-2023-118, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2023-09-11011 September 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-2023-112, Corrections to the 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-09-0606 September 2023 Corrections to the 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-2023-107, Technical Specification Bases Control Program Periodic Report of Bases Changes TS 6.8.4.j.42023-09-0606 September 2023 Technical Specification Bases Control Program Periodic Report of Bases Changes TS 6.8.4.j.4 ML23219A0042023-09-0101 September 2023 Transmittal Letter - Safety Evaluation Related to the SLRA of St. Lucie Plant, Units 1and 2, Revision 1 L-2023-114, Proposed Turkey Point Units 6 and 7; Seabrook Station; Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Official Service List Update2023-08-17017 August 2023 Proposed Turkey Point Units 6 and 7; Seabrook Station; Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Official Service List Update L-2023-098, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, Revision 22023-08-0707 August 2023 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, Revision 2 IR 05000335/20230022023-08-0707 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023002 and 05000389/2023002 L-2023-105, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-08-0303 August 2023 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23201A0872023-08-0303 August 2023 Audit Plan in Support of Review of License Amendment ML23212B2652023-07-27027 July 2023 Operator Licensing Written Examination Approval 05000335/2023301 and 05000389/2023301 L-2023-099, Pump Relief Request 10 (PR-10), One-Time Request for an Alternative to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump2023-07-26026 July 2023 Pump Relief Request 10 (PR-10), One-Time Request for an Alternative to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump L-2023-102, Relief Request PSL2-15-RR-01, Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Code Examination Requirements for Reactor Vessel Bottom Area and Piping in Covered Trenches2023-07-26026 July 2023 Relief Request PSL2-15-RR-01, Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Code Examination Requirements for Reactor Vessel Bottom Area and Piping in Covered Trenches ML23200A1232023-07-21021 July 2023 Transmittal Letter for the St. Lucie SLRA Review L-2023-097, Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision 1 - Supplement 62023-07-13013 July 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision 1 - Supplement 6 L-2023-076, In-Service Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1)2023-07-11011 July 2023 In-Service Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1) ML23184A0352023-06-30030 June 2023 Notification of St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 Focused Engineering Inspection (FEI) 05000335/2023010 and 05000389/2023010 and Initial Information Request L-2023-087, Florida Power & Light/Nextera Energy, Results of the Safety Culture Program Effectiveness Review, March 20, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22340A452)2023-06-29029 June 2023 Florida Power & Light/Nextera Energy, Results of the Safety Culture Program Effectiveness Review, March 20, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22340A452) IR 05000335/20234032023-06-29029 June 2023 Security Inspection Report 05000335/2023403 and 05000389/2023403 IR 05000335/20234022023-06-20020 June 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000335/2023402 and 05000389/2023402 L-2023-082, Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision 1, Supplement 52023-06-14014 June 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application Revision 1, Supplement 5 L-2023-074, Addendum to 2021 Decommissioning Funding Status Reports / Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Ctsfsi) Financial Assurance Update2023-06-0202 June 2023 Addendum to 2021 Decommissioning Funding Status Reports / Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Ctsfsi) Financial Assurance Update L-2023-071, NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 29 and Florida Power and Light Company Quality Assurance Program Description for 10 CFR Part 52 Licenses (FPL-2) Revision 11, Annual Submittal2023-05-22022 May 2023 NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 29 and Florida Power and Light Company Quality Assurance Program Description for 10 CFR Part 52 Licenses (FPL-2) Revision 11, Annual Submittal IR 05000335/20234012023-05-16016 May 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000335/2023401 and 05000389/2023401 (Cover Letter) IR 05000335/20230012023-05-0909 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000335/2023001 and 05000389/2023001 ML23109A1132023-04-30030 April 2023 SLRA Change Schedule Letter L-2023-059, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 4 Supplemental Response2023-04-21021 April 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 4 Supplemental Response ML23097A1642023-04-17017 April 2023 Summary of March 23, 2023, Meeting with Florida Power and Light on St. Lucie and Turkey Point Improved Technical Specifications Conversion License Amendment Requests L-2023-055, 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report2023-04-12012 April 2023 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report 2024-01-08
[Table view] |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 21, 2017
SUBJECT:
ST. LUCIE PLANT - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS REPORT NUMBER 05000335/2017007 AND 05000389/2017007
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On June 9, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. D. DeBoer and other members of your staff. Additional inspection results were discussed with Mr. D. DeBoer and other members of your staff on July 20, 2017. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000335/2017007 and 05000389/2017007, w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 050000335, 05000389 License Nos.: DPR-67, NPF-16 Report Nos.: 05000335/2017007, 05000389/2017007 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L)
Facility: St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6501 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Dates: June 5 - June 9, 2017 Inspectors: G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead)
R. Patterson, Reactor Inspector M. Greenleaf, Reactor Inspector S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector (Trainee)
Approved by: Jonathan H. Bartley, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
Inspection Report (IR) 05000335/2017-007, 05000389/2017-007; 06/05/2017 - 06/09/2017;
St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2; NRC Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments.
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between June 5 and June 9, 2017, by four Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors from Region II. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310,
Components Within the Cross Cutting Areas dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated November 1, 2016. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.
No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
Main article: IP 71111.17T
a. Inspection Scope
Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments: The inspectors reviewed six safety evaluations performed pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.59, Changes, tests, and experiments, to determine if the evaluations were adequate and that prior NRC approval was obtained as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed sixteen screenings and zero applicability determinations where licensee personnel had determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. The inspectors reviewed these documents to determine if:
- the changes, tests, or experiments performed were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that sufficient documentation existed to confirm that a license amendment was not required;
- the safety issues requiring the changes, tests or experiments were resolved;
- the licensee conclusions for evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59; and
- the design and licensing basis documentation used to support the change was updated to reflect the change.
The inspectors used, in part, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, dated November 2000.
This inspection constituted 22 evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determination samples as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.17-05. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. However, the following unresolved item (URI) was identified.
(Opened) Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions
Introduction:
The team identified an unresolved item (URI) regarding the adequacy of a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation performed for procedures related to post-accident hot leg injection (HLI) alignment.
Description:
Engineering Change (EC) 284437, Evaluation of Actions Required to Mitigate Hot Leg Injection Single Failure Vulnerability, revision 0, was created to proceduralize actions needed to mitigate a single failure vulnerability associated with HLI by installing temporary power jumpers to valves in the HLI flow path. The actions in the procedures were generated to provide specific direction to operators and maintenance personnel to install electrical jumper cabling to provide power to un-powered motor operated valves in the HLI flow paths in case one of the electrical power trains was disabled as a result of a postulated single failure. Certain electrical single failures could disable both the primary and alternate methods of aligning coolant injection into the reactor coolant system hot legs, which is needed to preclude boron precipitation, which could interrupt long term core cooling during postulated design basis accidents. The electrical single failures of concern were described in St. Lucie Unit 1 licensee event report 2011-003-01, Long-Term Post-LOCA Hot Leg Injection Single Failure Vulnerability.
The inspectors noted that the St. Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR sections 8.3.1.2.1, 8.3.1.2.2, and 8.3.1.2.3, Redundancy, Electrical Separation, and Physical Separation, respectively, did not explicitly account for the installation of electrical jumper cables to provide power between the electrical trains as described in the newly created procedures. The inspectors also noted that the guidance in NEI 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, revision 1, section 4.3.2, Does the Activity Result in More Than a Minimal Increase in the Likelihood of Occurrence of a Malfunction of an SSC Important to Safety? considers a reduction in system/equipment redundancy, diversity, separation, or independence, as a more than minimal increase and would require NRC review and approval prior to implementation. The inspectors were unable to locate all relevant licensing basis documents regarding HLI action requirements for redundancy, and electrical and physical separation, or prior NRC approvals of these actions during the inspection. Review of these documents is needed to determine if the licensees response in Question 2 of the 50.59 evaluation was adequate in its conclusion that a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR did not exist.
Additionally, the inspectors noted that the St. Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR Table 15.4.1-11, LOCA Dose Summary, contained results of consequence analyses, but only provided results for offsite consequences and the control room. At the time of the inspection, it was unclear to inspectors how the dose consequences due to actions outside of the control room had previously been evaluated. Further, the inspectors noted that the St.
Lucie Unit 1 UFSAR, Table 12.1-11, Areas Identified in Shielding Review as Requiring Accessibility Following an Accident, did not identify the electrical bus rooms, where the jumpers would be installed, nor the operational support center (OSC) where the jumpers are stored, as requiring occupancy post-accident. The guidance in NEI 96-07, revision 1, section 4.3.4, Does the Activity Result in More Than a Minimal Increase in the Consequences of a Malfunction? utilizes the guidance in section 4.3.3 for determining if a more than minimal increase in the consequence of a malfunction existed. The guidance in section 4.3.3 stated, Activities affecting on-site dose consequences that may require prior NRC approval are those that impede required actions inside or outside the control room to mitigate the consequences of reactor accidents. For changes affecting the dose to operators performing required actions outside the control room, an increase is considered more than minimal if the resultant mission dose exceeds applicable GDC 19 criteria. Review of the licensees 50.59 evaluation determined that the evaluation only addressed the potential for offsite dose increases and did not address the potential increase in dose resulting from the procedural actions for installation of the jumpers, which are performed outside of the control room. Additional review is needed to determine if onsite dose assessment of the actions was previously addressed by the licensee or considered by the NRC.
This issue is a URI pending the determination of whether a performance deficiency or violation of NRC requirements exists. (URI 05000335/2017007-01, Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions)
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On June 9, 2017, the inspectors presented inspection results to Mr. D. DeBoer and other members of the licensees staff. On July 20, 2017, a re-exit meeting was conducted via teleconference to present the final inspection results to Mr. D. DeBoer and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- D. DeBoer, PSL Site Director
- D. Cecchett, Nuclear Licensing Principal
- S. Cornell, Nuclear Staff Engineer
- T. Falkiewicz, Nuclear Engineer I
- K. Frehafer, Nuclear Licensing Principal
- W. Laframboise, Nuclear Engineering Site Manager- Design
- R. Raldiris, Nuclear Engineer Principal
- M. Snyder, Nuclear Site Licensing Manager
NRC personnel
- D. Beaulieu, Reactor Operations Engineer
- P. Buckberg, Project Manager
- T. Morrissey, Senior Resident Inspector, St. Lucie Plant
- L. Suggs, Chief, Projects Branch 3
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
- 05000335/2017007-01 URI Question Regarding Adequacy of Evaluation of Hot Leg Injection Actions (Section 1R17.b.1)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED