ML18012A801

LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined That Previous Auxiliary Control Panel Had Not Verified Operability of Interposing Relays.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tss.Reviewed Other Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer circuitry.W/970604 Ltr

ML18012A801
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	06/04/1997
From:	Donahue J, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-97-115, LER-97-012, LER-97-12, NUDOCS 9706160096
Download: ML18012A801 (5)

Text

REGULAT .

CATEGORY INFORMATION DISTRlRUTION 1~ STEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION. NBR;9706160096 DOC.DATE; 97/06/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL,50-400 Shearon Harris Nuc'ear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AF= I'AT.ON VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power ~ Light Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power & light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined that previous Auxiliary Control Panel had not verified operability of interposing relays. Caused by misinte.pretation of ".Ss.Rev ewed other remote shutdown panel transfer circuitry.W/970604 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (lER),. Incident Rpt, etc.

E NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 ROONEYiV 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 EQ PD/~B 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 XLE ESTER 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR DE/EELB" 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FIl E 01 1 1 D, EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCEgJ H 1 1 NOAC POOREiW. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 U'

E NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIPED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25

~'

Carolina Power & light Company Harris Nvdear Plant PO 8ox 165 New Hill NC 27562 JUN OC 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-97-115 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 97-012-00 Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a surveillance testing deficiency related to the Auxiliary Control Panel.

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)

Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - NRR Project Manager) 11!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII.IIIIIIIIIII 9'706i60096 970604 PDR ADQCK 05000400 PDR State Road 113k New Hill NC

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0 APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 l495)

EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY UIFORMATION COLLECTION REDDEST: 50/I HRS. REPORTED lESSONS lEARNED ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INCORPORATED INTO THE UCEHSING PROCESS ANO FED BACK TO UIDUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE UIFORMATION AHO (See reverse for required number of RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH irk F33L US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, OC 205550001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 9(5(h digits/characters for each block) OID(L OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHIHGTON, OC 205(KL FACIUTY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMBER (21 PAGE (3)

Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400 1 OF 2 TITLE (4)

Auxiliary Control Panel surveillance testing deficiency.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)

FAC IUTY N AME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH SEOUENTIAL REVISION OAY YEAR MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER FACILITY NAME OOCKETNUMBER 5 5 97 97 01 2 00 4 97 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT To THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Chock one o r more) (11)

MODE (9) D 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) 50.73(a) (2) (i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a) (1) 20.2203(a)(3) (i) 50.73(a)(2) (ii) 50.73(a) (2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 0%

20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii} 50.73(a) (2)(iii] 73.71 20.2203(a) (2) (ii) 20.2203(a) (4) 50,73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a) (2)(v) SpecIIY in Abstract below or in NRC Form 360A 20.2203(a) (2)(iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES CRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM REPORTABLE REPORTABLE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES SUBMISSION (lf yos, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.o., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten linos) (16)

On May 5, 1997, with the plant defueled for refueling outage 7, a condition related to inadequate testing of control power circuitry for the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP, EIIS Code:EB-RELIFU) was determined to be reportable. Specifically, on a transfer to the ACP from the main control board, there are'17 interposing relays that energize and actuate to transfer the control power supply path through alternate fuses in several 6.9KV and 480V Emergency Bus Panels. These alternate control power fuses provide a back-up power supply path in the event that a fire in the main control room causes a failure of the primary fuses.

Investigation determined that previous ACP testing had not veriTied the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer function to the alternate control power fuses.

This condition was caused by an incorrect interpretation of Technical Specification testing requirements and an incomplete understanding of the function of the interposing relays. The failure to test these components has existed since initial surveillance test procedure development.

Corrective actions included a review of other ACP circuits and testing of the ACP interposing relays and their subsequent actuation functions. Procedures will also be revised to ensure that future surveillance testing includes verification of this function.

NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORT COMMISSION (49Q LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FAGN ITT NAME OI OOCXET EER NUMBER (6) PAGE r3I SEOUENTIAL REVISION TEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit II'1 50400 2 OF 2 97 - 012 OO TEN'r pf more spore rs roqvvorf, vse orfrrrrronal oopios ol A'RC form 36QI II7)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On May 5, 1997, with the plant defueled for refueling outage 7, a condition related to inadequate testing of control power circuitry for the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP, EIIS Code:EB-REL/FU) was determined to be reportable. Specifically, on a transfer to the ACP from the main control board, there are 17 interposing relays that energize and actuate to transfer the control power supply path through alternate fuses in several 6.9KV and 480V Emergency Bus Panels. These alternate control power fuses provide a back-up power supply path in the event that a fire in the main control room causes a failure of the primary fuses.

Investigation determined that previous ACP testing had not verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer function to the alternate control power fuses.

CAUSE:

This condition was caused by an incorrect interpretation of Technical Specification testing requirements and an incomplete understanding of the function of the interposing relays. The failure to test these components has existed since initial surveillance test procedure development.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event. Special testing was completed on May 30, 1997, which verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.

This testing provides confidence that an alternate control power supply path would have existed if a fire had occurred in the control room causing a failure of the primary control power fuses.

This event is being reported as a conditon prohibited by Technical Specifications per 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

Previous Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) LERs related to inadequate surveillance testing have been submitted.

These include LERs94-001, 95-001,95-003, 95-007, and 96-002. Corrective actions contained in LER 95-007 stated that HNP would perform a comprehensive review of the implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements. This review was in progress when the NRC issued Generic Letter 96-01.

Surveillance testing deficiencies identified as a result of Generic Letter 96-01 were documented in LER 96-002.

A review of surveillance test procedures will continue in conjunction with HNP's conversion to the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. A sample review of other remote shutdown panel transfer circuitry was performed during the investigation of this condition. This review concluded that the requirements of TS 4.3.3.5.2. had been met with the exception of the 17 circuits identified in this LER.

2. Special testing was completed on May 30, 1997 per OST-9005T, which verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. Surveillance test procedures will be revised or'developed to ensure that future testing verifies the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses. This will be completed prior to the next scheduled perfor'mance of this testing in refueling outage 8.

2. A review of surveillance test procedures will continue in conjunction with HNP's conversion to the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431)